Page |1
EN BANC case was pending trial. Thus, the trial
G.R. No. L-16177 May 24, 1967
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
PANCHO PELAGIO Y ALFONSO, ET
AL., defendants.
PANCHO PELAGIO Y ALFONSO, OSCAR
CAYMO Y REYES and JOSE GUICO Y
PAPAS, defendants-appellants.
Jose Bonto and Jose Sarte for defendants-
appellants.
Antonio Barredo for plaintiff-appellee A. B.
Zamora.
Manuel V. Pineda for other plaintiff-appellee.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Pasay City in
Criminal Case No. 3380, People v. Pancho
Pelagio, et al., condemning the appellants,
Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo and Jose
Guico, to death for the crime of robbery with
homicide as defined and penalized in Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code.
The amended information under which the
above judgment was rendered originally
recited six defendants, namely, the three
aforenamed appellants, and Arcadio Balmeo,
Evelyn Villanueva and Arcadio Manalang alias
Ding Manalang. Subsequently, however,
Arcadio Balmeo and Evelyn Villanueva were
discharged from the said information when
they agreed to turn state witnesses. Armando
Manalang, on the other hand, died while the
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
Villanueva St., Pasay City. At this meeting,
proceeded only with respect to the herein
appellants: Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo
and Jose Guico.
The records disclose that Jose Guico, an ex-
convict, and Evelyn Villanueva lived in
common law relationship at No. 289-A (Int.)
Leveriza St., Pasay City, from about January
1955 to March of the same year. Among their
friends were Pancho Pelagio, also an ex-
convict, and Armando Manalang. At around
three o'clock in the afternoon of March 23,
1955, while Manalang was at the above
residence, Pancho Pelagio came to see the
spouses Guico and Villanueva. Pelagio's wife
had just delivered a child and he wanted to
borrow money for the hospital expenses.
It is not determinable from the records if
Pancho Pelagio was then accommodated in
his request for a loan. The records disclose,
however, that Armando Manalang, taking
advantage of the said visit, informed Pancho
Pelagio of a robbery he, Manalang was
planning with some other friends who later
were revealed by Manalang to be Jose Guico,
Oscar Caymo and Arcadio Balmeo. Pelagio
and Manalang decided to talk the matter over
and, in fact, did discuss the subject once more
later that afternoon in the presence of Jose
Guico and Evelyn Villanueva, when Caymo
and Balmeo arrived in the same house. The
following day, March 24, 1955, the above
persons, namely, Evelyn Villanueva, Pancho
Pelagio, Armando Manalang, Oscar Caymo
and Arcadio Balmeo, met again at Guico's
residence and there finalized and agreed on
the plan to rob the house of Guico's former
landlady, a certain Aling Nena, at No. 327 G.
Jose Guico was absent.
But the full and exact nature of Jose Guico's
participation in the first meeting is unclear
because there is evidence to the effect that
while the robbery was then being discussed,
Guico was in the bathroom taking his shower.
(t.s.n. pp. 6, 12-13, Hearing of August 23,
1955). It is established, though, that after
Manalang had sketched the intended victim's
house and its surrounding, Guico explained
the location of the said house in relation to the
surrounding streets and, the points thereof
through which entrance and exit should be
effected.
When the meeting broke up at about sick
o'clock that evening, March 24, 1955, Pancho
Pelagio, Oscar Caymo, Armando Manalang
and Arcadio Balmeo set out for the execution
of their plan. They all walked together towards
Aling Nena's residence although before
reaching the place, Caymo ordered Manalang
to hail and hold a taxi which the latter did.
Then, too, only Balmeo and Caymo actually
entered the victim's premises because, as
was earlier agreed upon, Pancho Pelagio
acted as the lookout for the two and he simply
posted himself by the gate of the said house.
Caymo and Balmeo gained entrance to the
house through its back kitchen door which
they found to be open. Once inside, Caymo
drew his gun and sought out its occupants.
Only an old woman, Mrs. Severina de Gloria,
however, was in at the time. Caymo then
pointed the gun at the old lady and intimidated
her into producing all the money and jewelry
she could. All in all, the pair got about P437 in

cash, three pieces of jewelry worth about
P205.00 and a watch worth about P300.00.
After they had taken the above items, Caymo
ordered Mrs. de Gloria to lie face downward,
covered her with a blanket, and cautioned her
against moving or otherwise sounding out an
alarm. The two then went down the house and
out into the street. At the gate, however, they
failed to find Pancho Pelagio.
From G. Villanueva Street where the victim's
house was located, Caymo and Balmeo
walked till they got to the corner of F.
Fernando street where they found Armando
Manalang waiting for them in a taxi. Caymo
and Balmeo then rode on it.
As the taxi was about to leave, however, a
jeep from the opposite direction blocked its
way and as the two vehicles were thus
stopped, a man alighted from the jeep and
started to walk towards the taxi. When the
stranger was very near the taxi already,
Manalang instructed Caymo to shoot at the
man as the latter was a police officer.
Whereupon, Caymo leveled several shots at
the latter, about six in all; and the man, who
was later identified as Patrolman Francisco
Trinidad of the Pasay Police Department, fell
dead.
From the scene of the shooting, Manalang,
Caymo and Balmeo went direct to a house in
Buendia Street owned by Manalang's sister
where they changed clothes and hid the death
weapon and the money and jewelry they had
robbed. Shortly thereafter, Caymo and
Balmeo proceeded to a house in Blumentritt
where they met Pancho Pelagio whom they
called to account for his absence at the gate
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
during the robbery. The latter explained that
he had to scamper away before Caymo and
Balmeo had gone down because he, Pelagio,
saw someone slip out of the house apparently
to summon the police.
The records do not disclose just how and
when the herein appellants and their
companions were apprehended by the police.
It appears, however, that on March 25, 1955,
or the day following the incident, Oscar
Caymo was taken to the National Bureau of
Investigation and subjected to paraffin test
and found positive for nitrate burns in both
hands, the next day, he executed his
extrajudicial confession (Exh. I) relating to his
participation in the crime and implicating
Pancho Pelagio, Armando Manalang had
Arcadio Balmeo in it.
On March 26, 1955, appellant, Jose Guico
also executed an extra-judicial confession
(Exh. I) owning his participation in the
formation of the conspiracy as earlier recited
in this decision. He named as co-conspirators
Pancho Pelagio and Armando Manalang.
The last to be apprehended was Armando
Manalang. On April 8, 1955, he extra-judicially
confessed (Exh. G) to the above offense and
implicated as his companions in it Jose Guico,
Oscar Caymo, Arcadio Balmeo and Evelyn
Villanueva.
In the trial court, the herein appellant's
common defense was alibi. Pancho Pelagio
claimed that at the time of the incident he was
playing mahjong at the house of one Angelina
Dadivas in Lakandola Street, Tondo, Manila.
Oscar Caymo, on the other hand, claimed that
Page |2
he was then at home at No. 2316 Oroquieta
Street, Manila. Finally, Jose Guico maintained
that during the incident he was at the
residence of one Jose Obligacion where he
stayed until about 11:00 in the evening.
Consistently with their alibi, the appellants
charged that the extrajudicial confession given
by them were secured by the police through
threat and maltreatment.
In the appeal before us now, only Oscar
Caymo sticks to the defense of alibi. Appellant
Pancho Pelagio now admits he participated in
the crime in the manner recited above but
submits that, under the circumstances, he
should only be convicted for simple robbery
and not for robbery with homicide. Appellant
Jose Guico, on the other hand, argues in this
appeal that even under the facts found by the
trial court regarding his participation, he
cannot justly be convicted for the crime
charged. The Office of the Solicitor General,
for its part, urges the affirmance of the
decision under review with respect to Pancho
Pelagio and Oscar Caymo but recommends
the acquittal of Jose Guico on reasonable
doubt.
After a careful and thorough review of the
evidence, this Court believes that the decision
appealed from should be modified to the end
that Oscar Caymo's conviction should stand,
Pancho Pelagio's guilt be reduced to simple
robbery, and Jose Guico, as recommended by
the Solicitor General, be acquitted on
reasonable doubt.
Appellant Oscar Caymo's insistence on his
alibi is absolutely futile. The evidence against

its credibility is both forceful and
overwhelming.
To begin with, Oscar Caymo was positively
identified by Mrs. Severina de Gloria as one of
those who broke into her house on the night of
the incident and robbed her at gunpoint. He
was likewise positively identified during the
trial by Francisco Juni, the driver of the get-
away taxi, as the gunwielder in the fatal
shooting of Pat. Trinidad. Additionally, state
witnesses Evelyn Villanueva and Arcadio
Balmeo testified at the stand that he was
among those who hatched and agreed on the
robbery at the house of Jose Guico previous
to the execution of the same. And then, too,
he was found positive for nitrate burns in both
his hands by the National Bureau of
Investigation the very day following the
incident. Against this finding, he has offered
neither denial nor any reasonable explanation.
Even if this Court disregards his extrajudicial
confession, therefore, though we do not here
now find the same inadmissible the
acceptance of Caymo's alibi would still be
completely anomalous and irrational. No
jurisprudence in criminal cases is more settled
than the rule that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses and that the same should be
rejected when the identity of the accused has
been sufficiently and positively established by
eyewitnesses to the crime. (People v. Ruiz,
G.R. No. L-11063, August 22, 1958; People v.
Asmawil, G.R. No. L-18761, March 31, 1965;
People vs. Lumayag, G.R. No. L-19142,
March 31, 1965). When nothing supports it
except the testimonies of relatives and friends
and the defendant's own urging of the same,
the said defense weighs and is worth nothing.
(People v. Bañaga, et al., G.R. No. L-14905,
January 28, 1961) Besides, the rule is to the
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
effect that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough
to prove that he was also somewhere when
the crime was committed but the defendant
must likewise demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime at such time. (People v.
Limpo, et al., G.R. No. L-13058, January 28,
1961) Caymo's alibi does not meet this
standard. Consequently, this Court would only
do wrong and carry justice to set aside his
conviction.
This Court, however, concurs with appellant
Pancho Pelagio's submission that, by the trial
court's own factual determination, his criminal
liability cannot be extended beyond simple
robbery. We hold Pancho Pelagio guiltless or
innocent of Pat. Trinidad's death.
Even the decision under appeal recites that
when Arcadio Balmeo and Oscar Caymo
hurried out of the victim's house after the
robbery, Pancho Pelagio had evidently fled
from his lookout post because the pair,
Balmeo and Caymo, failed to locate him at the
gate where he was supposed to have
stationed himself. To be sure, the said
decision itself renders the account that it was
only Balmeo and Caymo who walked together
from the said house to the corner of
Villanueva and F. Fernando Streets where
then they saw Armando Manalang waiting for
them in a taxi and that it was only when these
three had taken to the said taxi, and the cab
was about to leave, that the shooting of Pat.
Trinidad happened. When the homicide was
committed, therefore, Pancho Pelagio could
not have had the least intervention or
participation as might justify penalizing him
likewise for the said killing. So far as the
Page |3
records disclose, the conspirators were
agreed only on the commission of robbery;
there is no evidence that homicide besides
was determined by them when they plotted
the crime. All these warrant the exclusion of
Pancho Pelagio from any responsibility for the
said killing. (People vs. Basisten, et al., 47
Phil. 493) Considering that those who actually
participated in the robbery were only three,
Pancho Pelagio included, and only one of
them was armed, the same evidently was not
"in band." (Art. 296, Revise Penal Code) This
being the case, then it would indeed be
irregular or questionable to hold Pancho
Pelagio similarly responsible as Caymo and
Balmeo for the killing of Pat. Trinidad. Under
the code, it is only when the robbery is in band
that all those present in the commission of the
robbery may be punished, for any of the
assaults which its members might commit.
Thus, in People v. Pascual, G.R. No. L-4801,
June 30, 1953 (unreported), we held that
where three persons committed robbery and
two of them committed rape upstairs on its
occasion, while the third guarded the owner of
the house downstairs, only the two who
committed the assault should be punished for
robbery with rape while the third was liable for
robbery only.
Finally, we find the Solicitor General's
recommendation for the acquittal of appellant
Jose Guico well founded. While it seems
proven that the said appellant did participate
in the first of two meetings in the discussion of
the plan to commit the robbery in question by
answering Armando Manalang's inquiries
relating to the intended house and its
surrounding streets and the means of
entrance thereto and the channels of exit
therefrom, the evidence is as much that,

thereafter, his involvement with the conspiracy
ceased. It should be recalled that the
conferences on the robbery were held on
March 23, and 24, 1955. At the first meeting,
the participants were Jose Guico, Pancho
Pelagio, Oscar Caymo, Armando Manalang,
Arcadio Balmeo and Evelyn Villanueva. At the
meeting of the 24th the same group, save for
appellant Jose Guico, conferred and finalized
the plan and, in fact, proceeded to execute the
same almost immediately after the conference
adjourned. There is ample and positive
evidence on record that appellant Jose Guico
was absent not only from the second meeting
but likewise from the robbery itself. To be
sure, not even the decision under appeal
determined otherwise. Consequently, even if
Guico's participation in the first meeting
sufficiently involved him with the conspiracy,
such participation and involvement, however,
would be inadequate to render him criminally
liable as a conspirator. Conspiracy alone,
without the execution of its purpose, is not a
crime punishable by law, except in special
instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code)
which, however, do not include robbery.
Besides, appellant Jose Guico's absence from
the second conference as well as from the
robbery itself strongly points to his evident
change of mind regarding his commitment the
previous day to be in on the robbery. Under
the circumstances and under a policy of liberal
consideration for timely retreat or repentance,
he may be deemed to have desisted
voluntarily from the conspiracy before the
contemplated crime could actually be carried
out and therefore, free from penal
accountability. (People v. Timbol, et al., G.R.
Nos. 47473-47474, August 4, 1944
[unreported]) As Viada expounds on the rule,
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
"when the action of the felony starts and the
accused, because of fear or remorse desists
from its continuance, there is no attempt. . . . If
the author of the attempt, after having
commenced to execute the felony by external
acts, he stops by a free and spontaneous
feeling on the brink of the abyss, he is saved.
It is a call to repentance, to the conscience, a
grace, a pardon which the law grants to
voluntary repentance." (Cited and translated
in Padilla Criminal Law, p. 120, 1964 Ed.)
In summary then, this Court finds appellant
Oscar Caymo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of robbery with the homicide
attended by the aggravating circumstances,
all recited in the information and proven at the
trial, of nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle
without the compensating mitigating
circumstances. On the other hand, appellant
Pancho Pelagio is hereby determined to be
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple
robbery under Article 294, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, attended by the
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and
recidivism, having been at the time of the trial,
as recited in the information and proven at the
trial, previously convicted for robbery. There is
no mitigating circumstance appreciable in his
favor. For both appellants, therefore, the
penalties prescribed by law should be
imposed in their maximum period, although
appellant Pancho Pelagio is still qualified to
avail of the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. For the reasons given above,
appellant Jose Guico should be, as he is
hereby acquitted.
Wherefore this Court affirms the decision
under appeal insofar as it imposes the death
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penalty on appellant Oscar Caymo, but
modifies the conviction of appellant Pancho
Pelagio from robbery with homicide to simple
robbery under Article 294, paragraph 5,
R.P.C., with the aforementioned aggravating
circumstances. Accordingly and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the said
appellant is hereby sentenced to a prison term
of from four years and two months of prision
correccional to eight years and one day
of prision mayor. The abovenamed appellants,
moreover, are hereby ordered to indemnify,
jointly and severally the offended parties
named in the decision under appeal the sums
therein stated. The indemnity for the death of
Pat. Francisco Trinidad, payable to his heirs,
should be raised from P3,000.000 to
P6,000.00 and charged alone against
appellant Oscar Caymo. Finally, the conviction
of appellant Jose Guico is hereby set aside
and let judgment be entered acquitting him for
the reasons given above. Costs against the
appellants.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 99840 August 14, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
RODOLFO FEDERICO Y
MEDIONA, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The accused-appellant was charged with
murder in Criminal Case No. 90-82576-SCC
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 49, under an information the
accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about March 17, 1990, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused conspiring and
confederating together with others
whose true names, real identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown
and helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, and by
means of treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one Pastor
Neil Escala y de Guzman by then and
there stabbing him several times on
the different parts of his body with a
knife, thereby inflicting upon the said
Pastor Neil Escala y de Guzman
mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.
Contrary to law.1
He was also charged with frustrated murder in
Criminal Case No. 90-82577 for stabbing on
the same occasion Rogelio Fernando. These
two cases were not, however, consolidated
despite a motion for that purpose. 2
After trial on the merits of the first case, the
trial court, in a decision promulgated on 7
December 1990,3 found the accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime of murder and sentenced him to
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with
all the accessory penalties provided by law,
and to pay the heirs of the victim P16,980.00
as actual damages and P50,000.00 as
indemnity for moral damages.
The trial court considered treachery as the
qualifying circumstance in view of the
"suddenness" of the attack, leaving the victim
"completely unaware of the intentions and
actuations of Francisco Mediona because, at
the time, [the victim, Pastor Escala] was
conversing with Rogelio Fernandez and was
thus unable to defend himself and prevent the
attack on him by Francisco
Mediona."4
The evidence for the prosecution as
developed by the testimonies of its witnesses
is summarized in the Brief for the Appellee as
follows:
Sometime in February 1990, Rogelio
Fernando, a tricycle driver and
Francisco Mediona, a Metro Aide, had
an altercation resulting in one chasing
the other (TSN, May 28, 1990, pp. 15-
16, 22). However, before the incident
could worsen, Rogelio Fernando and
Francisco Mediona settled their
differences before the Barangay
Chairman of their place in Tondo,
Manila, in the presence of the mother
of Rogelio Fernando and a Barangay
Tanod and sealed it by shaking hands
(Ibid., pp. 15, 22-23). Rogelio
Fernando believed then that was the
end of his differences with Francisco
Mediona (Ibid.). He was wrong.
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On March 17, 1990, between 8:00 and
8:30 p.m., Rogelio Fernando, Pastor
Escala, one Artemon and a certain
Jun, all of whom were tricycle drivers,
were in front of the bakery owned by
Benedicto Escala, the father of Pastor
Escala, located at No. 212 Magsaysay
Street, corner Liwayway Street, Don
Bosco, Tondo, Manila, conversing
about tricycle sidecars, while Marcelo
Gallardo was seated as he used to in
front of his house located eight (8)
meters away from Escala's bakery
across the street, passing the time
(tsn, May 28, 1990, pp. 5-7, 21-22, 24,
26-27, 30-33, 35-36, 38-41, 44). The
place was illuminated by a lighted
electric post about seven (7) to eight
(8) meters from the bakery (Ibid., pp.
26-27, 35-36). Although passenger
jeepneys and other vehicles plied
Magsaysay Street, however, there
were no vehicles passing at the time
(Ibid., p. 38).
At that precise moment Marcelo
Gallardo saw appellant Rodolfo
Federico and the latter's cousins
Francisco Mediona and Ruben
Mediona emerge from an alley across
the street going towards the direction
of the bakery; then change their
direction and go to a house nearby
(Ibid., pp. 35, 40-43). Not long after,
appellant and his two cousins
reappeared at Magsaysay Street and
proceeded towards the bakery (Ibid.).
Francisco Mediona was holding with
his right hand a bladed knife similar to
that used by butchers (Ibid., pp. 32,
44-45). At a distance of about six (6)

