Lecture on Constitutional Law I

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Immunity from suit

Nature of immunity from suit. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office
or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court while serving as such (David v.
PGMA, infra). The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit
is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the government is a job that, aside
from being from requiring all of the office holder’s time, also demands undivided attention
(Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393, 399).

Executive Privilege

Nature of executive privilege. Executive privilege is the power of the President to withhold
certain types of information from the courts, the Congress, and ultimately the public. The types
of information include those which are of a nature that disclosure would subvert military or
diplomatic objectives, or information about the identity of persons who furnish information of
violations of law, or information about internal deliberations comprising the process by which
government decisions are reached (Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
2012:835).

Confidential information which are covered by executive privilege

• Conversations and correspondence between the President and other officials of the
government.
• Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national
security should not be divulged.
• Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements.
• Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings.
• Matters affecting national security and public order (Senate v. Ermita 448 SCRA 1, 26).

Diplomatic negotiations privilege

Diplomatic negotiations are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction but such privilege is
only presumptive (Akbayan Citizens Action Party [“AKBAYAN”) v. Aquino, 558 SCRA 468,
518).

Deliberative process privilege

Concept. Deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations

and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect

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national security but, on the “obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly
among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news,” the
objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions (Id., 520-521).

The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and
presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rational for the
confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential
communications is similar, if not identical (Id., 521).

Rules of Succession
• The Vice-President shall act as President if the President-elect fails to qualify until a
President is qualified or if a President shall not have been chosen until a President shall
have been chosen and qualified (Sec. 7, Art. VII).
• The Vice-President shall act as President
• When the President is unable to discharge the powers of the presidency and he
voluntary make the declaration himself by transmitting his written declaration to the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House.
• When the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency but
he does not voluntarily declare himself unable for any reason, the majority of the
members of the cabinet shall make such declaration by transmitting their written
declaration to the Senate President and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives (Sec. 11, Art. VII).
• The Vice-President shall BECOME President
• If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect died or is
permanently incapacitated.
• In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the
President (Sec. 7, Art. VII).
• The Senate President or the Speaker of the House of Representative, if the former is
unable, shall ACT as President until a President or Vice-President shall have been elected
or qualified, if no President or Vice-president shall have chosen or qualified or where
both shall have died or become permanently incapacitated or in case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office or resignation of both the President and the Vice-President
(Sec. 8, Art. VII).

Prohibitions on the President, Vice-President and members of the Cabinet, their assistants
and deputies
• They shall not hold any other office or employment during the tenure, unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution.
• They shall not, during their tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
• They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office (sec. 13, Art.
VII).

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Powers of the President
• Execute the laws of the land
• Appointment and removal
• Control over the executive departments, bureaus and offices
• Military power
• Pardoning power
• Diplomatic power
• Supervisory power over all local governments
• Contract loan
• Residual power

Power of Appointment

Four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint under the Constitution. These four
(4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel, or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone (Sarmiento III v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, 553-554).

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination
is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints (Id.).

Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not subject to confirmation. The position of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which needs the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments. (Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 160, 170-171).

Other officers whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments
• The regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council
• The Chairman and the Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission
• The Chairman and the Commissioners of the Commission on Elections
• The Chairman and the Commissioners of the Commission on Audit
• Members of the Regional Consultative Commission
• Sectoral Representatives of the House of Representatives

Limitations on the power to appoint

• The President may not appoint his spouse and relatives by consanguinity and affinity
within the fourth civil degree during his term as members of the Constitutional
Commissions, Office of the Ombudsman, or as secretaries, undersecretaries, chairmen, or

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 heads of bureaus or offices, including government owned and controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries. (Sec. 13, Art. VII)
• The President or acting President cannot exercise the power of appointment two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety. (Sec. 15, Art. VII)
• Appointment in the Judiciary shall be made upon recommendation of the Judicial and Bar
Council. (Sec.8, Art. VII)
• Appointments extended by the Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by
the elected President within ninety days from his assumption. (Sec. 14, Art. VII)

Prohibition on midnight appointment does not cover appointments in the Judiciary. Given the
background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive
Department. The framers did not extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary,
because the establishment of the JBC and subjecting the nomination and screening for
judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberative prior process of the JBC ensure that there
would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. (De Castro v. Judicial and Bar
Council [JBC], 615 SCRA 666, 742)

