FIRST DIVISION The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act

[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000] was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in
1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he
was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two
counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171.
Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners
bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security
Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from
legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country.
Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC
judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered
by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal cases were filed in court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance
to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its
controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name
of official duty.[3] The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official
functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in
bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. [4] It appears that even the
government’s chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by
petitioner and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming
petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in
the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.[5] As already mentioned
above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to
say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC
such as the one at bar.[6] Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be
invoked only when specifically granted by law.[7] The rule on criminal procedure is clear that
no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
MeTC.[8] Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the courts
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective.[9]

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person is
covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In SO ORDERED.
receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases
without notice to the prosecution, the latters right to due process was violated. It should be Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.2
noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The
needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances
requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper
time.[1] At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does
not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.[2]

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides: Jksm

"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article
experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the
following privileges and immunities:
a.).......immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed
by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the
immunity."
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the
testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the
circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other
evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We
think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the
evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any
doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to
be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc
Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as
a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40
meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers'
mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a
small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch
running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part
of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and
height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the
door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the
door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like
the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other
openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for
the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He
sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced
by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his
way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room
was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped
to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was
struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door.
In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the
person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the
light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by
the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it
afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell
down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who
immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called
to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident
just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as
cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife
under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly
and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either
returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity.
Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends,
Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the
nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and
Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No.
27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for
assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally
wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants
Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he
did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of
their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself,
unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate,
and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or
say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military
hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the
trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years
and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual
Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act,
in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:
 (1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle
to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if
the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or
"ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would
doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his
threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned
that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief
advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in
using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking
promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first
blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That
neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real
danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful
aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and
resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person
or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held
criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he
would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but
which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the
true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think
there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no
criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due
to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the
offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent)
"cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where
the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal
negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act
committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.
(Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases
cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596;
Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7
Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question
worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or
ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal
Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other
crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts
constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in
order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the
various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears
that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of
the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of
legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out
in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent
is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of
the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential
requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions
modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts
negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime
or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to
commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real,
for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits
supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s.
313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and
a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of
the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which
the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in
proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the
crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own
nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise
stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same
whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless
the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal
liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he
had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as
used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and
roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can
be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia,"
which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but
omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code
was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal,
vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to
exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done
was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless
admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in
general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have
shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there
is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that
under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within
the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example
in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice
which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury
which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that,
whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant
in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of
the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission
punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following
language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or
their absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal,
is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision
of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential
element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from
an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice,
would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it
shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple
imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their
discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the
crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in
which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may
consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal
intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts
contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and
imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in
meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of
criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more
than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little
further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an
evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a
statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable
grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it
means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In
English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and
"malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or
willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being
understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying
rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428
and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the
definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice
aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent,
we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare
exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an
act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases,
thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as
to the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a
thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a
criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words,
punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither
in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in
any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is
therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the
essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find
this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct
on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention
were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against
my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal
jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
 Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the
intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the
happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may,
we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we
hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its
jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every
guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the
public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors
does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man,
no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind,
destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a
punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil
mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself
spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the
appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is
credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to
all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that
no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this
doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia
juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not
be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the
courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the
doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of
the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say
that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the
commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and
beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158,
notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not
to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the
mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it
is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec.
300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore,
requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of
abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or
mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's
Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of
fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind
necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or
negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must
depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387;
P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509;
Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207,
209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he
honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake
was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be
expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or otherwise, upon which he
acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord
with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he
does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the
facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other
words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious
authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication,
that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man
undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him.
If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself
correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish
him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the
extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases
there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule
is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road,
"holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or
his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that
the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent
danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the
slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly
exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took
the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or
assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent
is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination)
overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the
"act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a
felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it
should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it
will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of
caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in
Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his
life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who
has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is
discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder
only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man
say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the
pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must,
before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a
doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And
when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are
to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed
to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a
few of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in
the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night,
in company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that
the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered
a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing
a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and
took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the
unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him
another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the
house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he
rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six
days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused,
who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-
law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the
occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted
in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the
Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an
illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists
rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with
articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of
imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he
was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering,
from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her
child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which
they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other
than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the
acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly
that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he
should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he
was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means
which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which
he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of
producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or
distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they
might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower
court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for
the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal
Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a
retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the
voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you
money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from
his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before
simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his
assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak,
for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and
not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the
place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this
homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga
did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said
article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the
attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison
mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this
sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable
mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were
rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night,
by a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the
window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his
money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in
an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found
dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal
responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law?
The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites
to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for
the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision
correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted
the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his
mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting
 in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877).
(I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that
the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault
he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed
to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented
themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal
intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-
defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly
exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have
been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as
to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger
which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed,
and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond
exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that,
according to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined
and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was
wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice or criminal
intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the
deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on
the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant
therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to
enter said room, without any justifiable motive.