to seven (7) meters from the lighted
electric post, the trio momentarily
stopped. Then Francisco Mediona, still
armed with a knife, proceeded
towards the bakery where Rogelio
Fernando, Pastor Escala, Artemon
and Jun were still conversing; while
Ruben Mediona and appellant Rodolfo
Federico, who both stayed behind,
pulled out from their pockets slings
with darts and aimed the same
towards the bakery, where Rogelio
Fernando's group was (Ibid., pp. 31,
35-36, 45, 48, 50). Francisco Mediona
bought bread from the bakery (Ibid.,
pp. 7, 17). After buying bread,
Francisco Mediona suddenly and
without any warning stabbed Rogelio
Fernando on the left side of the body,
who was caught by surprise and was
hit between the armpit and left breast,
and at the same time uttered "malas
mo, pare" (Ibid., pp. 7-8, 16-17, 32).
Rogelio Fernando felt pains in his
body and instinctively fled from the
scene before Francisco Mediona
could finish him off (Ibid., p. 18). He
ran towards Magsaysay Street, but his
path was blocked by Ruben Mediona
and appellant, who aimed their slings
and darts at him (Ibid., p. 8-11). So he
turned towards Herbosa Street,
Tondo, Manila, to avoid being hit by
the darts of appellant and Ruben
Mediona (Ibid., p. 11). There, he met
some friends who brought him to the
Tondo Medical Center for medical
treatment (Ibid., pp. 11-12).
Meanwhile, immediately after he
stabbed Rogelio Fernando, Francisco
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
Mediona instantly turned to Pastor
Escala, held him by the hair, and
stabbed him with his bladed knife
(Ibid., pp. 33-34, 51). Pastor Escala
fell down on his back to the pavement
and again Francisco Mediona stabbed
him (Ibid.). Marcelo Gallardo saw
Francisco Mediona stabbing Pastor
Escala four (4) times on different parts
of the body (Ibid.). After stabbing
Pastor Escala, Francisco Mediona
defiantly hurled a challenge on anyone
in the vicinity to a fight but nobody
took up his challenge (Ibid.).
Thereupon, Francisco Mediona fled
with the appellant and Ruben Mediona
(Ibid.).
Pastor Escala was rushed to the Mary
Johnston Hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival by Dr. G.
Uy, the hospital's surgeon-on-duty.5
The autopsy conducted on Pastor Escala's
body revealed that it bore six stab wounds
which caused his death.6
The accused-appellant denied any
participation in the commission of the crime
and interposed alibi to strengthen such denial.
According to him, at 6:00 p.m. of 17 March
1990, he was in the house of his cousin Elsa
Mediona along Magsaysay Street, Tondo,
Manila, which is about twenty arms-length
from the bakery. Shortly before 9:00 p.m. that
evening, he noticed a commotion outside
Elsa's house and heard someone shouting,
"May saksakan, may saksakan." When he
went out of the house, he heard people, say
that Francisco Mediona stabbed somebody.
Page |6
He then returned to the house of Elsa, but
shortly thereafter, two policemen arrived,
handcuffed him, and pushed him outside the
house. He told them that he had not done
anything wrong, and when he asked why they
arrested him, they just told him to give his
explanation at the police headquarters. At the
police headquarters, Patrolman Richard
Lumbad tried to force him to admit that he
killed Pastor Escala, but he refused to do so.
Although the accused-appellant was not the
one who stabbed the victim in this case, the
trial court convicted him as a principal on the
basis of conspiracy established by the
following facts, to wit: (a) the accused-
appellant and his cousins Francisco Mediona
and Ruben Mediona emerged together and at
the same time from an alley nearby and went
toward the bakery while the victim and his
companions were conversing in front of the
bakery; (b) instead of proceeding directly to
the bakery, they first veered toward another
direction and went to the house nearby
(presumably Elsa Mediona's house); (c) they
reappeared after a while near the bakery
where Francisco pretended to buy bread,
while the accused-appellant and Ruben,
armed with slings and darts which they
pointed at the bakery, positioned themselves
strategically along Magsaysay Street; (d)
when Francisco was receiving the bread, he
suddenly stabbed Rogelio Fernando on the
left side of his body, and after the latter
managed to escape, Francisco turned to
Pastor Escala and stabbed him several times
while the accused-appellant and Ruben
continued to aim their slings and darts at the
bakery; (e) after stabbing Escala, Francisco
challenged every one in the area to a fight and
since nobody dared to accept the challenge,

he left the scene together with the accused-
appellant and Ruben Mediona.
The trial court concluded that by their acts, the
accused-appellant and his cousins Francisco
and Ruben showed a common objective, that
of killing Rogelio Fernando and Pastor Escala,
and each of them performed separate parts
aimed at and to attain the same objective.
Such acts were concerted and cooperative in
point of time and sequence, indicating
concurrence of sentiments, sympathy and
determination.
In this appeal, the accused-appellant wants us
to acquit him because the trial court:
ERRED IN CONVICTING [HIM]
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. . .
AS PRINCIPAL OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER DESPITE THE FACT THAT
HE HAD NOT CONSPIRED OR
COOPERATED WITH THE
ASSAILANT IN STABBING THE
VICTIM TO DEATH.
He does not, therefore, question the findings
of the trial court that the crime committed for
the killing of Escala is murder. The only issue
presented to us is whether there was
conspiracy between the accused-appellant
and his cousin Francisco Mediona, the person
who actually stabbed Escala. If there was, the
accused-appellant admits that he would be
equally liable with Francisco; otherwise, the
latter alone should suffer the consequences
for the criminal act.
Our own scrutiny of the records and
evaluation of the evidence for the prosecution
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
fail to convince us with moral certainty that the
accused-appellant had conspired with his
cousins Francisco Mediona and Ruben
Mediona to kill Pastor Escala.
The basis for the trial court's conviction of the
accused-appellant was the existence of a
conspiracy between him, Ruben Mediona, and
Francisco Mediona to kill both Rogelio
Fernando and the victim in this case, Pastor
Escala. What the trial court overlooked,
though is that the conspiracy which the
records and the evidence of this case show
and which the prosecution successfully
established is to kill Fernando only and not
Escala also.
It is very obvious that the accused-appellant
and his cousins intended to harm Fernando
because of the bad blood that existed
between the latter and Francisco Mediona due
to a misunderstanding that occurred a month
before the incident which Francisco could not
forget despite the amicable settlement
mediated by the barangay captain. The
actions of the accused-appellant in arming
himself with a sling and darts which he aimed
towards the bakery where Fernando and the
others were and in blocking the path of
Fernando when the latter tried to run away
from Francisco establish his concurrence in
the criminal purpose of Francisco, the actual
assailant of Fernando. But with respect to the
stabbing of the victim herein, Pastor Escala,
we find very tenuous and insufficient the
evidence of conspiracy. Conspiracy, just like
the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.7 And the rule has
always been that co-conspirators are liable
only for acts done pursuant to the
Page |7
conspiracy; for other acts done outside the
contemplation of the co-conspirators or which
are not the necessary and logical
consequence of the intended crime, only the
actual perpetrators are liable. 8 In such a case,
the dictum that the act of one is the act of all
does not hold true anymore.
No reason, motive, or intent on the part of
Francisco was shown or proved why he would
stab Escala. And there is no convincing
evidence that the killing of Escala was part of
the conspiracy to kill Rogelio Fernando.
Neither is there any indication that the
accused-appellant was aware that Francisco
would attack Escala. Francisco stabbed
Escala only after he had stabbed Rogelio
Fernando and the latter ran away. Why
Francisco decided to also stab Escala is
beyond our ken. We could only surmise that
Escala made a move which Francisco
perceived as an act of aggression against him
because after repeatedly stabbing Escala,
Francisco even challenged those around him
to a fight.9 We cannot and should not assume
that the accused-appellant had any inkling of
what Francisco was going to do at the time
the latter turned against Escala. Because the
conspiracy was to kill Fernando only and the
accused-appellant did not conspire with
Francisco in the killing of Escala, he cannot be
held liable as a co-conspirator for the said
killing.
In the absence of a conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose and intention immediately
before the commission of the crime, or
community of criminal design the criminal
responsibility arising from acts directed
against one and the same person is individual

and not collective; each of the participants is
liable only for the acts committed by
him. 10 The accused-appellant, by his actions
while Francisco was stabbing Escala, is liable
for the latter's death, not as a co-principal
however, but as an accomplice under Article
18 of the Revised Penal Code. It was
established that at the time Francisco
attacked and stabbed Escala, the accused-
appellant and Ruben Mediona remained
standing in the same place where they were
when Francisco stabbed Fernando and still
had their slings and darts pointed at the
people near the bakery. It is obvious then that
at that particular instance, the accused-
appellant became aware of the intent of
Francisco to kill Escala. Moreover, he
cooperated in the execution of Francisco's
purpose and concurred therewith by pointing
his sling and darts, either to give moral
support to Francisco or to deter the people
from attacking him in retaliation for the
stabbing of Escala. Such cooperation,
however, was not indispensable to the
accomplishment of the evil deed as to make
him a co-principal.
Under Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty to be imposed upon an
accomplice in a consummated crime is that
next lower in degree to the one prescribed by
law for the consummated felony. The penalty
prescribed by Article 248 at the time of the
commission of the crime herein was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to
death. 11 The penalty next lower in degree
would be prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum penalty which
may be imposed upon the accused-appellant
would be within the range of the penalty next
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
Page |8
lower in degree to that of prision [G.R. No. 121828. June 27, 2003]
mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium which is prision
correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium, and its maximum would be
within the range of prision mayor maximum
PEOPLE OF THE
to reclusion temporal medium. In view of the PHILIPPINES, appellee,
absence of any mitigating or aggravating vs. EDMAR AGUILOS,
circumstances, such maximum period shall be
the medium period of the prescribed,
ODILON LAGLIBA Y
penalty. 12 Accordingly, the accused-appellant ABREGON and RENE
shall be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate GAYOT PILOLA, accused,
penalty ranging from eight (8) years of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years
RENE GAYOT
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as PILOLA, appellant.
maximum.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of
Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Manila in Criminal Case No. 90-82576-SCC is
AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications on
Before us is the appeal of
the extent of the accused-appellant's criminal
liability and the imposable penalty, and as
appellant Rene Gayot Pilola for the
modified, accused-appellant RODOLFO reversal of the Decision of the
[1]
FEDERICO Y MEDIONA is found guilty Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of City, Branch 164, convicting him of
murder only as accomplice and his penalty is
hereby reduced from reclusion perpetua to an murder, sentencing him to
indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) suffer reclusion perpetua and
years of prision mayor as minimum, to ordering him to indemnify the heirs
Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum. of the victim Joselito Capa y Rulloda
in the amount of P50,000 for the
Costs against the accused-appellant. latters death.
SO ORDERED.
The Indictment
SECOND DIVISION

On June 7, 1998, Edmar Aguilos,
Odilon Lagliba y Abregon and
appellant Rene Gayot Pilola were
charged with murder in an
Information which reads:
That on or about the 5th day of
February, 1988 in the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together with one
Ronnie Diamante who is still at-large
and no fixed address and mutually
helping and aiding with one another,
armed with double-bladed knives and a
bolo and with intent to kill, treachery
and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault hack and stab one Joselito Capa
y Rulloda, as a result of which the latter
sustained hack and stab wounds on the
different parts of his body, which
directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [2]
Of the three accused, Odilon
Lagliba was the first to be
arrested and
[3]
tried, and
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
subsequently convicted of
murder. The decision of the trial
[4]
court became final and
executory. Accused Edmar Aguilos
remains at large while accused
Ronnie Diamante reportedly died a
month after the incident. Meanwhile,
herein appellant Rene Gayot Pilola
was arrested. He was arraigned on
March 9, 1994, assisted by counsel,
and pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Thereafter, trial of the case
[5]
ensued.
The Evidence of the Prosecution [6]
On February 5, 1988, at around
11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside
their store at 613 Nueve de Pebrero
Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting
for her husband to arrive. Joselito
Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were
drinking beer. Edmar Aguilos and
Odilon Lagliba arrived at the
store. Joselito and Julian invited
them to join their drinking spree, and
although already inebriated, the two
newcomers obliged. In the course of
their drinking, the conversation
turned into a heated
Page |9
argument. Edmar nettled Julian, and
the latter was peeved.An altercation
between the two ensued. Elisa
pacified the protagonists and
advised them to go home as she
was already going to close
up. Edmar and Odilon left the
store.Joselito and Julian were also
about to leave, when Edmar and
Odilon returned, blocking their
way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses
and punched Julian in the face. Elisa
shouted: Tama na. Tama na. Edmar
and Julian ignored her and traded
fist blows until they reached Aling
Soteras store at the end of the
street, about twelve to fifteen meters
away from Elisas store. For his part,
Odilon positioned himself on top of a
pile of hollow blocks and watched as
Edmar and Julian swapped
punches. Joselito tried to placate the
protagonists to no avail. Joselitos
intervention apparently did not sit
well with Odilon. He pulled out his
knife with his right hand and stepped
down from his perch. He placed his
left arm around Joselitos neck, and
stabbed the latter. Ronnie and the
appellant, who were across the
street, saw their gangmate Odilon
stabbing the victim and decided to

join the fray. They pulled out their
knives, rushed to the scene and
stabbed Joselito. Elisa could not tell
how many times the victim was
stabbed or what parts of his body
were hit by whom. The victim fell in
the canal. Odilon and the appellant
fled, while Ronnie went after Julian
and tried to stab him. Julian ran for
dear life. When he noticed that
Ronnie was no longer running after
him, Julian stopped at E. Rodriguez
Road and looked back. He saw
Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow
block and with it bashed Joselitos
head. Not content, Ronnie got a
piece of broken bottle and struck
Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled
from the scene. Joselito died on the
spot. Elisa rushed to Joselitos house
and informed his wife and brother of
the incident.
[7]
The next day, Dr. Bienvenido
Muoz, Supervising Medico-Legal
Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, conducted an autopsy
on the cadaver of Joselito and
prepared Autopsy Report No. N-88-
375, with the following findings:
[8]
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
Pallor, conjunctivae and integument,
marked and generalized.
Contused abrasions: temple, right, 3.0 x
3.0 cm.; mandibular region, right, 2.0 x
8.0 cm.; back, suprascapular region,
left, 3.0 x 4.0 cm.; deltoid region, right,
1.0 x 3.0 cm.
Lacerated wound, scalp, occipital
region, 4.0 cm.
Incised wounds: forehead, right side,
5.5 cm.; arm, left, upper third, posterior
aspect, 1.5 cm.
Stab wounds:
1. Elliptical, 1.8 cm., oriented almost
horizontally, edges are clean-cut,
medial extremity is sharp, lateral
extremity is blunt; located at the
anterior chest wall, level of
3rd intercostal space, right, 5.0 cm. from
anterior median line; directed
backward, upward and medially, non-
penetrating, with an approximate depth
of 3.0 cm.;
2. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost
horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one
extremity is sharp and the other is
P a g e | 10
blunt; located at the antero-lateral
aspect of chest, level of 3rd intercostal
space, left, 3.0 cm. from anterior
median line; directed backward,
downward and medially, into the left
thoracic cavity, penetrating the left
ventricle of the heart with an
approximate depth of 10.0 cm.;
3. Elliptical, 3.0 cm., oriented almost
horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one
extremity is sharp and the other is
blunt; located at the antero-lateral
aspect of chest, level of 4th intercostal
space, 12.0 cm. from anterior median
line; directed backward, downward and
medially, penetrating upper lobe of left
lung with an approximate depth of 9.0
cm.;
4. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost
horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one
extremity is sharp and the other is
blunt; located at the antero-lateral
aspect of chest, level of 5th intercostal
space, left, 15.0 cm. from anterior
median line; directed backward,
downward and medially, penetrating
the left thoracic cavity and then lower
lobe of left lung and then penetrating
the left ventricle of the heart with an
approximate depth of 11.0 cm.;

