GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICES, INC. (INPORT), petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and JOSE L. BACALSO,

Facts:

Bacalso was employed as an admeasure by Gold City and was suspected by the management for
undermeasuring the cargo. Two other admeasurer were sent to re-measure pallets of banana already
measured by Bacalso. The report indicated that Bacalso under measured the bananas. Feeling insulted,
Bacalso confronted and quaralled with the two admeasurers in the office of Chied Admeasurer Guanco.
They were ordered to stop fighting,but this was ignored and a fistfight insued

Balasco was charged with charged with assaulting a co-employee and falsifying reports and records of
the company relative to the performance of his duties. He was placed in preventive suspension. But
when Balasco received the notice of termination , it is based upon the grounds of assaulting a co-
employee and of insubordination

Bacalso alleged that he was apprised of the charge of insubordination only in his notice of termination,
and that he was thereby denied an opportunity to be heard on this charge before being dismissed.

Gold City argued that insubordination or disrespect towards a superior officer is punishable by dismissal
under the Schedule of disciplinary sanctions and norms of conduct, incorporated in the existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") with the union.

Issues:

1 whether private respondent was denied due process in the course of his dismissal; and

2 whether every case of insubordination or wilful disobedience by an employee of a lawful work-

connected order of the employer or its representative is reasonably penalized with dismissal

Held:

1) No. The purpose of the requirement of notice is obviously to enable the employee to defend himself
against the charge preferred against him by presenting and substantiating his version of the facts. Since
Gold City here in effect charged private respondent with a second offense other than falsification of
company records, it was incumbent upon petitioner employer to have given private respondent
additional time and opportunity to meet the new charge against him of insubordination. Gold City failed
to do that here. In so failing, Gold City failed to accord to private respondent the full measure of his right
to procedural due process.

2) No. We believe and so hold that private respondent's act constituted wilful disobedience to a lawful
order of petitioner's representative obviously connected with private respondent's work.

It does not follow, however, that private respondent Bacalso's services were lawfully terminated either
under Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code or under the CBA Schedule of penalties. We believe that not
every case of insubordination or wilful disobedience by an employee of a lawful work-connected order
of the employer or its representative is reasonably penalized with dismissal. For one thing, Article 282
(a) refers to "serious misconduct or wilful disobedience". There must be reasonable proportionality
between, on the one hand, the wilful disobedience by the employee and, on the other hand, the penalty
imposed therefor.

Considering that private respondent Bacalso's unruly temper did not become an effective threat to his
co-workers or the safety of the customers dealing with his employer, or to the goodwill of his employer,
and considering further that he had been quite candid in admitting that he had been at fault as soon as
the investigation began in the company level, we agree with the NLRC that termination of his services
was a disproportionately heavy penalty. We believe that suspension without pay for three (3) months
would be an adequate penalty for the assault on a co-worker and act of insubordination that private
respondent Bacalso actually committed.

Chavez vs Bonto-Perez
June 23, 2011

Chavez is a dancer who was contracted by Centrum Placement & Promotions Corporation to
perform in Japan for 6 months. The contract was for $1.5k a month, which was approved by
POEA. After the approval of said contract, Chavez entered into a side contract reducing her
salary with her Japanese employer through her local manager-agency (Jaz Talents Promotion).
The salary was reduced to $500 and $750 was to go to Jaz Talents. In February 1991 (two years
after the expiration of her contract), Chavez sued Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents for
underpayment of wages before the POEA.

The POEA ruled against her. POEA stated that the side agreement entered into by Chavez with
her Japanese employer superseded the Standard Employment Contract; that POEA had no
knowledge of such side agreement being entered into; that Chavez is barred by laches for
sleeping on her right for two years.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chavez is entitled to relief.

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that the managerial commission agreement executed by Chavez to
authorize her Japanese Employer to deduct her salary is void because it is against our existing
laws, morals and public policy. It cannot supersede the standard employment contract approved
by the POEA with the following stipulation appended thereto:

It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are in conformance
with the Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the POEA under Memorandum
Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes made in any part of this contract without prior
approval by the POEA shall be null and void;
The side agreement which reduced Chavez’s basic wage is null and void for violating the
POEA’s minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by the POEA. Here,
both Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents are solidarily liable.

