Lee v CA
Lee’s mother.
Facts:
- Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the
Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China.
- They had 11 children (Lee-Keh children)
- In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu),
supposedly to serve as housemaid.
- The children believe that Tiu had relations with Lee.
- After Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children
with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other children) claimed that they, too, were
children of Lee and Keh.
- This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter.
- The NBI concluded the following:
o The mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK
CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN.
o There was a grand design of making his 8 children as their own
legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his second
family and secure their future.
o Specifically: the eldest of the Lee’s other children, Marcelo Lee
(who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a
17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the time.
Another of the Lee’s other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-
year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so
forth. In other words, by the hospital records of the Lee’s other
children, Keh’sdeclared age did not coincide with her actual age
when she supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering
eight.
- The respondent Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC a Special Proceeding
for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee,
one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the
name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name.
- The Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s
presumed mother, to testify in the case.
- The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming
that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother.
- The RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and
oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious
object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma
- The CA ruled only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad
testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under
Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue: W/N the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case
that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of
petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Keh’s daughter. YES
SC:
- Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:
o The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion
promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time specified
therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the
books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in
whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable
cost of the production thereof.
- It should be noted that the primary purpose of the petition is to establish
that it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given
birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records and not to declare
them illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng.
- Due to this, The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for
seeking Tiu’s testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their
right to compel the attendance of such a material witness.
- HOWEVER, the following
- In regards to the following contention:
o a) considering her advance age, testifying in court would subject
her to harsh physical and emotional stresses;
 Lee must establish this claim to the satisfaction of the trial
court. About five years have passed from the time the Lee-
Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to
appear before the trial court.
 The RTC would have to update itself and determine if
Tiu’s current physical condition makes her fit to undergo
the ordeal of coming to court and being questioned. If she
is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her.
 The trial court’s duty is to protect every witness against
oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially
true where the witness is of advanced age.
o b) it would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify
against her stepdaughter (RELEVANT ISSUE).
 Section 25 of Rule 130 states:
 No person may be compelled to testify against his
parents, other direct ascendants, children or
other direct descendants.
 The Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the
prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal,
or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants.
 The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule
applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a
family tie connected by a common ancestry.1avvphi1 A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
 Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or
ascending. The former unites the head of the
family with those who descend from him. The
latter binds a person with those from whom he
descends.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO (2003) 6. Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she examined
Cynthia on 16 September 1996. She found Cynthia to be five to six months
FACTS: pregnant and to have incomplete, healed hymenal lacerations at 3, 5, 8 o’clock
positions, which could have been caused by sexual intercourse or any foreign
1. Artemio was charged before the RTC of Tarlac with 13 counts of rape in separate
body inserted in her private part.
complaints. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At his arraignment
Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in each case.
7. Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18 September 1996,
2. Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang Tagalog Elementary
Cynthia, accompanied by her mother, complained before him and NBI
School in Tarlac, Tarlac, testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of
Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was raped by her father Artemio.
Artemio with his second common-law wife. Sometime before the end of the
She then executed a written statement, which she subscribed and sworn to
school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his father Artemio,
before Atty. Canlas.
Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he was awakened by Cynthia’s loud
cries. Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping
8. The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de parte,
motion. After about two minutes, his father put on his short pants.
Atty. Isabelo Salamida, took the witness stand and testified for the defense. He
declared that on 24 June 1997 (the same day when he testified before the court),
3. Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a
between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m., he and his secretary went to the house of Artemio
drunkard. He angrily prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors.
in Barangay Sapang Tagalog. The hut was made of sawali. Its door was padlocked,
Whenever he was drunk, he would maul Elven and quarrel with his stepfather,
and its windows were shut. When he went around the house and tried to peep
Celestino Navarro.
through the old sawali walls on the front and left and right sides of the hut, he
could not see anything inside the room where Artemio and his children used to
4. Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio in Barangay Sapang
sleep. Although it was then about noontime, it was dark inside. Atty. Salamida
Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac, testified that on the second week of March 1996,
then concluded that prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the truth
between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., while he was passing by the house of Artemio on his
when he declared having seen what Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped
way to the field to catch fish, he heard somebody crying. He then peeped
through a small opening in the sawali wall of the house in the early morning
through a small opening in the destroyed portion of the sawali wall of Artemio’s
sometime on the second week of March 1996.
house. He saw Cynthia lying on her back and crying, while her father was on top
of her, doing a pumping motion. Eddie observed them for about fifteen seconds,
9. On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified that the house where Artemio used to live
and then he left and proceeded to the field to catch fish. He reported what he had
was a small hut with some destroyed portions in its sawali walls. When she went
witnessed to Artemio’s stepfather, Celestino, later that morning.
there to visit her children sometime in December 1995, there was a hole in front
and at the sidewall of the hut facing a vacant lot where people passed by to fish
5. Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio,
in a nearby brook. When she went to the place again sometime in September
testified that she and Artemio started living together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in
1996 after she was informed of Cynthia’s pregnancy, she noticed that the
February 1969. Out of their common-law relationship, they had six children, one
destroyed portions of the hut’s sawali walls were not yet repaired.
of whom was Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio parted ways
permanently. Later, Gloria and her children lived in Pura, Tarlac. When
10. The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro, stepfather of Artemio, testified
Artemio’s mother died sometime in 1996, Cynthia lived with Artemio in a small
that he is the owner of the small house where Artemio and his children used to
one-room dwelling owned by Celestino and located in Barangay Sapang Tagalog,
reside. At the time that Artemio and his children, including Cynthia, were living
Tarlac, Tarlac. On 30 August 1996, her son Novelito told her that Cynthia was
in that house, the hut’s old sawali walls had some small holes in them, thus
pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her
confirming the testimony of Eddie Sicat. After Artemio was arrested on the basis
condition. The latter confessed that she had been sexually abused by her father.
of Cynthia’s complaint before the NBI, Celestino made some repairs in the hut
Gloria then went to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
by, among other things, placing galvanized iron sheets to cover the holes at the
Tarlac and reported what Artemio had done to their daughter Cynthia.
destroyed portions of the sawali walls. Thereafter, a person named Alvin
occupied the house.
11. In its Decision of 22 September 1997, the trial court convicted Artemio in
Criminal Case No. 9375. It, however, acquitted him in all the other twelve cases
for lack of evidence.
12. Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues
that Elven, as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness against him
under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Besides, Elven’s testimony
appears not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him to say, as the
questions asked were mostly leading questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive
in testifying against him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to him.
13. In another attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
Artemio points to the following inconsistencies in their testimonies: (1) as to the
time of the commission of the crime, Elven testified having seen Artemio on top
of his sister one night in March 1996, while Eddie Sicat testified having seen
them in the same position between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. in the second week of
March 1996; (2) as to the residence of Cynthia in 1996, Gloria testified that the
former was living with her in Guimba from November 1995 to September 1996,
while Elven and Eddie declared that she was in Sapang Tagalog in March 1996;
and (3) as to the residence of Artemio, Jr., Gloria stated that he was living with
the appellant, but later she declared that he was living with her in Pura.
14. Artemio also argues that since his house had no electricity and was dark even at
daytime, it was impossible for Elven and Eddie to see him allegedly doing
pumping motion on top of Cynthia. In his Reply Brief, he likewise urges us to
disregard the testimonies of rebuttal witnesses Celestino and Gloria. According to
him, Celestino had an ax to grind against him (Artemio) because he had been
badgering Celestino for his share of the lot where the hut stands, which was
owned by Artemio’s deceased mother. On the other hand, Gloria wanted to get
rid of Artemio because she was already cohabiting with another man.
ISSUE (TOPICAL): WON Elven should be disqualified as a witness.
HELD: NO. This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is
not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant.
1. The SC finds no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on the
culpability of Artemio. It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial
court, especially on the credibility of the witnesses, are accorded great weight
and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This is so because the trial court
has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of
truthfulness or falsehood. This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as where
there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that has been ignored
or misconstrued by the court, or where the trial court has acted arbitrarily in its
appreciation of the facts. The SC did not find any of these exceptions in the case
at bar.
2. As to the competency of Elven to testify, the SC ruled that such is not affected by
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on "filial
privilege." This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant
is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The rule refers
to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges.
As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify
against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily
testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness
against his father of his own accord and only "to tell the truth."
3. Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecution’s act of propounding leading
questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court expressly
allows leading questions when the witness is a child of tender years like Elven.
4. The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves
scant consideration. Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy. As
observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not have subjected
himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive
other than to bring to justice the despoiler of his sister’s virtue. There is no
indication that Elven testified because of anger or any ill-motive against his
father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly pressured or influenced by
his mother or by anyone to testify against his father. The rule is that where there
is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his
testimony is entitled to full credence.
5. The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do not
impair the credibility of these witnesses. We agree with the trial court that they
are minor inconsistencies, which do not affect the credibility of the witnesses.
The SC has held in a number of cases that inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses that refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy the
witnesses’ credibility. On the contrary, they may even be considered badges of
veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on the material points in the
testimonies. What is important is that the testimonies agree on essential facts and
substantially corroborate a consistent and coherent whole.
6. To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a rape committed by a father on
a daughter, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender,
which are special qualifying circumstances, must be alleged in the complaint or
 information and proved by the prosecution during the trial by the quantum of
proof required for conviction.

7. Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the
complaint and duly established by evidence during trial, the allegation in the
complaint regarding her age was not clearly proved. It must be stressed that the
severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried
out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the
most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. Accordingly, in the absence of
sufficient proof of Cynthia’s minority, Artemio cannot be convicted of qualified
rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. He should only be convicted of
simple rape and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac, in
Criminal Case No. 9375 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that that accused
Artemio Invencion y Soriano is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the victim Cynthia Invencion the sums of P50,000 as indemnity;
P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
 STANLEY FINE FURNITURE, Elena and Carlos Wang VS. GALLANO, SIAREZ
Quick Summary: Victor Gallano and Enriquito Siarez filed an illegal dismissal case
against employer Stanley Fine. Stanley Fine stated in its position paper that it was
forced to declare them dismissed due to the filing of an unmeritorious labor case
against it filed by the two. HELD: Such statement is an admission against interest.
Error of counsel who made the position paper is binding against Stanley Fine.
FACTS:
Stanley Fine Furniture (Stanley Fine), through its owners Elena and Carlos Wang,
hired respondents Victor T. Gallano and Enriquito Siarez in 1995 as
painters/carpenters. On May 26, 2005, Victor and Enriquito filed a labor complaint
for underpayment/non-payment of salaries, wages, Emergency Cost of Living
Allowance (ECOLA), and 13th month pay. They indicated in the complaint form that
they were "still working" for Stanley Fine.
On May 31, 2005, Victor and Enriquito filed an amended complaint. This time they
claimed that they were dismissed on May 26, 2005. They were allegedly scolded for
filing a complaint for money claims and hence were not allowed to work.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) found that they were illegally dismissed. LA noted the
following contradictory statements in Stanley Fine’s position paper, thus:
“Also, Stanley Fine was forced to declare them dismissed due to their failure to report
back to work for a considerable length of time and also, due to the filing of an
unmeritorious labor case against it by the two complainants. . . . The main claim of the
complainants is their allegation that they were dismissed. They were NOT
DISMISSED.”
The Labor Arbiter held that above statements found in Stanley Fine’s position paper
as admission by it that Victor and Enriquito were dismissed due to the filing of a case
against them - a blatant transgression of the Labor Code. It is virtually a confession of
judgment and a death [k]nell to the cause of respondents. It actually lends credence to
the fact that complainants were dismissed upon respondents’ knowledge of the
complaint before the NLRC. In fact, four days after the filing of the complaint, the the
complainants amended their complaint to include illegal dismissal.
NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. According to NLRC, the statement, "due
to the filing of an unmeritorious labor case," is NOT an admission against Stanley
Fine’s interest. The complainants-appellees were merely required to explain their
unauthorized absences they committed for the month of May 2005 alone. Memoranda
were issued to them Victor and Enriquito to explain their unauthorized absences.
That they simply refused receipt of them cannot extricate themselves from its legal
effects as the last of which clearly show that it was sent to them thru the mails.
CA reversed the NLRC, and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It held that
the statements were admissions against interest and binding upon Stanley Fine.
On January 21, 2010, Elena Briones filed a petition for review. Elena alleged that the
statement, "due to the filing of an unmeritorious labor case," was and error on the part
of her former counsel which should not bind her.
Victor and Enriquito filed their comment and argued that the petition should be
denied because Elena "is neither the respondent, party in interest or representatives as
parties." Elena filed her replyand posited that she has legal standing to file the petition
for review because she is the owner/proprietress of Stanley Fine. As per the
Department of Trade and Industry’s certification, Stanley Fine is a sole proprietorship
owned by "Elena Briones Yam-Wang." On this issue the SC held that Elena Briones
has standing to file this case.
Elena further argued that the statement "unmeritorious case" was a mistake
committed by her former counsel which should not bind her, considering its grave
consequence.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it agreed with the Labor Arbiter
that the statement, "filing of an unmeritorious labor case," is an admission against
interest and binding against Stanley Fine Furniture
HELD: The statement is an admission against interest and binding against Stanley
Fine Furniture.
RATIO: An admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute since no man would declare anything against himself
unless such declaration is true. Thus, an admission against interest binds the person
who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable
mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it.
The general rule is that errors of counsel bind the client. The negligence and mistakes
of counsel bind the client. A departure from this rule would bring about never-ending
suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the
client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by operation of law. The only
exception would be, where the lawyer’s gross negligence would result in the grave
injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law.
Elena’s position paper states the following:

5. Also, Stanley Fine was forced to declare them dismissed due to their
failure to report back to work for a considerable length of time and also, due
to the filing of an unmeritorious labor case against it by the two complainants.
. . .. . . .