By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the
accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision
correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an
indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby
reversing the judgment appealed from.
 G.R. No. L-38511 October 6, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y RAMONES (alias FRANCISCO CAGURO, alias FRANCISCO
ADMONES, aliasBUCOY, alias FRISCO GUY), defendant-appellant.
VICKERS, J.:
The accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime
of asesinato, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of July, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any
just cause therefor and with intent to kill and treachery, assault and attack one Yu
Lon by suddenly giving him a fist blow on the back part of the head, under
conditions which intended directly and especially to insure, the accomplishment of
his purpose without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim Yu Lon might
make, thus causing him to fall on the ground as a consequence of which he suffered
a lacerated wound on the scalp and a fissured fracture on the left occipital region,
which were necessarily mortal and which caused the immediate death of the said Yu
Lon.
After hearing the evidence, Judge Luis P. Torres found the defendant guilty as charged, and
sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Yu Lon in the sum of P1,000, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Appellant's attorney de oficio makes the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in finding that the appellant the person who committed the
assault on Yu Lon, the victim to the crime charged in the information.
2. Assuming that the appellant is the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon
(a fact which we specifically deny), the trial court erred in finding that the appellant
struck his supposed victim.
3. Assuming that the appellant is the person who committed the assault on Yu Lon,
and that the appellant did strike his supposed victim (facts which we specifically
deny) the trial court erred in finding that the blow was dealt from the victim's rear.
4. The trial court erred in finding that the identity of the appellant was fully
established.
5. Assuming that the four preceding errors assigned are without merit, the trial
court erred in convicting the appellant of the crime of murder, under article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, instead of convicting him of the crime of maltreatment,
under article 266 of the said Code.
It appears from the evidence that about 8:30 on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu
Yee, father and son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk at the corner of Mestizos and San
Fernando Streets in the District of San Nicolas Yu Lon was standing near the outer edge of
the sidewalk, with his back to the street. While they were talking, a man passed back and
forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu Yee was about to take leave of his father,
the man that had been passing back the forth behind Yu Lon approached him from behind
and suddenly and without warning struck him with his fist on the back part of the head. Yu
Lon tottered and fell backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the lower part of his
body fell on the sidewalk. His assailants immediately ran away. Yu Yee pursued him through
San Fernando, Camba, and Jaboneros Streets, and then lost sight of him. Two other
Chinese, Chin Sam and Yee Fung, who were walking along Calle Mestizos, saw the incident
and joined him in the pursuit of Yu Lon's assailant. The wounded man was taken to the
Philippine General Hospital, were he died about midnight. A post-mortem examination was
made the next day by Dr. Anastacia Villegas, who found that the deceased had sustained a
lacerated wound and fracture of the skull in the occipital region, and that he had died from
cerebral hemorrhage; that he had tuberculosis, though not in an advanced stage, and a
tumor in the left kidney.
Yu Yee promptly reported the incident to the police, and about 3 o'clock the next morning
Sergeant Sol Cruz and other detectives, accompanied by Yu Yee, went to the scene of the
crime and found blood stains in the street. Yu Yee said that he could recognize his father's
assailant, and described him as being about five feet in height, 25 or 30 years old, with long
hair and wearing a suit of dark clothes. After Sergeant Sol Cruz had been working on the
case for three or four days he received information that the accused might be the person
that had assaulted Yu Lon, and on August 4th the accused was arrested by detectives
Manrique and Bustamante. He was wearing a dark wool suit. Yu Yee was immediately called
to the police station. The accused was placed near the middle of a line of some eleven
persons that had been detained for investigation. They were wearing different kinds of
clothes. Yu Yee without hesitation pointed out the defendant as the person that had
assaulted Yu Lon. He identified him not only by his long hair combed towards the back and
worn long on the sides in the form of side-whiskers (patillas), but also by his high cheek-
bones and the fact that his ears have no lobes. The defendant was identified at the trial not
only by Yu Yee, but also by Chin Sam and Yee Fung.
With respect to the first four assignment of error, which raise questions of fact as to the
identification of the accused, and whether or not be struck the deceased, and if he did
assault the deceased, whether he did so in a treacherous manner, we see no sufficient
reason, after considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, to doubt the correctness
of the findings of the trial judge. The accused was identified by Yu Yee and two other
Chinese, and although Yu Yee may have overstated at the trial some of the facial
peculiarities in the defendant that he claimed to have observed at the time of the incident, it
must be remembered that Yu Yee without hesitation picked the defendant out of a group of
eleven persons as his father's assailant, and that he had exceptional opportunities for
observing his father's assailant, because while that person was walking back and forth
behind Yu Lon, Yu Yee was facing the assailant.
We find the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses as to the whereabouts of the
defendant on the night in question unworthy of credit.1awphil.net
The testimony of the three Chinese that a man struck the deceased and then ran away is
corroborated by the testimony of a 15-year old boy, Dominador Sales.
As to the contention that the deceased would have fallen on his face if he had been struck
on the back of the head, the expert testimony shows that in such a case a person
instinctively makes an effort to preserve or regain his balance, and that as result thereof the
deceased may have fallen backwards. Another consideration is that sidewalks almost
invariably slope towards the pavement, and this being true, when the deceased
straightened up, he naturally tended to fall backwards. The evidence leaves no room for
doubt that the accused struck the deceased on the back of the head, because when the
deceased was assaulted he and Yu Yee were standing on the sidewalk, facing each other,
and if the accused had not struck the deceased on the back of the head, it would have been
necessary for him to go between the deceased and Yu Yee. Since the accused struck the
deceased from behind and without warning, he acted with treachery. "There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make." (Article 14, No. 16, of the Revised Penal Code.)
The fourth assignment of error is a repetition of the first.
In the fifth assignment of error it is contended that the appellant if guilty at all, should be
punished in accordance with article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, or for slight physical
injuries instead of murder.
Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provide that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended; but in order that a person may be criminally liable for
a felony different from that which he proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the two
following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a felony was committed; and (b) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by
the offender. U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil., 14 U.S. vs. Diana, 32
Phil., 344.)
In the Brobst case, supra, it was held that death may result from a blow over or near the
heart or in the abdominal region, notwithstanding the fact that the blow leaves no outward
mark of violence; that where death result as the direct consequence of the use of illegal
violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person
contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility; that
one is not relieved, under the law in these Islands, from criminal liability for the natural
consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to produce such
consequences; but that in such cases, the lack of intention, while it does not exempt from
criminal liability, is taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance. (U.S. vs.
Luciano, 2 Phil., 96.)
The reasoning of the decisions cited is applicable to the case at bar. There can be no
reasonable doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon. There is nothing to indicate that it
was due to some extraneous case. It was clearly the direct consequence of defendants
felonious act, and the fact that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury
does not relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act, but is merely a mitigating
circumstance (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil., 22).
The next question is whether the crime committed by the defendant should be classified as
homicide or murder. Can the defendant be convicted of murder when he did not intend to
kill the deceased?
We have seen that under the circumstances of this case the defendant is liable for the killing
of Yu Lon, because his death was the direct consequence of defendant's felonious act of
striking him on the head. If the defendant had not committed the assault in a treacherous
manner. he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although he did not intend to
kill the deceased; and since the defendant did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty
of murder, because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The Supreme Court of Spain has held that there is no incompatibility, moral or legal,
between alevosia and the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to cause so great
an injury:
Considering that there is no moral or legal incompatibility between treachery and
the mitigating circumstance No. 3 of article 9 of the Penal Code, because the former
