JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO

CASE DIGESTS

CIVIL LAW

2018

Prepared by:
Head:
Carla Angela D. Villadolid
Members:
Justin Francis Macabuhay
Ana Regina C. Ortiz
Jv H. Brucelo
Desiree F. Villas
Ma. Angela Camille R. Felipe
Abegail P. Guardian
Mohammad Ali Bantao
Philip Gerald S. Fulgueras

LYCEUM OF THE PHILIPPINES UNIVERSITY-MAKATI

COLLEGE OF LAW
 Table of Contents
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS _________________________________________________ 1
AGUILAR VS SIASAT (G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015) ________________________ 1
REPUBLIC VS SAREÑOGON, JR. (G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016) __________ 2
MATUDAN VS REPUBLIC (G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016) ________________ 3
PROPERTY ________________________________________________________________________________ 4
ANDRES VS STA. LUCIA REALTY DEVELOPMENT INC. (G.R. No. 201405,
August 24, 2015)_________________________________________________________________________ 4
DE GUZMAN VS FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (G.R. No.
191710, January 14, 2015)_______________________________________________________________ 5
REPUBLIC VS CORTEZ, SR. (G.R. No. 197472, September 7, 2015) _______________ 7
MACALINO, JR. ET AL. VS PIS-AN (G.R. NO. 204056, June 1, 2016) _____________ 8
NAGA CENTRUM VS SPOUSES ORZALES (G.R. NO. 203576, September 14,
2016) _____________________________________________________________________________________ 9
SIY VS TOMLIN (G.R. No. 205998, April 24, 2017)_________________________________ 10
GUYAMIN VS FLORES (G.R. No. 202189, April 25, 2017) ________________________ 11
SUCCESSION_____________________________________________________________________________ 11
ENDAYA VS VILLAOS (G.R. No. 202426, January 27, 2016) ______________________ 11
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS ____________________________________________________ 12
MOVERTRADE CORP. VS COA AND DPWH (G.R. No. 204835, September 22,
2015) ____________________________________________________________________________________ 12
SONLEY VS ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK (G.R. No. 205623, August 10, 2016)___ 13
PSHS-CAGAYAN VS PIRRA CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES (G.R. NO.
204423, September 14, 2016) __________________________________________________________ 14
SALES _____________________________________________________________________________________ 15
FIRST OPTIMA REALTY CORP. VS SECURITRON SECURITY SERVICES,
INC. (G.R. No. 199648, January 28, 2015) ____________________________________________ 15
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES (G.R.
No. 205951, July 4, 2016) ______________________________________________________________ 16
TAINA MANIGQUE-STONE VS CATTLEYA LAND, INC. (G.R. No. 195975,
September 5, 2016) _____________________________________________________________________ 16
DOMINGO VS MANZANO (G.R. No. 201883, November 16, 2016) _______________ 17
SIY VS TOMLIN (G.R. No. 205998, April 24, 2017)_________________________________ 18
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS ____________________________________________________________ 19
REPUBLIC VS SPOUSES BENIGNO (G.R. No. 205492, March 11, 2015)_________ 19
 BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT VS BALCOM-TAMBUYAT (G.R. No. 202805, March 23,
2015) ____________________________________________________________________________________ 20
REPUBLIC VS PASICOLAN (G.R. No. 198543, April 15, 2015) ___________________ 21
MAHILUM VS ILANO (G.R. No. 197923, June 22, 2015)___________________________ 23
REPUBLIC VS. DAYAOEN (G.R. No. 2007773, July 8, 2015)______________________ 24
TRINIDAD VS PALAD (G.R. No. 203397, December 9, 2015) _____________________ 25
HEIRS OF GUIAMBANGAN VS. MUNICIPALITY OF KALAMANSIG (G.R. No.
204899, July 27, 2016)__________________________________________________________________ 26
NICOLAS VS MARIANO (G.R. No. 201070, August 1, 2016) ______________________ 27
GUNTALILIB VS DELA CRUZ (G.R. No. 200042, July 7, 2016)___________________ 27
TORTS AND DAMAGES ________________________________________________________________ 28
MARSMAN & CO. VS LIGO (G.R. No. 198643, August 19, 2015) _________________ 28
PEOPLE VS PERALTA AND AMBAS (G.R. No. 208524, June 1, 2016)___________ 29
PEOPLE VS FABRE (G.R. No. 206878, August 22, 2016) ___________________________ 29
GREENSTAR VS UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION (URC) (G.R No.
205090, October 17, 2016) _____________________________________________________________ 30
REPUBLIC VS SPOUSES SALVADOR (G.R. No. 205428, June 7, 2017)__________ 31
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

AGUILAR VS SIASAT (G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015)

FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (Aguilar spouses) died,
intestate and without debts. Included in their estate are two parcels of land. Petitioner
Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed a case for mandatory injunction with damages against
respondent Edna G. Siasat alleging that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of the
Aguilar spouses. Thus, he was entitled to the said parcels of land. He alleged that the
respondent stole the titles of the subject properties.
Respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the
Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of
generosity and kindness of heart. That petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the
Aguilar spouses and since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former. That the titles of the subject
properties were not stolen, but entrusted to the respondent for safekeeping by Candelaria
Siasat- Aguilar, who is her aunt.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar
spouses as their son. To prove filiation, he presented, among others, Alfredo Aguilar’s
Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1, a public instrument subscribed and made under
oath by Alfredo Aguilar, which bears his signature and thumb marks and indicates that
petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent. The Bacolod City
Civil Registry could issue no true copies of the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner
because the record of births during the period 1945 to 1946 was “all destroyed by
nature”.
The courts ruled that they do not constitute clear and convincing evidence to show
filiation based on open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 as public document
satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship under Article 172 of the
Family Code particularly number 2 of the first paragraph

RULING:
Yes. To repeat what was stated in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, filiation may be
proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in
any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required.
As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the
requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article

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172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an “admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.”
It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph
thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.

Note: This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained a copy
of his Certificate of Live Birth from the National Statistics Office (NSO), since the
Bacolod City Civil Registry copy thereof was destroyed. He would not have had to go
through the trouble of presenting other documentary evidence; the NSO copy would have
sufficed.

REPUBLIC VS SAREÑOGON, JR. (G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016)

FACTS:
The respondent, Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose), filed a Petition before the RTC of
Ozamiz City for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S. Sareñogon
(Netchie). The petitioner testified that they got married in civil rites at the Manila City
Hall. However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left
to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hong Kong as a domestic helper. For three
months, he did not receive any communication from Netchie. He likewise had no idea
about her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but
failed. He returned home after his contract expired. He then inquired from Netchie’s
relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was.
Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the
Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of
the Family Code.
The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose’s alleged efforts in locating
Netchie did not engender or generate a well-founded belief that the latter is probably
dead. It maintains that even as Jose avowedly averred that he exerted efforts to locate
Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the assistance of the relevant government
agencies like the Philippine National Police, the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, or the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. It
likewise points out that Jose did not present any disinterested person to corroborate his
allegations that the latter was indeed missing and could not be found. It also contends that
Jose did not advert to circumstances, events, occasions, or situations that would prove
that he did in fact make a comprehensive search for Netchie.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged efforts of respondent in locating his missing wife do
not sufficiently support a “well-founded belief” that respondent’s absent wife is probably
dead

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RULING:

No. The “well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is
complied with only upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed
been made to ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
The law did not define what is meant by “wellfounded belief.” It depends upon
the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a
case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to
locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one).
Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below
the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his
bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s
whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom
he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing
Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent government
agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook a thorough, determined
and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were),
and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he
visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the
course of his search.

