1. Republic v.

Mupas (181892, September 8, 2015)

Facts:

The Republic executed a concession agreement with PIATCO for the construction, development, and
operation of the NAIA III under a build-operate-transfer scheme. SC nullified the contracts on the grounds
that the latter was not a pre-qualified bidder, however, the Republic should first pay PIATCO before it
could take over the NAIA project.

The Republic filed a complaint for the expropriation of the NAIA III, excluding the land which the Republic
already owns. Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession based on the Republic's manifestation that
it had deposited with the Land Bank the amount representing its assessed value. The court ordered Land
Bank to release the same to PIATCO, to be deducted from the just compensation.

The Republic questioned the RTC order and two other RTC orders before the SC in which a restraining
order was issued. The Court, applying RA No. 8974, held the implementation of the writ of possession
until the Republic directly pays PIATCO the proffered value. It also authorized the Republic to perform
acts essential to the operation of the NAIA III once the writ of possession becomes effective.

For purposes of computing just compensation, it was held that PIATCO should only be paid the value of
the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method under Section 10 of RA 8974 IRR.
It was provided however, that the replacement cost method is only one of the factors to be considered
and equity should also be considered. The Court computed the just compensation using the depreciated
replacement cost method. Petitioners assail the use of the depreciated replacement cost method is
contrary to the provisions of RA 8974 which makes no mention of depreciation or deterioration.

Issue:

Whether or not the compensation computed was just

Held:

Yes, the court provided for a valid computation for just compensation.

The nature of the provisions in RA 8974 as mere guidelines, as opposed to being mandatory rules, cannot
be denied. First, the mandate under the law is addressed not to courts, but to the Implementing Agency
or the department, bureau, office, commission, authority, or agency of the national government, including
any government-owned and -controlled corporation or state college or university, concerned and
authorized by law or its respective charter to undertake national government projects.

Second, Section 13, RA 8974 IRR explicitly states that the court shall determine the just compensation to
be paid to the owner of the property, considering the standards set out in Sections 8, 9, and 10 thereof.
Clearly, the Court may consider the guidelines set, but it cannot be bound by these guidelines.

At best, any finding on just compensation using the methods set forth in the statute is merely a preliminary
determination by the Implementing Agency, subject to the final review and determination by the Court.
While we may be guided by the replacement cost of the property, just compensation will be ultimately
based on the payment due to the private property owner for his actual loss - the fundamental measure
of just compensation compliant with the Constitution.
 2. National Power Corporation v. Posada (191945, March 11, 2015)

Facts:

NPC instituted proceedings to acquire a right-of-way easement over parcels of land owned by
respondents. Petitioner offered the price of P500 per square meter but respondents called P2,000 per
square meter. The RTC confirmed the right to expropriate and ordered the creation of a commission who
recommended a market value of P1,500 per square meter as just compensation.

Petitioner amended its Complaint, instead of an easement of right-of-way, it needs to acquire the parcels
of land for the construction of the Substation Island Grid Project. It deposited an amount representing the
value of the properties to be expropriated. It filed an Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession which the trial court issued. The court also required payment of additional compensation
which petitioner failed to deposit. In view of the failure to comply with the order, the Writ of Possession
was recalled.

NPC appealed to the CA which denied the same. In a turn of events, NPC claims it no longer needed the
properties as it was set to acquire an alternative site. It filed the present Motion to Withdraw Appeal.

Held:

The trial court committed two errors. First, it based the value of the improvements on the property on
the determination made by the commissioners, and not on the determination made by the National
Power Corporation, contrary to the requirements of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8974. According to the
law, it is the implementing agency, not the commissioners, that determines the proffered value of the
improvements and structures. A Writ of Possession may be issued once there is confirmation by the trial
court of the proffered value.

The second error of the trial court occurred when it issued a Writ of Possession on the basis of the National
Power Corporation's deposit of the alleged provisional value with Land Bank of the Philippines, not on its
actual payment to respondents. In the Gingoyon case, it was held that RA 8974 now plainly requires direct
payment to the property owner, and not a mere deposit with the authorized government depositary.
Without such direct payment, no writ of possession may be obtained.
 3. Secretary of Public Works and Highways v. Heracleo (179334, April 21, 2015)

Facts:

In 1940, the DPWH took respondents’ property without expropriation proceedings for the construction of
the MacArthur Highway. Later, in 1994, the former demanded payment for the market value of subject
land.