8. The main claim of the complainants is their allegation that they were
dismissed. They were NOT DISMISSED. Management was [sic] has only
instructed them to submit a written explanation for their absence before they
would be allowed back to work. . . .72 (Underscoring in the original)

There is not an iota of proof that the lawyer committed gross negligence in this case.
That counsel did not reflect his client’s true intentions is a bare allegation. It is not a
mere afterthought meant to escape liability for such illegal act. Elena’s counsel
reflected the true reason for dismissing respondents. Both position papers state that
Elena dismissed respondents because of the filing of a labor complaint. Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Labor Arbiter’s ruling that the
statement, "unmeritorious labor complaint," is an admission against interest.

Assuming that the statement, "filing of an unmeritorious labor case," is not an

admission against interest, still, the Court of Appeals did not err in reinstating the
Labor Arbiter’sdecision. Elena admitted85 that no notices of dismissal were issued.

NOTES/TIDBITS:

Victor and Enriquito alleged in their position paper that they were requesting from
their employer an increase in pay to comply with the minimum wage law. However,
they were reprimanded and were told "not to work anymore."

Elena’s words: "Nag complain pa kayo sa Labor ha, tanggal na kayo" were clear,
unequivocal and categorical. These circumstances were sufficient to create the
impression in the mind of complainants – and correctly so – that their services were
being terminated. The acts of respondents were indicative of their intention to
dismiss complainants from their employment.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF SPOUSES DIONISIO
DELOY and PRAXEDES MARTONITO, represented by POLICARPIO DELOY,
Respondents. (2013; Mendoza, J.)
FACTS
1. July 8, 2003 - The respondents, heirs of Spouses Dionisio Deloy and Praxedes
Martonito-Deloy, instituted a complaint for unlawful detainer against
MERALCO before the MTCC of Trece Martires City
o Respondents were owners through succession of an 8,550-sqm property
in Trece Martires City, a portion of which (680 sqm) was donated in
1965 by Dionisio to the Communications and Electricity Development
Authority (CEDA), for the latter to provide affordable electric supply to
Cavite; a deed of donation was executed with that imposed as condition
o June 1985 – CEDA offered to MERALCO its electric distribution system
for sale, embodied in a MOA; on the same day, a Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed between CEDA and MERALCO; Thereafter, MERALCO
occupied the land
o Oct 1985- MERALCO, thru its AVP and Head of Legal Dept Atty
Torres, wrote a LETTER (IMPT) to Dionisio, requesting permission for
the continued use of the land as a substation site; however, no
agreement was reached between them
o Dec 1985 – LG Dela Paz of the Trece Martires Substation of MERALCO
sent an INTERNAL MEMORANDUM (IMPT) to Atty Gonzales and Atty
Torres, stating some of the reasons for the failure of the parties to reach
an agreement
o Eventually, respondents offered to sell the land to MERALCO, but were
rejected; hence, respondents demanded, through a letter, that
MERALCO vacate the land on or before June 15, 2003. MERALCO did
not move out. Thus, the complaint for unlawful detainer.
2. MERALCO: CEDA is the owner of the land by virtue of the deed of donation;
since the condition imposed in the deed (ie provide affordable electricity in
Cavite) was still being observed and complied with by MERALCO, the latter,
being CEDA’s successor-in-interest, had legal justification to occupy the land
3. MTCC dismissed the unlawful detainer case
o No jurisdiction because it would require an interpretation of the deed of
donation, making it one not capable of pecuniary estimation
o Nevertheless, MTCC opined that MERALCO was entitled to the
possession of the land, unless the deed of donation was revoked or the
deed of sale nullified
4. RTC affirmed MTCC
o MTCC had no jurisdiction to interpret contracts involving the sale of
the subject land to MERALCO, after the latter raised the issue of
ownership of the subject land; the interpretation of the deed of sale and
the deed of donation was the main, not merely incidental, issue
5. CA reversed RTC
o Partially granted the complaint for unlawful detainer
o As to the issue of possession, the CA stated that by seeking Dionisio’s
permission to continuously occupy the subject land, MERALCO
expressly acknowledged his paramount right of possession. MERALCO,
thru its representative, Atty. Torres, would not have asked permission
from Dionisio if it had an unconditional or superior right to possess the
subject land. The CA considered the fact that this recognition of
Dionisio’s right over the subject land was amplified by another letter,
dated December 16, 1985, by one L.G. De la Paz to Atty. Torres, expressly
declaring Dionisio as the owner of the subject land. MERALCO never
disputed the declarations contained in these letters. Neither did it claim
that the same was made through palpable mistake. Indeed, Meralco even
marked these letters as documentary exhibits. Pursuant to Section 26,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, these admissions and/or declarations
may be admitted against Meralco.
6. In this petition:
MERALCO
- MTCC without jurisdiction; respondents’ complaint before the MTCC failed
to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer, but for one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, because the issue of physical possession is inextricably
linked with the proper interpretation of the deed of donation executed
between Dionisio and CEDA.
- it validly acquired title to the subject land by virtue of the deed of sale
executed by CEDA in its favor on June 28, 1985; as a consequence, extrinsic
or extraneous evidence, such as the letters, dated October 11, 1985 and
December 6, 1985, cannot contradict the terms of the deed of sale between
CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE (Evidence)
Whether or not evidence aliunde, such as the letters dated 11 October 1985 of
petitioner’s Assistant Vice President and head of legal department, L.D. Torres and
Internal Memorandum dated 6 December 1985 of petitioner’s L.G. dela Paz, which
purportedly recognized respondents’ ownership of the property can prevail over the
deed of absolute sale.
RULING
Yes.
1) It is undisputed that on October 11, 1985 or four (4) months after the approval of
the MOA and the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale, MERALCO, through its
Assistant Vice President and Head of the Legal Department, Atty. Torres , sent a
letter to Dionisio seeking his permission for the continued use of the subject land.
The letter reads:
xxx
Dear Mr. Deloy:
This has reference to the Deed of Donation (Inter-vivos) executed on November 12,
1965 between Communications and Electricity Development Authority (CEDA) and
Dionisio D(e)loy for a 680-square meter of land used as a substation site adjacent to
A.B. Memorial Hospital x x x.
In compliance with the franchise Nationalization program of the National
Government, we wish to inform you that Meralco had taken over the electric
operations in the province of Cavite being served by CEDA.
In view of this recent development, may we respectfully request you to please allow
Manila Electric Company (Meralco) to continue the use of the above-mentioned
portion of land as a substation site, subject to the terms and conditions which we may
mutually agree upon.
In the interest of public service, we shall highly appreciate your kind cooperation on
this matter and awaiting your reply.
Very truly yours,
[Signed]
L. D. TORRES
Assistant Vice-President & Head, Legal Department
2) Relative thereto, L.G. De la Paz of Trece Martires Substation of MERALCO sent
an Internal Memorandum to Atty Gonzales and Atty Torres, re: some obstacles in
reaching a lease agreement with the Deloys. The Memo reads:
This refers to the proposed contract of lease with Mr. Dionisio Deloy, co-owner of the
lot wherein the Trece Martires Substation is located.
Mr. Deloy had donated the use of 680-sq. m. portion of his co-owned land for CEDA’s
substation in Trece Martires in 1966. Copy of the Donation is enclosed. On October
11, 1985, the company informed him through its letter of its intention of continuing
with the use of the property as a result of its acquisition of CEDA’s franchise. He
agreed to the request and proposed rental would be free provided one of his
sons/grandsons would be employed by Meralco. xxx
xxx
There are some problems that may come up with the death of Mr. Deloy. These are:
1. the settlement of his estate among his heirs
xxx
By these two documents, MERALCO acknowledged that the owners of the subject
land were the Deloys. The first letter was written barely four (4) months after the
deed of sale was accomplished. MERALCO never disputed the declarations contained
in these letters which were even marked as its own exhibits. Pursuant to Section 26,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, these admissions and/or declarations are admissible
against MERALCO.
Heirs of Bernardo Ulep v Ducat: “Being an admission against interest, the documents
are the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The
rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare
anything against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume
that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not.”
Hence, the letter and the internal memorandum presented, offered and properly
admitted as part of the evidence on record by MERALCO itself, constitute an admission
against its own interest. MERALCO should appropriately be bound by the contents of
the documents.
Nevertheless, MERALCO insists that extrinsic evidence, such as the two documents,
even if these were their own, cannot contradict the terms of the deed of sale between
CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The Court has read the MOA and the Deed of Absolute Sale but found nothing that
clearly stated that the subject land was included therein. What were sold, transferred
and conveyed were "its electric distribution facilities, service drops, and customers'
electric meters except those owned by the VENDOR'S customers, x x x, and all the
rights and privileges necessary for the operation of the electric service x x x." No
mention was made of any land. Rights and privileges could only refer to franchises,
permits and authorizations necessary for the operation of the electric service. The
land on which the substation was erected was not included, otherwise, it would have
been so stated in the two documents. Otherwise, also, MERALCO would not have
written Dionisio to ask permission for the continued use of the subject land.

At any rate, it is fundamental that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an

indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. It bears to emphasize that the titleholder is entitled to all the
attributes of ownership of the property, including possession. Thus, the Court must
uphold the age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled
to its possession.

PETITION DENIED.
Lacbayan v Samoy o 3) Knowingly and voluntarily made
NOTE: The assent to Partition Agreement can’t be an admission to co-ownership o 4) Be adverse to the admitter's interest
properties.  Here, the question on the Partition Agreement indicates a QUESTION OF
FACTS: LAW to determine whether the parties have the right to freely divide among
themselves the subject properties.
 Petitioner Betty Lacbayan and Respondent Bayani Samoy had an extramarital  Further, such admission would prejudice the Respondent's interest but also
affair. Respondent was already married. Petitioner then gave birth to a son. his wife's interest as a legal spouse on the properties. Respondent is not
 They formed a manpower service company. They were also able to acquire 5 allowed to waive such right on the wife's behalf.
parcels of land registered in their names (as husband and wife)
 Their relationship went sour and they separated. They agreed to divide their
properties executing a PARTITION AGREEMENT
o Respondent was to get three properties while Petitioner was to get
two properties
 BUT! Petitioner wanted additional demands in the Partition Agreement
where Respondent refused.
 Petitioner then filed for judicial partition in RTC.
 Petitioner claims that the properties were acquired from income of the
company she formed with Respondent.
 Respondent claims that properties were purchased from his personal funds.
He says he only registered them to both Pet.'s and Resp.'s name exclude
from property regime with his wife.
 RTC court dismissed complaint. It took weight on Pet's admission that
properties acquired from their manpower company (she only owns 3.33%
shares)
 CA denied appeal.
 Raised to Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent’s assent to the initial partition agreement serves as
an admission against interest, where Respondent had admitted the existence of co-
ownership between him and petitioner?

HELD: NO. Respondent cannot be said to have admitted the existence of co-
ownership

RATIO:

 Admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or

unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with
the facts alleged by him.
o Shown by Sec. 26 of Rule 130 of ROC.
 To be admissible, admission must:
o 1) Involve matters of fact and NOT OF LAW
o 2) Be categorical and definite
Taghoy vs Tigol - The petitioners argue that the heirs, in executing the extrajudicial
J. Brion settlement, did not intend to divest themselves of their respective rightful
shares, interests and participation in the subject property because it lacked a
Facts: consideration, as affirmed by the respondents' own joint affidavits; the
- Spouses Filomeno Taghoy and Margarita Amit owned a parcel a land. They payment of the PNB loan could not be a valid consideration for the transfer
executed an SPA in favor of Felixberto Tigol who thereafter executed a REM since the loan was still unpaid and outstanding at the time of the execution
over the subject property to secure a 22k loan from PNB. The spouses of the extrajudicial settlement.
obtained the loan to finance the shellcraft business of their children.
- Filomeno died instestate, his heirs (widow Margarita and seven children) - The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the Extrajudicial
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale, adjudicating to Settlement and Sale was the basis of their registration of title, and their
themselves the subject property and selling the same to Felixberto Tigol and payment of the PNB loan was the real consideration for the transfer; the
his wife Rosita (herein respondents) for 1k. joint affidavits were executed only out of generosity and kindness, subject to
the heirs' reimbursement of the amounts they paid for the loan, such that
- Subsequently, Filomeno’s heirs executed 2 Deeds of Confirmation of Sale. when the heirs did not reimburse the amounts paid, they then caused the
Simultaneous with this, respondents executed explanatory Joint Affidavits registration of title in their names.
attesting that the sale was without any consideration and was only executed
to secure a loan.
- The RTC ruled that the sale was absolutely simulated. The CA, however,
ruled that it was only relatively simulated.
- A few months after, a TCT was issued in the respondent’s names. They then
obtained a 70k loan with the Philippine Banking Corporation, secured by a
Issue: W/N the sale of the subject property to the respondents was
REM on the subject property.
absolutely/relatively simulated? It was absolutely simulated
- 7 years later, heirs of Filomeno filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
the respondent’s TCT and for judicial partition. They alleged that the deeds
Ratio:
of confirmation of sale became the bases for the transfer of the title in the
- In the interpretation of contracts, the intention of the parties is accorded
respondents' names, but the sale was fictitious or simulated, as evidenced by
primordial consideration; such intention is determined from the express
the respondents' own explanatory joint affidavits attesting that the transfer
terms of their agreement, as well as their contemporaneous and subsequent
was for the purpose only of convenience in securing a loan, not for absolute
acts. When the parties do not intend to be bound at all, the contract is
conveyance or sale.
absolutely simulated; if the parties conceal their true agreement, then the
contract is relatively simulated. An absolutely simulated contract is void, and
- The respondents admitted that they executed the joint affidavits but
the parties may recover from each other what they may have given under
countered that they acquired a valid title to the subject property through the
the simulated contract, while a relatively simulated contract is valid and
Extrajudicial Settlement of Heirs and Sale. They claimed that when
enforceable as the parties' real agreement binds them. Characteristic of
Filomeno died without the PNB loan being paid, the heirs agreed that the
simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to
respondents will advance payment of the loan, subject to reimbursement, to
produce legal effects, or in any way, alter the juridical situation of the
save the foreclosure of the subject property; the heirs then executed the
parties.
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale in the respondents' favor as their way of
- In the present case, the parties never intended to be bound by their
reimbursing the amount the latter paid; the respondents executed the joint
agreement as revealed by the two (2) joint affidavits executed by the
affidavits out of generosity, expressing their willingness to be reimbursed,
respondents simultaneous with the execution of the deeds of confirmation of
but when the heirs failed to reimburse the amounts advanced by them, then
sale.
they caused the registration of the title in their names.
- The joint affidavits are very solid pieces of evidence in the petitioners' favor.
They constitute admissions against interest made by the respondents under
oath. An admission against interest is the best evidence that affords the
greatest certainty of the facts in dispute, based on the presumption that no
man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true.
It is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is
his fault if it does not.

