IMBONG VS OCHOA

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the
Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the:
Right to life
Right to health
Freedom of religion and right to free speech
Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
Freedom of expression and academic freedom
Due process clause
Equal protection clause
Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to
himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in
the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people
to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component
rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or
impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not
be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment
or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon
the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute
had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may
be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the
valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid
portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific
and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of
“fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend
to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum
would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum,
and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or”
in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s
womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded
duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
“primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave
the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the
definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be
struck down.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public.
In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA
4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
 Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only
after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern
RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or
belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control
program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious
beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and
goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly,
Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a
family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b)
the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies
and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and
endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-
kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services.
Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may
be made in life-threatening procedures.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State
to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might
raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their
youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather
than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in
developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners.
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms
as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH
Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law)
as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
“incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the
public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the
equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states
that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children
and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does
not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide
priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro
bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow
them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free
speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason
for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive
branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of
the Filipino people.
Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still,
the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain
individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on
locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived
or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of
a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance
of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their
proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-
reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated
and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears
to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents
of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to
the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do
any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

. Estrada vs Sandiganbayan, GR No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Estrada vs Sandiganbayan, GR No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to
impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on
the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this
terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge
on the validity of the mentioned law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial
challenge.

Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s
contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize
cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s
reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only
be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a
saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the
statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of
strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute
in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.
On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be
applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’ decision to
include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the
plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

Issues:
WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The
amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the
various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense.
 Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts.
These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of
the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute
is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

Morfe v. Mutuc
G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968

FACTS:
Congress enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public officials and employees from
committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service. One of the specific
provisions of the said act is that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or
after his assumption of office "and within the month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as
upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs,
"a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes
paid for the next preceding calendar." Said provision was challenged for being violative of due process as
an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy,
implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against
self-incrimination.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the periodical submission of statement of assets and liabilities of an official is
violative of the petitioner’s constitutional rights.

HELD:
No. The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for
official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further
promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can
cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all.

When a government official accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the
obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office
but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. While in the attainment of such public good, no
infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and
undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the statute allows. The due process clause is not
susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power. It cannot
also be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on
the right of a person to privacy. It is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such compulsory
revelation, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give freedom from
testimonial compulsion. It appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure has been shown to exist by such requirement. Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater
plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his invocation of the non-incrimination clause. The court
stresses that it is not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man's conduct from
judicial inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice.

Dumlao v COMELEC G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980

Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order

Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for
said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.

He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory

and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.

S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elecOted, shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective local office from which he has retired.

He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him, and that the classification
provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.

His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay of a person who was convicted
of a crime given that there was judgment for conviction and the prima facie nature of the filing of charges
for the commission of such crimes.

He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution,
which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination." Apart form this, hey also attacked the term of office and the election
period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.

Issue:
1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?

Held:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted

Ratio:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine judicial review, three
requisites are present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question

a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed for his disqualification.
It was only a hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet been adversely affected by
the operation of the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of
constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that his suit be dismissed.

However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved and the imminent
elections.

2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.

If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a reasonable classification.
Young blood can be encouraged to come in to politics.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for
new blood assumes relevance.

The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that
the retired employee has already declared himself tired an unavailable for the same government work,
but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.

It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision.
Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee is not
violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class.

The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times,
it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.

Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not
synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence,
as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been
filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate
effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of
disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be
ineligible to run for public office.

A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is
virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto,
which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the
sentence.

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the
prima facie evidence against him.

A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial

determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora
G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000

FACTS:
The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the
Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to conduct joint
visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The PNP Chief, through Police
Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (LOI) which detailed
the manner by which the joint visibility patrols would be conducted under the leadership of the Police
Chief of Metro Manila. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other
for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) questions the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement. It contends that no
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, it prays that this
Court review the sufficiency of the factual basis for Marine deployment.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review.

(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

HELD:
(1) Yes. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether
the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the
problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. When the President calls the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or
substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support
the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no
evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the
military. There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such
power.

(2) No. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself,
which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the
local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging
to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines
joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police
patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in
the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution. Considering the
above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the
patrols.