MATUDAN VS REPUBLIC (G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016)

FACTS:
In October 26, 1976, Nicolas Matudan (petitioner) and Marilyn Matudan
(respondent) got married in Laoang, Northern Samar. They had four children. In 1985,
Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on petitioner and their children lost contact with
her. Petitioner inquired from the respondent’s relatives but they did not tell him her
whereabouts.
23 years later, or on June 20, 2008 petitioner filed a Petition for declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged
that Marilyn was psychologically incapacitated in fulfilling her obligations as a wife and
mother as she failed to provide her family emotional and financial support.
Based on expert evaluation conducted by Dr. Tayag, petitioner is suffering from
Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder and respondent has Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with Antisocial Traits.
As for respondent, the manifestation of her disorder are as follows: Preoccupation
with pursuing matters that would make her happy; has a high sense of self-importance;
wants to have her way and disregards her husband's opinions; lacks empathy; wants to
have a good life.

3
 Her personality condition is rooted on her unhealthy familial environment. She
came from an impoverished family. Her parents were more pre-occupied with finding
ways to make ends meet to such extent that they failed to give adequate attention and
emotional support to their children.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was able to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity

RULING:
No. Petitioner’s affidavit and testimony failed to show gravity and juridical
antecedence.
While he complained that Marilyn being irrational, irresponsible, immature, and
self-centered, he nonetheless failed to sufficiently and particularly elaborate on these
allegations. He likewise contradicted his own claims when he testified that he and the
respondent were happily married and never had a fight.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental-- not merely physical - incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the narration of the petitioner and
was not able to evaluate the respondent personally. These observations and conclusions
are insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that
prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality
disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain
the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really
incapable of fulfilling her duties.

PROPERTY

ANDRES VS STA. LUCIA REALTY DEVELOPMENT INC. (G.R. No. 201405,

August 24, 2015)
FACTS:
Petitioners and Liza filed a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way against
respondent before the RTC. They alleged that they are co-owners and possessors for
more than 50 years of three parcels of unregistered agricultural land in Pag-asa,
Binangonan, Rizal with a total area of more or less 10,500 square meters. A few years
back, however, respondent acquired the lands surrounding the subject property,
developed the same into a residential subdivision known as the Binangonan Metropolis
East, and built a concrete perimeter fence around it such that petitioners and Liza were

4
denied access from subject property to the nearest public road and vice versa. They thus
prayed for a right-of-way within Binangonan Metropolis East in order for them to have
access to Col. Guido Street, a public road. In its Answer, respondent denied knowledge of
any property adjoining its subdivision owned by petitioners and Liza. Nevertheless, it
pointed out that petitioners and Liza failed to sufficiently allege in their complaint the
existence of the requisites for the grant of an easement of right-of-way.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way
from respondent.

RULING:
No. Not all may demand for an easement of right-of-way. Under the law, an
easement of right-of-way may only be demanded by the owner of an immovable property
or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same
Here, petitioners argue that they are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-
way from respondent because they are the owners of the subject property intended to be
the dominant estate. They contend that they have already acquired ownership of the
subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription. Sifting through petitioners'
allegations, it appears that the subject property is an unregistered public agricultural land.
Thus, being a land of the public domain, petitioners, in order to validly claim acquisition
thereof through prescription, must first be able to show that the State has - expressly
declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the
President that the subject property is no longer retained for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land remains
to be a property of public dominion and hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of
prescription.
In the absence of such proof of declaration in this case, petitioners' claim of
ownership over the subject property based on prescription necessarily crumbles.
Conversely, they cannot demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent for lack of
personality.

DE GUZMAN VS FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (G.R. No.

191710, January 14, 2015)
FACTS:
Petitioners were co-owners in fee simple of a parcel of land measuring 15,063
square meters and situated in Barrio Bulao, Cainta, Rizal, which was later subdivided
among them and for which individual titles were issued. The property is enclosed and
surrounded by other real properties belonging to various owners. One of its adjoining
properties is Filinvest Home Subdivision Phase IV-A, a subdivision owned and
developed by respondent corporation which, coming from petitioners’ property, has a
potential direct access to Marcos highway either by foot or vehicle. As such, petitioners
filed on August 17, 1988 a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against respondent
before the RTC of Antipolo.

5
 Unwilling to grant petitioners a right of way within its subdivision, respondent
alleged in its Answer that petitioners have an access to Sumulong Highway through
another property adjoining the latter’s property. In fact, the distance from petitioners’
property to Sumulong Highway using the said other property is shorter as compared to
the 2,500-meter distance between petitioners’ property and Marcos Highway using
respondent’s subdivision. On April 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a Decision granting
petitioners the right of way across respondent’s subdivision. Petitioners and respondent,
however, differ in the interpretation of the RTC decision as to the extent of the easement
and the indemnification. Petitioners insisted that the right of way pertains only to Road
Lot 15, on the other hand, it was respondent’s contention that the right of way covers the
whole stretch from petitioners’ property all the way to its subdivision’s gate leading to
Marcos Highway.

ISSUES:
(1) What is the extent of the right of way granted to petitioners?
(2) What is the correct assessment of indemnity?

RULING:
(1) The right of way granted to petitioners covers the network of roads within
respondent’s subdivision and not merely Road Lot 15.
The RTC then in resolving the complaint for easement of right of way was
confronted with the contentious issue as to which between the two routes from
petitioners’ property, i.e., the one passing through respondent’s subdivision leading to
Marcos Highway or the one passing through another property leading to Sumulong
Highway, is the more adequate and less prejudicial route pursuant to the requirement of
the law. Thus, when it made the following comparison and eventually concluded that the
route passing through respondent’s subdivision is the more adequate and the less
prejudicial way, what it obviously had it mind was the road network in respondent’s
subdivision since the measurement thereof in meters corresponds with that mentioned by
the RTC.
(2) Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that the width of the easement of right of way
shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly
be changed from time to time.
According to Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, a noted civilist, it is the needs of the
dominant tenement which determine the width of the passage. During the remand
proceedings, it was established that the width of the affected roads is 10 meters. Under
the circumstances, the Court finds it rather iniquitous to compute the proper indemnity
based on the 10-meter width of the existing roads. And per their complaint, petitioners
were simply asking for adequate vehicular and other similar access to the highway. To
the Court’s mind, the 10-meter width of the affected road lots is unnecessary and
inordinate for the intended use of the easement. At most, a 3-meter wide right of way can
already sufficiently meet petitioners’ need for vehicular access. It would thus be unfair to
assess indemnity based on the 10-meter road width when a three-meter width can already
sufficiently answer the needs of the dominant estate.

6
 REPUBLIC VS CORTEZ, SR. (G.R. No. 197472, September 7, 2015)

FACTS:
Respondent Rev. Cortez, Sr., a missionary by vocation engaged in humanitarian
and charitable activities, established an orphanage and school in Cagayan. He claimed
that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land located in
the western portion of Palaui Island. President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 201
reserving for military purposes a parcel of the public domain situated in Palaui Island.
More than two decades later President Ramos declared Palaui Island and the surrounding
waters situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as marine reserve.
Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Rogelio C. Biñas in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command. Rev. Cortez and his men were
constrained to leave the area. In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the said Petition with the
RTC seeking preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Biñas to restore to him
possession and to not disturb the same, and further, for the said preliminary writ, if
issued, to be made permanent.
The petition was granted. However, the same pertained to five hectares (subject
area) only, not to the whole 50 hectares claimed to have been occupied by Rev. Cortez
because the last 38 years cannot reasonably be determined or accurately identified the
land area. Even so, Rev. Cortez failed to present in evidence the application for patent
allegedly filed by him showing that he applied for patent on the entire 50 hectares of land
which he possessed or occupied for a long period of time.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction

RULING:
No. An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the
proper object of possession. Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect one's
alleged right of possession over the same.
“Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be
protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of
said right.” Thus, it is necessary that the Court initially determine whether the right
asserted by Rev. Cortez indeed exists. As earlier stressed, it is necessary that such right
must have been established by him with absolute certainty. Here, the Court notes that
while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he, nevertheless,
failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public
domain and therefore can be the proper object of possession. In this case, there is no such
proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and
disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered as
still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore not a
proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed in this light,
Rev. Cortez’s claimed right of possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of the
subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no matter how long,
cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be lawfully

7
possessed in the first place. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev. Cortez
failed to conclusively establish his claimed right over the subject portion of Palaui Island
as would entitle him to the issuance of a final injunction.