depends upon the manner of execution of the crime and the latter upon the
tendency of the will towards a definite purpose, and therefore there is no obstacle,
in case treacherous means, modes or forms are employed, to the appreciation of
the first of said circumstances and simultaneously of the second if the injury
produced exceeds the limits intended by the accused; and for that reason it cannot
be held in the instant case that this mitigating circumstances excludes treachery, or
that the accused, being chargeable with the death of the offended party, should not
be liable due to the voluntary presence of treachery in the act perpetrated, although
with mitigation corresponding to the disparity between the act intended and the act
consummated, etc. (Decision of May 10, 1905, Gazette of April 20, 906; Viada: 5th
edition, Vol. 2, p. 156.)
In the case of the United States vs. Candelaria (2 Phil., 104), this court speaking through
Chief Justice Arellano said:
In trying Jacinto to a tree the three defendants acted treacherously (alevosamente).
Whether it was to prevent him from making resistance, whether it was to torture
him for the purpose of making him give information, or whether it was for the
purpose of inflicting further punishment, the fact is that by this means the
defendants secured themselves against any risk which might have arisen from an
attempt at self-defense on the part of the victim. We are of opinion that they had no
intention to cause so great an evil as that which resulted, but this does not
neutralize that other qualifying circumstance of the resulting death, because if there
was no alevosia for the purpose of killing there was alevosia for the purpose of the
illtreating. The means employed were not made use of for the precise purpose of
making certain the death of Jacinto de Jesus but as a safe means of illtreating him
without risk to the persons who were doing so. If by this means the ill treatment
was aggravated, it follows that it is a qualifying circumstances in the death which
resulted. It was not a condition of the purpose, but it was a condition of the criminal
act itself, in whatever sense this be taken.
The penalty of murder (article 248 of the Revised Penal Code) is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, and there being present in this case one mitigating and no
aggravating circumstance the prison sentence of the appellant is reduced to seventeen
years, four months, and one day of reclusion temporal. As thus modified, the decision
appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 75369. November 26, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO,
EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN and JUAN MACANDOG (at large), Defendants,
FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO and EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN, Defendants-
Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Cesar R. Canonizado, for Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; THROWS THE CASE OPEN FOR A COMPLETE REVIEW OF ALL
ERRORS AS MAY BE IMPUTABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT. — While the factual findings of the
trial court are generally given due respect by the appellate court, an appeal of a criminal
case throws it open for a complete review of all errors, by commission or omission, as may
be imputable to the trial court. (People v. Valerio, Jr., L-4116, February 25, 1982, 112 SCRA
208, 231) In this instance, the lower court erred in finding that the maceration of one half
of the head of the victim was also caused by Iligan for the evidence on record point to a
different conclusion. We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed, after Quiñones, Jr.
had fallen from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This
finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of
Quiñones, Jr.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY; REQUISITES THEREOF, PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR. —
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), (People v. Ural,
G.R. No. L-30801, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138, 144) the essential requisites of Article 4
are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by
the offender. (People v. Mananquil, L-35574, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 196, 207). We
hold that these requisites are present in this case.
3. ID.; ID.; PROXIMATE LEGAL CAUSE, DEFINED. — The intentional felony committed was
the hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial by
the physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside the point. What is material is that by the
instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was
meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was directed at a vital
and delicate part of the body: the head. (See: People v. Diana, 32 Phil. 344 [1915]). The
hacking incident happened on the national highway where vehicles are expected to pass any
moment. One such vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running
scared and having barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of
people. Quiñones, Jr., weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented
highway, was run over by a vehicle. Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan’s
hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head might not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate
cause of the latter’s death. Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (Urbano v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988, 157 SCRA 1 quoting Vda. De Bataclan v.
Medina, 102 Phil. 181). In other words, the sequence of events from Iligan’s assault on him
to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short span of
time between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan
cannot escape liability.
4. ID.; ALIBI; NOT CONSIDERED WHEN ACCUSED IS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY
WITNESSES. — We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide
in favor of Iligan because he was positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by
the prosecution witnesses. (People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 72400, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA
71).
5. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION,
WRONGLY APPRECIATED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — But we disagree with the lower court with
regards to its findings on the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by the lower court in view of the
suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiñones, Jr. Suddenness of such attack,
however, does not by itself show treachery. (People v. Gadiano, L-31818, July 30, 1982,
115 SCRA 559) There must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by
the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself.
(People v. Crisostomo, L-32243, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 47). In this case, the hacking of
Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a
warning to the deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants. The
group of Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks against
them. (People v. Mercado, L-33492, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 455). The requisites
necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in this case.
Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung
to their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time
between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act. (People v. Batas, G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2, 1989, 176 SCRA 46).
6. ID.; CONSPIRACY; NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONSTITUTED BY MERE KNOWLEDGE,
ACQUIESCENCE OR APPROVAL OF THE ACT WITHOUT COOPERATION OR AGREEMENT TO
COOPERATE NOR BY MERE PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME. — Absent any
qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide. Again, contrary to the
lower court’s finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established to hold
Edmundo Asis liable as Iligan’s co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active part in
the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiñones, Jr., which led to his running over by a
vehicle and consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was carrying a
stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated and coming
from an undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of Iligan, Edmundo Asis
must have known of the former’s criminal intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or
approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the act
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. (People v. Izon, 104 Phil.
690 [1958]) Such being the case, his mere presence at the scene of the crime did not make
him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault perpetrated by Iligan.
(Orobio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57519, September 13, 1988, 165 SCRA 316)
Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.
7. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; ABSENT ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE AND APPLYING
THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW. — There being no mitigating circumstance, the
penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium (Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal
Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that within the
range of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal medium as maximum. We find
insufficient proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for the victim’s unrealized income and
therefore, the same is disallowed.
DECISION
FERNAN, J.:
In this appeal, uncle and nephew, Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis, seek a reversal of the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II 1 convicting them
of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in the amounts of P30,000 for the latter’s
death and P256,960 representing the victim’s unrealized income.
On October 21, 1980, the following information for murder was filed against Fernando
Iligan, Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"That on or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, at sitio Lico II, barangay Sto. Domingo,
municipality of Vinzons, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one
another, with treachery and evident premeditation, one of the accused Fernando Iligan
armed with a bolo (sinampalok) and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, gang up and in a sudden unexpected manner, hacked Esmeraldo
Quiñones, Jr., on his face, thus causing fatal injuries on the latter’s face which resulted to
(sic) the death of said Esmeraldo Quiñones.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." cralaw virtua1aw library