SanMiguelBrewery,Inc., plaintiff-appellant vs.FranciscoMagno, defendant-appellee

Facts:
1.The Mun. Board of Butuan passed Ordinance No. 11 imposing a tax of 2% on the grosssales or receipts
of those engaged in the sale, trading in, or disposal of all alcoholic or malt beverages, wines and mixed or
fermented liquors, including tuba, basi, & tapuy.T h e s a me M u n i c i p a l B o a r d p a s s e d O r d i n a n c e
N o . 1 1 0 a me n d i n g O r d i n a n c e N o . 1 1 , fixing a tax on the sale of beer at the rate of Php 0.25 per
case of 24 bottles, & on thes a l e o f s o f t d r i n ks a t t h e r a t e o f P h P 0 . 1 0 p e r c a s e o f 2 4
b o t t l e s o f s o f t d r i n ks o r a n y carbonateddrinks.
2.S a n M i gu e l B r e w e r y ( S a n M i g u e l ) m a i n t a i n s a w a r e h o u s e o n t h e c i t y o f B u t u a n
a n d a l t h o u gh c o n s i s t e n t l y & p r o m p t l y p a i d t h e
r e q u i r e d t a x e s u n d e r O r d i n a n c e N o . 1 1 , suddenlystoppedpaying&incurredbacktaxes.Verbaldemands were
madebythe CityTreasurertoSanMiguelandwarnedthemthatawarrantofdistraint &levywillbeissuedagainstthemiftheycontinuetorefuseto
paytheirtaxes.
3 . S a n M i g u e l a n s w e r e d t h e d e m a n d s a n d q u e s t i o n e
d t h a t t h e p o w e r o f t h e c i t y government to distraint & levy can only be
exercised with respect to the delinquencies inthepaymentofrealestatetaxes.
4.Later, a formal letter for demand was made by the
C i t y T r e a s u r e r a n d S a n M i g u e l requestedmoretimetoactonthedemandandreferthe mattertoitsManila
Office.
5. MorewrittendemandsweremadebytheTreasurerbutfailedtocollectfromSanMiguel.T h e T r e a s u r e r t h e n i s s u e d a
w a r r a n t o f d i s t r a i n t & l e v y a ga i n s t t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f S a n Miguelatitsbranchoffice.Taxesandpenalties
amountedtoPhp24,747.32.6.The notice of seizure by virtue of the warrant of distraint & levy was served to the
BranchManagerofSanMiguelandSanMiguelvoluntarilysurrendered2deliverytrucks.
7.
San Miguel filed at the Court of First Instance of Manila against Francisco Magno in hisi n d i vi d u a l
c a p a c i t y t o r e l e a s e t h e d e l i ve r y t r u c ks a n d t o p a y t h e m t h e a m o u n t o f P h p 6,000 &
Php 3,000.00 for each day that the trucks were impounded. Francisco Magnofiled an Answer and stated
that his actions were in furtherance of his duties as the CityT r e a s u r e r o f B u t u a n C i t y . D u r i n g
t h e p e n d e n c y o f t h e a c t i o n , S a n M i gu e l p a i d u n d e r protestthetaxesassessedtothem.Theimpounded
truckswerethenreleased.8.San Miguel filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the Court of Appeals but was
denied.

Issue:
1.Whether the Ordinance No. 26 is constitutional
2 . W h e t h e r F r a n c i s c o M a g n o s h o u l d b e p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e f o r d a m a ge s
3. WhetherSanMiguelshallpayMagnofornominaldamages&attorney’sfees.

Decision:
1. Magno, as the City Treasurer of Butuan issued the said warrant through Ordinance
No.2 6 o f B u t u a n C i t y . T h e a p p e a l o f S a n M i g u e l q u e s t i o n e d t h e
v a l i d i t y o f t h e s a i d ordinance. As a general rule, the question of
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y s h o u l d b e r a i s e d a t t h e earliest opportunity. If it was not raised in the
pleadings, the issue cannot be raised at the trial court as well as on appeal. The exemptions are made in
criminal cases where the issue of constitutionality can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and in
civil cases where the determination of the constitutionality is important in the decision. In civil cases also,
the appellate court may consider the question on the constitutionality of
thes t a t u t e w h e n i t i n v o l v e s t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t b e
l o w . S i n c e t h e r e a r e n o exemptions in this case where the question of the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 26mayberaised,theappealofthepetitionerscannotquestionthesame.In addition,itisnotcorrect
thatMagnoshouldbesuedinhisindividualcapacitysincehe is not the proper party against whom the invalidity of the
statute should be pleaded. A municipal ordinance is not subject to collateral attack & public policy forbids
collateral impeachmentoflegislativeacts.2 . M a g n o s h o u l d n o t b e h e l d p e r s o n a l l y
& individually liable to pay for damages to
SanM i g u e l s i n c e h e i s s u e d t h e w a r r a n t o f d i s t r a i n t a n d l e v
y i n g o o d f a i t h & i n h i s performanceofhisdutiesasthe CityTreasurerunderOrdinanceNo.26ofButuan
City.
3.San Miguel should be made to pay for the attorney’s fees made by Magno. Since San M i gu e l s u e d
M a g n o i n h i s i n d i vi d u a l c a p a c i t y , M a g n o i s n o w f o r c e d t o h i r e a p r i va t e counsel to
defend his rights. Because of this, it is only proper for San Miguel to pay for heexpensesMagnomadeforhiringhis
owncounsel
 ERNESTO FRANCISCO, JR., et al. v . HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al.

The power of judicial review extends to the rule making power of the Congress where said rule contravenes the mandate of
the Constitution. Pursuant to the mandate of Section 3 (8) of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, the 12th Congress of the
House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Rules).
Section 16 Rule V of the House Rule provides that ―impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General‖ while Section 17 Rule V states, ―Within
a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official.
A House Resolution was subsequently issued directing the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) by the Chief Justice. Then President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first complaint), endorsed by some of the members of the House of
Representatives against then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. (Davide, Jr.) and seven other associate justices, in accordance
with Section 3 (2) Article IX. The first complaint was dismissed for being insufficient in substance, hence, the Committee
Report was never sent to the House in plenary.
A second impeachment complaint (second complaint) signed by at least one third (1/3) of the members of the House of
Representatives was filed with the Secretary General of the House of Representatives by Gilbert Teodoro et al., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry. Hence, the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Ernesto Francisco, Jr., et al. (Francisco) prays that the House of Representatives be prevented from transmitting
the Articles of Impeachment of the second complaint to the Senate, that the House Rules be declared null and void for being
unconstitutional. Likewise, it prayed that the House Resolution infringes the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers
and the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. On the other hand, Respondent-members of the House of
Representatives claims that the second complaint will prosper since the term, ―initiate is different from ―filing under
Section 16 Rule V of the House Rule, hence, the first complaint was not really ―filed.
Respondent-intervenors Senator Franklin Drilon (Drilon) and Atty. Jaime Soriano, et. al. filed filed a Manifestation and
Petitions for Intervention, respectively, asserting that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear, prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, a co-equal and independent branch from performing its mandate of intiating impeachment cases and that
there is no justiciable issue and the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination. The Manifestations and
Petitions for Intervention were admitted by the Court.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings
2.) Whether or not the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by the 12th Congress is constitutional
3.) Whether or not the second impeachment complaint may be validly filed

HELD:

This Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our
present 1987 Constitution: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. There
exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Respondent-members of the Congress‘ and intervenors Atty. Romulo Macalintal, et
al.‘s reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to
support the proposition that the Senate’s “sole power to try and decide impeachment cases,” as provided for under Art. XI,
Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment
to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are
no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional
law is concerned. While the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary
in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is
not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
The Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings adopted by the 12th Congress is Unconstitutional.
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term “initiate”
does not mean “to file;” that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean “to file. Respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate
Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term “cases” must be distinguished from the term “proceedings.”
An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that
the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has
“exclusive power” to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. On the other hand, proceeding takes place
not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a
Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives;
(2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3)
whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for
further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either
affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members.
If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the
Senate. It is at this point that the House “initiates an impeachment case.” Thus, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. To the argument that only the House of
Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says “The House of Representatives
shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment,” This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to
the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating “impeachment cases” with “impeachment proceeding.” Father Bernas
concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, “No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year,” it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee
on Justice for action.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and
only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption
that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced. Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence,
these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. If
as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would, by necessary implication, have the power to alter or
amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance,
or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These
rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term “initiate” a meaning different meaning from
filing and referral.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution
is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term “initiate” a meaning different
from “filing.” Therefore, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
The Second Impeachment Complaint is barred by Par .5 Section 3 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Having concluded that
the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice,
the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.