5. Elliptical, 1.3 cm., oriented almost
horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one
extremity is sharp and the other is
blunt; located at the lateral chest wall,
level of 7th intercostal space, left, 16.0
cm. from anterior median line; directed
backward, upward and medially, into
the left thoracic cavity and then
penetrating the lower lobe of left lung
with an approximately depth of 10.0
cm.;
6. Elliptical, 4.0 cm., oriented almost
horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one
extremity is sharp and the other is
blunt; located at the lumbar region, left,
14.0 cm. from anterior median line;
directed backward, upward and
medially, into the abdominal cavity and
then penetrating ileum;
7. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost
vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper
extremity is sharp, lower extremity is
blunt; located at the chest, lateral, level
of 9th intercostal space, left; 14.0 cm.
from posterior median line; directed
forward, upward and medially, non-
penetrating with an approximate depth
of 4.0 cm.;
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
8. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost
vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper
extremity is blunt, lower extremity is
sharp; located at the abdomen, postero-
lateral aspect, 15.0 cm. from posterior
median line; directed forward, upward
and laterally, into the abdominal cavity
and then perforating the spleen and
pancreas with an approximate depth of
13.0 cm.;
9. Elliptical, 5.0 cm., oriented almost
vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper
extremity is blunt, lower extremity is
sharp; located at the left arm, upper
third, anterior; directed backward,
downward and medially, involving skin
and underlying soft tissues with an
approximate depth of 6.0 cm.;
10. Elliptical, 2.3 cm., oriented almost
vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper
extremity is sharp, lower extremity is
blunt; located at the left forearm, upper
third, anterior; directed backward,
upward and medially and
communicating with another wound,
arm, left, medial aspect, 2.0 cm.;
11. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost
vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper
extremity blunt, lower extremity, sharp;
P a g e | 11
located at the left arm, lower third,
posterior aspect, directed forward,
downward and medially,
communicating with another wound,
arm, left, lower third, posterior aspect,
1.5 cm.
Hemothorax, left 900 c.c.
Hemopericardium 300 c.c.
Hemoperitoneum 750 c.c.
Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
Stomach-filled with rice and other food
particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Multiple stab
wounds.
The Evidence of the Appellant
The appellant denied stabbing
the victim and interposed the
defense of alibi. He testified that at
around 11:00 p.m. of February 5,
1988, he was in the house of his
cousin, Julian Cadion, at 606 Nueve
de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong
City. He suddenly heard a

commotion coming from
outside. Julian rushed out of the
house to find out what was going
on. The appellant remained inside
the house because he was suffering
from ulcer and was experiencing
excessive pain in his stomach. The
following morning, the appellant
learned from their neighbor, Elisa
Rolan, that Joselito had been
stabbed to death. The appellant did
not bother to ask who was
responsible for the stabbing.[9]
Julian alias Buboy Cadion
corroborated the appellants
testimony. He testified that the
appellant was in their house on the
night of February 5, 1988, and was
suffering from ulcer. The appellant
stayed home on the night of the
incident.
[10]
Agripina Gloria, a female
security guard residing at Block 30,
Nueve de Pebrero, 612, Int. 4,
Allison St., Mandaluyong City,
testified that on February 5, 1988 at
around 11:00 p.m., she heard a
commotion outside. Momentarily,
she saw Ronnie rush into the kitchen
of the house of her niece Teresita;
he took a knife and run towards
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
Nueve de Pebrero Street where
Edmar and Julian were fighting. She
then followed Ronnie and saw
Joselito trying to pacify the
protagonists. Ronnie grabbed
Joselito and instantly stabbed the
latter, who for a while retreated and
fell down the canal. Not content,
Ronnie repeatedly stabbed
Joselito. Thereafter, Ronnie ran
towards the direction of the mental
hospital. Agripina did not see Odilon
or the appellant anywhere within the
vicinity of the incident.
[11]
On May 3, 1995, the trial court
rendered its assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds RENE
GAYOT PILOLA of 606 Nueve de
Febrero Street, Mandaluyong City,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder punished under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, he is hereby sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. Pilola is hereby
ordered to indemnify the heirs of
deceased Joselito Capa alias Jessie in
the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
P a g e | 12
PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnity for
his death jointly and solidarily with
Odilon Lagliba who was earlier
convicted herein. With cost against the
accused.[12]
In the case at bar, the appellant
assails the decision of the trial court
contending that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS
CONSPIRACY ANENT THE
ASSAILED INCIDENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
UNRELIABLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS ELISA
ROLAN AND IN SETTING ASIDE
THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT MANIFESTLY
ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. [13]
The appellant avers that Elisa is
not a credible witness and her
testimony is barren of probative
weight. This is so because she
contradicted herself when she
testified on direct examination that
Ronnie struck the head of the victim
with a hollow block. However, on
cross-examination, she stated that it
was Edmar who struck the
victim. The inconsistency in Elisas
testimony impaired her credibility.
The contention of the appellant
does not hold water.
First. The identity of the person
who hit the victim with a hollow block
is of de minimis importance. The
victim died because of multiple
wounds. The appellant is charged
with murder for the killing of the
victim with a knife, in conspiracy with
the other accused.
Second. The perceived
inconsistency in Elisas account of
events is a minor and collateral
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
detail that does not affect the
substance of her testimony, as it
even serves to strengthen rather
than destroy her credibility. [14]
Third. Elisa has been consistent
in her testimony that the appellant
was one of the men who stabbed the
victim, the others being Ronnie and
Odilon. Elisas testimony is
corroborated by the autopsy report
of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz and his
testimony that the victim sustained
eleven stab wounds. The doctor
testified that there were two or more
assailants:
Q Could you tell the court what
instrument could have been
used by the perpetrator in
inflicting those two incise
wounds?
A Those incise wounds were
caused by a sharp instrument
like a knife or any similar
instrument.
Q Now you also found out from the
body of the victim eleven stab
wounds?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, tell the court in which part of
the body of the victim where
these eleven stab wounds [are]
located?
P a g e | 13
A Shall I go one by one, all the
eleven stab wounds?
Q All the eleven stab wounds?
A One stab wound was located at
the front portion of the chest,
right side. Another stab wound
was located also on the chest
left side, another stab wound
was located at the antero
lateral aspect, its the front of
the chest almost to the
side. And also another one,
also at the chest, another stab
wound was at the left side of
the chest and another one was
at the lumbar region of the
abdomen left side or where the
left kidney is located, lumbar
area. Another one at the side of
the chest, left side of the
chest. Another stab wound in
the abdomen, another stab
wound at the left arm. Another
one at the left forearm and the
last one in the autopsy report is
located at the left arm. These
are all the eleven stab wounds
sustained by the victim.
A The instrument used was a sharp
pointed edge or a single bladed
instrument like a knife, kitchen
knife, balisong or any similar
instrument.
Q Considering the number of stab
wounds, doctor, will you tell us
whether there were several
assailants?
 P a g e | 14

A In my opinion, there were more
than one assailants (sic) here
because of the presence of
different types of stab wounds
and lacerated wounds. This
lacerated wound could not
have been inflicted by the one
holding the one which inflicted
the instrument . . (discontinued)
which inflicted the stab
wounds.
Q So there could have been two or
three assailants?
A More than one.[15]
The physical evidence is a mute
Fifth. The trial court gave
credence and full probative weight to
Elisas testimony. Case law has it
that the trial courts calibration of the
testimonial evidence of the parties,
its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and the probative weight
thereof is given high respect, if not
conclusive effect, by the appellate
court.
The appellant argues that the
prosecution failed to prove that he
conspired with Ronnie and Odilon in
could not categorically and positively
assert as to what part of the victims
body was hit by whom, and how
many times the victim was stabbed
by the appellant. He asserts that he
is merely an accomplice and not a
principal by direct participation.
We are not persuaded by the
ruminations of the appellant.
There is conspiracy when two or
more persons agree to commit a
felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy as a mode of
[18]

but eloquent manifestation of the stabbing the victim to death. He

veracity of Elisas testimony.
[16]
Fourth. Even the appellant
himself declared on the witness
stand that he could not think of any
reason why Elisa pointed to him as
one of the assailants. In a litany of
cases, we have ruled that when
there is no showing of any improper
motive on the part of a witness to
testify falsely against the accused or
to falsely implicate the latter in the
commission of the crime, as in the
incurring criminal liability must be
contends that for one to be a
proved separately from and with the
conspirator, his participation in the
same quantum of proof as the crime
criminal resolution of another must
itself. Conspiracy need not be
either precede or be concurrent with
proven by direct evidence. After all,
the criminal acts. He asserts that
secrecy and concealment are
even if it were true that he was
essential features of a successful
present at the situs criminis and that
conspiracy. It may be inferred from
he stabbed the victim, it was Odilon
the conduct of the accused before,
who had already decided, and in fact
during and after the commission of
fatally stabbed the victim. He could
the crime, showing that they had
not have conspired with Odilon as
acted with a common purpose and
the incident was only a chance
design. Conspiracy may be implied
[19]

encounter between the victim, the

case at bar, the logical conclusion is if it is proved that two or more
appellant and his co-accused. In the
that no such improper motive exists, persons aimed by their acts towards
absence of a conspiracy, the
and that the testimony is worthy of the accomplishment of the same
appellant cannot be held liable as a
full faith and credence. [17] unlawful object, each doing a part so
principal by direct participation. Elisa
that their combined acts, though
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS

apparently independent of each
other, were, in fact, connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness
of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. There [20]
may be conspiracy even if an
offender does not know the identities
of the other offenders, and even
[21]
though he is not aware of all the
details of the plan of operation or
was not in on the scheme from the
beginning. One need only to
[22]
knowingly contribute his efforts in
furtherance of it. One who joins a
[23]
criminal conspiracy in effect adopts
as his own the criminal designs of
his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is
established, all the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of
the manner and extent of their
participation since in contemplation
of law, the act of one would be the
act of all. Each of the conspirators
[24]
is the agent of all the others. [25]
To hold an accused guilty as a
co-principal by reason of conspiracy,
he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance
or furtherance of the
conspiracy. The mere presence of
[26]
an accused at the situs of the crime
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
will not suffice; mere knowledge,
acquiescence or approval of the act
without cooperation or agreement to
cooperate on the part of the accused
is not enough to make him a party to
a conspiracy. There must be
intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design
and purpose. Conspiracy to exist
[27]
does not require an agreement for
an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence. From the legal
standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at
the time of the commission of the
offense, the accused had the same
purpose and were united in its
execution. As
[28]
a rule, the
concurrence of wills, which is the
essence of conspiracy, may be
deduced from the evidence of facts
and circumstances, which taken
together, indicate that the parties
cooperated and labored to the same
end.[29]
Even if two or more offenders do
not conspire to commit homicide or
murder, they may be held criminally
liable as principals by direct
participation if they perform overt
acts which mediately or immediately
P a g e | 15
cause or accelerate the death of the
victim, applying Article 4, paragraph
1 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal
liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he
intended.
In such a case, it is not
necessary that each of the separate
injuries is fatal in itself. It is sufficient
if the injuries cooperated in bringing
about the victims death. Both the
offenders are criminally liable for the
same crime by reason of their
individual and separate overt
criminal acts. Absent conspiracy
[30]
between two or more offenders, they
may be guilty of homicide or murder
for the death of the victim, one as a
principal by direct participation, and
the other as an accomplice, under
Article 18 of the Revised Penal
Code:
Art. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are
the persons who, not being included in
Article 17, cooperate in the execution

of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts.
To hold a person liable as an
accomplice, two elements must
concur: (a) the community of
criminal design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with
the latter in his purpose; (b) the
performance of previous or
simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of
the crime. Accomplices come to
[31]
know about the criminal resolution of
the principal by direct participation
after the principal has reached the
decision to commit the felony and
only then does the accomplice agree
to cooperate in its
execution. Accomplices do not
decide whether the crime should be
committed; they merely assent to the
plan of the principal by direct
participation and cooperate in its
accomplishment. However, where
[32]
one cooperates in the commission of
the crime by performing overt acts
which by themselves are acts of
execution, he is a principal by direct
participation, and not merely an
accomplice. [33]
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
In this case, Odilon all by himself
initially decided to stab the
victim. The appellant and Ronnie
were on the side of the
street. However, while Odilon was
stabbing the victim, the appellant
and Ronnie agreed to join in; they
rushed to the scene and also
stabbed the victim with their
respective knives. The three men
simultaneously stabbed the hapless
victim. Odilon and the appellant fled
from the scene together, while
Ronnie went after Julian. When he
failed to overtake and collar Julian,
Ronnie returned to where Joselito
fell and hit him with a hollow block
and a broken bottle. Ronnie then
hurriedly left. All the overt acts of
Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant
before, during, and after the
stabbing incident indubitably show
that they conspired to kill the victim.
The victim died because of
multiple stab wounds inflicted by two
or more persons. There is no
evidence that before the arrival of
Ronnie and the appellant at the situs
criminis, the victim was already
dead. It cannot thus be argued that
by the time the appellant and Ronnie
P a g e | 16
joined Odilon in stabbing the victim,
the crime was already
consummated.
All things considered, we rule
that Ronnie and the appellant
conspired with Odilon to kill the
victim; hence, all of them are
criminally liable for the latters
death. The appellant is not merely
an accomplice but is a principal by
direct participation.
Even assuming that the
appellant did not conspire with
Ronnie and Odilon to kill the victim,
the appellant is nevertheless
criminally liable as a principal by
direct participation. The stab
wounds inflicted by him cooperated
in bringing about and accelerated
the death of the victim or contributed
materially thereto.[34]
The trial court correctly overruled
the appellants defense of alibi. Alibi
is a weak, if not the weakest of
defenses in a criminal prosecution,
because it is easy to concoct but
hard to disprove. To serve as basis
for acquittal, it must be established
by clear and convincing
evidence. For it to prosper, the

accused must prove not only that he
was absent from the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission,
but also that it was physically
impossible for him to have been
present then. In this case, the
[35]
appellant avers that at the time of the
stabbing incident, he was resting in
the house of his cousin at 606 Nueve
de Pebrero Street as he was
suffering from stomach pain due to
his ulcer. But the appellant failed to
[36]
adduce any medical certificate that
he was suffering from the
ailment. Moreover, Elisa positively
identified the appellant as one of the
men who repeatedly stabbed the
victim. The appellants defense of
alibi cannot prevail over the positive
and straightforward identification of
the appellant as one of the victims
assailants. The appellant himself
admitted that his cousins house, the
place where he was allegedly resting
when the victim was stabbed, was
merely ten to fifteen meters away
from the scene of the
stabbing. Indeed, the appellants
defense of denial and alibi,
unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative
and self-serving and cannot be given
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
greater evidentiary weight than the
positive testimony of prosecution
eyewitness Elisa Rolan. [37]
The appellants defenses must
crumble in the face of evidence that
he fled from the situs criminis and
later left his house. The records
show that despite being informed
that he was sought after by the
authorities as a suspect for the killing
of the victim, the appellant suddenly
and inscrutably disappeared from
his residence at Nueve de
Pebrero. As early as May 5, 1988, a
subpoena for the appellant was
returned unserved because he was
out of town. The appellants own
[38]
witness, Julian Cadion, testified that
the appellant had left and was no
longer seen at Nueve de Pebrero
after the incident, thus:
Q So, how long did you stay at 606
Nueve de Pebrero after
February 5, 1988?
A One week only, sir, and then
three weeks after, I returned to
Nueve de Pebrero.
Q The whole week after February 5,
1988, was Rene Pilola still
living at 606 Nueve de
Pebrero?
P a g e | 17
A I did not see him anymore, sir.
Q And then three weeks thereafter,
you went back to Nueve de
Pebrero. Is that what you were
then saying?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, at the time that you went
back to 606 Nueve de Pebrero,
was Rene Pilola there?
A I did not see him anymore, sir.[39]
The records show that the
appellant knew that he was charged
for the stabbing of the
victim. However, instead of
surrendering to the police
authorities, he adroitly evaded
arrest. The appellants flight is
evidence of guilt and, from the
factual circumstances obtaining in
the case at bar, no reason can be
deduced from it other than that he
was driven by a strong sense of guilt
and admission that he had no
tenable defense. [40]
The Crime Committed by the
Appellant
and the Proper Penalty Therefor

The trial court correctly convicted
the appellant of murder qualified by
treachery. Abuse of superior
strength likewise attended the
commission of the crime. There is
treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended
party might make. The essence of
treachery is the swift and
unexpected attack on the unarmed
victim without the slightest
provocation on his part. In this
[41]
case, the attack on the unarmed
victim was sudden. Odilon, without
provocation, suddenly placed his
arm around the victims neck and
forthwith stabbed the latter. The
victim had no inkling that he would
be attacked as he was attempting to
pacify Edmar and Julian. Ronnie
and the appellant, both also armed
with deadly weapons, rushed to the
scene and stabbed the victim, giving
no real opportunity for the latter to
defend himself. And even as the
victim was already sprawled on the
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
canal, Ronnie bashed his head with
a hollow block. The peacemaker
became the victim of violence.
Unquestionably, the nature and
location of the wounds showed that
the killing was executed in a
treacherous manner, preventing any
means of defense on the part of the
victim. As testified to by Dr.
Bienvenido Muoz, the victim was
stabbed, not just once, but eleven
times mostly on the chest and the
abdominal area. Six of the stab
wounds were fatal, causing damage
to the victims vital internal organs.
[42]
The aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength is
absorbed by treachery. There is no
[43]
mitigating circumstance that
attended the commission of the
felony.The penalty for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since no aggravating and
mitigating circumstances attended
the commission of the crime, the
proper penalty is reclusion perpetua,
conformably to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.
P a g e | 18
Civil Liabilities of the Appellant
The trial court correctly directed
the appellant to pay to the heirs of
the victim Joselita Capa the amount
of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, in accord with current
jurisprudence. The said heirs are
[44]
likewise entitled to moral damages in
the amount of P50,000, also
conformably to current
jurisprudence. In addition, the heirs
[45]
are entitled to exemplary damages
in the amount of P25,000.
[46]
WHEREFORE, the Decision,
dated May 3, 1995, of Branch 164 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City in Criminal Case No. 73615,
finding appellant Rene Gayot Pilola
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. The
appellant is hereby directed to pay to
the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa
the amount of P50,000 as civil
indemnity; the amount of P50,000
as moral damages; and the amount
of P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8187 January 29, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PANGLIMA INDANAN, defendant-appellant.
Leo T. Gibbons, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for
appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
An appeal from a judgment convicting the
appellant of the crime of murder, and
sentencing him to be hanged.
The accused was at the time of the
commission of the crime, the headman of
Parang. He is alleged to have committed the
murder by inducement. The proofs tend to
demonstrate that on the 24th day of March,
1912, the accused sent Induk to bring to the
house of the accused one Sariol. The
following day, Induk, in obedience to the
orders, brought Sariol to the house,
whereupon the accused ordered the
witnesses, Akiran and Suhuri, to tie Sariol.
They obeyed the order in the presence of the
accused, who was at the time lying upon a
bed in the room. This was about 4:30 in the
afternoon. Sariol remained there with his
hands tied behind his back until night, when
the accused, in the presence of several
witnesses, ordered Sariol to be taken to the
Chinese cemetery and there killed, the
accused asserting at the time that he had an
order to that effect from the governor. He gave
strict orders to Akiran that he should be
present at the time that Sariol was killed, and
that he should aid in killing him. To make sure
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
of the work being well done, the accused
ordered Akiran to take his (the accused's)
bolo with which to assist in the killing. Sariol
was taken to the cemetery, in an isolated spot
a considerable distance from the road and
about 200 yards from the nearest house, and
there killed. Kalyakan struck the first blow with
his bolo, while Akiran joined in and assisted
thereafter. The deceased at the time he was
killed had his hands tied behind his back. On
returning to the house of the accused after the
death of Sariol, Unding told the accused that
Sariol had been killed, whereupon the
accused said that it was all right and appeared
to be very much pleased.
The proofs demonstrate beyond question that
the accused was the recognized headman of
Parang, and it appears from the testimony of
the witnesses, Kalyakan, Suhuri, and Akiran,
that he had a very powerful influence over
them, hence this power over them was such
that any order issued by him had the force
and efficacy of physical coercion. One of the
witnesses testified: "He (the accused) knows
what is good and what is bad, and he is the
headman of the governor. He is headman of
Parang." And in answer to the question, "He is
the biggest chief in the Parang ward?" replied:
"There is none, only himself." He further said:
"The people do not hesitate to take his orders
because he is the headman of the governor."
Later, in reply to the question, "If he were to
get angry with the people, what would he do
to them?" this witnesses answered: "I do not
know; might kill them." Another witness,
answering the question as to why he did not
run away instead of going to the Chinese
cemetery as the accused ordered him,
answered: "The reason why I did not run
away, well, take the same thing as the
P a g e | 19
Government soldiers. They are told to do a
thing and they do it." Prior to this time the
same witness had said: "If a chief says
anything to a man like me and tells me it is by
order of the governor and that he has a
warrant there, well, a man like me does what
he tells me." Another witness declared: "I am
afraid of him. I did not believe that he would
make me do anything unjust." The same
witness afterwards testified in answer to the
question: "Would you have killed this man if
any other person besides Panglima, the
headman, had ordered you to ?" "I would not."
Another witness declared: "Well, he was the
headman. It was the headman's orders, and if
we did not do it, he would get angry with us."
This witness, answering the question, "Did
Panglima make you think that he was acting
under the orders of the Government in
causing this man to be killed?" testified: "He
said, 'I have a warrant here.' To the question,
"And you thought that it was a legal execution,
did you?" answered, "Yes, because he (the
accused) is not afraid of the governor."
We are of the opinion that the domination of
the accused over the persons who, at his
orders, killed the deceased was such as to
make him responsible for whatever they did in
obedience to such orders.
Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code
declares those to be principals in a crime
"who directly force or induce others to commit
it."
Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says:
They force another to commit a crime
who physically by actual force or

grave fear, for example, with a pistol in
hand or by any other threatening
means, oblige another to commit the
crime. In our commentary on
paragraph 9 of article 8 (page 28), we
have already said that he who suffers
violence acts without will and against
his will, is no more than an instrument,
and therefore is guilty of no wrong.
The real culprits in such case, the only
guilty persons, are those who use the
violence, those who force the other to
commit the crime.
One is induced directly to commit a
crime either by command, or for
a consideration, or by any other
similar act which constitutes the real
and moving cause of the crime and
which was done for the purpose of
inducing such criminal act and was
sufficient for that purpose. We have
already seen in our commentary on
paragraph 12 of article 8 that the one
who physically commits the crime may
escape criminal responsibility by
showing that he acted with due
obedience to an order; in such case
the criminal responsibility falls entirely
upon the one who orders, that is, upon
him who by his commands has directly
induced the other to commit the act.
But in case the obedience of the
inferior is not due to the superior and
therefore not necessary, and does not,
therefore, exempt him from criminal
responsibility as the physical author of
the crime, he who thus, by his
command, directly induced him to the
criminal act is considered by the law
also as principal in the crime.
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
The pacto by virtue of which one
purchases for a consideration the
hand which commits the crime makes
him who gives, promises, or offers the
consideration the principal in the crime
by direct inducement, because without
such offer or promise the criminal act
would never have been committed.
But this does not mean that the one
who actually commits the crime by
reason of such promise, remuneration
or reward is exempted from criminal
responsibility; on the contrary, we
have already seen in our comments
on paragraph 3 of article 10 that such
circumstance constitutes
an aggravation of his crime.
We have heretofore said that in
addition to the precepto and
the pacto there are similar means by
which another may be induced to
commit a crime which also make the
one who offers the inducement the
principal in the crime by virtue of the
provisions of article 13, paragraph 2.
But it must be borne in mind that
these acts of inducement do not
consist in simple advice or counsel
given before the act is committed, or
in simple words uttered at the time the
act was committed. Such advice and
such words constitute undoubtedly an
evil act, an inducement condemned by
the moral law; but in order that, under
the provisions of the Code, such act
can be considered direct inducement,
it is necessary that such advice or
such words have a great dominance
and great influence over the person
who acts; it is necessary that they be
P a g e | 20
as direct, as efficacious, as powerful
as physical or moral coercion or as
violence itself.
The following decisions of the supreme court
of Spain illustrate the principles involved and
their application to particular cases:
It was held by that court on the 14th day of
April, 1871, that one who, during a riot in
which a person was killed, said to one of the
combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not
appearing that he did anything more than say
these words except to be present at the fight,
was not guilty of the crime of homicide by
inducement, the court saying that,
"considering that, although the phrases
pronounced were imprudent and even
culpable, they were not so to the extent that
they may be considered the principal and
moving cause of the effect produced; direct
inducement cannot be inferred from such
phrases, as inducement must precede the act
induced and must be so influential in
producing the criminal act that without it the
act would not have been performed."
In a decision rendered on the 10th of July,
1877, the principle was laid down that "a
person who advised a married woman whose
husband was very stingy and treated her
badly that the only thing for her to do was to
rob him, was not guilty of the crime of robbery
by inducement, for the reason that imprudent
and ill-conceived advice is not sufficient."
In a decision of the 22nd of December, 1883,
it was held that a father who simply said to his
son who was at the time engaged in combat
with another, "Hit him! Hit him!", was not

responsible for the injuries committed after
such advice was given, under the facts
presented. The court said: "It being held in
mind that the inducement to the commission
of the crime by means of which a person may
be considered a principal in the same manner
as he who executes the act itself can only be
founded in commands, sometimes in advice,
in considerations, or by inducement so
powerful that it alone produces the criminal
act. None of these characteristics pertain to
the words of Miguel Perez, inasmuch as the
circumstances which surrounded the event at
the time do not appear in sufficient detail to
show with clearness the effects which the
words produced, or the relative situation of the
deceased and of the one who killed him, or
the point to which the fight had progressed at
the time the words were spoken. Moreover,
the decision of the court below does not show
sufficient facts upon which to affirm that
Miguel foresaw the use of the firearm on the
part of his son when he spoke the words
referred to, or, for that reason, that he thereby
induced him to use said weapon."
In a decision of the 19th of December, 1896,
the court held that the fact "of having
proposed to other persons the abstraction of
the tickets which were the subject matter of
the robbery, at the same time telling them the
place where they were to be found, does not
constitute inducement to commit the robbery
because the proposal to commit the robbery
was not sufficiently efficacious to be the cause
of the crime, as the crime, under the facts,
could have been committed without it; nor was
the indication of the place where the money
was to be found a sufficient motive to induce
the robbery."
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
The foregoing decisions have been presented
for the purpose of showing concrete cases in
which the acts of the accused were not
sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute
inducement. They not only lay down the legal
principles which govern in prosecutions of this
character, but they also illustrate in the most
valuable way the application of those
principles to actual cases.
The following decisions of the same court
present instances in which the acts of the
accused constitute inducement under the law
and illustrate the application of the principles
to concrete cases.
In a decision of the 14th of April, 1871, the
facts as stated by the court were: "It appeared
that Lulu, who was living with Joe and Zozo (a
married couple) in the town of X, gave birth to
a child on the morning of the 28th of March,
the offspring of her illicit relations with William.
It had been previously agreed upon by the first
three named to deliver the child to William as
soon as it was born, with instructions to
deposit it in some frequented place so that it
might be found and taken up; but Joe
changed his mind and handed the child over
to the father, telling him, 'Here is your child, do
with it whatever you please; throw it into the
sea if you choose to,' which the latter actually
did." Under the facts the accused was held
guilty by inducement.
In a judgment pronounced on the 22nd of
January, 1873, it was held that "a woman
who, living with a man in scandalous
concubinage in the presence of a daughter
who continually manifested her disgust and
repugnance for such conduct, conceived
P a g e | 21
against the daughter the most profound hatred
and conceived the purpose of killing her by
most insidious methods, obtaining for that
purpose poison and various deadly weapons,
and contriving that she and her family and all
of the tenants in the house should go to the
theater on an evening during which the
daughter was sick and obliged to remain at
home, in order that her lover might be entirely
undisturbed in killing the daughter and that he
might not be surprised in the act, such woman
is the author and principal of the crime the
same as her lover who actually committed the
deed."
In a decision of the 6th of July, 1881, the court
held that "one who takes advantage of his
position as an inspector for the maintenance
of public peace and proposes to a private
citizen the perpetration of a robbery, with the
threat that unless he did commit the robbery
he would be arrested as an escaped prisoner,
at the same time offering to withdraw the
officers from the vicinity of the place to be
robbed, and who after the robbery received a
part of the booty, was guilty of the crime as
principal, although he did not take personal
part therein."
In a decision of the 12th of April, 1882, it was
said that "an alcalde of a barrio who,
accompanied by a number of peace officers,
ordered them to stop certain music that was
being played in the public street, and after the
order had been obeyed and the music
stopped one of the persons expressed his
resentment against the act whereupon the
alcalde ordered the peace officers to attack
the man, which they did, inflicting upon him

various wounds, was guilty of the crime
of lesiones graves by inducement."
In a decision of the 21st of June, 1882, it was
stated that "a father who from the balcony of
his house cried out in a loud voice to his sons
who were fighting with others to kill those with
whom they were fighting before they were
killed themselves, because they might as well
go to jail for a big thing as a little, was guilty of
the crime of lesiones graves by inducement by
reason of the injuries inflicted under such
orders."
In a decision of the 22nd day of December,
1883, the court said, "that the inducement and
the commission of a crime whereby the
inducer becomes a principal to the same
extent and effect as if he had physically
committed the crime exist merely in acts of
command, sometimes of advice, or agreement
for a consideration, or through influence so
effective that it alone determines the
commission of the crime."
In a decision of the 11th of November, 1884,
the court laid down the proposition that the
secretary of the ayuntamiento who induced a
certain persons to form new lists
of compromisarios five days prior to the
election of senators was guilty as principal of
the crime against the election lists, saying: "It
appearing and it being a fact proved that the
secretary of the ayuntamiento of Jalom,
Miguel Antonio Dura, induced the members of
the council to commit the act stated, his
participation as principal in the commission of
the act is well established according to the
provisions of paragraph 2, article 13, of the
Penal Code, because such inducement
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
coming from a person of such influence as the
secretary of the ayuntamiento in a small
village must be considered sufficiently
dominant to turn the mind of those induced."
In a decision rendered on the 28th of
December, 1886, it was held that a woman
who was at enmity with an uncle for having
refused to renounce in her favor a donation
which a relative had given to him, who made
frequent threats to kill the uncle and who
finally offered a third person a certain sum of
money together with the land involved in the
donation if he would kill the uncle, and who
told her son that, if they were unable to get
anybody else to kill the uncle, he must do it
himself as he would thus inherit
15,000 pesetas with which they could flee
abroad, and in case he refused to do it he
must leave the house because he was a
coward, was guilty as principal of the crime of
murder committed by the son under such
inducement. The court said: "It being borne in
mind that the suggestions with which the
mother moved the mind of her son to kill the
uncle had the force of a real inducement and
inclined and decided the will of the son by
means of the relations which she bore to him
as well as the reward which she held up
before him."
In a decision of the 26th of January, 1888, it
was held that finding as principal in a crime,
him who, "by direct and influential means and
taking advantage of the inexperience of a boy
of tender age," induces him to commit a
crime, was warranted by law, the court saying
that "in view of the fact that the inducement
exercised by Juan Santiso with regard to the
boy, Ramon Carballo, to steal the jewels in
P a g e | 22
question from his grandmother's house shows
such a direct and inducing cause of the
criminal act that without such inducement the
crime would not have been committed."
In a decision of the 9th of April, 1882, the
court held "that the inducement referred to in
paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal Code
exists whenever the act performed by the
physical author of the crime is determined by
the influence of the inducer over the mind of
him who commits the act, whatever be the
source of such influence."
In a decision of the 3rd of February, 1897, it
was declared that one was the "principal by
inducement in five different larcenies, it having
been proved that the inducer, knowing that the
oil which was brought to her for sale was
stolen by the persons who were seeking to
sell it to her, advised them thereupon to
continue stealing oil and furnished them
vessels in which to carry it and contributed on
five different occasions to the realization of the
larcenies, it appearing that the physical
authors of the crime were boys under 15
years of age and that they acted upon the
suggestions of the inducer without
discernment or judgment of their own," the
court saying that in view of the fact that she
knew that the oil which she first purchased
from the boys was stolen oil, that the boys
were less than 15 years of age, and therefore
easily led, that she furnished the vessels in
which to carry the stolen property — all
indicate conclusively that the five crimes were
committed by the influence exercised by the
woman, which inducement was not merely
that of favoring the execution of the crime but
was that which determined its commission."

In a decision of the 31st of May, 1898, it was
laid down "that the command of a master to
his servant, by reason of the special relations
which exist between them, contains the
elements of inducement which makes the
master who orders such servant to cut wood
belonging to a third person, in order that he
might benefit thereby, the principal of the
crime committed by such servant," the court
saying that "in view of the fact that the
command of the master to the servant, made
within the sphere and under the ordinary
conditions of domestic life, when they relate to
acts simple and apparently legitimate,
contains the necessary elements, directly and
sufficiently efficacious, of inducement
according to the provisions of paragraph 2 of
article 13 of the Penal Code, it appearing that
the master, taking advantage of the
ascendency and authority which he naturally
must exercise over his servant or inferior,
ordered him to cut and carry away wood from
land which he knew did not belong to him,
without disclosing to the servant that
circumstance, which concealment gave rise to
the influence which the master exercised over
the servant in that particular act."
The following decisions of the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands apply the foregoing
principles to particular cases.
In the case of the United States vs. Galuran
(12 Phil. Rep., 339) it appeared that one of the
defendants conceived the idea of the robbery
of a warehouse and assisted in procuring
false keys with which to open it. He took no
immediate part in the act of robbery itself. The
court in its opinion said:
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
These facts, which we hold to have
been proven, clearly show the guilt of
the appellant, Sy-Yoc, as the instigator
of the crime herein prosecuted. From
him came the initiative in the robbery;
he was the first to conceive the idea of
its commission, and, being unable or
unwilling to carry it out himself, he
employed Galuran, impelling him to
the material execution of the crime by
a promise to pay him P16 for each
case of whisky that he was able to
steal. The better to induce him to
commit the offense, he clearly
demonstrated how easily it could be
accomplished, instructed him as to the
best means of carrying it out, and
offered him money to pay for the false
key. He thus removed all the
difficulties in the way of determination
to execute, and the actual execution of
the robbery in question. These acts
constitute a real inducement made
directly for the commission of the said
robbery, and place the appellant, Sy-
Yoc, in the position of principal in
accordance with paragraph 2 of article
13 of the Penal Code.
In the case of the United States vs. Ancheta
(15 Phil. Rep., 470) it appeared that the
accused induced certain Igorrotes to kill a
third person by holding up before them the
fact that by such act they would be able to
obtain P40 which was then in the house of the
victim, as well as the carabao which he
owned, saying to them, "If you go to work you
only make a little; it is better to kill this man
and take his carabao and the P40 which was
received from the sale of the house in town."
They having made an unsuccessful attempt
P a g e | 23
upon the life of the proposed victim and
having returned and explained why they had
not been able to kill them, the accused said to
them: "Why did you eat my chickens if you are
not going to do what I told you to do. I came
here to spend the night in Cambaguio
because I thought you were going to kill
them." The Igorrotes then spent three days
clearing some land for another person from
whom they received P2.25. About noon of the
third day of their work, the defendant went to
them and said: "Now you must repeat what I
told you to do, and comply with our
agreement; I am going to Ululing to-day, and I
wish you to kill Tiburcio to-night. You go to the
bushes and conceal yourselves in the same
place you were concealed before." The
murder was committed as proposed. Upon
these facts and inducer of the crime, and that
he was liable as principal. (Supreme court of
Spain, 20th of October, 1881, 7th of January,
1887, 12th of January, 1889.)
In the case of the United States vs. Empinado
(17 Phil. Rep., 230) it appeared that the
accused had a conversation with Serapio
Tapic, a laborer, in which the accused asked
him if he knew Antonio Gavato and his
associates, to which he replied in the
negative. The defendant then said: "I wish to
confer upon you a commission, which is as
follows: Order must be disturbed in the cockpit
of Gavato, and when you arrive there wound
any person." It seems that Tapic was reluctant
to obey this order, but defendant gave him
something to eat and drink until he became
intoxicated, and then he gave him a bolo and
P10 and said: "Comply with what I have
ordered and in case you incur any
responsibility I will be responsible to the court,
and as soon as you wound any person or

persons, return to me and I will defend you."
The court held that these facts constituted
sufficient inducement to bring the accused
within the provisions of article 13, paragraph
2, of the Penal Code.
In the case of the United States vs. Gamao
(23 Phil. Rep., 81) the court said:
Mauricio Gamao, nephew of Gil
Gamao, was a poor, ignorant
fisherman, and more or less
dependent upon his uncle for
subsistence. On the other hand, Capt.
Gil Gamao was, when this crime was
committed, a man of great influence in
Escalante. He had a great number of
people working for him, one of whom
was his nephew Mauricio. He was the
local political leader of his party. One
of his nephews was president of the
town. He had two brothers-in-law in
the municipal council. Of his nephews,
one was chief of police and two others
were members of the police force. He
had acquired, as we have said, a bitter
hatred toward the Roman Catholic
Church and the Spanish friars and
priests. He called a meeting in his own
house on the afternoon of May 15,
where the question of murdering the
priest was discussed. He was the
prime mover in this meeting. He
dominated all who were present. He
selected his nephew Mauricio to
commit the crime and directed him to
do it. Mauricio, immediately after
murdering the priest, returned to the
house of his uncle Gil and reported
the fact. The influence exercised by
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
Gil Gamao over his nephew was so
great and powerful that the latter,
through fear, could not resist it. That
Mauricio was directly induced to
murder the priest by his uncle Gil we
think there can be no question.
In the case of the United States vs. Chan Guy
Juan (23 Phil. Rep., 105) it was held that the
"one who employs an innocent agent to
commit a crime is liable as a principal,
although he does nothing himself in the actual
commission of the crime."
In the case of the United States vs. Alcontin
(10 Off. Gaz., 1888) it appeared that "a
married woman suggested to her paramour,
with whom she had been maintaining illicit
relations that he kill her husband in order that
thereafter they might live together freely. The
paramour acting upon these suggestions and
actuated by a desire to possess the woman
for himself without the interference of the
husband, killed him. The guilty pair
immediately thereafter made their escape and
lived together as man and wife until the time
of ] their arrest." Upon these facts the court
said:
We think that the direct inducement to
the commission of the crime is fully
established por pacto (for a
consideration); that is to say, on the
understanding that the woman would
live in illicit relations with the murderer
after the death of her husband;
and por precepto (by precept) which
constituted "a real, intentional, direct
and efficacious exciting inducement
(excitacion) to commit the crime." The
P a g e | 24
propositions and suggestions of the
woman constituted something more
than mere counsel or advice which her
co-defendant was entirely free to
accept or not, in that they were
coupled with a consideration which, in
view of the relations existing between
them, furnished a motive strong
enough to induce the man to take the
life of her husband; and for the further
reason that due to these illicit relations
she had required such an influence
over her co-defendant that her
insistent suggestions that he commit
the crime had a marked and
controlling influence upon his mind.
In the case of the United States vs. Matinong
(22 Phil. rep., 439) it appeared that the
accused proposed to his companions an
assault upon the house of Francisco Tolosa;
that armed with a talibon he accompanied
them during the assault; that, while the assault
was being made, he stood watch at the foot of
the stairs of said house so that his
companions would not be caught, and that,
finally, he accompanied them to the place
where the deceased was killed. These facts
were held by the court to be sufficient to make
the accused a principal by inducement as well
as by direct participation.
In the case at bar, the words and acts of the
accused had the effect of a command. There
does not seem to have existed, however, any
official relation between the accused and the
persons whom he induced to kill Sariol. While
he appears to have been the headman of
Parang, those whom he induced held no
official position under him and owed him,

legally speaking, no obedience. According to
tradition and custom, however, the headman
seems to have been a person whose word
was law and whose commands were to be
obeyed. Moreover, the accused represented
to those who physically committed the crime
that he had a warrant from the governor
authorizing, if not requiring, the acts
committed, and urged upon them, in effect,
that all must obey the commands of the
Government. This representation was false,
but it produced the same effect as if it had
been true. It cannot be doubted that the
accused knew the representation was false
and purposely and intentionally made it as an
additional factor going to insure obedience to
his orders.
Even if there should happen to be lacking any
element sufficient to bring the acts of the
accused within the definition of inducement by
command, and we do not believe there is,
there would still remain all of the elements
necessary to qualify the crime as murder by
inducement. From the authorities heretofore
cited and the principles laid down therein as
those which must govern in the determination
of whether or not the acts of an accused
constitute inducement under the law, it may
be stated as a general proposition that, where
the inducement offered by the accused is of
such a nature and made in such a way that it
becomes the determining cause of the crime,
and such inducement was offered with the
intention of producing that result, then the
accused is guilty by inducement of the crime
committed by the person so induced. The
inducement to the crime must be intentional
on the part of the inducer and must be made
directly for the purpose in view.
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
The verb "induce" is sufficiently broad,
generally speaking, to cover cases where
there exists on the part of the inducer the
most positive resolution and the most
persistent effort to secure the commission of
the crime, together with the presentation to
the person induced of the very strongest kind
of temptation, as well as words or acts which
are merely the result of indiscretion or lack of
reflection and which carry with them,
inherently, almost nothing of inducement or
temptation. A chance word spoken without
reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation,
an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act, may give
birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to,
crime in the mind of one for some
independent reason predisposed thereto
without the one who spoke the word or
performed the act having any expectation that
his suggestion would be followed or any real
intention that it produce a result. In such case,
while the expression was imprudent and the
results of it grave in the extreme, he would not
be guilty of the crime committed. Therefore, in
applying the principles laid down to concrete
cases it is necessary to remember only that
the inducement must be made directly with
the intention of procuring the commission of
the crime and that such inducement must be
the determining cause of the crime.
In the case before us, as we have seen, the
accused falsely represented to the persons
who actually committed the crime that he had
an order from the Government requiring the
death of Sariol and that they were under
obligation to carry out that order. It is clear
from the evidence that this inducement was
offered by the accused directly to the persons
interested with the intention of moving them to
do his bidding, and that such representation
P a g e | 25
was the moving cause of the fatal act. While it
may be said, and is true, that the personal
commands of the accused were entirely
sufficient to produce the effects which actually
resulted and that such commands may be
considered the moving cause of the crime, still
there is no doubt, under the evidence, that the
representation that the accused had in his
possession an order from the Government
commanding the death of Sariol was also of
material influence in effecting the death; and
where two fundamental causes work together
for the production of a single result and one of
those causes would lead to a conviction upon
one theory and the other upon another, a
conviction is sustainable upon either theory.
There was present premeditation, qualifying
the crime as murder. There were present,
also, the aggravating circumstances
of desplobado and nocturnity.
We are of the firm conviction that the
judgment of the court below is well founded,
and we accordingly affirm the same, with
costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent,
JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42476 July 24, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
KIICHI OMINE, EDUARDO AUTOR, LUIS
LADION, and AGAPITO
CORTESANO, defendants-appellants.

Jose Ma. Capili and Habana and Quimpo for
appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for
appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
Defendants appeal from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Davao finding them
guilty of frustrated homicide, with the
aggravating circumstance that advantage was
taken of their superior strength, and
sentencing each of them to suffer an
indeterminate sentence from six years
of prision correccional to twelve years
of prision mayor, to indemnify Angel Pulido
jointly and severally in the sum of P540,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the corresponding
costs.
The only assignment of error made by the
attorneys for the defendants is that the lower
court erred in convicting the appellants, and in
not acquitting them with the costs de oficio.
The first question to be considered is the
participation of the several defendants in the
commission of the crime.
It appears from the evidence that the
defendant Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion, and
Agapito Cortesano were working on the hemp
plantation of Angel Pulido under the direction
of their co-defendant Kiichi Omine, who was
the overseer or manager, with a
compensation of ten per cent of the gross
receipts. The four defendants lived together in
a house on the plantation.
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pullido for
permission to open a new road through the
plantation. According to the offended party he
refused to grant this request because there
was already an unfinished road. Kiichi Omine
on the other hand contends that Angel Pulido
gave him the permission requested and he
began work on December 24, 1933. When
Angel Pulido and his son, Hilario,
accompanied by Saito Paton and a Moro by
the name of Barabadan, were returning home
from the cockpit that evening they noticed that
a considerable number of hemp plants had
been destroyed for the purpose of opening a
new road. Angered by the destruction of the
hemp plants, Angel Pulido and his party went
to the house of the defendants, who had just
finished their supper. There is a sharp conflict
in the evidence as to what followed. The
witnesses for the prosecution contend that
while the offended party was talking with
Omine, Eduardo Autor attempted to intervene,
but was prevented by Hilario Pulido; that
Eduardo Autor attacked Hilario Pulido with a
bolo, but did not wound him except on the left
thumb; that Luis Ladion and Agapito
Cortesano then held Angel Pulido by the
arms, and when Eduardo Autor approached,
Omine shouted to him "pegale y matale", and
Autor struck Angel Pulido in the breast with
his bolo.
Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito
Cortesano on the other hand maintain that the
offended party and his son were the
aggressors; that the first to arrive was Hilario
Pulido, who after applying to Kiichi Omine an
offensive epithet and asking him why he had
grubbed up the hemp plants, struck him in the
breast with brass knuckles; that when
Eduardo Autor attempted to intervene, Angel
P a g e | 26
Pulido and his son attacked him their fists,
Hilario Pulido him on the right cheek with
brass knuckles; that Luis Ladion and Agapito
Cortesano ran away before Angel Pulido was
wounded by Eduardo Autor; that Kiichi Omine
never uttered the words attributed to him or
urged Autor to strike Angel Pulido.
The only eyewitness for the prosecution were
the offended party and his son, and a Bagobo,
named Saito, who was their relative and lived
with them. Barabadan was not presented as a
witness. The witnesses for the defense were
the four appellants.
The offended party received only one wound.
Only one blow struck, and it was struck by
Eduardo Autor. The anger of Angel Pulido and
his son was, however, directed chiefly against
Kiichi Omine, who was responsible for the
destruction of the hemp plants. There was
obviously no conspiracy among the
defendants, but the offended party and his
son and his relative, Saito, narrated the facts
of the incident in such away that all the four
defendants would appear to be equally
responsible for the injury sustained by the
offended party. The evidence does not
convince us that Ladion and Cortesano took
any part in the fight; on the contrary it inclines
us to believe that they ran away and were not
present when Angel Pulido was wounded.
This impression is strengthened by the fact
that they were not included in the original
complaint subscribed and sworn not by the
offended party on December 29th. They were
not included as defendants until the amended
complaint was filed on February 19, 1934. But
if they were present and held the offended
party by the arms, as alleged by him, the

evidence does not show that they held him for
the purpose of enabling Eduardo Autor to
strike him with his bolo. If they did in fact
intervene, it may have been for the purpose of
preventing the offended party and his son
from continuing their attack on Omine. There
was no need for Ladion and Cortesano to hold
Angel Pulido in order to enable Eduardo Autor
to strike him with his bolo, or for Kiichi Omine
to induce him to do so by shouting "pegale y
matale". According to the witness for the
prosecution, Hilario Pulido and Eduardo Autor
had already struck each other in the face with
their fists, and Eduardo Autor had received a
blow in the right eye, and then struck Hilario
Pulido with his bolo. Angel Pulido would
naturally intervene in the fight between his son
and Eduardo Autor, and if he did so, Autor,
who had already drawn his bolo, would strike
him without the need of any inducement from
Omine. Furthermore, under the circumstances
of this case, even if it were satisfactorily
proved that Kiichi Omine uttered the words in
question, we are of the opinion that they
would not be sufficient to make him a principal
by induction, because it does not appear that
the words uttered by Kiichi Omine caused
Eduardo Autor to strike Angel Pulido. In the
first place, as we have indicated, Eduardo
Autor had already other reasons for striking
Angel Pulido when Omine is alleged to have
uttered the words of inducement. In the
second place, the words in question were not
in this particular case sufficient to cause
Eduardo Autor to strike the offended party
with his bolo. Although Eduardo Autor was
working under the direction of Omine,
apparently according to the testimony of Angel
Pulido, he was being paid by Pulido. It does
not appear that Omine had any particular
influence over Eduardo Autor. The cases cited
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
by the Solicitor-General of a father giving
orders to his son are obviously different from
the case at bar.
In the leading case of the United States vs.
Indanan (24 Phil., 203), it was held that in
order that a person may be convicted of a
crime by inducement it is necessary that the
inducement be made directly with the intention
of procuring the commission of the crime and
that such inducement be the determining
cause of the commission of the crime. In that
case various decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain illustrating the principles involved and
their application to particular cases were cited
with approval. One of the decisions cited was
that of April 24, 1871, where it was held that
one who, during a riot in which a person was
killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab
him! Stab him!", it not appearing the he did
anything more than say these words except to
be present at the fight, was not guilty of the
crime of homicide by inducement. The
Supreme Court of Spain said: "Considering
that, although the phrases pronounced were
imprudent and even culpable, they were not
so to the extent that they may be considered
the principal and moving cause of the effect
produced; direct inducement cannot be
inferred from such phrases, as inducement
must precede the act induced and must be so
influential in producing the criminal act that
without it the act would not have been
performed." Another decision cited was that of
December 22, 1883, where it was held that a
father who simply said to his son who was at
the time engaged in combat with another. "Hit
him! Hit him!", was not responsible for the
injuries committed after such advice was
given.
P a g e | 27
Commenting upon No. 2 of article 13 of the
Penal Code, which has been incorporated in
the Revised Penal Code without change as
No. 2 of article 17, Viada says that in order
that, under the provisions of the Code, such
act can be considered direct inducement, it is
necessary that such advice or such words
have great dominance and great influence
over the person who acts, that it is necessary
that they be as direct, as efficacious, as
powerful as physical or moral coercion or as
violence itself. (2 Viada, 386, 5th Edition.)
We are therefore of the opinion that the co-
defendants of Eduardo Autor are not
responsible for the injury inflicted by him on
Angel Pulido.
The lower court, taking into consideration the
nature and location of the wound of the
offended party, found that it was the intention
of the defendant Eduardo Autor to kill the
offended party, and accordingly found said
defendant guilty of frustrated homicide, but in
our opinion the evidence does not justify this
finding. It is true that the wound was serious
and in a vital part of the body, but judging from
the nature of the wound, which was about
eleven inches in length, extending from the
breast to the lower ribs on the right side, we
think it is probable that it was caused by the
point of the bolo on a downward stroke. It was
not a stab wound, and was probably given
during a commotion and without being aimed
at any particular part of the body. As we have
already stated, Eduardo Autor struck the
offended party only once. This fact tends to
show that it was not his intention to take the
offended party's life. If he had so intended, he
could easily have accomplished his purpose,

so far as the record shows. It might be
contended that Eduardo Autor did not strike
the offended party a second time, because he
thought that he had already killed him. This
was apparently the theory of the prosecution,
because the offended party and his witnesses
testified that the offended party dropped down
unconscious when he was wounded, but the
evidence does not seem to us to sustain that
contention. In the first place a cutting wound
like that in question would not ordinarily
render the injured man immediately
unconscious.
In the second place it appears from the
affidavit of Saito, one of the witnesses for the
prosecution, that Angel Pulido did not fall
down unconscious; but swayed and asked for
help, while the blood was flowing from his
breast and stomach; that Saito approached
the wounded man to support him and take him
home.
It is a rule that in a case of physical injuries
the court must be guided by the result unless
the intent to kill is manifest.
When criminal liability is made to
consist in the intention to perform an
act which was not realized, the facts
from which it is claimed that intention
sprang must be such as to exclude all
contrary supposition. When this
intention is not necessarily disclosed
by the acts performed by the
defendant, greater importance should
not be given to such acts than that
which they in themselves import, nor
should the defendant's liability be
extended beyond that which is actually
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
involved in the material results of his
act. Intention may only be deduced
from the external acts performed by
the agent, and when these acts have
naturally given a definite result, the
courts cannot, without clear and
conclusive proof, hold that some other
result was intended. (U.S. vs.
Mendoza, 38 Phil., 691.)
There is no merit in the contention of Eduardo
Autor that Angel Pulido was accidentally
wounded in a struggle for the possession of
the offended party's bolo. That claim is
disproved by the affidavit of Autor, Exhibit E,
executed on December 26, 1933, where he
stated that he snatched out his bolo and
struck Angel Pulido in the stomach because
Pulido was very aggressive.
We are therefore of the opinion that Eduardo
Autor is guilty of lesiones graves, since the
offended party was incapacitated for the
performance of his usual work for a period of
more than ninety days, and not of frustrated
homicide.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision
appealed from is reversed as to Kiichi Omine,
Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano, and they
are acquitted with the proportionate part of the
costs de oficio. As to the appellant Eduardo
Autor, the decision of the lower court is
modified, and he is convicted of lesiones
graves and sentenced to suffer one year,
eight months, and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, to indemnify the offended party
in the sum of P540, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, which
shall not exceed one-third of the principal
P a g e | 28
penalty, and to pay the corresponding costs.
In accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum sentence to be
served by him is fixed at one year of prision
correccional.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-67948 May 31, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
NAPOLEON MONTEALEGRE, defendant-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for
defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the conviction of the
accused, who is constitutionally presumed innocent, depends
upon the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the
defense. Unfortunately for the accused in this case, his
prosecution for murder with assault upon a person in authority,
undoubtedly already strong, was made even stronger by the
defense itself.
As the trial court * which convicted him saw it, the crime
imputed to Napoleon Montealegre was committed as follows:
At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11,
1983, while Edmundo Abadilia was eating at
the Meding's Restaurant in Cavite City, he
detected the smell of marijuana smoke
coming from a nearby table. Intending to call a
 P a g e | 29

policeman, he quietly went outside and saw of the incident, Capt. Cipriano Gilera of the his gun, what
Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his car whom he Cavite police immediately organized a team happened to
hailed to report the matter. After parking his that went to look for him that very night. 8 They Camantigue?
vehicle, Camantigue joined Abadilla in the did not find him in his house then but he was
restaurant and soon thereafter the two apprehended in the morning of March A. He could not
smelled marijuana smoke from the table 12,1983, on board a vehicle bound for move, sir. He
occupied by Vicente Capalad and the Baclaran. He gave his name as Alegre but could not make
accused-appellant. Camantigue then later admitted he was the fugitive being any defense
approached the two and collared both of sought. 9 because he
them, saying "Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?' was being held
Forcing them up, he asked the waitress ff she Dr. Regalado Sosa, reporting on the autopsy by
knew them but the waitress said she did of the Camantigue's body, testified that death Montealegre
not. 1 Then the mayhem began. was caused by shock due to massive internal and he was
hemorrhage caused by seven stab wounds being stabbed
While Camantigue was holding the two, affecting the heart, lungs, liver, stomach, at the back. 15
Montealegre with this right hand and Capalad pancreas, and diaphragm.10 The weapon used
with his left hand, Capalad suddenly and was 6" in length and about 2 to 2.5 cm. in He replied as follows to questions on re-direct
surreptitiously pulled out a knife from a width and the blood found on it was analyzed to stress the participation of the accused-
scabbard tucked in the right side of his waist as human.11 The stabbing incident was appellant —
and started stabbed Camantigue in the narrated in detail at the trial by Abadilla, 12 who
back. 2 Camantigue let loose Montealegre to was corroborated by Generoso San Juan. 13 Q. When
draw the gun from his holster but accused
Montealegre, thus released, restrained On direct examination, Abadilla testified that Capalad
Camantigue's hand to prevent the latter from Montealegre prevented Camantigue from started
defending himself Montealegre used both his drawing his pistol while he was being stabbed stabbing Pfc.
hands for his purpose 3 as Capalad continued by Capalad, demonstrating with the aid of Camantigue at
stabbing the Victim. 4 While they were thus court personnel the relative positions of the the back,
grappling, the three fen to the floor and three during the incident. 14 accused
Capalad, freed from Camantigue's grip, rose Montealegre
and scampered toward the door. Camantigue On cross-examination, he reiterated his was being held
fired and, continuing the pursuit outside, fired previous declaration even more emphatically, by Pfc.
again. 5 Capalad fled into a dark alley. thus: Camantigue at
Camantigue abandoned the chase and asked that time?
to be brought to a hospital. Capalad was later
Q. When
found slumped in the alley with a bullet wound
accused A. Yes, sir.
in Ms chest. Neither Camantigue nor Capalad
Montealegre
survived, both expiring the following day. 6
held the hand Q And in fact
of Pfc. Montealegre
The accused-appellant, for his part, escaped Camantigue was very close
during the confusion. 7 Having been informed upon drawing to the right of
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
 P a g e | 30

Camantigue at able to pull out Capalad

that time? from his waist doing?
the gun?
A. Yes sir. A. Capalad
A. No. sir. was still
Q And stabbing
Montealegre Q. Why? Camantigue,
was aware that Your Honor. 17
Capalad was A. Because
stabbing Pfc. Montealegre San Juan was equally categorical in his
Camantigue? was holding his testimony, saying on direct examination.
hand, Your
A. Yes, sir, he Honor. Q. When
knew. 16 Camantigue
Q. With both was being
In answer to clarificatory questions from the hands? stabbed, where
court, he declared: was
A. Yes, sir. Montealegre?
Q. And when
Montealegre Q. A. He was on
saw that Montealegre the right side.
Camantigue was holding
was about to with both Q. What was
draw gun, hands rights he doing at
Montealegre hand of that time?
grabbed the Camantigue?
hand of A. When
Camantigue? A. Yes, sir. Camantigue
was being
A. Yes, sir. Q. And at this stabbed, he
moment when tried to pull his
Q. With what Montealegre gun but
hand? was holding Montealegre
with both held his hand.
A. Both hands, hands the
sir. hand of Q. Was
Camantigue, Camantigue
Q. And was what was able to draw
Camantigue his gun?

ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
 P a g e | 31

A. No. sir. A. He could not Q. Now, while

draw his gun Pfc.
Q. What because while Camantigue
happened Montealegre was arresting
when was holding his Vicente
Camantigue hand, Capalad Capalad, what
failed to draw was stabbing happened if
his gun? They him at the any?
slammed down back. 19
on the floor A. Camantigue
and when they And to the court, the witness maintained his pulled his gun.
were already testimony as follows:
on the floor, I Q. What
ran away Q. So happened after
because I was Camantigue that?
already figures was hit many
lightened. 18 times by A. Nothing, I
Capalad while did not see
The cause of the defense did not improve Montealegre anymore what
when on cross-examination, he insisted: was holding happened. 21
the right hand
A. When of the xxx xxx xxx
Camantigue policeman to
was about to prevent him
A. I cannot say
draw his gun, from drawing
anything about
Montealegre his gun?
that. I did not
suddenly held see what really
the hand of A. Yes, sir. 20 happened.
Camantigue.
The accused-appellant, testifying on his Q. Did you see
Q. And when behalf, only succeeded in confinning his own Capalad
Montealegre guilt. He claimed he ran away before the stabbing Pfc.
suddenly held stabbing but his testimony, consisting of Camantigue?
the hand of denials, evasions, contradictions, claims of
Camantigue, ignorance and forgetfulness and protestations
A. I did not
what happened of innocence, does not have the ring of truth.
see. 22
to The following excerpts are reflective of the
Camantigue? kind of defense he offered to exculpate
himself from the charge established against xxx xxx xxx
him by the prosecution.
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
 P a g e | 32

Q. From whom on the right even more onlookers could not forget. The
did you come side of Pfc. evidence has established that the accused-
to know that Camantigue appellant was directly and personally involved
Pfb. while Capalad and was in fact one of the two persons held by
Camantigue was on the left the victim when he was stabbed. Yet
shot and killed side? Montealegre would now insist, quite
Vicente incredibly, that he was unaware of what had
Capalad? A. I am not transpired that night.
sure whether I
A. From the was standing If it is true, as he says, that he ran away
witness at the right or before the stabbing, there would have been
Abadilla. I have at the left. less likelihood of Capalad's attack as
heard from him Camantigue's attention would have been fully
that Q. But the fact concentrated on his lone captive. Moreover,
Camantigue is that you there would have been nothing to restrain the
killed were standing policeman from drawing his pistol and
Capalad. 23 on the right defending himself against Capalad if the
side of accused-appellant had, by his own account,
xxx xxx xxx Camantigue? already escaped before the stabbing.

Q. Mr. A. I am not It is also worth noting that, instead of reporting

Montealegre, sure if that is to the authorities, what the accused-appellant
did you notice the right side. did was attempt to hide, only to be found the
while following morning on board a bus bound for
Pfc.Camantigu Q. But you outside Cavite City. When apprehended, he
e was holding were standing first gave a false name before he finally
both of you, did on the side admitted his Identity, thus beginning the mesh
you notice that where his gun of contradictions, admissions and denials, in
Vicente and holster which he would enshare himself.
Capalad were placed?
stabbed Pfc. The Court accepts the evidence established
Camantigue? A. I cannot by the prosecution that at the time of the
remember. 25 stabbing, the victim was in uniform and,
A. I did not see therefore, could easily be recognized as a
anything. 24 person in authority. Several witnesses testified
It is simply unbelievable that the accused-
as to his attire when he was killed. 26 And even
appellant did not know what was happening
xxx xxx xxx assuming that the victim was in civilian clothes
on that evening of March 11, 1983. As one of
on that tragic night, the record shows that no
the principal figures of the stabbing incident,
less than the accused-appellant himself,
Q. And you he could not have not known, nor could he
replying to questions put to him by the
were standing later not remember, that startling event that
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS

prosecution, declared twice that he knew the
victim to be a policeman. 27
The accused-appellant was correctly
considered a co-principal for having
collaborated with Capalad in the killing of the
police officer. The two acted in concert, with
Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue seven
times and the accused-appellant holding on to
the victim's hands to prevent him from
drawing his pistol and defending himself.
While it is true that the accused- appellant did
not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was
nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having
prevented Camantigue from resisting the
attack against him. The accused-appellant
was a principal by indispensable cooperation
under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal
Code.
As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this
provision are: "(1) participating in the criminal
resolution, that is, there is either anterior
conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention immediately before the commission
of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in
the commission of the offense by performing
another act without which it would not have
been accomplished.
The prosecution contends that although there
was no evidence correspondence of a prior
agreement between Capalad and
Montealegre, their subsequent acts should
prove the presence of such conspiracy. The
Court sustains this view, which conforms to
our consistent holding on this matter:
Conspiracy need not be
established by direct proof as
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
it can be inferred from the acts
of the appellants. It is enough
that, at the time the offense
was committed, participants
had the same purpose and
were united in its execution; as
may be inferred from the
attendant circiumstances. 29
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that there is no
evidence to show a previous
plan to kill Regino Bautista.
The whole incident happened
because the accused came
upon Bautista and Mallabo
fishing within or near the
fishpond enclosure of Carlo
Aquino which was under the
care of Vicente Cercano.
But for a collective
responsibility among the
herein accused to be
established, it is not necessary
or essential that there be a
previous plan or agreement to
commit the assault; it is
sufficient that at the time of the
aggression all the accused by
their acts manifested a
common intent or desire to
attack Bautista and Mallabo,
so that the act of one accused
became the act of all. 30
xxx xxx xxx
P a g e | 33
If it be proved that two or more
persons aimed by their acts
towards accomplishment of
the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their
acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of
personal association and
concurrence of sentiment, a
conspiracy may be inferred
though no actual meeting
among them to concert is
proven. A conspiracy only be
entered into after the
commencement of overt acts
leading to the consummation
of the crime. 31
As for the second requirement, the Court has
held that:
There can be no question that
appellant's act in holding the
victim from behind when the
latter was stabbed by his
collaborated Victor Buduan,
was a positive act towards the
realization of a common
criminal intent, although the
intent can be classified as
instantaneous. It can be safely
assumed that had not
appellant held both arms of
the victim from behind, the
latter could have partied the
thrust or even run away from
his assailant. By immobilizing
the two hands of the victim

from behind, and although
there was no anterior
conspiracy , the two cousins
showed unity of criminal
purpose and intent
immediateIy before the actual
stabbing. 32
xxx xxx xxx
It has been sufficiently
established that appellant
Cabiles seized the running
decedent in such a manner
that the latter could not even
move or tum around. This
enabled the pursuing Labis,
who was armed with a drawn
bolo and was barely five
meters away from the
decedent, to finally overtake
him and stab him at the back
with hardly any risk at all.
Cabiles therefore performed
another act-holding the
decedent—without which the
crime would not have been
accomplished. This makes him
a principal by indispensable
cooperation. 33
The above requisites having been
established, the accused-appellant was
correctly convicted of the complex crime of
murder, as qualified by treachery, with assault
upon a person in authority. Accordingly, he
must suffer the penalty imposed upon him, to
wit, reclusion perpetua, there being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
plus the civil indemnity, which is hereby
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
increased to P30,000.00, and the actual,
mectical and fimeral expenses in the sum of
P37,380.00 as proved at the trial.
Pfc. Renato Camantigue was only 34 years
old when he died in line of duty while
enforcing the law against the abuse of
dangerous drugs. He was struck down with no
less than seven vicious stabs by a man who,
by his own admission, was at the time of the
incident "burned" on marijuana. The kiner also
eventually succumbed, and that made the
second life needlessly lost to the wickedness
of drug addiction. There was another Iife also
ruined, this time of the 28 year-old accused-
appellant himself, although, fortunately for
him, his loss is not irretrievable nor is his
future forever foreclosed. In the somber
shadows of the prison bars, as he ponders the
wrong he has done, he may yet find his
ultimate redemption in rehabilitation and
remorse.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is
AFFIRMED as above modified, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5240 November 19, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LINO EGUIA LIM BUANCO (alias LIM
BUANCO) and LUCIANO DE LOS
REYES, defendants-appellants.
O'Brien and De Witt for appellant Lim
Buanco.
Felipe Buencamino for appellant Luciano de
P a g e | 34
los Reyes.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for
appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The defendants, Lino Eguia Lim Buanco,
(alias Lim Buanco) and Luciano de los Reyes,
were charged jointly with the crime of estafa.
Demurrers to the information were interposed
and overruled. Separate trials were then
demanded by the defendants and granted.
Both defendants were found guilty as
charged, and each was sentenced to two
years and ten months of presidio
correccional in the public carcel of Bilibid, in
the city of Manila; to jointly and separately
indemnify the Banco Español-Filipino in the
sum of P2,273, Philippine currency, and in the
event of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment for the time and in the manner
and place prescribed by law.
The information charged:
That on or about the 6th of October,
1906, in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said Lino Eguia Lim
Buanco, (alias Lim Buanco) and
Luciano de los Reyes, conspiring and
confederating together, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with intent of gain,
defraud El Banco Español-Filipino, a
corporation then and there duly
organized, existing and doing a
general banking business in the city of

Manila, Philippine Islands, of and in
the sum of two thousand (P2,000)
pesos, Philippine currency, by then
and there pretending and representing
that the said Lino Eguia Lim Buanco,
(alias Lim Buanco) did then and there
possess property and credit which the
said Lino Eguia Lim Buanco,
(alias Lim Buanco) did not possess
and the use of other similar deceit, in
this, to wit: That on or about the said
6th day of October, 1906, the said
Lino Eguia Lim Buanco, (alias Lim
Buanco) then and there prepared,
drew, executed, signed, presented,
and caused to be presented for
payment to the said El Banco
Espanol-Filipino his personal check
upon the said El Banco-Espanol
Filipino, then and there doing a
general banking business in the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, as
aforesaid, for the sum of two thousand
(P2,000) pesos, Philippine currency, a
true copy of which check, together
with all the indorsements and
notations thereon, made both before
and after the same was paid by the
said El Banco Espanol-Filipino, is
hereto attached, marked "Exhibit A,"
and made a part hereof, and the said
Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim
Buanco) and Luciano de los Reyes,
each well knowing that the said Lino
Eguia Lim Buanco, (alias Lim Buanco)
did not then and there have any funds
to his credit in said bank, and
conniving, conspiring and concerning
together to defraud said bank as
aforesaid, did then and there falsely
and fraudulently state and represent to
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
said bank and its agents, and
particularly to Lino Eguia, one of the
agents and the cashier of said bank;
that the said Lino Eguia Lim Buanco,
(alias Lim Buanco) then and there had
sufficient funds deposited to his credit
in said bank to meet and pay said
check and that the said Lino Eguia
Lim Buanco, (alias Lim Buanco) was
then and there a creditor of said bank
in an amount more than equal to said
check and that the said bank was
obligated to pay and should then and
there pay to the said Lino Eguia Lim
Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) the
amount of said check; that the said
Luciano de los Reyes was then and
there a clerk in the banking institution
of "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" and as
such was in charge of the book
containing the entry and record of the
account of the said Lino Eguia Lim
Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) with said
"El Banco Espanol-Filipino" and the
said Luciano de los Reyes,
cooperating, as aforesaid, with said
Lino Eguia Lim Buanco, (alias Lim
Buanco) to defraud the said "El Banco
Espanol-Filipino," at the request and
in cooperation with the said Lino Eguia
Lim Buanco (alias Lim Buanco), did
then and there falsely state and cause
it to appear upon the books of the said
bank and in the account of the said
Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim
Buanco) that the said Lino Eguia Lim
Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) had to his
credit in said bank more than enough
to pay the said check of two thousand
(P2,000) pesos, and was then and
there a creditor of said bank in more
P a g e | 35
than the amount of said check; and
did further then and there, falsely and
fraudulently in combination with the
said Lino Eguia Lim Buanco,
(alias Lim Buanco), as aforesaid place
upon the back of said check over his
signature the word "corriente," thereby
stating and causing it to appear and
be understood by the said "El Banco
Espanol-Filipino" and its agents, and
particularly the said Lino Eguia, agent
and cashier of said bank, that the said
Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim
Buanco) had then and there deposited
to his credit in said bank funds more
than sufficient to pay the amount of
said check and that the said "El Banco
Espanol-Filipino" was obligated then
and there to pay and should pay to the
said Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim
Buanco), the amount of said check;
that relying on the false and fraudulent
representations, as aforesaid, of the
said Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim
Buanco), and Luciano de los Reyes
the said "El Banco Espanol-Filipino"
was induced to pay and did pay to the
said Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim
Buanco) and his order the said sum of
two thousand (P2,000) pesos,
Philippine currency, which said sum
the said Lino Eguia Lim Buanco
(alias Lim Buanco), and the said
Luciano de los Reyes then and there
converted to their own use, to the
damage and prejudice of the said "El
Banco Espanol-Filipino" in the said
sum of two thousand (P2,000) pesos,
Philippine currency, equivalent to and
of the value of ten thousand pesetas,
Philippine currency.

All contrary to law.
The evidence shows conclusively that for at
least three and a half years prior to the 6th
day of October, 1906, Luciano de los Reyes
was employed in the Banco Espanol-Filipino,
and there served and acted as bookkeeper
and check registry clerk. During that time he
was in charge of certain current account-
books, and it was his duty to inspect certain
checks presented to the bank for payment,
including those drawn by Lim Buanco; to
examine the account of the maker of said
checks, and determine whether or not the
drawer of the check had a sufficient balance
to his credit to justify the payment of the
check. In the performance of these duties,
Reyes was required to indorse upon each
check, if it was entitled to payment, the words
"Corriente. P. O. Luciano de los Reyes." After
the check was marked in this manner it was
passed to the cashier of the bank, who in
reliance upon the indorsement, paid or
ordered the same to be paid.
During the period referred to the defendant
Lim Buanco had an account with the bank,
and drew large sums of money therefrom by
means of checks signed by him, and
inspected and indorsed as above by Reyes.
During this time a conspiracy existed between
the defendants Lim Buanco and Reyes for the
withdrawal of funds from the bank by Lim
Buanco, regardless of whether he had any
funds in the bank to his credit, and in
furtherance of this conspiracy the entries in
the account of Lim Buanco on the books of
the bank were fraudulently and illegally
manipulated by Reyes in such a manner as to
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
make the books show an apparent credit
balance, when in fact Lim Buanco was owing
the bank a large amount of money.
On the 6th day of October, 1906, Lim Buanco
drew a check on the Banco Espanol-Filipino
for the sum of P2,000, and this check was
through the agency of another bank in which it
was deposited by Lim Buanco, presented in
due course of business to and paid by the
Banco Espanol-Filipino. Before the check was
thus paid, Reyes, acting in his capacity as an
employee of the bank, indorsed thereon the
words "Corriente. P. O. Luciano de los
Reyes," although at the time when this
indorsement was made Lim Buanco had no
actual credit balance in the bank, and no
permission had been given by any officer or
officers in authority of said bank to overdraw
his account. In this manner the defendants
Lim Buanco and Reyes, in furtherance of the
conspiracy to cheat, deceive, and defraud the
bank, secured the payment of the check,
although they both knew at the time that the
defendant Lim Buanco had no credit balance
in said bank, but was in fact indebted to the
bank in the sum of more than 300,000 pesos,
which had previously been withdrawn from the
bank by means of similar checks drawn by
Lim Buanco and fraudulently indorsed as
correct by Reyes.
The amount of money thus fraudulently
obtained from the bank by means of the check
as aforesaid, with interest thereon at the rate
of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the
check to the date of the decision in the court
below, to wit, January 16, 1909, amounted to
the sum of P2,273, Philippine currency,
equivalent to 11,365 pesetas, which the court
P a g e | 36
determined to be the damage occasioned to
and suffered by the bank by reason of the
aforesaid fraudulent conduct of the
defendants, acting together in furtherance of
said conspiracy. No part of the said sum has
been returned or paid bank to the Banco
Espanol-Filipino by Lim Buanco, or by Reyes,
or by any person acting for or in his or their
behalf. The trial court also found that Lim
Buanco and Reyes each had voluntarily
admitted the crime as charged against him.
Separate trials were granted to the
defendants, but the court, after both were
convicted, embodied its findings of facts and
conclusions in one decision, and one joint
sentence was pronounced upon the
defendants. Thereafter each defendant
separately moved for a new trial, which was
denied, and an appeal was taken to this court,
where, as in the court below, they appear by
separate attorneys. Although separate briefs
are filed, the various assignments of errors
raise essentially the same questions.
1. It appears that the court in fact granted the
motion of the defendants for separate trials,
and that Lim Buanco was tried on January 7
and 12, 1909. This trial was followed
immediately by that of Reyes, and on January
16, after both trials were completed, the court
announced its findings of facts and
conclusions in each case in one decision, and
imposed one sentence which included both
defendants. the practice of entering one
sentence against several defendants thus
jointly charged and separately tried is not that
which prevails in the United States, but it was
approved by this court in United States vs.
Fernandez (9 Phil. Rep., 269), and in the

recent case of United States vs. Raymundo,
No. 4947. 1
It appears that the sentence as to each
defendant was based upon the evidence
submitted upon the separate trial of his case.
Every right intended to be protected, and
every purpose sought to be effected by the
privilege of a separate trial were effectually
preserved. No rights which accrue to a
defendant after the decision and sentence can
be prejudicially affected by the fact that
another defendant is included in that
sentence. The right of each to move for a new
trial, and to appeal and have his appeal
considered upon the record made in his case
is preserved unimpaired, and in its entirety.
The practice is convenient, and saves much
time and labor, and as it can in no way
prejudice the rights of a defendant, there is no
reason why it should not be approved.
2. In the statement preliminary to the findings,
and by way of recital, the trial court stated that
neither of the defendants testified as a witness
in his own behalf. The defendants contend
that this was a violation of their constitutional
right. In proceedings under the jury system it
is general provided by statute that the court
must not in the presence of the jury refer to
the fact that the defendant has availed himself
of the right to decline to be a witness, but
much of the importance of the matter
disappears when the case is tried by a court
without a jury. The judge is necessarily in
possession of the fact that the defendant has
a right to testify or not, as he may be advised,
and this statutory prohibition is upon the court
drawing any inference of guilt from the fact
that the defendant elects not to testify. Under
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
the Code Criminal Procedure, a defendant
has the right to appear and defend in person
or by counsel, and if he offers himself as a
witness he may be cross-examined as any
other witness, but "his neglect or refusal to be
a witness shall in no manner prejudice or be
used against him." The question under his
statute is not whether the court referred to the
fact that the defendant did not testify, but
whether his failure to testify was used to his
prejudice. The reference here is in the
preliminary statements and it is very clear
from the entire proceedings and the sentence
that this circumstance was not considered as
an evidential fact, and that it in no manner
affected the conclusion reached by the court
upon the question of the guilt of the
defendants or either of them.
3. It is urged that the complaint does not
allege facts sufficient to constitute the crime
of estafa, because it does not allege
specifically that Lim Buanco did not at the time
when the check was drawn have funds to his
credit in the bank sufficient to pay the check.
The position is without merit, because the
complaint does not in fact allege that the
check was drawn by Lim Buanco, and "that
the said Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim
Buanco), and Luciano de los Reyes, each well
knowing that the said Lim Buanco did not then
and there have any funds to his credit in said
bank, and conniving, conspiring and
concerning together to defraud the bank, etc."
Under the liberal rule of construction
prescribed by General Orders, No. 58, and
frequently approved by this court, this, when
read in connection with the rest of the
complaint, must be construed as a sufficient
allegation that both Lim Buanco and Reyes
when the check was drawn knew that Lim
P a g e | 37
Buanco did not have sufficient money in the
bank to pay the same. (See U. S. vs. Cajayon,
2 Phil. Rep., 570.) lawphil.net
It is also claimed that the court erred in finding
the defendants guilty of the crime of estafa,
because the evidence fails to prove the
essential elements necessary to constitute
this offense. This claim rests upon the
assertion that the evidence shows that the
money must have been obtained with the
consent of the bank; that Lim Buanco never
presented the check to the bank, or made any
representations to bank, nor any person that
he had sufficient money in the bank to pay the
check; that he merely used the check in his
commercial transactions with the Chartered
Bank, of India, Australia, and China, and had
it credited to his account in that bank, with the
understanding that it would be presented to
the Banco Espanol-Filipino, and if paid, the
credit should stand; otherwise it should be
canceled. It is true that Lim Buanco drew the
check and deposited it to his own credit in the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China,
by which it was presented for payment to the
Banco Espanol-Filipino, upon which it was
drawn. The Chartered Bank of India, Australia,
and China was not defrauded, because the
check was in fact paid. The implied
representation to the Chartered Bank that the
check would be paid in the ordinary course of
business was made good, and therefore the
Chartered Bank suffered no loss, but the
argument based on this fact loses sight of the
real offense which was committed against the
Banco Espanol-Filipino. That bank never
intended to allow Lim Buanco to overdraw his
account, although it did intend to pay the
check; that is, it intended to perform the
physical act of paying the check, but that act

was induced by the combined fraudulent act
of Lim Buanco and Reyes. Through the
fraudulent machinations and devices of these
two defendants, the Banco Espanol-Filipino
was induced to part with its money. In order to
obtain this result, Lim Buanco drew the check,
and Reyes, acting and operating in connection
with him, falsified the records of the bank and
thus accomplished their fraudulent purpose.
The allegation in the information, and the
statement in the findings of the trial court, that
the defendants conspired and confederated
together to defraud the bank, and that in
furtherance of the conspiracy the defendants
did defraud the bank, means no more than
that they operated together, and so operating
succeeded in defrauding the bank.
Counsel for the defendant Reyes contends
that the court committed an error in holding
that the evidence shows that Reyes is guilty
as principal of the crime of estafa. Upon this
record we are satisfied that both the
defendants are equally guilty. Each performed
the part which was necessary to enable them
to accomplish the criminal purpose they had in
view. Article 535 of the Penal Code says that:
The following shall incur the penalties
of the preceding articles:
1. He who shall defraud others by
using a fictitious name, by assuming
fictitious power, influence, or
attributes, or by pretending to possess
imaginary property, credit,
commission, enterprises, or business,
or by using any other similar deceit
that is not one of those mentioned in
the following cases.
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
Lim Buanco certainly by implication
represented to the bank that possessed a
credit to which he was not entitled, and with
the assistance of Reyes he gave that claim
the color of truth, and thus deceived the bank.
The fact that Reyes falsified the accounts-
current of Lim Buanco, making him appear as
a creditor when as a matter of fact he was a
debtor of the bank, together with the fact that
he acted in collusion with Lim Buanco, made
him guilty of a deceit under the province of the
paragraph above quoted. We can not see that
this conclusion is in the least affected by the
fact that under the by-laws of the bank it may
have been the duty of the directors of the
bank to ascertain the correctness of the
entries made by Reyes before the payment of
the check. The fraudulent conduct of Reyes
can not be deprived of its criminal character
by the fact that other officers, directors, or
employees of the bank may have been
careless in the performance of their duties.
Whatever may have been the strict duty of the
other officers of the bank, the fact remains
that Reyes was guilty of the fraudulently
manipulating the records of the bank, and he
can not escape the legal consequences
thereof by showing that if others had properly
performed their duties he would not have
been able to have accomplished anything by
his fraudulent acts. We are referred to a
judgment of the supreme court of Spain of
March 22, 1871, to the effect that one who
misstates the boundaries of land upon which
he places a mortgage to secure the payment
of a loan of money, is not guilty of the crime
of estafa, because such misstatement did not
amount to a false representation that he
owned any property, credits, or business
which he did not have. We can not see that
this decision is at all applicable to the present
P a g e | 38
case. Here the bank was deceived by the
affirmative act of Reyes, acting in conjunction
with Lim Buanco. In the case referred to the
boundaries of the land were well known, and
the creditor had the right to ascertain for
himself the superficial area of the property
before he accepted the same as security. Had
the party by some fraudulent suggestion or
device misrepresented the area of the land,
and prevented the person to whom he was
giving the mortgage from making any
examination for himself, it is probable that a
different conclusion would have been
reached.
It is impossible to accept the contention that
this was merely a case of overdraft on the part
of Lim Buanco, and that the bank intentionally
and in the ordinary course of business
permitted the overdraft. All the facts are
inconsistent with such a claim, and the
evidence fails to justify the conclusion that the
bank or its proper authorities ever intended to
permit Lim Buanco to overdraw his account. It
is somewhat difficult to understand why these
irregularities, which extended over many
months, were not previously discovered, but
the failure earlier to discover the fraud does
not deprive the acts of the defendants of
criminality.
The defendants contend that the crime
charged in the information is conspiracy, and
not estafa. As we read the complaint and
consider the evidence, the conspiracy referred
to therein means no more than an agreement
or understanding between the parties that
they should work together to accomplish a
fraudulent purpose. The crime of conspiracy
as known to the common law does not exist

under the system embodied in a Penal Code.
Under the common law, a combination of two
or more persons to do an unlawful act by
lawful means, or a lawful act by unlawful
means, to the prejudice of an individual or the
public, is a distinct offense. The Penal Code
defines certain acts as conspiracies and
makes them punishable, and the statutes of
the Philippine Islands have created certain
crimes which are denominated conspiracies.
Article 4 of the Penal Code says that there is a
conspiracy when two or more persons act
together for the commission of a crime, and
decide to commit it, but it also provides that a
conspiracy or proposition to commit a crime is
punishable only in the cases in which the law
specifically makes them so. A penalty for such
conspiracies is provided in but a few
instances. Article 137 provides that
conspiracies to commit any of the crimes
mentioned in the three preceding articles,
which relate to the crime of treason, shall be
punishable with the penalty of presidio mayor.
Article 157 imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death upon any person who shall
kill the king, and article 158 provides that a
conspiracy to commit such a crime shall be
punished with reclusion temporal. Article 164
provides that a conspiracy to kill the
immediate successor to the crown, or the
regent of the kingdom, shall be punished with
the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and
maximum degrees. Article 235 provides that
conspiracies to commit the crime of rebellion
shall be punished with the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
degrees, and article 240 provides that a
conspiracy to commit the crime of sedition
shall be punished with the penalty of arresto
mayor or prision correccional in its medium
degree. These are the only conspiracies
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
which are made punishable by the Penal
Code. (See 3 Alcubilla, 281.) Sections 4, 7,
and 8 of Act No. 292, and section 1 of Act No.
1692, declare that certain specified acts shall
constitute criminal conspiracies, and provide
for their punishment, but the legislature has
not yet deemed it advisable to adopt the
general common law of conspiracy. It thus
appears that when two or more persons act
together for the commission of a crime, and
proceed to commit the crime of estafa, the act
is not a criminal conspiracy under the Penal
Code, because no penalty has been provided
therefor nor is it within the provisions of Acts
Nos. 292 or 1692. No crime of conspiracy is
attempted to be charged against the
defendants by this information. They are
charged with the crime of estafa, committed in
the manner described in the information, and
upon the evidence they were properly
convicted of that crime.
The judgment and sentence of the trial court
should be and are therefore affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the appellants.
So ordered.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-67803-04 July 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
Pat. RICARTE MADALI and ANNIE
MORTEL MADALI, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
P a g e | 39
Juan B. Soliven for defendants-appellants.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Husband and wife Patrolman Ricarte Madali and Annie Mortel
Madali appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Romblon, Branch LXXXI 1 finding them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of killing father and son Cipriano and Felix Gasang, and
seriously wounding Agustin Reloj and Cipriano's daughter,
Merlinda. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court
hereby finds the guilt of
accused Ricarte Madali and
Annie Mortel Madali beyond
reasonable doubt of the
following offenses and
sentences each of them as
follows:
(1) For the frustrated murder
of Agustin Reloj, each
accused is meted an
indeterminate penalty of SIX
(6) YEARS of prision
correccional, as minimum to
TWELVE (12) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. (E)ach
of them is also sentenced to
suffer all the accessory
penalties provided for by law,
and each is ordered to pay in
solidum the offended party,
Agustin Reloj, the sum of
P200.00 as reimbursement of
medical and hospitalization
expenses.

(2) For the murder of Felix
Gasang, each accused is
sentenced the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and
each of them is likewise
sentenced to suffer the
accessory penalties provided
for by law, and each is also
ordered to pay in solidum to
the heirs of Felix Gasang, the
sum of P12,000, as death
indemnity.
(3) For the murder of Cipriano
Gasang and the mortal (sic)
wounding of Merlinda Gasang
(which has been converted
into a complex crime of
murder with frustrated murder)
each accused is sentenced to
the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the
accessory penalties provided
for by law and to indemnify in
solidum the heirs of Cipriano
Gasang the sum of
P12,000.00 and each is also
ordered to pay in solidum,
Merlinda Gasang the sum of
P6,000 for reimbursement of
medical and hospitalization
expenses.
Each of the accused is
likewise ordered to pay in
solidum the heirs of deceased,
Cipriano Gasang and Felix
Gasang, the sum of
P50,000.00, which amount
represents the value of the
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
loss (sic) earning capacity of
deceased Cipriano and Felix,
both surnamed Gasang, and
the sum of P30,000.00 as
moral damages, and the sum
of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
The sentences of reclusion
perpetua and
the indeterminate
penalty imposed upon each
accused should be served
successively, with
proportionate costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.2
According to the prosecution, said crimes
stemmed from an altercation between the son
of the Madali spouses, Ramon, and the group
of Felix Gasang, who was twenty years old
when he was killed. 3 It appears that on
October 26, 1979, Felix figured in a fist-fight
with someone who was a friend of Ramon.
The latter interceded and mauled Felix with a
"chako" 4 One of Felix's companions then was
Agustin Reloj. 5
The following day, the police summoned Felix
to the municipal building. Felix's mother,
Desamparada Gasang, went with him. 6 At the
police station, Ricarte Madali, a police officer,
angrily scolded Felix and his cousin, Arnaldo
Fadriquilan, and told them that because they
were "very brave", he would put them in jail for
twelve hours. Madali added after asking about
Felix's age that he would "sow bullets" in the
body of Felix. 7 According to witness
policeman Aristeo Fetalino, Madali also
P a g e | 40
uttered, "Kailangan sa imo lubongan bala"
which means, what you need is a bullet
embedded in you. 8 Madali's father-in-law,
Agustin Mortel, who arrived at the police
station, agreed with Madali that Felix and his
group must be "sown with bullets" to eradicate
them. 9 Another group mate of Felix was
detained at the municipal jail but Felix was
sent home with his mother. 10
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of
October 31, 1979, Felix and his cousin,
Agustin Reloj, went home together from the
town plaza. Their houses were located near
each other in sitio Marawi, barangay Cagbo-
aya, San Agustin, Romblon.
Felix and Agustin parted ways at the Marawi
bridge. Felix dropped by the store of Coroy
Mangao to buy cigarettes while Agustin
proceeded home. Around fifteen meters from
the house of Ricarte Madali, the latter
accosted, him, held him by his arm and said,
"So you are here, you devil, now you are
finished. I have been waiting for you. I have
been watching for you for three nights
already. 11 Then Madali dragged Agustin
towards the gate of his (Madali's) house.
When Agustin asked Madali why he was
dragging him, Madali said that the reason was
because Agustin helped in fighting his son.
As one of Agustin's feet stepped over the
knee-high fence at the gate of the Madali
residence, he was clubbed by Annie Madali
with a piece of wood. Annie struck him first on
the left shoulder and would have given him
another blow had not Agustin freed himself
from Madali's hold. Annie landed that blow on
Madali instead. 12

Agustin was looking back as he ran away
when Madali shot him. He was hit below his
right hip. He fell to the ground and did not get
up fearing that Madali might shoot him again.
Agustin was still lying down on the ground
with his eyes focused on Madali when Felix
Gasang arrived. He saw Annie beamed her
flashlight at Felix and she said, "Here comes
another." 13
Agustin saw Felix raising his hands as Annie
focused her flashlight on Felix. Felix told
Madali that he would not fight with him but
then Madali shot Felix twice. Felix fell to the
ground. Madali was still near the gate of his
house when Cipriano Gasang arrived. Annie
beamed her flashlight at Cipriano and she
said, "Here comes, here comes another, fire
upon him. 14 Madali shot Cipriano who fell to
the ground. Merlinda Gasang, who was with
her father Cipriano, clung to the fence nearby
and shouted that she was also hit. Then
Desamparada Gasang arrived and shouted
for help. One Romeo Manes came and carried
away Merlinda. Agustin slowly stood up and
as he walked towards his house, he saw
Roman Galicia (Galicha) and the Madali
spouses who were then entering their gate. 15
Merlinda Gasang * was at home when she heard an
explosion. Her father, Cipriano, was also at home then but after
the second shot, he went out of the house towards the direction
of the source of the gunfire. There was a minute interval between
the first and the second shots but only a second elapsed
between the second and the third shots. The fourth shot came
about two minutes later. 16
Cipriano was "beyond the gate" of the Madali
residence when he was shot by Madali.
Merlinda was around three meters from her
father.17 She saw Annie focused her flashlight
at Cipriano and she heard Annie say, "Yara
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
pa, yara, pa, barila" meaning "Here comes
another one, here comes another one,
shoot." 18 That was when the fourth explosion
occurred and Merlinda heard her father
exclaim that he was hit. Merlinda felt that she
was also hit. 19 She did not fall to the ground
because she was able to take hold of the
wooden fence. 20 She saw both her brother
Felix and Agustin lying flat on the ground with
the latter's head turned to one side. 21
Merlinda shouted for help. Romeo Manes
came and brought her to the Tablas Island
Emergency Hospital. 22 She did not notice
anymore where Ricarte Madali was at that
time because she was looking towards the
direction of their house. She saw her mother
running to her. 23
Desamparada Gasang was washing the
dishes after supper when she heard the first
shot. After the fourth shot, she became
apprehensive because a policeman was mad
at her family. 24 She proceeded to where she
heard the gunbursts and she met her
daughter Merlinda who informed her that she
was shot by Madali and that she saw Annie
focused a flashlight on her. Then
Desamparada saw her husband crawling on
the ground. She asked him to stand up but he
could not do so. Cipriano told her, "Ging
iwagan ako ni Annie Madali cag ging baril ako
ni Ricarte Madali" (Annie focused a light on
me and Ricarte Madali shot me.) She then
went back to her daughter and shouted for
help.
The bodies of Cipriano and Felix Gasang
were not removed from the road until around
midnight. They were brought to the Gasang
P a g e | 41
residence for autopsy. 25 The rural health
physician who conducted the postmortem
examinations on both Cipriano and Felix
found that Cipriano sustained a gunshot
wound at the right lower quadrant of the
abdomen along the mammary line. From that
point of entry, the bullet followed an obliquely
downward course penetrating the small and
large intestines and the urinary bladder, and
exited at the middle of the left buttock.
Cipriano's death was caused by hemorrhage
due to the gunshot wound.26
Felix also died of hemorrhage resulting from
the gunshot wound at the right second
intercostal space within the mid-clavicular line
of the chest. The bullet veered backwards
towards the left hitting the right lung, its blood
vessels and the fourth cervical vertebra. The
second gunshot wound was at the right side of
the abdomen at about the level of the navel
and within the right anterior axillary line. The
bullet hit the subcutaneous tissues and exited
at the posterior axillary line. 27
Merlyn (Merlinda) Gasang sustained a
gunshot wound at the anterior upper third
portion of her right leg with no exit wound and
which would incapacitate her for ten to fifteen
days 28 However, she stayed for treatment at
the emergency hospital in San Agustin for 39
days. Later, she was brought to the hospital in
Romblon for extraction of the slug lodged in
her leg. For the treatment of her wound,
Merlinda spent P6,200.00. She could not go to
school for three months. 29
Agustin Reloj suffered a gunshot wound at the
glutael region of the right thigh. The bullet
entered the lateral aspect of the upper third of

