LABAGALA vs.

SANTIAGO

FACTS:

Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land in Manila. However, his

sisters sued him for recovery of 2/3 share of the land alleging that
he had fraudulently registered it in his name. The trial court
decided in favor of his sisters.

Jose died intestate. His sisters then filed a complaint before the
RTC for recovery of the 1/3 portion of said property which was in
the possession of Ida C. Labagala (who claimed to be Ida C.
Santiago, the daughter of Jose).

The trial court ruled in favor of Labagala. According to the trial

court, the said deed constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were
not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the
property as Jose's daughter.

When appealed, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of

the trial court. It took into account that Ida was born of different
parents, as indicated her birth certificate.

ISSUES:

1. WON respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this

action for recovery of title and possession.

2. WON petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property

he co-owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or
donation.

HELD:

The Court AFFIRMED the decision of the CA.

On Issue No. 1

Yes.

Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child,

to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife.
However, the present respondents are asserting not merely that
petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a
child of Jose at all.

A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof

of filiation. Use of a family name certainly does not establish
pedigree. Thus, she cannot inherit from him through intestate
succession.

On Issue No. 2

No.

The Court ruled that there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not
have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to
petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could
not have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the
time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential
requisites of a contract, including one of sale, absent which there
can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not
pay any centavo for the property which makes the sale void. Article
1471 of the Civil Code provides that if the price is simulated, the
sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a
donation, or some other act or contract.

Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation.

Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid
donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725
of the Civil Code. Being a minor, the acceptance of the donation
should have been made by her father or mother or her legal
representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of
those mentioned in the law accepted the donation for Ida.

Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v Mijares

410 SCRA 97 (2003)

FACTS:

 Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960 but had been

separated de facto since 1974.
 In 1984, Ignacia learned that Vicente sold a property (lot) to
spouses Mijares for P40,000 on 1983.
 She also found out that Vicente misrepresented her in the
MTC declaring that she died on March 22, 1982 and that the
heirs left are him and the 5 minor children.
 On September 1983, the court granted guardianship over the
minor children to Vicente and authorized the latter to sell the
estate of Ignacia on October 1983.
 On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter
to respondent spouses demanding the return of her ½ share
in the lot.
 Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed on June 4,
1996 a complaint for annulment of sale against respondent
spouses.
 In their answer, respondent spouses claimed that they are
purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid because
it was duly approved by the court.
 Vicente Reyes, on the other hand, contended that what he
sold to the spouses was only his share.
 On February 15, 1990, the court a quo rendered a decision
declaring the sale of lot void with respect to the share of
Ignacia. It held that the purchase price of the lot was
P110,000.00 and ordered Vicente to return ½ thereof or
P55,000.00 to respondent spouses.
 Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the decision praying
that the sale be declared void in its entirety and that the
respondents be ordered to reimburse to her the rentals they
 collected on the apartments built on Lot No. 4349-B-2
computed from March 1, 1983.
 Both Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and respondent spouses appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal,
Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale is valid, void or merely voidable?

HELD:

Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, the governing laws at the
time the assailed sale was contracted, provide:

Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos

mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined
in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s
consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the
court may compel her to grant the same…

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years
from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment
of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent,
when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this
right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.

In the case at bar, it is clear that the lot is a conjugal property of

Ignacia and Vicente. Therefore, the sale of said lot to the Mijares
spouses, without the knowledge and consent of Ignacia Reyes, is
voidable. The action to annul the sale made on 1983 was filed on
1986 which is within the prescriptive period under Article 173.
The Court finds that respondent spouses are not purchasers in
good faith. They already know about the discrepancies and
irregularities in the death certificate presented by Vicente. The said
errors should have prompted them to question the sale and
pertaining documents.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Deed of Sale
executed by Vicente and respondents was annulled. The guilty
husband is asked to pay damages to Mijares spouses and to his
children (petitioners).

ABALOS vs MACATANGAY

FACTS: Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered

owners of a parcel of land with improvements. Arturo made a
Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Macatangay,
binding himself to sell to latter the subject property and not to offer
the same to any other party within 30 days from date. Full payment
would also be eected as soon as possession of the property shall
have been turned over to Macatangay. Macatangay gave an
earnest money amounting to P5,000.00 to be deducted from the
purchase price of P1,300,000.00 in favor of the spouses.

Subsequently, Arturo and Esther had a marital squabble brewing

at that time and Macatangay, to protect his interest, made an
annotation in the title of the property. He then sent a letter
informing them of his readiness to pay the full amount of the
purchase price. Esther, through her SPA, executed in favor of
Macatangay, a Contract to sell the property to the extent of her
conjugal interest for the sum of P650,000 less the sum already
received by her and Arturo. She agreed to surrender the property
to Macatangay within 20 days along with the deed of absolute sale
upon full payment, while he promised to pay the balance of the
purchase price for P1, 290,000.00 after being placed in possession
of the property. Macatangay informed them that he was ready to
pay the amount in full. The couple failed to deliver the property so
he sued the spouses.

RTC dismissed the complaint, because the SPA could not have
authorized Arturo to sell the property to Macatangay as it was
falsified. CA reversed the decision, ruling the SPA in favor of Arturo,
assuming it was void, cannot affect the transaction between Esther
and Macatangay. On the other hand, the CA considered the RMOA
executed by Arturo valid to effect the sale of his conjugal share in
the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of property is valid.

RULING:

No. Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the
effectivity of the Family Code. There being no indication that they
have adopted a different property regime, their property relations
would automatically be governed by the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. The subject land which had been admittedly
acquired during the marriage of the spouses forms part of their
conjugal partnership.

Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the

conjugal partnership. This right is clearly granted to him by law.
More, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not
entitled as of right to joint administration.

The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator

of the conjugal partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s
consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any property
belonging to the conjugal partnership without the conformity of the
husband. The law is explicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husband’s consent, except in cases
provided by law.

More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of

the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the
conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes
neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title
until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result
of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is
limited to the net remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber
ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the aairs of the
partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or
wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and it is finally determined that, after settlement of
conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided
between the spouses or their respective heirs.

The Family Code has introduced some changes particularly on the

aspect of the administration of the conjugal partnership. The new
law provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is
now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In the event
that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of
administration does not include the power to dispose or encumber
property belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances,
the present law specially requires the written consent of the other
spouse, or authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance
of conjugal partnership property without which, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.

Inescapably, herein Arturo’s action for specic performance must

fail. Even on the supposition that the parties only disposed of their
respective shares in the property, the sale, assuming that it exists,
is still void for as previously stated, the right of the husband or the
wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non
habet. No one can give what he has not.