1. G.R. No.

74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL
POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike —
but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement
of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of
Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage
to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by
transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No.
626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary
to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the
carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by

virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the
following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may
ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13,
1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for
violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ
of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation
of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and
he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is
that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the
measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a
challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable
here. The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the
Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the
basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor
General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely
different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of
court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving
the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may
be made in the first instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity,
and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to
recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary,
they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished
jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of
the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition
unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President
Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of
his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his
judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the
legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required
immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of
instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to
justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question
the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to
protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a
more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question
of due process.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is
the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and
the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained
by the body. 10

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due
process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make
it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process
lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may
need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave
the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of
inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter
of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process — and in so doing sums it all up — as nothing more
and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed
against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for
themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John
made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every
person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear
"the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment.
Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is
indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to
the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in
its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is
unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in
repressive regimes, the insolence of power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be
dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system
that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient
rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of
the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be
secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and
empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a
number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of
contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances
when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad
dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person
sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be
summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous
judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to
protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By
reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is
hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond
the tomb — in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even
so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper
but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A,
amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except
under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its
Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for
the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need
for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our
farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it
had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.

A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding
and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted
thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was
affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by
farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural
output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in
their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals.
The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. ...

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of
the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the
slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for
agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private
ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by
their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain,
or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the
productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor
man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of
Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for
the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the
above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where
they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and
preventing their improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose
(sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it
could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of
the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow
that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still
have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty
is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the
executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because
the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and
conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed,
and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the
measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due
process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings
as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted,
however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their
instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order
should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority
to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized
property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman
of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos."
(Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by
what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they
alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there
is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative
powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose
of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to
the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated
the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance
with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a
member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate
of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone,
refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had
the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them,
this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure
would have become a faitaccompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the
present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation
of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest,
and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to
invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of
protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if
they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed
above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the
amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

2. G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR
INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.

J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is
whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower
court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be
more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite
showing to sustain an attack against its validity.

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners,
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the
general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders
for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the
petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its
eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly
licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood
to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It
was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who
was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).

After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the
assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar
as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any
other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that
the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting
any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling
up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the
surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the
nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name,
relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as
well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has
personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or
duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it
also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would
be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being
arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise
for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that
Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being
arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance
requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the
challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful
guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs
counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged
ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
once again a transgression of the due process clause.

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the
above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760
from and after July 8, 1963.

In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances
regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or
motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its
alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did
fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a
proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that
only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right
to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the
preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and
the dismissal of the petition.

Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
September 28, 1964, which reads:
 1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel
del Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with
offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general
manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio
City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;

2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief
executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution
and enforcement of such ordinances;

3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and
motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;

4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the
acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending
sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of
Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one
vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement
dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);

5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with
the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is
attached hereto as Annex C;

6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license
fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of
Manila.1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on
the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of
conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but
likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the
arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4,
1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition,
with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a
judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and
referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The
only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court,
agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does
appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon
the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is
undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of
Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of
the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the
preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from
enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines
of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with
what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and
substantive aspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the
elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts
and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being
of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.2

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence
to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case
here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman &
Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis
tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject
clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the
specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of
this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the
present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with
the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power
measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of
nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise
would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does
"to all the great public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the
very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to
promote public health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police
power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full
to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included
as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven
for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine
harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests
to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and
by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees
was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal"
and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that
the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues
eloquently for it.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval,
ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license
tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than
Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any
person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is
smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of
the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of
the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties
however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as
either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any
other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the
question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance,
or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its
doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process
requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result
in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment
of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of
officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"19 decisions based on
such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form
or phrases.21

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious
exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would
amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of
the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the
need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong
case must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach
to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process
requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment
of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for
motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its
alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged
ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels
being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the
settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-
useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail
in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the
police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but
in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in
this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general
rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number
of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an
important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees
clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of
licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared
unreasonable.23

Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's
police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority
conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to
cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes,
just and uniform.25

As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in
imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given
to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a
massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this
particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is
urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them
of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public
markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale
of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere
fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a
particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a
case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected
by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which
may result from the legal exercise of that power."27

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel,
lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different
conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of
due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to
the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there
appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the
legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of
conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be
absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly
apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of
the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the
proper scope of the police power."28

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made
to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made
to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so
that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all.29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation
of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The
policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right
of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed
sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How
justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the
principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what
seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and
specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest
should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and
uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to
are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him
at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its
sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent
upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would
require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof
means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render
the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to
answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has
been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment
either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from
Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying
criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing
laws as saying what they obviously mean."35

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments
pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so
uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed
decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With
costs.

3. G.R. No. L-26054 July 21, 1978

LUZON SURETY CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JESUS PANAGUITON, ET AL., defendants, CUSTODIA J. VDA. DE VELASCO, as
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of ANGELES VELASCO, defendant-appellant.

GUERRERO, J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, issued in Civil Case No.
35662 denying the appellant's petition for relief from judgment. The Court of Appeals, finding that
this case posed only questions of law, elevated it to this Court for disposition pursuant to section 31
of the Judiciary Act, as amended, and section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court. The records
disclose the following undisputed facts:

That on April 21, 1955, plaintiff, as surety, and defendant Jesus Panaguiton, as
principal, executed jointly and severally a surety bond for P10,000.00 in favor of the
International Tobacco Co., Inc. to secure the payment of all his monetary liabilities,
as well as the faithful performance of his obligation to said Company (Exhibit A); that
in consideration of the execution by plaintiff of the said Surety Bond (Exhibit A), there
were, in turn, executed in the latter's favor an Indemnity Agreement (Exhibit B) by
defendant Jesus Panaguiton, Paz Lomugdan, Emilia Lotilla, Julian Panaguiton (now
deceased) and succeeded by Paz T. Panaguiton, Estefania Panaguiton, Juana
Panaguiton and Epifania Panaguiton), Angeles Velasco (also deceased and whose
estate is now represented by Custodia J. Vda. de Velasco) and Juana Alera Vda. de
Lotilla, and a Mortgage (Exhibit C) by defendants Paz Lomugdan, Emilia Lotilla, the
two deceased just mentioned (now represented by their respective representatives
above referred to) and Juana Alera Vda. de Lotilla, which Mortgage is duly registered
with the Register of Deeds of the Province of Antique; that for failure of defendant
Jesus Panaguiton to comply with the terms and conditions of the Surety Bond
(Exhibit A), the International Tobacco Co., Inc. filed Civil Case No. 30842 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila against plaintiff and said Jesus Panaguiton (Exhibits
D and F); that in the Civil Case just mentioned, a decision was rendered sentencing
 the defendants therein (Jesus Panaguiton and Luzon Surety Co., Inc.) to pay to the
International Tobacco Co., Inc., the sum of P3,752.61 with 6% interest thereon from
October 9, 1956, together with P600.00 as attorney's fees (Exhibit F); that in
compliance with said decision, herein plaintiff paid to the International Tobacco Co.,
Inc., the sum of P600.00 and P3,552.61 on November 15, 1957 and December 24,
1957 (Exhibits G to G-3) and that notwithstanding demands made by plaintiff on
defendants herein for the reimbursement of the sums thus paid by it to the said
International Tobacco Co., Inc., said defendant have failed and refused to make said
reimbursement (Exhibits H to H-14) ... 1

On July 20, 1960, the trial court rendered judgment ordering defendants, including herein defendant-
appellant to pay plaintiff within ninety (90) days from notice jointly and severally, the sum of
P4,352.61 with interest thereon at 12% per annum plus attorney's fees and costs. On October 7,
1960, defendant-appellant Custodia J. Vda. de Velasco (as administratrix of the estate of the
deceased Angeles Velasco) filed a petition for relief from judgment, accompanied with an affidavit of
merit, alleging:

1. That the said decision, in so far as the petitioning defendant is concerned, is a

complete nullity for the reason that she was not notified of the hearing of the case
held on March 1, 1960;

2. That if she was duly notified of the hearing she would be able to show that the
Indemnity Agreement (Exhibit B) was not at all signed by the deceased Angeles
Velasco; and

3. That the petitioning defendant, not having been represented by legal counsel, was
of the mistaken belief that she has sixty (60) days within which to file a petition for
new trial, or reconsideration or appeal from the decision, 2

After the trial court's denial of her petition for relief from judgment on December 6, 1960, defendant-
appellant or December 27, 1960 filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying her petition
for relief, which motion was also denied, hence the present appeal.

The order appealed from dated December 6, 1960 states:

Considering (1) defendant Custodia J. Vda. de Velasco's Petition for Relief From Judgment and (2)
plaintiff's Answer To Petition for Relief — and it being admitted by said defendant that she received
copy of the decision of this Court of July 20, 1960, on August 26, 1960: that she could have
appealed from said decision within thirty(30) days from the date last mentioned, but failed to do so,
hence the said decision has become final, and that therefore she is no longer entitled to the said
Petition For Relief From Judgment — the latter is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Manila, Philippines, December 6, 1960.

(Sgd.) E. SORIANO

In her brief, the appellant assigns the following errors:

I
 The lower court erred in denying the appellant's petition for relief from judgment on
the erroneous ground that the appellant had a remedy by appeal from the decision of
July 26, 1960, which she did not avail of and allowed to lapse, without considering
that the decision subject matter of the petition is a complete nullity in so far as
appellant is concerned because she was never notified of the hearing of the case
and was deprived of her day in court.

II

The lower court erred in denying the petition for relief from judgment in spite of the
fact that it was filed within the period provided for in Sec. 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court and the further fact that appellant has a substantial and meritorious defense
which warrant the granting of said relief.

We find merit in defendant-appellant's contention that the trial court committed reversible errors.
That the defendant-appellant was not notified of the hearings set for March lst and May 13, 1960 is
borne by the records. Her name as a party defendant does not even appear in the list of persons to
be given notice of the hearings by the Clerk of Court. 3 She was, therefore, denied the fundamental
right to be heard, an essential element of procedural due process which this Court in the leading
case of El Banco Español Filipino vs. Palanca 37 Phil. 921 said, and We must reiterate, thus: "(D)ue
process of law implies that there must be a court or tribunal clothed with power to hear and
determine the matter before it, that jurisdiction shall have been lawfully acquired, that the defendant
shall have an opportunity to be heard, and that judgment shall be rendered upon lawful hearing."

For well-entrenched indeed in our jurisprudence is the indispensable requisite that for the
constitutional guarantee of the right to be heard, parties to the case must be notified as to when such
hearing shall take place. Not only have the parties the right to be present at the trial of their cases
but are also entitled to a reasonable notice of the time fixed for trial. Nothing is better settled than
that absent such notice, resulting in the failure of a litigant to be accorded his day in court, there can
be a resort to this Tribunal. Its response has invariably been to assure that such a right be
respected. 4

We agree with defendant-appellant's contention that not having been duly informed of the scheduled
hearings, the decision is a complete nullity insofar as she is concerned, The ruling of this Court in
the case of Cayetano v. Ceguerra, 5 wherein We held that: "Having filed an answer, defendants
should have been entitled to notice of hearing. And if the answer was not responsive, the trial court
should have apprised the defendants of such fact, considering that they were not lawyers. It
appearing that they were not informed of the scheduled hearing, all the proceedings undertaken
herein became a nullity, there being a deprivation of their day in court, amounting to lack of due
process," squarely supports defendant-appellant's position.

