SALAZAR vs.

ACHACOSO AND MARQUEZ

DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.
FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of
arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner. Having
ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it was found
that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served
said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them
entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was
accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she
was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers —
practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated
assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by
Mrs. Flora Salazar.
A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the confiscated
properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that since the house the POEA
raided was a private residence, it was robbery.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be
barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as
one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor)
validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and
arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was
validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We have held that a warrant must
identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who
may issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President
or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of
deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
GALLANT MARITIME DIGEST SERRANO V.
DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,INC.

By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).
FACTS:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved
Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept
a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of
US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief
Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence,
petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May
26, 1998.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to
March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two
(2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9)
months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73.

The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner
illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of
the complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the
respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally,
in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment,
the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US
$8,770.00), representing the complainant’s salary for three (3) months of the unexpired
portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation
on the salary period of three months only — rather than the entire unexpired portion of
nine months and 23 days of petitioner’s employment contract – applying the subject clause.
However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner’s “[b]asic
salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month,
vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”

Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the
finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum
salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to
US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which
should be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. The NLRC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge
against the subject clause. After initially dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA
eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution which granted the
petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner.
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however,
the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brings his cause to this
Court on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in accord with
applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant
worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead of
limiting it to three (3) months.
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,
the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioner’s award the
overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his contract since under the contract they form
part of his salary.
The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance of the
constitutional question raised therein.
ISSUES:

 Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional

 Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of
his illegal dismissal
 Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was
illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to
petitioner in all three fora.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner
at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired
portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the
US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total
of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his
employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31
Arguments of the Petitioner

For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it
impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due
process.
The Arguments of Respondents

Respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was
belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity,
which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.40
The Arguments of the Solicitor General

The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its
provisions could not have impaired petitioner’s 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No.
8042 having preceded petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the
minimum terms of petitioner’s employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this
was not stipulated upon by the parties.
The Court’s Ruling:

First Issue
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected sector?

The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without
distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate
to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of
similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed
on, others in like circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the Court in the
present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the
subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory
intent against, and an invidious impact on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that
precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also
her right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
Second Issue

It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the
unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary
benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of
computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their
employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of
computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment
periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of
one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary
awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is
less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the latter’s
unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally
dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to local workers
with fixed-term employment.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that
precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also
her right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire
unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law
and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

Third Issue

Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated
into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like
petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment
Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime,
leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work
“performed” in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any
work “performed” on designated rest days and holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is
unwarranted since the same is given during the actual service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause “or for three months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10
of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8,
2004 Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the
effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of
US$1,400.00 per month.
OSM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(Third Division) and FERMIN F.
GUERRERO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Rules of Court do not require that all supporting papers and documents accompanying a
petition for certiorari should be duplicate originals or certified true copies. Furthermore, unilateral
decisions to alter the use of a vessel from overseas service to coastwise shipping will not affect the
validity of an existing employment contract validly executed. Workers should not be prejudiced
by actions done solely by employers without the formers consent or participation.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside the February 11, 1999 and the March 26, 1999 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 50667. The assailed Resolutions dismissed a Petition filed in the CA,
challenging an adverse ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The first
Resolution disposed as follows:

We resolve to OUTRIGHTLY DISMISS the petition.[2]

The second Resolution[3] denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

On the other hand, the NLRC Decision disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in that
respondents OSM Shipping Phils. Inc. and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency
Services Co. are jointly and severally ordered to pay complainant the sum of ELEVEN
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY NINE and 65/100 [US dollars] (US$11,359.65) or its
peso equivalent at the time of payment representing complainants unpaid salaries, accrued fixed
overtime pay, allowance, vacation leave pay and termination pay.[4]

The Facts

This case originated from a Complaint filed by Fermin F. Guerrero against OSM Shipping
Philippines, Inc.; and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. The
Complaint was for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries, overtime pay and vacation pay.
The facts are summarized in the NLRC Decision as follows:
[Private respondent] was hired by [Petitioner] OSM for and in behalf of its principal, Phil Carrier
Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SLC) to board its vessel M/V [Princess] Hoa as a Master
Mariner for a contract period of ten (10) months. Under the said contract, his basic monthly
salary isUS$1,070.00, US$220.00 allowance, US$321.00 fixed overtime, US$89 vacation leave
pay per month for x x x 44 hours f] work per week. He boarded the vessel on July 21, 1994 and
complied faithfully with the duties assigned to him.

[Private respondent] alleged that from the start of his work with M/V Princess Hoa, he was not
paid any compensation at all and was forced to disembark the vessel sometime in January 1995
because he cannot even buy his basic personal necessities. For almost seven (7) months, i.e. from
July 1994 to January 1995, despite the services he rendered, no compensation or remuneration
was ever paid to him. Hence, this case for illegal dismissal, [non-payment] of salaries, overtime
pay and vacation pay.