MACALINO, JR. ET AL. VS PIS-AN (G.R. NO. 204056, June 1, 2016)

FACTS:
Emeterio Jumento was the owner of half portion of Lot 3154 consisting of 469
square meters, while his children, Hospicio and Severina, own the other half in equal
shares. When Hospicio and Severina died single and without issue, Emeterio as their sole
heir inherited the whole lot.
Apparently, the City of Dumaguete built in the 1950's a barangay road which cut
across said lot. As a result, Lot 3154 was divided into three portions. Sometime in the
1970's, Artemio, a grandson-in-law of Emeterio, commissioned a Geodetic Engineer to
survey Lot 3154 so that taxes would be assessed only on the portions of the subject
property which remained as private property. Accordingly, Engr. Ridad came up with a
sketch plan where the three portions of Lot 3154 were denominated as Lot 3154-A, Lot
3154-B, and Lot 3154-C.
On May 3, 1995, Artemio and the other heirs of Emeterio executed an Extra
Judicial Settlement of Estate and Absolute Sale adjudicating among themselves Lot 3154
and selling a 207-square meter portion of the same to the spouses Wilfredo and Judith
Sillero (spouses Sillero). The document, did not, however, identify the portion being sold
as Lot No. 3154-A. The spouses Sillero, immediately after the sale, fenced Lot No. 3154-
A and built a house thereon. Not long after, they sold Lot 3154-A to petitioner Gil
Macalino, Jr. by virtue of a Deed of Sale.
A few years later or on January 18, 2005, Gil, joined by his children and their
respective spouses filed against Artemio a Complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages
with the RTC. Gil contends that the deed of sale covers not only Lot 3154-A but also Lot
3154-C.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the deed of sale executed between Spouses Sillero and Gil Macalino
covers not only Lot 3154-A but also Lot 3154-C
(2) Whether or not the remedy of Quieting of Title is available to the petitioners

RULING:
(1) No. The deed of sale covers only Lot 3154-A.
Although the Absolute Sale did not specifically indicate that Artemio and his co-heirs
were conveying to the spouses Sillero Lot 3154-A, there should be no question that the
sale was only specific to Lot 3154-A since none other than the parties to the said
transaction acknowledged this. At any rate, the testimonial evidence presented by
Arteinio sufficiently supports the conclusion that what was sold to the spouses Sillero
was indeed Lot 3154-A only.
Since what the spouses Sillero bought from Artemio and his co-heirs was Lot
3154-A, it logically follows that what they sold to Gil was the same and exact property.

8
After a1l “no one can give what one does not have.” Moreover, what Gil occupied after
the sale was Lot 3154-A only.
(2) No. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud
upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. "In order that an action
for quieting of title may prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the subject-matter of the action.
Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial
ownership. In the absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to
be prevented or removed." Petitioners anchored their Complaint on their alleged legal
title over Lot 3154-C which as above-discussed, they do not have. Hence, the action for
quieting of title is unavailable to petitioners.

NAGA CENTRUM VS SPOUSES ORZALES (G.R. NO. 203576, September 14,

2016)
FACTS:
Respondents own a house and lot situated at No. 28-B Valentin Street, Sabang,
Naga City which is surrounded, by property owned by others. One of which is by the
property of the petitioner. The respondents alleged that when they acquired their property
in 1965, their access to the public highway (Valentin Street) was through Rizal Street,
which forms part of a property now owned by the petitioner. But when the squatters
inhabiting said place were evicted, the petitioner caused Rizal Street to be closed by
enclosing its property with a concrete fence. This prompted the respondents to ask for a
permanent right of way through the intervention of the court after the petitioner refused
their offer to buy the portion where the proposed right of way is sought to be established.
The petitioner, however, alleged that there is an existing passageway leading to
Valentin Street along Lot 1503 of Cad-290 which is available to the respondents and that
the property of the respondents became isolated due to their own acts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has the right to demand a right of way

RULING:
Yes. The respondent has the right to demand right of way. To be entitled to an
easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met:
1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons,
and is without adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable;
3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and
4. The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance of the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
Respondents may not be blamed for the isolation they are now suffering. By its
very location, their property is isolated, and this is not their fault. Suffice it to say further
that the Court agrees with the findings of the lower courts that the closure of Rizal Street
by the petitioner caused their property to be isolated.

9
 Significantly, respondents have been using Rizal Street for so long; petitioner
knew of this, and it even granted access to respondents. At the very least, respondents
have been using Rizal Street for 23 years. While petitioner may have allowed access by
the informal settlers to Rizal Street through tolerance, the same cannot be said of
respondents; they are not informal settlers on petitioner's land.
Petitioner thus acknowledged respondents' right to use Rizal Street. For this
reason, it is guilty of gross and evident malice and bad faith when, even while Civil Case
No. 2004-0036 was pending, it deliberately blocked respondents' access to Rizal Street
by constructing a building thereon, dumping filling materials and junk on the main gate
of respondents' home, and converting portions of the road into an auto repair shop and
parking space, making it difficult and inconvenient, if not humiliating, for respondents to
traverse the path to and from their home. Petitioner's action betrays a perverse and
deliberate intention to hurt and punish respondents for legally demanding a right of way
which it nevertheless knew was forthcoming, and which, considering the size of its land,
it may give without the least prejudice to its own rights.

SIY VS TOMLIN (G.R. No. 205998, April 24, 2017)

FACTS:
Petitioner William Anghian Siy filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Prayer for Replevin against respondent
Alvin Tomlin.
Petitioner alleged that he is the owner of a 2007 model Range Rover. In 2010, he
entrusted the said vehicle to Ong, a businessman who owned a second-hand car sales
showroom, after the latter claimed that he had a prospective buyer. Ong failed to remit
the proceeds of the purported sale nor return the vehicle. Petitioner later learned that the
vehicle was being transferred to respondent.
On August 17, 2011, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to quash the
Writ of Replevin, dismiss the Complaint, and turn over the vehicle to him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the possession of the car

RULING:
No. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is
either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered,
and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains
the same. From petitioner's own account, he constituted and appointed Ong as his agent
to sell the vehicle. In return, Ong accepted the agency and was able to sell the subject
vehicle to a certain Chua, and petitioner thus ceased to be the owner thereof. Nor is he
entitled to the possession of the vehicle; together with his ownership, petitioner lost his
right of possession over the vehicle. On the contrary, respondent, who obtained the
vehicle from Chua and registered the transfer with the Land Transportation Office, is the
rightful owner thereof, and as such he is entitled to its possession.

10
 GUYAMIN VS FLORES (G.R. No. 202189, April 25, 2017)

FACTS:
In 2006, respondents Flores filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against
petitioners Guyamin.
Respondents alleged in their Complaint that they are the registered owners of a
984-square meter lot in General Trias, Cavite covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and
that petitioners are their relatives who for many years have been occupying the subject
property by mere tolerance of respondents' predecessors and parents, the original owners
of the same. Petitioners have been reminded to vacate the premises because respondents
have decided to sell the property. Petitioners still failed to vacate after respondents made
several attempts to settle the matter through conciliation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners should vacate the property

RULING:
Yes. With the clear realization that they are settling on land that they do not own,
occupants of registered private lands by mere tolerance of the owners should always
expect that one day, they would have to vacate the same. Their time is merely borrowed;
they have no right to the property whatsoever, and their presence is merely tolerated and
under the good graces of the owners. The Court must give respondents the justice they
deserve. As owners of the subject property who have been deprived of the use thereof for
so many years owing to petitioners' continued occupation, and after all these years of
giving unconditionally to the petitioners who are their relatives, respondents must now
enjoy the fruits of their ownership.

SUCCESSION

ENDAYA VS VILLAOS (G.R. No. 202426, January 27, 2016)

FACTS:
Gina Endaya and the other heirs of Atilano Villaos (petitioners) filed before the
RTC a complaint for declaration of nullity of deeds of sale, recovery of titles, and
accounting of income of the Palawan Village Hotel (PVH) against Ernesto Villaos
(respondent). The purported sale of the affected lots, from Atilano to respondent, was
said to be spurious.
On the other hand, respondent filed an ejectment case with preliminary mandatory
injunction against petitioners. According to respondent, he bought from Atilano eight
parcels of land, including those where PVH stood. However, instead of leaving, petitioner

11
even participated in a violent and unlawful take-over of portions of PVH. Petitioners
assailed that the deeds of sale were forged and were not properly notarized.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to possession

RULING:
Yes. While respondent has in his favor deeds of sale over the eight parcels of
land, these deeds were not registered; thus, title remained in the name of the owner and
seller Atilano. When he died, title passed to petitioner, who is his illegitimate child. This
relationship does not appear to be contested by respondent. Under Article 777 of the Civil
Code, “the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.” Thus, petitioner and her co-heirs should have been favored on the question of
possession, being heirs who succeeded the registered owner of the properties in dispute.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

MOVERTRADE CORP. VS COA AND DPWH (G.R. No. 204835, September 22,
2015)

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
entered into a Contract Agreement for dredging and other related works in Pampanga Bay
and the primary Pasac-Guagua-San Fernando Waterways in Pampanga.
Due to the alleged absence of spoil sites, petitioner requested permission from
Director Soriquez to allow it to undertake side dumping. However, Director Soriquez
denied the request and reminded petitioner that side dumping was not allowed.
Despite the denial and prohibition by Director Soriquez and Engr. Bustos,
petitioner continued to side dump. When the project was in its final phase of completion,
petitioner wrote a letter asking for payment for the dredging work it rendered.
Director Soriquez issued a letter informing petitioner of the denial of its request
for payment. Upon completion of the project, the amount of P 7, 354, 897 for dredging
work rendered was not paid. Petitioner filed money claim with COA against respondent
DPWH for payment of the dredging works.
COA denied its claim and ruled that petitioner is not entitled to payment for the
dredging works for breach of contract. Petitioner moved for reconsideration it is still
entitled to payment under the principle of quantum meruit. COA explained that the said
principle is not applicable as there is a written contract entered into by the parties.

ISSUE:

12
 Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the payment of P7,354,897.10 for dredging
works

RULING:
No. Under paragraph 11 of the Contract of Agreement, petitioner should dispose
of the dredge spoils by dumping them at the pre-designated areas provided by respondent
DPWH. DPWH consistently prohibited side dumping through its letters. Petitioner’s
blatant defiance of the prohibition on side dumping is a clear violation of the contract that
should not be ignored just because the petitioner had completed the project.
It is a basic principle in law that contracts have the force of law between the
parties and should be complied with in good faith. In this case, the contract specifically
provides the manner of disposing dredge spoils. Petitioner cannot unilaterally change the
manner of disposal without first amending the contract or obtaining the express consent
or approval of respondent DPWH. Otherwise, petitioner would be guilty of breaching the
contract.

SONLEY VS ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK (G.R. No. 205623, August 10, 2016)

FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent entered into a Contract To Sell which a parcel
of land was sold in favor of the former. The petitioner paid the down payment and they
agreed that succeeding payment will be payable for 60 monthly installment. The
petitioner failed to pay the monthly installment and the respondent filed before a court to
rescind the contract. During pre-trial, the parties entered into a compromise agreement.
The petitioner still failed to pay the monthly installment in accordance with the
compromise agreement. The checks that were issued by the petitioner were still
dishonored by the bank. The respondent prayed to rescind the Contract To Sell. The trial
court and the CA rendered its decision in favor of the respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent had the power to rescind the Contract To Sell

RULING:
Yes. The respondent has the power to rescind the contract.
Under Article 2041 of the Civil Code, "(i)f one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by
the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as
rescinded and insist upon his original demand." The language of this Article 2041
denotes that no action for rescission is required and that the party aggrieved by the breach
of a compromise agreement may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved
in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without
bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not seek a judicial declaration of
rescission, for he may 'regard' the compromise agreement already 'rescinded’.
In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that she failed to pay the monthly
installments that were agreed upon in the agreement. Petitioner may be right in arguing
that respondent has the option to proceed with the sale and charge corresponding

13
penalties instead, pursuant to the stipulations in the Contract to Sell; however, respondent
chose to rescind the same, an option which it is equally entitled to by contract and under
the law, and thus evict petitioner from the premises.

PSHS-CAGAYAN VS PIRRA CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES (G.R. NO.

204423, September 14, 2016)

FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent entered into a Contract Of Agreement and
Notice To Proceed, where the respondent must construct Project A (Academic Building I
- Phases IV and V, and Girls' Dormitory Building I - Phase IV) and Project C (Academic
Building II - Phase I, Boys' Dormitory Building - Phase I, and School Canteen - Phase I).
Under Project A, the petitioner already paid the Partial Billing (PB)nos.1-4. The
respondent requested for the PB no.5 while the petitioner asked for the substantial
acceptance and completion of the project. In the report of the respondent, the project is
already 94.09% complete. The request of the respondent was denied because under the
COA's report, there are still some defective or undelivered items.
Under Project C, suspension was requested by respondent because of certain
difficulties but petitioner denied the same because there is no change in the structural
design. The petitioner informed the respondent that the former will terminate the contract
because of the delay, default, and abandonment of the latter.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the respondent is entitled the Partial Billing no. 5.
(2) Whether or not the termination of Project C by the petitioner is valid

RULING:
(1)Yes. Under Art. 1234 of the Civil Code, if the obligation had been substantially
performed in good faith, the obligor (respondent) may recover as if it had strictly and
completely fulfilled its obligation, less the damage suffered by the oblige(petitioner).
When the respondent requested for the PB no.5, the petitioner did not object to the
request. In fact, the petitioner sent a team to determine the value of PB no.5. The
willingness of the petitioner to pay was only put on hold because of the COA’s report,
but it is not a valid excuse to avoid the payment. The petitioner treated Project A as
substantially completed; thus, it is liable to pay the respondent the PB no. 5.
(2)Yes. Respondent did not communicate with the petitioner anymore and refused
to receive written communication from the petitioner. Hence, there is delay and
abandonment of the project. In the contract they agreed upon, petitioner can terminate
their contract if the respondent incurs delay, abandons the project, and causes stoppage of
work without the petitioner’s authority. To avoid unjust enrichment, the Court said the
respondent is entitled to the work done on the basis of quantum meruit.

14
 SALES

FIRST OPTIMA REALTY CORP. VS SECURITRON SECURITY SERVICES,

INC. (G.R. No. 199648, January 28, 2015)

FACTS:
Looking to expand its business, respondent – through its General Manager,
Antonio Eleazar (Eleazar) – sent a Letter addressed to petitioner – through its Executive
Vice-President, Carolina T. Young (Young) – offering to purchase the subject property at
₱6,000.00 per square meter. Eleazar personally went to petitioner’s office offering to pay
for the subject property in cash, which he already brought with him. However, Young
declined to accept payment, saying that she still needed to secure her sister’s advice on
the matter. She likewise informed Eleazar that prior approval of petitioner’s Board of
Directors was required for the transaction, to which remark Eleazar replied that
respondent shall instead await such approval.
Respondent sent a Letter to petitioner, accompanied by a Check issued for
₱100,000.00 and made payable to petitioner. Despite the delicate nature of the matter and
large amount involved, respondent did not deliver the letter and check directly to Young
or her office; instead, they were coursed through an ordinary receiving clerk/receptionist
of the petitioner, who thus received the same. Respondent through counsel demanded in
writing that petitioner proceed with the sale of the property. Petitioner argued that it
never agreed to sell the subject property and that its board of directors did not authorize
the sale thereof to respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale

RULING:
No. Respondent’s offer to purchase the subject property was never accepted by
the petitioner at any instance, even after negotiations were held between them. Thus, as
between them, there is no sale to speak of.
The stages of a contract of sale are: (1) negotiation, starting from the time the
prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the time the contract is
perfected; (2) perfection, which takes place upon the concurrence of the essential
elements of the sale; and (3) consummation, which commences when the parties perform
their respective undertakings under the contract of sale, culminating in the
extinguishment of the contract. In the present case, the parties never got past the
negotiation stage. Nothing shows that the parties had agreed on any final arrangement
containing the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely, (1) consent or the meeting
of the minds of the parties; (2) object or subject matter of the contract; and (3) price or
consideration of the sale.
Since there is no perfected sale between the parties, respondent had no obligation
to make payment through the check; nor did it possess the right to deliver earnest money
to petitioner in order to bind the latter to a sale. As contemplated under Art. 1482 of the

15
Civil Code, "there must first be a perfected contract of sale before we can speak of
earnest money.”

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES

(G.R. No. 205951, July 4, 2016)

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent executed a Contract to Sell payable within seven years
in quarterly installments. The contract to sell stipulated, among others, that "all payments
required under this Contract to Sell shall be made by the buyer without need of notice,
demand, or any other act or deed, at the principal office address of the seller; and that
should respondent fail to fully comply with the agreement or in case the contract is
canceled or rescinded….”
Respondent failed to fully pay the stipulated price in the contract to sell. Petitioner
thus sent a notarized demand letter to pay and for rescission of contract. Respondent was
still unable to pay and petitioner rescinded the contract to sell.
Petitioner filed an ejectment case against respondent before the MTCC, but
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a demand for payment is required

RULING:
No. An ejectment case is not limited to lease agreements or deprivations of
possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is as well available against
one who withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right of
possession under an express or implied contract, such as a contract to sell.
It was plainly erroneous for the lower courts to require a demand to pay prior to
filing of the ejectment case. This is not one of the requisites in an ejectment case based on
petitioner's contract to sell with respondent. As correctly argued by petitioner, the full
payment of the purchase price in a contract to sell is a positive suspensive condition
whose non-fulfillment is not a breach of contract, but merely an event that prevents the
seller from conveying title to the purchaser; in other words, the non-payment of the
purchase price renders the contract to sell ineffective and without force and
effect. Respondent's failure and refusal to pay the monthly amortizations as agreed
rendered the contract to sell without force and effect; it therefore lost its right to continue
occupying the subject property, and should vacate the same.

TAINA MANIGQUE-STONE VS CATTLEYA LAND, INC. (G.R. No. 195975,

September 5, 2016)

FACTS:

16
 Cattleya Land, Inc., respondent, entered into a Contract of Conditional Sale with
the Tecson spouses covering 9 parcels of land including the subject property in Bohol
(TCT No. 17655). However, neither the Contract of Conditional Sale nor the Deed of
Absolute Sale could be annotated on the certificate of title of the subject property because
the Register of Deeds of Bohol, Atty. Narciso S. De la Serna, refused to annotate both
deeds due to a pending case between the Tecson spouses and Tantrade, Inc. The
respondent did not succeed in having the Deed of Absolute Sale registered and the title
transferred to its name because it could not surrender the owner's copy of TCT No.
17655. According to Respondent, the Tecson spouses could not deliver TCT No. 17655
because the certificate of title had been destroyed in a fire, which broke out in Sierra
Bullones, Bohol. This claim by the Tecson spouses turned out to be false for the reason
that a person named Taina (who was married to Michael Stone), petitioner, was able to
present the owner's copy of TCT No. 17655 with the Deed of Sale.
In this regard, the respondent instituted a civil action against petitioner for
quieting of title and/or recovery of ownership and cancellation of title with damages.
RTC held that the contract of sale entered by the Tecson spouses with respondent and
petitioner constituted a double sale, wherein respondent had a superior right to the lot
covered thereby, for it was first to register the sale in good faith. It further ordered the
cancellation of TCT No. 21771 in the name of petitioner. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent has superior rights over petitioner with respect to the
subject property

RULING:
Yes, respondent has superior rights over the subject property. As what the Section
7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides, “Save in cases of hereditary succession,
no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.” That aliens, whether
individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of
the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.
In the case at bar, petitioner herself admitted that it was really Michael who paid
for the subject property. Thus, Michael was the real purchaser, and that it was only placed
under her name to skirt or circumvent the constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing
foreigners or aliens from acquiring or purchasing lands in the Philippines. Given the fact
that the sale by the Tecson spouses to petitioner as Michael’s dummy was totally
abhorrent and repugnant to the Philippine Constitution, and is thus, void ab initio, it
stands to reason that there can be no double sale to speak of here. Thus, Respondent still
has superior rights over the subject property.

DOMINGO VS MANZANO (G.R. No. 201883, November 16, 2016)

FACTS:

17
 Emmanuel and Tita Manazano, respondents, owner of 35,281-square meter in
Caloocan City (TCT No. 160752) executed a notarized agreement with Desiderio and
Teresa Domingo, petitioners, with respect to the sale of the subject property amounting to
Php. 900,000. Upon execution of the agreement, the petitioners paid for the Php. 100,000
as reservation fee and subsequently paid a total of Php. 345,000. All this time, the
property remained in the possession of the respondents. The respondents refused to
accept the remaining payment of Php. 550,000 because the property was no longer for
sale and they were forfeiting petitoners’ payments. Soon thereafter, the petitioners
discovered that Carmelita Aquino bought the subject and a new tile (TCT No. C-359293)
had been issued in her name, to which the petitioners’ adverse claim was nevertheless
carried over.
The petitioners filed a complaint for specific performance and damages with
injunctive relief against respondents, compelling the respondents to accept payment of
the remaining balance, execute a deed of sale over the subject property in their favor, and
restrain the sale in favor of Aquino. RTC held, applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code
that Aquino was a buyer in bad faith, as she knew of petitioners’ prior purchase and
registered adverse claim – and such knowledge was equivalent to registration. CA
assailed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have superior rights over the subject property by
virtue of Article 1544 of the Civil Code

RULING:
No, the petitioners have no superior rights over the subject property, for Art. 1544
does not apply in this case. As what the Court ruled in Luzon Development Bank v.
Enriquez, 654 Phil. 315 (2011), since failure to pay the price in full in a contract to sell
renders the same ineffective and without force and effect, then there is no sale to speak
of.
In the case at bar, the petitioners failed to pay the purchase price in full, while
Aquino did, and thereafter she was able to register her purchase and obtain a new
certificate of title in her name. As far as this Court is concerned, there is only one sale -
and that is, the one in Aquino's favor. Since there is only one valid sale, the rule on
double sales under Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply.

SIY VS TOMLIN (G.R. No. 205998, April 24, 2017)

FACTS:
William Anghian Siy, petitioner, filed before the RTC of Quezon City a
complaint for Recovery of Possession with Prayer for Replevin against Frankie Domanog
Ong, Chris Centeno, John Co Chua, and Alvin Tomlin, respondents.
The petitioner alleged that: he is the owner of a 2007 model Range Rover with
Plate Number ZMG 272 which he purchased from Alberto Lopez III (Lopez); he
entrusted the said vehicle to Ong, after the latter claimed that he had a prospective buyer
therefor, but failed to remit the proceeds of the purported sale nor return the vehicle; he

18
found out that the vehicle had been transferred to Chua; he filed a complaint before the
Quezon City Police District's Anti-Carnapping Section, and when Ong learned of the
complaint, he arranged the return of the vehicle, but still failed to do so.
On the other hand, respondent argued that petitioner failed to show that he is the
owner of the vehicle; he is entitled to its possession; that the vehicle is wrongfully
detained by him; that it has not been distrained, seized or placed under custodia legis; and
that he is a buyer in good faith and for value. The RTC issued a Writ of Replevin in favor
of the petitioner. CA assailed RTC’s decision, for it did not acquire jurisdiction over the
instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is the rightful owner of the vehicle and that sheriff ‘s
implementation of Writ of Replevin is proper.