Philippine jurisprudence is replete with decisions of this Court laying down as a fundamental part of
due process the essential requisite that a party should be given an opportunity to be heard by
notifying or informing him or his counsel as to when such a hearing will take place, affording him
reasonable notice of the time fixed for the hearing or trial of the case. To cite a few of these
decisions:

Lack of notice to a party in a judicial proceedings is a denial of due process. (Shell

Company of the Philippines vs. Enage, 49 SCRA 416)

Denial of procedural due process is a grave jurisdictional defect rendering judgment

void. (Aducayen vs. Flores, 51 SCRA 78)
 Procedural due process is that which hears before its condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. It contemplates notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting one's person or
property. (Macabingkil vs. Yatco, 21 SCRA 151; Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company vs. Cadiao L-28725, March 12, 1966, 22 SCRA 987; Bermejo vs. Barrios,
31 SCRA 764, 775; Jose Carandang vs. Hon. Joe Cabatuando, etc., et al. L-25384,
October 26, 1973)

Lack of notice to a party adversely affected has invariably been held to mean the
nullity of the decisions rendered in ordinary civil case since they suffer from a fatal
infirmity for want of due process. (Tiglao vs. Commission on Elections, et al., L-
31566 and 31847, August 31, 1970.)

The rationale of these rulings is so basic and fundamental, founded on fair play, simple justice and
fairness that We cannot but express our concern, if not displeasure, when cases as the case at bar
are delayed and keep clogging court dockets for the failure, negligence and/or ignorance of judges
to apply these simple legal precepts and judicial pronouncements. In the instant case, the trial court
had peremptorily rejected defendant-appellant's petition for relief from judgment, declaring that her
failure to appeal within 30 days from receipt of the decision was fatal to her cause. We disagree with
the court's ruling. It is precisely because of the expiration of the period for appeal that she seeks to
avail of the remedy of relief from judgment, alleging that being a layman and without the benefit of
counsel. she was of the mistaken belief that she had sixty (60) days within which to appeal the
decision. Such remedy of relief from judgment is available to her as provided under Rule 38, Sec. 2
and 3, Revised Rules of Court, thus:

Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding
thereof — When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken,
against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same cause
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.

Sec. 3. I'ime for filing petition, contents and verification. — A petition provided for in
either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60)
days after the petitioner learns of the judgment order, or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered, or
such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the
case may be.

Appellant having received on August 26, 1960 notice of the decision dated July 20, 1960, filed her
petition for relief from judgment on October 6, 1960, accompanied with the affidavit of merit, which is
clearly within the sixty (60) days period laid down by the Rules. The trial court gravely erred in
denying appellant' s petition for relief.

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the trial court on July 20, 1960 is hereby nullified and set
aside insofar as herein defendant-appellant is concerned. The case is remanded to the trial court to
enable the defendant-appellant to present her evidence and for said trial court to proceed and act
accordingly.

SO ORDERED.
4. G.R. No. 150540. October 28, 2003]

DIMALUB P. NAMIL, ABDULNASSER TIMAN, TERESITA G. AKOB, MALIGA AMILUDIN

and EPAS GUIAMEL, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, public
respondent.
JOENIME B. KAPINA, MONIB B. WALINGWALING, MAULANA G. KARNAIN,
ABDULGAPHAR M. MUSTAPHA, ABDULRAKMAN TALIKOP and WILSON
SABIWANG, private respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, to set aside the November 6, 2001 Resolution No.
4615,[1] promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc[2] installing the
private respondents as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat,
although the petitioners had already taken their respective oaths and assumed offices in the
same elective positions.
The antecedents are as follows:
On May 14, 2001, the election for the members of the Sangguniang Bayan was held in
Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat.
On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang issued Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (COCVP) No. 8031108[3] which contained, inter alia, the
petitioners and the Sangguniang Bayan winning candidates:

1. NOREN B. APIL
2. MALOD B. MOSADI
3. DIMALUB P. NAMIL
4. ABDULNASSER A. TIMAN
 5. TERESITA G. AKOB
6. MABANING P. SAMAMA
7. EPAS T. GUIAMEL
8. MALIGA M. AMILUDIN

The above-named candidates took their oath, and assumed their offices on June 30,
2001[4] as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang.
The next day, May 21, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang issued
COCVP No. 8031109 which listed the private respondents as winners, namely:

1. JOENIME B. KAPINA
2. MONIB B. WALINGWALING
3. MAULANA G. KARNAIN
4. ABDULGAPHAR M. MUSATAPHA
5. MALOD B. MOSADI
6. ABDULRAKMAN A. TALIKOP
7. WILSON K. SABIWANG
8. MABANING P. SAMAMA

Thereafter, private respondent Joenime B. Kapina wrote the COMELEC requesting that she
and the others who were proclaimed as winners on May 21, 2001 be recognized as the winning
candidates and the new members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan
Kudarat. Appended to said letter was a certification issued by Regional Election Director Clarita
N. Callar, Region XII, Cotabato City, that the private respondents named in the COCVP No.
8031109, issued on May 21, 2001, were duly proclaimed as the winning candidates for the said
municipality. When apprised of the said letter, the Commissioner-in-Charge for Region XII,
Mehol K. Sadain, conducted an investigation on the matter of having two (2) sets of winning
candidates as members of the Sangguniang Bayan for Palimbang. He issued Memorandum No.
2001-09-005 requiring the Law Department, the Regional Election Registrar and the Provincial
Election Supervisor to submit their respective reports/comments on the letter. The said officers
submitted their respective memorandum, thus:
1. Memo dated September 11, 2001 of Atty. Jose Balbuena, Director Law Department,
to the effect that, our Comelec field officials in Region XII who directly
participated in the canvassing who were named in (Memo No. 2001-09-001)
could best provide the needed explanation and information on the double
proclamation of Sangguniang Bayan winners in Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat.
2. Memo dated September 6, 2001 of Atty. Clarita Callar, Regional Election Director,
Region XII, to the effect that the Election Assistant Amy Laguda who issued the
certification on the proclamation based on Certificate No. 8031109 dated May
21, 2001 verified the genuineness of her signature on the said certification, and
further said that at the time she issued the certification the PES had not yet
received a copy of Certificate No. 8031108 dated May 20, 2001. Further, Atty.
Callar referred to the verification of Ms. Celia Romero that per records of the
RSD, the names appearing as elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan for
the Municipality of Sultan Kudarat ... are those proclaimed in Certificate of
Canvass of Votes & Proclamation No. 8031109. Incidentally, Ms. Romero also
issued a certification that the serial numbers of the Certificates of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation were 8031108 for Lambayong, SK and 8031109
for Palimbang, SK.
 3. Memo filed on September 6, 2001 by Atty. Lintang H. Bedol, PES, Sultan Kudarat,
recommending that the parties should file the appropriate case/s before the
Commission, instead of coursing their redress through the PES of Sultan
Kudarat or the RED of Region XII.
4. A confidential certification of EO Malic Sansarona dated September 12, 2001 to the
effect that the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation ... No. 8031109
dated June 21, 2001 is [the] genuine and valid proclamation of elected Municipal
Officials of the Municipality of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat, and that the other
proclamation [No. 8031108] is fictitious and falsified.
Acting on the said Memoranda, Commissioner Sadain submitted his Recommendation[5] to
the COMELEC, thus:
1. Finds that there was a VALID PROCLAMATION of the winning candidates for
positions of Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat
as contained in Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation No. 8031109;
2. That there being a VALID PROCLAMATION, there is NO NEED for adjudication on
this matter; and therefore
3. Respectfully RECOMMENDS to the Commission En Banc, the adoption of the
following recommendation [Annex D] of Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Dir., Law
Department and Atty. Gregorio T. Saraos, Attorney II, IPD, Law Department.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department RECOMMENDS to issue an Order for the
immediate installation of the winning members of the Sangguniang Bayan [of Palimbang, Sultan
Kudarat], namely: JOENIME B. KAPINA, MONIB B. WALINGWALING, MAULANA G.
KARNAIN, ABDULGAPHAR M. MUSTAPHA, MALOD B. MOSADI, ABDULRAKMAN A.
TALIKOP, WILSON K. SABIWANG, AND MABANING P. SAMAMA... and for said purpose, to
direct the Brigade Commander, 60 1st Brigade Pulutana of General Santos City, Saranggani
Province, to effect and enforce the said Order and to submit his compliance within five (5) days
from notice hereof.

Acting on the recommendation of Commissioner Sadain, the public respondent issued

on November 6, 2001 the assailed Resolution No. 4615. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,

(1) that the proclamation of the winning candidates contained in Certificate of Canvass of Votes
and Proclamation No. 8031109 is a valid proclamation; (2) to adopt the recommendation of the
Law Department which is in accordance with the result of the investigation conducted by the
Commissioner-in-Charge; and herein orders the immediate installation of JOENIME B. KAPINA,
MONIB B. WALINGWALING, MAULANA G. KARNAIN, ABDULGAPHAR M. MUSTAPHA,
MALOD B. MOSADI, ABDULRAKMAN A. TALIKOP, WILSON K. SABIWANG, AND
MABANING P. SAMAMA as the duly elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat.[6]

The petitioners contend that the public respondents Resolution No. 4615 is null and void
since it was issued without according them due notice and hearing, contrary to the enshrined
principle of due process. The public respondent thus committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 The petitioners allege that they were never accorded the chance to present their side in
connection with the investigation that was purportedly conducted by Commissioner Sadain and
on the memoranda/report of the public respondents officers. The public respondent simply
approved the recommendation of Commissioner Sadain. The petitioners were kept in the dark,
learned about the controversy only when they were notified of the assailed resolution of the
public respondent.
The public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, as well as the private
respondents, asserts that the petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision before instituting this action with this Court; hence, the petition is premature. It is
pointed out that the public respondent has broad powers to enforce all election laws, it has the
power to control and supervise the proceedings of the board of canvassers, and the power to
suspend or annul proclamation. When it learned about the two (2) sets of winning candidates as
members of Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat, the public respondent required
an investigation to be conducted by one of the commissioners, who required the election
officers in the place concerned to submit their reports on the matter. After a study of the various
reports, it was ascertained that COCVP (C.E Form No. 25) No. 8031108 was null and void,
fictitious and falsified. The public respondent made a finding that the genuine COCVP was that
one bearing Serial No. 8031109, intended for the Municipality of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat. It
was thus incumbent upon the public respondent to order the immediate installation of the
winning candidates on the basis of the genuine COCVP to give effect to the will of the
electorate, conformably to its mandate under Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code and the
ruling of this Court in Aguam vs. Commission on Elections.[7]
The public respondent further asserts that the twin requirement of notice and hearing in
annulment of proclamation is not applicable when the proclamation is null and void, citing Utto
vs. Commission on Elections.[8]
The petition is meritorious.
While it is true that the COMELEC is vested with a broad power to enforce all election laws,
the same is subject to the right of the parties to due process. In this case, the petitioners had
been proclaimed as the winning candidates and had assumed their office. Since then, they had
been exercising their rights and performing their duties as members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat. Their proclamation on May 20, 2001 enjoys the
presumption of regularity and validity since no contest or protest was even filed assailing the
same. The petitioners cannot be removed from office without due process of law. Due process
in the proceedings before the public respondent exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires
due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in
appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, we also
ruled in Farias vs. Commission on Elections, Reyes vs. Commission on Elections and Gallardo
vs. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a
proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.[9]
In this case, the public respondent nullified the proclamation of the petitioners and ousted
them from their office as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, based solely on the
recommendations of its law department and of Commissioner Sadain, and on the memoranda
of its officers. The petitioners were not accorded a chance to be heard on the said
recommendations and the memorandum of Regional Election Director Clarita Callar,
certification of Celia Romero, and certification of Election Officer Malic Sansarona
dated September 12, 2001 before it issued the assailed resolution.
 The conclusion of the public respondent that the basis of the petitioners proclamation was a
fictitious and falsified document was grounded, inter alia, on a confidential certification of
Election Officer Malic Sansarona dated September 12, 2001.[10] However, it appears that a
certification[11] was earlier issued by the same election officer on June 25, 2001, stating that the
petitioners whose names were listed as winning candidates as Sangguniang Bayan members in
the COCVP (C.E. Form No. 25) No. 8031108, the very certificate declared by the public
respondent in its Resolution No. 4615 as fictitious and falsified document, won in the elections.
In the case of Caruncho III vs. Commission on Elections,[12] this Court has held that due
process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due notice and hearing.
The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any
motion to set aside his proclamation. This Court also ruled in Sandoval vs. Commission on
Elections[13] that:

... Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC
No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We
hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered
without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then
after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its
ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his
evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the
adjudication of the case. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner
without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely
on private respondents allegations. We held in Bince, Jr. vs. COMELEC:

Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is
not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a
vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in proceedings
before the COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing,
among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to
annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission
on Elections, Reyes vs. Commission on Elections and Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections
that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the
effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.

The public respondents reliance on the ruling of this Court in Utto vs. Commission on
Elections[14] is misplaced. The Court, in that case, held that the twin-requirement of notice and
hearing in an annulment of proclamation is not applicable because of the illegality of petitioners
proclamation.[15] The factual circumstances in the instant petition are far different from those
obtaining in Utto. In the Utto case, a notice of appeal was filed questioning the ruling of the
board of canvassers but, the latter proceeded in proclaiming Utto as the winning candidate. This
made the proclamation illegal. In the present case, nobody questioned the petitioners
proclamation.
We rule that the petition in this case was not prematurely filed. Generally, a motion for
reconsideration is a pre-requisite to the viability of a special civil action for certiorari. However,
there are exceptions to the rule. The aggrieved party is not obliged to first file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed resolution before filing a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended where, as in this case, (1) the question is purely legal, (2) judicial
intervention is urgent; (3) its application may cause great and irreparable damage; and (4) the
controverted acts violate due process.[16]
 The private respondents cannot invoke Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code to fortify
their cause, because the said law specifically refers to pre-proclamation controversies, thus:

Sec. 242. Commissions exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies. The

Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies. It may motu
proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total
suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any
proclamation, if one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the
succeeding section.[17]

Even the fact that the public respondent initiated the proceedings for the partial or total
annulment of an illegal proclamation would not dispense with the requirements of notice and
hearing. This was made clear in Sandoval vs. Commission on Elections:[18]

Citing Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondent argues that the
COMELEC is authorized to annul an illegal proclamation even without notice and hearing
because the law states that it may motu proprio order a partial or total suspension of the
proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has
been made. ...

...

The phrase motu proprio does not refer to the annulment of proclamation but to the manner of
initiating the proceedings to annul a proclamation made by the board of canvassers. The law
provides two ways by which annulment proceedings may be initiated. It may be at the own
initiative of the COMELEC (motu proprio) or by written petition. In either case, notice and
hearing is required. This is clear from the language of the law.[19]

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution
No. 4615 of the public respondent COMELEC en banc dated November 6, 2001, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
5. [G.R. No. 140945. May 16, 2005]

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. JOSE

EVANGELISTA, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

A person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision
rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger.[1]
This refers to the petition for review on certiorari filed by the National Housing Authority
assailing the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 51646, granting
respondents petition for annulment of judgment. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed part of paragraph No. 3 of the dispositive
portion of the decision dated November 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Br. CIII, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 is hereby declared void, non-binding and inapplicable in so
far as petitioners TCT No. 122944 is concerned.

Let a copy hereof be furnished the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the proper annotation.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioner now comes before the Court with the following assignment of errors allegedly
committed by the CA:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION OF
THE LOWER COURT IS NOT BINDING ON HEREIN RESPONDENT JOSE EVANGELISTA
BECAUSE THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER HIS PERSON.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN ANNULLING THE DECISION OF THE

LOWER COURT ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BECAUSE
RESPONDENT JOSE EVANGELISTA WAS NOT IMPLEADED AS A PARTY DEFENDANT IN
PETITIONERS ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF TITLE.[4]

The assailed decision of the CA originated from a civil case filed by petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch CIII) for recovery of real property, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-91-10071.[5] Said case involves a real property measuring 915.50 square meters
and located in V. Luna Road, Quezon City, originally awarded in 1968 by the Peoples Homesite
and Housing Corporation (petitioners predecessor) to a certain Adela Salindon. After the death
of Salindon, her heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement where the property was transferred
to Arsenio Florendo, Jr., Milagros Florendo, Beatriz Florendo and Eloisa Florendo-
Kulphongpatana. However, in a decision in G.R. No. L-60544, entitled Arsenio Florendo, Jr., et
al. vs. Hon. Perpetuo D. Coloma, Presiding Judge of Branch VII, City Court of Quezon City, et
al., rendered by the Court on May 19, 1984, the award in favor of Salindon was nullified and set
aside for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, and
petitioner was declared the owner of the property.
Despite said decision, the property was auctioned off by the Quezon City Treasurers Office
on April 23, 1986, for unpaid real property taxes by the Florendos. The highest bidder was
Luisito Sarte. Because the Register of Deeds refused to register the final deed of sale issued by
the City Treasurer, Sarte filed a petition for issuance of title and confirmation of sale, which was
granted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 84). Consequently, the Register of
Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28182 in the name of Sarte, who divided
the property into Lot 1-A, measuring 570.50 square meters and covered by TCT No. 108070,
and Lot 1-B, measuring 345 square meters and covered by TCT No. 108071.[6]
It was in 1991 that petitioner filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 with Sarte, the City Treasurer
of Quezon City and the Quezon City Register of Deeds, as defendants. While the case was
pending, Sarte executed in favor of respondent Jose Evangelista, a Deed of Assignment dated
December 2, 1994, covering Lot 1-A.[7] TCT No. 108070 was cancelled and TCT No. 122944
was issued in the name of respondent on December 21, 1994. Subsequently, the Register of
Deeds annotated on TCT No. 122944 an Affidavit of Adverse Claim of petitioner, to wit:

Entry No. 7159/T-No. 122944: AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM

Executed under oath by Manuel V. Fernandez (in behalf of NHA), adverse claimant, claiming
among others that NHA has the right of the ownership of the property being the subject of
controversy in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, entitled National Housing Authority vs. Luisito Sarte,
et al., now pending before RTC, Br. 103, Q.C., Doc. No. 76, page 16, Bk. I, s. of 1995 of Not.
Pub. of Q.C. Belsie Cailipan Sy.
Date of the instrument May 4, 1995
Date of the inscription May 4, 1995.[8]
and Notice of Lis Pendens, to wit:
Entry No. 1367/T-No. 122944: NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

By virtue of a notice of lis pendens presented and filed by Oscar I. Garcia & Virgilio C. Abejo,
notice is hereby given that a case has been pending RTC, Q.C. in Civil Case No. Q-95-23940
entitled National Housing Authority, plaintiff, -vs.-Luistio Sarte, Jose Evangelista, Northern Star
Agri-Business Corporation, BPI Agricultural Development Bank & the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, defendants, plaintiff praying for Annulment of the Deed of Assignment, Deed of
Absolute Sale, Real Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and 126639 &
damages.
Date of the Instrument May 24, 1995
Date of the Inscription - May 31, 1995[9]
On May 1, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file supplemental complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-91-10071, seeking to include respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business
Corporation and BPI Agricultural Development Bank as defendants. The proposed additional
defendants were the subsequent purchasers of Lots 1-A and 1-B.[10] The trial court, however,
denied the motion in its Order dated May 17, 1995.[11]
Thus, petitioner, on May 31, 1995, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 82) a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale, Real
Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944 and 126639, and Damages, against Sarte,
respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business Corporation, BPI Agricultural
Development Bank and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
95-23940.[12] But the trial court dismissed without prejudice said case on October 23, 1995, on
the ground of the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-91-10071.[13]
In a decision dated November 29, 1995, the trial court, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071,
rendered its decision in favor of petitioner, with the following dispositive portion:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff National Housing Authority
as follows:

1. The auction sale conducted by the Quezon City Treasurer in 1986 of the parcel of land
consisting of 915.50 sq. m. subject of this case previously covered by TCT No. 138007 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued in the name of Adela Salindon and wherein defendant
Luisito Sarte was the auction buyer and TCT No. 239729 in the name of Arsenio Florendo,
Milagros Florendo, Beatriz Florendo and Eloisa F. Kulphongpatana is hereby declared null and
void ab initio;

2. TCT No. 28182 subsequently issued in the name of defendant Luisito Sarte by the Quezon
City Registry of Deeds is hereby declared null and void ab initio and the herein defendant
Quezon City Register of Deeds is hereby ordered to cancel said TCT 28182 in the name of
Luisito Sarte;

3. Any transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land
subject of this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before
or during the pendency of the instant case are hereby declared null and void, together
with any transfer certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions
by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the
cancellation of such TCTs;
4. The defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to issue a new transfer
certificate of title over the entire parcel of land (915.50 sq. m.) subject of this case in favor of the
National Housing Authority by way of satisfying the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 50544
promulgated on May 1984;

5. The NHA is hereby required and authorized to put in place on the property at bar a notice,
readable, bold, and stable, sufficiently signifying the essence of this courts decision so that no
person may err as to the real ownership of the instant parcel of land and to fence the same to
prevent entry of squatters or other illegal intruders.

The court further renders judgment as follows:

1. No pronouncement as to attorneys fees, costs and other damages as fundamentally the main
responsible character here are the public officers sued in their official capacity.

2. The complaint-in-intervention by Teresita Vasquez is held premature in view of the disposition

herein made in favor of NHA which can only fully act with regard to the claim of said intervenor
after this decision becomes final. Moreover, insofar as and to the extent in which intervenor
Vasquez has joined the NHA in the case at bench, her assertions and prayers have already
been adjudged in this decision in favor of the plaintiff National Housing Authority.

