Sat-mp i'ii Currier!

21(4), 521—535 (2008), Copyright © Cambridge University Press

dOi:1U.1017/502698897080019—H Printed in the United Kingdom

lrritability and Sensibility: Key Concepts in the

Assessing
Medical Doctrines of Haller and Bordeu

Dominique Bom'y
Cent/a d‘Ellii'qiie illédimlc tie Lille, Iiirririi/ Car/101121118 tic Lille

Argument

This article addresses the doctrinal

controversy over the various characterizations ofirritability
and sensibility. In the middle of the
eighteenth century, this scientific debate involved
some encyclopaedist physicians, Albrecht von Haller (1709—1777), jean—jacques Menuret de
Chainbaud (1733—1815), and Théophile de Borden (17224776). The doctor from Bern
described irritability as an experimental
property of the muscle fibers and made it the basis
ofa neoeniechanisni in which organic reactions are related to the
degree ofirritation of the
fibers. The practitioners from Montpellier considered
sensibility, a property ofliving matter, to
be a spontaneous activity ofthe organ and
developed around this notion an original conception
ofthe organism as the sum ofthe specific lives ofeach
part, Beyond conceptual divergences, two
ways ofthinking whose philosophical presuppositions (conception oflivnig matter, mechanism.
and orgaiiicism), were in opposition, while their
epistemological principles (experience versus
observation) and their medical practices (active medicine and expectant medicine) went on to
evolve in diflerent directions. The privileged place
granted to experimentation and assessment
enabled physiology to be articulated as an autonomous scientific
discipline: the pre—eminence
ofobservatioii and attention to the radical
specificity of the livmg being constituted the bases
of clinical medicine,

Ever since the notions of

sensibility and irritability were theniatized in the works
of Francis Glisson(159771677), the question of the properties of living matter,
and more particularly, the meaning of the vital
reactivity embedded in matter has
been understood in light of these twin notions and their
evolution, from both
philosophical and physiological points of View. Guido Giglioni accurately describes
how Glisson’s legacy deeply marked the
eighteenth~century debate, even if he stresses
in addition that ”Glisson’s works witnessed an
intriguing development: while the
notion ofirritability became increasingly
popular, the name of Glisson disappeared,"1
In France, the Lockean version of the hypothesis of
thinking matter had a better fate.
But whether we follow the path of Glisson’s
thought or that of Locke, it remains
the case that the experimentalist approach to
living phenomena in Europe in the

'
“Historical accidents and hermeneutical \‘agarics contributed to the (all into oblivion of Glisson’s theory of
irritability during the eighteenth century” (see page 466 in this issue).
 5.72 Dmui’m‘xiiic Blurry

eighteenth century made room for epistemological debates (how can we know living
matter?) and philosophical controversies (what is the nature ofmatter? how should we
understand the link between body and niind?). Accordingly we must take note of this
important crossroads between the more “scientifically" oriented thinking dominated
by physiologists and the ”philosophical” turn ofmedical doctrines.
In the middle of the eighteenth century, the notions of sensibility and
irritability
frequently remained confused; their use was sometimes inconsistent or ambiguous
among physicians (Steinke 2001, 38). The ambiguity and lack of precision in the use
of these two terms were constant in the various editions of Diderot and D’Alembert’s

Entyrlopédi'c. A noted evolution therein can be charted, however, as a

consequence
of significant alterations by the group of medical associates of this venture. The
first edition
(I75I—l765) showed the marked influence ofphysicians associated with
theMontpellier School, while the Swiss physiologist Albrecht Von Haller had an
overwhelming influence on the Slipplémé‘llt (177671778) and the following editions.
Research conducted by john Lough concerning the editors ofthe first edition of the

Enryrlapt‘die makes it possible to estimate the number of associates from Languedoc

at roughly around twenty, twelve of whom were doctors at the Medical
Faculty of
Montpellier (Lough 1973, 35). This first team of associates was greatly influenced by
various vitalist theses deriving from well—known writings such as those ofThéophilc de
Borden and Paulfloseph Barthez.2 With the launching ofthe Supplement and thereafter,
the majority of the articles on this subject were written by Haller (Lough credits him
with about 200 articles in volumes I to IV ofthe Siqiplé/Imir). By contrast, only three
of Haller‘s associates were from Montpellier, which explains this evolution.
In the article “Inflammation, Inflammatoires (Maladies)," Jean—joseph Menuret dc
(Thainbaud (17334815)3 accounts for the onset ofinfiamniatory phenomena through
the untimely stimulation of irritability and not through stagnation of the blood, the
mechanistic theory, iior through deficiencies in the preserving soul, the animist theory.
Ménuret credits Francis Glisson with putting forward the property ofirritability, and