RULING:
No, respondent is the rightful owner of the vehicle. As what the Court ruled in
Superlines Transoortation Company, Inc. v. Philippine National Construction Company,
548 Phil. 354 (2007), “In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show
that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be
recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully
detains the same." In the case at bar, since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to
Chua, petitioner thus ceased to be the owner thereof. Nor is he entitled to the possession
of the vehicle; together with his ownership, petitioner lost his right of possession over the
vehicle. Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the subject
vehicle at the time he filed Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 in July, 2011, petitioner may not
seek a return of the same through replevin. Quite the contrary, respondent, who obtained
the vehicle from Chua and registered the transfer with the Land Transportation Office, is
the rightful owner thereof, and as such, he is entitled to its possession.

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

REPUBLIC VS SPOUSES BENIGNO (G.R. No. 205492, March 11, 2015)

FACTS:
Spouses Dante and Lolita Benigno, respondents, filed before RTC of Calamba,
Laguna an Application for Registration of title, under Presidential Decree No. 1529, of a
293-square meter lot in Laguna. The RTC granted the application; confirming the title of
the respondents. However, the Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, assailed the said
grant and filed notice of appeal. The CA denied petitioner’s Motion for Extension of time
to file its Appellant's Brief. Petitioner argued that the Calamba RTC’s decision, granting
respondents’ application for registration, is null and void for lack of the required

19
certification from the DENR – that the land applied for is alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of respondent’s application for registration is null and
void

RULING:
Yes, the grant of respondent’s application for registration is null and void. Under
the Regalian doctrine, "all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony." Furthermore, as provided under PD 1529, applicants must prove: "(1)
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain
at the time the application for registration is filed; and (2) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
However, in the case at bar, records indicate that respondents did not present any
documentary evidence in LRC Case No. 105-95-C to prove that the land applied for is
alienable and disposable public land. Their Exhibits "A" to "N" are bereft of the required
documentary proof – particularly, a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records,
and a CENRO or PENRO certification – to show that the 293-square meter land applied
for registration is alienable and disposable public land. Respondents do not dispute this;
in fact, they sought the application of the exceptional ruling in Republic v. Vega precisely
to obtain exemption from the requirement on the submission of documentary proof
showing that the property applied for constitutes alienable and disposable public land.

BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT VS BALCOM-TAMBUYAT (G.R. No. 202805, March 23,

2015)

FACTS:
During Adriano M. Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat’s
marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties, including a 700-square meter parcel
of land in Bulacan. However, when TCT No. T-145321 was issued; it was made under
the name of "Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis”. When Adriano died,
Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation. She alleged that: she was the surviving
spouse of Adriano; TCT T-145321 was erroneously registered and made in the name
above-mentioned. On the other hand, Banguis, petitioner, denied specifically that the
subject property was acquired by Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage, for she
bought it using her personal funds; that she and Adriano were married. In this regard, the
RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent and cancelled the registration of TCT
No. T-145321. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
The petitioner insisted that Section 108 of PD 1529 cannot apply in view of the
contentious and controversial nature of her opposition to the petition for cancellation,

20
which can be threshed out only in a separate proper proceeding where the court sits not
merely as a land registration court, but as a court of general jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals grossly erred in sustaining the RTC
which cancelled and corrected the questioned entry in TCT No. T-145321 from “Rosario
E. Banguis” to “Wenifreda Balcom Tambuyat” under Section 108 of the Property
Registration Decree
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals grossly erred in sustaining the RTC
which corrected and cancelled the questioned entry in TCT No. T-145321 through an
absolute and complete disregard of the proof of ownership and possession by the
petitioner over the subject matter.
RULING:
(1) No. Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration,
or amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances: (1) when
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate,
have terminated and ceased; (2) when new interests have arisen or been created which do
not appear upon the certificate; (3) when any error, omission or mistake was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (4)
when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (5) when the registered
owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and
no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (6) when a corporation,
which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within
three years after its dissolution; and (7) when there is reasonable ground for the
amendment or alteration of title. In the case at bar, the situation falls under (3) and (7),
where the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan committed an error in issuing TCT T-145321 in
the name of "Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis" when, in truth and in
fact, respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful spouse.
(2) No, the Court denied petitioner’s petition. The proceedings under Section 108
are "summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are
only clerical but certainly not controversial issues." In the case at bar, the evidence
apparently indicates that the petitioner could not be the owner of the subject property.
The Court is thus led to the conclusion that the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan simply
erred in including petitioner in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse.

REPUBLIC VS PASICOLAN (G.R. No. 198543, April 15, 2015)

FACTS:
Respondents Cesar and Gregorio Pasicolan filed a Petition for Reconstitution of
OCT No. 8450 in the name of Pedro Callueng before the RTC of Tuguegarao City.
Respondents claimed to be the legal and forced heirs of the late Pedro.
The RTC granted the petition and directed the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Cagayan to issue a new owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 8450 in the name of Pedro
Callueng in lieu of the lost or destroyed one. Petitioner Republic through the OSG,
appealed to the CA ascribing upon the court a quo that it erred in not finding that

21
 respondents failed to present competent evidence to show that the alleged lost Certificate
of Title was valid and subsisting at the time of its alleged loss. The CA rendered the
assailed decision dismissing the appeal. It gave credence to the pieces of documentary
evidence presented by the respondents and the report of LRA.
The OSG contends that the CA erred in affirming the Decision of the trial court
considering that the decree which the LRA certified as a true copy did not previously
form part of its records. The OSG also insist that respondents failed to present
competitive proof of the loss of OCT No. 8450 because the non-execution of an affidavit
of loss before the Register of Deeds in accordance with Section 12 of RA 26 and the
absence of testimony on record setting forth the circumstances that led to such loss cast
doubt on respondents’ claim that the owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 8450 is indeed lost.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents adduced competent evidence to warrant reconstitution of
the allegedly lost OCT
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that respondents failed to adduced competent
evidence to warrant reconstitution of the allegedly lost OCT. Section 2 of RA 26 enumerates the
sources from which reconstitution of lost or destroyed original certificates of title may be
based:
Section 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such
of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate
of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the
register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the
case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was
issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property,
the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged,
leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document
showing that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
Respondents would then have to present evidence under Section 2(f) of RA 26,
i.e., any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis
for reconstituting the loss or destroyed OCT. However, respondents’ other documentary
evidence such as the technical description, sepia film and tax declarations are not
sufficient pieces of evidence to grant a Petition for Reconstitution under Section 2(f) of
RA 26. As discussed in Republic vs. Heirs of Julio Ramos, a vague Certification by the
LRA without stating the nature of the decree, as well as the claimant in such case cannot
be considered as a sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting a lost or destroyed
certificate of title. Neither do the tax declarations submitted support respondents’ cause.
As held in Republic of the Philippines vs. Santua, a tax declaration can only be prima
facie evidence of claim of ownership, which, however, is not the issue in the

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reconstitution proceeding. The non-submission of Affidavit of Loss by the person who
was allegedly in actual possession of OCT No. 8450 at the time of its loss casts doubt on
respondents’ claim that OCT No. 8450 once existed and subsequently got lost.