Juan Macandog was never apprehended and he remains at large. At their arraignment on
January 12, 1981 Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Thereafter, the prosecution presented the following version of the commission of
the crime.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
At around 2:00 o’clock in the morning of August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. and his
companions, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo,
Vinzons, Camarines Norte after attending a barrio fiesta dance. In front of the ricemill of a
certain Almadrones, they met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew, Edmundo Asis, and
Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed ("winahi") them aside thereby prompting Zaldy Asis
to box him. 2 Felix Lukban quickly told the group of the accused that they had no desire to
fight. 3 Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew fall, drew from his back a bolo and hacked
Zaldy Asis but missed. Terrified, the trio ran pursued by the three accused. They ran for
about half an hour, passing by the house of Quiñones, Jr. They stopped running only upon
seeing that they were no longer being chased. After resting for a short while, Quiñones, Jr.
invited the two to accompany him to his house so that he could change to his working
clothes and report for work as a bus conductor. 4
While the trio were walking towards the house of Quiñones, Jr., the three accused suddenly
emerged on the roadside and without a word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiñones, Jr. with his
bolo hitting him on the forehead and causing him to fall down. 5 Horrified, Felix Lukban and
Zaldy Asis fled to a distance of 200 meters, but returned walking after they heard shouts of
people. Zaldy Asis specifically heard someone shout "May nadale na." 6
On the spot where Quiñones, Jr. was hacked, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban saw him already
dead with his head busted. 7 They helped the brother of Quiñones, Jr. in carrying him to
their house. 8
That same day, August 4, 1980, the body of Quiñones, Jr. was autopsied at the Funeraria
Belmonte in Labo, Camarines Norte by the municipal health officer, Dr. Marcelito E. Abas.
The postmortem examination report which is found at the back of the death certificate
reveals that Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., who was 21 years old when he died, sustained the
following injuries:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to multiple fracture of the entire half of
the frontal left, temporal, parietal and occipital bone of the head, with massive maceration
of the brain tissue.
"2. Other findings — Incised wound at the right eyebrow, medial aspect measuring about 4
cms. in length, 0.5 cm. in width and 0.5 cm. in depth, abrasion on the left shoulder and
right side of the neck." 9
The death certificate also indicates that Quiñones, Jr. died of "shock and massive cerebral
hemorrhages due to a vehicular accident."cralaw virtua1aw library
The defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They alleged that they were in their
respective houses at the time the crime was committed.chanrobles law library
Accused Fernando Iligan testified that at around midnight of August 4, 1980, he left his
house to fetch his visitors at the dance hall. 10 Along the way, he met his nephew,
Edmundo Asis, whom he presumed was drunk. He invited his nephew to accompany him to
the dance hall. However, they were not able to reach their destination because Edmundo
was boxed by somebody whom he (Edmundo) sideswiped. 11 Instead, Fernando Iligan
brought his nephew home. 12 On their way, they were overtaken by Juliano Mendoza whom
Fernando Iligan invited to his house to help him cook. 13 After bringing his nephew home,
Fernando Iligan and Juliano Mendoza proceeded to Iligan’s house and arrived there between
1:30 and 2:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day.
Edmundo Asis corroborated Iligan’s testimony. He testified that while they were walking in
front of the Almadrones ricemill, he sideswiped someone whom he did not recognize
because there were several persons around. He said, "Sorry, pare" but the person to whom
he addressed his apology boxed him on his left face. He fell down and Iligan helped him.
Later, Iligan accompanied him to his home in Lico II. 15 After Iligan and Juliano Mendoza
had left his house, he slept and woke up at 7:00 o’clock the following morning.
The defense made capital of the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Abas to the effect that
Quiñones, Jr. died because of a vehicular accident. In ruling out said theory, however, the
lower court, in its decision of May 7, 1986, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The accused, to augment their alibi, have pointed to this Court that the Certificate of Death
have shown that the victim’s death was caused by a vehicular accident. To this,
notwithstanding, the Court cannot give credit for some reasons. First, the fact of the alleged
vehicular accident has not been fully established. Second, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Sr., (the)
father of the victim, testified that Dr. Abas told him that if his son was hacked by a bolo on
the face and then run over the entire head by a vehicle’s tire, then that hacking on the face
could not be visibly seen on the head (t.s.n., pp. 16-17, October 13, 1981) Third, Exhibit ‘2’
(the photograph of the victim taken immediately after his body had been brought home) is
a hard evidence. It will attestly (sic) show that the entire head was not crushed by any
vehicle. On the contrary, it shows that only half of the face and head, was damaged with
the wound starting on a sharp edge horizontally. There are contusions and abrasions on the
upper left shoulder and on the neck while the body downwards has none of it, while on the
right forehead there is another wound caused by a sharp instrument. Therefore, it is simple,
that if the victim was run over by a vehicle, the other half portion of his head and downward
part of his body must have been likewise seriously damaged, which there are none." 17
The lower court also found that Iligan’s group conspired to kill anyone or all members of the
group of the victim to vindicate the boxing on the face of Edmundo Asis. It appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and accordingly
convicted Iligan and Edmundo Asis of the crime of murder and imposed on them the
aforementioned penalty.
Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed this appeal professing innocence of the crime for which
they were convicted. For the second time, they attributed Quiñones, Jr.’s death to a
vehicular accident.
No eyewitnesses were presented to prove that Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle. The
defense relies on the testimony of Dr. Abas, a prosecution witness, who swore that the
multiple fracture on the head of Quiñones, Jr. was caused by a vehicular accident 18 which
opinion was earlier put in writing by the same witness in the postmortem examination. Dr.
Abas justified his conclusion by what he considered as tire marks on the victim’s left
shoulder and the right side of his neck. 19 He also testified that the incised wound located
at the victim’s right eyebrow could have been caused by a sharp bolo but it was so
superficial that it could not have caused the victim’s death. 20
Circumstantial evidence on record indeed point to the veracity of the actual occurrence of
the vehicular mishap. One such evidence is the testimony of prosecution witness Zaldy Asis
that when he helped bring home the body of Quiñones, Jr., he told the victim’s father,
Esmeraldo Quiñones, Sr. that "before Esmeraldo Quiñones (Jr.) was run over by a vehicle,
he was hacked by Fernando Iligan." 21 When asked why he mentioned an automobile,
Zaldy Asis said that he did not notice any vehicle around but he mentioned it "because his
(Quiñones, Jr.) head was busted." 22 It is therefore not farfetched to conclude that Zaldy
Asis had actual knowledge of said accident but for understandable reasons he declined to
declare it in court. Defense witness Marciano Mago, the barangay captain of Sto. Domingo,
also testified that when he went to the scene of the crime, he saw bits of the brain of the
victim scattered across the road where he also saw tire marks. 23
For its part, the prosecution, through the victim’s father, presented evidence to the effect
that Iligan authored the maceration of half of the victim’s head. Quiñones, Sr. testified that
from their house, which was about five meters away from the road, he saw Fernando Iligan
holding a "sinampalok" as he, together with Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog, chased
someone. During the second time that he saw the three accused, he heard Iligan say, "Dali,
ayos na yan." 24 Hence, the lower court concluded that the victim’s head was "chopped"
resulting in the splattering of his brain all over the place. 25 It should be emphasized,
however, that the testimony came from a biased witness and it was uncorroborated.
While the factual findings of the trial court are generally given due respect by the appellate
court, an appeal of a criminal case throws it open for a complete review of all errors, by
commission or omission, as may be imputable to the trial court. 26 In this instance, the
lower court erred in finding that the maceration of one half of the head of the victim was
also caused by Iligan for the evidence on record point to a different conclusion. We are
convinced beyond peradventure that indeed, after Quiñones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-
hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not
in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quiñones, Jr.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), 27 the essential
requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that
the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony committed by the offender. 28 We hold that these requisites are present in this case.
The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan.
That it was considered as superficial by the physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside the
point. What is material is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the
location of the wound, the assault was meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do
away with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body: the head. 29
The hacking incident happened on the national highway 30 where vehicles are expected to
pass any moment. One such vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis,
running scared and having barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard
shouts of people. Quiñones, Jr., weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the
cemented highway, was run over by a vehicle.

Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head
might not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter’s death.
Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the
final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom." 31 In other words, the sequence of events from Iligan’s assault on him to
the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short span of time
between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot
escape liability.chanrobles law library
We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in favor of Iligan
because he was positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the prosecution
witnesses. 32
him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault perpetrated by Iligan.
38 Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.
There being no mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion
temporal medium (Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that within the range of prision mayor as minimum and
reclusion temporal medium as maximum. We find insufficient proof to warrant the award of
P256,960 for the victim’s unrealized income and therefore, the same is
disallowed.cralawnad
WHEREFORE, appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is hereby convicted of the crime of
homicide for which he is imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum and he shall indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo
Quiñones, Jr. in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). Appellant Edmundo Asis is
hereby acquitted of the crime charged against him. Costs against appellant Iligan.
SO ORDERED.

But we disagree with the lower court with regards to its findings on the aggravating Gutierrez, Jr and Bidin, JJ., concur.
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by
the lower court in view of the suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiñones, Jr. Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Suddenness of such attack, however, does not by itself show treachery. 33 There must be
evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it
impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. 34 In this case, the hacking of
Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a
warning to the deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants. The
group of Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks against
them. 35

The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in
this case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused
had clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length
of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 36

Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide. Again,
contrary to the lower court’s finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been
established to hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligan’s co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not
take any active part in the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiñones, Jr., which led to
his running over by a vehicle and consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony
that he was carrying a stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being
uncorroborated and coming from an undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion
of Iligan, Edmundo Asis must have known of the former’s criminal intent but mere
knowledge, acquiescense or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There must be
intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose. 37 Such being the case, his mere presence at the scene of the crime did not make
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner
Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went
to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters
from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano
went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo
Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of
the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and
demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked
Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack.
Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who
hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a
swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter
embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his
house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the
house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for
barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with
Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by
Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla,
rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested
that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo
Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal
certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years
of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on
October 23, 1980 and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser
palmar prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This
wound was presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was
already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their
differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on
October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to
formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter
(Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties
appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis
and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close relatives to
each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno
Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and
promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore
and not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the
additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay
captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General
Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and
was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that
the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a
healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical
findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With difficulty opening his
mouth. Restless at times. Febrile11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj.
IM. Sudden cessation of respiration and HR after muscular spasm. inhalation
administered. Ambo bag resuscitation and cardiac massage done but to no
avail. Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.PMC done and cadaver
brought home by relatives. (p. 100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of
homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano
guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE
(12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the
law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered
confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view
of the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but
raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against
the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial
was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to such position
in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon
that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San
Fabian, a town of said province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation
dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or
controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were
regulated and reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to
the canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in
said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching
mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected,
with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late
Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some
companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said
Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
"Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this
provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law
and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas,
56 SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a
result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November
14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a
very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from
tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and
logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for
Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened
from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which
covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True,
that the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of
his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said
wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which
ultimately caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the
victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus.
And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except
through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently,
the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected
with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is
liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C.
People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was
due to his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being
properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation
canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a
desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found
himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that
the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp.
20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier
was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and
that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and
tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like
tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was
infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely
confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the
symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the
wound was infected is not clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of
proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages
695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their
brief. It is as follows:

... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from
the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability
for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However,
over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur
within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and
headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty
swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients
often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the
commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar
descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes
generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The
intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small
proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region
of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to
some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the
major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an
interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation
period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are
caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery,
which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction
of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and
dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli
produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of
respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then
lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and
an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but
dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately
severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time;
trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but
ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe
tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or
less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged,
generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine,
1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends
on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried
the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980.
After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw
and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with
only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd
day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on
the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was
not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after
the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound
could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we
are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death
must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however,
lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death.
The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil.
1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we
ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of
 the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are
proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125) so different from each other that article 1813 of the present
(Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but
the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall
the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for
the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the
compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable
expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity the complaining
provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
127 SCRA 16). reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every
private right to be proved only by a preponderance of
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less
limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while criminal law?
not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio
Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said: "For these reasons, the Commission recommends the
adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a
xxx xxx xxx serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is the innumerable persons injured or wronged."
required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment
of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt
did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not
thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides
victim are so minded.
that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil
liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Commission as follows: Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal
case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most SO ORDERED.
serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use
to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the
court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed
is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from
the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil
liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning
fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal
liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical
result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and
distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the
other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction
of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages
 G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN
SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-
175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an
information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of
Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the
decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of
Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda
which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery
and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior
strength, and the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the
wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by
causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial,
the trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but
crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y
Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by
direct participation of the crime of murder for the death of Bayani Miranda,
and appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of Pugay,
he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together
with the accessories of the law for both of them. The accused are solidarily
held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P13,940.00
plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal
penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the
following errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS
ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A
COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY
THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS
ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends.
Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of
May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were
different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel
and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with
several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy
and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him.
They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took
a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the
body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the
process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a
human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the
deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped
the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other
police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring
as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed
to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the
police officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario
municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written
statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The two
accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-
appellants for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their
written statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F,
that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was
water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the
other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did
not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did
not impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written
statements alleging that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police
maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted
effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned
and discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as
the sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically
stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive
and convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and
unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other
eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons
investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of
the case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the
presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the
crime. In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one
Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the
respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-
appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses
in the information filed. Considering that their testimonies would be merely corroborative,
their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the
suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil.
797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the
prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only
was the latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in
exchange for his absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was reading
a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to
testify and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified
that she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time when the
instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and
both Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had no previous
misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against
them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour
gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-
appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to
pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only
when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics when
you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson. How could you
possibly see that incident while you were reading comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and burned
later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from doing
so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a
matter of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if
that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you come to
know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that
actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to you to
ask him not to and then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he
was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour gasoline that
is why you prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it was
gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got hold of
a can of gasoline, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour
gasoline when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the process of
pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that
Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that
Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it
was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased
when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased
on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or
unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately
before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the
accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is
also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the
deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from
different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of
them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386;
U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay.
Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before
pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained
gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even
before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid
every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his
companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor
General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468,
470, this Court ruled as follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to
be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which
no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person,
rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of
danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging
from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor
General in his brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his
act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is
characterized by treachery as the victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect
himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to
kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing
that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of
treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods,
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on
the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have
committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of
doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the
deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility.
Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical
injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a
graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor.
Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances,
the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The
eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they
noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17\
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging
from eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by
Miranda's parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is
P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to
P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the
P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the
court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against
the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
 G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta
City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and
Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan.
Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto
Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land
dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he
would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian,
Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan,
Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the
location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig
fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her
home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the
accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified
that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and
especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured".
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC),
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder.
Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only
for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be
incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he
and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod
for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to
the Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due
to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own
spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her
house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not
impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the
void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced,
that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed,
employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a
reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been
physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law
and the courts did not hold him criminally liable.
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. The Revised Penal Code,
inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, and now
penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with
means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against
property. The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies.
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against
person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this
clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in
order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to
a crime. Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the
motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;
(2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance
of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime.
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to
the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One
example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty.
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the
petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee
Kong, the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the
police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The
accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an
attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party
imagined where he was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no
less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this
country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished
simply because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated
upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the
criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill
the victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court
held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only
became impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did
not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from
committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is
inherently impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case
where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either by
outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed
opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no
application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts
not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if
there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to
wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of
his criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the
public requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the
unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really
present or not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again:
Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort
to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention
will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes
cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room
thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part
of the house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to
make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we
cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between
the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible
crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible
crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and
Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the
crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of
committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard,
commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories:
legal versus factual impossibility. In U.S. vs. Wilson the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If
the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the
defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was
impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal
liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, the accused was indicated for attempting to
smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal
if done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to
send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed.
However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and
consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court
reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility
as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the
proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing
of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision,
and thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act
which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus
conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility
until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court
will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually
impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be
convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are
satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as
an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of
accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not
for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such
thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a
crime charge — that is, attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The
impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act
penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article
4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical
impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the
absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will
render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act
"which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the
consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will
which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of

respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby
MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized
in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind
the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties
provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 152133 February 9, 2006
ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
petitioner Rollie Calimutan prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001,1affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 46, of Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19
November 1998,2 finding petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
T February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked for
he Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the crime of homicide,
allegedly committed as follows –
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay
Panique, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw a stone at PHILIP CANTRE,
hitting him at the back left portion of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due to
impact which caused his death a day after.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.
Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant 4 for the arrest of petitioner
Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was provisionally released 5 after posting
sufficient bailbond.6 During the arraignment on 21 May 1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded
not guilty to the crime of homicide charged against him.7
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Dr.
Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI); (2) Belen B. Cantre, mother of the victim, Philip Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Sañano,
companion of the victim Cantre when the alleged crime took place. Their testimonies are
collectively summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness Sañano,
together with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in Crossing
Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness
Sañano proceeded to go home to their respective houses, but along the way, they crossed
paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was
harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit responsible for
throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a previous night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao,
victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan
dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre and witness Sañano. Petitioner Calimutan then
picked up a stone, as big as a man’s fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the
left side of his back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held
his back. Witness Sañano put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan,
and attempted to pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down another
stone he was already holding. He also urged victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just
go home. Witness Sañano accompanied victim Cantre to the latter’s house, and on the way,
victim Cantre complained of the pain in the left side of his back hit by the stone. They
arrived at the Cantre’s house at around 12:00 noon, and witness Sañano left victim Cantre
to the care of the latter’s mother, Belen.
Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident involving
petitioner Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of stomachache, and was
unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately feeling cold and then warm. He
was sweating profusely and his entire body felt numb. His family would have wanted to
bring him to a doctor but they had no vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05
some food. He was able to eat a little, but he also later vomited whatever he ate. For the
last time, he complained of backache and stomachache, and shortly thereafter, he died.9
Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal
Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination Report10 and Certification
of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim
Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. The body of victim
Cantre was subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February 1996.
Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help of the Lingkod
Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested for an exhumation and
autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre by the NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the
body of the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez on 15 April 1996,12 after
which, he reported the following findings –
Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white Barong Tagalog and
blue pants placed inside a wooden golden-brown coffin and buried in a concrete niche.
Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side.
Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line.
Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].
Laceration, spleen.
Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.
Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially digested food particles.
xxxx
CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his exhumation and
autopsy report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage
and there was massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated
spleen. The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a
stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to
death by petitioner Calimutan