suggests as synonyms for this term, sensilii/ily, Inability mm’ miitmcti/ity, with a reference
to the articles “Irritabilité” and “Sensibilité.” In his
opinion, this property, which
is “totally beyond the scope of the soul," is present in all organic parts. “It is such
that when these parts are irritated, they contract, stiffen, start moving and seem to
want to free themselves of that which is
irritating them” (Menuret 17651:), 8:713b).
For Ménuret, this property of living organized bodies is responsible for fevers and
irritations when they are subjected to excessive stimulation. Each organic part reacts

according to its own Vital iii/crest A perturbing element inopportunely stimulates an

organic reaction whose effect is harmful to the organism. The ambiguity is obvious:
Ménuret identified sensibility and irritability. Gabriel—Francois Venel (1723—1775), a

2
On the difll‘rences between Bordeu and Barthel, cf. Boury 2001.
3Ménutet's name is often giwn as jeanijacques, but see Kafker and Kafker 1988, 2567257, for the correct

reference to his birth Certificate bearing the name jeanr‘loseph,

 Inimbiln)‘ and Sum'biliry 5.73

phySiCian and chemist who was close to Théophile de Bordeu (LecornueLehman 2006,
54—58), wrote the article “Irrrtabilité,” which did not dispel the misunderstanding.
Irritability is ua term invented by Mr, Glisson and revived in recent times by the famous
Mr. Haller to indicate a specific mode ofa more
general faculty of the organic parts
ofanimals which will be dealt with under the name
sensibility" (Venel 1765, 8:909b).
It was in the article ”Sensibilité” by Henri
Fouquet (172771806), that the elements
of the doctrine of sensibility were more specificalle
developed “Sensibility is, within
the living body, a property that certain
parts possess to perceive impressions of external
as a result of which
objects, they produce movements in proportion to the
degree of
intensity of this perception” (Fouquet 1765, 15:38b). This definition reveals the two
phases ofseiisibility, one perceptive, the other active There is the sensing ofthe external
object and the adapted reaction of living organs. “It is in this double relationship of
actions which are so closely linked between themselves that
only the imagination
can follow them or differentiate between them, that should be considered”
sensitivity
(ibid,). Feeling allows for discrimination “between useful and harmful physical objects.”
Motility brings us nearer or farther away from the object, according to our appreciation
of the interest or danger it represents. The attention paid to this
subjective dimension
is something remarkable, as, from that moment on, the assimilation ofthe
living body
to any type ofartificial mechanism is excluded. And
yet, in that same article, Fouquet
wavers
regarding the definition ofsensibility: there is genuine semantic vagueness. The
author speaks in turn of sensibility, a sensory principle or a sensitive soul.
Sensibility
is the property that enables us to perceive, move or act:
glands secrete and excrete as
a result of this
sensibility The heart is controlled by this same sensitive principle, just
like the workings of the soul. This sensitive principle is the real
guarantor ofthe unity
ofthe organism and is consubstantial with its matter. Fouquet added:

Sensibility must be considered in the natural state of man as a being which seeks and
breathes only feeling and movement, whose nature is the same in all subjects, but whose
etfects vary according to the disposrtion or indisposition ofthe
organs and to which alone
the apparent loss of coordination (ataxia) in the
exercising ofthis senSitive soul can be
imputed. . It grasps the different sensations and determines the different desires
. .

to . . .

live is in truth to feel. (Ibid., 42b).

The concepts ofirritability arid sensibility, therefore,

ambiguous tools. Their
were

use does ofcourse indicate the existence ofgenuine between

proximity researchers, but
at the same time, it confronts the historian With a of
degree conceptual conquion and
misunderstanding when it comes to differentiating systems of thought and assessing
reciprocal influences. The debate was carried forward by all the protagonists in a
Newtonian perspective, which sought for
to account
phenomena by exposing laws
identifying a
property specific to it. ”The Newtonian method for all those scientists
consists indefining an irreducible property (for example, gravity) and then explaining
the phenomenon by writing the law ofthis property’s manifestation" (Huneman 2007,
 524 DummiqueBimry

263). The issue therefore was to know which was the property with manifestations
capable of qualifying the living being and with laws that made the living organism
scientifically recognizable. Sensibility and irritability were both candidates to become
this irreducible property of the living being.
I have chosen here to study the two concepts which indicate the substantial or
essential properties of matter in the works of two more or less contemporary scholars
who influenced the theoretical reflections ofDenis Diderot (1713—1794). Diderot is the

philosopher who was most concerned with issues arising from scientific developments
in the knowledge of living phenomena. Many scientists and physicians influenced his
works and his doctrine; first Borden and his morzlpellz‘émi'n colleagues, then Haller,
Marat, and Zimmermann. Comparing and contrasting the inquiries of Borden and
Haller with respect to Diderot’s tenets is significant, for it allows us to appraise their
influence and to assess their own evolution.
Albrecht von Haller (170871777) and Borden (1722—1776) studied the properties
of living matter and derived from them explanatory principles regarding the workings
of organisms. These two physicians influenced Diderot and are mentioned in his
work especially when he deals with the sciences
of Vital phenomena such as
physiology, embryology, and medicine (Boury 2004, 201—205). Texts such as Pcnst‘t’s sur
I’lntcrpre'rafimr do [a nature (1754), llEIm'erie/i enrre ri'A/embt’rf er Didrmr (1769) and Idle/moms
dc p/zysinlqgiz’ (from l765) reveal the variations in Diderot's thinking about medicine
and physiology The essential points in the topics dealt with by the philosopher in
the P0113505 or in the linil’rricn (the various forms of sensibility and its relevance to
movement, the unity of the living being and its different kingdoms) are derlved from
the ideas of vitalist physicians, especially Borden (Kaitaro 1997, 40). But the 13/577101er
dc [J/iysfoquic reveals by contrast the impact of Haller’s works, notably the Prinmr Linm'

I’liyrlnlagiru' (1747), which was translated and edited by Pierre Tarin (172171793), a
doctor and mtyr/upt‘disre. Diderot then begins to diversify his sources, and focused on the
relations between sensibility and movement, taking as a basis the biological experiments
of Robert Whytt (1714—1766)4 and Haller, rather than the medical observations of
Borden. Diderot adopted the positions, experiments, and conclusions of the Swiss

physician, notably the famous slogan that the fiber is to physiology what the line is to
mathematics.5 Borden and Haller knew each other, and read and criticized each other’s
work, but the perspectives in which they conducted their research and the objectives
that they pursued, diverged.
Albrecht von Haller was an active researcher. An assiduous and systematic
experimenter, he contributed to establishing the bases of physiology. He gave few

4
Peter Hans Reill relates V’hytt, Haller, and Borden to one another because “their respective analyses formed
the grand topics oflateecighteenth century physiological, anatomical and medical research and debate" (Reill
2003, 134).
5
“Fibra enini physiologo id est, quod linea geometra‘" (Haller 1757. l, 2), which in Diderot becomes: ”En
physiologic la fibre est ce que la ligne est en mathérnxiques" (Didemt 1765, in Diderot 1975—, 17:338)
 li'i'itabilily and Sensibility 525

consultations bUt published numerous medical works. Hubert Steinke has shown
extensively and precisely how doctors who, like the Swiss physician, privileged the
epistemological over the experimental, practical side, organized their scientific activity.
The way the experimental community in Gottingen worked, the articulation between

teaching and research, the practical lessons given by Haller, the way he was assisted by
johann—Georg Zimmerman (172871793X1 the laboratory and experimental animals
(dogs and rabbits) are all indications of the way in which he conceived his activity
(Steinke 2005, 146—153). Like Boerhaave, he remained fundamentally and faithfully a
type of mechanicist, improving on the paradigm of Newtonian explanation: general
laws explain how animals and men operate and they are the same for all natural bodies.
Based on this thesis, I-laller studied and experimented on the notion
ofirritability for
which he drew clear limits in relation to sensibility.
Two sources make it possible to give Haller’s precise
position on irritability and
sensibility. In his Gottingen dissertation, Dc pattibns (aiparis lzimimii scnsibilibtu ct
irritabilibns, presented in 1752 and published in English and French translations in
1755, Haller opposes two categories of organic parts: “I call the irritable part of the
human body that part which becomes shorter when
any foreign body touches it
somewhat Forcefully; ifthe exterior touch is steady, the
irritability ofthe fiber becomes
all the greater as it gets even shorter, I call the sensitive fiber ofinazi that which,
.. .

when touched, transmits the impression of this contact to the soul"

(Haller 1755, 7).
the
object ofa simple quantitative measurement with a graduated ruler,
Irritnliility,
is the criterion making possible a classification ofthe various organic parts under study,
according to the shortening obtained through artifiCial excitation. Haller made use of
an elementary
experimental device to draw up an objective class ication. Sensibility
is described much less precisely, with a definition
introducing the notion of soul and
impression; it is not the object ofany measurement and so an appreciation ofits presence
and its intensity remains subjective. Measuring the
shortening offibers gives irritability
a universal value, as it the measurable
opens way to a
comparison ofthe various living
tissues. Haller founded his argument on experiments
stimulating individual organs.
In the case of the individual muscle, Haller attested to the effects of
irritability on
muscular fibers, their shortening due to excitation, whereas there was neither
sensibility
nor nerve influence.
Any assessment of sensibility remained linked to an individual
impression, subject to variations in the conditions of its perception. Ittitability and
sensibility were not to be confused when characterizing parts. He referred only to
experimental criteria and rejected all metaphysical explanation. Nerves, for example,
were not irritable because, when
applying “a mathematical instrument, divided into
small parts, along a nerve ofa living dog l irritated the nerve in this condition and
. . .

'
Emch-Deriaz 1993 is a detailed account of the genesis and contents of Zinimerniann's Van det
Eifa/iiiiiig tn
llf'i
Ariieylemist, which she describes as an outcome of his collaboration with Heller, who was his “mentor" in
Gomngen
526 Dmilmiqlli‘ Bmiry

it remained perfectly Similarly, ”the destruction ofa nerve which destroys

motionless.”
sensibility, does destroy irritability” (ibid,)
not

The difference he presented between these two properties, irritability and sensibility,
enabled him to specify the extent of his research as well as the metaphysical
contradictions of his adversaries. It is not because they receive fragments of the soul,
whose sensibility to touch would result in withdrawal to a"oid contact that muscular
fibers shorten, but through the quality itself of the “gluten" which constitutes the
fibers. As the irritable parts are insensitive, they do not come from the sensibility of
the soul. Observations and experiments prove that irritability persists after death and
in individual parts. For Haller, irritability might be distinct from the soul but did not
exclude its existence. He differed from Julien Offray de la Mettrie (170971751) who
made irritability “the basis ofhis ungodly and antirspiritualist scheme” (ibid., 74). Haller

rejected any influence of the soul on the vital movements of the individual muscle,
by considering irritability “as gravity and attraction are, a property ofniatter,” in this
case of
gluten which forms the muscular fiber “without being able to determine the
causes” (ibid.), It persists after death and in the individual parts subtracted from the

empire of the soul, which for him is unique and indivisible.

The article entitled ”Irritabilité" published in 1778 in the Genéve-Neufchatel
edition ofthe Eth’flopétilt‘ offers another example ofl-Ialler’s method, In this article, he

dispelled all possible confusion as to his own conception: “Irritability is totally ditferent
from sensibility; even ifit depended on it, it would always be apart, as it is invariably
the cause ofa shortening which is never the consequence ofsensibility" (Haller 1778,
19:93). Haller extended the concept of irritability, the simple property of muscular
fibers, considering it to be the source of all vital movements, Based on numerous
experiments, he endowed it with the expression ofan “innate force," which did not
sum
up the entirety of vital phenomena. It was associated with a “dead force” and a
“nervous force.” The “ticarijbrrr” corresponded to the material part ofbodies it was
—

a natural physical “mntrattility” common to bones and cellular tissue found in

corpses.
The action mode of the “itartiaiisflirtr” resembled that ofthe soul; this similarity caused
confusion between “tierubzisfime” and irritability for a long time. But as the nerve is not
irritable, it cannot be a source of irritability, because in that case it would give what
it does not itself possess. Irritability, a muscular property, does not require nerves to
become an active force: animals without heads, without marrow, without nerves are

very irritable. The polyp, which is not known to have a nervous

system, as well as

anencephalous fetuses are capable of movement when they subjected

are to stimuli

Feeling is an “alteration occurring in the soul when an alteration has occurred in

the body" (ibid.), whereas irritability is very active even after death. “Nervous force,”
the expression of the conscious will, may add nothing but a “stimulating liquor,” as the
“innate force" in willing muscles requires this aid to act, whereas in vital movements,
it acts without any help from nervejuices. These conclusions emphasize the difference
in nature between sensibility and irritability. Besides these experimental results, Haller

used evidence supported by observrng the eHects ofwillpower, which varies depending
 Il'l'ili‘lflllf)’ and Sensibility 527

whether the part involved is sensiti\ e or not. On the one hand, the heart,
very irritable
but not very sensitive, does not obey willpower; on the other hand, the muscles of

voluntary movements, highly innervated,

are
subject to willpower. These findings
further linked sensibility the
activity ofthe soul.
to

Théophile de Bordeu was first and foremost a practitioner who sought to find
rational (scientific, philosophical) solutions to the practical problems his associates were

facing and wanted in this way to give medicrne bases as solid as those of the rival
seienees. His doctrine evolved from Stahlian
animism, of which his first two theses,
written in 1742 and 1743, bore the mark (Bordeu 1751), towards a
particular vision
of the living being, organicism,7 which retains a certain proximity to materialism as
it insists on the material unity of man, and the absence of all recourse to an external

principle or an individual substance for the

functioning of the organism.
to account

The notionofsensibility was one of the central themes in Bordeu’s works. Instead
of a chain transmitting movement as Descartes had imagined, Bordeu described
the organic property transforming physical movement into nervous
impulses. “This
function ofman’s which makes it possible to perceive any object, is born within this

organ, instrument of the body which is affected in various ways and can be called
sensation or feeling” (Borden 1751, § II).
The nerves are animated by a peculiar vital tension which enables them to
prepare
themselves to perceive the stimulation which is specific to them and so transform this
material movement, whatever its origin, into a sensation transmitted to the brain or
another organ. In this capacity of the nerve, Borden recognized a role in
transmitting
pain, in regulating the activity of different organs and in being able to know the state
of the organs. This function characterizes the living organism and
coniprehends all
the phenomena of contact (material or intellectual) between the
living being and its
internal and external environment.

Support for this function is constituted by all of the central nervous structures —

brain, cerebellum, bone marrow, and the various peripheral nerves. Borden emphasized
their unity ofstructure and composition, to account for the homogeneity offunction
In his Recherche: mmtmiiiqircs stir la paiirimi dexglmides e! Sllr lmu'fimcrioii
(1751), Bordeu
analyzed the
workings of glands. A gland, like eyersight or hearing, is aroused by a
stimulation which is specific to it, Its “appetite” selects elements in the blood, which
it separates to constitute its particular humor, It adapts its
activity to its needs and to
those of the organism. This very appetite is one of the constituents of the
particular

7
“The view that claims that the whole is more than the sum ot‘its parts is often called holistic. A related and
practically synonymous term is
organicisni Holisin and organicism are often combined with the idea that livmg
organisms are hierarchically organized" (Kaitaro 1997, 24). Karma thus brings together two notions, holism
and organicism, to express the influence ofthe Montpellier physicians. Organicism implies that the laws ofthc
various functions] le.els are not the same. The laws of the lower levels of the structure do not determine the
actuary ofthe higher levels; the higher levels influence and control the activity of the lover le' (:15, This strong
degree ofsubordination implies a hierarchy of values in the system oflav's governing the functioning of the
tarious le els On Borden’s organicism. see Boury 2004, 83—102.
 528 Duniiniqn, Bun/y

life of the partss' Glandular secretion is a kind of sensation, The

recognize ability to

specific stimulations and

provide adapted response characterizes all forms of living
an

beings, Bordeu called this disposition sensibility, associating perception and motion.
Sensibility is a quality ofliving matter. The doctor observes its effects and deduces
existence from it: he does not measure its intensity, nor does he set up its laws. To

strengthen his argument, Borden emphasized the difference in rhythm and in the
intensity of physiological phenomena according to individuals and their condition
Glands function discontinuously; they excrete their humors at particular moments
Borden accounted for this functional adaptation through the capaCity of glands to

perceive changes or influences in other organs, those of the organism as a whole and
those of the environment. This property of the glands is a manifestation of sensibility.
The adaptability of the glands is impaired by drugs, which affect the nerves: opium
numbs the nerves and curbs the activity of certain glands. Bordeu concluded that it
was
definitely the nerves that distribute this property to the various organs. Hejustified
the difference between the throbbing of living flesh and the cold rigidity of corpses

through the Vital tension that animates the nerves. Time is the equivalent of sensiln'lity.
Ifsmsibility is the very life ofnerves, it appears in the form of permanent toniri/y, the
source of the
capacity to perceive and to act.
The radical difference introduced by the notion of sensibility compared to all the
mechanistic models" is the place devoted to a specifically Vital interest. The activity
of an automaton is directed to the end for which it is built. The mechanism may
be complex but it
always fulfills its task in the
same
way following the program that
is imposed on it. The principle of vital reaction lies in the organs adaptation to the
perpetual variation in its conditions of activity as it pursues its own advantage. For
the same reason, each part contributes to the general consensus of the body, for each
has an interest in the balance produced through the regulated coordination of the
activities of them all. This subjective wish to ensure as far as possible its preservation
and development differentiates the life of an organ from that ofa machine, The basis
ofthis property is to be found in sensibility, considered to be a universal property ofthe

living being. Borden endowed sensibility with a determining force in organic workings
even if he did not commit himself as to the nature of this
organic property. “Would