Laches does not apply in the case at bar. In this case, Chavez filed her claim well within the
three-year prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor
Code. For this reason, laches is not applicable.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D.
SACO, respondents.

Facts:

The petitioner challenge the decision of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration POEA
on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case of Vitaliano Saco as he
was not an overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident
in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797
and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued
that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and
should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed
jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the
complainant.

The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the
Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered
overseas workers.

Moreover, the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative
of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been
given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not
subject to delegation.

Issues:
Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 has violated the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power.

Discussions:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power:

1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to
do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who
is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Rulings:

No. There was no principles violated. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly
provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. … “The governing Board of the
Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the
law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions
of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by “filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping vs NLRC and Rances
Pacific Asia is an overseas employment agency that provided Rances work abroad. Rances was
engaged by Gulf-East Ship Management a Radio Operator but due to insubordination he was
dismissed our months later. According to Rances he sued Gulf-East in Dubai and the Gulf-East
compromised with him that instead of paying him $9k+ they’ll just pay him $5.5k plus his fare
going home to the Philippines plus if in case Rances’ wife does not agree with the amount of the
allowance being sent to her via Pacific Asia, Rances is entitled to have $1.5k more from pacific
Asia.

Back in the Philippines, Rances was sued by Pacific Asia for acts unbecoming of a marine
officer (due in part to his insubordination to Pacific Asia’s client). Rances filed a counterclaim
for the $1.5k as his wife did not agree with the monthly allowance sent by Pacific Asia to her.
POEA ruled in favor of Pacific Asia but did not rule on Rances’ counterclaim. Rances then filed
a separate case for his $1.5k claim. Rances produced the original copy of the Dubai court
decision awarding him the compromised amount of $5.5k. The said court decision was in Arabic
but it came with an English translation. It also came with a certification from a certain Mohd Bin
Saleh who was purportedly an Honorary Consul for the Philippines. This time he won.

Pacific Asia appealed but its appeal was one day late after the reglementary period. POEA
denied the appeal. NLRC likewise denied the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pacific Asia can be allowed to appeal.

HELD: Yes. The delay was due to an excusable mistake. Apparently, there was a mistake in the
filing of the appeal when the new messenger honestly thought that the appeal was supposed to be
filed in NLRC Intramuros but actually it was supposed to be in POEA Ortigas (that happened to
be the last day as well, and when he was advised to go to Ortigas, offices were already closed).

Also, on the merits; POEA has no jurisdiction to enforce foreign judgments. It’s the regular
courts that have jurisdiction. The POEA is not a court; it is an administrative agency exercising,
inter alia, adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. Further, Rances is not suing on the strength of
an employer-employee relationship between him and Gulf-East, but rather on the strength of a
foreign judgment.

And, even if the POEA has jurisdiction over the matter, it cannot take in evidence the alleged
original copy o the court decision from Dubai as it was not properly authenticated pursuant to the
Rules of Court (Sect 25, 26 Rule 132). The translation was also not duly authenticated. And an
honorary consul is not authorized to make authentication of foreign public records.

DUMEZ COMPANY VS NLRC – SKIP

MCKENZIE VS CUI – SKIP

CATAN VS NLRC

GR. NO. 77279

APRIL 15, 1988
FACTS: The Petitioner, a duly licensed recruitment agency, as agent of Ali and Fahd Shabokshi
Group, a
Saudi Arabian firm, recruited private respondent to work in Saudi Arabia as a steel man. The
contract was
automatically renewed when private respondent was not repatriated by his Saudi employer but
instead
was assigned to work as a crusher plant operator. On March 30, 1983, while he was working as a
crusher
plant operator, private respondent's right ankle was crushed under the machine he was operating.
On
September 9, 1983, he returned to Saudi Arabia to resume his work. On May 15,1984, he was
repatriated. Upon his return, he had his ankle treated for which he incurred further expenses.
ISSUE: WON this was grounds for cancellation or suspension of license or authority of M. S.
Catan
Placement Agency.
HELD: Yes, Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or
foreign-
based employer for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of
employment.
[Section 10(a) (2) Rule V, Book I, Rules to Implement the Labor Code. The Court ruled that a
recruitment
agency was solidarily liable for the unpaid salaries of a worker it recruited for employment in
Saudi
Arabia. Even if indeed petitioner and the Saudi principal had already severed their agency
agreement at
the time private respondent was injured, petitioner may still be sued for a violation of the
employment
contract because no notice of the agency agreement's termination was given to the private
respondent.

