RESTRICTED

GULF WAR
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST INFORMATION WARFARE
INTRODUCTION

1. On August 02, 1990 the world witnessed one of the most shocking spectacles
of the twentieth century. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait initiated one of the most important
international conflicts since the Second World War. Yet it is also one of the least well
understood in terms of causes, its immediate outcome and its likely long-term effects
on the technological development of warfare. Gulf war was the breeding ground to
test all modern war machines and technologies what so ever developed after
Second World War. Extensive use of media, electronic warfare, command and
control warfare, psychological warfare, cyber warfare and other passive war fighting
tools marked it as the ‘Revolution in Military Affair (RMA)’.

2. The Iraqi ruler occupied neighbouring Kuwait when the world community,
especially the Arab world was busy recovering from the worries of bloody Gulf War.
The lengthy Iran – Iraq war that lasted until 1988 is also believed to have set the
stage for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Iraq’s emergence as a much stronger military
power than its arch rival, idle and restless huge standing army, external debt,
disagreement on a number of issues with Kuwait and historical mistakes in border
demarcation were few of many reasons that prompted Saddam Hussein to take this
venture. The far-reaching dangers implicit in this grave development and many
reasons somewhat understandable left the USA no option other than to lead an
information intensive war.

3. To coup up with the challenges and opportunities of Information Technology

(IT) in the military arena, the new concept of war fighting and related techniques has
been labelled as Information Warfare (IW). Many scholars and military think tanks
also refer the entire spectrum of development as RMA. IW has expanded the
physical battle space and the area of military operations far beyond traditional
boundaries. According to Martin C Libicki, a renowned US defence analyst, IW
concept encompasses seven different but interconnected forms of warfare:
Command and Control Warfare, Intelligence-based Warfare, Electronic Warfare,
Psychological Warfare, Hacker Warfare, Economic IW and Cyber Warfare. The Gulf
War in 1990-91 is truly the example of an IW, which was fought in five dimensions-
Land, Sea, Air, Space and Information. It witnessed unprecedented use of media
and other tools of IW for which it has been termed as the “FIRST INFORMATION
WAR”.

4. Never before in history have so many books been written analysing the role of
media and information technology in one particular war. Gulf war experiences
showed the nature of present and future warfare. It also shows how information
and communication is a vital tool to defeat the enemy in and out of the battlefield. A
newer concept in strategic studies, that is RMA is gaining currency where IW is a
very important component and the Gulf War contributed significantly to it. The Gulf
War was the ‘precursor war’, which showed how the new communication

1
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

technologies and knowledge-based systems could be pivotal in the present and

future day warfare.

5. Information Revolution for a country like Bangladesh seemed to be far

reaching. But, in fact, changes have been taking place into the daily lives all along.
Typewriter, the icon of the office, is gradually vanishing and being supplanted by
computers. The government lifted taxes on computer import in 1998 and
commercialized the Internet, providing the general mass access to virtually limitless
stores of information around the globe. Thus, connectivity has changed the nature of
conflicts and its environment. In today’s Information Age, national power may be
measured by the ability to attain information dominance and the capacity to deprive
the enemies of information. The battle spaces in this environment also include
economic, financial, psychological and political sectors.

6. In view of the aforesaid, this paper will attempt to study the Gulf War in brief
and the IW in the backdrop of Gulf War. A further attempt will be made to highlight
the application of IW tools in Gulf War and analyse the prospect of IW in future
conflicts. At the end, efforts will be made to identify options open for Bangladesh to
survive the changed environment and reap benefits introduced by IW.

AIM

7. The aim of this paper is to study the Information Warfare as applied in Gulf
War with a view to identifying options open for Bangladesh.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE GULF WAR

Background of Iraqi Invasion

8. Kuwait shares its border with KSA on south- west and Republic of Iraq on the
north and west. Within the framework of Ottoman Empire it became independent in
1913. In 1932, Iraq accepted the borderline with reservations. Despite the
agreement Iraq continued to claim Kuwait to be the integral part of their country on
the plea that Kuwait had belonged to the Ottoman Empire along with Iraq and was
governed under the same province of Basra. On 19 June 1961, the British
government announced Kuwait’s full independence but Iraq did not agree to it.

9. Kuwait poured billions of dollars into Iraq’s war chest during Iraq-Iran War.
After the war Kuwait took Iraq to be a grateful friend. Btu in July 1990, Saddam
charged for producing more oil than its OPEC quota thus pulling the price down.
Accusation also made that Kuwait had been slant drilling and stealing Iraqi oil from
Rumaylah oil field. More over, Iraq demanded a favourable lease for Warba and
Bubiyan Island. Arabs diplomatic effort could not break the iceberg and ultimately
these events culminated in annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990.

2
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

Coalition and the Operations

10. Coalition Goals. The coalition, formed by the US and other countries
under the umbrella of the UN wanted to free Kuwait and restore the ruling family to
power and see the international law was respected. It aimed to maintain the social,
political, economical and if possible, territorial status in the Gulf region. Militarily, Iraq
had become a source of widespread concern and not only to its neighbours.
Therefore the coalition wanted to end Baghdad’s nuclear and chemical ambitions
and if possible, destroy its weapons research and production facilities.

11. Operation Desert Shield. Before the coalition offensive, a massive scale
logistic build-up continued for about six months. The operation was code named
“Operation Desert Shield”. It was even comparable to some of the largest logistics
build up witnessed the Second World War. The allied forces in the theatre
concentrated 585,000 troops, 2,950 tanks, 2,650 APCs, 1,079 artillery pieces and
1,925 helicopters. At the sea four carrier task forces were deployed in the gulf.

12. Operation Desert Storm. After necessary log build-up, the coalition began
actual combat code named “Operation Desert Storm”. After the UN dead line of 15
January 1991, the offensive began and was completed in four phases, each with a
clearly defined objective.

a. Phase 1. Gaining air supremacy by suppression and destruction of

Iraqi’s air defence command, control and communication facilities. They
achieved air supremacy by 20 January.

b. Phase 2. Destroying strategic, military and economic targets within

Iraq and Kuwait to paralyse defence structure.

c. Phase 3. Isolating the Iraqi Army in southern Iraq and Kuwait to

disrupt their line of communication. Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System (JSTAR) was used to monitor Iraqi movements round the clock,
denying the Iraqis even the opportunity of night movement.

d. Phase 4. To provide close air support to Coalition ground campaign.

In this phase helicopters played a crucial role both in combat support and in
air mobility.

13. Operation Hail Mary. The plan for the coalition ground campaign for the
eviction of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait was formulated in November 1990 and was
code-named ‘Operation Hail Mary’. The main features of the plan were:

a. Amphibious Feint. It entailed an amphibious feint with 17,000 US

Marines lying offshore in the Gulf, which tied down about 125,000 Iraqi
troops.

b. Frontal Attack on Southern Kuwait. Next was the frontal attack on

southern Kuwait with mechanised formations composed of Arab countries,
two US marine divisions and one US armoured brigade. The purpose of this

3
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

frontal attack was to divert Iraqi attention from the main thrust in the form of a
double envelopment plan.

c. The US VII Corps Attack. The US VII Corps with 150,000 men,
43,000 wheeled and 7,000 tracked vehicles was to advance north through the
Saudi – Iraqi border and then swing east into Kuwait to engage the Iraqi
Armoured reserve before it could intervene the fighting in the south.

d. The US XVIII Air Borne Corps. Further west the US XVIII Air Borne
Corps of some 118,000 troops was to advance quickly to establish a blocking
position in the Euphrates valley trapping Saddam’s Army in Kuwait.

14. Final Victory. The Coalition ground campaign began on 24 February 1991
and by 28 February, in just 100 hours of actual combat, the Iraqi army was thrown
out of Kuwait and educed to remnants. The coalition force suffered only 200
casualties against 25,000 to 100,000 Iraqis estimated dead. Due to the sustained air
campaign the morale of the Iraqi troops and the command, control and
communication facilities of the Iraqi Army got completely destroyed. As such they
failed to detect the movement of coalition forces and were completely surprised.

INFORMATION WARFARE – THE FIFTH DIMENSION

15. Definition. IW is the offensive and defensive use of information and

information systems to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy, an adversary's information,
information-based processes, information systems and computer-based networks
while protecting one's own. Such actions are designed to achieve advantages over
military or business adversaries.

16. Concept of IW. In recent days the concept of IW is widely accepted to the
military requirements as part of RMA. This is because of its outstanding
performance in the field of national strategy and military establishment. People
may be able to destroy their enemy’s will to fight through IW, primarily dealing
with command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I). Information and
war have intermittent meaning. Information mostly gives away the enemy
intention, his strength, moral and in general the situation in which the battle is to
be fought.

17. Forms of IW. There are seven forms of warfare or conflicts that involve the
protection, manipulation, degradation and denial of information. The characteristics
of the forms of IW as identified by Martin Libicki are:

a. Command and Control Warfare (C2W). C2W is the military strategy

that implements IW on the battlefield and integrates physical destruction. Its
objective is to decapitate the enemy’s command structure from its body of
command forces.

4
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

b. Intelligence-Based Warfare (IBW). IBW occurs when intelligence is

fed directly into operations like targeting and battle damage assessment,
rather than used as the input for overall command and control.

c. Electronic Warfare (EW). EW involves radio-electronic or

cryptographic techniques that attempt to degrade the physical basis for
transferring information. It tries to degrade hostile use of radio spectrum while
facilitates own use.

d. Economic IW. Designed to block information or channelling it to

pursue economic dominance. An information blockade works by forcing the
target country to work in the dark.

e. Cyber Warfare. Cyber Warfare is the use of information systems

against the virtual persons. It includes information terrorism and semantic
attacks.

f. Psychological Warfare. Psychological Warfare encompasses the

use of information against the human mind. Information is used against the
national will, opposing commanders and troops, and the culture.

g. "Hacker" Warfare. Hacker Warfare refers almost exclusively to

attack on computer networks. These attacks are specific to properties of the
particular system because the attacks exploit knowable holes in the systems
security structure. Persons involved in this are called ‘hacker’.

18. Basic Features of IW. There are few defining features of IW. These are
discussed below:

a. Low Entry Cost. Unlike traditional weapon technologies,

development of information-based techniques does not require sizeable
financial resources or state sponsorship. Information systems expertise and
access to important networks may be the only prerequisites.

b. Blurred Traditional Boundaries. Traditional distinctions-public

versus private interests, warlike versus criminal behaviour and the
geographical boundaries, such as those between nations as historically
defined, are complicated by the growing interaction within the information
infrastructure.

c. A New-Strategic Intelligence Challenge. Poorly understood

strategic IW vulnerabilities and targets diminish the effectiveness of classical
intelligence collection and analysis methods. Therefore, a new field of
analysis focussed on strategic IW will have to be developed.

d. Formidable Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment Problems.

There is currently no adequate tactical warning system for distinguishing
between strategic IW attacks and other kind of cyberspace activates,
including espionage and accidents.

5
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

e. Difficulty in Building and Sustaining Coalitions. Reliance on

coalitions is likely to increase the vulnerabilities of security postures of all
partners to strategic IW attacks, giving opponents a disproportionate strategic
advantage.

19. Tools and Means of IW. Viruses, Worms, Trapdoors, Trojan Horses, Nano
machines, High Energy Radio Frequency guns, Logic bombs, Electronic Jamming
and Chipping are few of the computer related weapons which can be effectively
employed to destroy adversaries information systems. Surveillance satellites over-fly
enemy territory without the fear of being shot down can be used to gather
information on enemy. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) satellites in low orbit permit
picking up electronic signals from various emitters. Media plays an important role in
the modern day warfare. The “CNN factor” during Gulf War and Kosovo crisis needs
no amplification. With the proliferation of IT, defence reporting has become more
challenging as correspondents find it hard to discern and distinguish between facts
and misinformation.

20. The Approach to Effective Counter Measures Against IW. Effective

counter measures against IW include both deterrence and system defensive
measures. A suggested definition of deterrence against an information assault is
"the ability through international law, specific applications of information
technologies, or the monitoring of the perception management to deter an
information assault on the territory of a sovereign state". Systems vulnerability
analysis and improved design can yield several positive results. Security training is
absolutely essential at all levels and without it other defensive measures are less
effective. Aggressive domestic and international law enforcement can certainly have
a deterrent effect on potential adversaries. Tagging information systems hardware
and software with electronic IDs can also deter would-be intruders and attackers.

APPLICATION OF INFORMATION WARFARE TOOLS IN GULF WAR

Information Warfare in Gulf War

21. The Gulf War was the first time information was used both as a target and as
a weapon. Command and control nodes, communication facilities, TV and radio
stations were the first to be struck with missiles and bombs. Information Warfare as
a concept has fast gained acceptance after the Gulf War, though the understanding
of the concept trails far behind. Gulf War applied all possible tools of information
war. It witnessed unprecedented use of media, psychological operations and other
related means. Never before in history have so many books written analysing media
and information’s role in one particular war. According to Bill Gates:

“A victory for technology. That’s how people remember the Gulf War of 1991.
Cruise missiles hugged the terrain over hundreds of miles to hit heavily
fortified targets, and radar evading stealth fighters dropped smart bombs on
communication centers and bridges. For thirty-eight days during Operation
Desert Storm, the US, military and its allies controlled the air. Flying 2500
sorties a day with minimal losses, the Allied air forces set up the ‘left hook’
6
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

ground assault that drove Iraq from Kuwait and ended the war after just 100
hours of ground operations.”

Information Intensive Weapon Systems Used in Gulf War

22. Weapon System of the Allies. The primitive, less sophisticated Iraqi
weapon systems were no match for the “intrinsically superior systems” of the
western powers during the Gulf War. The Coalition weapon systems were so
designed that they could destroy without being destroyed themselves.

23. Command and Communication. During the Gulf War, the US and its
allies depended on powerful command and control systems for effective
communication. Overall, at the height of operations, the US communication system
supported more than 700,000 phone calls and 1,52,000 messages per day, relying
on 130 satellite terminals, 60 voice and 20 message switches.

24. Aerial Surveillance. The western allies made use of modern

computerised surveillance system to detect Iraqi aircraft and to control the Coalition.
The AWACS planes, capable of distinguishing friendly and enemy aircraft were
continuously airborne during the war. Two experimental JSTARS ground
surveillance aircraft for detecting mass vehicle movement also assisted the
Coalition. AWACS and JSTARS worked in harmony; fast moving AWACS was
designed to track airplanes and JSTARS could pick-out smaller objects moving
slowly.