[Petitioner] OSM, for its part, alleged that on July 26, 1994, Concorde Pacific, an American
company which owns M/V Princess Hoa, then a foreign registered vessel, appointed x x x
Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SASCO) as ship manager particularly to
negotiate, transact and deal with any third persons, entities or corporations in the planning of
crewing selection or determination of qualifications of Filipino Seamen. On the same date,
[Petitioner] OSM entered into a Crew Agreement with x x x PC-SASCO for the purpose of
processing the documents of crew members of M/V Princess Hoa. The initial plan of the [s]hip-
owner was to use the vessel in the overseas trade, particularly the East Asian Growth Area.
Thereafter, the contract of [private respondent] was processed before the POEA on September
20, 1994.

OSM alleged further that the shipowner changed its plans on the use of the vessel. Instead of
using it for overseas trade, it decided to use it in the coastwise trade, thus, the crewmembers
hired never left the Philippines and were merely used by the shipowner in the coastwise trade.
Considering that the M/V Princess Hoa was a foreign registered vessel and could not be used in
the coastwise trade, the shipowner converted the vessel to Philippine registry on September 28,
1994 by way of bareboat chartering it out to another entity named Philippine Carrier Shipping
Lines Co. (PCSLC). To do this, the shipowner through Conrado V. Tendido had to terminate its
management agreement with x x x PC-SASCO on September 28, 1994 by a letter of termination
dated September 20, 1994. In the same letter of termination, the ship owner stated that it has
bareboat chartered out the vessel to said [PCSLC] and converted it into Philippine registry.
Consequently, x x x PC-SASCO terminated its crew agreement with OSM in a letter dated
December 5, 1994. Because of the bareboat charter of the vessel to PCSLC and its subsequent
conversion to Philippine registry and use in coastwise trade as well as to the termination of the
management agreement and crew agency agreement, a termination of contract ensued whereby
PCSLC, the bareboat charterer, became the disponent owner/employer of the crew.

As a disponent owner/employer, PCSLC is now responsible for the payment of complainants

wages. x x x. [5]

Labor Arbiter (LA) Manuel R. Caday rendered a Decision[6] in favor of Private Respondent
Guerrero. Petitioner and its principal, Philippine Carrier Shipping Agency Services, Co. (PC-
SASCO), were ordered to jointly and severally pay Guerrero his unpaid salaries and allowances,
accrued fixed overtime pay, vacation leave pay and termination pay. The Decision held that there
was a constructive dismissal of private respondent, since he had not been paid his salary for seven
months. It also dismissed petitioners contention that there was a novation of the employment
contract.
On appeal, the NLRC (Third Division) affirmed the LAs Decision, with a modification as to
the amount of liability. On January 28, 1999, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition[7] to set aside
the NLRC judgment. The petition was dismissed, because petitioner had allegedly failed to comply
with the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, petitioner had
attached to its Petition, not a duplicate original or a certified true copy of the LAs Decision, but a
mere machine copy thereof. Further, it had not indicated the actual address of Private Respondent
Fermin F. Guerrero.[8]
Hence, this Petition.[9]

The Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:

1. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it required
as attachment to the Petition for Certiorari the duplicate original of another Decision which is
not-the subject of the said Petition?

2. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it
disregarded the subsequent compliance made by petitioner?

3. Did not the Court of Appeals err in interpreting and applying the 1997 Rules when it did not
consider the Notice to private respondent Guerrero through his counsel as Notice to Guerrero
himself?[10]

The foregoing issues all refer to the question of whether, procedurally, petitioner has complied
with Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Additionally and in the interest of speedy justice,
this Court will also resolve the substantive issue brought before the CA: did the NLRC commit
grave abuse of discretion in ruling in favor of private respondent?

The Courts Ruling

While petitioner is procedurally correct, the case should nonetheless be decided on the merits
in favor of private respondent.

Procedural Issue:
 Compliance with the Rules of Court

Petitioner puts at issue the proper interpretation of Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court.[11] Specifically, was petitioner required to attach a certified true copy of the LAs Decision
to its Petition for Certiorari challenging the NLRC judgment?
Section 3 of Rule 46 does not require that all supporting papers and documents accompanying
a petition be duplicate originals or certified true copies. Even under Rule 65 on certiorari and
prohibition, petitions need to be accompanied only by duplicate originals or certified true copies
of the questioned judgment, order or resolution. Other relevant documents and pleadings attached
to it may be mere machine copies thereof.[12] Numerous decisions issued by this Court emphasize
that in appeals under Rule 45 and in original civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation
to Rules 46 and 56, what is required to be certified is the copy of the questioned judgment, final
order or resolution.[13] Since the LAs Decision was not the questioned ruling, it did not have to be
certified. What had to be certified was the NLRC Decision. And indeed it was.
As to the alleged missing address of private respondent, the indication by petitioner that
Guerrero could be served with process care of his counsel was substantial compliance with the
Rules.
This Court has held that the sending of pleadings to a party is not required, provided that the
party is represented by counsel.[14] This rule is founded on considerations of fair play, inasmuch
as an attorney of record is engaged precisely because a party does not feel competent to deal with
the intricacies of law and procedure.[15] Both jurisprudence[16] and the basics of
procedure[17] provide that when a party has appeared through counsel, service is to be made upon
the latter, unless the court specifically orders that it be upon the party.
We also note that from the inception of the case at the LAs office, all pleadings addressed to
private respondent had always been sent to his counsel, Atty. Danilo G. Macalino. Note that private
respondent, who was employed as a seaman, was often out of his home. The service of pleadings
and other court processes upon him personally would have been futile, as he would not have been
around to receive them.
This Court has repeatedly held that while courts should meticulously observe the Rules, they
should not be overly strict about procedural lapses that do not impair the proper administration of
justice.[18] Rather, procedural rules should be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[19]