Nature of acting appointment. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its

temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by
an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee
of her choice could assume office. (Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, 472 SCRA 587, 598)

Distinction between ad interim appointment and appointment in acting capacity. Both of them
are effective upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended anytime there is a vacancy. Moreover,
ad interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or
rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling up important offices but, if abused, they can also
be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
(Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, 472 SCRA 587, 600)

Ineligibility of elective official to hold any other position. The view that an elective official may
be appointed to another position if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office,
ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX- B, of
the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an
appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first
paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to other government posts, except as are
particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and
planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a

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member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
(Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, 574-575)

Removal of impeachment officers. Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries
with it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President
are also removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise—
that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the
appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from
the power of the President’s power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed
by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment
proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be
removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its
personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil
Service Commission [Section 1(2), Article IX (B)], the Commission on Elections [Section 1(2),
Article IX(C)], and the Commission on Audit [Section 1(2), Article IX(D)] shall likewise be
appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article
XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9,
Article XI) but may also be removed only by impeachment. (Section 2, Article XI) (Gonzaless
III V. Office of the President, 679 SCRA 614, 654)

Commander-in-Chief and Martial Law Powers

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. (Sec. 18, Art. VII)

When may the President exercise the calling out power. Section 18, Art. VII grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers,
the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or
rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, these conditions
are not required in the exercise of calling out power. The only criterion is that “whenever it
becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656, 669)

Scope of the calling out power. Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the
armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion, and rebellion. This involves
ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is
considered illegal or ultra vires. (David v. PGMA, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)
Calling-out power cannot validate any of the following acts: (a) arrests and seizures without
judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and
press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, as they are powers which can be

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exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of
Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. (Id.)

Constitutional checks to prevent possible abuses in the exercise to declare martial law
• The Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all the members, in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, as the case may
be. (Sec. 18, Art. VII)
• The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof. The Supreme Court must promulgate its
decision within thirty days from the date of filing of the petition. (Id.)

Grounds for the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
• invasion or
• rebellion, when public safety requires it

The power of Congress to review the basis of the declaration of martial is automatic. It is evident
that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the
power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Congress exercises the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the
President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain
the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court
the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a
proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers,
which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to
defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final
rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it
becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. (Fortun, et. al. v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
et. al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012)

The declaration of state of rebellion is devoid of any legal significance. A declaration of

rebellion at most, only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces
may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps, the declaration may wreak emotional effects
upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. The Supreme Court’s
mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. In a decided case, the
Court found that such declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the
declaration is deemed not written. ( Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656)

Power to conduct peace negotiations is implicit in the Commander-in-Chief power. The

President’s power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general
responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific
duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. (Province of North Cotabato v. GRP
Peace Panel, 568 SCRA 402, 502)

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Power to deploy members of AFP and PNP in areas placed under state of emergency. The
deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places placed under a state of emergency is not by
itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23(2), Article VI of the
Constitution. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in
the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. (Ampatuan v. Puno,
651 SCRA 228, 223-224)
Martial law

What martial law includes. Martial law, in its most comprehensive sense, includes all laws that
has reference to or is administered by the military forces of the State. It includes (1) The military
law proper, that is, the body of administrative laws created by Congress for the governance of the
army and the navy as an organized force; (2) The principles governing the conduct of military
forces in times war and in the government of occupied territory; and (3) The martial law in sensu
strictiori, is that law which has application when the military arm does not supersede civil
authority but is called upon to aid in the execution of civil function (Aguirre, supra, 184, citing 3
Willoughby, 2nd ed.; Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2).

Power of control

Extent of power of control. The power to control means the power to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. It does not include the power to remove an officer or
employee in the executive department. The power merely applies to the exercise of control over
the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It only means that
the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the performance of
his duties. (Ang-Angco v. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619).

Doctrine of qualified political agency. All executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or the law that he acts in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he acts personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. (Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451, 463).

No power of impoundment under the Constitution. The President does not enjoy the power of
impoundment under the Constitution. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for
whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate
budget authority of any type. (Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506)

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Power of the President to create ad hoc investigative body. The President’s power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of the laws is inherent in the
President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct
investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. (Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 158).\
Pardoning power

The pardoning power of the President is a private, though official act, and its exercise rests on
the absolute and uncontrollable discretion of the President. The reason for its exercise is not open
to judicial scrutiny. It proceeds from the power of the President to execute the laws. (US v.
Guarin, 30 Phil. 85).