- Thus, by the respondents' own admissions, they never intended to be bound

by the sale; they merely executed the documents for convenience in
securing a bank loan, and they agreed to reconvey the subject property upon
payment of the loan. The sale was absolutely simulated and, therefore, void.
MATTEL, INC. v. FRANCISCO (2008) o Rule 204 of the Rules and Regulations on Trademarks provides:
Austria Martinez, J. Declaration of Actual Use. The Office will not require any
FACTS: proof of use in commerce in the processing of trademark
applications.1avvphi1 However, without need of any notice from
- Jimmy Uy filed a trademark application for registration of the trademark, the Office, all applicants or registrants, shall file a declaration of
“Barbie” for the use on confectionary products such as milk, chocolate, etc. actual use of the mark with evidence to that effect within three
years, without possibility of extension,from the filing date of the
application. Otherwise, the application shall be refused or the mark
- Mattel then filed a “Notice of Opposition” against Uy’s “Barbie” trademark as
shall be removed from the register by the Director motu propio.
the latter was confusingly similar to its trademark on dolls and doll
(Emphasis supplied)
accessories.
o Memorandum Circular No. BT 2K1-3-04 dated March 29, 200120 of
the IPO provides:
- Uy filed his answer, denying the allegations therein and claiming that there
For pending applications prosecuted under R.A. 166 we distinguish
is no similarity between the two goods.
as follows:
2.1. Based on use – must submit DAU and evidence of use
- The IPC was enacted, and it dismissed the opposition and gave due course to
on or before December 1, 2001, subject to a single six (6) month
the application for registration of “Barbie.”
extension. (Sec. 3.2, Final Provisions of the Trademark Regulations,
R.A. 8293, IPO Fee Structure and MC. No. BT Y2K-8-02)
o MfR was denied on the ground that there was no proof on record
that Mattel had ventured into the production of chocolates and
- It is both a judicial admission and an admission against interest. A judicial admission
confectionary products under the trademark Barbie.
binds the person who makes the same.
- In the same vein, an admission against interest is the best evidence which
- Mattel then filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground of newly discovered affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for this
evidence: Mattel’s trademark application rule is that no man would declare anything against himself unless it is true.

- Meanwhile, no DAU was filed by Uy before the required date.
ISSUES: WON the case is moot and academic  YES
HELD/RATIO:
- Since Uy has abandoned his application by non-filing of DAU, there is no
more actual case or controversy.
- Neither does this case fall under the exceptions for the court to pass moot
and academic questions.

- Uy’s declaration in his comments and memorandum before the Court that he
has not filed the DAU as mandated by law is a judicial admission that he has
effectibely abandoned or withdrawn any right or interest in his trademark.
- Pertinent laws violated:
o Section 124.2 of R.A. No. 8293 provides:
The applicant or the registrant shall file a declaration of
actual use of the mark with evidence to that effect, as prescribed by
the Regulations within three (3) years from the filing date of the
application. Otherwise, the applicant shall be refused or the marks
shall be removed from the Register by the Director. (Emphasis
supplied)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JOSE T. GO, AIDA DELA ROSA, FELECITAS
NICOMEDES (Millena)
Topic: Rule 130 Sec. 27
The ONLY relevant portion of this case: In a criminal case of estafa through
falsification of commercial document, a letter by the respondent to the BSO stating that
he was willing to assume the (l)iability and full payment of the accounts under
examination, is an offer of compromise and thus an implied admission of guilt under
Rule 130 Sec. 27.
NOTE: This is a lengthy case but the court just devoted one paragraph for the relevant
topic.
Facts:
On Oct. 1988, the Monetary Board of Bangko Sentral issued an order of
closure of the Orient Commercial Banking Corporation and placed such bank under
receivership of the Phil. Deposit Insurance Corporation. During the receivership,
PDIC collected OCBC's past due loans. Among the debtors were Timmy's Inc. and
Asia Textile Mills, each owing P10M.
When issued demand letters, both companies denied having been granted
loans by the bank, insisting that the loan documents were falsified. They sent
affidavits nd furnieshed official dfocuments such as passport and the articles of
incorporation containing their respective signatures.
Upon ingestigation by PDIC, it turned out that the loans purportedly in the
name of Timmy's and Asia Textile, were released in the form of manager's checks in
the name of Philippine Recycler's and Zeta International. These checks together with
other cheks totaling to about P120M were encashed by Go in the bank, then
deposited to the savings account of Go. Immediately thereafter, the money was
moved to his current account. A day prior to such deposit, checks amounting to over
P145M were presented against the account of Go which bounced due to insufficiecy
of funds. After the deposit, his account held around P146M, thus when the checks
that previously bounced were represented, they were finally cleared.
Go is OCBC's President while Dela Rosa is VP and COO.
IMPORTANT FACT: During PDIC's investigation, sent a letter to the BSP requesting
that the BSP refrain from sending any communication to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia
Textile Mills, Inc., among others. He manifested that he was "willing to assume the
liability and full payment" of the accounts under investigation and examination,
including the Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. accounts.
Hence, the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents.
After the presentation of prosecution's evidence, the respondents filed a
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence.
THE DEMURRER WAS GRANTED. CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue: WON the demurrer was proper.
Held: NO. The order granting the demurrer was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The RTC grossly erred when it failed and/or refused to weigh the prosecution's
evidence. Generally, demurrer, when granted, amounts to acquital and therefore,
double jeopardy may attach. But an exception would be if the order is made with
GAD.
BASIS OF THE RTC IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER:
On the falsification:
1. The individuals who assert that their handwriting and signatures were forged were
not presented in court.
2. The officials of PDIC and liquidator of OCBC, and the cashier of OCBC Recto
BRanch, who were presented as witness to prove the falsification were not present
when the documents were executed and signed, thus did not have personal knowlede
of the alleged falsification.
COURT: WRONG. The loan documents were processed and signed by the
respondents themselves.
Simulating OCBC loan documents – such as loan applications, credit
approval memorandums, and the resultant promissory notes and other credit
documents – by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate, and by counterfeiting or
imitating their handwriting or signatures constitute falsification of commercial and
public documents.
On estafa:
1. since the payees of the checks were NOT Asia Textile Mills, Inc. and Timmy’s, Inc.,
but other entities– Phil. Recyclers Inc. and Zeta International, and there are no
documents drawn by the former assigning the loan proceeds to the latter, then it
cannot besaid that there were loan proceeds released to these Asia Textile and
Timmy's.
2. it is doubtful that the two manager’s checks were presented and negotiated for
deposit in Go’s savings account, since theydo not contain the required indorsements
of the borrowers, the signatures of the tellers and individuals/payees who received the
checks and the proceeds thereof, and the respective account numbers of the
respondents; and the checks were presented beyond banking hours
COURT: WRONG. The lower courts failed to appreciate the fact that the OCBC funds
ended up in the personal bank account of Go. It is irrelevant that the proceeds of the
supposed loans were made payable to entities other than the alleged borrowers.
Besides, the manager’s checks themselves indicate that they were the proceeds of the
purported Timmy’s, Inc.’s and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.’s loans, through the alpha
numeric codes specifically assigned to them that are printed on the face of the checks;
the connection between the checks and the purported loans is thus established.
Lastly, Go’s January 28, 1998 letter to the BSP stating that he was "willing to assume
the viabilityand full payment" of the accounts under examination – which included the
Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. accounts, among others – is an offer of
compromise, and thus an implied admission of guilt under Rule 130, Section 27 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence.
Elements of falsification:
1. that the offender is a private individual
2. that the offender commited any acts of falsification
3. that the document falsified is a commercial document
In this case, Go is presumed to be the author of the falsification. Whenever someone
has in his possession falsified documents [which he used to] his advantage and
benefit, the presumption that he authored it arises. Go failed to rebut this
presumption.
Dela Rosa’s involvement in the scheme has been satisfactorily shown. As OCBC SVP
and COO and member of the OCBC Loan Committee, she approved the purported
Timmy’s, Inc. loan, and she certified and signed the February 2, 1997 OCBC
Disclosure Statement and other documents.62 She likewise gave specific instructions
to deposit the proceeds of the checks in Go’s OCBC Savings Account. Finally, she was
a signatory to the two checks. On the other hand, respondent Nicomedes as OCBC
Senior Manager for Corporate Accounts – Account Management Group, among others
prepared the Credit Approval Memorandum and recommended the approval of the
loans.

In case Ma'am asks:

Elements of estafa acccording to Art. 315.

1. that money is received by the offender in trust or on commission or for
administration
2. there is misappropriation or converstion of such money
3. that the misappropriation is to the prejudie of another
4. that there is demand by the offended party

Applied to this case, the respondents as officials of the bank have a fiduciary duty
with respect to the bank's funds, and holds the same in trust or for administration for
the bank's benefit. The encashment of the checks and subsequent deposit to GO's
bank account and used to fund his previously dishonored checks is misappropriation.
Misappropriation is an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were
one's own. Obviously, such misappropriation prejudiced the bank and its depositors.
The last element which was not proven by the prosecution in this case, has been held
in previous cases that the same is not strictly an element.
San Miguel Corp. v. Kalalo
Sereno | June 13, 2012 | In division
Helen Kalalo was a dealer of beer products. She had a credit overdraft arrangement
with San Miguel whereby, prior to delivery, she would be required to issue two
checks to petitioner: a blank check and a check to be filled up with an amount
corresponding to the gross value of the goods. Business grew and the number of beer
products delivered to her increased from 200 to 4,000 cases a week. She requested
regular statements of account from petitioner, but it failed to comply.
An SMC agent required Kalalo to issue several postdated checks to cope with the
Christmas season, without informing her of the breakdown of the balance. After
making cash payments, she noticed that she still owed SMC a substantial amount. She
insisted on a detailed statement of account, but SMC failed to do so. She ordered her
bank to stop payment on seven checks.
Instead of updating Kalalo’s account, SMC sent a demand letter for the value of the
dishonored checks. In an Offer of Compromise, Kalalo acknowledged the receipt of
the statement of account and proposed to settle the obligation. SMC did not accept.
SMC filed a complaint against Kalalo for violating the Bouncing Checks Law.
Meanwhile, Kalalo kept reiterating her demands that SMC update her account. It
finally complied during trial. The Statement a net balance owed to petitioner
was P 71,009. Kalalo recanted her Offer of Compromise.
MeTC acquitted Kalalo but ordered her to pay the amount. SMC appealed the civil
aspect to the RTC, asking for a larger amount. RTC dismissed the appeal. CA also
dismissed.
SC: SMC’s Rule 45 petition DENIED.
WON Kalalo admitted liability in the Offer of Compromise. NO.
1. The Offer of Compromise may not be considered as evidence against Kalalo. “My
client…acknowledges the receipt of the Statement of Account demanding the
payment of the sum of P816,689.00 representing her unpaid accounts.” The letter
does not contain an express acknowledgment of liability. At most, what respondent
acknowledged was the receipt of the statement of account, not the existence of her
liability.
2. That Kalalo made a compromise offer cannot be considered as an admission of
liability. In Pentagon Steel Corporation v. CA, compromise offers must not be
considered as evidence against the offeror because: (1) the law favors the settlement
of controversies out of court and a person is entitled to "buy his or her peace" without
danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any communication
made toward that end will be regarded as privileged. (2) Offers for compromise are
irrelevant because they are not intended as admissions by the parties making them.
WON Offer of Compromise may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt. NO.
1. Rule 130, Section 27, states: In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an
admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. In
criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
The Offer was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint. The was clearly not
made in the context of a criminal proceeding and cannot be considered as an implied
admission of guilt. Kalalo also recanted the contents of the Offer. She explained that,
at the time she had the letter prepared, the final amount owed to petitioner SMC was
yet undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of imprisonment from
petitioner’s agents.
WON Kalalo is liable for P921K or P71K. P71K.
SMC failed to prove the amount of P 921,215. SMC claims the Statement of Account
does not reflect the transactions covered by the dishonored checks, as it only covers
cash transactions, but it failed to present any evidence to prove that cash transactions
were treated differently from check transactions. In this case, it was sufficiently
established that the dishonored checks were issued merely to guarantee the
performance of a future obligation; that is, the payment of the net value of the goods
after the value of the empty bottles and beer cases returned to petitioner were
deducted from the gross value of the goods delivered to respondent. Kalalo’s
obligation to petitioner in the amount of P 71,009 is unrebutted and supported by
sufficient evidence.
People of the Philippines v. Charlie Nazareno
09 August 2010
Facts:
1. Nazareno was charged with murder in RTC Manila for the death of one
Romeo De Guzman. RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA
affirmed RTC Decision.
2. The facts, based on the eyewitness account of Jericho Capanas, are as
follows:
At around 3:30 o’clock in the morning of 23 September 2001, he saw
Nazareno being unruly in front of their neighbor’s house. Upon reaching the
victim’s house, appellant kicked the door and when the door flung open,
Romeo de Guzman, the victim, who was sleeping behind the door, stood up.
The victim was, however, unable to step out of the door as Nazareno
suddenly grabbed him by the hair and delivered a thrust to his chest using a
bolo. After stabbing the victim, appellant hurriedly left the scene. Capanas
was less than an arm’s length from appellant and the victim when all these
were happening. The doors of their houses are adjacent and only a wall
separates the two houses.
3. Lawrence Hofer and Joseph Claderia, members of the Concerned Citizen’s
Anti-Crime Organization, Inc., a citizen’s organization tasked to assist Police
Station 8, were sent to the scene by the police. When they got there, they
saw Nazareno with blood all over his clothes holding a bladed weapon
which was also covered with blood. The barangay tanod arrested him and
they brought him first to Police Station 8 for investigation and then to
UERMMC where the victim was being treated. There, Nazareno was
positively identified by the victim as the person who stabbed him before
dying.
4. Dr. Salen, the medico-legal officer who conducted the post-mortem
examination of the victim, testified that the victim sustained two stab
wounds: one on the right ear and one on the chest. The latter wound caused
the death of the victim.
5. Nazareno’s defense: (essentially self-defense although even Nazareno did not
expressly state it) He was in a drinking spree with the victim and 2 others
when the victim suddenly asked him to take revenge at an enemy. When he
refused, the victim, who was holding a bladed weapon, quarreled with him
and pulled his hair. They started fighting and, as they grappled for the
weapon, the victim suddenly fell. Appellant left and went home. He was still
holding the bladed weapon when he was arrested. Nazareno admitted
having written a letter to the victim’s brother asking the latter’s forgiveness
Issue: W/N the guilt of Nazareno was proven beyond reasonable doubt. YES.
Ratio:
1. Appellant assails the credibility of witness Capanas claiming that there were
inconsistencies in his testimony.
The matters pointed out by appellant are minor and inconsequential and do not affect
the substance of the eyewitness’ declaration, nor the veracity or weight of his
testimony. The issues raised by appellant do not pertain to the actual act constitutive
of the offense charged, as on this point, the testimony of Jericho Capanas is clear and
convincing (He saw the stabbing, he saw that the victim was stabbed on his chest and
hacked on his right ear, that the crime was committed just in front of the door, and
that he was less than an arm’s length from the scene).
This account of Capanas is corroborated by the testimony of the medico-legal officer.
The records disclose nothing that would indicate any motive on the part of Capanas
to testify falsely against appellant. Absent any showing that a witness for the
prosecution was actuated by improper motive, his positive and categorical
declarations on the witness stand, under the solemnity of an oath, deserve full faith
and credence.
2. The identity of the killer of Romeo de Guzman is not unknown. Nazareno
was positively identified by an eyewitness as the assailant and no less than appellant
himself, on two occasions, admitted authorship of the crime:
First, Nazareno wrote a letter to the victim’s brother asking the latter’s forgiveness for
the killing of Romeo de Guzman. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court held that
appellant’s act of pleading for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt
to compromise, which in turn, can be received as an implied admission of guilt under
Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Second, while on re-direct examination on the witness stand regarding the letter he
wrote to the victim’s brother, appellant admitted having killed Romeo de Guzman:
Court: So, in effect, you are saying that you are admitting having killed
Romeo de Guzman?
Witness: Basta nag-agawan kami.
Court: The question is answerable by yes or no.
Witness: Yes, Your Honor.
Nazareno’s testimony amounts to a judicial admission of guilt which may be given in
evidence against himself under Section 26 Rule 13025 of the Rules of Court.

3. Re treachery

There is no doubt that the same was attended by treachery. The Court has held that
an attack on a victim who has just wakened or who was roused from sleep is one
attended by treachery because in such situation, the victim is in no position to put up
any form of defense. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on
an unsuspecting and unarmed victim who does not give the slightest provocation. In
this case, the victim has just awakened and still drunk having been earlier engaged in
a drinking spree with appellant. Clearly, the victim’s guard was down when appellant
stabbed him with the bolo.

Conclusion: Considering the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, the guilt of

appellant was clearly proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Offer of compromise not admissible
People v Galvez
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. │ March 30, 2007
FACTS:
 An information was filed against Cesar Galvez, a member of the PNP for the
murder of one Rosalio Enojarda (Galvez allegedly shot Enojarda with an
M16 armalite rifle)
 Prosecution presented evidence showing that one of Enojarda’s companions,
Rellios, saw Galvez ~5 m away holding an armalite rifle and firing at their
direction. Rellios also saw that Galvez had companions but did not recognize
them because they were ~9 m away. Perez (another companion) also crawled
and hid in the bushes and when the firing stopped, one of the attackers
passed by ~2 m from where he was hiding and because the moon was bright,
he recognized Galvez, his cousin; he also saw that Galvez had companions
but did not recognize them.
 Galvez’s defenses were denial and alibi. He testified that he was staying at
his father-in-law’s house, drank tuba at a nearby store and then went home.
He presented a visitor at his father-in-law’s house and the sari-sari store
owner to corroborate his testimony. He also presented a Document
Examiner and Forensic Analyst who testified that the paraffin test conducted
on both his hands showed that there was no nitrate present and a Ballistic
Examiner, who testified that the shells found at the scene of the crime were
not fired from the firearm issued to Galvez.
 RTC found Galvez guilty:
o RTC concluded that the bullet that hit and instantly killed Enojarda
came from the gun fired by any of the 3 unidentified persons who
were the companions of the accused. Also, despite the fact that the
Information failed to allege conspiracy and the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and armed band, RTC convicted
Galvez of murder based on conspiracy for the reason that he was
seen by 2 witnesses at the scene of the crime carrying a firearm
together with his unidentified armed companions. TC also held that
the offer of Galvez to have the case settled out of court is an
indication of his guilt.
 CA affirmed with modification (proper penalty accdg to CA should be
reclusion perpetua). MR denied.
 Records of the case were forwarded to SC pursuant to Sec 13, Rule 124 Rules
of CrimPro.
why Enojarda was killed.
ISSUES/HOLDING/RATIO:
1. W/N accused is liable for murder. NO. CA decision reversed and set aside,
Galvez acquitted.
Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in order that an accused
may be held liable for the acts of his co-accused. In the absence of any
averment of conspiracy in the information, an accused can only be made
liable for the acts committed by him alone and such criminal responsibility
is individual and not collective.
Since conspiracy was not alleged in the Information in this case, it is
imperative that the prosecution prove Galvez’s direct participation in the
killing of the victim. This, the prosecution failed to do. The prosecution
witnesses never actually saw Galvez shoot the victim.
The circumstances noted are not sufficient to establish the guilt of
Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.
In considering both favorable and "incriminating" circumstances 1 for or
against Galvez, the following must always be borne in mind: that the
Information charged Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime of Murder;
that the 3 other armed men were not included as John Does; and that there
was no allegation of conspiracy in the Information. Consequently, it was
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that Galvez was the sole author of
the shot that killed Enojarda. The "incriminating circumstances" do not
point to Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime. The presence of the 3
armed men raises the probability that any one of those men inflicted the
fatal shot. It must be stressed that the prosecution witnesses merely
presumed that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda. Moreover, the fact that
Galvez was seen minutes after Enojarda was shot does not sufficiently
establish that Galvez was the one who shot Enojarda. There is no evidence
that Galvez was seen or was together with the 3 other armed men when
Enojarda was hit. There is a missing link that precludes the Court from
concluding that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda. It cannot be said therefore
that there was positive identification of Galvez through circumstantial
evidence.
1(a)Both Perez and Rellios testified that they saw Galvez with 3 other armed companions minutes after
Enojarda was shot but they did not testify that they saw him in the vicinity before the shooting of Enojarda.
(b) Perez testified that only 1 shot hit Enojarda.
(c) Perez testified that he did not see Galvez shoot at Enojarda and that he merely assumed that Galvez was
the one who shot the victim when the latter passed by him. Rellios testified that he only presumed that
Galvez shot at Enojarda.
(d) Perez testified that he had no misunderstanding with Galvez 50 and that he does not know any motive
2. [Syllabus topic] W/N Galvez’s supposed offer to the victim’s wife to settle the
case may be received in evidence as a tacit admission of guilt. NO.
While the Court agrees that in criminal cases, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt, such
principle is not applicable in this case. The only basis of the RTC in
concluding that Galvez made on offer of compromise, is the Order of the
RTC which reads:
Considering that the accused as well as his Counsel, Atty.
Bienvenido G. Martin appeared in Court together with Rosaflor
Enojarda, the wife of the victim, and manifested that there is a
possibility of understanding and settlement between the parties, the
above-entitled case is hereby reset for new assignment.
Galvez’s supposed offer of compromise was not formally offered and admitted
as evidence during the trial. The victim’s widow or any prosecution witness
did not testify on any offer of compromise made by Galvez.
The Court also recognized that there may be instances when an offer of
compromise will not amount to an admission of guilt. In People v. Godoy,
the Court pronounced that:
…In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible
as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which
assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that
in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public
interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards
the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases
the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a
consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of
imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim
by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an
admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences
which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
As the alleged offer of compromise was not presented in court, it was not
shown that Galvez indeed made such an offer under the consciousness of
guilt. Galvez was not given the opportunity to explain that it was given for
some other reason that would justify a claim that it was not an admission of
guilt or an attempt to avoid its legal consequences. In this case, the
presumption of innocence of Galvez prevails over the alleged implied
admission of guilt.
Others:
o As to motive: Also, when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely
circumstantial or inconclusive, motive is vital. In this case, prosecution witness
Perez testified that he did not know of any motive on the part of Galvez to kill
Enojarda. This is a circumstance that should be taken in favor of Galvez.
o As to the negative result of the ballistic and paraffin tests: While it is true that
the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not conclusively prove
that Galvez did not shoot the victim, the same negative results cannot be used as
circumstantial evidence against Galvez to prove that he shot Enojarda.
o As to the weakness of Galvez’ alibi: That Galvez was a police officer who could
have justified his presence at the scene of the crime with a lawful purpose, yet he
put up an alibi which is inherently weak; and that Galvez did not present his
wife and father-in-law as witnesses to corroborate his story that he was at their
house on the night in question, pertain to the weakness of Galvez’s alibi which
may cast doubt on his innocence. However, these circumstances do not prove
beyond reasonable doubt Galvez’s guilt. Although an accused must satisfactorily
prove his alibi, the burden in criminal cases still rests on the prosecution to prove
the accused’s guilt. The prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own
weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
o As to Galvez’ refusal to give a statement to the investigating officer: That Galvez
refused 3 times to give a statement to the investigating police officer is a
prerogative given to the accused and should not be given evidentiary value to
establish his guilt.
o Dissenting opinion of Ynares-Santiago: In the absence of direct evidence, the
prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its
burden.
There is no doubt that Galvez was present at the scene of the crime. 5
minutes after the first burst of gunfire, he was seen armed with an armalite rifle
and shooting in the direction of the copra kiln. He not only failed to explain and
justify his presence at the crime scene and his act of shooting in the direction of
the copra kiln, but raised the defense of alibi which was inherently weak and
remained uncorroborated. He also refused to give his statement despite being
summoned 3 times by the police. It is also worth noting that Perez, one of the
prosecution witnesses who positively identified Galvez, was a cousin of the latter.
The CA found no ill-motive on the part of Perez, hence his positive identification
of Galvez is all the more convincing and credible.
 The prosecution’s failure to allege conspiracy would not completely absolve
Galvez from any liability. For sure, Galvez cannot be held liable for the acts
committed by the 3 John Does, but he may definitely be made to answer for the
consequences of his own act. Due to the failure of the prosecution to allege
conspiracy and indict the 3 John Does in the information, the critical point of
inquiry is Galvez’ individual participation in the killing of Enojarda, i.e., whether
the evidence prove beyond reasonable doubt that Galvez was the one who shot
and fatally wounded Enojarda. Even if the circumstantial evidence does not
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Galvez was the one who inflicted the fatal
gunshot wound on Enojarda, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to hold
that he was one of the 4 armed malefactors who fired upon Enojarda during the
first burst of gunfire.

His intent to kill may be deduced from the kind of weapon he used as well as
the manner of shooting he employed. Treachery is, likewise, present due to the
suddenness of the attack and the use of the cover of darkness in mounting the
attack. There is sufficient evidence to hold him liable for attempted murder only
because, as previously discussed, there is reasonable doubt as to whether he
inflicted the fatal gunshot wound on Enojarda.
G.R. No. 168071 December 18, 2006
LUCIANO TAN, vs. RODIL ENTERPRISES
FACTS:
Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of the subject premises, the Ides O’Racca Building since
1959. The Ides O’Racca Building is owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On
18 May 1992, Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, through DENR, entered into a
Renewal of a Contract of Lease over the Ides O’Racca Building. A subsequent
Supplementary Contract dated 25 May 1992 was similarly entered into, thus,
extending the lease agreement until 1 Sept. 1997.
The validity of the 18 May 1992 and the 25 May 1992 contracts was placed in
question in several actions involving Rodil Enterprises, the Ides O’Racca Building
Tenants Assoc. Inc., and other tenants. The validity of the aforementioned
contracts were upheld by the Supreme Court in a consolidation of cases despite a
previous declaration of the Office of the President rendering both contracts
without force and effect.
During the pendency of those cases, a subsequent Contract of Lease was drawn
between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic on 18 Oct 1999. Rodil Enterprises then
subleased various units of the property of the property to members of the Ides
O’Racca Building Tenants Association and a space, known as Botica Divisoria, was
subleased to Luciano Tan. When Tan refused to pay rentals despite repeated oral
and written demands to pay as well as vacate the premises, Rodil Enterprises filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer.
In his defense, Luciano Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the government
who owns the Ides O’Racca Building and not of Rodil Enterprises. As such, he has
the right to lease the said premises. He based his claim on the OP decision that
declared the Renewal of Contract of Lease and the Supplemental Contract between
Rodil Enterprises and the Republic to be without force and effect. He prayed for
the dismissal of the Complaint, and for the return of whatever amount Rodil
Enterprises had collected during such time when he was still paying rentals to the
latter.
The MeTC recognized an agreement in open court by Tan and Rodel Enterprises
where in the parties agreed in principle that Tan will pay back rentals since
Septemb 1997 up to the time of the case and also pay the monthly rentals. The
MeTC also ruled in favor of Rodil Enterprises stating that Tan did not contest the
sublease and in fact admitted that there were back rentals based on the agreement
made in open court.
The RTC reversed stating that the MeTC erred in holding that the offer to
compromise by Luciano Tan’s counsel was akin to an admission of fact, the same
being contrary to Sec. 27, Rule 130. As reasoned by the RTC:
During the pre-trial conference held in the lower court, proposals and counter-
proposals emanated from the parties’ counsels, which was normally inspired by
the desire to "buy peace", nay, to put an end to the troubles of litigation, and to
promote settlement of disputes as a matter of public policy. The act of
defendant/appellant in the midst of pre-trial is not an admission of any liability
and therefore, should not be considered admissible evidence against him.
The CA reinstated the MeTC’s ruling stating that Tan made an implied admission of
the existence of a contract of sublease with Rodil Enterprises and that he had
reneged in the payment of rentals based on the aforementioned agreement in open
court. Moreover, it deemed Luciano Tan’s Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit
Rentals as another admission in favor of Rodil.
ISSUE: whether Luciano Tan made a judicial admission anent his liability as a
sublessee of Rodil Enterprises
HELD: Yes
The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of
liability. It is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court in Trans-
Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. CA, to wit:
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the
circumstances of the case and the intent of the party making the offer should be
considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same
for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is
inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the
existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably,
then, the admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness. Indeed, an offer of
settlement is an effective admission of a borrower’s loan balance.
Similarly, in the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co., the Court applied
the exception to the general rule. In Varadero¸ there was neither an expressed nor
implied denial of liability, but during the course of the abortive negotiations therein,
the defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff. Finding that there was no
denial of liability, and considering that the only question discussed was the amount to
be paid, the Court did not apply the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.
In the case at bar, the MeTC and the CA properly appreciated petitioner’s admission
as an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. The MeTC found that petitioner
did not contest the existence of the sublease, and his counsel made frank
representations anent the former’s liability in the form of rentals. This expressed
admission was coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The Motion to Allow Defendant
to Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as an explicit acknowledgment of
petitioner’s liability on the subleased premises. The CA agreed with the MeTC.
Indeed, the existence of the Contract of Lease, dated 18 Oct 1999 was not denied by
petitioner. The contracts that were assailed by petitioner are the contracts dated 18
and 25 May 1992, the validity of which has been upheld by this Court in the
consolidated cases.

Finally, we find a categorical admission on the part of petitioner, not only as to his
liability, but also, as to the amount of indebtedness in the form of rentals due. The
Order of the MeTC was clear that the petitioner agreed in open court to pay the
amount of P440,000, representing petitioner’s unpaid rentals from Sept. 1997 to June
2000; and that petitioner will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750 on or
before the 5th day of each month. The petitioner’s judicial admission in open court, as
found by the MeTC, and affirmed by the CA finds particular significance when
viewed together with his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, wherein
petitioner stated that the rentals due on the premises in question from Sept 1997 up to
the present amounted to P467,500, as of the date of filing the Motion. Petitioner
cannot now be allowed to reject the same. An admission made in the pleading cannot
be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him,
and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith
should be ignored whether objection is interposed by a party or not. A judicial
admission is an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, for purposes of the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot
thereafter disprove.
Estrada v. Ombudsman, 21 January 2015 the only issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose of
Carpio, J. determining whether an information should be filed, and does not prevent
Sen. Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-
Facts: respondents during the pre-trial or even during the trial.
1. The Ombudsman served upon Sen. Jinggoy Estrada two complaints for Furthermore, in citing the Reyes case, Justice Velasco’s dissent
Plunder. overlooked a vital portion of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning. This Court
2. Estrada and 18 co-respondents filed their counter-affidavits. quoted from the Court of Appeals’ decision: "x x x [A]dmissions made by
3. Estrada filed his request to be furnished with copies of counter-affidavits of Peñaloza in his sworn statement are binding only on him. Res inter alios act a
the other respondents. alteri nocere non debet. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
4. On March 27, 2014, the Ombudsman denied the request (March 27 Order). declaration or omission of another." In OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-
5. On March 28, 2014, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Estrada 0397, the admissions of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents can in no way prejudice
(March 28 Resolution). Sen. Estrada. Even granting Justice Velasco’s argument that the 28 March
6. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the March 28 Resolution. He 2014 Joint Resolution in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-039720
did not file a MR of the March 27 Order but instead filed a Petition for mentioned the testimonies of Sen. Estrada’s correspondents like Tuason and
Certiorari to set aside the March 27 Order. Cunanan, their testimonies were merely corroborative of the testimonies of
7. On the same day of filing the petition, the Ombudsman issued an order complainants’ witnesses Benhur Luy, Marina Sula, and Merlina Suñas and
furnishing Estrada the counter-affidavits of the other respondents. were not mentioned in isolation from the testimonies of complainants’
witnesses.
Issue/Held:
1. WON the March 27 Order constituted grave abuse of discretion violating
Estrada’s right to due process. NO

Ratio:
1. Estrada fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory
requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the
Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman supports Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the
respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and
documents. The counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the
supporting affidavits of the complainant.

Justice Velasco’s dissent: In Ombudsman v. Reyes, the Court

remanded the case to the Ombudsman. It stated that there was disregard of
Reyes’ right to due process because he was not furnished a copy of the
counter-affidavits of Peñaloza and of Peñaloza’s three witnesses.
Ponente: In the Reyes case, failure to furnish a copy of the counter-
affidavits happened in the administrative proceedings on the merits, which
resulted in Reyes’ dismissal from the service. In Sen. Estrada’s Petition, the
denial of his Request happened during the preliminary investigation where
GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GOV. JUM AKBAR, and NOR- saw Ikram driving Salapuddin’s minitruck in Lamitan, Basilan on September
RHAMA J. INDANAN 20, 2007 and delivering water from Salapuddin’s water refilling station.
 Based on the affidavits of Jamiri, Ikram, and Aunal, Police Superintendent
FACTS: Asher Dolina requested to then Chief State Prosecutor Zuño the inclusion of
Salapuddin, Congressman Hataman, Jim Hataman and Police Officer 1 (PO1)
 November 13, 2007: a bomb exploded near the entrance of the South Wing
Bayan Judda in the complaints for murder and multiple frustrated murder.
lobby of the House of Representatives (HOR) in the Batasan Complex,
 Dr. Benito Molino (Dr. Molino) conducted in the presence of investigators
Quezon City shortly after the the session was adjourned.
from the Commission on Human Rights a medical examination of the
 5 Congressmen died, and 6 other Congressmen were seriously injured. Post-
detained—- revealing that the three were subjected to physical and mental
blast investigation revealed that the explosion was caused by an improvised
torture
bomb planted on a motorcycle that was parked near.
 The 3 executed affidavits of recantation. Salapuddin submitted his counter-
 Acting on a confidential information that the person who parked the
affidavit where he reiterated the statements he made in his November 17,
motorcycle was staying with members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and
2007 affidavit and assailed Ikram’s attempt to implicate him as Ikram’s
learning that one ASG member, Abu Jandalalias "Bong," has standing
desperate act of self redemption after owning up to the crime
warrants of arrest for kidnapping and serious illegal detention, police officers
 Prosecutor Zuño approved the DOJ Investigating Panel’s Supplemental
raided an alleged ASG safehouse at Payatas, Quezon City.
Resolution. The Resolution recommended the amendment of the
 2 were killed, Caidar Aunal (Aunal), Ikram Indama (Ikram) and Adham
Information in Criminal Case No. Q-07-149982, pending before Quezon City
Kusain (Kusain) were arrested and then brought to Camp Crame in Quezon
RTC, Branch 83, to include Ikram, Aunal, Kusain, Jamiri, PO1 Bayan Judda,
City
Jang Hataman and Salapuddin
 Several items were likewise seized from the premises: two .45 pistols, one
 Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review of the Supplemental Resolution with
motor vehicle plate number "8," an HOR ID issued to Ikram, and a black
the Office of the Secretary of Justice (SOJ)
wallet with a GSIS ID card issued to Aunal with calling cards of Salapuddin
 SOJ issued a Resolution excluding Salapuddin from the Information for the
One of the .45 pistols found was traced back to Julham S. Kunam, Political
complex crime of murder and frustrated murder, thus modifying the
Affairs Assistant of Salapuddin.
Supplemental Resolution of the Investigating Panel. The Secretary of Justice
 Kusain executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay: native of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan who
predicated his modificatory action on the interplay of the following
came to Manila in March 2005, staying when he first arrived in Manila in
premises:
the house of Salapuddin, his father’s friend. Salapuddin paid for 1 year of his
o the only material evidence against Salapuddin is the statements of
college education and helped him be employed as a building attendant at the
Ikram.
Ninoy Aquino International Airport. He was in the house at Parkwood Hills
because Redwan asked him to get the payment for his black XRM Honda Ikram’s statements are laden with irreconcilable
motorcycle that Redwan took from his house on November 2, 2007. inconsistencies and contradictions that they cannot be
Redwan did not disclose the purpose for use and it was only after the raid considered worthy of belief.
that he learned that his motorcycle was the very same motorcycle used
during the bombing. "there is nothing on record that will indicate that x x x
 Based on the sworn statements of these different people involved: request for Salapuddin performed the overt acts of the offense charged."
the conduct of inquest proceedings made
SOJ observed that the statements of the other accused cannot
 As the investigation went on, Ikram executed several affidavits.
 NOTE: Ikram, in his first three affidavits, never mentioned Salapuddin’s be given weight as they were obtained through force and
involvement, let alone implicate him, in the plan to kill Congressman Akbar. intimidation and were later recanted.
This changed in his fourth affidavit:  Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan (petition for Certiorari) questioned the
 Ikram would later amend the dates mentioned in his earlier affidavits by SOJ’s Resolution before the CA.
executing an affidavit dated January 10, 200846 (Ikram’s fifth affidavit)
 Maturan, the mayor of Ungkaya Pukan, Basilan, stated in his affidavit that he Matters relating to the admissibility of evidence and credibility of
 witnesses are best determined by the courts during trial, and not at the
stage of determining probable cause. There is, so respondents claimed,
overwhelming evidence to link Salapuddin in the conspiracy to kill
Congressman Akbar.
 CA set aside the Resolution of the SOJ.
o Totality of the evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability that
Salapuddin lent moral and material support or assistance to the
perpetrators in the commission of the crime,"
o "the absence (or presence) of any conspiracy among the accused is
evidentiary in nature after a full-blown trial on the merits."
o Recantation made by Jamiri, Aunal, and Kusain and their claim of
torture were of little probative value inasmuch as these were
"unsupported by competent proof."
 Salapuddin filed MR-DENIED
 Ikram filed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagbabawi, Pagwalang Bisa ng Naunang
Mga Salaysay at Pagpapatotoo:
 Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review with the SC, ascribing on the appellate
court the commission of grave error in admitting the extrajudicial admissions
of Jamiri, Kusain, and Aunal
o They were obtained through torture and physical abuse, without
the effective assistance of a competent independent counsel of their
choice, and were in fact recanted.
o Plus wrong in according full probative value to Ikram’s extrajudicial
confession implicating Salapuddin even if it was riddled with
serious contradictions and inconsistencies
 SC denied petition. Salapuddin filed MR: specifically inviting attention to the
prosecution’s admission: no other direct evidence linking him to the crime
charged except Ikram’s testimony. Since, Ikram has recanted his testimony
on account of the violations of his constitutionally protected rights, there is
no longer any reason or probable cause to maintain the criminal case filed
against him.
 SC granted the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner and reinstated
the petition.
ISSUES:
W/N SOJ was correct in excluding Salappudin from the Information for the
complex crime of murder and frustrated murder? YES
HELD:
The determination of probable cause is, under our criminal justice system, an
executive function that the courts cannot interfere with in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion. Otherwise, a violation of the basic principle of separation of powers will
ensue. The Executive Branch, through its prosecutors, is, thus, given ample latitude to
determine the propriety of filing a criminal charge against a person.
This broad authority of prosecutors, however, is circumscribed by the requirement of
a conscientious conduct of a preliminary investigation for offences where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day. (aims to prevent: the State
forced to prosecute frivolous suits and innocent men unnecessarily dragged to defend
themselves in courts against groundless charges)
Thus: investigating prosecutors are duty-bound to sift through all the documents,
objects, and testimonies to determine what may serve as a relevant and competent
evidentiary foundation of a possible case against the accused persons. They cannot
defer and entirely leave this verification of all the various matters to the courts. So,
while prosecutors are not required to determine the rights and liabilities of the
parties, a preliminary investigation still constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the
merits of the case so that the investigating prosecutor is not excused from the duty to
weigh the evidence submitted and ensure that what will be filed in court is only such
criminal charge that the evidence and inferences can properly warrant.
Prosecutor’s call on the existence or absence of probable cause is further subject to the
review of the Secretary of Justice who exercises the power of control over prosecutors.
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the SOJ who, under the
RAC, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and
who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
NOW, IF the SOJ reverses or modifies the resolution of the investigating prosecutors,
he or she can direct the prosecutors concerned "to dismiss or move for dismissal of the
complaint or information with notice to the parties." This action is not subject to the
review of courts unless there is a showing that the Secretary of Justice has committed
a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to an excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing
the challenged resolution.
So APPLYING THIS TO THE CASE:
CA in reversing the resolution of the SOJ, has evidently neglected this elementary
principle. CA has assumed, but has not sufficiently explained, how the SOJ’s decision
finding the absence of probable cause to indict Salapuddin amounts to a grave abuse
of discretion. Instead, the CA glossed over the testimonies presented by the parties and
adopted the reversed conclusion of the Investigating Prosecutors that the totality of the
evidence presented points to the probability that Salapuddin has participated in a
conspiracy that culminated in the Batasan bombing.
Indeed, probable cause requires less proof than necessary for conviction. Nonetheless,
it demands more than bare suspicion and must rest on competent relevant evidence.
 A review of the records, however, show that the only direct material
evidence against Salapuddin, as he had pointed out at every
conceivable turn, is the confession made by Ikram. While the
confession is arguably relevant, it isn’t competent to establish the
probability that Salapuddin participated in the commission of the
crime. On the contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this
cannot be considered against Salapuddin on account of the principle
of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet expressed in Section 28,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. – The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided.
Clearly thus, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot
be admitted against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.
“a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against
him…but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers”
The exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the rule
allowing the admission of a conspirator requires the prior establishment of the
conspiracy by evidence other than the confession. In this case, there is no proof
demonstrating the participation of Salapuddin in a conspiracy to set off a bomb in
the Batasan grounds and thereby kill Congressman Akbar. Not one of the other
persons arrested and subjected to custodial investigation professed that Salapuddin
was involved in the plan to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds. Instead, the
investigating prosecutors did no more than to rely on Salapuddin’s association with
these persons to conclude that he was a participant in the conspiracy.
CA: “Salapuddin’s participation in the forgoing, cannot be downplayed just because he
did not actively take part in the planning. Rather, despite this, it has hands written all
over it. The circumstances, the people and place used are all, one way or another,
associated with him. It cannot be mere coincidence”
SC: mere association with the principals by direct participation, without more, does
not suffice. Relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy.
Salapuddin’s complicity to the crime, if this be the case, cannot be anchored on his
relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or his ownership of the place where
they allegedly stayed while in Manila.
It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance
or furtherance of the complicity. Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the
act, without the cooperation or approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove
conspiracy. There must be positive and conclusive factual evidence indicating the
existence of conspiracy, and not simple inferences, conjectures and speculations
speciously sustained because "it cannot be mere coincidence.”
The investigating prosecutors themselves were aware of the need for other clear and
positive evidence of conspiracy besides the confession made by a supposed co-
conspirator in charging a person with a crime committed in conspiracy.
Indeed, the SOJ was correct in overturning the investigating prosecutors and ordering
Salapuddin’s exclusion from the Information. The Secretary cannot plausibly be found
culpable of grave abuse of his discretion.
CA has failed to capture the import of ruling in People v. Listerioin supporting its
general declaration that "the totality of evidence" indicates Salapuddin’s participation
in the conspiracy.
“Jurisprudence teaches that ‘it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed
some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime
planned to be committed.’ However, this overt act may consist of active participation
in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting
moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators x x x.”
CA failed to correctly appreciate that even in Listerio, the "assistance," which was
considered by this Court as an "overt act" of conspiracy, was extended while "by being
present at the commission of the crime”
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, it denotes an intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
HERE: no evidence or testimony, not even Ikram’s, suggests the presence of
Salapuddin during the blast. He cannot, therefore, be properly accused of exerting an
"overt act" by extending "assistance" to whoever was responsible for the commission
of the felony.
While conspiracy can be proven by circumstantial evidence, the series of evidence
presented to establish an accused’s participation in the conspiracy must be
consistent and should lead to no other conclusion but his participation in the crime as
a conspirator. The conspiracy itself must be proved as positively as the commission of
the felony itself.

Confession of Ikram relied on by investigating prosecutors and the appellate court

does not provide the threshold consistent picture that would justify Salapuddin’s
complicity in the conspiracy that led to the Batasan bombing. Consider: Ikram made
the allegation regarding Salapuddin’s participation in the conspiracy in his fourth
affidavit, after he categorically denied knowing who the mastermind was.

Ikram’s acknowledged denial of the person behind the plan to kill Congressman
Akbar is to be sure inconsistent with the claim he made in the very same affidavit
dated November 20, 2007 that he heard Salapuddin order Redwan to kill
Congressman Akbar. Reference to Salapuddin as the mastermind behind the grand
plan to kill Congressman Akbar also varies with Ikram’s claim that the Hataman
brothers made the order on two separate occasions, which allegation was, as
previously stated, corroborated by Jamiri and Aunal in their own affidavits

Discrepancies in the affidavits do not persuade this Court to find probable cause that
Salapuddin, was part of the conspiracy. THOUGH SC is not pre-empting the findings
of the trial court with regard to Ikram, Aunal, Jamiri and Kusain, the variations and
the inconsistencies contained in their affidavits lend credence to their allegations of
torture and coercion, especially as these allegations are supported by medical reports
prepared by an independent medical practitioner who was assisted by the personnel
of the Human Rights Commission.

NOTE: It’s necessary in finding probable cause to indict a person for the commission
of a felony, that only those matters which are constitutionally acceptable, competent,
consistent and material are considered. No such evidence was presented to
sufficiently establish the probable cause to indict Salapuddin for the non-bailable
offenses he is accused of.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MICHAEL BOKINGO ALIAS "MICHAEL
BOKINGCO" & REYNANTE COL
August 10, 2011| PEREZ, J.:| Digest by Ron San Juan
Facts:
 An Information was filed against accused-appellants charging them of the crime
of murder. On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded
2
not guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed to the crime charged.
 The crime was allegedly committed as follows:
The victim, Pasion and his wife, Elsa, were residing in a house along Mac
Arthur Highway in Balibago, Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop,
which formed part of his house. Appellants, who were staying in the
apartment at the back of the house of Pasion, were among the 13
construction workers employed by Pasion.
Vitalicio (Pasion’s brother-in-law) testified that he heard a commotion from
Apartment No. 3. He checked and saw Bokingco hitting something on the
floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen
door and attacked him as well. Vitalicio managed to escape. Pasion and
Vitalicio were brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later
while Vitalicio was treated for his injuries.
Elsa testified that she was in the master's bedroom on the second floor of the
house when she heard banging sounds and her husband's moans. When she
went down to check on her husband, Col blocked and attacked her with a
2 That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in the City of Angeles, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, armed with a claw hammer and with intent to kill by
means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of confidence, and nighttime, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting and beating
his head and other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon said NOLI PASION
fatal wounds on his head and body which caused his death.
knife. Col then instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa
informed him that she does not know the combination lock. Col dragged
but eventually let her go away after Bokingco opened the screen door and
told Col: "tara, patay na siya."
 During the preliminary investigation, Bokingco admitted that he conspired with
Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing several days before because
they got "fed up" with Pasion.
 Bokingco testified in open court that he was only provoked in hitting Pasion
back when the latter hit him in the head. Col, on the other hand, confirmed that
he was one of the construction workers employed by Pasion. He however
resigned on 26 February 2000. He insisted that he doesn't know Bokingco very
well.
 The trial court rendered judgment finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues:
1) Whether the qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to convict
Bokingco of murder. (NO)
2) Whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator. (NO)
Held: Court found Bokingco guilty of homicide only. Col was acquitted.
Bokingco is guilty of homicide only. The qualifying circumstances of treachery,
evident premeditation, night-time and abuse of confidence were not proven.
 There is no question that Bokingco attacked and killed Pasion. Bokingco made
two (2) separate and dissimilar admissions: (1) In his extrajudicial confession
taken during the preliminary investigation where he admitted that he and Col
planned the killing of Pasion; and (2) When he testified in open court that he
was only provoked in hitting Pasion back when the latter hit him in the head.
 Treachery cannot be appreciated in the absence of any proof of the manner in
which the aggression was commenced. Nobody witnessed the commencement
and the manner of the attack. While the witness Vitalicio managed to see
Bokingco hitting something, he failed to see the victim at that time.
 Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion. But the admitted manner
of killing is inconsistent with evident premeditation. Bokingco merely admitted
that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head. It was during
the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Col's plan to kill
Pasion. Bokingco's confession was admittedly taken without the assistance of
counsel in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. 3 Applied
in this case, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against Bokingco because
he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time his confession was taken
before a judge.
 Having ruled however that evident premeditation has not been proved, the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly appreciated. There
was no evidence to show that Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to facilitate
the commission of the offense.
 Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
in this case. There was no showing that he took advantage of said trust to
facilitate the commission of the crime.
There was no sufficient evidence to implicate Col.
 In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation, it is necessary that
conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved.
 Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an
unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during,
and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts
of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action,
3
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
and community of interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the
unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy.
 As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the
crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.
 The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa's testimony that appellants fled
together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.
Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the
apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at
Elsa's house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault. Based on
these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco
in killing Pasion. At the most, Col's actuations can be equated to attempted
robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against appellants before
it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder.
 The fact that Bokingco told Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to
leave the place does not prove that they acted in concert towards the
consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes
committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from
the crimes they separately committed.
 Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already
killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated
because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was
attempting to rob the pawnshop.
 In as much as Bokingco's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is
likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a
cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is
binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and
is considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule
is an admission made by a conspirator.
 Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of
the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given
in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than by such act or declaration.
 In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-
conspirators, it is necessary that:
 1. The conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;
2. The admission relates to the common object; and
3. It has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.
 As we have previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has
no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence against Col.
 Bokingco's judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he
only attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in the head.
Learning Child v. Ayala Alabang Village Association (2010)
Topic: Admission by co-partner or agent (for purposes of the topic, Ayala Land, Inc is
the “other person jointly interested in with the party” in Section 29. The “party” is
AAVA.)
This is a consolidation of three cases before the Supreme Court. The first two cases are
identical being two separate petitions for review against the same CA decision. The
third case took a different route but the CA arrived at the same conclusion. In all
three CA decisions, the school (Learning Child) and the school’s owners (Spouses
Alfonso) lose. They also lose in the SC.
FACTS
In 1984, Ayala Land Inc (ALI) sold subject lot in the Ayala Alabang Village to Spouses
Jose and Cristina Yuson which in turn sold the same lot to Spouses Felipe and Mary
Anne Alfonso. The TCT of the lot was annotated with a Deed of Restrictions,
required by ALI, which says that the property must be used exclusively for the
establishment and maintenance of a preparatory school (nursery and kindergarten).
ALI turned over the right to enforce the restrictions to the Ayala Alabang Village
Association (AAVA). However, the “Deed Restrictions” attached to the Deed of
Restrictions says that Ayala Corporation and/or AAVA may enforce by court action
the provisions in the Deed of Restrictions.
In 1989, Spouses Alfonso opened on the lot The Learning Child Center Pre-School
(TLC). However, in 1991, TCL was expanded to include a grade school program, the
School of the Holy Cross. AAVA wrote to TLC protesting the addition of the grade
school as a violation of the Deed of Restrictions.
FIRST TWO CASES IN SC:
In 1992, AAVA filed an injunction case with the RTC against TLC alleging breach of
contract as well as violation of the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance (classifying
AAV as a low-density residential area thereby limiting use of property to a prep
school which should not exceed two classrooms) and a Barangay Ordinance (which
prohibited parking on either side of the street up to 8 meters in width. TLC is
adjacent to Balabac and Cordillera streets which are both less than 8 meters in width).
Adjacent owners of properties within the vicinity of TLC intervened in the same suit
seeking essentially the same relief as AAVA. (Spouses Arzaga, Quisumbing, Sena, KSL
Corp, LawPhil, Inc).
RTC dismissed the complaint-in-intervention by the adjacent owners for failure to
show that they were entitled to the damages they prayed for. The adjacent owners
didn’t move for reconsideration nor file an appeal. RTC however granted AAVA’s
petition finding breach of contract and violation of the Barangay Ordinance. It also
said that the Deed of Restrictions was in the nature of an easement allowed by the
Civil Code.
TLC and Spouses Alfonso filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that, with the
passage of the Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance 91-39 reclassifying the property as
“institutional,” the Deed of Restrictions no longer apply.
RTC reversed itself and agreed with the Spouses Alfonso by saying that while non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute and has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power by the municipality.
AAVA moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC.
The CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the RTC’s earlier decision. When the
Spouses Alfonso moved for reconsideration, several students (Aquino, et.al) of the
TLC allegedly benefiting from the school’s program for various learning and
behavioral disorders filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The CA denied both motions. Spouses Alfonso and Aquino et. al. filed separate
petitions for review with the Supreme Court.
THIRD CASE:
While the motion for reconsideration by the Spouses Alfonso was pending in the RTC
(before the RTC reversed itself), the Municipality of Muntinlupa passed a Resolution
correcting an alleged typographical error in the Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance. The
resolution, in effect, places the block which the prep-school was located as under the
“institutional” classification. This was the basis of the RTC when it reversed itself.
The Municipality filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a
petition for the approval of the Resolution. AAVA and the adjacent property owners
filed an Opposition.
HLURB remanded the petition to the Muntinlupa SB for the required public hearings ISSUE 1: WON Resolution was a mere correction of the Makati Zoning Ordinance and
because the Resolution was not a correction of an error but an actual rezoning of the not a rezoning ordinance? (Correction only.)
property.

The Office of the President, upon appeal by the Municipality and the Spouses
The “WHEREAS” clauses of the Resolution clearly says that it merely aims to correct
Alfonso, reversed the HLURB ruling that the Resolution was for mere correction and
a specific error in the Ordinance. The Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa shows that
not rezoning. The President also said that no less than Ayala Corporation required
the subject property was “institutional” and not “residential.” The subject property is
that the lot be exclusively used for “school and related activities,” and that prior to the
Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V. The mistake was that Block 3 was replaced by Block 1
sale, the property was already used for school purposes. Plus, the TLC is not the only
somehow in the Ordinance itself and this mistake contradicts the Official Zoning Map
school operating within the AAV, De La Salle-Zobel, Benedictine Abbey School,
and which mistake the Resolution aims to correct. SC says it is harder to make a
Woodrose School, etc, operated inside AAV, so AAVA and the adjacent property
mistake on the map; it is easier to mistype 1 instead of 3. SC also noted that AAVA
owners cannot claim that the TLC violated their privacy/dignity/peace of mind as
never contended that Lot 25 Block 1 was “institutional.”
residents of AAV.
AAVA’s claim that, based on the case of Resins, Inc v. Auditor General, the cure is by
The CA agreed with the President that the Resolution was not for rezoning purposes
legislation, not by judicial decree. SC says yes, that’s the general rule (separation of
and was merely a correction and so did not require notice and hearing. However, the
powers). In Resin, a taxpayer filed a suit in order for the statute to be corrected. Here,
CA reversed the President by citing its earlier ruling that the Deed of Restrictions
the Municipality is correcting itself and the court is merely affirming such correction.
cannot be nullified by the Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance.
There is presumption of regularity in the act of the Municipality in correcting itself
The Spouses Alfonso filed a petition for review of this CA decision. while in Resin, the Municipality is being compelled by the petitioner to correct itself
which, in deference to the principle of separation of powers, the court refused to do.
ISSUES:
ISSUE 2: WON Motion to intervene of Aquino et. al. properly denied. (Yes. Their
ISSUE 1: WON Resolution was a mere correction of the Makati Zoning Ordinance
alleged interest is moot. Granting not moot, they filed during appeal which the Rules
and not a rezoning ordinance? (Correction only.)
do not allow)
ISSUE 2: WON Motion to intervene of Aquino et. al. properly denied. (Yes. Their
The Motion for Leave to Intervene was filed on February 5, 1998. This case was
alleged interest is moot. Granting not moot, they filed during appeal which the Rules
decided on July 10, 2010 by the Supreme Court - after a lapse of 12 years, the
do not allow.)
petitioners should have graduated from grade school. Their interest does not survive
ISSUE 3: WON the grade school (School of the Holy Cross) can continue operations. as there was no indication whatsoever that the case was a class action suit in behalf of
(No. The Deed of Restrictions cannot be annulled by a Zoning Ordinance.) minors who would benefit from TLC’s school programs.

ISSUE 4: (TOPICAL) WON AAVA abrogated the Deed of Restrictions by its own acts
(estoppel by deed) and the acts of ALI. (No. Acts and reasons listed in ratio. ALI falls
within the exception to res alios inter acta rule, because under S.29, it is a person
jointly interested with the party. Nonetheless, ALI’s acts still doesn’t affect the Deed
of Restrictions.)
Granting arguendo, the motion was still properly denied because it was filed during
the appeal to the CA, and not before judgment of the trial court which Rule 19
Section 2 requires.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall
be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
ISSUE 3: WON the grade school (School of the Holy Cross) can continue operations.
(No. The Deed of Restrictions cannot be annulled by a Zoning Ordinance).
Ortigas v. Feati case used by RTC and Spouses Alfonso - almost the same case but the
developer annotated in the deed of sale that the property can only be used for
residential purposes. The owners (Feati Bank and Trust Co) later built a commercial
bank. Municipality of Mandaluyong reclassified the property into an industrial and
commercial zone because of the heavy development in the area. SC upheld owner’s
building of the commercial bank.
Harmonize the Ortigas case with the case at bar. In Ortigas, the property underwent
rapid development that it was but proper for the Municipality to reclassify it while in
the case at bar, the area remains mainly residential despite the classification as
“institutional.” Also, in Ortigas, the Municipality had good reasons to reclassify while
in the case at bar, the municipality simply adopted the classification used in a zoning
map purportedly submitted by ALI itself. Thus, in Ortigas, the Municipality exercised
police power and reclassified the property with the intention of affecting existing
rights over the property. In the case at bar, no such intention by the municipality is
apparent and so the Deed of Restrictions cannot be said to be nullified by the Zoning
Ordinance.
Note: there are other cases but the Ortigas case is the strongest in favor of the Spouses
Alfonso. I condensed the contents for digest purposes as this is not really the topical
issue. :)
ISSUE 4: (TOPICAL) WON AAVA abrogated the Deed of Restrictions by its own acts
(estoppel by deed) and the acts of ALI. (No. Acts and reasons listed below. ALI falls
within the exception to res alios inter acta rule, because under S.29, it is a person
jointly interested with the party. Nonetheless, ALI’s acts still doesn’t affect the Deed of
Restrictions.)
Act 1. AAVA Village Manager Frank Roa admitted before the trial court that AAVA
had previously approved the proposed construction of a school building with 24
classrooms, which approval is further evidenced by a stamp mark of AAVA on the
Site Development Plan with the signature of Frank Roa himself.
Supreme Court: The Deed of Restrictions does not specify the number of classrooms,
it is an ordinance that specifies the limit of 2 classrooms, so AAVA cannot be said to
be estopped because it failed to limit the number of classrooms built. Also, Frank
Roa’s signature came with a note: that the approval is subject to the Deed of
Restrictions regarding the use of the classrooms. Nowhere did he say that he
sanctioned the use of the classrooms for grade school purposes since the Site
Development Plan explicitly says The Learning Child Pre-School.
Act 2. While the case was submitted for resolution with the Court of Appeals, AAVA,
through its president Jesus M. Tañedo, authorized through a letter the construction of
a new "school building extension."
Supreme Court: We accept the explanation that AAVA was forced to allow the
building of the extension due to the trial court’s orders when it reversed itself.
Note that for Acts 3 and 4, AAVA is contending that it cannot be bound by ALI’s acts
because of the res alios inter acta rule. The court ruled that ALI’s acts can still bind
AVA because it is a person jointly interested with the party under the Section 29
exception to the rule. The basis for this is the “Deed Restrictions” attached with the
Deed of Restrictions which explicitly says:
"2. Compliance with the said restrictions, reservation, easements and conditions maybe
enjoined and/or enforced by Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or the Ayala
Alabang Village Association, their respective successors and assigns, or by any member
of the Ayala Alabang Village Association."
Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. — The act or declaration of a partner or
agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The
same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other
person jointly interested with the party.
Act 3. ALI itself requested the reclassification of the subject property as institutional,
as allegedly proven by the testimony of then Municipal Planning and Development
Officer Engineer Hector S. Baltazar.
Supreme Court: we have already ruled that the reclassification didn’t nullify the Deed
of Restrictions. In the same vein, even if ALI itself requested the reclassification, its
acts cannot be said to have affected the Deed of Restrictions.
Act 4. ALI assented to the reclassification of the subject property to institutional, as
shown by its letter dated July 24, 1991. It also said in the same letter that the building
of classrooms was a “worthy undertaking.”
Supreme Court: Same reasoning as #3. Also, when ALI said that the expansion was a
“worthy undertaking,” it mentioned in the same letter that the condition must be met
i.e. that AAVA board must concur with the expansion. In April 5, 1992, the AAVA
board voted that the Deed of Restrictions must be implemented. So ALI’s statement
cannot by itself be taken as an abrogation of the Deed of Restrictions because the
condition that the AAVA board must concur was not fulfilled.

DISPOSITION: Cease grade school operations by not accepting new enrollees.

However, those already enrolled in the grade school program may continue and
graduate as they are innocent by-standers to the dispute.
Estrada vs Desierto; Estrada vs Arroyo (April 3, 2001)
(topic is in issue #3)
Puno, J.
Facts:
This is an MR of the court’s resolution in Estrada vs Desierto (March 2, 2001) which
dismissed the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic.
Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by this
Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine
the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule
against the admission of hearsay evidence
Issue 1: W/N the use of the Angara Diary violates the rule against admission of
hearsay evidence. NO.
Petitioner: The Angara diaries were published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and as
such constitutes statements made outside the court.
SC:
First: The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot
complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Petitioner even cited in
his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second and third parts of the
diary. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but
unfortunately failed to do so.
Second: Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court
statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. Not at all hearsay evidence is
inadmissible as evidence. An examination of our rules of exclusion will show that
they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class.
Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these
admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. Admissions are not covered by the
hearsay rule. The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be
categorized as admissions of a party.
 his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a
candidate;
 his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of
Staff Angelo Reyes;
 his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would
be opened by Monday and
 Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa
red tape, bureaucracy, intriga.
Third: The ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant
statements. These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they
are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes:
(1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and
(2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue.
The second class includes the following:
a) Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental
condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;
b) Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state
of mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith,
etc. of the latter;
Where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as motive, malice, knowledge,
intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken
as conclusive of his state of mind, the only method of proof available is testimony of
others to the acts or statements of such person.
The Angara Diary is a testimony of another which contains statements of the
petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent
to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can
reasonably deduce petitioner’s intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not
covered by the rule on hearsay.
Issue 2: W/N the Angara Diary can be used against Estrada it not being his own diary.
YES.
Petitioner: The Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding on
him.
SC: The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive
admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is
reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied
by the other person.
In the Angara Diary, the options of Estrada started to dwindle when the armed forces
withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus,
Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise Estrada to
consider the option of dignified exit or resignation. Estrada did not object to the
suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Estrada’s silence
(to be treated as his reaction) on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an
admission by him [of his intent to resign.]
Issue 3 (TOPIC): W/N the use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule on res
inter alios acta.
Petitioner: The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. This is embodied in Sec 28
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
(petitioner). What is done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through
a mere instrument.
Example of Secretary’s Angara’s acts on behalf of President Estrada: According to the
Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng
kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin. This
statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara briefed him
about the progress of the first negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask
Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacaang after taking their final lunch
on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as
saying to Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? Secretary Angara told
him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team
of negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the
peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of the
presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara
on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the
petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.

SC: Section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, says: “The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter
provided.”

The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section
29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent.

Section 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act or

declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his
authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be
given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the
act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly
interested with the party.

Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the
Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the
critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacanang Palace. Under our rules of
evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal
PEOPLE v CACHUELA (2013)
FACTS:
1. July 23, 2004- Ibañez went to Weapons System Corporation (WSC), told Henessy
Auron, WSC’s Secretary and Sales Rep, that he was the one who bought a gun
barrel at the company’s gun show and inquired about the schedule and the rates
of WSC’s firing range and the membership fee of its gun club. He also asked the
days when there are many people in the firing range, and whether Henessy was
WSC’s only female employee.
2. July 26- at around 9:00 am, Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but
no one opened the door because employee Zaldy Gabao’s hands were tied.
Henessy called Raymundo Sian, the company’s operations manager, and
informed him that Zaldy’s hands had been tied. After one hour, the police
arrived and opened the gate using acetylene. They saw that Zaldy had been
handcuffed to the vault. Zaldy informed the police that the company’s gunsmith,
Rex Dorimon, was inside the firing range. The police entered the firing range,
and saw Rex lifeless.
3. An autopsy was conducted on the body of Rex, and found that the victim
suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax and abdomen, caused by a
.45 pistol.
4. The NBI received an information from an asset that the group of Cachuela was
involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex, and that Cachuela had
been looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI, after forming an
entrapment team, were met by Melvin Nabilgas, who was sent by Cachuela and
Ibañez to look for buyers of firearms. The police told Nabilgas that they were
conducting an entrapment operation against the 2 suspects of the robbery at
WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave the names of the other
persons involved in the crime.
5. The asset informed Cachuela that Nabilgas had already talked to the buyers and
that they would like to see the firearms being sold, so Cachuela set up a meeting
with them at a gasoline station. 3 NBI agents and the asset went to the agreed
place. Cachuela brought them inside his house to show them several firearms.
When the agents inquired whether the firearms had legal documentation, he
sensed that the meeting was a set-up. The NBI agents then arrested Cachuela and
seized 4 firearms including a .9 mm Bernardelli.
6. The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibañez, who directed the asset to
bring the prospective buyers to his residence. The NBI agents and the asset
entered Ibañez’s car, and asked him where the firearms were. Ibañez brought out
and showed 3 firearms to the agents. The agents asked whether the guns had
legal documentation before they arrested Ibañez. The agents recovered two guns,
a .45 Glock 30 and a .45 Llama.
7. At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants Cachuela and Ibañez,
during a police line-up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for
the killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the
both appellants and Zaldy in the crime.
8. The prosecution filed an Information for robbery with homicide before the RTC
against the Cachuela, Ibañez, Nabilgas and Zaldy. During trial, Zaldy died.
9. RTC found Cachuela and Ibañez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also ordered them to pay the heirs of Rex civil
indemnity and damages, and to pay P1,563,300.00, representing the value of the
firearms and ammunitions stolen from WSC. Nabilgas was acquitted on ground of
reasonable doubt.
10. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision but reduced the amount
representing the value of the stolen firearms and ammunitions from WS to
of P1,093,947.50, and the amount of damages.4
11. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
(The only issue where Section 30 Rule 130 is discussed.)
WON the extrajudicial confession given by Nabilgas implicating appellants Cachuela
and Ibañez, was admissible? NO. However the circumstantial evidence are still
sufficient to prove the guilty of the two accused.
RATIO:
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION: Nabilgas executed an extrajudicial confession at the
NBI Main Office, where he implicated the appellants and Zaldy in the crime charged.
This confession was made with the assistance of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer provided
by the NBI. During trial, he repudiated this confession, and claimed that he had been
4
The CA held that the circumstantial evidence showed that the appellants robbed WSC and killed Rex during the course
of this robbery 1) Ibañez visited WSC two days before the robbery and asked several questions from Henessy; (2) a
robbery occurred at WSC where 53 firearms and several ammunitions worthP1,563,300.00 had been stolen; (3) among
the firearms stolen were a .9 mm Bernardelli and a .45 Glock 30; (4) Rex, a gunsmith working in WSC, was found dead
at the firing range; (5) Rex sustained gunshot wounds on different parts of his body; (6) Cachuela and Ibañez were caught
trying to sell the .9 mm Bernardelli and the .45 Glock 30 respectively, in separate entrapment operations; and (7)
Cachuela and Ibanez were unable to explain how they came into possession of the stolen firearms. It disregarded the
appellants’ defenses of alibi, denial and frame-up for being self-serving. The CA likewise found unmeritorious the
appellants’ argument that the firearms confiscated from them were inadmissible in evidence, pointing out that the seizures
were the result of lawful entrapment operations.
tortured by the NBI agents, and that he was forced to copy a previously prepared
statement.
 The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible,
must satisfy the following requirements:
1. the confession must be voluntary;
2. it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel,
preferably of the confessant's choice;
3. it must be express; and
4. it must be in writing.
 Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when he
executed the alleged written confession. 5
 The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were
provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas. She was assigned the
task despite Nabilgas’ open declaration to the agency’s investigators that he
already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan, who also
confirmed this fact.
 Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when she was called to assist him.
She merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession. There was
also nothing in the records to show that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas’
confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the nature of
his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights.
 People v. Rapeza: the lawyer called to be present during custodial
investigations should, as far as reasonably possible, be the choice of the
individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer is furnished by the police
for the accused, the lawyer should be competent, independent and prepared
to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished
from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights.
 "An ‘effective and vigilant counsel’ necessarily and logically requires that the
lawyer be present and be able to advise and assist his client from the time
the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer
until the signing of the extrajudicial confession."
 In addition, the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a
witness who was present at the time the written confession was made. The
prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the witness stand.
 Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is also inadmissible in evidence against the
appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule.
5
A custodial investigation is understood as any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. It begins when there is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to focus on a particular person as a
suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with
an alleged offense.
 The res inter alios acta rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible
against his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them.
 An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This provision
states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy,
and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
 In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that:
a. the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;
b. the admission relates to the common object; and
c. it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.
 This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no
other piece of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to
prove that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in committing the crime
charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be shown as distinctly and
conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial
court due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.
Other Issues:
WON the out-of court identification was admissible (NO)
OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION: Lino testified that Zaldy identified the
appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex in
a police line-up held at the NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We note that
Zaldy did not testify in court since he was brought to the National Center for Mental
Health, and subsequently died there during the trial. For this reason, the Court
examined with greater scrutiny Lino’s testimony regarding Zaldy’s alleged out-of-
court identification.
 People v. Algarme:
 In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz.:
1. the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime;
2. the witness' degree of attention at that time;
3. the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness;
4. the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification;
 5. the length of time between the crime and the identification;
and,
6. the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
 Lino’s failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring
omission that renders unreliable Zaldy’s out-of-court identification. No way
exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the admissibility
and reliability of out-of-court identifications. The absence of an independent in-
court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment and
assessment of Lino’s testimony.
 Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the
appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing
of Rex. He did not state when the line-up took place; how this line-up had
been conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with the appellants (if
there were indeed other persons included in the line-up); and whether the
line-up was confined to persons of the same height and built as the
appellants. Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied Zaldy before
and during the line-up, and whether there had been the possibility of prior
or contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy regarding the
appearance of the appellants.
WON the circumstantial evidence to prove guilt are sufficient (YES)
 In view of the inadmissibility of Zaldy’s out-of-court identification and Nabilgas’
extrajudicial confession, the prosecution’s case rests purely on circumstantial
evidence. Conviction can be secured "on the basis of circumstantial evidence if
the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to a fair and
reasonable conclusion proving that the accused is the author of the crime to the
exclusion of all others." There can be conviction if the prosecution can establish
the appellants’ participation in the crime through credible and sufficient
circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that the accused,
and none other, committed the imputed crime.
 "Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances
from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common
experience. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites
concur:
a. there is more than one circumstance;
b. the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and
c. the combination of all the circumstances unavoidably leads to a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 No doubt exists, based on the appellants' actions, that their primary objective was
to rob WSC, and that the killing of Rex was done on occasion, or by reason, of
the robbery.
 The overriding intention of the appellants cannot but be to rob WSC; the
killing of Rex was merely incidental to the robbery. "Intent to rob is an
internal act, but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of
personal property." Rex was killed to facilitate the robbery; he was also the
person who would have been a witness to the crime.
 People v. De Leon: homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on
the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed (a) to facilitate the
robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the
culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery;
or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.
 Another WSC employee – Zaldy – was not killed, but merely tied to the
vault. The Court cannot second-guess on what could have been behind the
malefactors’ decision to spare Zaldy’s life, but we note that Zaldy became
one of the accused in this case after the Office of the City Prosecutor found
probable cause to indict him in the crime, as the robbery could have been
the result of an "inside job." Unfortunately, Zaldy was unable to testify
during trial since the RTC ordered that he be brought to the National Center
for Mental Health for treatment.
 Ibañez and Cachuela failed to overcome the disputable presumption that "a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act
is the taker and the doer of the whole act." To recall, Ibañez was at WSC two
days before the robbery, asking questions to the company’s secretary. Several
days after the robbery, the appellants were caught trying to sell firearms that
were reported stolen from WSC in separate entrapment operations; they could
not satisfactorily explain how and why these guns came to their respective
possession. The appellants likewise did not impute ill motive on the part of the
arresting officers that would impel the latter to fabricate evidence against them.
 The fact that the cartridge bullet shells found at the firing range (where the
lifeless body of Rex had been discovered) matched with one of the guns
recovered from Ibañez during the entrapment operation clinches the case against
the appellants insofar as establishing the nexus between the robbery and the
victim’s killing. Notably, the gunshot wounds suffered by Rex also came from the
same caliber of gun recovered from Ibañez.
 Robbery with homicide is a single indivisible crime punishable with reclusion
perpetua to death under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The lower courts correctly sentenced the appellants to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua only in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance that attended the commission of the crime.
 The CA ordered the appellants to restitute the amount of P1,093,947.50,
representing of the value of the stolen firearms and ammunitions. The
Court increased this amount to the total amount of P1,481,000.00 as !his
is the value of the stolen items as proven by the evidence on record.
 REPUBLIC v SANDIGANBAYAN, MARCOS (2003)
FACTS: Republic through PCGG (represented by OSG) filed a petition before the
Sandiganbayan (SB) for forfeiture of the Marcos family’s ill-gotten wealth, part of
which amounts to US$356 million (now estimated to be >US$658 million inclusive of
interest), which funds are deposited in escrow in PNB. Said funds were previously
held by 5 account groups of various foreign foundations in different Swiss banks: 1)
Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts; 2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-
Spinus-Avertina Foundation accounts; 3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation
accounts; 4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts; and 5) Maler Foundation
accounts. Per evidence of OSG, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos ordered the
establishment of said foundations which held them and their children Imee,
Bongbong, and Irene as beneficiaries. Their identities were hidden from the bank
through fiduciaries (esp Fides Trust Company). The entire scheme was designed to
conceal the wealth of the Marcos family (which was overly disproportionate to their
lawful income) in offshore accounts. The other portion of the ill-gotten wealth sought
to be forfeited consists of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes frozen in
BSP per freeze order issued by PCGG.
Respondents Imelda, Imee, Irene, and Bongbong filed their answer. In their answer,
“Respondents specifically DENY" almost all averments in the petition either “for lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude” or “for being false.”
They, however 1) did not specifically aver the facts supporting their denial; and 2)
alleged that Imelda “specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.”
Before pre-trial, a General Agreement and Supplemental Agreements were executed
by the Marcos children and PCGG Chair for a global settlement of assets of the
Marcos family. The Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of,
and distribute to human rights victims all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos
family under certain conditions. The Agreements also specified in one of its whereas
clauses the fact that the Republic obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal
Tribunal that it owns the $356 million. Said judgment affirmed the decision of Zurich
District Atty Peter Consandey granting Republic’s request for legal assistance and
declaring the various deposits in the name of the foundations to be of illegal
provenance and freezing said deposits.
Respondents Marcos children moved for approval and enforcement of said
Agreements. Bongbong was presented as witness. Republic filed a motion for
summary judgment (MSJ) and/or judgment on the pleadings. Imelda opposed, which
opposition was adopted by Marcos children. SB denied MSJ, on the ground that the
motion to approve the Agreements took precedence over MSJ.
Imelda filed manifestation claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of
Agreements and that she owned 90% of the funds, with the remaining 10% belonging
to Pres Marcos’ estate. Meanwhile, Marcos children moved that the funds be placed
in custodia legis. SB granted the motion.
After pre-trial, Republic filed another MSJ on the ground that, because of the
admissions by Marcoses, there is no genuine issue. Imelda again opposed, and her
opposition was adopted by Marcos children. After hearing the motion, SB granted
summary judgment, forfeiting all funds in favor of the State. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES & RULING:
1) WON summary judgment was proper
YES. Marcoses offered nothing but a spurious defense. Blanket denials
without supporting facts and stock answers that they have no sufficient
knowledge and (for Imelda) that the funds were lawfully acquired in their
Answer are negative pregnants. Likewise, Marcoses failed to substantiate
how the funds were lawfully acquired in their pre-trial brief, to which no
document at all was attached to prove the truth of their allegations and no
witness at all was listed as required by the Rules. No affidavit, deposition, or
admission accompanied Marcoses’ opposition to MSJ, as required by the
Rules. In other pleadings, Marcoses offered nothing but general denials or
feigned defenses.
In sum, Marcoses failed to tender any genuine issue. Hence, summary
judgment was proper.
2) WON forfeiture was proper
YES. The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is
unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is
manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of
the public officer who owns it. Hence, given the manifest disproportion between the Marcoses’ lawful
income of $304,372.43 and the deposits of $356 million which they
First, Imelda admitted in her Answer the combined accumulated salaries admittedly own, forfeiture was proper.
of the Marcos couple as reflected in the Certification of Minister of Budget
and Management. Total salaries from 1966 to 1986 amounted to only
$304,372.43.

It was not for the Republic to establish the other lawful income of
Marcoses. Marcoses did not prove the same; they did not even specify the
same in their Answer. Further, the Marcos couple did not file any Statement
of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could be
determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation of law and
to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL
would reward them for their violation of the law.

Second, the Marcoses admitted that they owned the $356 million funds
in the Swiss banks. In their Answer, they averred that the funds were
lawfully acquired, hence unwittingly admitting that they owned the same.
Imelda also failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of
actionable documents attached to the petition for forfeiture. Meanwhile, the
stipulations in the Agreements undeniably indicated their manifest intent to
enter into a compromise with Republic. Corollarily, their willingness to
agree to an amicable settlement with the Republic only affirmed their
ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no person would
acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar deposits if he did not in
fact own them.

Under Rule 129.4, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be

controverted by the party making such admission and becomes conclusive
on him, and all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent
therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the
adverse party or not.

Under R130.29 and R130.31, the individual and separate admissions of

each respondent bind all of them. The declarations of a person are admissible
against a party whenever a privity of estate exists between the declarant and
the party, the term privity of estate generally denoting a succession in
rights. Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to the record
is competent. Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents Marcoses
in this case. And where several co-parties to the record are jointly interested
in the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of one is competent
against all.