MAHILUM VS ILANO (G.R. No. 197923, June 22, 2015)

FACTS:
Petitioner Serrano Mahilum is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by
TCT 85533 of the Registry of Deeds of Las Pinas City. She entrusted the original
owner’s duplicate copy to Perez. After several months, petitioner demanded the return of
the title, but Perez failed to produce the same; after much prodding, Perez admitted that
the title was lost. Thus, in June 2004, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Loss and caused
the same to be annotated upon the original registry copy of TCT 85533.
In June 2006, petitioner received a letter from the Registry of Deeds of Las Pinas
City informing her that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT 85533 was not lost, but that it
was presented to the registry by respondents, spouses Ilano, who claimed that the
property covered by the title was sold to them. The title to the property remained in
petitioner’s name, as respondents have not registered the unnotarized and undated Deed
of Absolute Sale.
Petitioner demanded the return of TCT 85533, but respondents refused to
surrender the title to her. Petitioner filed a Complaint for “annulment of agreement and
deed of absolute sale, specific performance, with damages against respondents and Perez.
Respondents argued that the complaint failed to state a cause of action in that petitioner
failed to allege that respondents were purchasers in bad faith or with notice of a defect in
the title; that in the absence of such an allegation, the presumption that respondents are
purchasers in good faith prevails.

ISSUE:

Whether or not failure to allege bad faith in the complaint is a fatal defect
considering that the Agreement/Deed of Absolute Sale were merely simulated, fictitious
and forged

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that since a new title was never issued in
respondents’ favor, and instead, title remained in petitioner’s name, the former never
came within the coverage and protection of the Torrens System, where the issue of good
or bad faith becomes relevant. Since respondents never acquired a new certificate of title
in their name, the issue of their good or bad faith which is central in annulment of title
case is of no consequence; petitioner’s case is for annulment of the Agreement and Deed
of Absolute Sale, and not one to annul title since the certificate of title is still in her name.
It is petitioner who must be protected under the Torrens System – as the registered owner
of the subject property. “A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.

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The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet title to land and put
a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title.”

REPUBLIC VS. DAYAOEN (G.R. No. 2007773, July 8, 2015)

FACTS:
Dayaoen, Taule, and Batcagan filed an Application for Registration of three
parcels of land located in Barangay Tabangaoen, La Trinidad, Benguet. Since 12 June
1945, appellees and their predecessor-in-interest have been in public, open, exclusive,
uninterrupted and continuous possession thereof in the concept of an owner. The court
rendered a decision finding appellees to have the registrable title over the subject
properties.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA and argued that the La Trinidad RTC erred
in granting respondents’ application for registration since they failed to prove that the
subject property constitutes alienable and disposable land; that the annotation on the
survey plan that the subject property is alienable and disposable is not sufficient; and that
respondents failed to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property. The CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the
decision of La Trinidad RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts erred in considering as substantial compliance the
certification or annotation in the survey plan that the subject land is alienable and
disposable.

RULING:
Yes. The trial and appellate courts seriously erred in declaring that the annotation
in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan and the certifications therein constitute
substantial compliance with the legal requirement on presentation of a certificate of land
classification status or any other proof that the subject land is alienable and disposable.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The
classification and reclassification of such lands are the prerogative of the Executive
Department. The President may at any time transfer these public lands from one class to
another.
While judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 209 may be taken, the
DENR certificate of land classification status or any other proof of the alienable and
disposable character of the land may not be dispensed with, because it provides a more
recent appraisal of the classification of the land as alienable and disposable, or that the
land has not been re-classified in the meantime. The applicable law – Section 14(1) of
P.D. 1529 – requires that the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable
at the time the application for registration of title is filed; one way of establishing this
material fact is through the DENR certificate of land classification status which is
presumed to be the most recent appraisal of the status and character of the property.

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 Such notations or certifications in approved survey plans refer only to the
technical correctness of the surveys plotted in the plans and have nothing to do
whatsoever with the nature and character of the properties surveyed, and that they only
establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
alienable and disposable area per verification through survey by the proper government
office; they do not indicate at all that the property sought to be registered is alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.

TRINIDAD VS PALAD (G.R. No. 203397, December 9, 2015)

FACTS:
In July 1985, respondents – spouses Bonifacio Palad and Felicidad Kausapin
bought from Ramos an eight-hectare parcel of land located within Lucena City, which
was later registered as TCT T-47318. Respondents later caused the subject property to be
surveyed, and it was discovered that a two-hectare portion of the subject property was
occupied by Augusto Trinidad, who converted the same into a fishpond.
In May 1992, respondents filed with the RTC of Lucena City a Complaint for
recovery of possession with damages against Augusto. Augusto claimed that respondents
were not the owners of the subject property; that Kausapin secured her title through
dubious means; that the subject property formed part of a five-hectare piece of property
that was given to him by his father, Atty. Trinidad; that this five-hectare property was
acquired by his father from Genaro Kausapin, who was his father’s client; that said five-
hectare property was declared for taxation purposes by his father; that since 1980,
Augusto has been in possession of the five-hectare property; that he filed criminal cases
for falsification against Felicidad; and that Felicidad was motivated by greed and bad
faith in filing the case. Augusto Trinidad thus prayed that the complaint be dismissed;
that Felicidad’s TCT T-47318 be nullified. Augusto argued that TCT T-47318 is void on
the ground that it was obtained through a simulated extrajudicial settlement agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents have a better right of possession over the disputed 2-
hectare portion of the 8-hectare property by the mere fact that said disputed portion is
covered by a certificate of title in their names

RULING:
Yes. The fact is undisputed that the subject two-hectare property lies within Lot
13-C which is registered in the name of respondents as TCT T-47318. The evidence on
record also suggests that contrary to petitioners’ claim, the subject property constitutes a
portion of an eight-hectare parcel of land acquired by respondents from Ramos by
purchase in 1985. This is a finding of fact arrived at by both the RTC and the CA – and
this is admitted by petitioners in their Petition.
TCT T-47318 constitutes evidence of respondents’ ownership over the subject
property, which lies within the area covered by said title; that TCT T-47318 serves as
evidence of indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of respondents,

25
whose names appear therein; and that as registered owners, they are entitled to possession
of the subject property. As against possession claimed by the petitioners, respondents’
certificate of title prevails. “Mere possession cannot defeat the title of a holder of a
registered Torrens Title.” As CA correctly held, petitioners are mere intruders with
respect to the subject property; they have no right to own or possess the same.

HEIRS OF GUIAMBANGAN VS. MUNICIPALITY OF KALAMANSIG (G.R. No.

204899, July 27, 2016)

FACTS:
Datu Eishmael Sumamagumbra, heir of the late Babai Guiambangan and
ascendant and predecessor in interest of herein petitioners, instituted before the RTC of
Isulan, Sultan Kudarat a case against respondents Municipality of Kalamansig a case for
recovery of possession of real property in connection with a parcel of land situated in
Kalamansig. Sultan Kudarat which Eishmael claimed was registered in Babai’s name as
OCT 995-A. A judgment was rendered by RTC on 4 March 2002, ordering the defendant
Municipality of Kalamansig to vacate the portions used as market site and the portion
where the ice plant structure is constructed and surrender the possession to the plaintiff.
The judgment became final and executory and the trial court ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution. However, after five years, the record was not reconstituted because a
fire gutted the Hall of Justice where the files of the case were kept. Cabug issued another
Sheriff’s Partial Return of Service and Notice of Garnishment. Thereafter, respondents
filed an Urgent Motion to Issue an Order to the Sheriff Prohibiting Him from Executing
an Alleged Judgment in the Urgent Motion, seeking to restrain Cabug from enforcing the
decision in the case on the ground that since the record thereof was not reconstituted, then
there is no judgment in said case to be enforced; and that for failure to reconstitute the
record, petitioners have no other recourse but to file the case anew, as the Act No. 3110
requires.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 4 March 2002 Judgment and 2 May 2002 Order of the trial
court directing the issuance of writ of execution are deemed reconstituted

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the facts need not be further proved and
reconstitution of the record is irrelevant and unnecessary because both parties have
admitted the judgment dated 4 March 2002 rendered in favor of petitioners. The 4 March
2002 Judgment and 2 May 2002 Order of the trial court directing issuance of a writ of
execution are deemed reconstituted. It must be remembered that under Act No. 3110, the
judicial record shall be reconstituted to the extent that the parties agree; thereafter, the
court shall intervene and determine what proper action to take. It can reconstitute only
that part of the record which can stand on its own, and then continue proceedings upon
such record so reconstituted. In the present case, it can be said that the Judgment and
Record of subsequent actions taken are deemed reconstituted by agreement of the parties
and with the approval of the trial court.

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 NICOLAS VS MARIANO (G.R. No. 201070, August 1, 2016)

FACTS:
The subject of the controversy is a land-grant of Mariano from National Housing
Authority. Mariano loaned from Nicolas and mortgaged the said property. Eventually,
Mariano executed a deed of Absolute Sale of Real property which is questioned before
the court by Mariano for having lack of consent from Mariano’s husband.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale is valid

RULING:
No. The sale is not valid. While the title is in the name of Mariano, she has not
completed her installment payments to NHA. Thus Mariano never became the owner of
the subject property, then she could not validly mortgage and sell the same to Nicolas.
The principle nemo dat quod non habet certainly applies.
By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document.
Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the
mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof
of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership.
Indeed, the Torrens system of land registration "merely confirms ownership and
does not create it. It cannot be used to divest lawful owners of their title for the purpose
of transferring it to another one who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or
recognized by law.

GUNTALILIB VS DELA CRUZ (G.R. No. 200042, July 7, 2016)

FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint entitled for “Quieting Of Titles x x x; Annulment
and Cancellation of Unnumbered OCT/Damages” against petitioner. Petitioner contends
that the case constituted a collateral attack on their unnumbered OCT which is prohibited.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed since it a collateral attack on
OCT

RULING:
No. The complaint is an action to annul and cancel tile and not one of quieting of
title. It is true that "the validity of a certificate of title cannot be assailed in an action for
quieting of title; an action for annulment of title is the more appropriate remedy to seek

27
the cancellation of a certificate of title." Indeed, it is settled that a certificate of title is not
subject to collateral attack. However, while respondents' action is denominated as one for
quieting of title, it is in reality an action to annul and cancel Tumaliuan's unnumbered
OCT. The allegations and prayer in their Amended Complaint make out a case for
annulment and cancellation of title, and not merely quieting of title: they claim that their
predecessor's OCT 213, which was issued on August 7,1916, should prevail over
Bernardo Tumaliuan's unnumbered OCT which was issued only on August 29, 1916; that
petitioner and his co-defendants have knowledge of OCT 213 and their existing titles;
that through fraud, false misrepresentations, and irregularities in the proceedings for
reconstitution (LRC Case No. 6544), petitioner was able to secure a copy of his
predecessor's supposed unnumbered OCT; and for these reasons, Tumaliuan's
unnumbered OCT should be cancelled. Besides, the case was denominated as one for
"Quieting Of Titles x x x; Cancellation of Unnumbered OCT/Damages."

TORTS AND DAMAGES

MARSMAN & CO. VS LIGO (G.R. No. 198643, August 19, 2015)

FACTS:
An employee was accused of criminal acts, illegally arrested and detained,
presented to the media at a humiliating press conference against his will, and prosecuted
in an unfounded criminal suit which was dismissed and eventually acquitted for lack of
evidence. The employee now filed for a damages for malicious prosecution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is malicious prosecution

RULING.
Yes. All the elements of malicious prosecution exist.
For a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following:
(1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he
instigated its commencement;
(2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal;
(3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
(4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice an improper or a sinister motive.
The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the
wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that
the charges were false and groundless.

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 PEOPLE VS PERALTA AND AMBAS (G.R. No. 208524, June 1, 2016)

FACTS:
Peralta and Ambas were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Prosecution’s witness positively identify Peralta and Ambas who denied the allegations
and presented and alibi. RTC and CA convicted them and awarded damages.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or no Peralta and Ambas is guilty of the charged crime
2.) Whether the award for damages is proper

RULING:
1.) Yes. The RTC and CA correctly convicted the accused.
2.) For the award as civil indemnity and damages, modifications are in order.
The awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in favor of the heirs
should be increased from Php 50,000 to Php 75,000 to conform with the
prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, exemplary damages in the amount of
Php 75,000 is awarded. Finally, interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all
damages awarded is imposed from the date of finality of this decision until
fully paid.

Moreover, award for actual damages, loss for earning capacity are sustained. Temperate
damages in the amount of Php 3,000 is awarded to Olitan (witness) since he did not
present a receipt during the actual trial to prove the actual costs of items taken from him.

PEOPLE VS FABRE (G.R. No. 206878, August 22, 2016)

FACTS:
Marcelino Caga y Fabre was charged with rape with AAA after having a drinking
spree with her and her boyfriend.
The RTC of Manila rendered a judgment finding Caga guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify private complainant "AAA" the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos by way of moral damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of P50,000 by way of moral damages is proper

RULING:
No. In line with the prevailing jurisprudence of People vs Jugueta (2016), the
Court said that moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code also does not fix the
amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on
the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral

29
damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the
award of civil indemnity.
The Court hereby modifies the award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00. Civil indemnity and exemplary damages are further added to the award of
damages, both in the amount of ₱75,000.00. Also, interest at the rate of 6% per
annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded.

GREENSTAR VS UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION (URC) (G.R No.

205090, October 17, 2016)

FACTS:
Petitioner’s bus collided head-on with the URC van, which was then being driven
Quezon province-bound by NURC's Operations Manager, Bicomong who died in the
accident. Petitioners filed a complaint against NURC to recover damages sustained
during the collision, premised on negligence.
RTC found that Plaintiff has no cause of action and cannot recover from the
defendants even assuming that the direct and proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the defendant's employee Renato Bicomong. The accident having occurred
outside Bicomong's assigned tasks, defendant employers cannot be held liable to the
plaintiffs, even assuming that it is the fault of defendants' employee that was the direct
and proximate cause of their damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are liable to petitioners considering that the accident
was caused by Bicombong’s negligence

RULING:
No. The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, Article 2180
that ‘employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees ... acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks.’ Second, the operation of the registered-owner
rule that registered owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their
Vehicles.
The appropriate approach in cases where both the registered-owner rule and
Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered
owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there
arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven.
As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that no liability
under Article 2180 has arisen.
In this case, Respondents succeeded in overcoming the presumption of
negligence, having shown that when the collision took place, Bicomong was not in the
performance of his work; that he was in possession of a service vehicle that did not
belong to his employer NURC, but to URC, and which vehicle was not officially
assigned to him, but to another employee; that his use of the URC van was unauthorized -
even if he had used the same vehicle in furtherance of a personal undertaking in the past.

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 REPUBLIC VS SPOUSES SALVADOR (G.R. No. 205428, June 7, 2017)

FACTS:
The Republic represented by the DPWH filed a complaint for the expropriation of
a portion of a parcel of land owned by the Sps. Salvador or the construction of the C-5
Northern Link Road Project Phase 2 (Segment 9) from the North Luzon Expressway
(NLEX) to McArthur Highway.
The RTC thereafter issued the corresponding Writ of Possession in favor of the
Republic. On the same day, respondents signified in open court that they recognized the
purpose for which their property is being expropriated and interposed no objection
thereto. They also manifested that they have already received the total sum of
₱685,349.22 from the DPWH and are therefore no longer intending to claim any just
compensation.
RTC ruled in favor of the Republic and likewise directed the Republic to pay
respondents consequential damages equivalent to the value of the capital gains tax and
other taxes necessary for the transfer of the subject property in the Republic's name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the capital gains tax on the transfer of the expropriated property
can be considered as consequential damages that may be awarded to respondent

RULING:
No. Consequential damages are only awarded if as a result of the expropriation,
the remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. In
this case, no evidence was submitted to prove any impairment or decrease in value of the
subject property as a result of the expropriation. More significantly, given that the
payment of capital gains tax on the transfer· of the subject property has no effect on the
increase or decrease in value of the remaining property, it can hardly be considered as
consequential damages that may be awarded to respondents.

31