SO ORDERED.[14] (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the trial courts judgment,
particularly paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion, referring to the nullity of any transfer,
assignment, sale or mortgage made by Sarte. In his petition, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud
as ground. According to respondent, since he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, he
was prevented from ventilating his cause, right or interest over the property, and the judgment
was not binding on him, as the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.[15]
The CA granted the petition and declared null and void paragraph 3 of the dispositive
portion of the trial courts decision insofar as petitioners title to the property is concerned.[16] The
CA found that respondent was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 and the trial court did
not acquire any jurisdiction over his person. The CA also ruled that the judgment violated
respondents right against deprivation of the property without due process of law. [17]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner took the present
recourse.
Petitioner insists that it should not be faulted for the trial courts denial of its motion to
include respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. Petitioner also claims that the
auction sale of the property by the City Treasurer of Quezon City is void ab initio because it was
never supposed to be included in the auction sale as petitioner, which has been declared by the
Court in G.R. No. L-60544 as the owner of the property, is exempt from payment of taxes.
Hence, Sarte cannot claim any right over the same and respondent, having bought it from Sarte,
does not acquire any better right thereto. Petitioner also alleges that respondent is not a buyer
in good faith because the latter was aware of the pending litigation involving the property.[18]
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in annulling paragraph 3 of the
trial courts decision on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process of law.
 Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.[19] Jurisprudence and Section 2,
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court lay down the grounds upon which an action for annulment of
judgment may be brought, i.e., (1) extrinsic fraud, and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process.[20]
Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party
or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case, the judgment or final order and
resolution are void.[21] A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either
by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons.[22]
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never made a party to Civil Case No. Q-
91-10071. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger,
and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.[23] Yet, the assailed
paragraph 3 of the trial courts decision decreed that (A)ny transfers, assignment, sale or
mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant
Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case are
hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer certificates of title issued in connection
with the aforesaid transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered
to cancel or cause the cancellation of such TCTs. Respondent is adversely affected by such
judgment, as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from Sarte, and title was
already transferred to him. It will be the height of inequity to allow respondents title to be nullified
without being given the opportunity to present any evidence in support of his ostensible
ownership of the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. [24] Clearly,
the trial courts judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its dispositive portion is concerned.
Petitioner argues that it should not bear the consequence of the trial courts denial of its
motion to include respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. True, it was not
petitioners fault that respondent was not made a party to the case. But likewise, it was not
respondents fault that he was not given the opportunity to present his side of the story.
Whatever prompted the trial court to deny petitioners motion to include respondent as defendant
is not for the Court to reason why. Petitioner could have brought the trial courts denial to the CA
on certiorari but it did not. Instead, it filed Civil Case No. Q-95-23940 for Annulment of Deed of
Assignment, Deed of Absolute Sale, Real Estate Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT Nos. 122944
and 126639, and Damages, against herein respondent Sarte and others. Unfortunately for
petitioner, this was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 82) on the
ground of litis pendentia. Be that as it may, the undeniable fact remains -- respondent is not a
party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, and paragraph 3, or any portion of the trial courts judgment
for that matter, cannot be binding on him.
Petitioner also claims that respondent is not a buyer in good faith, citing as badge of
knowledge, respondents alleged awareness of the pending lawsuit over the property. Petitioner
claims that respondent had admitted that before TCT No. 122944 was issued to the latter, the
notice of lis pendens was already annotated at the back of the title. Respondent, however,
denied having made such admission.[25] There is merit to respondents denial.
Based on petitioners claim, one would assume that the notice of lis pendens was annotated
on the title preceding TCT No. 122944, which is TCT No. 108070 in the name of Sarte.
However, there is nothing in TCT No. 108070 which shows any annotation of a notice of lis
pendens or adverse claim. The last entries on TCT No. 108070 were Entry No. 4172 made on
May 24, 1994, canceling Entry No. 674, which is an annotation of a mortgage, [26] and a
registration of the Deed of Assignment between Sarte and respondent, which was made on
December 21, 1994.[27] It was already after respondent acquired the property and after TCT No.
122944 was issued in his name that petitioners adverse claim (Entry No. 7159) and a notice
of lis pendens (Entry No. 1367) were annotated.[28] It should also be pointed out that the notice
of lis pendens annotated on the back of respondents title refers to Civil Case No. Q-95-23940,
and not Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. It was in petitioners Affidavit of Adverse Claim that Civil
Case No. Q-91-10071 was indicated.
To repeat, as records show, at the time the notice of lis pendens and adverse claim was
annotated, the Deed of Assignment has already been entered into by respondent and Sarte,
and TCT No. 122944 was already issued in respondents name on December 21, 1994.
Petitioner filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 way back in 1991. TCT Nos. 108070 and 108071
were issued in Sartes name on May 13, 1994;[29] TCT No. 122944 was issued in respondents
name on December 21, 1994.[30] Petitioner had enough opportunity to have its adverse claim
and a notice of lis pendens annotated on Sartes title before the latter assigned the property to
Evangelista, but it did not do so. The adverse claim was annotated only on May 4, 1995 and the
notice of lis pendens, on May 31, 1995.[31] While a notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to
a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he
should keep his hands off the same, unless he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation,
such constructive notice operates as such from the date of the registration of the notice of lis
pendens,[32] which in this case, was, at the earliest, on May 4, 1995. This was long after title to
the property was transferred to respondent.
Note also must be made that respondent was not furnished by petitioner of a copy of its
motion for leave to file supplemental complaint.[33] Thus, it cannot be said that respondent knew
of the existence of Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. Moreover, the filing of Civil Case No. Q-95-
23940 against respondent and other defendants was made only on May 31, 1995, and at that
point, TCT No. 122944 was already issued in respondents name.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not declaring that respondent is a purchaser of the
property in good faith. This is an issue that cannot be dealt with by the Court in this forum, as
the only issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in annulling paragraph 3 of the trial
courts decision on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process of law. Whether or not
respondent is a purchaser in good faith is an issue which is a different matter altogether that
must be threshed out in a full-blown trial for that purpose in an appropriate case and in the
proper forum. Also, CA-G.R. CV No. 52466, which is the appeal from the trial courts decision in
Civil Case No. Q-91-10071, is pending before the CA, and it would be premature and
unwarranted for the Court to render any resolution that would unnecessarily interfere with the
appellate proceedings.
Insofar as this petition is concerned, what the Court declares is that the notice of lis
pendens cannot serve as constructive notice to respondent for having been annotated after the
transfer of the property to him and that he is entitled to have paragraph 3 of the trial courts
decision annulled.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit and the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51646 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
6. G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the

Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773.
These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private
respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the
said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges
that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee.

The facts are:

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on
June 20, 1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for
the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
for the provisional arrest of private respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ
of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final
and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part,
private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for
bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-
95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition
for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for
judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;
 2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they
so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be
filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking,
said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation
be noted therein accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting
in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first
time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may
be granted bail.

In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings," thus:

x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1,
6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail
will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes
the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that
the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the
second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted
in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the
laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now
a valid subject of international law.

On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life,
liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the
principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon
the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court,
in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3the principles set
forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life,
liberty, and due process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable
it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s
ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is
not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings,
such as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during
the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure
to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting
that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to
treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal
law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.

In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that
foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon
the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed
in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both
are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand
the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal
proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its
nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is
it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent
the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain
the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further
note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently."

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a

criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence
of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary
presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is
the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears
the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the
purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily
met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used
in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not,
the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

7. G.R. No. 90786 September 27, 1991

ESPERO SANTOS SAIAW, petitioner

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ASSOCIATED BANK AND/ OR JOSE R.
TENGCO, Chairman of the Board, ROLLIE TUAZON, Manager, respondents.

Nicolas R. Ruiz, II for petitioner.

Soluta, Leonidas, Marifosque, Javier & Aguila Law Offices for private respondents

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 rendered in NLRC Case No. 4-1272-85
dated July 26, 1989, affirming the dismissal of the petitioner by the respondent bank, and reversing
thereby the Decision2 of Labor Arbiter Benigno C. Villarente, Jr. of March 29, 1988 which declared
the petitioner's dismissal as illegal and ordered his reinstatement with backwages and benefits.

The records show that the petitioner, Espero Santos Salaw, was employed by the private
respondents in September 1967 as a credit investigator-appraiser. His duties included inspecting,
investigating, appraising, and identifying the company's foreclosed assets; giving valuation to its real
properties, and verifying the genuineness and encumbrances of the titles of properties mortgaged to
the respondents.

On November 27, 1984, the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary,
National Capital Region, extracted from the petitioner — without the assistance of counsel — a
Sworn Statement3 which made it appear that the petitioner, in cahoots with a co-employee, Reynaldo
Madrigal, a supervisor in charge of the acquired assets of respondent Associated Bank, sold twenty
sewing machines and electric generators which had been foreclosed by the respondent bank from
Worldwide Garment and L.P. Money Garment, for P60,000.00, and divided the proceeds thereof in
equal shares of P30,000.00 between the two of them.

On December 5, 1984, the petitioner was requested by private respondent Rollie Tuazon, the bank
manager, to appear before the bank's Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee (PDIC)
which would be meeting the following day, December 6, 1984, at 9:00 a.m., in connection with the
Worldwide case.

When petitioner Salaw signified his readiness to appear before the PDIC, private respondent Rollie
Tuazon sent him a letter4 stating —

Your request to appear before the Personnel Discipline and Invesgation Committee (PDIC)
with regard to the Worldwide Case has been accepted.

Thus, you are requested to come on Thursday, February 28, 1985 at 11:00 at the Board
Room, 10th Floor of the Madrigal Building, Ayala, without counsel or representative.
(Emphasis supplied)

On April 1, 1985, the petitioner was terminated from his employment effective March 27, 1985, for
alleged serious misconduct or willful disobedience and fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on
him by the private respondents.

Subsequently, the petitioner filed with the NLRC on April 17, 1985, a complaint for illegal dismissal
against respondent Bank, Jose R. Tengco, and Rollie Tuazon. This case was docketed as Case No.
NCR-4-1272-85. He likewise submitted an affidavit recanting his Sworn Statement before the CIS
(Annex "A") mentioned earlier.

After the proper proceedings, on March 29,1988, Labor Arbiter Benigno C. Villarente, Jr., rendered a
Decision5 the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of

complainant illegal and ordering respondents to reinstate complainant to his former or
equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and to pay him his backwages and benefits
due an employee of respondent Bank from the time of illegal dismissal until actual
reinstatement.

The private respondents appealed the labor arbiter's decision to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which on July 26, 1989, rendered a Decision6 reversing that of the labor arbiter
and dismissing the case for lack of merit.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC decision, but this was denied in a
Resolution7 dated October 31, 1989. Hence, this recourse.

The only issue for our resolution is whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner by the private
respondents was legally justified.

Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee by his
employer are two-fold: the substantive and the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid
or authorized cause as provided by law (Articles 279, 281, 282-284, New Labor Code), but the
rudimentary requirements of due process — notice and hearing — must also be observed before an
employee may be dismissed. One does not suffice; without their concurrence, the terminate would,
in the eyes of the law, be illegal.8

The inviolability of notice and hearing for a valid dismissal an employee can not be over-
emphasized. Those twin requirements constitute essential elements of due process in cases
employee dismissal. The requirement of notice is intended inform the employee concerned of the
employer's intent dismiss him and the reason for the proposed dismissal; on other hand, the
requirement of hearing affords the employ the opportunity to answer his employer's charges against
him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal effected. Neither one of these two
requirements can be dispensed with without running afoul of the due process requirement of the
Constitution.9

We agree with the labor arbiter that the petitioner was terminated without the benefit of due process
of law. His dismiss was, therefore, illegal. Thus,

Respondents' initial act in convening their Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee
(PDIC) to investigate complainant (after the CIS experience) would have complied with the
demands of due process had complainant been given the opportunity to present his own
defense and confront the witnesses, if any, and examine the evidence against him. But as
the records clearly show, complainant was denied that constitutional right when his
subsequent request refute the allegations against him was granted and a hearing was
set "without counsel or representative. (See respondent Tuazon's letter t respondent dated
February 25, 1985).10

The investigation of petitioner Salaw by the respondent Bank' investigating committee violated his
constitutional right to due process, in as much as he was not given a chance to defend himself, as
provided in Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code
governing the dismissal of employees. Section 5 of the said Rule requires that "the employer shall
afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires."11 (Emphasis supplied.) Here petition was perfunctorily denied the
assistance of counsel during investigation to be conducted by the PDIC. No reasons preferred which
vitiated the denial with irregularity and unfairness.

It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure in the adjudication cases. However, the right to counsel, a very basic requirement of
substantive due process, has to be observed. Indeed, rights to counsel and to due process of law
are two of fundamental rights guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution to person under investigation, be
the proceeding administrate civil, or criminal. Thus, Section 12(1), Article III thereof specifically
provides: "Any person under investigation for the commssion of an offense shall have the right to ...
have compete and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing in
the presence of counsel."12 To underscore the inviolability this provision, the third paragraph of the
same section explicitly states that, "any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible evidence against him."13

As aptly observed by the labor arbiter, the respondents premised their action in dismissing the
complainant on his supposed admission of the offense imputed to him by the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) in its interrogation in November, 1984. The said admission was carried in a three-page
Sworn Statement signed by the complainant. Aside from this Statement, other evidence was
presented by the respondents to establish the culpability of the complainant in the fraudulent sale of
respondents' foreclosed properties. Even the minutes of proceeding taken during the investigation
conducted by respondents were not presented. ... This is a glaring denial of due process. We find it
worth reiterating the cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of
administrative character as enunciated by this Court in classic landmark decision of Justice Laurel
in Ang Tibay,14wit:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, Law.
ed. 1129, the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence prese (ChiefJustice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468,66 S. Ct. 906, Law. ed.
1288). In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy 22 Phil. 598, the right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such
right conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence presented thrust it
aside without notice or consideration.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregard namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached. (Edward vs. McCoy, supra.) ...