ORIENT EXPRESS PLACEMENT PHILIPPINES vs NLRC

FACTS
ANTONIO F. FLORES was hired as crane operator by ORIENT EXPRESS PLACEMENT
PHILIPPINES for 1 year, subject to a 3-month probationary period. However, after 1
month and 5 days in Saudi Arabia, Flores was repatriated to the Philippines.
Consequently, he filed a complaint with the POEA for having been terminated from work
for no valid reason. ORIENT EXPRESS and NADRICO countered that Flores was
terminated for poor job performance.

On 7/14/1992, POEA rendered a decision in favor of complainant. It was observed that

neither ORIENT EXPRESS nor NADRICO pointed out the reasonable standards of work
required of Flores by which his incompetency was adjudged; much less did they specify
how the latter failed to live up to such reasonable standards. Hence, his dismissal was
unwarranted.

On appeal, NLRC affirmed the POEA decision. In addition, it ruled that the designation
of Flores as floorman instead of crane operator for which he was hired violated his
employment contract. The NLRC concluded that since Flores never worked as crane
operator, his foreign employer could not have observed and assessed his performance
as such and then come up with a performance evaluation sheet, especially considering
his consistent claim that he was made to work as floorman instead. Subsequent motion
for reconsideration filed by ORIENT EXPRESS and NADRICO was denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE
WON the dismissal of FLORES is valid

RULING
Under Art. 281 of the Labor Code, the services of an employee hired on a probationary
basis may be terminated when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance
with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the
time of his engagement. However, the Court cannot sustain his dismissal on this ground
because petitioner failed to specify the reasonable standards by which private
respondent's alleged poor performance was evaluated, much less to prove that
such standards were made known to him at the time of his recruitment in Manila.
Both private respondent's Agency-Worker Agreement with ORIENT EXPRESS and
NADRICO never mentioned that:
 He must first take and pass a Crane Operators' License Examination in Saudi
Arabia before he would be allowed to even touch a crane
 He would be assigned as floorman pending release of the results of the
examination or in the event that he failed;
 He would be subjected to a performance evaluation by his superior 1 month after
his hiring to determine whether the company was amenable to continuing with his
employment.
Hence, respondent Flores could not be faulted for precisely harboring the impression that
he was hired as crane operator for a definite period of 1 year to commence upon his
arrival at the work-site and to terminate at the end of 1 year. No other condition was
laid out except that he was to be on probation for 3 months. No standard
whatsoever by which such probationary period could be hurdled was specified and
made known to him.
Due process dictates that an employee be apprised beforehand of the condition of his
employment and of the terms of advancement therein. Precisely, implicit in Art. 281 of
the Code is the requirement that reasonable standards be previously made known by
the employer to the probationary employee at the time of his engagement, such an
essential requirement was not met by petitioner, even assuming that Flores' alleged
unsatisfactory performance was true. Besides, unsatisfactory performance is not one of
the just causes for dismissal under the Labor Code.

HERMOGENES VS OSCO – SKIP

INTER-ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., SEA HORSE SHIP, INC. and

TRENDA WORLD SHIPPING (MANILA), INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RIZALINO D. TAYONG,
respondents.

facts

On 16 July 1989, while at the Port of Hongkong and in the process of unloading cargo,
Captain Tayong received a weather report that a storm code-named "Gordon" would
shortly hit Hongkong. Precautionary measures were taken to secure the safety of the
vessel, as well as its crew.