25. Fighter Aircraft. The Coalition planes were equipped with highly effective
infrared or radar-guided air-to-air missiles. Guided by the AWACS these fighter
aircraft had a significant technological superiority over Iraqi fighters. The western
powers quickly attained total aerial surveillance of the Coalition troops movements.

26. Electronic Warfare Aircraft. The Coalition made extensive use of the
EA-6 prowler, EC-130 Hercules and F-4 Phantom to detect and suppress the Iraqi
radar-controlled air defence systems. Jammers were used to disturb the functioning
of enemy radar. Other anti-radar measures such as HARM missiles were also put to
use. Other sophisticated weapons used were radar decoys, usually remotely piloted
gliders.

27. Bombers. The allied forces possessed F-17 Nighthawk bomber which
used “stealth” technology to reduce its detect ability by radar and make it an
intrinsically superior weapon system. Other bomber such as the A-6 Intruder, A-7,
AV-8 Harrier, Jaguar and Tornado were usually equipped with television-guided and
laser-guided precision munitions.

28. Guided Missiles. The long-ranged Tomahawk missiles used in the war had
a pre-programmed map, of the terrain over which it flew, fed in its computer. A total
of 288 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles were fired with a success rate of over 85
percent.
29. Satellites. A wide range of optical and radar satellites were used to obtain
information on the disposition of the Iraqi forces. Another interesting use of modern

7
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

technology was the Global Positioning Systems (GPS), which provided navigational
aid to aircraft and land forces.

30. Ground Attack Aircraft. The A-10 airplane (Thunderbolt or Warthog) and
the AH-64 Apache and AH-1 Cobra helicopters of the Coalition were equipped with
laser-guided munitions, representing weapon systems not available to the Iraqis.
The anti-aircraft defences of the Iraqi tanks were powerless against these aircraft.

Use of Media for Information Warfare in the Gulf War

31. Gulf war saw revolution media could bring during such a conflict to achieve
nation aims. Learning from mistakes made in the Vietnam War, President Bush’s
administration decided that the Persian Gulf War’s publicity would be conducted
differently.

32. During the Gulf War, the administration was able to convince the media to
adhere to certain guidelines. The journalists were to accompany military units in
special combat “pools”. The pools represented newspapers, wire services,
television, radio and newsmagazines. All information provided outside the censored
pool reports were from official military briefings.

33. The media was manipulated by the Coalition. A report early in the war that 60
Iraqi tanks had surrendered to Egyptian forces was later proven to be planned
falsely by the CIA in an attempt to lure more Iraqi defections.

Communication and Control Warfare

34. In the Gulf War the allies devoted considerable resources to communication
and control. Overall US military employed 10% of its enlisted personnel in
communications and intelligence roles. U.S. forces demonstrated mastery by
destroying many physical manifestations of Iraq's command-and-control structure.

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)

35. The Gulf War brought a whole new meaning to the use of multimedia in
psychological operations. Radio and TV broadcasts, leaflets, and loudspeakers used
the themes of Arab brotherhood, allied air power and Iraqi isolation to induce large
numbers of enemy soldiers to desert.

36. Allied PSYOPS included combined use of ‘black radio stations’ and leaflet
propaganda. Psychological warfare radio stations presumably transmitting from
Saudi Arabia, such as the allegedly CIA-run Voice of Free Iraq and Radio Free Iraq,
called upon the Kurdish and Shi Iraqis to rise up against ‘Saddam Hussein gang’.
According to International Red Cross, nearly 87,000 Iraqi soldiers surrendered to
coalition forces, most of them clutching the leaflets or hiding them in the clothing.

Cyber and Hacker Warfare

8
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

37. Electronic warfare and computer simulation was extensively used to take
advantage of information. Professional hackers were employed to destroy, degrade,
exploit or compromise information systems by means of hacker techniques.

Evolution of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

38. The Gulf War has changed the military strategy as far as the future of warfare
is concerned. A new concept, called Revolution in Military Affairs, is gaining
increased currency. Central to the RMA argument is the role of Information. It
involves vastly improved means of real-time information, surveillance and target
acquisition to improve accuracy of precision weapons and minimal collateral
damage. This type of warfare is characterised by manoeuvre rather than attrition,
where destruction of enemy’s means of command and control is the prime canon of
military doctrine.

PROSPECT OF INFORMATION WARFARE IN

FUTURE CONFLICT

39. Vision on Future War. The world is moving fast towards the economic
restructuring, where fighting a war is a lower priority task. Any future conflict is likely
to be characterised by the following characteristics:

a. Any future war is likely to be fought in five dimensions, the space being
the fifth dimension. Information warfare will be the focal point in any such
conflict.

b. Mere evil intention of any invading nation will not be enough to cause a
war. Rather a group of nation is more likely to involve them in a coalition to
fight against a common enemy.

c. World opinion will be invaluable to support such war effort and use of
media and other electronic means will integrate the world opinion.

d. For any invading nation, economic embargo to deter a war is likely to

be more effective than before.

e. In this era of globalisation, the world community is likely to react and

support instantaneously to protect the rights of any invaded nation. Thus it
eliminated the concept of so called ‘weaker nation’.
f. In to-day’s world the developed nations are most inclined towards the
concept of “Non Offensive Defence”, where the nations are more inclined to
maintain a sizeable defence forces with all modern equipment and
armaments to safeguard the territorial sovereignty and integrity rather than
waging a war.

g. Any future conflict is going to be a demonstration of modern

technology to an extent beyond the limit of our expectations with minimum
collateral damages but maximum effectiveness
9
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

h. Any future conflict likely to be dominated by US interests. Even the US

interest might overrule the UN and other nation’s demands

40. Military Trends of Information Warfare. Information Warfare brought in

the new concept of “Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)”. RMA is the sixth
generation of warfare. But the induction of the sixth generation will not render the
fifth generation (Nuclear) or the forth generation (Conventional) warfare obsolete,
rather it will enhance each other. The role of information warfare can be stated as
follows:

a. Space, the Fifth Dimension. Space, the ultimate high ground

provides numerous advantages for placing sensors. It offers a much greater
fields of view than is attainable by land or air and has a virtually untouchable
covered look down capability.

b. Fog of War. Although the fog of war will never be totally eliminated,
relative advantages can be achieved by reducing it a ‘mist of war’ where the
enemy remains fog bound. Correlating the space pictures with information
gathered from across the electromagnetic spectrum by air, land and sea
sensors will provide operational level situational awareness.

c. Command and Control System. Sixth generation global command

and control systems will provide commanders with the planning, optimisation
and assignment capability needed to wage high tempo wars. Commanders
will be able to transmit missions to their subordinates at the push of a button.

d. Identification of Friends and Foes (IFF)/ . Sensor to Shooter (STS)

Capability. A real time, accurate, non-co operative IFF will provide a
quantum leap in speed to the ‘Sensor to Shooter (STS)’ process, allowing for
near instantaneous sensing to shooting, increased tempo and decreased
reaction time.

e. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). Once the enemy is engaged,

the distributed network of sensors will provide a real time BDA to the
operational commander and subordinate units.

f. Sixth Generation Battle Space. The electromagnetic (EM) spectrum

will play an extremely critical role in the IW age. Since the IW will rely heavily
on the linkage of forces to achieve synergistic gains, EM spectrum domination
will be paramount in achieving battle space dominance.

10
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

41. Non Military Trends of Information Warfare. Non-military trends of IW

are as follows:

a. The World is becoming a Global Village. The increasing flow of

information, the evolution of the global economy, and the creation of the
INTERNET are all factors in creating the modern global village.

b. Civilians are More Vulnerable to IW. IW, both defensive and

offensive, is not confined to the battlefield. In fact it is a matter of fur more
urgency to the citizen than to the soldiers. It is more likely that both the
victims and the attackers of IW will be found in the civilian sphere

c. Information Terrorism. In future days, IW is likely to be a

continuous process. Which is beyond the purview of any conventional conflict.
It is likely to attack the civilian and military life in the form of information
terrorism. The terrorist seeks to disrupt the daily life of his target nation by
striking at the most vulnerable points in the society. Such vulnerable points
include all public and military infrastructures using IT.

d. IW Attack is Relatively Cheaper. While the technology to operate

and protect these networks is quite costly, the means required to attack them
are relatively cheap. In the simplest case, one needs only a Computer, a
Modem and a willing hacker. It implies that IW defence is relatively costlier
than IW offence.

e. The media as “Psycho Weapon”. This aspect of IW is nothing

new. Besides the combat forces, now psychological warfare endeavours to
influence the populace of an enemy country to oppose the war effort, or to
depose the reigning government.

f. Direct Broadcast Satellite(DBS). In this age of DBS no one needs

a government’s permission to speak directly to a country’s people. Using
DBS, the leader of one nation can talk to the people of other nation without
any legal prejudice.

g. Growing Dominance of INTERNET. The INTERNET is becoming

the prevailing means of information transferral. In the foreseeable future the
INTERNET will replace, or more accurately ‘Swallow’ the other form of media.
We will likely to see the DBS TV in merging in to the INTERNET. Thus the
media will enter the age of “MEGA TV”.

h. IW – A Double Edged Weapon. IW is a double edge sword. Those

countries most capable of waging war are also the ones most vulnerable to it.

11
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH

IW – Bangladesh Scenario

42. Since liberation war in 1971, Bangladesh is mostly committed in low intensity
conflicts like counter insurgency operations and counter terrorism. It is anticipated
that tomorrow’s terrorist may be an information terrorist. The target for future
conflicts will be information system or computer network in the field of military and
public infrastructures.

43. Our dependence on computer and cybernetics is growing very fast. There is
no room for complacency with the present trends. It is expected that by 2020,
activities involving the operation and control of essential physical and functional
infrastructures, like, power grid, traffic control, telecommunication, transportation and
others will be shifted from mechanical/electrical control to electronic/software control.
Any future threat is likely to be on our information systems. This growing threat on
IW warrants a contemplated IW Defence, which should start immediately although in
a limited scale.

44. In Bangladesh, economy and economic threat should be placed higher on the
list of threat perception. We might find that poverty, unawareness and lawlessness
as greater impediments for us to fight against possible IW threat.

45. The concept of IW is two folds: defensive and offensive IW. Bangladesh
adopts the policy of friendship with all, which dictates all it’s foreign policy. Hence
our prime focus should be on developing IW Defence potentials.

46. Our most potential adversary is capable of initiating any kind of surprise. In
this commercially driven web served world. They are the technology providers to the
world. Thereby they might use this warfare as a ploy to gain some geo-political
advantages. More so IW has no front line. Potential battlefields are anywhere and
everywhere. Network also allows the access of any body and every body. Therefore
it is essential to comprehend the nature and characteristics of IW that Bangladesh
are likely to face in future.

47. Newly conceived concept of IW is rarely known. Even the renowned IT

experts of the country are also little concern about the likely IW threat. Our present
IT security concerns only the information security and virtually nil effort has been
paid to provide protection against information disruption or destruction threat. This
trends of IT development without due consideration to IW threat might culminate in
to a problem like Y2K bugs.

48. In future battlefields, war will seek victory through concentration of effects
rather than concentration of force. Electronic attack will be the predominant method
of defeating enemy command and control system, firepower assets, intelligence
gathering and dissemination means. The war will be politically and militarily complex
and will involve synergistic application of all the elements of national and military
power.

12
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

Options for Bangladesh

49. General. In view of the growing trends of the IW threat, we should integrate
our whole IT effort as a single entity. Besides we should put considerable effort in
the form of IW defence. Following options are suggested for Bangladesh to
implement effective IW defence.

50. Designate an Accountable IW Focal Point (IW Doctrine). Development

in IT sector by different organizations with no clear and complete aim has led to
confusion and slow progress to date. Besides, this development trend has given a
little thought on the growing threats of IW. The government needs a single focal
point to integrate the IT efforts and supervise the complete activities and inter
relationship that are involved in this new warfare area. This step should include:

a. Issue IW instructions and policies.

b. Develop a plan and associated budget to obtain the needed IW

defence capability.

c. A long-term project to integrate the IT and IW phenomena.

51. Organise for IW Defence. Government should immediately form a

national IW committee and subsequently convert it into a separate IW organization
under the ministry of defence. This committee should be composed of experts from
the defence forces, government and non-government organisations, financial
institutions national and private media and IT service providers. This committee/
organisation should deal with the following issues:

a. Intelligence indication and warning.

b. IW planning and coordination.

c. System, network and infrastructure design.

d. Research and Development (R&D).

52. Increase Awareness. An important and cost effective first line of IW

defence is a users and operations community who are aware of potential threats and
is well trained in fighting possible IW threats. This can be achieved by implementing
awareness training and education programs to focus on new threats to both
unclassified and classified network. This step should specially address the need to
make the senior level government and non-government officials aware of the IW
vulnerabilities.

53. Assess Infrastructure Dependencies and Vulnerabilities. We need to

assess infrastructure dependencies and vulnerabilities of various infrastructures,
those are vitally needed to support mobilization, deployment and employment of
forces and to control and sustain those forces. This step should include:

13
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

a. Assess operational and functional infrastructure dependencies and

vulnerabilities.

b. Develop a list of essential infrastructure protection needs.

c. Develop the resources estimates for essential infrastructure protection.

54. Define Threat Condition and Responses. Develop a system to provide a

common understanding of IW threat conditions. Appropriate responses to these
conditions should also be developed. This step should include:

a. Define and promulgate a useful set of IW threat condition.

b. Define and implement responses to IW Defence threat conditions.

c. Explore legislative and regulatory implications.

55. Establish and Maintain a Minimum Essential Information Infrastructures

(MEII) Current information infrastructures are susceptible to IW attacks, aimed at
collapsing government as well as commercial systems. A strategy and overall
concept must be developed for MEII. This minimum infrastructure can serve as a
means for restoring essential services. It should include:

a. Define options with associated costs and schedules.

b. Identify minimum essential force structure and supporting information

infrastructure needs.

c. Prioritise critical functions and infrastructure dependencies.

d. Design the MEII capability.

56. Staff for Success. A cadre of trained professionals with recognized career
paths is an essential ingredient for defending present and future information
systems. This step should include:

a. Establish a career path and mandate training and certification of

systems and network administration.

b. Establish a military skill especially for IW Defence.

c. Develop specific IW awareness courses with strong focus on

operational preparedness.

57. Resolve the Legal Issue. Legal parameters and awareness is unclear
against an information attack. To lessen the confusion we should resolve the legal
matters and issue a rules of engagement regarding appropriate defensive action.
Areas to examine include:

14
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

a. Safe guard private and military infrastructures.

b. Attack of unknown nationality.

b. Tracking attackers through multiple systems.

c. Promulgation of clear guidance regarding monitoring of systems,

control and use of warning banners on these systems.

CONCLUSION

58. Kuwait shares its border with KSA and Iraq. Under Ottoman Empire Kuwait
became independent in 1913 but Iraq accepted the borderline with reservations.
Iraqi claim on Kuwait based on the fact that Kuwait was governed under the same
province of Basra along with Iraq. In April 1973, following an Arab mediation Iraq
withdrew its claim. During Iraq-Iran war, Kuwait helped Iraq. But in mid 1990,
Saddam put forward number of demands to Kuwait including the reduction of oil
production, a favourable lease for Warba and Bubiyan and writing off the loan. Arabs
diplomatic efforts failed to solve the debacle and ultimately Iraq annexed Kuwait in
August 1990. The USA led coalition aimed to free Kuwait and restore the ruling
family to power. They also wanted to maintain the social, political and regional status
in Middle East ensuring stable oil supply. For the first six months logistic build up
and IW went on simultaneously. From 15 January 1991, the allied stormed Iraqi air
space. The allied brought parity in terms of ground force and out numbered in terms
of air power. The 40 days of gulf war, which finally ended in a 100 hours ground
assault, has added a new dimension in the annals of world history. (Paragraph 8-
14).

59. IW is the offensive and defensive use of information and information systems
to safeguard own interest and deny the same to an adversary. The concept of IW is
widely accepted to the military requirements because of its outstanding performance
in the field of national strategy and military establishment. There are several forms of
IW that involve C2W, IBW, EW, Economic IW, Cyber Warfare, Psychological
Warfare and Hacker Warfare. All these forms cover a wide spectrum of activities
from decapitating the enemy’s command structure through physical destruction to
the use of information against the human mind. Information is used against the
national will, opposing commanders and troops, and their culture. (Paragraph 15 –
17).

60. Features of IW made it attractive and easy to apply. Unlike traditional weapon
technologies, development of information-based techniques does not require
sizeable financial resources or state sponsorship. Tools of IW include Viruses,
Trapdoors, Logic Bombs, Electronic Jamming and Chipping that are mainly
computer related. Surveillance satellites over-fly enemy territory without the fear of
being shot down can be used to gather information on enemy. Besides, media plays
an important role in the modern day warfare to form world opinion. Effective counter
measures against IW include both deterrence and system defensive measures.
15
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

Improved design, hardening and protective measures, and security training can be
helpful as defensive measures. (Paragraph 18 – 20).

61. Information Warfare as a concept has fast gained acceptance after the Gulf
War, though the understanding of the concept trails far behind. Gulf War applied all
possible tools of information war. It witnessed unprecedented use of media,
psychological operations and other related means. The primitive less sophisticated
Iraqi weapon systems were no match for the “intrinsically superior systems” of the
western powers during the Gulf War. The western allies made use of modern
computerised surveillance system to detect Iraqi aircraft and to control the Coalition.
Two experimental JSTARS ground surveillance aircraft for detecting mass vehicle
movement also assisted the Coalition. The Coalition planes were equipped with
highly effective infrared or radar-guided air-to-air missiles. Guided by the AWACS
these fighter aircraft had a significant technological superiority over Iraqi fighters.
The Coalition made extensive use of bombers using “stealth” technology, long-
ranged Tomahawk missiles, a wide range of optical and radar satellites, Apache and
Cobra helicopters equipped with laser-guided munitions. (Paragraph 21 – 30).

62. Gulf war saw revolution media could bring during such a conflict to achieve
nation aims. The journalists were to accompany military units in special combat
“pools”. The pools represented newspapers, wire services, television, radio and
news magazines. All information provided outside the censored pool reports were
from official military briefings. In the Gulf War the allies devoted considerable
resources to communication and control. It brought a whole new meaning to the use
of multimedia in psychological operations. Electronic warfare and computer
simulation was extensively used to take advantage of information. A new concept,
called Revolution in Military Affairs is gaining increased currency. Central to the
RMA argument is the role of Information. It involves vastly improved means of real-
time information, surveillance and target acquisition to improve accuracy of precision
weapons and minimal collateral damage. (Paragraph 31 – 38).

63. Any future war is likely to be fought in five dimensions, the space being the
fifth dimension. Information warfare will be the focal point in any such conflict. Mere
evil intention of any invading nation will not be enough to cause a war. World opinion
will be invaluable to support such war effort and use of media and other electronic
means will integrate the world opinion. In today’s world the developed nations are
most inclined towards the concept of “Non Offensive Defence”, where the nations
are more inclined to maintaining a sizeable defence forces with all modern
equipment and armaments to safeguard the territorial sovereignty and integrity
rather than waging a war. IW brought in the new concept of “Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA)”. RMA is the sixth generation of warfare. Space, the ultimate high
ground provides numerous advantages for placing sensors. Sixth generation global
command and control systems will provide commanders with the planning,
optimisation and assignment capability needed to wage high tempo wars.
(Paragraph 39-40).

64. The increasing flow of information, the evolution of the global economy, and
the creation of the INTERNET are all factors in creating the modern global village. In
16
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

future days, IW is likely to be a continuous process, which is beyond the purview of

any conventional conflict. It is likely to attack the civilian and military life in the form
of information terrorism, which will seek to disrupt the daily life of his target nation by
striking at the most vulnerable points in the society. (Paragraph 41).

65. It is anticipated that tomorrow’s terrorist in Bangladesh may be an information

terrorist and their targets will be information systems and computer networks in the
field of military and public infrastructures. All the infrastructures like power grid,
traffic control, telecommunications, transpositions and others will come under
automation and software controlled networks and these will be very vulnerable to
information warfare. The foreign policy of Bangladesh being “Friendship with all and
malice with none” demands the development of information defence potentials. As
our potential and adversary is well equipped with information technologies, it is
essential to comprehend the nature and the characteristics of IW that Bangladesh is
likely to face in future. In future, offensive information warfare will aim at defeating
the enemy command and control system, firepower assets, intelligence gathering
and dissemination means. (Paragraph 42 - 48).

66. In view of the growing trends of information warfare threats, we should

integrate our whole information technology effort as a single entity. The government
needs to supervise the complete activities and interrelationship that are involved in
this new warfare area. Awareness must be increased in IW. An important and cost
effective first liner of IW defense is a users and operations community who are
aware of potential threats and is well trained in protection, detection and reaction
tactics and techniques and procedures. This can be achieved by implementing
awareness training and education programs to focus on new threats to both
unclassified and classified network. (Paragraph 49 - 52).

67. We need to assess infrastructure dependencies and vulnerabilities of various

infrastructures, those are vitally needed to support mobilization, deployment and
employment of forces and to control and sustain those forces. Legal parameters and
awareness is unclear against an information attack. To lessen the confusion we
should resolve the legal matters and issue rules of engagement regarding
appropriate defensive action. (Paragraph 53 – 57).

RECOMMENDATIONS

68.

17
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

Mirpur Cantonment K M ENAYETUL HAQUE

Major
Nov 2001 Group Leader

Distribution:

Lieutenant Colonel Md Abdul Hannan, psc, sigs

Sponsor Directing Staff
Group Research Paper

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books.

1. Martin C. Libicki, “What is Information Warfare?” National Defence University,

Washington DC.

2. Bruce W. Watson, Bruce George, MP, Peter Tsouras and B.L. Cry, “Military
Lessons of the Gulf War” Green Hill Books, London (1991).

3. Mahmood Hassan, “Gulf War- Third World and the Euro American Society”,
Academic Publishers, Dhaka (1992).

4. Rep. Les Aspin and Rep. William Dickinson. “Defence for a New Era- lessons
of the Persian Gulf War”, Brasseys (US) Inc, New York (1992).

5. Michael R Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, “ The General War- The
Inside story of the Conflict in the gulf”, Little Brown and Company, New York (1995).

6. Aharon Levran, “Israeli Strategy after Desert Storm- Lessons of the Second
Gulf War”, Frank Cass, London (1997).

7. Alberto Bin, Richard Hill and Archer Jones, “Desert Storm- A Forgotten War”,
Pager Publishers, London (1998).

18
RESTRICTED
 RESTRICTED

Journals

8. Information Operation (FM 100-6), Military Review, US Army, November –

December 1996.

9. Information Operation and Battlefield Simulation/ Digitisation, Military Review,

US Army, November – December 1995.

10. The Gulf War: A Critical Analysis, Armed Forces Day Journal 1998, P 66-71.

Precis

11. Information Warfare, Defence Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur,
Dhaka, Bangladesh.

12. Media Study, Defence Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur, Dhaka,
Bangladesh.

Internet

13. John R Mac Arthur, “Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War: How
Government Can Mould Public Opinion”, October 7, 1993.

14. John Stockwell, “The CIA and the Gulf War”, A Speech delivered on 20
February 1991 at the Louden Nelson Community Center, Santa Cruise California.

15. Histories- Historical Epidemics and Modern Media, htpl : // www.pbs.org.

16. The Gulf War, index. htmlindex. html.

JOBS PENDING

1. Cover Page
2. Spiral
3. Abstract
4. Table of contents
5. Recommendations
6. Foot note
7. Photocopy

19
RESTRICTED