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila
vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgate November 29, 1937, XXXVI O.G. 1335), but the
evidence must be "substantial."(Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142,147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 8 Law. ed. 965.) "Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v
National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; Nation Labor Relations Board v.
Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15 Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.)...

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission
vs. L. & N.R. Co 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed.
431) ...

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations (now the National Relations Commission) or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts
of controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate arriving at a decision ....

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations (now NLRC) should, in controversial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty inseparable
from the authority conferred upon it.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering further that the admission by the petitioner which was extracted from him by the
Criminal Investigate Service of the Philippine Constabulary (National Capital Region) without the
assistance of counsel and which was made the sole basis for his dismissal, can not be admitted in
evidence against him, then, the finding of guilt of the PDIC, which was affirmed by the public
respondent NLRC; has no more leg stand on. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity.

Significantly, the dismissal of the petitioner from his employment was characterized by undue haste.
The law is clear that even in the disposition of labor cases, due process must not be subordinated to
expediency or dispatch. Otherwise, the dismissal of the employee will be tainted with illegality. On
this point, we have ruled
consistently.15

We reiterate the rule laid down in Santos v. NLRC16 that normal consequences of a finding that an
employee has been illegally dismissed are, firstly, that the employee becomes entitled to
reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights and, secondly, the payment of
backwages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement." The
petitioner is entitled to no less.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the appealed
decision of the NLRC REINSTATING the decision of the labor arbiter.

SO ORDERED.

8. G.R. No. 180146 December 18, 2008

PO2 RUEL C. MONTOYA, petitioner,

vs.
POLICE DIRECTOR REYNALDO P. VARILLA, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION, POLICE OFFICE and ATTY. RUFINO JEFFREY L. MANERE, REGIONAL LEGAL
AFFAIRS SERVICE, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to
nullify and set aside the Decision1 dated 9 August 2007 and Resolution2 dated 18 October 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96022, which affirmed Resolutions No. 05-1200 and No. 06-
1500 dated 24 August 2005 and 23 August 2006, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), dismissing petitioner Police Officer 2 (PO2) Ruel C. Montoya from the police service.

The following are the factual antecedents:

Montoya, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), was assigned to the Central Police
District (CPD) in Quezon City, when the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Special
Order No. 10443 on 9 September 1998 dropping him from the rolls, effective 15 August 1998, for
failure to attend the Law Enforcement and Enhancement Course (LEEC) at the Special Training
Unit, National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO), Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. Montoya
had been absent without official leave (AWOL) for a period of 67 days, from 23 January 1998 to 31
March 1998.
On 15 December 1998, four months after he was dropped from the rolls, Montoya filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof addressed to the PNP Regional Director for the National Capital Region
(NCR), explaining that on 22 January 1998, he went to the Baler Police Station/Police Station 2 to
have his Sick Leave Form approved by the station commander. Allegedly due to the fact that his
name had already been forwarded to the NCRPO for the LEEC, his Sick Leave Form was not
approved. Montoya averred that his failure to attend the LEEC was beyond his control, since he was
suffering from arthritis with on and off symptoms of severe body pain. Montoya attached to his
Motion a certification simply dated 1998, issued by a certain Dr. Jesus G. de Guzman, and
authenticated by Police Chief Inspector (P/CINSP.) Ethel Y. Tesoro, Chief, Medical Service, CPD.

Upon the recommendation of the Chief of the NCRPO Legal Division, the NCR Regional Director
issued on 11 June 1999 Special Order No. 990 canceling Special Order No. 1044. Montoya was
also preventively suspended for 30 days, from 8 June to 8 July 1999, pending Summary
Proceedings of his administrative liability. The 67 days when Montoya went on absence without
leave (AWOL) were immediately deducted from his leave credits.

The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were conducted by Hearing Officer Police
Superintendent (P/Supt.) Francisco Don C. Montenegro of the Central Police District Office (CPDO),
and based on his findings, the NCR Regional Director rendered a Decision4 on 23 June 2000
dismissing Montoya from the police service for Serious Neglect of Duty (due to AWOL), effective
immediately. Montoya received a copy of said Decision on 20 July 2000.

Allegedly unassisted by counsel, Montoya filed on 1 August 2000 with the CPD office a Petition for
Review/Motion for Reconsideration5 of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director,
which he addressed to the PNP Chief. In a Memorandum issued on 3 July 2002 by the Directorate
for Personnel and Records Management of the PNP Headquarters, Montoya’s Petition/Motion was
denied for lack of jurisdiction, since a disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal from service
imposed by a PNP regional director may only be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB).

Montoya next filed on 2 September 2002 an appeal of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR
Regional Director before the RAB of the National Capital Region (RAB-NCR), alleging lack of due
process considering that he was not even notified of any hearing by the Summary Hearing Officer
and was thus deprived of the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The Summary Hearing
Officer in the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against him recommended his dismissal from police
service based on his failure to report for the LEEC, without even looking into his side of the
controversy.

On 11 December 2002, the RAB-NCR rendered its Decision6 granting Montoya’s appeal and
ordering his reinstatement. Pertinent provisions of the said Decision read:

The Summary Hearing Officer (SHO), P/Supt. Francisco Don Montenegro, conducted the
hearing ex-parte on the basis only of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the [herein
petitioner Montoya] in which he categorically stated that on January 22, 1998, when he went
to Police Station 2 to have his sick leave form approved, he was informed that his name was
already forwarded to NCRPO to undergo LEEC schooling. With that information, the SHO
concluded that appellant, PO2 Montoya, should have proceeded to STU, NCRPO to inform
his superior about his physical predicament. However, [Montoya] did nothing to have the
officers of STU, NCRPO notified of his sickness in order that appropriate actions can be
instituted. Sixty-seven days is too long for a period for [Montoya] to allow even one day of
reporting to STU, NCRPO to present his Medical Certificate and seek proper action for his
ailment. Thus, [Montoya] was ordered dismissed from the Police Service.
 xxxx

This Board, after careful review and evaluation of the records and arguments/evidence
presented by herein [Montoya] finds this appeal meritorious and tenable. Nothing on the
records would show that [Montoya] was notified of the summary hearing conducted by the
Summary Hearing Officer nor was he given a chance to explain his side and submit
controverting evidence on his behalf. On the other hand, what appeared on the record is the
fact that the Summary Hearing Officer, who was tasked to resolve this case, conducted the
hearing ex-parte. Thereafter, he recommended for the [Montoya’s] dismissal from the police
service on the ground that the latter failed to inform his superiors about his physical
predicament since [Montoya] did nothing to have the officers of STU, NCRPO notified of his
sickness in order that appropriate actions can be instituted. Summary Hearing Officer further
concluded that sixty-seven days is too long for a period (sic) for [Montoya] to allow even one
day of reporting to STU, NCRPO to present his Medical Certificate and seek proper action
for his ailment.

The RAB-NCR decreed in the end:

Wherefore, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
movant-appellant PO2 Ruel Catud Montoya is hereby ordered to be reinstated in the police
service without loss of seniority rights and with full payment of his salaries and backwages
covering the period effective from the time of his dismissal from the service up to his
reinstatement.7

Thereafter, the NCR Regional Director authorized Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Rufino
Jeffrey L. Manere (Manere) to appeal several RAB-NCR decisions involving different police
officers,8 including the Decision dated 11 December 2002 on Montoya’s case, before the Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG). The NCR Regional Director assailed the RAB-NCR
decision reinstating Montoya in the police service on the following grounds:

a. Failure to file a Notice of Appeal with the NCRPO prior to his appeal to the Appellate
Board, as provided by Sec. 2, Rule III, MC # 91-007;

b. The Board erred to take cognizance of the case despite the fact that the decision of the
NCRPO dated 23 June 2000 had already become final and executory.

c. The Board erred in giving backwages despite the "no work, no pay" policy.

On 8 August 2003, Montoya, together with the other police personnel9 reinstated in the service by
RAB-NCR (hereinafter collectively referred to as Montoya, et al.), filed before the DILG an Urgent
Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the Appeal of the NCR Regional Director.

On 10 November 2003, DILG Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. issued an Order denying the appeal of the
NCR Regional Director.10 DILG Secretary Lina noted that the NCR Regional Director received a copy
of the RAB-NCR decision on Montoya’s case on 10 February 2003, but it only appealed the same to
the DILG on 30 April 2003, beyond the 15-day reglementary period for appeals. DILG Secretary Lina
also declared that neither Manere nor the NCR Regional Director has personality to appeal the RAB-
NCR decision to the DILG. The right to appeal from the decision of the RAB to the DILG is available
only to the active complainant or the respondent who was imposed a penalty of demotion in rank,
forced resignation, or dismissal from the service. Manere, representing the NCR Regional Director,
is not a party complainant or a respondent aggrieved by the adverse decision, hence, he cannot
appeal the said decision. Similarly, there is no specific provision allowing the NCR Regional Director,
in his capacity as the judge and/or arbiter of PNP disciplinary cases, to file an appeal to the DILG
from the decision of the RAB. Finally, DILG Secretary Lina explained that the filing of an appeal by
"either party" under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 697511 covers only demotion and dismissal from
the service and never exoneration and suspension. Thus, the appeal of the RAB-NCR decision
exonerating Montoya should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for the reason that the said
decision had already become final and executory. The dispositive portion of DILG Secretary Lina’s
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeals are hereby denied for lack of merit. The assailed
decisions of the Regional Appellate Board – National Capital Region, 4th Division, are hereby
affirmed in toto.12

The NCR Regional Director, represented by Manere, appealed the Order dated 10 November 2003
of DILG Secretary Lina to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The NCR Regional Director asserted
its right to appeal citing Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy.13

On 23 March 2004, the NCR Regional Director issued Special Order No. 611 reinstating Montoya, et
al., without prejudice to the pending appeal of the NCR Regional Director before the CSC.

Subsequently, the CSC issued on 24 August 2005 Resolution No. 05-1200 which recognized the
right of the PNP disciplining authorities to appeal the decision of the RAB-NCR to the DILG. The
CSC set aside the 10 November 2003 Order of DILG Secretary Lina and affirmed the decisions of
the NCR Regional Director dismissing Montoya, et al., from police service. According to the CSC,
Montoya, in particular, was guilty of laches and abandonment of his position. It also held that the 11
December 2002 Decision of the RAB-NCR on Montoya’s case, affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina,
was based on mere affidavits which were not substantiated.

The CSC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Montoya, et al., in Resolution No. 06-1500 dated
23 August 2006 for lack of new evidence or any valid reason that warrants the setting aside or
modification of its Resolution No. 05-1200.

Montoya, et al., sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 43
with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 96022.

On 9 August 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing CA-G.R. SP No.
96022, since there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC in issuing Resolutions
No. 05-1200 and No. 06-1500. The dispositive portion of said Decision states:

Wherefore this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS Resolution No. 05-1200
dated August 24, 2005 and Resolution No. 06-1500 dated August 23, 2006 of the Civil
Service Commission. Accordingly, the Order dated November 10, 2003 of the DILG
Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. affirming the nine (9) decisions of the Regional Appellate Board
reinstating [Montoya, et al.] to the police service is SET ASIDE. The decisions of the NCRPO
Regional Director dismissing petitioners-police officers Enrique C. Paulino, Rebecca P.
Fernandez, Donato L. Geda, Marlo S. Quiambao, Danilo De Leon Nuqui, Ruel C. Montoya,
Cecilia Z. de Leon, Alberto S. Mendoza and Rodolfo C. de Leon are hereby AFFIRMED.14

Aggrieved, Montoya filed his own Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 96022, but it was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 18 October 2007.

Hence, the present Petition15 in which Montoya raises the following issues:
 I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT MANERE FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES.