The District Engineer offered to pay at the rate of P0.70 per square meter, per the Provincial Appraisal
Committee of Bulacan but the latter was unsatisfied with the offer and moved for its possession with
damages. RTC and CA both declared the market value at P1,500 per square meter, with annual 6%
interest. Later, the SC found that just compensation should be based on the value of the property at the
time of taking, which is P0.70 per square meter with an annual interest of 6% from 1940 until full payment.

Issue:

Whether or not the compensation awarded by the Supreme Court may be considered as just, and;
whether or not the courts may award other damages

Held:

Yes, the Court featured a sample computation where it found the compensation as just. Also, it may award
the latter exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Just compensation due should be fixed not as of the
time of payment but at the time of taking in 1940 which is P0.70 per square meter, and not P1,500 per
square meter, as valued by the RTC and CA, subject to the legal interest as per advise of the Monetary
Board. In addition, it awarded exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

It is important to note that the purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property
taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property is the market
value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted. Also, additional compensation shall be awarded to
by way of exemplary damages and attorney's fees in view of the government's taking without the benefit
of expropriation proceedings. An irregularity in an expropriation proceeding cannot ensue without
consequence. Thus, the Court held that the government agency's illegal occupation of the owner's
property for a very long period of time surely resulted in pecuniary loss to the owner

Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
The true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The equivalent to be given for the property
to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. Moreover, the concept of just compensation does
not imply fairness to the property owner alone but also to the public, which ultimately bears the cost of
expropriation.

To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process weaken one of the State's inherent
powers. Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the
property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
 4. City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila (14355, October 31, 1919)

Facts:

Petitioner presented to the CFI pieces of land in Binondo to be expropriated for the purpose of extending
Rizal Avenue. Respondent is a corporation that claimed it was an owner of two parcels and had Torrens
title of such parcels of the subject land. The latter denied the necessity of such expropriations and
maintained that if the construction should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available,
which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting
places of the dead. Other private defendants also presented similar cases.

The CFI decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the land in question, and absolved
each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint. On its ground for appeal, plaintiff
argues that it may expropriate any land it may desire subject to the appraisal of courts in expropriation
proceedings, and to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value pursuant to its charter.

Issue:

Whether or not courts may inquire into the necessity of the expropriation exercised by a municipal
corporation

Held:

Yes, the power of the courts is not limited to this question.

When a municipal corporation attempts to expropriate private, the courts have ample authority to make
inquiry, concerning the question whether or not the purpose of the appropriation is for some public use.
The right of expropriation is not inherent to a municipal corporation and some law must exist conferring
the power upon it. The land to be expropriated must be private, and the purpose of the expropriation
must be public. If either one of them fails, the right to expropriate does not exist.

Also, there is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a municipality is given authority to
expropriate, and a decision by the municipality that there exists a necessity for the exercise of that right.
Certainly, the legislative declaration of granting the power cannot be converted into a declaration that a
necessity exists for its exercise in a particular case. Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer
upon a municipality the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, is a question with which the courts
are not concerned. But when that right or authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of
their property, the courts are authorized to make inquiry.

The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity
must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not
follow, the taking of the land.
 5. Republic v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (L-18841, January 27, 1969)

Facts:

The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System renting trunk lines of
PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. One of the rules in its application prohibits the
public use. Nevertheless, the Bureau extended its services to the public prescribing its own rates.

PLDT complained for the use of its trunk lines to serve private persons. When PLDT received no reply, it
disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau. This isolated Philippines, on telephone services,
from the rest of the world, except the United States. The Bureau proposed PLDT an interconnecting
agreement, with the government paying for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from
the GTS to PLDT. The latter counter-offered for a consideration of 1/3 of the gross revenues as its share
in the overseas telephone service. The proposals were not accepted by either party.

At the instance of the plaintiff before the CFI, PLDT denied any obligation on its part to execute a contract
of services with the Bureau and averred that it was justified to disconnect the trunk lines because its
facilities were being used in fraud of its rights. It further claimed that the Bureau was engaging in
commercial operations to the prejudice of PLDT, using defendant's own telephone poles, without proper
accounting of revenues. The lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter
into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent may be compelled to enter such agreement

Held:

Yes, the Republic of the Philippines may compel for the continuance of the GTS upon such terms and
compensation that the court may determine to be just.

Under the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public
ownership upon payment of just compensation. There is no reason why the State may not require a public
utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor.

The parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is made between them as to
its terms and conditions. However, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State may require
PLDT to permit interconnection of the GTS and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service
may require, subject to the payment of just compensation determined by the court.
 6. People v. Fajardo (L-12172, August 29, 1958)

Facts:

During his incumbency of respondent as mayor of Baao, Camarines Sur, Ordinance No. 7-1950 was passed
requiring any person who will construct or repair a building should obtain a written permit from the mayor
beforehand. The Ordinance also prohibited buildings that destroys the view of the public plaza or occupies
any public property. Building not following the latter rule shall be removed at the expense of the owner.

After respondent’s term, he and his son-in-law requested for a permit to construct a building their land,
located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. It was denied as it
would destroy the view of the plaza. Nevertheless, the building was constructed without a permit for it
was for their residential home following the destruction of their former residence by a typhoon.

The justice of peace convicted respondents for violation of the Ordinance and was affirmed by the CFI.

Issue:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise of police power

Held:

No, the Ordinance is outside the boundaries of police power and is a taking without just compensation.

A municipal ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive if it operates to permanently deprive owners the
right to use their own property. Zoning which limits property to a use which cannot reasonably be made
of it cannot be said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property without
just compensation. Use of property is an element of ownership. If it be of public benefit that property
remain open and unused, then certainly the public, and not the private individuals, should bear the cost
of reasonable compensation for such property.

The beautification of neighborhoods is conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents but while
property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, the State may prohibit structures
offensive to sight. However, the State may not, under guise of police power, permanently divest owners
of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community. The landowner should be given just compensation and an
opportunity to be heard.
 7. Republic v. De Castellvi (L-20620, August 15, 1974)

Facts:

There was a lease contract between the respondent and the Air Force in this case commencing in 1947.
Soon enough, the heirs of the estate respondent was representing indicated their intent to subdivide the
land for sale to the general public but the Chief of Staff answered that there were permanent installations
in the land therefore he will recommend the same for expropriation to the President. Respondent filed
an ejectment case against the Air Force.

On June 26, 1959, the Republic filed a complaint with the CFI for eminent domain against De Castellvi over
the land. Apparently, the Committee on Appraisal for the province indicates that the fair market value of
the subject parcels of land was at P0.20 per square meter or a total of around P260,000. Petitioner alleges
that it should have taken possession of the land upon deposit of the sum amount.

In her motion to dismiss, respondent countered that the land had a fair market value of P15 per square
meter or a total of P11.389M. She averred that the Air Force have been illegally occupying her property
since July 1, 1956, preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of
unrealized profits. If not dismissed, she prayed that the Republic should pay the fair market value, the
interest of 6% from 1956, P5M as unrealized profits, and the costs of suit.

After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer P260,000 on July 10, 1959, the court
ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959. Commissioners, as
appointed, declared that the value should be at P10 per square meter. The court decided the value to be
at P10 per square meter and ordered payment of 6% interest on the total amount running from 1956 and
the same rate on total amount less the provisional deposit in 1959.

Issue:

Whether or not the taking of property was when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property

Held:

No, the taking property was made on June 26, 1959.

There are two essential elements in the taking of property under eminent domain: (1) that the entrance
and occupation by the plaintiff must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the
property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use. The
taking of the property cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced
to occupy the property as lessee thereof.

The taking of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, the Republic was placed in possession of the property, by
authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The taking for determining the just compensation to be paid
must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
 8. Amigable v. Cuenca (L-26400, February 29, 1972)

Facts:

Petitioner is the owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by TCT No. T-18060.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used an area of 6,167 square meters of
the said lot, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

Petitioner’s counsel wrote to the President requesting payment for the appropriated portion of the land.
The claim was endorsed to the Auditor General who disallowed the claim. She then filed a suit seeking
indemnity for damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

Respondents answer that the claim was premature failing to file claim with the Auditor General; that the
right of action to recovery has prescribed; that petitioner cannot claim for damages, attorney’s fees and
cost of suit because the government has not given its consent to be sued; and, that plaintiff has no cause
of action against the defendants.

