Ex-Im Philippines, Inc. vs.

Union Bank of the Philippines, 716 SCRA 21, 2014

FACTS:

Rosario filed against Alfonso and Union Bank claiming that Alfonso mortgaged the property
without her consent, and for reconveyance.

Bignay Ex-Im Philippines, Inc. (Bignay), through its President, Milagros Ong Siy (Siy), offered to
purchase the property. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by and between Union Bank and Bignay
whereby the property was conveyed to Bignay for P4 million. The deed of sale was executed by the
parties through Bignay’s Siy and Union Bank’s Senior Vice President Anthony Robles (Robles).

A Decision was rendered in favor of Alfonso. Union Bank appealed the above Decision with the
CA. It likewise sought a new trial of the case, which the trial court denied. The CA appeal was dismissed
for failure to file appellant’s brief; the ensuing Petition for Review with this Court was similarly denied
for late filing and payment of legal fees.

Union Bank next filed with the CA an action to annul the trial court’s December 12, 1991
judgment.

This time, Bignay filed a Petition for annulment of the Decision. In a July 15, 1994 Decision, the
CA dismissed the Petition. Bignay’s resultant Petition for Certiorari with this Court suffered the same
fate.

Meanwhile, as a result of the Decision, Bignay was evicted from the property; by then, it had
demolished the existing structure on the lot and begun construction of a new building.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Union Bank was grossly negligent in this case.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the gross negligence of the seller in defending its title to the property
subject matter of the sale – thereby contravening the express undertaking under the deed of sale to
protect its title against the claims of third persons resulting in the buyer’s eviction from the property,
amounts to bad faith, and the buyer is entitled to the remedies afforded under Article 1555 of the Civil
Code.
 De Guzman vs. Toyota Cubao, Inc. November 29, 2006

FACTS:

On November 27, 1997, petitioner purchased from respondent a brand new white Toyota Hi-Lux 2.4 SS
double cab motor vehicle, 1996 model, in the amount of P508,000. Petitioner made a down payment of
P152,400, leaving a balance of P355,600 which was payable in 36 months with 54% interest. The vehicle
was delivered to petitioner two days later. On October 18, 1998, petitioner demanded the replacement
of the engine of the vehicle because it developed a crack after traversing Marcos Highway during a
heavy rain. Petitioner asserted that respondent should replace the engine with a new one based on an
implied warranty. Respondent countered that the alleged damage on the engine was not covered by a
warranty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an implied warranty.

RULING:

Under Article 1599 of the Civil Code, once an express warranty is breached, the buyer can accept or
keep the goods and maintain an action against the seller for damages. In the absence of an existing
express warranty on the part of the respondent, as in this case, the allegations in petitioner's complaint
for damages were clearly anchored on the enforcement of an implied warranty against hidden defects,
i.e., that the engine of the vehicle which respondent had sold to him was not defective.

JAIME D. ANG, Petitioner, VS COURT OF APPEALS AND BRUNO SOLEDAD, Respondents.

G.R. No. 177874 September 29, 2008

FACTS:

Respondent Soledad sold his car to petitioner Ang by Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 28, 1992.
Ang later offered the car he bought from Soldedad, for sale which was eventually sold to Paul Bugash.
However, the vehicle was seized by virtue of a writ of replevin on account of the alleged failure of
Ronaldo Panes, the owner of the vehicle prior to Soledad, to pay the mortgage debt constituted
thereon.
To secure the release of the vehicle, Ang paid BA Finance but Soledad refused to reimburse the
said amount, despite repeated demands. Ang filed on July 15, 1996 with the MTCC a complaint which
was however dismissed on the ground of prescription since more than 6 months elapsed from the
delivery of the subject vehicle to the plaintiff buyer to the filing of this action, pursuant to Article 1571.
Ang appealed to the RTC which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint but required defendant
to reimburse the amount plaintiff paid BA Finance Corporation. Soledad’s Motion for Reconsideration
was denied hence, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and accordingly reversed the RTC
decision and denied the petition.
 Hence, the present recourse – petition for review on certiorari, Ang maintaining that his cause
of action had not yet prescribed when he filed the complaint and he should not be blamed for paying
the mortgage debt.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the defendant Soledad in executing the Deed of Absolute Sale declaring that, “I
hereby covenant my absolute ownership to (sic) the above-described property and the same is
free from all liens and encumbrances… xxx “ ,made an EXPRESS warranty, the prescriptive period
for which is that specified in the contract, and in the absence of such period, the general rule on
rescission of contract, which is four years; or an IMPLIED warranty which prescribes six months
from the date of delivery of the thing sold.
2. Whether or not petitioner Ang is entitled to damages for warranty against eviction by virtue of
the writ of replevin issued on account of the alleged failure of Ronaldo Panes, the owner of the
vehicle prior to Soledad, to pay the mortgage debt constituted on the subject vehicle and
pursuant to the declaration of defendant Soledad in the Absolute Sale that, “I will defend the
same from all claims or any claim whatsoever; will save the vendee from any suit by the
government of the Republic of the Philippines.”

HELD:

In declaring that he owned and had clean title to the vehicle at the time the Deed of Absolute
Sale was forged, Soledad gave an implied warranty of title. In pledging that he "will defend the same
from all claims or any claim whatsoever [and] will save the vendee from any suit by the government of
the Republic of the Philippines," Soledad gave a warranty against eviction.
A warranty is a statement or representation made by the seller of goods, contemporaneously
and as part of the contract of sale, having reference to the character, quality or title of the goods, and by
which he promises or undertakes to insure that certain facts are or shall be as he then represents them.
Warranties by the seller may be express or implied. Art. 1546 of the Civil Code defines express
warranty as any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the thing is an express
warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the
same, and if the buyer purchases the thing relying thereon.
On the other hand, an implied warranty is that which the law derives by application or inference
from the nature of the transaction or the relative situation or circumstances of the parties, irrespective
of any intention of the seller to create it. Among the implied warranty provisions of the Civil Code are: as
to the seller’s title (Art. 1548), against hidden defects and encumbrances (Art. 1561), as to fitness or
merchantability (Art. 1562), and against eviction (Art. 1548).
Since what Soledad, as seller, gave was an implied warranty, the prescriptive period to file a
breach thereof is six months after the delivery of the vehicle, following Art. 1571. Ang’s action therefore
has already prescribed.
On the merits of his complaint for damages, Ang cannot recover damages for breach of
warranty against eviction due to the absence of the following essential requisites for such breach, vìz:

"A breach of this warranty requires the concurrence of the following

circumstances:

(1) The purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the thing
sold;
 (2) This eviction is by a final judgment;

(3) The basis thereof is by virtue of a right prior to the sale made by the
vendor; and

(4) The vendor has been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit
for eviction at the instance of the vendee.

For one, there is no judgment which deprived Ang of the vehicle. For another, there was no suit
for eviction in which Soledad as seller was impleaded as co-defendant at the instance of the vendee.

MOLDEX REALTY, INC., petitioner, vs. FLORA A. SABERON, respondent.

G.R. No. 176289. April 8, 2013.

Facts:

Respondent Flora entered a contract to sell of a lot with the petitioner Moldex. Flora opted to
pay on installment. Later on, Moldex sent Flora notices reminding her to update her account. For failure
to settle accounts, Notarized Notice of Cancellation of Reservation Application and/or Contract to Sell.
Flora, on the other hand, filed before the HLURB for the annulment of the contract to sell, recovery of all
her payments with interests, damages, and the cancellation of Moldex’s license to sell.

Flora alleged that the contract to sell between her and Moldex is void from its inception.
According to Flora, Moldex violated Section 5 of PD No. 957 when it sold the subject lot to her before it
was issued a license to sell. Flora likewise claimed that Moldex violated Section 17 of the same law
because it failed to register the contract to sell in the Registry of Deeds.

Issue:
Is the contract to sell between Moldex and Flora void for violating Sections 5 and 17 of PD 9571?

Ruling: No. The lack of a certificate of registration and a license to sell on the part of a subdivision
developer does not result to the nullification or invalidation of the contract to sell it entered into with a
buyer. The contract to sell remains valid and subsisting. The court upheld the validity of the contract to
sell notwithstanding violations by the developer of the provisions of PD 957. We held that nothing in PD
957 provides for the nullity of a contract validly entered into in cases of violation of any of its provisions
such as the lack of a license to sell.

Note:
Respondent is nevertheless entitled to a 50% refund under the Maceda Law because she was
able to pay the installments for at least 2 years.

1
REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISION LOTS AND CONDOMINIUMS, PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF
 Under the Maceda Law, the defaulting buyer who has paid at least two years of installments has
the right of either to avail of the grace period of one month for every one year of installment payments
made or the 50% refund of the total payments made.
--------JIANE’S----------

Spouses Jaime and Evangeline Sebastian v. BPI

G.R. No. 160107. October 22, 2014

Facts:

Spouses Sebastian availed themselves of a housing loan from BPI Family as one of the benefits extended
to its employees. To secure the payment of the loan, they executed a REM in favor of BPI Family.

The petitioner’s amortizations were regularly deducted from Jaime’s salary until the spouses received a
notice of termination from BPI. The notices of termination contain a demand for the full payment of the
outstanding loan balance.

For failure to heed the demand, BPI Family instituted a petition for the foreclosure of the REM. The
spouses contended that their rights under RA 6552 had been disregarded, considering that Section 3 of
the law entitled them to a grace period within which to settle their unpaid installments without interest.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 6552 is applicable in the case at bar.

Held:

No. The law is not applicable.

RA 6552 is aimed to protect buyers of real estate on installmentpayments, not borrowers or mortgagors
who obtained a housing loan to pay the costs of their purchase of real estate and used the real estate as
security for their loan.

The Sps. Sebastian’s insistence would have been correct if the monthly amortizations being paid to BPI
Family arose from a sale or financing of real estate. In their case, however, the monthly amortizations
represented the installment payments of a housing loan that BPI Family had extended to them as an
employee’s benefit. The monthly amortizations they were liable for was derived from a loan transaction,
not a sale transaction, thereby giving rise to a lender-borrower relationship between BPI Family and the
petitioners.

Spouses Noel and Michelle Noynay v. Citihomes Builder and Development Inc.
G.R. No. 204160. Septmber 22, 2014

Facts:

Petitioners and respondent executed a contract to sell covering the sale of a house and lot. Under the
terms of the contract, the price of the property was fixed at a certain amount with a downpayment and
the remaining balance was to be paid in 120 equal monthly installments with annual interest.
Two years later, the petitioners allegedly started to default on their payments. Several months later, the
respondent decided to declare the petitioners delinquent and to cancel the contract considering that
nine months of agreed amortizations were left unpaid. The notarized notice of cancellation of the
contract was received by the petitioners. They were given 30 days to within which to pay the arrears
and failure to do so would authorize the respondent to consider the contract as cancelled. Respondent
sent a demand letter asking the petitioners to vacate the premises due to their continued failure to pay
the arrears.

The petitioners insist that by virtue of the monthly installments amounting to three years that they had
already paid, the Maceda law sould apply in their case. This means that for the cancellation to be
effective, the cash surrender value should have been paid first to them by respondent. Respondent
counters that because the petitioners failed to pay at least 2 years of the installments, the cancellation
became effective upon the expiration of the 30-day period following the receipt of the notice of
delinquency and cancellation notice and without the need for the payment of the cash surrender value.

Issue:

Whether or not the cancellation of the contract to sell was valid.

Held:

No. It is not valid.

Maceda law requires that for an actual cancellation to take place, the notice of cancellation by notarial
act and full payment of the cash surrender value must be first received by the buyer. Clearly, no
payment of the cash surrender value was made to the petitioners. Thus, no cancellation of the contract
to sell could be considered validly effected.

GERONIMO v CALDERON

Facts:

Spouses Estela and Rodolfo Calderon (respondents, for brevity) filed a verified complaint[5] before the
HLURB Regional Office against Silverland Realty &Development Corporation, SilverlandVillage I
Homeowners Association,... Silverland Alliance Christian Church (SACC), Joel Geronimo, Annie
Geronimo, Jonas Geronimo and Susan Geronimo,for specific performance and for the issuance of cease
and desist order and damages.

Respondents alleged that they are residents of #31 Silverlane Street, Silverland Subdivision, Pasong
Tamo, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Spouses Joel and Annie Geronimo are residents of #48 Silverlane
Street just across their house. Sometime in May 2005, a building was erected beside the house of Joel
and Annie. Jonas Geronimo directed the construction. When respondents asked about the building,
Susan Geronimo told them that her son, Joel, had bought the adjacent lot to build an extension house in
order to create a wider playing area for the Geronimo grandchildren because their two-storey house
could no longer accommodate their growing family.

The HLURB Arbiter rendered a Decision[6] on October 22, 2007 and ordered petitioners not to use the
property at #46 Silverlane Street for religious purposes and as a location of a church
Petitioners appealed. The First Division of the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB denied the appeal
and affirmed the decision of the HLURB Regional Office.[8] Petitioners filed an appeal before the OP,
but the OP denied the appeal.[9] Hence, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA.

The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling of the OP.

Issues:

(1) Whether the CA erred in ruling that the HLURB has jurisdiction over the present controversy; and (2)
whether the CA erred in affirming the HLURB's ruling that petitioners cannot use #46 of Silverlane Street
for religious purposes and as a location of a... church.

Ruling:

On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the HLURB has jurisdiction over the present controversy.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in
the complaint, which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to... recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

On the second issue, we uphold the ruling that petitioners cannot use #46 of Silverlane Street for
religious purposes or as a location of a church.

Here, as noted by the HLURB, the Development Permit indicates the use of the property as residential
except for the designated open spaces.

MORAN JR. v OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FACTS:

On February 2, 2004, the late Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. filed with the Consumer Arbitration Office (CAO) a
verified complaint against private respondent PGA Cars, Inc. pursuant to the relevant provisions of
Republic Act No. 7394 (RA 7394), otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines. On
September 23, 2005, the CAO rendered a decision in favor of complainant and ordered private
respondent to refund the purchase price of the BMW car in addition to the payment costs of litigation
and administrative fines.

After the CAO denied the motion sought for reconsideration filed by the Private respondents.

Therwith, an appeal to the Office of the President was files who then granted such and reversed the DTI
resolution and dismissed the complaint holding that private respondent cannot be held liable for
product defects. The OP however contends that the President’s power of control over the executive
department grants him the power to amend, modify, alter or repeal decisions of the department
secretaries.
ISSUE:
Whether CA is correct in dismissing the petition for certitorari on the ground that petitioner resorted to
a wrong mode of appeal as the OP having jurisdiction of the case in controversy.

RULING:
No. The CA is incorrect in dismissing the petition as the OP’s executive control is not absolute.

Such executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries laid down in Section 17 Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution is not absolute. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or
by judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case.

Villarica vs. Court of Appeals

26 scra 189
November 29, 1968.

FACTS:
Spouses Villarica sold a parcel of land in Davao with an area of 1,174 sq. meters for P35,000 to
spouses Consunji and Montaverde. The instrument of absolute sale and vendors’ transfer of certificate
of title was delivered to the vendees. On the same day, Spouses Consunji executed another instrument
granting the spouses Villarica an option to buy the same property within one year for P37, 750.00. The
spousces Consunji registered the absolute deed of sale and a new certificate was issued in their names.
The Spouses Consunji then sold the lot to Jovito Francisco for P47, 000.00 by means of a public
instrument which was registered and issued a new title. The spouses Villarica brought an action for the
reformation of the instrument of absolute sale between Spouses Consunji and Francisco into an
equitable mortgage as a security for a usurious loan of P28,000.00 alleging that such was the real
intention of the parties. Spouses Villarica contended that it should be presumed as an equitable
mortgage on the grounds that (1) the price of P35,000 was unusually inadequate; (2) the vendors
remained in possession of the property sold; (3) the period of one year for repurchase granted in the
instrument was extended for one month; and (4) the vendors pay the taxes on the land sold.

ISSUE: WON the public instrument between the spouses Villarica and Spouses Consunji is one of
absolute sale or equitable mortgage.

HELD:

The instrument thereof was one of absolute sale. The court found Spouses Villarica’s
contentions unmeritorious on the grounds that the price was not inadequate; Spouses Consunji does
not remain in possession of the property but instead were allowed to collect monthly rents; the taxes
paid were back taxes which a vendor has an obligation to pay as they sell the land free from all liens; and
said option to buy is different and distinct from the right of repurchase.

In the latter basis, it was discussed that the right of repurchase is not a right granted the vendor
by the vendee in a subsequent instrument, but is a right reserved by the vendor in the same instrument
of sale as one of the contract. Once the instrument of absolute sale is executed, the vendor can no
longer reserve the right to repurchase, and any right thereafter granted the vendor by the vendee in a
separate instrument cannot be a right of repurchase but some other right like the option to buy in the
instant case. Once the instrument of absolute sale is executed, the vendor can no longer reserve the
right to repurchase, and any right thereafter granted the vendor by the vendee in a separate instrument
cannot be a right of repurchase but some other right like the option to buy in the instant case.
 MISTERIO v. CEBU STATE COLLEGE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

June 23, 2005 |Calleja, Sr., J. | Pacto de Retro Sale.

SUMMARY: Asuncion Sadaya-Misterio and Sudlon Agricultural High School entered into a Deed of Sale
over a parcel of land. The sale was subject to Asuncion’s right to repurchase the property after the high
school shall have ceased to exist, OR 2) shall have transferred its site elsewhere. In 1983, BP 412 was
enacted, which consolidated vocational schools, including SAHS, and made them an extension of CSCST.
In 1998, the heirs of Asuncion wanted to exercise their right to redeem the property, on the ground that
SAHS has ceased to exist. The Court held that the action has prescribed, as when there is no period
provided for the exercise of such right, the right to redeem should be exercised within 4 years from the
happening of the allocated condition.

DOCTRINE: The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold is
immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the restrictive condition of repurchase by the
vendor a retro within the period provided in Article 1606 of the New Civil Code. The failure of the vendor
a retro to repurchase the property vests upon the latter by operation of law the absolute title and
ownership over the property sold.

FACTS:

 1952: The Provincial Board of Cebu granted to Sudlon Agricultural High School (SAHS), the usufruct
of 41 parcels of land covering 104.5441 ha of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate.
 December 31, 1956: Asuncion Sadaya-Misterio executed a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land (which
was also a part of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate) in favor of SAHS. The sale was subject to the right
of Misterio to repurchase the property 1) after the high school shall have ceased to exist, OR 2) shall
have transferred its site elsewhere.
o The right of the vendor (Misterio) to repurchase the property was annotated at the dorsal
portion of the TCT.
 The Provincial Board of Cebu, through a resolution, donated the aforementioned 41 lots to SAHS,
subject to 2 conditions: (1) that if SAHS ceases to operate, the ownership of the lands would
automatically revert to the province, and (2) that SAHS could not alienate, lease, or encumber the
properties.
 June 10, 1983: B.P. 412 was enacted, which consolidated as one school system certain vocational
schools in the province of Cebu, including SAHS, and which became an extension of the Cebu State
College of Science and Technology (CSCST).
 Cebu decided to recover the 41 lots it had earlier donated on the ground that SAHS had no
personality to accept the donation. When the heirs of Asuncion Misterio, who had then died
intestate, learned that the province of Cebu was trying to recover its donated property, they
informed the province on August 19, 1998 of their intention to exercise their right to repurchase
the property as stipulated in the Deed of Sale.
o The province of Cebu and CSCST settled their issue over the lots by entering into a
Memorandum of Agreement where the lots were partitioned – 43 ha goes to the province
while 51 ha goes to the SAHS (now part of the CSCST).
 March 19, 1990: The Misterio heirs then sent a letter to CSCST informing their intention to exercise
the option to repurchase, on the ground that SAHS had ceased to exist.
o CSCST denied the claim, stating that SAHS still existed, albeit it changed its name [to CSCST] and
expanded its offerings [which now included collegiate courses].
 The Misterio heirs then filed a complaint before the RTC for “Nullity of Sale and/or Redemption”,
alleging:
o That SAHS had no juridical personality of its own at the time of the sale, therefore the sale was
null and void
o And that assuming the sale was valid, the enactment of BP 412 abolished SAHS and converted
it to become part of CSCST, therefore rendering the operative condition granting the vendor
and her heirs the right to redeem
 After the case’s preliminary conference, the trial court issued a pre-trial order defining the issues:
o Whether SAHS has still retained its personality as such school or it had ceased to exist
o Whether the Misterio heirs have the right to exercise the right of redemption over the
property
 RTC – ruled in favor of the Misterio heirs
o The sale between Asuncion and SAHS is null and void for latter’s lack of juridical personality
to acquire real property
o With the enactment of BP 412, SAHS ceased to exist and to operate (under the Corporation
Code, the constituent corporations SAHS and CSCST became one through merger or
consolidation, with CSCST as the surviving entity), hence, the Misterio heirs can exercise their
right to redeem
 The OSG, representing the CSCST, appealed. Pending the appeal, the CSCST, through a Deed for
Reversion, deeded the property to the province of Cebu.
 CA – reversed the RTC
o The RTC erred in not confining itself to the issues defined by the parties during pre-trial
o While SAHS had ceased to exist when BP 412 took effect, the period for the petitioners to
repurchase the property expired on June 1987, four years after the enactment of BP 412
 Hence, the present petition by the Misterio heirs

RULING: Petition denied.

Whether the action to redeem the property has prescribed – YES.

 The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold is immediately
vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the restrictive condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro
within the period provided in Article 1606 of the New Civil Code. The failure of the vendor a retro to
repurchase the property vests upon the latter by operation of law the absolute title and ownership
over the property sold.
o Art. 1606. The right referred to in Article 1601, in the absence ofan express agreement, shall last
four years from the date of thecontract.
Should there be an agreement, the period cannot exceed tenyears.
However, the vendor may still exercise the right to repurchasewithin thirty days from the time
final judgment was rendered in acivil action on the basis that the contract was a true sale
withright to repurchase
 IN THIS CASE: Asuncion (vendor a retro) and SAHS (vendee a retro) did not agree on any period for
the exercise of the right to repurchase the property. Following Article 1606 (1), the said right
should be exercised within four years from the happening of the allocated condition contained in
the deed: (a) the cessation of the existence of the SAHS, or (b) the transfer of the school to other
site.
o In this case, SAHS ceased to exist in June 10, 1983, when BP 412 took effect. The right of the
Misterio heirs, as the successors-in-interest of Asuncion (vendor a retro), started to run and
lasted until June 10, 1987. However, the Misterio heirs expressed their intention to redeem the
property only in 1998.
 Misterio heirs contend that the issue of whether SAHS is yet to be resolved by court, hence the
applicable provision is Article 1606(3). The contention is misplaced as their right to repurchase the
property was not dependent upon the prior final interpretation of the said phrase. There is no doubt
that the Deed of Sale actually includes a right to repurchase. The four-year period for the
petitioners to repurchase the property was not suspended merely and solely because there was a
divergence as to the precise meaning of the phrase “after the SAHS shall cease to exist.”
 Moreover, the fact that the right to repurchase the property is annotated in the dorsal side of the
RTC does not mean the said right is imprescriptible. The annotation was only for the purpose of
notifying third parties of the petitioner’s right to repurchase the property under the terms of the
deed of sale, and the law.

--------JOBEN’S-----------