”
On the theme of the organic parts as individual “lives." see the essay by Charles Wolfe and Motoiclii Terada.
"The animal economy as object and program," in this issue.
”As Veronique Lr: Ru has noted (Le Ru 2001). the term “iiiécaiiisnie” was defined in 1701 iii the second
edition of Furetiére's Dizlmnnnnt (lst edition 1690) as the ”structure ofa natural or artificial organism, and the
combined action ofits parts." She also refers to Dortous de Mairan‘s comment in his Elagc of the abbé de
Moliéres that “mechanism as the immediate cause of all natural has
lately become the distinctive
phenomena
mark ofthe Cartesians” (in jeanejacques Dortous de Mairan, Hismirc dr l’At‘tidc'Init' Rtiyiilr ties sutures
patll‘ 1742).
Additionally, in the eighteenth century the term "iatromechanisni" appeared, referring to the medical doctrine
associated With Borelli (1608—1679) in Italy and later, in Northern Europe, with Boerhaave (1668—1738) and
his disciple Haller (170871777). latromechanists relied on Descartes' L'Hmmnt for the thesis ofthe animal as
machine, so that all living being: must obey mechanical laws; hence the notion of organism is reduced to that
ofa machine.
 Irrimliliry and Si'imbiliry 529

sensibility, in some respects, stem from the essence ofa

fragment ofmatter or would it be
attribute essential to its combinations?" (Bordeu 175],
an
CVIII).in The metaphor of
swarm ofbees shows the
a
importance he gave to organization, to the consensus ofthe
parts.Sensibility is the principle oforganic consensus: each part perceives the activity of
the other parts, through sympathy. Modifications in one
organ have repercussions on the
whole and on the organs that are linked to it in its sector. Each ofthese
organic elements
(from the elementary fiber to the most complex gland) possesses sensibility, that is, the
capacity to react to stimulation in accordance with its own interest. An alteration in
one
organ results in an adjustment in the workings of the neighboring organ. Borden
was not a distant precursor ofcybernetics! However, the role he attributed to
sensibility
exceeds that ofa mere
quality ofperception, He conceived the
organism as
resulting
from particular actions of the organs, whose equilibrium is a permanent adjustment
of reciprocal influences. The organism is living because it is sensitive. In the works
of Bordeu, the sum of little lives constitutes life in
general, because the product of
their sum exceeds the addition of their mere
juxtaposition It is as if organic unity
results from the united forces of the organs; there is
nothing further to explain “the
integrative and adaptive order" (Duchesneau 1982, 369) which is the end product of
Borden’s theory. Senn'liiliry is not an attractive force ofmechanical or
physical nature; it
is a quality ofliving matter. The doctor observes its effects and deduccs its existence: be
neither measures its intensity, nor promulgates its laws. In Borden’s
doctrine, sensibility
is not a property Opposed to the soul. It is a material
property, making it possible to
account for the
living behavior ofniatter. Borden made no pronouncement as to the
existence of a spiritual soul as he had no need of it in his
physiological system. If
the soul is to govern the body, it must have
knowledge ofthe laws and structure of all
the parts. It must be capable ofdividing
itselfainong the organs it governs, as they may
have poorly regulated or opposing activities. How can it
simultaneously be active in
the stomach at the time oi‘digestion and at rest in the other
organs? Borden reserved
a
place for the immortal and spiritual soul, but with no role to play in the organic
working of the human being, and he criticized recourse to a third term, between
corporal substance and spiritual substance. His system of sensibility brought together
the ability of the living being to react and the
possibility that these reactions might be
different, even contradictory; this would not be the case for a single and “intelligent"
principle.
Based on this radical rejection of a mechanistic
conception of organic workings,
the Montpellier physicians folloving the example of Bordeu went on to develop
—
—

W
This comment is significant, because Borden is
rarely so explicit when it comes to the philosophical difficulties
raised by his medical reflections He
rejects the notion of a separate spiritual principle, like Stahl's soul, Van
Helniont‘s iiir/mriis, and later Barthez’s Vital principle, and hesitates between a materialist
position, in which the
essence ofrhe conservative Force 15 material, and a Vision in which the coordinated
organization ofrhe organs
possesses the guiding, conservative properties of the Stahlian soul, Borden privileges the second position and as
such can rightfully be termed an “organisisti” as his earliest commentators did,
530 Dominique Bl my

an
epistemological conception hostile to experiments and experimentation in the
field of (economic aiiiiiiale, the organic working of the body, While remaining cautious
about reference to the concept of experiment, a divide is clearly defined between

experimenters and observers. Menuret de Chambaud systematically defended these

positions in articles in the Encyclopédi‘a. He was born in Montelimar and defended
his thesis in medicine in Montpellier in 1757. Sponsored by Gabriel—Francois Venel
(172371775), Menuret de Chambaud replaced Arnulphe d’Auniont (1720—1782) who
resigned from his position in the Entyzlapédie. For a long time, no one had acknowledged
his participation for what it was worth until the work ofjacques Roger and Roselyne
Rey’s thesis which attributes around one hundred articles to him, signed “Menurct,”
“M” or “m.” “Ifthe Chevalier de jaucourt (170471780), 2 true polymath, is excluded,
it can be considered that Ménuret’s contribution to medicine proper, represents the
most important and homogeneous set of articles the
Entyrlopzicdia” (Roger [1963]
in

1993, 631; Rey 2000, 7). His career was that ofa
provincial doctor from Montelimar
where he practiced. He published several works, including the innovative Trairé stir
Ir Poul: in 1768 and L'élqgc’ dc Vciiel in 1777. He made a reputation for himself

through his interventions in favor ofnieasures for public hygiene (moving cemeteries
to a distance outside urban areas, for instance). In 1784 he settled again in Paris. He

studied improvements in therapeutic means and was intensely interested in the reform
of medical studies: in 1791, he published l’Essai' [itim‘jbriiicr dc BUIIS Médmiis. If he
was hopeful at the onset of the French Revolution, he remained a moderate royalist,

backing General Duniouriez against the government ofthe Convention. Condemned

to exile, he lost the recognition ofhis peers, was forgotten and missed out on the
place
in history he deserved. In addition to his decisive collaboration With the Encyclopedia,
Ménuret also wrote articles, “Observateur” and “Observation,” in which he coherently
detailed an observational approach that took up a certain number of elements to be
found dispersed in Borden’s works Observation “is the attention of the soul turned
towards the objects that nature offers. Experimentation is this same attention directed to

phenomena created by art” (Ménuret 1765, llt3l3b), objects “artificially” constructed

by experimenting physicists. Ménuret reproached the “laborers of experimentation"
with altering nature in their works and with not being able to claim an authenticated

knowledge of the phenomenon they were seeking to explain. In this accusation,

there was no confusion between experimentation and certain active modalities of

exploration.
A comparison between working in a mine and dissecting a corpse shows we have
made use of techniques to discover what nature is hiding from us, without modifying
either its layout or its structure. The miner who uncovers a vein sees it as nature
made it, whereas the chemist who causes the mineral to react to some liquid that
dissolves it, is strictly speaking carrying out an experiment, ”by which natural results
will have been substituted by arbitrary ones” (ibid., 314a). Dissection by an anatomist
is nothing more than the revelation of the hidden dispositions of the human body
that mere external observation is inadequate to provide, whereas the physiologist who
 Irrilnbrlfry and Sensibility 53]

attempts to mix blood With

reactive substance only obtains mediocre,
a
imperfect,
“more or less nonexistent”
knowledge of his object ofstudy. Of course, one and the
other are our only two sources of knowledge, but it is in fact observation which is
the most productive of all the sciences. Newton discovered the
principle ofgravitation
through observation, and what about astronomers? Haven’t they developed the surest
ofsciences, without being able to attempt the least experiment because ofthe distance
ofthe stars?
This recourse undeniable guarantees only reinforces the scientific value of
to

medicine If, through observation alone, great scholars have managed to penetrate
some of Nature’s secrets, doctors can aspire to the same results, Those, however, who
favor experimentation have gone astray and are deforming nature rather than helping
to get to know it. Choosing this path to knowledge is the consequence of explicit
“epistemological” conceptions, Observation is about knowledge; the experimenters
art is about techniques. It is only when observation enables us to understand how
nature works that We Will be able to
attempt to imitate it through experiments. This
distinction explains the gap that our doctors emphasize, between
living organisms,
products of nature which cannot therefore be imitated by human techniques, and
machines or experimental artifices which are nothing but unfaithful, delusive
copies.
The essential originality of their doctrine is brought into play when
they favor
observation over experiments, since the differences in nature and
property between
inert matter and living matter (symbolized by sensibility) in their
justifies eyes the need
for specific treatment, for an autonomous, separate science: a new medical
philosophy.
“Passing from the physics of inorganic bodies to that of organic bodies, we shall see
a reduction in the
authority of experimentation and an increase in the empire and
utility ofobservation” (ibid., 315a). Experimenting implies intervening in the work of
life and modifying its course. This expedient is unsuited to give us authenticated

knowledge of “animal economy” Observnig and analyzing the combination and

regulated functioning of the organs on a healthy body as well as on a sick organism,
should be the only method for the practitioner to be able to
grasp the complexity of
living organisms.
The debate between Haller and the Montpellier physicians did not
really take
place. They were not
speaking ofthe same
things; the same words concealed concepts
of a different nature Bordeu made no secret of his goal: to launch the bases ofa
new medical
philosophy Whereas his condemnation of systems was only a refusal of
scientific doctrines imported into the field oflife’s phenomena, he was not
against the
rational adoption of their originality. The wealth of his observations, the
quality of
his philosophical reflections, and the worth of his experience as a practitioner, confer
a
privileged place to his doctrine in the second half of the eighteenth century His
theoretical formulation, however, remained out of sync with the
requirements ofa
truly scientific discipline. It was a last attempt to give coherence and effectiveness to
thought and medical practice which remain broadly “prerscientific.” On the other
hand, Haller’s conclusmns were less attractive, philosophically speaking, as they mixed
 53.7 Dominique BUIH')‘

experimental results with outmoded mechanistic considerations

(particularly the role
he attributed to animal minds). Yet his methods and objectives placed him in an
experimental context, which was to usher in Claude Bernard’s future advances in
experimental medicine. Helene Metzger showed how for Lavorsier in the same period,
“an empirical, experimental definition of elements alone was of use if
chemistry was
to work as a science" (Metzger 1935, 16). The most fruitful instrument in his research

method was systematic weighing as a verification criterion for his experiments,

Just
as
measuring the shortening ofniuscular fibers was essential in Albrecht von Haller’s
work as a physiologist. The sensibility ofBordeu and his colleagues was a philosophical

concept likely to attract Diderot. It allows the thinker to grasp the nature of living
beings, the unity ofthe world. In contrast, Haller’s i'rrilability may be considered as a
scientific concept marking the onset ofphysiology The following decades were notable
for the continuation of this opposition. The Montpellier school, with Bordeu at the
fore, can be considered as the first to attempt a medical anthropology which was to
expand into the nineteenth century (Williams 1994, 92—93) and for which Pierre—jean»
Georges Cabanis (1757—1808) was an essential link. Sensibility is the property oforgans
which “enables each one to establish a relationship with the outside world and with
itself,” it is the source ofnian’s moral existence, and even ifhe defends a very personal
conception ofthe workings of sensibility as a fluid, a “moving mass ofenergy” (Sand
2006, 123), Cabanis remained faithful to the Hippocratic, vitalist tradition. Menuret
de Chambaud, Bichat, Cabanis (in France) developed a monist conception in which
there was a close link between illness in the organs, psychic symptoms, and moral
ailments, The quality in the living being which accounts for this unity is
sensibility.
The content of the concept varied for halfa century but there is no doubt that it was

deeply influenced by Borden’s works.

The eighteenth century was a particularly favorable period in the field of physics,
chemistry, geology, and biology. By identifying oxygen, Lavoisier and Priestley
epitomized for chemistry what Haller represented with his works on sensibility and
irritability These scholars to whom one can add Charles Bonnet, Wolff, Blumenbach,
or Buffon “stimulated new lines of
enquiry in the sciences oflife” (Engelhardt 2000,
12), enquiries which they strove to carry forward in a nonrmetaphySical sense “and
in general limited to the empirical sphere of nature" (ibid). Even if Steinke judged
that Haller’s immediate successorsdid not take up the main points of his scientific
method, and that it only
was With the works of Claude Bernard and Albert Kolliker
that his experimental principles and results (revelation ofa property in the muscular
system independent ofthe nerves) were revived, developments in physiology show that
“Haller’s ideal ofscientific research finally seems to have been fulfilled” (Steinke 2005,
280-281).
The discussion between physicians concerning two concepts of sensibility and
irritability, occurring over arather short period of time about twenty years
—

brings
—

to light tensions in the field of Enlightenment medicine. As Canguilhern put it, “we