The CFI held that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's causes of action and the government had not
given its consent to be sued.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner may recover compensation from the government

Held:

Yes, considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the TCT and that
she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant
remains the owner of the whole lot. As owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the
portion of land in question because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since
restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time
because it has been and is now being used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago.

As for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from
the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the government
should pay for attorney's fees.
 9. Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. Commission on Elections (119694, May 22, 1995)

Facts:

Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers. Respondent

promulgated Resolution No. 2772 requiring itself to procure a free print space of not less than 1/2 page
in at least one newspaper of general circulation, or any magazine or periodical, in every province or city
for use in the case of candidates for senators in a provided period. This space may be used to make known
the qualifications of the candidates, their stands and platforms. It may also be used to disseminate vital
election information.

Letters were sent to the member broadsheet corporations of petitioner directing them the mandates of
the Resolution. The latter responds with moving for petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC
which issued a TRO. It was a motion to declare the Resolution unconstitutional as it violates the
prohibition against taking of private property without just compensation, prohibitions against involuntary
servitude, and violative of freedom of speech, press and expression.

The OSG argued that the Resolution does not require publishers to provide print space under pain of
prosecution, whether administrative, civil or criminal, there being no sanction or penalty for its violation.
Also, it does not constitute prior restraint on the part of the publishers with respect to the printing or
publication of materials in the news, opinion, features or other sections of their respective publications
or other accounts or comments.

Issue:

Whether or not the Resolution features a taking requiring just compensation

Held:

Yes, there is unlawful taking featured in requiring to donate “Comelec Space” in the boundaries of the
newspaper for public use, requiring just compensation to be lawful. The requisites for a lawful taking are
(1) the necessity for the taking; and (2) the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity
was not shown. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space.
Similarly, respondent was not granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by law.
A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws
must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.

To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec Space" amounts to taking of private property for
public use. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the Constitution, but not without
payment of just compensation. The necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec Space" is precisely
what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of
the power of eminent domain.

Finally, the economic costs of informing the general public about the qualifications and programs of those
seeking elective office are most appropriately distributed as widely as possible throughout our society by
the utilization of public funds, rather than cast solely on one small sector of society, i.e., print media
enterprises. The benefits which flow from a heightened level of information on and the awareness of the
electoral process are commonly thought to be community-wide; the burdens should be allocated on the
same basis.
 10. Sumulong v. Guerrero (L-48685, September 30, 1987)

Facts:

Pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 authorizing the expropriation of private lands for socialized housing, the
National Housing Authority filed a complaint for the expropriation of parcels of land covering around 25
hectares in Antipolo, Rizal and seeks to compensate owners at P1 per square meter per advice of the
provincial assessor. There was also a motion for immediate possession of the subject properties.

Petitioners’ properties are among those lands sought to be expropriated with an area of 6,667 square
meters and 3,333 square meters, respectively. NHA deposited P158,900 with the PNB as the total market
value of the subject 25-hectare land.

Respondent judge issued a Writ of Possession which the petitioners assail on the ground that they have
been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law.

Issue:

Whether or not socialized housing for the benefit of only a few people may be contended as of public use

Held:

Yes, socialized housing is the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower members of society,
including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities. The expropriated lands
shall be for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide dwelling to low-salaried
government employees, which is of public character.

The public use requirement for the exercise of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept
influenced by changing conditions. As long as the purpose of taking is public, eminent domain comes into
play. The Constitution determines what is public use: (1) the expropriation of land to be subdivided into
small lots for resale at cost to individuals; and, (2) the transfer of utilities and other private enterprise to
the government. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies public use.

Housing is a human need. Its shortage is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects
public health, safety, the environment, and in sum, the general welfare.
 11. Manosca v. Court of Appeals (106440, January 29, 1996)

Facts:

Petitioners inherited a parcel of land located at P. Burgos St., Taguig. When the parcel of land was
ascertained by the National Historical Institute as being the birth site of Felix Manalo, the founder of
Iglesia Ni Cristo. The NHI passed Resolution No. 1-1986, pursuant to P.D. No. 260, declaring the land to be
a national historical landmark.

The Secretary of Justice gave his opinion on the legality of the measure. He expounded that places
invested with historical interest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized.
Pursuant to this, the NHI as an agency of the government charged with the maintenance and the
development of historical sites and initiate the condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring
the lot in question in accordance with the procedure provided for in the Rules of Court instituted by the
OSG in behalf of the Republic.

The Republic, through the OSG, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the RTC in behalf of the
NHI. At the same time, it filed an urgent motion to take immediate possession of the property. The motion
was opposed by petitioners contending that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and
would constitute an application of public funds for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia Ni Cristo. The
trial court ruled in favor of the Republic.

Issue:

Whether or not the expropriation of the supposed landmark is for public use

Held:

Yes, to claim a national historical landmark for maintenance and development is for a public use and the
application of public funds is not for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia Ni Cristo.

The power of eminent domain should not be understood as being confined only to the expropriation of
vast tracts of land and land estates for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. Public use should not be
restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the
public has long been discarded.

To give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant
is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from the exercise of the power.
The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late
Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership
of Iglesia ni Cristo. Indeed, only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
 12. Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (L-59603, April 29, 1987)

Facts:

The President issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a parcel of land in Lapu-Lapu City for petitioner to
establish an export processing zone. The Proclamation included four parcels of land owned and registered
in the name of San Antonio Development Corporation. Petitioner offered to purchase in the amount
pursuant to P.D. No. 464 which should be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by
the assessor, whichever is lower, but no agreement was reached.

Petitioner filed with the CFI for the expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession
which the court granted. Petitioner was declared as having the lawful right to take the properties sought
to be condemned, upon just compensation. Commissioners were appointed to ascertain just
compensation which they decided to be P15 per square meter.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration invoking that P.D. No. 1533 which provides that compensation
shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or anyone having legal interest in the property or
determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever is lower. It contends that
the Decree amended Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. The motion was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the mode of determining just compensation pursuant to P.D. No. 1533 is unconstitutional

Held:

Yes, P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court’s discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67
of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional.

Determining just compensation in eminent domain is a judicial function. When a party claims a violation
of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court's findings.

The method of ascertaining just compensation provided in the foregoing legislations tends to render the
courts inutile in a matter which the Constitution reserved to it for final determination. The valuation in
the Decree may only serve as a guiding principle but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to
what is just compensation. The courts should live up to the mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights.
 13. Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation (127820, July 20, 1998)

Facts:

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95-1993, petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint of
expropriation against private respondent over two parcels of land with a combined area of 10,000 square
meters, located at Wakas, Parañaque. The expropriation was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living
conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing
project. Petitioner made an offer to enter into a purchase agreement but respondent did not accept.

The court authorized petitioner to take possession of the property upon deposit with its clerk of court of
an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. Respondent
answered that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
Resolution and not to an Ordinance as required by the Local Government Code; and (b) the cause of action
was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. The court thereafter dismissed the case. The CA affirmed
in toto the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not a resolution has the same force of an ordinance and will not deprive a valid action in an
expropriation case

Held:

No, an ordinance is different from a resolution, as in this case, which invalidates a case for expropriation.

To exercise the power of eminent domain, an LGU must meet the following requisites: (1) an ordinance is
enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property; (2) the power is
exercised for public use, welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless; (3) payment of just
compensation; and (4) a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner but the offer was
not accepted.

In this case, there was no compliance of the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an
ordinance because a resolution is different from an ordinance. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.

It is worthy to note that all the requisites for res judicata are present in this case. However, the principle
of res judicata cannot bar a right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. As an inherent
power of the State, it is absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment. Once all legal requirements
are complied with, there may still subsequently be an expropriation of the same property. Otherwise, the
power of eminent domain is not only improperly diminished, but also clearly defeat social justice.
 14. Republic v. Borbon (165354, January 12, 2015)

Facts:

In February 1993, NAPOCOR entered a property owned by respondents in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas
City to construct transmission lines for the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission
Project. It filed a complaint for expropriation, seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over
a portion of the property alleging that they had failed to reach any agreement. It prayed for the issuance
of a writ of possession upon deposit to take possession of the affected portion of the property.

Respondents maintained that the transmission lines had rendered the entire property inutile for any
future use and capabilities. They do not object to the entry provided it would pay just compensation for
P1,000 per square meter, and attorney's fees.

Accordingly, the RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay the respondents: (1) just compensation for the total area
of 14,257 square meters at the rate of P550 per square meter; (2) legal rate of interest from May 5, 1995
until full payment; and (3) the costs of suit.

Issue: