IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, plaintiff vs.

COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS, defendant

248 SCRA 300

Facts:

March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC
alleging that Imelda-Romualdez Marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. March 29,
1995, Marcos filed a corrected certificate of candidacy changing the entry “seven” months to “since childhood”.
The COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration declaring her not qualified to run for the
position of the member of the House of Representatives for the First District of Leyte. In a
supplemental petition, Marcos averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the election.

Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of
one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

A. Prior to Election: Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under
Article 78 of the said Code

B. After the Election:Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive
jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections

Held:

1. Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile for
actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for
the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. An individual does not
lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.

What is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four
decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the
domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the
height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home
province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing
a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the
ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her
domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country.
Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not
know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 371.
An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed
to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate
 abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this
court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect
an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to
supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point,
we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

Jurisdiction

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed
resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House
of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on
the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference
between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of
the First District of Leyte.
Domino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone
legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks
to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P.
Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr. filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a
resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. Thereafter, the
COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of
representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency
requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voter’s
Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.On 11
May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046,
ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering
that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory.7

Issue:
a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner
as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole
world, including the Commission on Elections.
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and
c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the
disqualification of petitioner.
Held:
a. No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the
exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final
and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is
within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was
made in the certificate of candidacy,that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the
right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial
jurisdicton, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINO's qualification as a
candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement. Moreover, the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a
resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voter's registration from
Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel,
Sarangani. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the
challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases
is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the
challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precint in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the
 voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the change or transfer of registration from one
place of residence to another for it is the function of the election Registration Board as provided under
Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189. The only effect of the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged
voter from the list of voters, is for the Election Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to
remove the voter's registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion
therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file.
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause
of action are indispensable requirements for the application of said doctrine.
b. No. The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile”
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other
reasons, one intends to return.
Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he
acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position
of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming
that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of
choice in the Province of Sarangani.
A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one
is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support
a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in Sarangani, but
it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile. The
mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to
abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house
and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the
one-year residence requirement. Further, Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon
City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of
residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where
Domino registered in his former barangay.
c. Yes. As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has
jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction
continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the
election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes and
provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office. The fact
of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the
winning candidate. A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be
considered a member of the House of Representatives. Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed
as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed
a member of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which
has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
Intervenor’s plea: Lucille Chiongban-Solon
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely, that
the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law
then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes
and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such
case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated
candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the
electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the
people's right to elect officials of their choice.
INTERVENOR's plea that the votes cast in favor of DOMINO be considered stray votes cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the COMELEC 2nd
Division and the decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are hereby AFFIRMED

Jalosjos v. COMELEC GR No. 191970, April 24, 2012

FACTS:
Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He migrated to Australia when he was eight and there acquired Australian
citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother
in Barangay Veteran's Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. He took an oath of allegiance and renounced his
Australian citizenship. From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village
where he lived and a fishpond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay.
On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his COC for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10,
2010 elections. Dan Erasmo, Sr. promptly filed a petition to cancel Jalosjos' COC on the ground that the latter
made material misrepresentation since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the
one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code.
After hearing, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that, while Jalosjos had regained Philippine
citizenship by complying with the requirements of R.A. 9225, he failed to prove the residency requirement for a
gubernatorial candidate. On motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the Second
Division's decision, ruling that Jalosjos had been a mere guest or transient visitor in his brother's house and, for
this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that
Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.

RULING:
YES.
The LGC requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at
least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must
also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. There is no hard
and fast rule to determine a candidate's compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence
is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a
domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new
one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency
requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay. To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new
domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of
choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or
residence somewhere. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since
he has merely been staying at his brother's house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion.
Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to
establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a
rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives
would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things:
actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does
not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or
irrelevant considerations.The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as
his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division dated February 11, 2010 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated May 4, 2010 that
disqualified petitioner Rommel Jalosjos from seeking election as Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Ongsiako-Reyes vs. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed
before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent
filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations
regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent Joseph Socorro Tan
alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to
admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the
basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en
banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took her
oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued
a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Status Quo Ante Order.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner
and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office
Held:
The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

Discussion:
1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal
has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and
qualification of the members of House of Representative.
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v. COMELEC23 and Guerrero v. COMELEC,24 the Court
ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has
not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House of
Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.Thus, until such
time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte,
there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether
the required oath of office was indeed complied with
2. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law
requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and
sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of
office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA
9225. As to the issue of residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen
who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through
positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of
choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to
RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has
not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial
Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to
prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be
an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
Dimaporo v. Mitra
202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859
October 15, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del
Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
in the immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC,
respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code
which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker,
expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. He
maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is
not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present
members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of
Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are
provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of
June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the
shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds
another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to
holding another office or employment.

ISSUE:

1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION?

2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY

ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS
CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because
of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we
have this …chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of
Article XI (1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.
Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their
principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the
term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks
to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another
public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy,
they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public
officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received
from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for
another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is
deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently
effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are
considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or
appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future
contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a
mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present
members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office, on impeachment … All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4)
grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not
exclusive. The expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not
preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To
justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It
was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67,
Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner
had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but
to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers
cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The
reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the
lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and
benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may
impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.

NOTES:

- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress,
petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution
may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually
holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure
may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term
of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary (2003)

Facts:
In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act was signed into law. Section 14 thereof repealed
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code which states that an elective official, except the President and the
Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. Hence, under RA 9006, an elective official shall no longer be deemed resigned if he files his
certificate of candidacy for an elective office while he is still in office.
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that an appointive official hall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy, was however retained by the Fair
Election Act.
Rodolfo Fariñas, then a Congressman belonging to the minority group, questioned the constitutionality of
Section 14 on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. He averred that the
repeal of Section 67 gave elective officials undue advantage over appointive officials (discrimination).
The Fariñas group also questioned the validity of RA 9006 in its entirety. They contend that irregularities
attended to the creation of the said law. Fariñas explained that RA 9006 originated as House Bill No. 9000 and
Senate Bill No. 1741; that there were contrasting provisions between the two bills hence a Bicameral
Conference Committee was created; that in fact two subsequent BCCs were convened which is irregular already
in itself; that only the 1st BCC had its record and the compromise bill from said 1st BCC was never subjected to
a conference with the lower house; that in the 2nd BCC, it appeared that another compromised bill was agreed
upon even though there was no meeting at all and that the Report as to how said compromise bill was reached
was instantly made and made to be passed around for signing – all these irregularities made the law
unconstitutional for being procedurally infirm.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, RA 9006 is constitutional.
On Equal Protection
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from the other.
In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term
and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. Further, appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly
prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote;
while elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to
take part in political and electoral activities.
On the Enrolled Bill Doctrine
The contention that irregularities attended the creation of RA 9006 is overridden by the enrolled bill doctrine.
Under this doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. The Supreme Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the internal rules of Congress,
whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have
no concern. Whatever irregularities there may have been in the Bicameral Conference Committee involve
internal rules which cannot be inquired into by the Court.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the
courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive
concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on
constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power.57No such transgression has been shown in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 150605 December 10, 2002

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN

Facts:

Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4 th district of Leyte as against
respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the
suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was
suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified
him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however
reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his
defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the
office he won.

Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.
2. Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
3. Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

HELD:
1. The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been
disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null
and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as
second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s choice.
2. Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and
that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had become final.
Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for
quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was not the issue.
3. The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the
matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its (Comelec’s) Decision be obeyed by all officials
of the land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the right to the office which merits recognition regardless of
personal judgment or opinion.

TOLENTINO & MOJICA vs. COMELEC, RECTO & HONASAN

G.R. No. 148334
January 21, 2004

This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (“Resolution No.
01-005”) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-006”) of respondent
Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as
Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared “official and final” the ranking of
the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.

Facts:

Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on
February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election
to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each,
were due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering
the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona,
Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.

On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected
Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full
term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for
prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC issued
Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in
the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to
indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as
allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters
Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as
purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these
omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections
without distinction such that “there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single
election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.” Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary
restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court
required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentino’s and Mojica's standing to
bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed
public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and
01-006.

Issue:

WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

Ratio Decidendi:

(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to
fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of
notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special
election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the
result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly
believed that there was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be
void.

(2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special
Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the
candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our
election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC “fix the date of election,”
if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for.

Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely
implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said
resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated
by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate
agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that “the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.”

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for
respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although
they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under
the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from
the party-list representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-
list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to
require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to
be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional seats
for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and
coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is
consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people,
but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the
members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is
computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties
with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered
in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be
referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of
seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of
its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled
to, based on proportional representation.

G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought
the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the
issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785.

RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the
issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Tha facts attendant
to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the
requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List
System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine
proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation
to the cause of the party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court.
The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Consitution, the
Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
179271, April 21, 2009

NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come
from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the
total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3
seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party
vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for
the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid;
Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner
at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule
creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%
qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-
lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD”
portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there
shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there
shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from
legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed
Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative
districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list
representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-
List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-
lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are
disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets
a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a
seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast
to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a
seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists
which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total
number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In
this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55
minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining,
first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not
garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats.
The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list –
but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes
cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which
means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that
BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having
more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied
seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be
prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO,
LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or
from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party”
was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major
political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which
represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other
justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely
because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the
marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties
cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list
system.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)

G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
FACTS:

 The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52
party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by
denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration
and accreditation as party-list organizations.
 Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
 December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to
grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National
Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections because PBB does not represent
any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
 13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing
of the official.
 Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of
intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941
and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to
include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections.
 Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.

ISSUE:

 Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

HELD:

 No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts
new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the
present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list
system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
 Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
 allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-
list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
 First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively
for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."
 Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first
"three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system
fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there
will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting
the party-list system.
 Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but
also for non-sectoral parties.
 R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-
list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial
fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-
based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the
electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
Cocofed-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation Inc. vs. COMELEC GR No. 207026, August 6, 2013
SUMMARY: Party-lists must submit a list of five nominees before the COMELEC. Otherwise, they would be
disqualified from participating in the elections, as what happened to petitioner COCOFED in this case.
FACTS:
• Petitioner is an organization and sectoral party whose membership comes from the peasant sector,
particularly the coconut farmers and producers. On May 29, 2012, COCOFED manifested with the COMELEC
its intent to participate in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013 and submitted the names of only two
nominees.
• On November 7, 2012, the COMELEC cancelled COCOFED’s registration and accreditation as a party-
list organization on several grounds. Notably, the Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Christian Lim cited, as
additional ground, that since COCOFED submitted only two nominees, then it failed to comply with Section 8
of Republic Act (RA) No. 79417 that requires the party to submit to COMELEC a list of not less than five
nominees.
• COCOFED questioned the COMELEC’s cancellation of its registration and accreditation before the
Supreme Court. Its petition was eventually consolidated with other petitions that formed the basis for the Atong
Paglaum decision.
• In its Decision in Atong Paglaum, the Court remanded all the petitions to the COMELEC to determine
their compliance with the new parameters and guidelines set by the Court in that case.
• On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued its assailed resolution, maintaining its earlier ruling cancelling
COCOFED’s registration and accreditation for its failure to comply with the requirement of Section 8 of RA
No. 7941, i.e., to submit a list of not less than five nominees.
• COCOFED moved for reconsideration only to withdraw its motion later. Instead, on May 20, 2013,
COCOFED filed a Manifestation with Urgent Request to Admit Additional Nominees with the COMELEC.
• On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the cancellation of COCOFED’s
accreditation final and executory.
ISSUE/S:
• WoN the petition is already moot and academic since COCOFED only received 0.36% of the total
number of votes cast in the party-list elections (less than 2%)
o NO. The validity of the COMELEC’s resolution, cancelling COCOFED’s registration, remains a very
live issue that is not dependent on the outcome of the elections. Under Section 4 of RA No. 7941, a party-list
group already registered “need not register anew” for purposes of every subsequent election, but only needs to
file a manifestation of intent to participate with the COMELEC. A finding that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in cancelling COCOFED’s registration would entitle it, if it is so minded, to participate in
subsequent elections without need of undergoing registration proceedings anew.
• WoN the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed resolution cancelling
COCOFED’s registration
o NO. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants the cancellation of its
registration.
o First, the language of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 does not only use the word “shall” in connection with
the requirement of submitting a list of nominees; it uses this mandatory term in conjunction with the number of
names to be submitted that is couched negatively, i.e., “not less than five.” The use of these terms together is a
plain indication of legislative intent to make the statutory requirement mandatory for the party to undertake.
o Second, while COCOFED’s failure to submit a complete list of nominees may not have been among the
grounds cited by the COMELEC in earlier cancelling its registration, this is not sufficient to support a finding of
grave abuse of discretion.
o Third, the fact that a party-list group is entitled to no more than three seats in Congress, regardless of the
number of votes it may garner, does not render Section 8 of RA No. 7941 permissive in nature. The publication
of the list of nominees does not only serve as the reckoning period of certain remedies and procedures under the
resolution. Most importantly, the required publication satisfies the people’s constitutional right to information
on matters of public concern. The need for submission of the complete list required by law becomes all the
more important in a party-list election to apprise the electorate of the individuals behind the party they are
voting for.
o Fourth, we cannot discern any valid reason why a party-list group cannot comply with the statutory
requirement.
o Fifth, while under the 6th parameter in Atong Paglaum, the Court said that the disqualification of some
of the nominees shall not result in the disqualification of the party-list group "provided that they have at least
one nominee who remains qualified," the Court in no way authorized a party-list group's inexcusable failure, if
not outright refusal, to comply with the clear letter of the law on the submission of at least five nominees.
G.R. No. 206952 : OCTOBER 22, 2013

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST (ABANG LINGKOD), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, Respondents.

REYES, J.:

FACTS:

ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant farmers and fisherfolks,
and was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It failed to obtain the number of votes
needed in the May 2010 elections for a seat in the House of Representatives.

On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC August 9, 2012 resolution, filed
with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A.
No. 7941.

In a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled ABANG LINGKOD registration
as a party-list group. It pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the
cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it
conducted after the May 2010 elections.

ABANG LINGKOD field a petitioner for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling its registration under the party-list system. The said petition was consolidated with the separate
petitions filed by 51 other party-list groups whose registration were cancelled or who were denied registration
under the party-list system. The said party-list groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to obtain status
quo ante orders from the court.

The Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list groups, including that of
ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified under the party-list system pursuant to the new
parameters laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed to participate in the May 2013 party-list
elections.

On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution, which, inter alia, affirmed the
cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under the party-list system. The COMELEC issued the
Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any summary evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the May 13,
2013 elections as the reason therefor.

On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the COMELEC's Resolution dated May 10,
2013. However, on May 15, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion for reconsideration it filed with
the COMELEC and, instead, instituted the instant petition with this Court, alleging that there may not be
enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon the merits of its motion for reconsideration considering that the
election returns were already being canvassed and consolidated by the COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process?

HELD: BANG LINGKOD was not denied of due process.

POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.

In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the Court finds that the
COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to present evidence establishing its
qualification as a party-list group. It was notified through Resolution No. 9513 that its registration was to be
reviewed by the COMELEC. That ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its Manifestation of Intent and other
pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941, which the
COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate dates, belies its claim that it was denied due process.

There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing to assess the
qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent
and all the evidence adduced by it to establish its qualification as a party-list group are already in the possession
of the COMELEC. Thus, conducting further summary evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining
ABANG LINGKOD's qualification under the party-list system pursuant to Atong Paglaumwould just be a
superfluity.

Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD's claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not categorically require the
COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining the qualifications of the
petitioners therein pursuant to the new parameters for screening party-list groups.

POLITICAL LAW: cancellation of party-list registration

Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration of ABANG
LINGKOD under the party-list system. The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's
registration on the ground that it declared untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in
the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately submitted digitally altered photographs of activities to
make it appear that it had a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Essentially,
ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground that it failed to adduce evidence showing its
track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.

R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to submit proof of their
track record as a group. The track record requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court
held that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seeking registration under the party-list system
must prove through their, inter alia, track record that they truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented.

In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines on who may register
under the party-list system and the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented. For purposes of
registration under the party-list system, national or regional parties or organizations need not represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector; that representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only
required of sectoral organizations that represent the sectors stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by
their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented.

Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no
longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken
to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the
sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.

Dissenting, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties or organizations intending to register under the
party-list system are still required to present a track record notwithstanding the Court's pronouncement in Atong
Paglaum; that the track record that would have to be presented would only differ as to the nature of their
group/organization. He opines that sectoral organizations must prove their links with the marginalized and
underrepresented while national or regional parties or organizations must show that they have been existing as a
bona fide organization.

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be
represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art.
VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable
by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To
allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week
will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation
not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes
of the correction system.

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang

Facts:
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the
Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by
some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had
collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place
him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that
Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was
said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang
to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang
petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from
suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or
votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of
the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself,
caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published,
he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.

ANTONINO V VALENCIA
MAY 27, 1974
FACTS:
Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the Nacionalista Party in the election for
governor in Davao.
Subsequently, Senator Antonino issued a statement that the loss was caused by the support given by Valencia,
the Secretary of Public Works, to the independent LP candidate Maglana which caused a division in LP votes.
Antonino was quoted in various newspapers that had Valencia not “Sabotaged” and “double-crossed” them, the
LP would have won.
Antonino then proceeded to file requests to have Valencia investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
on alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment.
Valencia retaliated by issuing a press release that he will also file charges with the Blue Ribbon Committee
regarding anomalous acts of the Senator. This release was published in newspapers
Antonino filed this case of damages. Valencia filed a counter-claim. Lower court ruled in favor of Antonino.
Valencia appealed. Antonino died and was substituted by Senator Antonino (Wife)
ISSUES:
1.W/N the Press Release was issued by Valencia
2.W/N the Press Release is libelous
Held/Ruling:
YES. The fact that Valencia caused the release and publication of the press release is seen in the following facts:
1.The newspapers reproduced the specific charges filed by Antonino.
2.On the press release there was marked “For release” under the date.
3.It was indicated on the press release the answers made by Valencia to the charges of Antonino in the same
numerical order.
4.The press release indicated that it came from Valencia
5.The press release quoted Valencia and he admitted making the statement in his office in the presence of the
press
6.The first page of the press release consisted of quoted statements by Valencia and reports and information he
received about Antonino
7.The press release mentioned specific figures which only Valencia could know given the time constraint
8.Valencia did not make any correction or denial of the published statement.
YES. The statements issued were defamatory and libelous in nature as they imputed upon him certain corrupt
practices. Also, because the statement was not issued privately or officially, malice is presumed and such
presumption was not overcome as
Valencia did not prove the truth of his statements or that they were published with good intentions and with a
justifiable motive or that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair comment on the character, good
faith, ability and sincerity of public officials.
The court said that had Valencia not been motivated with malice he would have filedcharges against Antonino
with the Senate seeing as Antonino was not a candidate forelection and that his term as senator was no yet to
expire.
Also, Valencia cannot claim that his actions were justified in that Antonino was first in making libelous
statements. The anomalous transactions charge was duly filed with the Blue Ribbon.
Also, the statement on sabotage and double crossingcannot be considered libelous ascontemporary politics
shows that no stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who changes political parties.

Antero J. Pobre v. Sen Miriam Defensor-Santiago

A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009

The Judicial and Bar Council of the Philippines is a constitutionally-created body that recommends
appointees for vacancies that may arise in the composition of the Supreme Court and other lower courts.

The function of the Council is to recommend to the president of possible appointees to the Judiciary.
he person then chosen by the president then becomes a member of the Judiciary, and is not anymore reviewed
by the Commission on Appointments.

The Council is composed of a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member
of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. They are the "regular" members, as opposed to
the Secretary of Justice and a representative of Congress who are the ex officio members. The Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court is the ex officio chairman,[1] while the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall serve as the ex
officio secretary

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:

1. The Judicial Bar Council sent public invitations for nominations to the soon-to-be vacated position of Chief
Justice. Senator Miriam Defensor applied for the position. However, the JBC then informed the applicants that
only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court could qualify for the position. For not being qualified, Sen.
Miriam delivered this speech on the Senate Floor.

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am

humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts
in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

2. In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, Antero J. Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the
excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor. To Pobre, the foregoing
statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that
disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

3. HOWEVER, according to Sen. Miriam, the purpose of her speech, was to bring out in the open controversial
anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what
she believed “to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC],” She felt that the JBC should have at least
given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the
position of Chief Justice

4. Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however,
explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being
part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.

Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution: No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
In Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun: Parliamentary Immunity is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success”. It is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one.

Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective
debating forum. Parliamentary Immunity is not for private indulgence, but for the public good.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech.

HELD:
1. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of
the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.

2. The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar,
used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly
crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in
question were intemperate and highly improper in substance.

3 No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the
people’s faith in the judiciary. As stated in In Re: Vicente Sotto, the people must not lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of this Court because if they do, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.

4. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.

5.Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a
former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international
law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land.
 Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, is duty-bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public
service are keepers of public faith.

6. The court does not accept the allegation of Senator Santiago that she delivered her privilege speech as a
prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show
that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of
Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions.
Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the
reputation of the Court for disgust. Parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege rather a privilege for
the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

7. Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an “unjust
act” the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC
functions under the Court’s supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as
the JBC’s ex-officio chairperson, have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of
Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate
assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.

8. Under Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides, the court
may promulgate rules to shield the judiciary, from the assaults that politics and self interest, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence.

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice.” It been said of a lawyer that “[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help
build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.

9.The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has
entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a
lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed
while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a
lawyer.

10. The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what
otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members.
However, the Court could not impose disciplinary sanctions upon the Senator because of her Constitutional
Privilege of Parliamentary Immunity. Doing such would result to encroachment of powers of Legislative Body.
 As such, The Supreme Court ONLY REMINDS that parliamentary immunity as granted to members of
Congress does not protect them against their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to
perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums
outside the congressional hall.
THEREFORE, SC REFERRED the matter to Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary
action because The Rules of the Senate contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that
prevents a Senator from using, under any circumstance, “offensive or improper language against another
Senator or against any public institution.” The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber but
it is unfortunate that the Senate President and her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules
on her.

11. WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

Eugenio Puyat vs. Sixto De Guzman

FACTS:
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The
election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not
properly counted – hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
on May 25, 1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a
conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer
with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued
that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body
(such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He
instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but
as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC
Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case
without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or
bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a
counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still
barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he
presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he
instead presented himself as a party of interest – which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the
fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not
likewise be done indirectly.

Read full text

NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of
justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or
jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative bodies,
like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial
and military tribunals, being administrative agencies, are included.
(From https://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/terms.asp, accessed 09/17/2014)

Liban v. Gordon
G.R. 175352
July 15, 2009

FACTS

Dante V. Liban, together with other petitioners, petitioned in Court to declare Richard J. Gordon as “having
forfeited his seat in the Senate.” The petitioners were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter, while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors.

During Gordon’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the
PNRC during the February 23, 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors, in which the petitioners alleged
that by accepting the responsibility, Gordon deemed ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Sec.
13, Article VI of the Constitution:

Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat….
Respondent contested that the petitioners’ citation of a constitutional provision had no basis, since PNRC is not
a government-owned or controlled corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution did
not apply to his case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer service to which is neither an office
nor an employment.

ISSUE

By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his Senate Seat?
HELD

No. The Philippine National Red Cross is a private organization performing public functions. It does not have
government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed
primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns
organized by its Board of Governors. Apart from that, PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be,
autonomous, neutral and independent to be able to conduct its activities in accord to their fundamental
principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Hence,
Article VI, Section 13 could not apply to Gordon’s case, in accepting the position in the PNRC. The petition
was deemed to have no merit.