On 21 July 1989, Captain Tayong followed-up the requisition by the former captain
of the Oceanic Mindoro for supplies of oxygen and acetylene, necessary for the
welding-repair of the vessel’s leaking turbo-charger and the economizer.

While the vessel was en route from Hongkong to Singapore, Captain Tayong reported
that the vessel had stopped in mid-ocean for six (6) hours and forty-five (45) minutes
due to a leaking economizer. He was instructed to shut down the economizer and use
the auxiliary boiler instead. 4

When the vessel arrived at the port of Singapore, the Chief Engineer reminded
Captain Tayong that the oxygen and acetylene supplies had not been delivered.

Captain Tayong called the shipowner, Sea Horse Ship Management, Ltd., in London
and informed them that the departure of the vessel for South Africa may be affected
because of the delay in the delivery of the supplies. 8

He was advised to contact Mr. Clark, the Technical Director, for a solution for the
supply of said oxygen and acetylene. 9

Mr. Clark responded that by shutting off the water to the turbo chargers and using
the auxiliary boiler, there should be no further problems.

Captain Tayong, however, communicated to Sea Horse his reservations regarding

proceeding to South Africa without the requested supplies, and was advised to wait
for the supplies. On August 1, 1989, the supplies were delivered and they
immediately sailed for Richard Bay.

When the vessel arrived at the port of Richard Bay, South Africa on August 16, 1989,
Captain Tayong was instructed to turn-over his post to the new captain. He was
thereafter repatriated to the Philippines, without being informed of the charges
against him.

The POEA dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Captain Tayong,
holding that there was valid cause for his untimely repatriation.

The NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the POEA and directed petitioners
to pay the Captain (a) his salary for the unexpired portion of the contract at
US$1,900.00 a month, plus one (1) month leave benefit; and (b) attorney's fees
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award due.

Issue:

Whether or not Capt. Tayong’s refusal to sail from Singapore to South Africa without
the supply of said oxygen and acetylene was an actual and sufficient basis for the
alleged loss of trust or confidence on the part of the petitioner?

Ruling

A master or captain, for purposes of maritime commerce, is one who has command
of a vessel. A captain commonly performs three (3) distinct roles: (1) he is a general
agent of the shipowner; (2) he is also commander and technical director of the vessel;
and (3) he is a representative of the country under whose flag he navigates. 16 Of
these roles, by far the most important is the role performed by the captain as
commander of the vessel; for such role (which, to our mind, is analogous to that of
"Chief Executive Officer" [CEO] of a present-day corporate enterprise) has to do with
the operation and preservation of the vessel during its voyage and the protection of
the passengers (if any) and crew and cargo.

It is a basic principle of admiralty law that in navigating a merchantman, the master

must be left free to exercise his own best judgment. The requirements of safe
navigation compel us to reject any suggestion that the judgment and discretion of
the captain of a vessel may be confined within a straitjacket, even in this age of
electronic communications. 22 Indeed, if the ship captain is convinced, as a reasonably
prudent and competent mariner acting in good faith that the shipowner's or ship
agent's instructions (insisted upon by radio or telefax from their offices thousands of
miles away) will result, in the very specific circumstances facing him, in imposing
unacceptable risks of loss or serious danger to ship or crew, he cannot casually seek
absolution from his responsibility, if a marine casualty occurs, in such instructions. 23

The critical question, therefore, is whether or not Captain Tayong had reasonable
grounds to believe that the safety of the vessel and the crew under his command or
the possibility of substantial delay at sea required him to wait for the delivery of the
supplies needed for the repair of the turbo-charger and the economizer before
embarking on the long voyage.

Under all the circumstances of this case, we, along with the NLRC, are unable to hold
that Captain Tayong's decision (arrived at after consultation with the vessel's Chief
Engineer) to wait seven (7) hours in Singapore for the delivery on board the Oceanic
Mindoro of the requisitioned supplies needed for the welding-repair, on board the
ship, of the turbo-charger and the economizer equipment of the vessel, constituted
merely arbitrary, capricious or grossly insubordinate behavior on his part.