II. WHETHER OR NOT MANERE HAS THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO APPEAL THE
DECISION EXONERATING THE PETITIONER.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF PETITIONER WAS

VIOLATED.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER DELAYED IN APPEALING THE DECISION

SUMMARILY DISMISSING HIM.

V. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER DESERVED TO BE DISMISSED FROM SERVICE.

The Court finds merit in the Petition at bar.

Though procedural rules in administrative proceedings are less stringent and often applied more
liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural
principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. The right to substantive
and procedural due process is applicable to administrative proceedings.16

Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.17 Unarguably, this rule, as it is stated, strips
down administrative due process to its most fundamental nature and sufficiently justifies freeing
administrative proceedings from the rigidity of procedural requirements. In particular, however, due
process in administrative proceedings has also been recognized to include the following: (1) the right
to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s
legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected.18

Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not strictly bound by
procedural requirements, they are still bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental
requirements of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is
not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. 19 In the
application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous
notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.20

In the instant case, the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were flawed from the very
beginning when these were conducted without due notice to him. The NCR Regional Director,
through Manere, never contested the fact that the Hearing Officer proceeded with his investigation
without giving notice to Montoya. Without notice, Montoya was unable to attend the hearings,
present written or oral arguments, and submit evidence in his favor; he was completely deprived of
the opportunity to be heard on the administrative charges against him and was irrefragably denied
due process.

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted
from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional
issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right
of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction.21 The rule must be equally true for quasi-judicial administrative bodies, for the
constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
is unqualified by what type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) he stands to lose the
same. Consequently, the Decision dated 23 June 2000 of the NCR Regional Director dismissing
Montoya from service is void for having been rendered in violation of the latter’s due process.

The foregoing finding of this Court precludes a ruling that Montoya delayed appealing the NCR
Regional Director’s Decision of 23 June 2000, and the said decision has already become final and
executory.

The Court reviews the vital dates. Montoya was able to receive a copy of the 23 June 2000 Decision
of the NCR Regional Director dismissing him from service on 20 July 2000. He erroneously filed his
Petition for Review/Motion for Reconsideration with the PNP Chief on 1 August 2000. The PNP
denied Montoya’s Petition/Motion on 3 July 2002, two years after the filing thereof, citing lack of
jurisdiction, considering that the proper appellate body is the RAB-NCR. Thus, Montoya was only
able to file his appeal of the decision of the NCR Regional Director before the RAB-NCR on 2
September 2002.

Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the DILG Act of 1990, provides:

SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. – The disciplinary action imposed upon a member of
the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the
Regional Director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be
appealed to the Regional Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of
the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief
of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided, furthermore, That, the Regional or
National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days
from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the Regional Appellate
Board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory
without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary.
(Underscoring supplied.)

Obviously, Montoya’s appeal on 2 September 2002 with the RAB-NCR, the appellate body with
jurisdiction, was filed way beyond 10 days from his receipt of a copy of the NCR Regional Director’s
decision on 20 July 2000.

As a general rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is
not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment
of the court final and executory.22 The Court, however, reiterates its previous pronouncements herein
that the Summary Dismissal Proceedings were conducted without notice to Montoya and in violation
of his right to due process. The violation of Montoya’s fundamental constitutional right deprived the
NCR Regional Director of jurisdiction over Montoya’s administrative case; and the decision rendered
by the NCR Regional Director therein was void. A void judgment does not become final and
executory and may be challenged at any time.

A decision of the court (or, in this case, a quasi-judicial administrative body) without jurisdiction is
null and void; hence, it can never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be
attacked directly or collaterally.23Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding the violation of
due process may be regarded as a "lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at
sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head."24

The Court also observes that it took the PNP two years to deny Montoya’s Petition/Motion before it,
even though the PNP Chief manifestly did not have jurisdiction over the same. While Montoya did err
in first filing his appeal with the PNP Chief, the prompt denial thereof would have spurred Montoya to
re-file his appeal sooner before the appropriate forum, the RAB-NCR.

As to the issue of whether the NCR Regional Director may appeal the Decisions dated 11 December
2002 and 10 November 2003 of the RAB-NCR and DILG Secretary Lina, respectively, the Court
answers in the negative.

Prior to Dacoycoy, case law held that dismissal of the charges against or exoneration of respondents
in administrative disciplinary proceedings is final and not subject to appeal even by the government.
On 29 April 1999, the Court promulgated its Decision in Dacoycoy, in which it made the following
pronouncements:

At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the question of the party adversely affected who
may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil
service disciplinary case. There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the
Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was
the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein, herein respondent Dacoycoy, to
implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent as the government agency
tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission
and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court
of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty
of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the
government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party
adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system.
Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to
the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant
jurisprudence that "the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the
government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary,
transfer, removal or dismissal from office" and not included are "cases where the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no
occasion for appeal." In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil
Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service
Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission;
Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more
recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.25 (Emphasis ours.)

Subsequently, the Court qualified its declarations in Dacoycoy. In National Appellate Board of the
National Police Commission v. Mamauag,26 citing Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court
elucidated that:
 RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the
disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize "either party" to appeal
in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent
when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the
service. The other party is the government when the disciplining authority imposes
the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the services
is the proper penalty.

However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or
tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or
dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be one that is
prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous
situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of
being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent.
Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:

To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought
before the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission was included only as a
nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission can be likened
to a judge who should "detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to
a higher court for review."

In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed
from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate. Its mandated function is to
"hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its
offices and agencies," not to litigate.

While Dacoycoy established that the government could appeal the decision exonerating respondent
public officer or employee from administrative charges, it was Mamauag which specifically required
that the government party appealing must be the one prosecuting the case and not the disciplining
authority or tribunal which heard the administrative case.

In the present case, Montoya appealed to the RAB-NCR the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR
Regional Director dismissing him from service. The RAB-NCR, in its 11 December 2002 Decision,
reversed the appealed decision of the NCR Regional Director and ordered Montoya’s reinstatement.
The NCR Regional Director then appealed the decision of the RAB-NCR to the Office of the DILG
Secretary. DILG Secretary Lina, in his Decision dated 10 November 2003, affirmed the decision of
the RAB-NCR. Once more, the NCR Regional Director filed an appeal with the CSC, where he was
able to secure a favorable ruling.

It is beyond dispute that the NCR Regional Director was acting as the investigating and disciplining
authority when he rendered his Decision dated 23 June 2000 dismissing Montoya from the service.
The pronouncement in Mamauag, that the disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the case and
imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal should not be the one appealing the subsequent
exoneration of the public officer or employee, squarely applies to the NCR Regional Director.

In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,28 the Court
explained:

It is a well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself from cases where his decision
is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such doctrine is the fact that a
 judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to
contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without his
active participation. When a judge actively participates in the appeal of his judgment, he, in a
way, ceases to be judicial and has become adversarial instead.

The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not only when
hearing and resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is brought on appeal
before a higher court. The judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency must keep
in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle the controversies between parties in
accordance with the evidence and the applicable laws, regulations, and/or jurisprudence. His
judgment should already clearly and completely state his findings of fact and law. There must
be no more need for him to justify further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate
courts. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the
appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his detachment and impartiality, and his interest in the
case becomes personal since his objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy
between the original parties (which he had already accomplished by rendering his judgment),
but more significantly, to refute the appellant’s assignment of errors, defend his judgment,
and prevent it from being overturned on appeal.

The NCR Regional Director, in actively appealing the reversal of his Decision, had inevitably
forsaken his impartiality and had become adversarial. His interest was only in seeing to it that his
decision would be reinstated.

The party who has the personality and interest to appeal the decisions of the RAB-NCR and DILG
Secretary Lina exonerating Montoya from the administrative charges against him and reinstating him
to the service is the PNP as a bureau. It was the PNP, in the exercise of its authority to implement
internal discipline among its members, which instigated the administrative investigation of Montoya,
so it may be deemed the prosecuting government party. And it is the PNP which stands to suffer as
a result of the purportedly wrongful exoneration of Montoya, since it would be compelled to take
back to its fold a delinquent member.

Given all of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the RAB-NCR, affirmed by DILG
Secretary Lina, reinstating Montoya to the service. It was only the RAB-NCR which properly
acquired jurisdiction over the appeal filed before it and was able to render a decision after a
consideration of both sides to the controversy. In Go v. National Police Commission,29 the Court
already issued a caveat, worth reiterating herein:

We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and that not even the fact
that the charge against him is serious and evidence of his guilt is – in the opinion of his
superiors – strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut evident in the record of this
case. It is precisely in cases such as this that the utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to
clean up the ranks of the police those who are innocent are denied justice or, through
blunder, those who are guilty are allowed to escape punishment.

Before finally writing finis to this case, the Court still finds it necessary to address the remaining
issue on the supposed failure of the NCR Regional Director to exhaust administrative remedies.
Montoya argues that the NCR Regional Director failed to exhaust administrative remedies when he
appealed the 10 November 2003 Decision of DILG Secretary Lina directly to the CSC, without first
filing an appeal with the Office of the President.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s
judicial power can be sought.30 The administrative agency concerned is in the best position to correct
any previous error committed in its forum.31

Montoya’s reliance on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is misplaced, for said
doctrine does not find application in the instant case. The doctrine intends to preclude premature
resort from a quasi-judicial administrative body to the court. Such is not the situation in this case.
Montoya is questioning the supposed premature resort of the NCR Regional Director from the
decision of the DILG Secretary to the CSC, instead of to the Office of the President; obviously, he
is challenging the resort from one administrative body to another.

Furthermore, Montoya’s assertion that DILG Secretary Lina’s decision should have first been
appealed to the Office of the President before the CSC is baseless.

PNP personnel fall under the administrative control and supervision of the DILG,32 which, in turn, is
under the administrative control and supervision of the CSC.

In Mendoza v. NAPOLCOM,33 the Court settled that the one and only Philippine police force, the
PNP, shall be civilian in character34 and, consequently, falls under the civil service pursuant to
Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution, which states:

Section 2. (1). The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters.

It is already explicitly provided in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 that the decision of the
Regional Director imposing upon a PNP member the administrative penalty of demotion or dismissal
from the service is appealable to the RAB. From the RAB Decision, the aggrieved party may then
appeal to the DILG Secretary.

Now the question is, from the DILG Secretary, where can the aggrieved party appeal?

In the event the DILG Secretary renders an unfavorable decision, his decision may be appealed to
the CSC.35

Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:

SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. – The Civil Service Law and its implementing
rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department [DILG].

Consequently, case law on administrative disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law also
applies to administrative disciplinary proceedings against PNP members. The Civil Service Law
referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, that in cases
where the decision rendered by a bureau or office (i.e., RAB of the PNP) is appealable to the
Commission, the same may initially be appealed to the department (i.e., DILG) and finally to the
Commission (i.e., CSC).36
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
Decision dated 9 August 2007 and Resolution dated 18 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 96022 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Philippine National Police
is ORDERED to reinstate petitioner PO2 Ruel C. Montoya to the police service without loss of
seniority rights and with full payment of his salaries and backwages covering the period effective
from the time of his dismissal from the service up to his reinstatement.

SO ORDERED.

9. G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S. J., DEAN CYNTHIA

ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE VENICIO ESCOLIN,
FISCAL MIGUEL ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS HERRAS, FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE CLARO
TESORO, RAMON CAGUIOA, and RAMON ERENETA. petitioners,
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the RTC-Makati, Br. 134, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO AMADO SABBAN,
DALMACIO LIM JR., MANUEL ESCONA and JUDE FERNANDEZ, respondents.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Benson & Jimenes for petitioners.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles for petitioner Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo.

Fabregas, Calida & Remollo for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

In 1975, the Court was confronted with a mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission
Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, a religious seminary which has a working arrangement
with the Ateneo de Manila University regarding accreditation of common students, to allow petitioner
who had taken some courses therein for credit during summer, to continue her studies.1 Squarely
meeting the issue, we dismissed the petition on the ground that students in the position of petitioner
possess, not a right, but a privilege, to be admitted to the institution. Not having satisfied the prime
and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding since there is no duty, much less a clear
duty, on the part of the respondent to admit the petitioner, the petition did not prosper.

In support of its decision, the Court invoked academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, as
recognized by the Constitution, the concept encompassing the right of a school to choose its
students.

Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University to refuse admittance to its students, this time in
Ateneo de Manila University proper, is again challenged.

Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the opening paragraph, the individual concerned was not
a regular student, the respondents in the case at bar, having been previously enrolled in the
University, seek re-admission. Moreover, in the earlier case, the petitioner was refused admittance,
not on such considerations as personality traits and character orientation, or even inability to meet
the institution's academic or intellectual standards, but because of her behavior in the classroom.
The school pointedly informed her that ". . . it would seem to be in your best interest to work with a
Faculty that is more compatible with your orientations."

On the other hand, students who are now being refused admission into petitioner University have
been found guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which
prohibits participation in hazing activities. The case attracted much publicity due to the death of one
of the neophytes and serious physical injuries inflicted on another.

Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add another dimension to the concept of academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning, this time a case fraught with social and emotional
overtones.

The facts which gave rise to this case which is far from novel, are as follows:

As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School,
held its initiation rites on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students interested in joining its ranks. As a
result of such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student of petitioner university,
died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital on February 10, 1991. He was not the
lone victim, though, for another freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized
at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries
inflicted upon him on the same occasion.

In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee2 which was tasked to investigate and submit
a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also
required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply.
In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension.3 Through their respective counsels,
they requested copies of the charges and pertinent documents or affidavits.

In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating

Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness,
found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School
Catalogue entitled "Discipline."4
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge on or
before February 18, 1991; otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present
their defenses.

On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board composed of petitioners Judge
Ruperto Kapunan, Justice Venicio Escolin, Atty. Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty.
Ferdinand Casis, to hear the charges against respondent students.

In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent students were informed that they had violated Rule
No. 3 of the Rules on Discipline contained in the Law School Catalogue. Said letter also states: "The
complaint/charge against you arose from initiations held on February 8-10, 1991. The evidence
against you consist of testimonies of students, showing your participation in acts prohibited by the
School regulations." Finally, it ordered respondent students to file their written answers to the above
charge on or before February 22 1991, otherwise they would be deemed to have waived their
defenses.5

In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent students, through counsel, requested that the
investigation against them be held in abeyance, pending action on their request for copies of the
evidence against them.6

Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear before it at a hearing on February
28, 1991 to clarify their answer with regard to the charges filed by the investigating committee for
violation of Rule No. 3. However, in a letter to a petitioners dated February 27, 1991, counsel for
respondent students moved to postpone the hearing from February 28, 1991 to March 1, 1991.7

Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on March 2, 1991 for clarificatory
questions.8 They were also informed that:

a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in accordance with the rules laid down
in the case of Guzman vs. National University;9

b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the affiants-neophytes;

c) Hazing which is not defined in the School catalogue shall be defined in

accordance with the proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina, Senate Bill No. 3815;

d) The Board will take into consideration the degree of participation of the petitioners
in the alleged hazing incident in imposing the penalty;

e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable to the President of the University, i.
e., Respondent Joaquin Bernas S. J.

On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean Castillo that, "in cases where the Disciplinary
Board is not prepared to impose the penalty of dismissal, I would prefer that the Board leave the
decision on the penalty to the Administration so that this case be decided not just on the Law School
level but also on the University level."10

In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule
No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities.
The Board found that respondent students acted as master auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation
rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies privilege," which allows them to participate in the
physical hazing. Although respondent students claim that they were there to assist and attend to the
needs of the neophytes, actually they were assigned a definite supportive role to play in the
organized activity. Their guilt was heightened by the fact that they made no effort to prevent the
infliction of further physical punishment on the neophytes under their care. The Board considered
respondent students part and parcel of the integral process of hazing. In conclusion, the Board
pronounced respondents guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through acquiescence.
However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of
dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration.11 Petitioner
Dean del Castillo waived her prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left to the President
of the University the decision of whether to expel respondents or not.

Consequently, in a resolution dated March 10, 1991, petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President
of the Ateneo de Manila University, accepted the factual findings of the Board, thus: "that as Master
Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's privilege;' that even assuming they did not lay hands on the
neophytes," respondents students are still guilty in accordance with the principle that "where two or
more persons act together in the commission of a crime, whether they act through the physical
volition of one or of all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to
the wrongdoing is responsible for the whole." Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense which led to the
death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the "offense of the respondents can be characterized as
grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian education and contrary to civilized behavior."
Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students.12

In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and concurred in by petitioner Fr. Bernas,13 the Board excluded
respondent students Abas and Mendoza from the coverage of the resolution of March 10, 1991,
inasmuch as at the time the latter resolution was promulgated, neither had as yet submitted their
case to the Board. Said resolution also set the investigation of the two students on March 21, 1991.

On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction14 alleging that they were currently enrolled as students for the second semester of school
year 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining order is issued, they would be prevented from taking
their examinations. The petition principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in their
dismissal.

On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining order the enjoining petitioners
from dismissing respondent students and stopping the former from conducting hearings relative to
the hazing incident.15

Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary restraining order were then held. On April
7, 1991, the temporary restraining order were issued on March 18, 1991 lapsed. Consequently, a
day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board
composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro, Ramon Caguioa, and Ramon Ereñeta to investigate the
charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.

Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari, prohibition

and mandamuswith prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, to include the
aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional respondents to the original petition.16

Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplement Petition arguing that the creation of the Special
Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process in the conduct
of investigations by the Disciplinary Board against respondent students; that a supplemental petition
cannot be admitted without the same being set for hearing and that the supplemental petition for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order will, in effect, extend the previous restraining order beyond
its mandatory 20-day lifetime.17 Acting on the urgent motion to admit the supplemental petition with
prayer for a temporary restraining order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of respondents Judge
Capulong, granted respondent students' prayer on April 10, 1991.18

On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent students.
Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to conduct special examinations in lieu of the final
examinations which allegedly the students were not allowed to take, and enjoined them to maintain
the status quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final
determination of the issue of the instant case. Lastly, it directed respondent students to file a bond in
the amount of P50,000.00.19

On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza
and directed the dropping of their names from its roll of students.20

The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction
upon posting by respondents of a bond dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of P50,000.00.

Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of respondent judge.21

In the case at bar, we come to grips with two relevant issues on academic freedom, namely: (1)
whether a school is within its rights in expelling students from its academic community pursuant to its
disciplinary rules and moral standards; and (2) whether or not the penalty imposed by the school
administration is proper under the circumstances.

We grant the petition and reverse the order of respondent judge ordering readmission of respondent
students. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he ruled that respondent
students had been denied due process in the investigation of the charges against them.

It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision of petitioner Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo de Manila University, to expel them was arrived at
without affording them their right to procedural due process. We are constrained to disagree as we
find no indication that such right has been violated. On the contrary, respondent students' rights in a
school disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated in the cases of Guzman v. National
University,22 Alcuaz v. PSBA, Q.C. Branch23 and Non v. Dames II24 have been meticulously respected
by petitioners in the various investigative proceedings held before they were expelled.

Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their argument that it is Ang
Tibay case25 and not the Guzman case which is applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases
essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the Guzman case is more apropos to the
instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein,
thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of
the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.26
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in view of the
death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified
and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four hours their
written statement on the incident,27 the records show that instead of filing a reply, respondent
students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges.28 While of the students mentioned in
the February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the
latter were granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their statements.29

Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners'
notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991.30 It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which
quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was
addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11,
February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce
evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.

The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before
the Joint Administration Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and
Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity
to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991
order, they were denied procedural due process.31 Granting that they were denied such opportunity,
the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases
involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative
proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed
with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which
characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent
students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our
previous ruling in Alcuaz.32

Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is
far from the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after
receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses.33 Similarly, the
Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991
wherein respondent students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions.

With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault petitioners for not explicitly defining
the word "hazing" and allege that there is no proof that they were furnished copies of the 1990-91
Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of
students who aspire to be future members of the Bar. It cannot be overemphasized that the charge
filed before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary
Board is not a criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in
character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous requirements of criminal due process, particularly
with respect to the specification of the charge involved. As we have had occasion to declare in
previous cases a similar nature, due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice.34 Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a student need not be drawn with the precision of
a criminal information or complaint. Having given prior notice to the students involved that "hazing"
which is not defined in the School Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No.
3815, the proposed bill on the subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs to be
said. We deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation under scrutiny.
Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a students, to the extent of dismissal or expulsion, finds
its raison d' etre in the increasing frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon the neophytes by
their insensate "masters." Assuredly, it passes the test of reasonableness and absence of malice on
the part of the school authorities. Far from fostering comradeship and esprit d' corps, it has merely
fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of those who aspire to eventual leadership in our country.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule
65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby
by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals.35

It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the
case involves a question of law,36 as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent
students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from petitioner
university.

Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a Temporary Restraining Order since
petitioners do not stand to suffer irreperable damage in the event that private respondents are
allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of
respondent students who have been investigated and found by the Disciplinary Board to have
violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority
of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has been
enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitutions.

At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire,37 thus:
(1) who may teach: (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted
to study.

Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim the title "gadfly of the State" has
deservedly earned for himself a respected place in the annals of history as a martyr to the cause of
free intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of his was the "best, the most sensible, and the
most sensible, and the most just man of his age." In 399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of
hemlock as punishment for alleged "corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in his own
words how this charge of "corruption," the forerunner of the concept of academic freedom, came
about:

Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their
own accord: they like to heart the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me,
and examine others themselves; there are plenty of person, as they soon discover,
who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those
who are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with
me. This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth. And then
if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practice or teach? they do not know,
and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the
ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things
up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse
appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of
knowledge has been detected — which is the truth; and as they are numerous and
ambitious and energetic, and are all in battle array and have persuasive tongues,
they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies.38
Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have similarly defied the stifling
strictures of authority, whether State, Church, or various interest groups, to be able to give free rein
to their ideas. Particularly odious were the insidious and blatant attempts at thought control during
the time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval universities, renowned as intellectual centers in
Europe, gradually lost their autonomy.

In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along the way, were gradually
crystallized in the cluster of freedoms which awaited the champions and martyrs of the dawning
modern age. This was exemplified by the professors of the new German universities in the 16th and
17th centuries such as the Universities of Leiden (1554), Helmstatdt (1574) and Heidelberg (1652).
The movement back to freedom of inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental
human rights of the 19th and 20th centuries. "Academic freedom", the term as it evolved to describe
the emerging rights related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of
thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words, with the right of individuals in university
communities, such as professors, researchers and administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss
and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from
internal and external interference or pressure.

But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is exercised judiciously and
does not degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of academic
freedom have been stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a measure of independence
through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. The components of this aspect of
academic freedom have been categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to
teach.

It is to be realized that this individual aspects of academic freedom could have developed only pari
passu with its institutional counterpart. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher
learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure. In theFrankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the
areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study.

In the Philippines, the Acts which are passed with the change of sovereignty from the Spanish to the
American government, namely, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916
made no mention of the rights now subsumed under the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This
is most especially true with respect to the institutional aspect of the term. It had to await the drafting
of the Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal protection.

The breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution which stated:
"Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." The only State University at
that time, being the University of the Philippines, the Charter was perceived by some as exhibiting
rank favoritism for the said institution at the expense of the rest.

In attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973 Constitution provided in its Section
8(2): "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." In his interpretation of the
provision, former U.P. President Vicente G. Sinco, who was also a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, declared that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the
University as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor."39

Has the right been carried over the to the present Constitution? In an attempt to give an explicit
definition with an expanded coverage, the Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of the
1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed by students, by teachers,
and by researchers." After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was none
too different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article
XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In
anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are included
herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic
concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall
leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom."40

More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the
sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that
academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also
includes . . . . " Gascon finished off the broken thought,— "the faculty and the students." Azcuna
replied: "Yes."

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology,41 we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition
that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a
privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the education Act of 1982,
students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.42

"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission,
discipline and promotion of students. This . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under a
social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the
schools."43

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful
management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline."44 Going a
step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as
collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the ponoply of academic
freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in
Holfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid
down by the school.

Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as their own a Christian school that
includes Theology as part of its curriculum and assidously strives to turn out individuals of
unimpeachable morals and integrity in the mold of the founder of the order of the Society of Jesus,
St. Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their barbaric and ruthless acts are the more
reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the
intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the
development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.

In essence, education must ultimately be religious — not in the sense that the founders or charter
members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious
education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is "an education which
inculcates duty and reverence."45 It appears that the particular brand of religious education offered by
the Ateneo de Manila has been lost on the respondent students.
Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila
University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the
students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them.

Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals that: "The
maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled
if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and
to reintegrate them to the student body."46 Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is
but congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds. That there must be such a congruence between the
offense committed and the sanction imposed was stressed in Malabanan v. Ramento.47

Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by petitioner university, we see no
reason to reverse its decision founded on the following undisputed facts: that on February 8, 9 and
10, 1991, the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted hazing activities; that respondent students were
present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as a result of the hazing, Leonardo Villa died from
serious physical injuries, while Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of
respondent students upon those whom ironically they would claim as "brothers" after the initiation
rites, how can we countenance the imposition of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even
suspension? We, therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon respondent
students. This finds authority and justification in Section 146 of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools.48

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of respondent Judge dated May 17, 1991
reinstating respondents students into petitioner university is hereby REVERSED. The resolution of
petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J., then President of Ateneo de Manila University dated March 1991, is
REINSTATED and the decision of the Special Board DISMISSING respondent students ADEL ABAS
and ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated May 20, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.

10. G.R. No. 173189 February 13, 2013

JONATHAN I. SANG-AN, Petitioner,

vs.
EQUATOR KNIGHTS DETECTIVE AND SECURITY AGENCY, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Jonathan I. Sang-an
assailing the decision2 dated September 29, 2005 and the resolution3 dated May 29, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 86677. TheCA set aside the decision4 dated December
15, 2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstated the decision5 dated
July 30, 200 I of Labor Arbiter Geoffrey P. Villahermosa (LA).

The Facts
Jonathan was the Assistant Operation Manager of respondent Equator Knights Detective and
Security Agency, Inc. (Equator). He was tasked, among others, with the duty of assisting in the
operations of the security services; he was also in charge of safekeeping Equator’s firearms.

On April 21, 2001, Equator discovered that two firearms were missing from its inventory. The
investigation revealed that it was Jonathan who might have been responsible for the loss.6 On April
24, 2001, Jonathan was temporarily suspended from work pending further investigation.

On May 8, 2001, while Jonathan was under suspension, a security guard from Equator was
apprehended by policemen for violating the Commission on Elections’ gun ban rule. The security
guard stated in his affidavit7 that the unlicensed firearm had been issued to him by Jonathan.

On May 24, 2001, Jonathan filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension with prayer
for reinstatement.8 In his position paper, however, he treated his case as one for illegal dismissal
and alleged that he had been denied due process when he was dismissed.9 Equator, on the other
hand, argued that Jonathan’s dismissal was not illegal but was instead for a just cause under Article
282 of the Labor Code.10

On July 30, 2001, the LA rendered a decision11 dismissing the complaint. It declared that no
illegal dismissal took place as Jonathan’s services were terminated pursuant to a just cause. The LA
found that Jonathan was dismissed due to the two infractions he committed:

The basis for the termination of the complainant was first, when he was suspended when he issued
a firearm [to] a security guard and then replaced it with another one, then took the respondent[’s]
firearm with him and since then both firearms were lost. x x x.

xxxx

His second offense which resulted in his being terminated was when he issued an unlicensed
firearm to a Security Guard stationed in one of the business establishment[s] in Bais City which is a
client of the respondents.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING this case for
lack of legal and factual basis.12

Jonathan appealed the LA’s decision to the NLRC, contending that no charge had been laid against
him; there was no hearing or investigation of any kind; and he was not given any chance or
opportunity to defend himself.

The NLRC sustained the findings of the LA that there had been just cause for his dismissal.
However, it found that Jonathan had been denied his right to due process when he was
dismissed. It held that Equator’s letter informing him of his temporary suspension until further notice
did not satisfy the requirements of due process for a valid dismissal. Thus, the NLRC modified the
LA’s decision and ordered Equator to pay Jonathan backwages from April 24, 2001 until the date of
the NLRC’s decision. Equator moved for reconsideration but the NLRC denied the motion, prompting
the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA. Equator argued
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it found that Jonathan had been denied
procedural due process.
The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC, finding that Equator substantially complied with the
procedural requirements of due process. It found that the letter given to Jonathan did not mean that
he had been dismissed; rather, he was only suspended – the very reason for the case for illegal
suspension Jonathan filed before the LA. 1âwphi1

The CA found that Jonathan filed his complaint for illegal suspension on May 2, 2001. During the
pendency of the illegal suspension case before the LA, Jonathan committed another offense on May
8, 2001 when he issued the unlicensed firearm to Equator’s security guard. The CA found that
Equator’s June 7, 2001 position paper brought Jonathan’s second offense before the LA for
resolution; thus, Jonathan was not denied due process. The CA reinstated the LA’s decision
dismissing Jonathan’s complaint. Jonathan filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA
denied. He thereafter filed the present petition.

The Parties’ Arguments

Jonathan contends that when Equator filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court alleging grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC, it failed to post a cash or surety bond as
required by Article 223 of the Labor Code. Without complying with this condition, the petition
for certiorari should have been dismissed outright. Also, Jonathan contends that the CA’s findings of
fact are contrary to the findings of fact by the NLRC. Since the findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies are accorded respect and finality, he argues that the NLRC’s decision must be sustained.

Equator, on the other hand, submits that the rule on posting of cash or surety bond as required by
Article 223 of the Labor Code is not applicable in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. It also submits that both the LA and the NLRC concur in finding just cause for the dismissal
of Jonathan; hence, Jonathan’s subsequent dismissal is valid.

The Issues

Given the parties’ arguments, the case poses the following issues for the Court’s resolution:

1. whether the posting of a cash or surety bond is required for the filing of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA; and

2. whether Jonathan was validly dismissed.

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition partially meritorious.

A cash/surety bond is not needed in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

The requirement of a cash or surety bond as provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code only
applies to appeals from the orders of the LA to the NLRC. It does not apply to special civil actions
such as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In fact, nowhere under Rule 65
does it state that a bond is required for the filing of the petition.

A petition for certiorari is an original and independent action and is not part of the proceedings that
resulted in the judgment or order assailed before the CA. It deals with the issue of jurisdiction, and
may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court or tribunal prior to an appeal from
the judgment, or to a final judgment where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy provided by law or by the rules.

Jonathan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal

Contrary to the findings of the CA, Jonathan was not merely suspended but was dismissed from the
service. While Jonathan initially filed an action for illegal suspension, the position papers both parties
filed treated the case as one for illegal dismissal. Jonathan alleged in his position paper that "the
[r]espondent illegally SUSPENDED (DISMISSED) the x x x complainant[,]" and claimed that his
dismissal lacked the required due process.13 Similarly, Equator’s position paper states that after the
commission of the second offense on May 8, 2001, "[management] made up a decision to
dismiss [Jonathan]."14 Even the LA treated the case before him as "a case for illegal
dismissal[.]"15 In Equator’s memorandum to this Court, it admitted that Jonathan was dismissed.16

We also find that Jonathan did not file his complaint for illegal suspension on May 2, 2001. The
records of the case disclose that the receiving date stamped on the complaint is May 24, 2001. The
date relied upon by the CA, May 2, 2001, was the date when the complaint was subscribed and
sworn to before a notary public.17 Due to the second offense committed by Jonathan on May 8,
2001, Equator decided to dismiss him. Therefore, when the LA tried the case, Jonathan had already
been dismissed.

Equator failed to comply with the procedural due process

In order to validly dismiss an employee, it is fundamental that the employer observe both substantive
and procedural due process – the termination of employment must be based on a just or authorized
cause and the dismissal can only be effected, after due notice and hearing.18

This Court finds that Equator complied with the substantive requirements of due process when
Jonathan committed the two offenses.

Article 282(A) of the Labor Code provides that an employee may be dismissed on the ground
of serious misconduct or willful disobedience of the lawful orders of his employer or representative
in connection with his work. Misconduct is improper or wrongful conduct; it is the transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character,
and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. The misconduct, to be serious within the
meaning of the Labor Code, must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial
or unimportant. It is also important that the misconduct be in connection with the employee's work to
constitute just cause for his separation.19

By losing two firearms and issuing an unlicensed firearm, Jonathan committed serious misconduct.
He did not merely violate a company policy; he violated the law itself (Presidential Decree No. 1866
or Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or
Disposition, of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof
and for Relevant Purposes),20 and placed Equator and its employees at risk of being made legally
liable. Thus, Equator had a valid reason that warranted Jonathan’s dismissal from employment as
Assistant Operation Manager.

The Court, however, finds that Equator failed to observe the proper procedure in terminating
Jonathan’s services. Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code provides that:
Section 2. Standard of due process: requirements of notice. – In all cases of termination of
employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed.

I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:

(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination,
and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;

(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of
counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him; and

(c) A written notice [of] termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.21

Jurisprudence has expounded on the guarantee of due process, requiring the employer to furnish
the employee with two written notices before termination of employment can be effected: a first
written notice that informs the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his or her
dismissal is sought, and a second written notice which informs the employee of the employer's
decision to dismiss him. In considering whether the charge in the first notice is sufficient to warrant
dismissal under the second notice, the employer must afford the employee ample opportunity to be
heard.

A review of the records shows that Jonathan was not furnished with any written notice that informed
him of the acts he committed justifying his dismissal from employment. The notice of suspension
given to Jonathan only pertained to the first offense, i.e., the loss of Equator’s firearms under
Jonathan’s watch. With respect to his second offense (i.e., the issuance of an unlicensed firearm to
1âwphi1

Equator’s security guard – that became the basis for his dismissal), Jonathan was never given any
notice that allowed him to air his side and to avail of the guaranteed opportunity to be heard. That
Equator brought the second offense before the LA does not serve as notice because by then,
Jonathan had already been dismissed.

In order to validly dismiss an employee, the observance of both substantive and procedural due
process by the employer is a condition sine qua non. Procedural due process requires that the
employee be given a notice of the charge against him, an ample opportunity to be heard, and a
notice of termination.22

Since Jonathan had been dismissed in violation of his right to procedural due process but for a just
cause, Equator should pay him nominal damages of ₱30,000.00, in accordance with Agabon v.
NLRC.23 The decision of the NLRC, although final, was brought to CA on a petition for certiorari and
was eventually nullified for grave abuse of discretion. When the CA ruled on the case, this Court had
abandoned the ruling in Serrano v. NLRC24 in favor of the Agabon ruling.

WHEREFORE, we hereby PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The decision dated September 29,
2005 and the resolution dated May 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 86677
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The employer, Equator Knights Detective and Security
Agency, Inc., had sut1icient basis to terminate the employment of Jonathan I. Sang-an whose
dismissal is thus declared to be substantively valid. However, he was denied his right to procedural
due process for lack of the required notice of dismissal. Consequently, Equator Knights Detective
and Security Agency, Inc. is ordered to pay petitioner Jonathan I. Sang-an ₱30,000.00 as nominal
damages for its non-compliance with procedural due process.
SO ORDERED.