the right thigh and exited at the posterior
aspect of the gluteus maximus muscle. The
attending physician certified that Agustin's
injury would incapacitate him for seven to nine
days, 30 Agustin, who was then a laborer,
stayed one week at the hospital and spent
P200 for the treatment of his wound. For his
pain and anxiety he stated, that he should be
compensated in the amount of P500.00. 31
Madali voluntarily surrendered to the San
Agustin police. 32 He handed his .38 caliber
service revolver to the policemen who arrived
at the scene of the crime and they noted that
there were only two remaining bullets in the
revolver. 33 He was placed under technical
arrest by the provincial commander of the
Philippine Constabulary. 34
After the investigation, on February 1, 1980,
two informations were filed against Patrolman
Madali and his wife, Annie Mortel Madali. In
Criminal Case No. 981, said spouses were
charged with multiple murder for the killing of
Felix and Cipriano Gasang. The information
alleged that they conspired, confederated and
mutually helped each other in killing Felix and
Cipriano treacherously, with evident
premeditation and with the use of a .38 caliber
revolver. 35
In the separate information for multiple
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 982,
conspiracy, treachery and evident
premeditation were also alleged as having
attended the felonious assault with the use of
a .38 caliber revolver on Merlinda Gasang and
Agustin Reloj which could have resulted in the
crime of murder had not timely and able
medical assistance intervened. 36
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
At the trial, both Madali and his wife, who had
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged,
testified in their own defense. According to
Madali, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening
of October 31, 1979, he and his family were
about to sleep when a stone was hurled at
their house. His wife said that it could have
been a stray stone. But then, three other
stones landed on the GI sidings, and the
lawanit and bamboo walls of their house.
Madali went to their porch where he noticed a
person crouching near their gabi plants. He
could not identify the person because of the
fog so he went inside their room and dressed
up in his fatigue trousers and jacket. He went
down the house and noticed that there was no
one in the gabi plants anymore.
Madali was behind their kitchen and about to
go back to his house when someone hit his
left shoulder. The person struck him again but
he was able to catch the club aimed at him
and strike the person with his nightstick.
Madali was about to give him another blow
with his nightstick but the person caught it.
They tried to get each other's club.
They were in that position when Madali's foot
stepped into a low canal, causing him to fall
down flat on his back. The intruder fell with
him and landed on Madali's stomach. The
person shouted at someone in the vicinity
what the latter was tarrying about. As Madali
tried to get up, he heard his wife call, "Carte,
Carte." Just then he kicked the intruder on the
stomach and the latter fell to the ground.
Madali hurriedly stood up, pulled his gun and
fired at the intruder. He noticed two other
persons approaching him. One person had a
P a g e | 42
club and the other had what looked like a
knife. He warned them, "This is a policeman.
Do not come near." One of the persons
proceeded to strike him and Madali was hit on
his forehead by the man with the club. Madali
in turn dealt him with a blow by swinging back
his left forearm. The man with a club fell
down.
When the man with the knife was about to
stab him, Madali fired his gun at him. As that
man was still closing in on him, Madali shot
him again. The man with the knife retreated to
the gate and fell just outside of it.
After firing two shots, Madali turned sideward
and saw the man with the club about to strike
him. So, Madali shot him. The man walked
away. Madali later identified the man
crouching amidst their gabi plants as Agustin
Reloj. 37
Annie Mortel Madali corroborated her
husband's testimony from the stoning of their
house until he dressed up, got his gun and
nightstick, and went out of the house. When
she heard Madali opening the door to the
stairs, Annie got up and went to their balcony
to peep. She saw her husband going around
their house in a clockwise direction. When he
was near their kitchen, Annie saw him
grappling with someone over the possession
of a club. Her husband and his protagonist fell
into a canal, trampling the gabi plants. She
heard the man say, "Hay, naga tanga pa
kamo dira!" meaning "What are you still
waiting for!"
Annie then saw two persons rushing inside
their premises. One person was holding a club

while the other one had something which he
appeared to thrust forward. Losing her
composure, Annie warned her husband by
calling out his name, "Carte, Carte!" Then she
heard a gunshot and the person holding a
club who grappled with her husband ran out of
the premises.
Annie heard her husband say, "Pulis ini, ayaw
maglapit" meaning "This is a policeman do not
come near." After that, she heard three more
gunshots. The two who came rushing inside
their premises scampered away and out of
their fence. She could not recognize the three
intruders. Madali then walked towards her and
asked her to call the police. Annie went inside
their sala and told her daughter Agnes to
summon the police. 38
Policeman Numeriano Galang who heard the
gun reports, met Agnes on his way to sitio
Marawi. When he arrived at the Madali
residence, he found Madali with his face and
jacket smeared with mud and with a swollen
forehead. 39 Galang asked Madali what
happened but he did not put his investigation
in writing. 40 At the yard, he found stones, two
slippers and a nightstick. 41 He did not find
bloodstains in the yard because it was
drizzling. 42 Neither did he find bloodstains
outside the yard because he inspected only
the areas surrounding the Madali house. 43
Policeman Antonio Morales arrived at the
scene of the crime with two other policemen.
He found Felix Gasang lying flat on his belly
about one foot from the gate. 44 To identify
him, they turned Felix's body face up and
found that his right hand was holding a
knife. 45 Later, that knife was turned over to
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
police investigator Pfc. Ernesto Solano. 46 The
other victim (Cipriano) was found about five to
six meters from the body of Felix. 47 Like
Galang, Morales saw pieces of stones which
were different from the stones found in
Madali's yard which were mere corals or
"boga," two pairs of slippers and the gabi
plants which appeared to have been trampled
upon. 48
To prove aggression on the part of his victims,
Madali presented a medical certificate stating
that on November 1, 1979, he was examined
at the Tablas Island Emergency Hospital for a
vertical contusion (hematoma) on his left
forehead and another contusion on the left
deltoid region. 49
The lower court gave full faith and credit to the
evidence of the prosecution, especially the
testimonies of eyewitnesses-victims Agustin
Reloj and Merlinda Gasang. It found that the
concerted acts of Madali and his wife while
committing the crimes proved conspiracy
between them thereby making their criminal
responsibility collective. While finding that the
prosecution failed to prove evident
premeditation, the lower court positively
appreciated treachery to qualify as murder the
killing of both Cipriano and Felix Gasang. It
noted, however, that the prosecution erred in
charging as the separate crimes of murder
and frustrated murder the killing of Cipriano
and the wounding of Merlinda. Observing that
only one bullet hit Cipriano and his daughter,
Merlinda, the lower court concluded that the
Madali spouses should have been charged
with the complex crime of murder and
frustrated murder. Accordingly, it imposed the
penalties set out above for the crimes of
P a g e | 43
frustrated murder, murder and the complex
crime of murder and frustrated murder.
In this appeal, the Madali spouses pray for
their acquittal arguing that the lower court
erred in: [a] finding Annie Mortel Madali guilty
as principal by direct participation; [b] not
finding that the Gasangs and their kins were
motivated by revenge; [c] not finding that
Ricarte Madali acted in self-defense; and [d] in
giving credence and/or adopting the theory of
the prosecution instead of that of the defense.
The prosecution of these cases was
highlighted by notable developments. Firstly,
before the defense could present its evidence,
on September 6, 1980, the capitol building of
Romblon was razed to the ground. All court
records were lost. The records of Criminal
Cases Nos. 981 and 982 were, however,
reconstituted and the accused arraigned
anew. 50 Secondly, prosecution eyewitness,
Roman Galicia recanted his testimony and
appeared for the defense claiming that he did
not see the gunwielder. 51 He alleged that he
testified for the prosecution for fear that the
special prosecutor would revive the rape case
against him. 52 The lower court thereafter
disregarded his entire testimony inasmuch as
only the transcript of his cross-examination as
prosecution witness could be
reproduced. 53 Thirdly, only the testimony of
Ricarte Madali was heard by
the ponente below as the previous presiding
judge was transferred to another sala. 54
In view of the disqualification of Roman
Galicia as a witness, the issue of the
credibility of the eyewitnesses has gained
importance in this case. Significantly, it is the

word of the accused Madali spouses as
against that of the surviving victims, Agustin
Reloj and Merlinda Gasang. Both prosecution
and defense failed to present corroborative
witnesses to buttress their testimonies.
Matters of credibility are ordinarily addressed
to the discretion and discernment of the trial
court which is presumed to have observed the
demeanor of the witnesses at the stand. While
the ponente of the decision below was able to
hear only the testimony of accused Ricarte
Madali, the Court sees no reason for not
giving sufficient weight to his factual findings
considering that he took pains in thoroughly
studying the case even to the extent of
conducting an ocular inspection of the scene
of the crimes and hearing part of the cross-
examination of Madali thereat. 55
The defense is anchored on the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. In order that
such plea can prosper, it must be positively
shown that there was a previous unlawful and
unprovoked attack that placed the defendant's
life in danger and forced him to inflict more or
less severe wounds upon his assailant,
employing therefor reasonable means to resist
the said attack. 56
The defense miserably failed to pass said test.
Its allegation that the Madali residence was
hurled with stones before Madali confronted
the Gasang group, was not credibly
established. No one was able to positively
identify the stone-throwers. Not even Madali
and his wife, Annie. There is no proof that the
stones found in the Madali yard were indeed
the stones thrown at their house. It is
interesting to note that even defense witness
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
Antonio Morales, a fellow policeman of
Madali, testified that he did not have personal
knowledge on where the stones were
discovered because he was only informed by
Galang (another policeman) "who in turn was
only told by Ricarte that the latter was
stoned. 57
Indeed, the defense story is riddled with
contradictions and loopholes which the
appellants failed to rectify. At the trial, Agustin
Reloj sketched a map of the neighborhood
and placed Felix Gasang's body on a spot
across the road from the Madali gate. 58 The
defense tried to discredit Reloj's sketch and
his testimony thereon by presenting
policemen Morales and Galang who testified
that Felix's body was found close to the gate
of the Madali residence. However, the
testimonies of said policemen clashed with
each other. Morales testified that both the two
dead bodies were found close to the gate
while Galang swore that while one body was
near the gate, the other body was five meters
away from the Madali fence. 59 It should be
noted that ten days after the alleged
commission of the crime, police investigator
Fetalino found blood stains in the middle of
the street indicating that a blood-drenched
body had been dragged across the
street. 60
If it were really true that both Agustin and
Cipriano were armed with clubs, at least
Cipriano's club would have been found as he
died on the spot. The nightstick found by the
police could not have been the one used by
any of the victims. According to defense
witness policeman Galang, the nightstick was
similar to that of a policeman. 61Hence, it could
P a g e | 44
have been the same nightstick which Madali
admittedly used in striking one of the
intruders. 62
Granting that Agustin Reloj and Felix and
Cipriano Gasang were armed with clubs and a
knife, Madali's means of resisting them was
unreasonable under the circumstance. Having
known that an interloper was inside his yard,
Madali, being a policeman, should have first
fired a warning shot to deter said intruder from
executing whatever vicious plans he had. As it
were, he fired directly at his victims and all
four shots hit their targets.
Moreover, if Agustin, Felix and Cipriano were
the intruders, then they should be credited for
their extraordinary bravery in entering the
Madali yard. They were neighbors and they
must have known that as a policeman, Madali
possessed a service revolver. The lower
court, which saw for itself the Madali yard
considered it "rather inconceivable" for people
like the victims to ever dare go inside the
premises armed only with a knife and clubs. 63
The lower court is correct in characterizing the
felonious assault on Agustin Reloj as
frustrated murder. While Agustin Reloj was hit
only below his right hip, Madali's act of
shooting was plainly attended by an intent to
kill. This is evidenced by the revealing
statements of Madali while accosting Agustin
Reloj some fifteen (15) meters from Madali's
house, thus: "So you are here, you devil, now
you are finished. I have been waiting for you. I
have been waiting for you for three nights
already. 64 The statements "now you are
finished" and "I have been waiting for you for
three nights already" sufficiently show that

Madali not only intended to do away with
Agustin Reloj but also that the crime had been
premeditated. They satisfactorily prove that
Madali had formed a determination to commit
the crime prior to the moment of its execution;
that he had clung to his determination and that
there was sufficient interval of time between
the determination and the execution of the
crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 65
Moreover, after uttering those damaging
statements, Madali dragged Reloj towards his
gate. Annie then clubbed Reloj who, however,
succeeded in freeing himself from Madali's
hold. Reloj was running away when Madali
shot him, hitting him below the right hip. 66
Indeed, firing at his fleeing victim and
subsequently shooting to death two (2) other
persons on the same occasion, to our mind,
evince quite clearly the intent to kill being then
entertained by Madali.
There is likewise no doubt that Madali
committed murder when he shot Felix Gasang
twice in the body. Treachery qualified the
killing to murder punishable under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code. There was
treachery because of the suddenness of the
attack. Felix was raising his hands, 67 and
saying that he would not fight back when
Madali feloniously fired at him twice. Annie
Madali's uttering "Here comes another" before
Madali shot Felix may not be considered
sufficient warning so as to rule out
suddenness of the attack. 68 However, no
generic aggravating circumstance has been
sufficiency proven.
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
We agree with the trial court that with respect
to the killing of Cipriano Gasang and the
wounding of Merlinda Gasang, the crime
committed was the complex crime of murder
with frustrated murder inasmuch as a single
shot hit them both. 69 It is immaterial that
Merlinda Gasang was wounded on the leg
and not on a vital part of her body. What is of
primordial consideration is the fact that the
criminal act which killed Cipriano also caused
Merlinda's injury. 70 As in the kiling of Felix,
treachery qualified the killing of Cipriano to
murder because of the suddenness of the
attack.
Annie Mortel Madali's defense strategy is to
deny participation in the commission of the
crimes and to interpose an alibi. She insists
that like any other wife, her natural reaction to
situations which involve risk is "to stay away,
meditate and to shout and warn her husband
of the intruders rushing towards him. 71 She
bewails the fact that the prosecution has
pictured her as "a brave, pugnacious and
aggressive wife like the heroine of the pre-war
movie "Annie of the Indies". 72 Indeed, Annie's
role in the commission of the crimes may
appear to be straight out of an action picture
were it not for the fact that her denials and
uncorroborated alibi cannot stand against the
categorical declarations of prosecution
eyewitnesses Agustin Reloj and Merlinda
Gasang on her participation therein. 73 She
should have presented witnesses to support
her story. As she herself admitted, she and
her husband were not alone in their house
when they were allegedly stoned. Six of their
children were home then. 74Some of them
must have been within the age of discernment
inasmuch as their eldest child was 21 years
P a g e | 45
old and therefore, any one of them could have
corroborated her story.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that proof
beyond reasonable doubt has not been
established as to the existence of conspiracy
between the Madali spouses. While direct
proof is not essential to prove conspiracy as it
may be shown by acts and circumstances
from which may logically be inferred the
existence of a common design among the
accused to commit the offense(s) charged, the
evidence to prove the same must be positive
and convincing considering that conspiracy is
a facile devise by which an accused may be
ensnared and kept within the penal
fold. 75 With this and the principle that in
criminal prosecution, doubts must be resolved
in favor of the accused, as guides, the Court
rules that the liability of Annie Mortel Madali
with respect to the crimes committed herein, is
only that of an accomplice. i•t•c-aüsl
Annie's participation in the shooting of the
victims consisted of beaming her flashlight at
them and warning her husband of the
presence of other persons in the vicinity. By
beaming her flashlight at a victim, Annie
assisted her husband in taking a good aim.
However, such assistance merely facilitated
the commission of the felonious acts of
shooting. Considering that, according to both
of the Madali spouses, "it was not so dark nor
too bright 76 that night or that "brightness and
darkness were equally of the same
intensity. 77 Ricarte Madali could have
nevertheless accomplished his criminal acts
without Annie's cooperation and assistance.

Neither may Annie's shouts of "here comes,
here comes another, shoot" be considered as
having incited Ricarte to fire at the victims to
make Annie a principal by inducement. There
is no proof that those inciting words had great
dominance and influence over Madali as to
become the determining cause of the
crimes. 78 The rapidity with which Madali
admittedly fired the shots 79 eliminated the
necessity of encouraging words such as those
uttered by Annie.
The fact that Annie dealt a blow on Agustin
while he was being dragged by Madali to their
yard does not make her a principal by direct
participation. Annie's act, being previous to
Madali's act of shooting Agustin, was actually
not indispensable to the crime committed
against Agustin. 80
Proof of motive is unnecessary where there is
a clear identification of the accused. 81 More so
in this case where the principal accused does
not deny having fired the fatal shots. But the
Madali spouses must have harbored a deep
resentment against the Gasang family to put
into action Madali's threat of "sowing bullets"
on them. What makes Madali's crimes even
more reprehensible is the fact that he claims
to have committed them in the pursuit of his
task as a peace officer. He even went to the
extent of wearing his fatigue jacket and
trousers to create a facade of performance of
an official function. Sadly, he misused his
authority and his wife, harboring an improper
sense of connubial cooperation, did not even
try to dissuade him.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty for a complex crime shall be the
ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
maximum period of the penalty for the most
serious crime. The death penalty being the
maximum period of the penalty for murder
of reclusion temporal maximum to death
under Article 248 of the same Code, the death
penalty should be imposed for the complex
crime of murder with frustrated murder
considering that under Article 63, an
indivisible penalty cannot be affected by the
presence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance. It should be noted that under
the ruling in People v. Muñoz, L-38968-70,
February 9, 1989, Article III, Section 19(1) of
the 1987 Constitution does not change the
period of the penalty for murder except only
insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty and reduces it to reclusion
perpetua. Hence, the lower court correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on
Ricarte Madali for said complex crime.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender which was proven but not
appreciated in favor of Ricarte Madali by the
trial court, should be considered in imposing
on him the penalty for the murder of Felix
Gasang. The presence of this mitigating
circumstance without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same justified the
imposition of the minimum period of the
penalty for murder pursuant to Article 64(2) of
the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the
proper penalty should be the indeterminate
sentence of not less than ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum and
not more than twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum. 82
The same mitigating circumstance should be
considered in the imposition of the penalty on
P a g e | 46
Ricarte Madali for the crime of frustrated
murder committed against Agustin Reloj. The
penalty for frustrated murder in accordance
with Article 50 in relation to Article 248
is prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Taking into consideration the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
penalty imposed on Ricarte Madali is four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to 12
years of prision mayor as maximum.
As an accomplice, Annie Mortel Madali should
be imposed the penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felonies. 83 For the complex
crime of murder and frustrated murder, like
her husband, she shall be imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, 84 considering
that the penalty prescribed by law for Ricarte
Madali is the death penalty. For the murder of
Felix Gasang, the penalty imposable on her
is prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium, 85 and there being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the
penalty should be reclusion
temporal minimum. 86 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Annie Mortel
Madali should therefore be meted the penalty
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum. For the crime of frustrated murder
committed against Agustin Reloj, Annie Mortel
Madali shall be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum.
 P a g e | 47

Ricarte Madali and Annie Mortel Madali shall

also be liable to the heirs of Cipriano and Felix
Gasang for indemnity in the total amount of
sixty thousand pesos (P60,000) in the
proportion of 2:1 (2 shares for Ricarte Madali
as principal and 1 share for Annie Mortel
Madali as accomplice), with each accused-
appellant being subsidiarily liable for the other
in case of insolvency. The Court sees no
reason to disturb the lower court's findings on
the reimbursement of hospitalization and
medical expenses in favor of Merlinda Gasang
and Agustin Reloj as well as the award of
damages, except to clarify that payment
thereof shall likewise be in the proportion of
2:1 as above stated and with each accused
being subsidiarily liable for the other in case of
insolvency.

WHEREFORE, except as hereinabove

modified, the decision of the lower court is
hereby affirmed. Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

ARATICLE 17 PRINCIPALS