Limitations to the pardoning power

• It can only be exercised after conviction by final judgment.
• It cannot extend to cases of impeachment.
• It cannot be exercised on matters involving violation of election laws, unless favourably
recommended by the Commission on Elections.
• Pardon cannot extinguish civil liability awarded to third persons.
• Pardon does not restore offices forfeited or vacated after conviction.

Pardoned official cannot claim back position which was forfeited by virtue of conviction in the
criminal case. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted one from the offense would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and
plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to
be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
(Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 190, 200)

Constitutional provisions providing for the diplomatic power of the President

• The President is the head of State and the repository of executive power (Sec. 1, Art. VII).
• The President shall nominate with the consent of the Commission on Appointment,
among others, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls (Sec. 16, Art. VII).
• The President may enter into a treaty or executive agreement with the concurrence of at r
two-thirds of all the members of the Senate (Sec. 21, Art. VII).
• The President may contract foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
(Sec. 21, Art. VII).

Residual power

Nature of residual power. The powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive powers are more than
the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power is inherent
in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has be executive (Marcos v. Manglapus,
177 SCRA 668). Residual power is the unstated power reserved in the President to do anything
which is not forbidden by the Constitution and designed to promote and safeguard the welfare of

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the people founded on his duty as steward of the people and protector of peace. (Aguirre,
Postulates in Constitutional Law 1, 1994:170)

Illustrations of the exercise of residual power

• The power to prohibit the return to the Philippines of a former dictator as a measure
justified by national security and peace and order is within the residual power of the
President. (Marcos v. Manglapus, supra)
• The authority to declare a state of rebellion, though not expressly provided for under the
Constitution, is within the residual power of the President. (Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary, 421 SCRA 656)
• The authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is justified
by the residual power of the President. (Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel,
568 SCRA 402)

Executive power to create investigative commission. The President’s power to conduct

investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws—in this case, fundamental
laws on public accountability and transparency—is inherent in the President’s powers as the
Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create
bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not
mean that he is bereft of such authority. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R.
No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 158)

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Nature of judicial power. The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not option
before the Supreme Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because the Court is not legally
disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred. Otherwise, the Court would be shirking from its duty vested under
Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, the Court is
duty bound to take cognizance of the petitions before it. In the august words of amicus curiae
Father Bernas, “jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced.
To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty.” (Francisco, Jr. v.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., 415 SCRA 44,
158)

Judicial review. The power of judicial review is the power of the Supreme Court to declare a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. It includes the power to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Sec. 1, 5, Art. VIII)

Requisites of judicial review

• Actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial review.
• The person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement.

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 • The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.
• The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Actual case or controversy. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an
opposite of legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest; a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief. (David v. PGMA, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)

Supreme Court cannot decide moot and academic cases. A moot and academic case is one that
ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case
or dismiss it on ground of mootness. (Id.)

Exceptions to mootness principle (David v. PGMA, supra)

• There is a grave violation of the Constitution.
• The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved.
• When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar and the public.
• The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Standing to sue
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
provided the following requirements are met: (Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace
Panel, infra)
• The cases involve constitutional issues.
• For taxpayer, there must be a chain of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional.
• For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law
in question.
• For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled promptly.
• For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators.

Matters outside the power of judicial review. In deciding to take jurisdiction over a petition for
constitutionality of a statute or any act of branches of government, the Supreme Court will not
review the wisdom of the decision of the Executive in taking the questioned action or of the
Congress in enacting the assailed statute. (Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, 49, 1997)

Political question
Concept. A political question refers to those issues which under the Constitution are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or regard to which full discretionary authority
has been e delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. (Marcos v.
Manglapus, supra).

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Criteria for determining whether a question is political (Choper, Constitutional Law, 2008:
28, citing Baker v. Carr).
• A “textually demonstrable” constitutional commitment of the issue to the political
branches.
• Lack of manageable standards for judicial resolution.
• A need for finality in the action of the political branches.
• Difficulty or impossibility of devising effective judicial remedies.

Examples of political question

• Validity of the internal processes and proceedings of the Congress (Arroyo v. De
Venecia, supra).
• Basis for the presidential certification of bills (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra).
• Determination of the propriety of the exercise of the calling out power (Sanlakas v.
Ermita, supra).
• Determination of what constitute an impeachable offense (Francisco v. Nagmamalasakit
ng mga Manananggol sa Manggagawang Pilipino, infra).
• Determination of sufficiency of form and substance of impeachment complaint
(Francisco, ibid.).
• Propriety of ratifying a treaty (Tanada v. Angara, supra).

Authority of courts to determine whether a legislative franchise was violated by the grantee. The
courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of persons, the final arbiter of their
rights and obligations under the law. The question of whether a franchisee is in breach of the
franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited to a court of law, and not
for an administrative agency, much less one to which no such function has been delegated by
Congress. In the same way that availability of judicial review over laws does not preclude
Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the
viability of quo warranto in the instant cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own
prerogative by abrogating the legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed enough
by the franchisees’ violation of the franchises extended to them. (Divinagracia v. Consolidated
Broadcasting System, Inc., G.R. 162272, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 213, 251)

Guarantees of judicial independence

• The members of the judiciary shall hold office during good behaviour until they reach the
age of seventy or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office (Sec. 11,
Art. VIII).
• The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released (Sec. 3, Art. VIII).
• Members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment on grounds
provided in the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. XI).
• The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be increased by law without its
advice and concurrence (Sec. 30, Art. VI).
• Congress shall not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5, Article VIII (Sec. 2, par. 2, Art. VIII).

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 • No law shall be passed reorganizing the judiciary when it will undermine the security of
tenure of its members (Sec. 2, par. 2, Art. VIII).
• Appointment to the Judiciary shall be made upon recommendation of the Judicial and Bar
Council without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sec. 9, par.
1, Art. VIII).
• Members of the Supreme Court and other lower courts shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Sec. 12, Art. VIII).
• The Supreme Court shall have exclusive power to discipline and remove judges of lower
courts (Sec. 11, Art. VIII).
• The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof (Sec. 6, Art. VIII).

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

• Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.
• Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
• All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
• All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
• All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
• All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
• All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
• Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
• Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
• Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
• Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law (Sec. 5, Art. VIII).

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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

Common provisions applicable to the Constitutional Commissions

• Prohibitions to hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
• Proscription against engaging in the practice of their profession or in active management
or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the function of their
office.
• Injunction against financial interest, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
• Enjoyment of fiscal autonomy.
• Authority to promulgate their respective rules concerning pleadings and practice before it
or before any of its offices, provided such rules shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.
• The decisions of the Commissions may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of the copy of the decision.
• The Commission is authorized to appoint their officials and employees in accordance
with law (Art. IX-A, Sections 1-8).

Provisions guaranteeing the independence of the Commissions

• The salary of the Chairman and Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be
decreased during their tenure.
• The members of the Commission have a fixed term of office.
• The members of the Commission cannot be removed from office except by
impeachment and upon their expiration of their term.
• The Commission enjoys fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriation shall be
automatically and regularly released.

No report-no release policy of the DBM violates the Constitution. “Automatic release” of
approved annual appropriations to commissions vested with fiscal autonomy should be construed
to mean that no condition to fund releases to them maybe imposed. (Civil Service Commission v.
Department of Budget and Management, 464 SCRA 115)

• Civil Service Commission

Scope of the civil service. The Civil Service Commission embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government owned- or controlled
corporations with original charters. (Sec. 2, A, Art. IX)

Criteria for appointments in civil service. Appointments in the civil service shall be made only
according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions
which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive
examination.

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 • Policy determining when it imposes upon the occupant thereof the duty to
determine and formulate a method of action for the government or any of its
subdivision.

• Primarily confidential when it denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or
betrayals of personal trust and confidential matters.

• Highly technical when the appointee is required to possess a technical skills or

training in the supreme or superior degree (Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, 2012:1051).

Positions are primarily confidential: (1) when the President, upon the recommendation of the
CSC, has declared the position to be primarily confidential, and (2) when the position, by its
nature, is primarily confidential. (Salazar v. Mathay, 73 SCRA 275)

Characteristics of career service. The Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance
based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or
based primarily on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher
career positions; and (3) security of tenure.

Characteristics of non-career service. Non-career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance

on bases other than of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2)
tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the
appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular
project for which purpose employment was made. (Read P.D. No. 807)

Security of tenure of public employees. No officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. (Sec. 2, Art. IX-B)

Prohibition on the right to strike for public employees. No officer or employee in the civil
service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign
(Id.).

Right to self-organization of public employees. The right to self-organization shall not be denied
to government employees (Id.).

• Commission on Audit

• Powers and functions of the Commission on Audit (Art. XI-B)

• Examine and audit all forms of government revenues.
• Examine and audit all forms of government expenditures.
• Settle government accounts.
• Define the scope and techniques for its auditing procedures.

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 • Promulgate accounting and auditing rules including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures.
• Decide administrative cases involving expenditure of public funds.
The auditing authority of the Commission over government-owned corporations extends only to
those with original charters.

Agencies under the post-audit authority of the COA

• Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy
under this Constitution.
• Autonomous state colleges and universities.
• Other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
• Such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from
or through the government, which are required by law or by the granting institution to
submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity (Id.).

Appointment of resigned Commissioner to the position of the Chairman of the Commission is

valid. A commissioner who resigns after serving the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of
the departing Chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided
that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of
the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy
in the position of the Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment. (Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 192791, April 14, 2012)

• Commission on Elections

The Commission on Elections is vested with the power to conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecution of election offenses. ( People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715)

The COMELEC is composed of a Chairman and six (6) Commissioners.

Qualifications of members of the Commission (Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-C

• They shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
• At least thirty-five years of age at the time of their appointment.
• They must be holders of a college degree. The majority of the members, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years.
• They must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections).

The Constitution prohibits the temporary or acting appointment of any member of the
Commission. (Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C) The appointment by the President of a temporary Chairman
for the COMELEC is unconstitutional. (Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 357)

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Scope of the powers of the COMELEC. The Commission on Elections possesses quasi-judicial
and quasi-legislative powers. Its main function is to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(Sec. 2 (1) (2), Art. IX-C)

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives. (Sec. 1, Art. XI)

Impeachable officers
• President
• Vice-President
• Members of the Supreme Court
• Members of the Constitutional Commissions
• Ombudsman

Grounds for impeachment

• Culpable violation of the Constitution
• Treason
• Bribery
• Graft and corruption
• Other high crimes
• Betrayal of public trust

Steps to be followed in impeachment .(Sec. 1 [2,3,4], Art. XI)

• A member of the House of Representatives, or any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by a member of the House, may file a verified complaint.
• The complaint is included in the Order of Business of the House of within three (3) days
thereafter.
• The proper Committee of the House conducts the hearing after which, by a majority of all
the members of the committee, submits a report to the House within sixty (60) days from
such referral, together with the corresponding resolution.
• The resolution of the Committee shall be calendared for consideration of the House
within ten (10) session days from receipt of the resolution.
• The House will either affirm or override the recommendation of the committee by a vote
of at least one-third of all the members of the House. The vote of each member shall be
recorded.
• If, the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least 1/3 of all the
members of the House, the same shall constitute as the Articles of Impeachment and
forthwith forwarded to the Senate for trial and decision.
• Power to try impeachment cases. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment. When sitting as an impeachment body, the Senators shall be on
oath or affirmation. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds
of all the members of the Senate.

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Effects of impeachment. Removal from office of the impeached official and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines.

When is an impeachment complaint initiated. The term to “initiate” refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The
initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by filing by at least one-third of the members of
the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section
3(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
(Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.,
415 SCRA 45, 169-170)

What are political questions in impeachment proceedings. The determination of what constitutes
an impeachable offense is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislature. (Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, ibid)

The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an

exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making power of the House of
Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. In the
discharge of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and
substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect
the compliance by the House of its duly to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent
any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines. (Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives on Justice, 643 SCRA 198, 239-241).

Nature of freeze orders. A freeze order is meant to have temporary effect; it was never intended
to supplant or replace the actual forfeiture cases where the provisional remedy—which means,
the remedy is an adjunct of or an incident to the main action—of asking for the issuance of an
asset preservation order from the court where the petition is filed is precisely available. For
emphasis, a freeze order is both a preservatory and preemptive remedy. (Ligot v. Republic, G.R.
No. 176944, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 509, 540)

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Goals of the national economy (Sec. 1, Art. XII)

• More equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth
• Sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the
benefit of the people
• An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged
Regalian doctrine. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna
and other natural resources are owned by the State. (Sec. 2, Art. XII)

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Limits imposed on the jura regalia of the state under Section 2, Article XII
• Only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated.
• The exploration, development, and utilization of all natural resources shall be under the
supervision of the State either by directly undertaking such exploration, development,
and utilization or through co-exploration, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements
with qualified persons or corporations.
• All agreements with the qualified private sector maybe for only a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years.
• The twenty-five year limit is not applicable to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, for which
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of grant.
• The use and enjoyment of the marine wealth of the archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone shall be reserved for Filipino citizens.
• Utilization of natural resources in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons may be allowed on a
small scale to Filipino citizens or cooperatives—with priority for subsistence fishermen
and fish workers. (Bernas, Primer, 461)

Classification of the land of the public domain. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified according to the uses to which they may be devoted. (Sec. 3,
Art. XII)

Rules on the disposition of agricultural lands of the public domain (Sec. 3, Art. XII)
• Private corporations or associations may not acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
• Qualified individuals may acquire a maximum of twelve (12) hectares of alienable lands
of public domain by purchase, homestead or grant.
• Private corporations may hold alienable lands of the public domain by lease up to a
maximum of 1,000 hectares and for a period of twenty-five years renewable for another
twenty-five years.
• Qualified individuals may lease land of the public domains up to a maximum of 500
hectares.

Proscription on the transfer of private lands to aliens. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. (Sec. 7, Art. XII)

An alien husband cannot object to the sale by his Filipino wife of a parcel of land acquired
during the marriage. An alien husband has no capacity or personality to question the sale of the
parcel of land by his wife, even if the same was acquired during their marriage, even on the
claim that he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property,
for such a theory would permit indirect contravention of the constitutional prohibition on
ownership by aliens of private land in the Philippines. (Cheezman v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 193 SCRA 93)

Validation of sales contrary to the constitutional prohibition. The Supreme Court has ruled that
where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity

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of the first transfer is corrected by a subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the alien who
buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale is validated since the purpose
of the constitutional ban has been achieved. In short, the law disregards the constitutional
disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified
party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party. (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 403
SCRA 1, 28-29; La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1, 91-92)

Prohibition does not apply to ownership of other real property. A foreigner may own a
condominium unit because the prohibition on aliens is only from acquiring land. (Hulst v. PR
Builders, G.R. No. 156364, September 25, 2008)

Proscription on the grant of franchise for public utility to aliens. No franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens
of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines
at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall franchise,
certificate or authority be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Sec. 11,
Art. XII)

Public utility. A public utility is a utility corporation which renders service to the general public
for compensation. Its’ essential feature is that its service is not confined to privileged individuals
but is open to an indefinite public. The public or private character of a utility does not depend on
the number of persons who avail of its services but on whether or not it is open to serve all
members of the public who may require it.(Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Public Utility
Board, 44 Phil. 551; Bernas, Primer, 482)

State polices on monopolies and restraint of trade. The State shall regulate or prohibit
monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
competition shall be allowed. (Sec. 19, Art. XII)

State policy on the ownership of educational institutions. Educational institutions, other than
those established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the
Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity
participation in all educational institutions. The control and administration of educational
institutions shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines. (Sec. 4[2], Art. XIV).

Winning bidder cannot modify any provision of the awarded contract. If the winning bidder is
allowed to later include or modify certain provisions in the contract awarded such that the
contract is altered in any material respect, then the essence of fair competition in the public
bidding is destroyed. A public bidding would be a farce if, after the contract is awarded, the
winning bidder may modify the contract and include provisions which are favorable to it that
were not previously made available to the other bidders. The government cannot enter into a
contract with the highest bidder and incorporated substantial provisions beneficial to him, not
included or contemplated in the terms and specifications upon which the bids were invited.
(Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation v. Pozzolanic Philippines
Inorporated, G.R. No. 183789, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 214, 232)

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 GENERAL PROVISIONS

Doctrine of state immunity from suit

Concept. The Constitution declares, rather superfluously, that the State may not be sued without
its consent. This provision is merely a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an
express affirmation of the unwritten rule insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice
(Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1993: 29). The doctrine is sometimes called as the “royal
prerogative of dishonesty” (Id., 33).

Basis. To Justice Holmes, the doctrine of non-suability is based not any formal conception or
obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right depends. Another justification is the practical
consideration that the demands and the inconveniences of litigation will divert the time and
resources of the State from the more pressing matters demanding its attention, to the prejudice of
the public welfare (Id.).

Foreign states cannot be sued in the local courts. The doctrine of non-suability of State is
available also to foreign States. They may not be sued in the local courts. The added basis in this
case is the principle of the sovereign equality of States, under which one State cannot assert
jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. To do so
would unduly vex the peace of nations (Id.).

Rules when a foreign state entered into a contract with private individuals. If the contract is
entered into by the foreign government as part of its governmental acts (jure imperii), then, there
is no waiver of the non-suability principle. However, if the contract is entered into in its
proprietary capacity (jure gestionis), then, there is a waiver of the non-suability principle.

Nature of submission to local jurisdiction. Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction

must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication. (Republic
of Indonesia v. Vinzon, G.R. No. 154705, June 26, 2003)

When is a suit against the State. The suit is against the State (a) when the Republic is sued by
name; (b) when the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; and (c) when the suit
is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimately liability will belong
not the officer but to the government. In all these instances, suability depends on whether the
State has consented to be sued (Bernas, Primer, 2011: 530).

Tests to determine whether government should be impleaded as party in suits against its officers.
If the action is for the recovery of title or right of possession to the property held by the officers
or agents on behalf of the government, the suit may prosper even if the government is not
impleaded. If, however, the action would impose a financial burden or an obligation to the
government, then the government as a rule, must be impleaded, otherwise the suit will not
prosper. (Lim v. Nelson, 87 Phil. 328)

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If the suit against a public officer will result to direct liability of the State and not merely of the
officer, the suit is in reality against the State. The action can be dismissed unless the State gives
consent to be sued.
Consent to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly.
There is an express consent when there is a law expressly granting authority to sue the State or
any of its agencies. There is implied consent: (1) When the state enters into a private contract,
unless the contract is merely incidental to the performance of a governmental function
(Santos v. Santos, 92 Phil. 281); (2) When the state enters into an operation that is essentially a
bussiness operation, unless the business operation is merely incidental to the performance of
a governmental function, as for instance, arrastre service. (Mobil Philippines v. Customs
Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120); and (3) When a state sues a private party, unless the suit is
instituted only to resist a claim. (Lim v. Brownell, 107 Phil. 344) (see also Bernas, Primer,
531-532)
Non-suability principle cannot be a shield for injustice. The doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. (Ministerio v.
Court of First Instance, 40 SCRA 464, 470)
Armed Forces

Composition. The armed forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force
which shall undergo military training and serve as may be provided by law. It shall keep a
regular force necessary for the security of the State (Sec. 4, Art. XVI).

Tour of duty of the Chief of Staff. The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces shall
not exceed three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the
Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty (Sec. 5[7], Art. XVI).

Partisan political activity. No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any
partisan political activity, except to vote (Sec. 5[3], Art. XVI).

Appointment to other positions. No member of the armed forces in active service shall, at any
time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the government
including government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries (Sec. 5[4],
Art. XVI).

Mass media and advertising industry

State policy on the ownership of mass media. The ownership and management of mass media
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations,
wholly owned and managed by such citizens. The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies
in commercial mass media when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of
trade or unfair competition therein shall be allowed (Sec. 11 [1], Art. XIV).

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State policy on the advertising industry. The advertising industry is impressed with public
interest, and shall be regulated by law for the protection of consumers and the promotion of the
general welfare. Only Filipino citizens or corporations or association at least seventy percentum
of the capital of which is owned by such citizens shall be allowed to engage in the advertising
industry. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body or entities in such industry
shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all the o and managing
officers of such entities must be citizens of the Philippines (Sec. 11[2], Art. XIV).

AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF CONSTITUTION

Modes of amendment of the Constitution
• Through Constituent Assembly, that is the Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members.
• Through Constitutional Convention.
• By the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein (Sections 1 and 2, Art. XVII).

Modes of revision of the Constitution

• Through Constituent Assembly, that is the Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members.
• Through Constitutional Convention (Sec. 1, Art. XVII).

Calling a Constitutional Convention. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
members, call a Constitutional Convention, or by a majority vote of all of its members, submit to
the electorate the question of calling such a convention (Sec. 3, Art. XVII).

When shall the proposed amendment take effect. Any amendment to, or revision of, the
Constitution under Section 1 of Article XVII shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later ninety days after
the approval of such amendment. Any amendment under Section 2 of Article XVII shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition (Sec. 4, Art. XVII).

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