Substantive Issue:

Liability of Petitioner for Unpaid Salaries

It is worthwhile to note that what is involved in this case is the recovery of unpaid salaries and
other monetary benefits. The Court is mindful of the plight of private respondent and, indeed, of
workers in general who are seeking to recover wages that are being unlawfully withheld from
them. Such recovery should not be needlessly delayed at the expense of their survival. This case
is now on its ninth year since its inception at the LAs office. Its remand to the CA will only unduly
delay its disposition. In the interest of substantial justice,[20] this Court will decide the case on the
merits based upon the records of the case, particularly those relating to the OSM Shipping
Philippines Petition before the CA.
On behalf of its principal, PC-SASCO, petitioner does not deny hiring Private Respondent
Guerrero as master mariner. However, it argues that since he was not deployed overseas, his
employment contract became ineffective, because its object was allegedly absent. Petitioner
contends that using the vessel in coastwise trade and subsequently chartering it to another principal
had the effect of novating the employment contract. We are not persuaded.
As approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), petitioner was the
legitimate manning agent of PC-SASCO.[21] As such, it was allowed to select, recruit, hire and
deploy seamen on board the vessel M/V Princess Hoa, which was managed by its principal, PC-
SASCO.[22] It was in this capacity that petitioner hired private respondent as master mariner. They
then executed and agreed upon an employment contract.
An employment contract, like any other contract, is perfected at the moment (1) the parties
come to agree upon its terms; and (2) concur in the essential elements thereof: (a) consent of the
contracting parties, (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract and (c) cause of
the obligation.[23] Based on the perfected contract, Private Respondent Guerrero complied with his
obligations thereunder and rendered his services on board the vessel. Contrary to petitioners
contention, the contract had an object, which was the rendition of service by private respondent on
board the vessel. The non-deployment of the ship overseas did not affect the validity of the
perfected employment contract. After all, the decision to use the vessel for coastwise shipping was
made by petitioner only and did not bear the written conformity of private respondent. A contract
cannot be novated by the will of only one party.[24] The claim of petitioner that it processed the
contract of private respondent with the POEA only after he had started working is also without
merit. Petitioner cannot use its own misfeasance to defeat his claim.
Petitioner, as manning agent, is jointly and severally liable with its principal,[25] PC-SASCO,
for private respondents claim. This conclusion is in accordance with Section 1 of Rule II of the
POEA Rules and Regulations.[26] Joint and solidary liability is meant to assure aggrieved workers
of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.[27] The fact that petitioner and its
principal have already terminated their agency agreement does not relieve the former of its
liability. The reason for this ruling was given by this Court in Catan National Labor Relations
Commission,[28] which we reproduce in part as follows:

This must be so, because the obligations covenanted in the [manning] agreement between the
local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminus with the term of such agreement so that if
either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties
towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up
to and until the expiration of the, employment contracts of the employees recruited and
employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the
very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad
was enacted.[29]
 WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions are hereby SET ASIDE, and the September 10, 1998
NLRC Decision REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES vs
NLRC Case Digest
SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION et al.
480 SCRA 146 (2006)

FACTS: Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace

International Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment was
made with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the contract,
Montehermozo continued her employment with her Taiwanese employer for another 2 years.

When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang, and
her Taiwanese employer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She alleges
that she was underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan. She further alleges that the 2-
year extension of her employment contract was with the consent and knowledge of Sunace.
Sunace, on the other hand, denied all the allegations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National
Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision. Hence,
the filing of this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozo’s employment was made with the
knowledge and consent of Sunace

HELD: There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when after the termination of
the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with the employee and
entered into a new and separate employment contract.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was with the
Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer.
The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax message written by Wang to
Sunace, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore was
aware of and had consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced. The
message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the
expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese broker
communicated regarding Montehermozo’s allegedly withheld savings does not necessarily mean
that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract.

As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to Sunace that
Montehermozo had taken already her savings from her foreign employer and that no deduction
was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or Sunace’s consent thereto.

Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume that it
was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons issued on February 15, 2000,
to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Montehermozo’s filing of
the complaint on February 14, 2000.

Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace]
cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending
[Montehermozo’s] employment contract necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a
misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal,
employer, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot,
therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year
employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner"
cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Montehermozo’s claims arising from the 2-year
employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Furthermore,
as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency relationship with its
foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign
principal directly negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new and separate employment
contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that the agency is revoked if the
principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons.
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION V.
SPS. CUARESMA
DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC., V. SPS. CUARESMA

G.R. Nos. 182978-79
April 7, 2009
These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals finding White
Falcon Services, Inc. and Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. solidarily liable to
indemnify spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma the amount of US$4,686.73 in actual damages
with interest.
FACTS:

On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotion, Inc.2 (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (KSA), for a contract duration of three years, with a corresponding salary of
US$247.00 per month.
Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.
Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk
Hospital, who conducted an autopsy of Jasmin’s body, the likely cause of her death was
poisoning.
Jasmin’s body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the City
Health Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report
indicated that Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not poisoning as originally
found by the KSA examining physician. The City Health Officer found that Jasmin had
abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears;
lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her
thigh and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; rib fracture; puncture wounds;
and abrasions on the labia minora of the vaginal area.6
On March 11, 1999, Jasmin’s remains were exhumed and examined by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested negative for non-
volatile, metallic poison and insecticides.
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmin’s parents and her surviving heirs,
received from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the following amounts:
P50,000.00 for death benefits; P50,000.00 for loss of life; P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and
P10,000.00 for medical reimbursement.
On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its principal in
the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance benefits, as
well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmin’s death.
While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for substitution alleging
that Rajab terminated their agency relationship and had appointed White Falcon Services,
Inc. (White Falcon) as its new recruitment agent in the Philippines. Thus, White Falcon was
impleaded as respondent as well, and it adopted and reiterated Becmen’s arguments in the
position paper it subsequently filed.
On February 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit. Giving weight to the medical report of the Al-Birk Hospital finding that Jasmin
died of poisoning, the Labor Arbiter concluded that Jasmin committed suicide. In any case,
Jasmin’s death was not service-connected, nor was it shown that it occurred while she was on
duty; besides, her parents have received all corresponding benefits they were entitled to under
the law. In regard to damages, the Labor Arbiter found no legal basis to warrant a grant thereof.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (Commission) reversed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter. Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City
and the NBI as contained in their autopsy and toxicology report, respectively, the Commission,
via its November 22, 2002 Resolution11 declared that, based on substantial evidence adduced,
Jasmin was the victim of compensable work-connected criminal aggression. It disregarded the
Al-Birk Hospital attending physician’s report as well as the KSA police report, finding the same
to be inconclusive. It declared that Jasmin’s death was the result of an “accident” occurring
within the employer’s premises that is attributable to her employment, or to the conditions under
which she lived, and thus arose out of and in the course of her employment as nurse. Thus, the
Cuaresmas are entitled to actual damages in the form of Jasmin’s lost earnings, including future
earnings, in the total amount of US$113,000.00. The Commission, however, dismissed all other
claims in the complaint.
Becmen, Rajab and White Falcon moved for reconsideration, whereupon the Commission issued
its October 9, 2003 Resolution12 reducing the award of US$113,000.00 as actual damages to
US$80,000.00.13 The NLRC likewise declared Becmen and White Falcon as solidarily liable for
payment of the award.
Becmen and White Falcon brought separate petitions for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. On
June 28, 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision:
WHEREFORE, the subject petitions are DENIED but in the execution of the decision, it should
first be enforced against White Falcon Services and then against Becmen Services when it is
already impossible, impractical and futile to go against it (White Falcon).
The appellate court affirmed the NLRC’s findings that Jasmin’s death was compensable,
the same having occurred at the dormitory, which was contractually provided by the
employer. Thus her death should be considered to have occurred within the employer’s
premises, arising out of and in the course of her employment.

In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals found that although Jasmin’s death was
compensable, however, there is no evidentiary basis to support an award of actual damages in the
amount of US$80,000.00. Nor may lost earnings be collected, because the same may be charged
only against the perpetrator of the crime or quasi-delict. Instead, the appellate court held that
Jasmin’s beneficiaries should be entitled only to the sum equivalent of the remainder of her 36-
month employment contract, or her monthly salary of US$247.00 multiplied by nineteen (19)
months, with legal interest.
Becmen filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (G.R. Nos. 182978-79). The
Cuaresmas, on the other hand, moved for a reconsideration of the amended decision, but it was
denied. They are now before us via G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
On October 6, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 184298-99 with G.R. Nos.
182978-79.
ISSUE:
Whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by way of benefits and damages,
for the death of their daughter Jasmin.

RULING:

The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public interest, and neither shall
act oppressively against the other, or impair the interest or convenience of the public. In case of
doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety
and decent living for the laborer.
The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the part of the
employer is sanctioned by Article 2219 (10)35 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of such
damages in actions referred to in Article 21.36
White Falcon’s assumption of Becmen’s liability does not automatically result in Becmen’s
freedom or release from liability. This has been ruled in ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation
v. NLRC.39 Instead, both Becmen and White Falcon should be held liable solidarily,
without prejudice to each having the right to be reimbursed under the provision of the
Civil Code that whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid.
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2008 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 is SET ASIDE. Rajab & Silsilah Company,
White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc., and their
corporate directors and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable and ORDERED to
indemnify the heirs of Jasmin Cuaresma, spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma, the
following amounts:

1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as moral damages;

2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as exemplary
damages;
3) Attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award; and,
4) Costs of suit.
PP vs. OCDEN DIGEST
DECEMBER 21, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ
PP vs. OCDEN

G.R. No. 173198

June 1, 2011

FACTS: The RTC rendered a Decision finding Ocden guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and three counts of estafa.
(This is based from complaints of several persons accusing her of promising to the
applicants employment to a stuffed toy factory in Italy, wherein she asks for 70k from each as
placement fee. After the applicants pay, they will be sent to Zamboanga on the assurance that
they will be first sent to Malaysia for easier processing of their visas, and then to Italy, which
never materialized.
Ocden asserts that she was also just an applicant for overseas employment; and that she was
receiving her co-applicants’ job applications and other requirements, and accepting her co-
applicants’ payments of placement fees, because she was designated as the applicants’ leader by
Ramos, the real recruiter. )
Aggrieved by the above decision, Ocden filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal. Ocden’s appeal
was sent to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court promulgated its Decision, dismissing the
appeal and affirming Ocden’s conviction.
Hence, this appeal
ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN LARGE SCALE ALTHOUGH THE CRIME
WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellant Dolores Ocden is DENIED.
NO
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find nothing on record that would justify a
reversal of Ocden’s conviction.
Illegal recruitment in large scale
Ocden contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that she is guilty of
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Other than the bare allegations of the prosecution
witnesses, no evidence was adduced to prove that she was a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. No certification
attesting to this fact was formally offered in evidence by the prosecution.
Ocden’s aforementioned contentions are without merit.
Article 13, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code defines and enumerates the acts which constitute
recruitment and placement:
(b) “Recruitment and placement” refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising for advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
The amendments to the Labor Code introduced by RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, broadened the concept of illegal recruitment and
provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., illegal
recruitment in large scale and illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate. Pertinent provisions
of Republic Act No. 8042 are reproduced below:
SEC. 6. Definition. – For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether
for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated
under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed
so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person,
whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
xx
 (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does
not actually take place without the worker’s fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a
syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
xxxx
**
It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants
abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be
employed. As testified to by Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan, Ocden gave such an impression
through the following acts:
(1) Ocden informed Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan about the job opportunity in Italy and the list of
necessary requirements for application;
(2) Ocden required Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard, to attend the
seminar conducted by Ramos at Ocden’s house in Baguio City;
(3) Ocden received the job applications, pictures, bio-data, passports, and the certificates of
previous employment (which was also issued by Ocden upon payment of P500.00), of Mana-a,
Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard;
(4) Ocden personally accompanied Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard, for
their medical examinations in Manila;
(5) Ocden received money paid as placement fees by Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons,
Jeffries and Howard, and even issued receipts for the same; and (6) Ocden assured Mana-a,
Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard, that they would be deployed to Italy.
It is not necessary for the prosecution to present a certification that Ocden is a non-licensee or
non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Section
6 of Republic Act No. 8042 enumerates particular acts which would constitute illegal recruitment
“whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of
authority.” Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the “[f]ailure
to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually
take place without the worker’s fault.”
Since illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) can be committed by any person, even by a licensed
recruiter, a certification on whether Ocden had a license to recruit or not,
is inconsequential. Ocden committed illegal recruitment as described in said provision by
receiving placement fees from Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s two sons, Jeffries and Howard,
evidenced by receipts Ocden herself issued; and failing to reimburse/refund to Mana-a, Ferrer,
and Golidan’s two sons the amounts they had paid when they were not able to leave for Italy,
through no fault of their own.
NOTES:
1. Under the last paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that
is, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.
In People v. Hu, we held that a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a
finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons, whether individually or as a
group. While it is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the
trial, nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense
was committed against three or more persons.
2. Section 7(b) of RA 8042 prescribes a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00 if the illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage.
3. The very same evidence proving Ocden’s liability for illegal recruitment also established her
liability for estafa.
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under
RA 8042 in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
RPC. It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his
acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation.
G . R . N o . 1 7 3 7 9 2 ,
A u g u s t 3 1 , 2 0 1 1
F I R S T D I V I S I O N
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v.
ROSARIO "ROSE" OCHOA PONENTE: LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
J.:
FACTS:
Rosario Ochoa was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale, forhaving recruited the
private complainants for various jobs in either Taiwan orSaudi Arabia without the
having secured the necessary license from the DOLEand for a consideration in the total
amount of P124,000.00 as placement fee.She was also charged with three counts of
estafa. The prosecution presented as witnesses Cory Aquino (Cory) of the POEAand private
complainants. Cory authenticated a Certification that Ochoa, in herpersonal capacity, is
neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruitworkers for overseas
employment.Ochoa stated under oath that she was employed by AXIL
InternationalServices and Consultant (AXIL) as recruiter. AXIL had a temporary
license
tor e c r u i t F i l i p i n o w o r k e r s f o r o v e r s e a s e m p l o ym e n t . S h e a d m i t t e d r e c r u i t i
n g private complainants and receiving from them the placement and medical feesbut claimed that
she remitted the money to the manager of AXIL. The RTC foundOchoa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment inlarge scale and three counts of estafa, which was
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUES:
1.Did the RTC err in admitting
t h e P O E A c e r t i f i c a t i o n t h a t O c h o a , i n h e r personal
capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers foroverseas
employment, which was already rejected during the hearings on bailfor being hearsay? Consequently,
can Ochoa be
acquitted?2 . S h o u l d O c h o a b e h e l d p e r s o n a l l y a n d c r i
m i n a l l y l i a b l e f o r i l l e g a l recruitment based on her allegations
that she was a mere employee of
AXILa n d t h a t s h e h a d t u r n e d o v e r t h e m o n e y s h e r e c e i v e d f r o
m p r i v a t e complainants to AXIL?3 . C a n O c h o a b e c h a r g e d a n d c o n v i c t e d
a t t h e s a m e t i m e w i t h t h e c r i m e s o f Estafa and Illegal Recruitment?
LAW:
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042.
RULING:
A s t o t h e f i r s t i s s u e , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t r u l e d i n t h e n e g a t i v e . Howev
er, as to the second and third issues, the Court ruled in the affirmative.
It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown thatappellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that she had the power orability to send complainants abroad for
work such that the latter were convincedto part with their money in order to be employed. All eight
private
complainantsh e r e i n c o n s i s t e n t l y d e c l a r e d t h a t O c h o a o f f e r e d a n d
p r o m i s e d t h e m employment overseas. Ochoa required private complainants to submit
their bio-data, birth certificates, and passports, which private complainants did.
Privatecomplainants also gave various amounts to Ochoa as payment for
placementa n d m e d i c a l f e e s . D e s p i t e p r i v a t e c o m p l a i n a n t s ’ c o m p l i a n c e w i t h
a l l t h e requirements Ochoa specified, they were not able to leave for work
abroad.Private complainants pleaded that Ochoa return their hard-earned money, butOchoa
failed to do so.
CASE DIGEST : PEOPLE VS REYES
G.R. No. 115022 August 14, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Manila and
BUENAVENTURA C. MANIEGO, respondents.

FACTS : The facts reveal that respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs,
Collection District II, Bureau of Customs, Manila International Container Port (MICP), issued
MICP Customs Personnel Order No. 21-92 dated January 10, 1992 assigning Jovencio D. Ebio,
Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the Office of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations
as Special Assistant.1 The actual transfer of Ebio was made on January 14, 1992.

On May 4, 1992, Ebio filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a letter-complaint
protesting his transfer. Ebio claimed that his new assignment violated COMELEC Resolution No.
2333 and section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881,

After a preliminary investigation, the COMELEC filed on May 6, 1995 an information with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Manila charging respondent Maniego with a violation of Section
261 (h) of B. P. Blg. 881

Before the arraignment, respondent Maniego moved to quash the information on the ground that
the facts alleged do not constitute an offense. On September 23, 1993, the trial court granted private
respondent's motion to quash and dismissed Criminal Case No. 93-120275.3 Petitioner moved to
reconsider but the same was denied on January 25, 1995.4 Petitioner forthwith elevated the case
to this Court on a pure question of law.

ISSUE WON Maniego is liable

HELD : It ought to be immediately obvious that Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se
outlaw the transfer of a government officer or employee during the election period. To be sure, the
transfer or detail of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority.

Prescinding from this predicate, two (2) elements must be established to prove a violation of
Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, viz: (1) The fact of transfer or detail of a public officer or
employee within the election period as fixed by the COMELEC, and (2) the transfer or detail was
effected without prior approval of the COMELEC in accordance with its implementing rules and
regulations.

In the case at bench, respondent Maniego transferred Ebio, then the Customs Operation Chief,
MICP to the Office of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as Special Assistant on
January 14, 1992. On this date, January 14, 1992, the election period for the May 11, 1992
synchronized elections had already been fixed to commence January 12, 1992 until June 10, 1992.
As aforestated, this election period had been determined by the COMELEC in its Resolution No.
2314 dated November 20, 1991 and Resolution No. 2328 January 2, 1992. Nonetheless, it was
only in Resolution No. 2333 which took effect on January 15, 1992 that COMELEC promulgated
the necessary rules on how to get its approval on the transfer or detail of public officers or
employees during the election period. Before the effectivity of these rules, it cannot be said that
Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, a penal provision, was already enforceable. Needless to state,
respondent Maniego could not be charged with failing to secure the approval of the COMELEC
when he transferred Ebio on January 14, 1992 as on that day, the rules of the COMELEC on the
subject were yet in existent.
PP VS. GALLO DIGEST
DECEMBER 21, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 187730 June 29, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, Accused-Appellant,
FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO and PILAR MANTA y DUNGO, Accused.
FACTS: Originally, accused-appellant Gallo and accused Fides Pacardo (“Pacardo”) and Pilar
Manta (“Manta”), together with Mardeolyn Martir (“Mardeolyn”) and nine (9) others [including
herein accused-appellant, were charged with syndicated illegal recruitment and eighteen (18)
counts of estafa committed against eighteen complainants.
NOTE: Basta ang nanyari, the trial proceeded while some of the accused were at large. Some
cases were provisionally dismissed due to non-appearance. Pacardo and Manta were acquitted.
While herein accused-appellant (GALLO) was convicted for syndicated illegal recruitment.
Hence, this appeal by Gallo alone.
In Criminal Case No. 02-206293, the information charges the accused-appellant, together with
the others, as follows:
The undersigned accuses xxx of a violation of Section 6(a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Workers Act of 1995,
committed by a syndicate and in large scale,
When arraigned GALLO pleaded not guilty; pre-trial was terminated and trial ensued, thereafter.
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION: Dela Caza was introduced by Eleanor Panuncio to
accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes, Yeo Sin Ung and another
Korean national at the office of MPM International Recruitment and Promotion Agency (“MPM
Agency”) located in Malate, Manila; Other accused were introduced as board members,
officers and employees of MPM.
Accused-appellant Gallo then introduced himself as a relative of Mardeolyn and informed Dela
Caza that the agency was able to send many workers abroad. Together with Pacardo and Manta,
he also told Dela Caza about the placement fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP
150,000) with a down payment of Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) and the balance to
be paid through salary deduction; Dela Caza, together with the other applicants, were briefed.
With accused-appellant’s assurance that many workers have been sent abroad, as well as the
presence of the two (2) Korean nationals and upon being shown the visas procured for the
deployed workers, Dela Caza was convinced to part with his money. Thus, on May 29, 2001, he
paid Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) to MPM Agency through accused-appellant Gallo.
Two (2) weeks after paying MPM Agency, Dela Caza went back to the agency’s office in
Malate, Manila only to discover that the office had moved to a new location at Batangas Street,
Brgy. San Isidro, Makati. He proceeded to the new address and found out that the agency was
renamed to New Filipino Manpower Development & Services, Inc. (“New Filipino”).
Dela Caza decided to withdraw his application and recover the amount he paid; Gallo even
denied any knowledge about the money. After two (2) more months of waiting in vain to be
deployed, Dela Caza and the other applicants decided to take action.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE: For his defense, accused-appellant denied having any part in the
recruitment of Dela Caza. In fact, he testified that he also applied with MPM Agency for
deployment to Korea as a factory worker; in order to facilitate the processing of his papers, he
agreed to perform some tasks for the agency, such as taking photographs of the visa and passport
of applicants, running errands and performing such other tasks assigned to him, without salary
except for some allowance. He said that he only saw Dela Caza one or twice at the agency’s
office when he applied for work abroad. Lastly, that he was also promised deployment abroad
but it never materialized.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE: RTC rendered its Decision convicting the accused of
syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa; CA affirmed; accused-appellant filed a timely appeal
before this Court.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and
estafa.
HELD: YES

The appeal has no merit.

Accused-appellant avers that he cannot be held criminally liable for illegal recruitment because
he was neither an officer nor an employee of the recruitment agency. He alleges that the trial
court erred in adopting the asseveration of the private complainant that he was indeed an
employee because such was not duly supported by competent evidence.
We disagree.
To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1) the offender
undertakes either any activity within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” defined under
Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2)
he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers;8 and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group
of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.9 When illegal
recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three (3)
or more persons individually or as a group, it is considered an offense involving economic
sabotage.
After a thorough review of the records, we believe that the prosecution was able to establish the
elements of the offense sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals that MPM Agency was
never licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Even with a license, however, illegal recruitment could still be committed under Section 6
of Republic Act No. 8042 (“R.A. 8042”), otherwise known as the Migrants and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 (See Notes).
In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts enumerated in Sec. 6 of R.A.
8042. Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in consideration of a
promise of foreign employment, accused-appellant received the amount of Php 45,000.00 from
Dela Caza. When accused-appellant made misrepresentations concerning the agency’s purported
power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process, collected money in
the guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.
Essentially, Dela Caza appeared very firm and consistent in positively identifying accused-
appellant as one of those who induced him and the other applicants to part with their money. His
testimony showed that accused-appellant made false misrepresentations and promises in assuring
them that after they paid the placement fee, jobs in Korea as factory workers were waiting for
them and that they would be deployed soon.
On the contrary, his active participation in the illegal recruitment is unmistakable. The fact
that he was the one who issued and signed the official receipt belies his profession of
innocence.

This Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between the accused-appellant and
the other persons in the agency who are currently at large, resulting in the commission of the
crime of syndicated illegal recruitment. Verily, the active involvement of each in the recruitment
scam was directed at one single purpose – to divest complainants with their money on the pretext
of guaranteed employment abroad.
Estafa

The prosecution likewise established that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of estafa as
defined under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (See notes)
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-appellant, together with the
other accused at large, deceived the complainants into believing that the agency had the power
and capability to send them abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for them in
Korea as factory workers; that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the complainants
parted with their money in payment of the placement fees; that after receiving the money,
accused-appellant and his co-accused went into hiding by changing their office locations without
informing complainants; and that complainants were never deployed abroad. As all these
representations of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code is thus applicable.1avvphi1
Defense of Denial Cannot Prevail over Positive Identification
APPEAL Denied.

________________
NOTES:
 Contents of the Information
That in or about and during the period comprised between November 2000 and December, 2001,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating
together and helping with one another, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract,
enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to xxxx in Korea as
factory workers and charge or accept directly or indirectly from said xxxx as placement fees in
connection with their overseas employment, which amounts are in excess of or greater than those
specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the POEA Board Resolution No. 02,
Series 1998, and without valid reasons and without the fault of the said complainants failed to
actually deploy them and failed to reimburse the expenses incurred by the said complainants in
connection with their documentation and processing for purposes of their deployment.
 Sec. 6 of RA 8042
Sec. 6. Definition. – For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether
for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated
under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed
so engaged. It shall, likewise, include the following act, whether committed by any person,
whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the
schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a
worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
xxxx
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and
Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation
and processing for purposes of deployment and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases
where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker’s fault. Illegal recruitment
when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage.
 nature of conspiracy in the context of illegal recruitment:
Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was evident from the acts of the
malefactors whose conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime clearly
indicated that they were one in purpose and united in its execution. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode and manner
in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. As such, all the accused,
including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment since in a
conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
 ART. 315, RPC
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned
hereinbelow…
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENT CO., INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
ARMANDO A. VINUYA,et al,
respondents
.
G.R. No. 197528. September 5, 2012. BRION, J
FACTS:
On March 5, 2008, respondent Vinuya et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissalagainst the
petitioner Pert/CPM and its President with labor arbiter alleging among others that theagency
deployed them to work as aluminium fabricator/installer for the agency’s principal,Modern
Metal in Dubai, United Arab Emirates for a two-year employment whose contracts
wereapproved by the POEA providing for nine-hours working day, salary of 1,350 AED with
overtimepay, food allowance, free and suitable housing (four to a room), free transportation, free
laundryand free medical and dental services. However, on April 2, 2007, Modern Metal
gaverespondents, except Era, appointment letters different from that of originally signed,
increasingtheir employment terms and reducing their salaries and allowances and removing
certainbenefits. Further, the working conditions were not as promised and they repeatedly
complainedwith their agency about their predicament but to no avail. Respondents resigned from
their jobciting personal/family problems for their resignation except for Era who mentioned the
realreason which is due to the company policy. After several weeks, petitioner repatriated the
respondent to the Philippines who shouldered their own airfare except for Ordovez and
Enjambre. The agency countered that the respondents werenot illegally dismissed alleging that
the respondents voluntarily resigned from their employmentto seek a better paying job.
The agency furthered alleged that the respondents even voluntarilysigned affidavits of quitclaim
and release.Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint finding that the respondent voluntarily
resigned from their job. Respondent appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter andfound that the respondents were illegally dismissed. NLRC also pointed out
that the signing of adifferent employment contract in Dubai is illegal. Consequently NLRC
ordered the agency andthe principal to pay, jointly and severally the respondents salary,
placement fee, and exemplarydamages. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the NLRC butmodified their judgment adjusting the awards particularly the
payment of their salaries in the lightof the Court’s ruling in Serrano striking down the clause in
Section 10, paragraph 5 of the RA8042 which limits the entitlement of illegally dismissed OFW.
The agency again moved for reconsideration reiterating its earlier argument and questioned the
applicability of the Serranoruling because it is not yet final and effective but was denied by the
NLRC. Petitioner appealedwith CA which upheld the decision of the NLRC finding the
resignation letter as dubious.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Serrano ruling which declared the subject Section 10 of RA8042
unconstitutional can be given retroactive application in the present caseWhether or not RA
10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010 restoring the subject clause inSection 10 of RA
8042 being amendatory in nature can be applied retroactively
RULING:
The SC held that the Serrano ruling can be given retroactive application asresolved in Yap vs.
Thenamaris Ship’s Management in the interest of equity and that the Serranoruling is an
exemption to the doctrine of operative fact.Moreover, the SC held that the amendment
introduced by R.A. 10022 cannot be given retroactiveeffect not only because there is no express
declaration of retroactivity of the law, but because theretroactive application will result in an
impairment of right that had accrued to the respondents byvirtue of the Serrano Ruling. The
SC reiterated that all statutes are to be construed as havingonly a prospective application, unless
the purpose and intention of the legislature to give themretrospective effect are expressly
declared or are necessarily implied from the language used.
HELD:
The petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution were AFFIRMED.