To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the sole testimony of the
accused, herein petitioner, Calimutan.
According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February 1996, he was walking
with his house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way to Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy,
Masbate, when they met with the victim Cantre and witness Sañano. The victim Cantre took
hold of Bulalacao and punched him several times. Petitioner Calimutan attempted to pacify
the victim Cantre but the latter refused to calm down, pulling out from his waist an eight-
inch Batangas knife and uttering that he was looking for trouble, either "to kill or be killed."
At this point, petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters away from the victim Cantre and
was too frightened to move any closer for fear that the enraged man would turn on him; he
still had a family to take care of. When he saw that the victim Cantre was about to stab
Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he described as approximately
one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim Cantre
on his right buttock. Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao then started to run away, and
victim Cantre chased after them, but witness Sañano was able to pacify the victim Cantre.
Petitioner Calimutan allegedly reported the incident to a kagawad of Barangay Panique and
to the police authorities and sought their help in settling the dispute between Bulalacao and
the victim Cantre. Bulalacao, meanwhile, refused to seek medical help despite the advice of
petitioner Calimutan and, instead, chose to go back to his hometown.14
Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the victim Cantre after
the stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of his friends told him that they still saw
the victim Cantre drinking at a videoke bar on the night of 04 February 1996. As far as he
knew, the victim Cantre died the following day, on 05 February 1996, because of food
poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan maintained that he had no personal grudge against the
victim Cantre previous to the stoning incident.15
On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision,16 essentially adopting the
prosecution’s account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and pronouncing that –
It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the accused was in defense
of his companion, a stranger, because after the boxing Michael was able to run. While it
appears that the victim was the unlawful aggressor at the beginning, but the aggression
already ceased after Michael was able to run and there was no more need for throwing a
stone. The throwing of the stone to the victim which was a retaliatory act can be considered
unlawful, hence the accused can be held criminally liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side was
a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony causing physical injuries to the
victim. The physical injury of hematoma as a result of the impact of the stone resulted in
the laceration of the spleen causing the death of the victim. The accused is criminally liable
for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result
had not been intended. (Art. 4, Par. 1, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-G.R. No.
03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964)
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one’s illegal acts
merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14
Phil. 310).
The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of
the Revised Penal Code with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby imposes the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8)
YEARS of Prision Mayor as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of Fifty
Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as compensatory damages and the sum of Fifty Thousand
(₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001,17 sustained the conviction of homicide
rendered by the RTC against petitioner Calimutan, ratiocinating thus –
The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal injury sustained by the
victim was caused by the stone thrown at the victim by the accused which, the accused-
appellant does not deny. It was likewise shown that the internal injury sustained by the
victim was the result of the impact of the stone that hit the victim. It resulted to a traumatic
injury of the abdomen causing the laceration of the victim’s spleen.
This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a Senior
Medico Legal Officer of the NBI after the exhumation of the victim’s cadaver…
The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by Municipal Health
Officer Dr. Conchita Ulanday stating that the cause of the victim’s death was food poisoning.
Dr. Ulanday was not even presented to testify in court hence she was not even able to
identify and/or affirm the contents of her report. She was not made available for cross-
examination on the accuracy and correctness of her findings.
Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report cannot prevail over the autopsy report (Exh.
"C") of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who testified and was cross-examined by the
defense.
Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died of food poisoning,
as reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they not present her as their witness to belie
the report of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.
The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded the highest respect
because it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of said witness.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate,
Branch 46, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002, 18 denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit since the issues raised therein
had already been passed and ruled upon in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001.
Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,
seeking (1) the reversal of the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19 November 1998, and of the
Court of Appeals, dated 29 August 2001, convicting him of the crime of homicide; and, (2)
consequently, his acquittal of the said crime based on reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy reports, with
dissimilar findings on the cause of death of the victim Cantre, constituted reasonable doubt
as to the liability of petitioner Calimutan for the said death, arguing that –
x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate was the
first physician of the government who conducted an examination on the cadaver of the
victim Philip Cantre whose findings was that the cause of his death was due to food
poisoning while the second government physician NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ronaldo
Mendez whose findings was that the cause of the death was due to a traumatic injury of the
abdomen caused by a lacerated spleen and with these findings of two (2) government
physicians whose findings are at variance with each other materially, it is humbly contended
that the same issue raised a reasonable doubt on the culpability of the petitioner.
As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the prosecution in the case
at bar, it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as to the petitioner’s guilt and therefore,
he is entitled to acquittal (People vs. Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23, 1981).19
In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his or her guilt is
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only
a moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind; it does not demand absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error. 20
In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold
petitioner Calimutan liable for the death of the victim Cantre.
Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal testimony before the
RTC of prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Mendez, are vital pieces of
evidence against petitioner Calimutan. Dr. Mendez determined that the victim Cantre died of
internal hemorrhage or bleeding due to the laceration of his spleen. In his testimony, Dr.
Mendez clearly and consistently explained that the spleen could be lacerated or ruptured
when the abdominal area was hit with a blunt object, such as the stone thrown by petitioner
Calimutan at the victim Cantre.
It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an expert
witness, whose "competency and academic qualification and background" was admitted by
the defense itself.21 As a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed
to possess sufficient knowledge of pathology, surgery, gynecology, toxicology, and such
other branches of medicine germane to the issues involved in a case.22
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence,23 and although it does not
necessarily bind the courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had properly accorded it
great weight and probative value. Having testified as to matters undeniably within his area
of expertise, and having performed a thorough autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre,
his findings as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre are more than just the mere
speculations of an ordinary person. They may sufficiently establish the causal relationship
between the stone thrown by the petitioner Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of the victim
Cantre which, subsequently, resulted in the latter’s death. With no apparent mistake or
irregularity, whether in the manner by which Dr. Mendez performed the autopsy on the
body of the victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report and testimony must be seriously
considered by this Court.
Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries would also support
the conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan caused the
death of the victim Cantre.
One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries24 in the following manner –
The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with bleeding and
disruption of the internal organs. The areas most vulnerable are the point of attachment of
internal organs, especially at the source of its blood supply and at the point where blood
vessels change direction.
The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle bounded by the ribs
on the two sides and a line drawn horizontally through the umbilicus forming its base
is vulnerable to trauma applied from any direction. In this triangle are found several
blood vessels changing direction, particularly the celiac trunk, its branches (the hepatic,
splenic and gastric arteries) as well as the accompanying veins. The loop of the
duodenum, the ligament of Treitz and the pancreas are in the retroperitoneal space, and the
stomach and transverse colon are in the triangle, located in the peritoneal cavity.
Compression or blow on the area may cause detachment, laceration, stretch-stress,
contusion of the organs (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H. Wecht et., p. 41).
As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that –
The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of a fall or blow from
the crushing and grinding effects of wheels of motor vehicles. Although the organ is
protected at its upper portion by the ribs and also by the air-containing visceral organs, yet
on account of its superficiality and fragility, it is usually affected by trauma. x x x.
Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult to comprehend for
people without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are some points that can be
plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary to common perception, the abdominal area is more
than just the waist area. The entire abdominal area is divided into different triangles, and
the spleen is located in the upper triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all
internal organs in the same triangle are vulnerable to trauma from all
directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit the victim Cantre from the front. Even impact
from a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre, in the area of the afore-mentioned
triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3) Although the spleen had already been ruptured
or lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible external injury to the victim. Injury to
the spleen cannot, at all times, be attributed to an obvious, external injury such as a cut or
bruise. The laceration of the victim Cantre’s spleen can be caused by a stone thrown hard
enough, which qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma26 –
Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other viscera, is
the most frequently injured organ following blunt trauma to the abdomen or the lower
thoracic cage. Automobile accidents provide the predominating cause, while falls, sledding
and bicycle injuries, and blows incurred during contact sports are frequently implicated in
children. x x x
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim
Cantre could rupture or lacerate the spleen – an organ described as vulnerable, superficial,
and fragile – even without causing any other external physical injury. Accordingly, the
findings of Dr. Mendez that the victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage from his lacerated
spleen, and the cause of the laceration of the spleen was the stone thrown by petitioner
Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre, does not necessarily contradict his testimony
before the RTC that none of the external injuries of the victim Cantre were fatal.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish that the proximate
cause of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred."27
The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Sañano and Belen Cantre,
had adequately recounted the events that transpired on 04 February 1996 to 05 February
1996. Between the two of them, the said witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions,
and physical condition of the victim Cantre during the said period. Before the encounter with
peticastioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to be physically fine.
However, after being hit at the back by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan,
the victim Cantre had continuously complained of backache. Subsequently, his physical
condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally, he died. Other than being stoned by petitioner
Calimutan, there was no other instance when the victim Cantre may have been hit by
another blunt instrument which could have caused the laceration of his spleen.
Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a lacerated spleen,
an injury sustained after being hit by a stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Not
even the post-mortem report of Dr. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer who first
examined the body of the victim Cantre, can raise reasonable doubt as to the cause of
death of the victim Cantre. Invoking Dr. Ulanday’s post-mortem report, the defense insisted
on the possibility that the victim Cantre died of food poisoning. The post-mortem report,
though, cannot be given much weight and probative value for the following reasons –
First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-mortem report, as well
as in the death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals that although she suspected food
poisoning as the cause of death, she held back from making a categorical statement that it
was so. In the post-mortem report, 28 she found that "x x x the provable (sic) cause of
death was due to cardio-respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must be confirm (sic) by
laboratory e(x)am." In the death certificate of the victim Cantre, 29 she wrote that the
immediate cause of death was "Cardio-Respiratory Arrest" and the antecedent cause was
"Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no showing that further laboratory tests were indeed
conducted to confirm Dr. Ulanday’s suspicion that the victim Cantre suffered from food
poisoning, and without such confirmation, her suspicion as to the cause of death remains
just that – a suspicion.
Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement 30 in which she had
explained her findings in the post-mortem report, to wit –
05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?
A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal.
06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certification on the death of PHILIP
B. CANTRE?
A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about "Food Poisoning".
What I stated in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE was a SUSPECTED victim of food
poisoning. I didn’t state that he was a case of food poisoning. And in the Certification, I
even recommended that an examination be done to confirm that suspicion.
07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?
A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except that of the contusion or abrasion,
measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I based my suspicion from the history of the
victim and from the police investigation.
08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal hemorrhage in
the cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver?
A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I made an incision
on the abdomen and I explored the internal organs of the cadaver with my hand in search
for any clotting inside. But I found none. I did not open the body of the cadaver.
09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the cadaver. Where was it
located?
A: On the left portion of his back, sir.
10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that part of his body,
his SPLEEN could be injured?
A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact was.
In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC31 how he conducted the
autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre, as follows –
Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation of the body of the
victim in this case?
A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.
Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?
A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the victim Philip Cantre, what other
matters did you do in connection therewith?
A We examined the internal organs.
Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?
A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus the intestines.
xxxx
Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as traumatic injury of
the abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is the significance of this medical term
traumatic injury of the abdomen?
A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do what other doctors do as they make causes
of death as internal hemorrhage we particularly point to the injury of the body like this
particular case the injury was at the abdomen of the victim.
Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abdomen of the victim this traumatic
injury is located?
A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left.
Q What particular organ are you referring to?
A The spleen, sir.
The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two doctors of the body
of the victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation for their apparent inconsistent
findings as to the cause of death. Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday
and her unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the
exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen
as the cause of death of the victim Cantre, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be
given credence by the courts.
Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC despite being
included in its list of witnesses did not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that
would give rise to the presumption that her testimony would be adverse to the prosecution
if produced.32 As this Court already expounded in the case of People v. Jumamoy33 –
The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the information did not
constitute, contrary to the contention of the accused, suppression of evidence. The
prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be presented for the
prosecution. If the prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the
prosecutor need not present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the
quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with for being merely
corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative
witnesses would not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the
prosecution's case. Besides, there is no showing that the eyewitnesses who were not
presented in court as witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that
the adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the
suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative
or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is
an exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed that the failure to present the
other witnesses was because their testimonies would be unfavorable to the prosecution, he
should have compelled their appearance, by compulsory process, to testify as his own
witnesses or even as hostile witnesses.
It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday before the RTC,
perhaps believing that it had already presented sufficient evidence to merit the conviction of
petitioner Calimutan even without her testimony. There was nothing, however, preventing
the defense from calling on, or even compelling, with the appropriate court processes, Dr.
Ulanday to testify in court as its witness if it truly believed that her testimony would be
adverse to the case presented by the prosecution.
While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim Cantre was
caused by his lacerated spleen, an injury which resulted from being hit by the stone thrown
at him by petitioner Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the
Court of Appeals as to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the
petitioner should have been convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they
are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two
types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious
intent of the offender –
In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language of
Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing
the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In
culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by
the offender to another person is "unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.34
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner
Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the
absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for
the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of reckless
imprudence –
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, that demonstrate
petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre, and conversely, that
substantiate the view of this Court that the death of victim Cantre was a result of petitioner
Calimutan’s reckless imprudence. The RTC and the Court of Appeals may have failed to
appreciate, or had completely overlooked, the significance of such circumstances.
It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness Sañano, on the
one hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on the other, was a chance
encounter as the two parties were on their way to different destinations. The victim Cantre
and witness Sañano were on their way home from a drinking spree in Crossing Capsay,
while petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao were walking from the market to
Crossing Capsay. While the evidence on record suggests that a running grudge existed
between the victim Cantre and Bulalacao, it did not establish that there was likewise an
existing animosity between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan.1avvphil.net
In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the prosecution and the
defense, it was the victim Cantre who was the initial aggressor. He suddenly punched
Bulalacao, the helper and companion of petitioner Calimutan, when they met on the road.
The attack of the victim Cantre was swift and unprovoked, which spurred petitioner
Calimutan into responsive action. Given that this Court dismisses the claim of petitioner
Calimutan that the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does take into account that the
victim Cantre was considerably older and bigger, at 26 years of age and with a height of five
feet and nine inches, compared to Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only 15 years
old and stood at about five feet. Even with his bare hands, the victim Cantre could have
hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault
of the victim Cantre against the latter when he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim
Cantre. The stone was readily available as a weapon to petitioner Calimutan since the
incident took place on a road. That he threw the stone at the back of the victim Cantre does
not automatically imply treachery on the part of petitioner Calimutan as it is highly probable
that in the midst of the fray, he threw the stone rashly and impulsively, with no regard as to
the position of the victim Cantre. When the victim Cantre stopped his aggression after being
hit by the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan, the latter also desisted from any other act
of violence against the victim Cantre.
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of
4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two years and one day of prision
correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter’s death and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few minutes. It was a
very brief scuffle, in which the parties involved would hardly have the time to ponder upon
the most appropriate course of action to take. With this in mind, this Court cannot concur in
the declaration made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at
the victim Cantre as a retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction to
an unexpected and unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao
was already able to run away from the victim Cantre may have escaped the notice of the
petitioner Calimutan who, under the pressure of the circumstances, was forced to act as
quickly as possible.

The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim
Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre.
What is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutan’s intention to drive away the attacker
who was, at that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as
earlier described, much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.35

Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when he threw the
stone at the victim Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable lack of precaution. He
failed to consider that a stone the size of a man’s fist could inflict substantial injury on
someone. He also miscalculated his own strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely
disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with such force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill
someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten meters.

Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre
was the proximate cause of the latter’s death, despite being done with reckless imprudence
rather than with malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan remains civilly liable for such death.
This Court, therefore, retains the reward made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the
heirs of the victim Cantre of the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and
another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated
29 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19
November 1998, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond