EN BANC We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO
QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in
its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and
damages, and another order denying amendment of the same
pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix
Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was averred that the
parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married,
succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times
by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result
she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by
defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed
support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause
of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been
born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained
defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as
a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby
girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no
amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no
cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this
Court.
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni
conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its
progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity
is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even
if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived
child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by
Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in
his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls
the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be
born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be
accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if they
were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the
Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as
yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true
that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds
further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in
the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso,
however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived
child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely
useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to
the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points
this out:
aun en el sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura
juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados
'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las
condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de
aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata
de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit.,
page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a
married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as
averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear
violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was
carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under
the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to
state a cause of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside.
Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee
Felix Icao. So ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the
husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could
recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against
petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the
complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered
judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz,
ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's
fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a
special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of
three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting
opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the
first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she
became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and
acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the
defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became
pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections
and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two
years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955,
accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter
Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and
P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and
his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in
consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The
plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for
his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his
consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in
filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of the
defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of
damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial
paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This
we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum
award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the
case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.
Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza
la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no
nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de
Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and
obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury
or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if
no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the
unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of
action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even
if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission
to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality
(or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no
answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code,
because that same article expressly limits such provisional
personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the
condition specified in the following article". In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is
generally held that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn
child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs.
Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the
editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any
damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly
upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights
of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the
parents can not expect either help, support or services from an
unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for
the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis
that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages,
if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the
case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have
not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently
because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his
wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he
was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority
opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the
appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities
are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the
suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no
steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of
the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken
interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the
appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at
obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for
P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity"
claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly
exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked
that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who
righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife has
deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern
would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an
unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to
personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the
administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of
abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not
only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the

abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it,
was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her
husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the
act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered

dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice

and the Board of Medical Examiners for their information and such
investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the
facts may warrant.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased,
respondent.
Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission,
through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its decision in
case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of
public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in
San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence
therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be
promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the
operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half
(2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant
Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and
that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the
opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions
of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a
certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of
the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate
through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an
ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2)
tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced
from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to
the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-
34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in
accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably
supported by evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and
the Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as
existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the increased
demand.
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted
departure from its announced policy with respect to the
establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's
brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of
the commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative
of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in
the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently
granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be
in contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he
would have had the right to prosecute his application before the
commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him
that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had
invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what the
commission said regarding his other properties and business, he
would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate
said plant had he not died. His transportation business alone was
netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and
continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its
decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his estate was
financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid
right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its
conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his
death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for
which a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the
commission might have denied application, although under the facts
of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the
financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant.
Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3)
that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule,
should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would
certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by
complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent
in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator
after his death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a
piece of land and during the life of the option he died, if the option
had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out
of special consideration for his person, there would be no doubt
that said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to
his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also
be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his
estate or legal representative fail to comply with the conditions of
the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right
to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public
convenience — the evidence established that the public needed the
ice plant — was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite
citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the
service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of
public convenience was subject to failure to secure its objective
through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here
is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in
the illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may
bring or defend actions, among other cases, for the protection of
the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says that
such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the
deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the
executor or administrator, the making of an inventory of all goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come
to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other
person for him.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages
366, 367) the present chief Justice of this Court draws the following
conclusion from the decisions cited by him:
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action
affecting the property or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased
person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive,
may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the
administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or
interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive,
because death extinguishes the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of
public convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an
"action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that
the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by
death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate
which, being placed under the control and management of the
executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in
representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors,
devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the
right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished
proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public
convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission,
it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and
entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that
proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and
article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively, consider as immovable
and movable things rights which are not material. The same
eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that article
336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not
sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are also
property for juridical purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the
term, property includes, among other things, "an option", and "the
certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a
bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also
been declared to include every species of title, inchoate or
complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether
executory or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the
Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the
following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a
forgery committed after the death of the man whose name purports
to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent
to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914,
7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had
before it a case of forgery committed after the death of one Morgan
for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged
that the information did not aver that the forgery was committed
with the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J.,
disposed of this objection as follows:
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the
law does not regard the estate of a decedent as a person. This
intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent is
a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr.
Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes
artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs.
Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port.
(Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two kinds:
natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial
persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons
forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of
artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law.
"Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person." 2
Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the
correctness of the definition given by the authors from whom we
have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim
against a decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the
estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind.
271. Unless we accept this definition as correct, there would be a
failure of justice in cases where, as here, the forgery is committed
after the death of a person whose name is forged; and this is a
result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We
perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it
seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded
as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of
enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and,
although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an
interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal
entity. The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete
until there has been a due administration; and one who forges the
name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a
promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud
the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having
diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed to have known
who those persons were, or what was the nature of their respective
interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, — the
estate — and not the natural persons who have direct or contingent
interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing
of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail
prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as
found by the commission, not counting the expenses and
disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have
occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the
estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to
show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as
having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most
recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs.
Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was
the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave
judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in
these words:
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds
that defendants Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to he
plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were
considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his
personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code
that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the
decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court
in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of
the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code was
abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22.
In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after
the innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the
matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant
doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and
assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that
becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which
survive after his demise.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the
decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not
have been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature of a
legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to
the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal
system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be
exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the
same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical
basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator,
to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the
deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is
identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to the
Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje
& L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized by law
figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the
capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a
bankrupt or deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate
of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the
Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service
Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and
categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue
certificates of public convenience or certificates of public
convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of
the United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations,
or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws
of the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of
the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong entirely to
citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying
reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate
of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of
injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising
such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent
as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule
in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs.
State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be
regarded as an artificial person. it is the creation of law for the
purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made .
...
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to
cite just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that
while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases
relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1)
and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for
otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional
guarantee against being deprived of property without due process
of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures.
We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include
artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these
constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among
these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased
persons. Hence, we hold that within the framework of the
Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered
an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement
and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise
during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the
fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death.
One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application
before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting
in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As
stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality
is considered extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and
surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be
exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, we
find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the
same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise
extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding
before the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said
proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of
the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could
not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could
have done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the desired
certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is
grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same
reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is
made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate,
creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the
investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in
the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the
instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this
Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of
the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship
exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for
reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of
personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can
find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the
extension of his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had
lived, in view of the evidence of record, he would have obtained
from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The
situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His
estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of
an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent
himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist
here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if
they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the
certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the
prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission
to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro
O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and
intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the
constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the
majority.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to We are of the opinion that the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante
obtain a certificate of public convenience to operate an ice plant in should be determined by the Commission upon evidence that the
San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in accordance with section 8 of party should be present. It should also determine the dummy
Article XIV of the Constitution which provides question raised by the petitioner.

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the We are of opinion and so vote that the decision of the Public Service
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Commission of May 21, 1946, be set aside and that the Commission
Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the be instructed to receive evidence of the above factual questions and
laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is render a new decision accordingly.
owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor such franchise, certificate
or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than
fifty years. No franchise granted to any individual, firm or
corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the public
interest so requires.

The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O.

Fragrante fulfills the citizenship requirement. To our mind, the
question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro O.
Fragrante fulfill the citizenship requirement of the law.

The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on

what it represents. It is a device by which the law gives a kind of
personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs.
They inherit and replace the deceased at the very moment of his
death. As there are procedural requisites for their identification and
determination that need time for their compliance, a legal fiction
has been devised to represent them. That legal fiction is the estate,
a liquid condition in process of solidification.

The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law
calls estate is, a matter of fact, intended to designate the heirs of
the deceased. The question, therefore, in this case, boils down to
the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.

There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of

the heirs of Fragrante. If they are Filipino citizens, the action taken
by the Public Service Commission should be affirmed. If they are
not, it should be reversed.

Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a front or dummy for aliens
to go around the citizenship constitutional provision. It is alleged
that Gaw Suy, the special administrator of the estate, is an alien.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN
YEUNG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Frine' C. Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for
respondent-appellee.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et
al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is,
sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the fundamental issues
involved in this case thus:
In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of
injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration, "restraining
the latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering
plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her
arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her
failure to do so."
The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint,
having been denied, the case was heard on the merits and the
parties submitted their respective evidence.
The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the
Solicitor General are these:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to
enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made
in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to
enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at
Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to
the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a
period of one month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was permitted
to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted
to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13,
1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the
amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen
Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the
expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within
the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or
his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated
extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit "4"). On January 25,
1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of
her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with
preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a
half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few
words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not
name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa.
She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-
law.
Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered
opinion, and so holds, that the instant petition for injunction cannot
be sustained for the same reason as set forth in the Order of this
Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which read:
First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who
is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines,
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and
hence it should be held to mean what it plainly and explicitly
expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" incontestably implies that an alien woman may
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a
Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the
explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized.
(Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R.
No. L-11855). However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the
complaint, to wit:
3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might
herself be lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being
disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by
virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM
YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the Naturalization
Laws of the Philippines.
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung
while claiming not to be disqualified, does not and cannot allege
that she possesses all the qualifications to be naturalized, naturally
because, having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on March
13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite
length of residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law,
Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).
Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of marriage to a
Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified under the
Naturalization Law, it would have been worded "and who herself is
not disqualified to become a citizen of the Philippines."
Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor,
whose authorized stay in the Philippines, after repeated extensions
thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962, having married her
co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month
before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage
was effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then
impending compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This
cannot be permitted.
Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a
temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one
month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without first departing from the
Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29,
1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017,
September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well
buttressed not only by the decided cases of the Supreme Court on
the point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions of
Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940 which reads:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the
Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-
immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country
and procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa
and thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This
paragraph is added by Republic Act 503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).
And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged
with the administration of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3,
Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of his duties in relation to
alien immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner of Immigration a
wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in determining cases
presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of Immigration CA-
G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may
not be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in
excess of his jurisdiction.
It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while
she barely and insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English, she
admitted that she cannot write either language.
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which
could have some bearing in the resolution of this appeal is the
allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the
governments brief, that "in the hearing ..., it was shown thru the
testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess
any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an
additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized
by said appellants that during the hearing in the lower court, held
almost ten months after the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau
Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a
child by her husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the
court a quo, thus:
I NOT.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE "WHO
MIGHT HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF SECTION 15,
REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN
ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY
VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE
POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN
FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A
FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH
MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9,
SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF
1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S
MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE,
MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A
MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID
OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY PLAINTIFF
LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO
WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST AND
IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN
YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
V dealt with in appellants' second and fourth assignments of error
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS'
COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE
COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO
LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED
IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962.
(PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL) .
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the
above decision upheld the two main grounds of objection of the
Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz:
That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a
temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one
month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without first departing from the
Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956;
Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16,
1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);
That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not
automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien
wife must possess all the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications.
(Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-
11855, Dec. 25, 1959)
It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper
resolution would necessarily cover all the points raised in appellants'
assignments of error, hence, We will base our discussions, more or
less, on said objections.
I
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters
does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem
evident that the Solicitor General's pose that an alien who has been
admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain
here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and
goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate
Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo
examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine
port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance
with the requirements of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that
petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We note the same
line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo.
Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were the Solicitor General
and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had become ipso
facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino husband,
they would have held her as entitled to assume the status of a
permanent resident without having to depart as required of aliens
by Section 9 (g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of
Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act providing:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the
Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-
immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country
and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa
and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act.
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as
temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire
Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows
upon their the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as
they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration
authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds.
True it is that this Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of
convenient ruses employed by alien to convert their status from
temporary visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the
procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned,
such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99
Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court,
reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration
Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:
... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the
strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that he will
enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the benefit of a
temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go back
on his representation and stay permanently, without first departing
from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him
of the departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act,
under the guise of "change" or "correction", for the law makes no
distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would,
as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the
Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to enter for a
limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission,
however flimsy such claim should be, and thereby compel our
government to spend time, money and effort to examining and
verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take
up permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be
able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence he
came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The
damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident.
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an
alien who has been here as a temporary visitor but who has in the
meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the
Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry
here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come
back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a
necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by
whatever legal means this has been conferred upon him. Consider
for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who
is naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens
of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be
allowed permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so
that they may be processed to determine whether or not they have
a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and
hardships which such a requirement entails and its seeming
unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd construction.
Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr.
Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok
Ha became also a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion
were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage,
she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence the decision
appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of
Commonwealth Act 613 provides that "in the event of the
naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf
the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum
deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative." (At. pp. 462-463)
In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that
the naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically
produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights
of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in
the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of
Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and
express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and
is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus
discussed therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments of
error are well taken.
II
Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by
the trial judge is that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to
appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino
citizenship is not denied did not have the effect of making her a
Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that she does
not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for
naturalization by the Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth
Act 473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any of
the disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor
General implicitly concedes that had it been established in the
proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the
qualifications required by the law of applicants for naturalization,
she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino
citizen in the instant case, without requiring her to submit to the
usual proceedings for naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with
what used to be the view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v.
Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated December
23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706,713,1 for it was only in Zita Ngo Burca vs.
Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30,
1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado
Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman who marries a
Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised
Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not
only that she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has complied
with all the formalities required thereby like any other applicant for
naturalization,2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our
jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still
pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us, however, in
their first and second assignments of error, not only to reconsider
Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact,
is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all subsequent
decisions up to Go Im Ty.3
Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,
Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial construction was in the
first Ly Giok Ha case,4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok
Ha, a woman of Chinese nationality, was a temporary visitor here
whose authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a
bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956, eight
days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a
Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her
husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage
and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of
said marriage, demanded for the cancellation of her bond, but
instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her
to leave, and upon her failure to do so, on March 16, 1956, the
Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery
of the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she had
no obligation to leave, because she had become Filipina by
marriage, hence her bond should be returned. The Commissioner
appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto
Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
The next and most important question for determination is whether
her marriage to a Filipino justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid
failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or before
March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners
alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became,
also, a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were
correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she
had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision
appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that "in the event of the
naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf
the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum
deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien
female who marries a male citizen of the Philippines follows ipso
facto his political status.
The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
upon which petitioners rely, reads:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she "herself may be
lawfully naturalized." As correctly held in an opinion of the Secretary
of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this limitation of section 15
excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines
under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated
with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the
Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have
not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the ... Philippines
are at war, during the period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the
United States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the
pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall under any of the classes
disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that, despite
her failure to depart from the Philippines within the period specified
in the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof,
petitioners have the burden of proving her alleged change of
political status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners
have not made out, therefore a case against the respondents-
appellants.
Considering, however, that neither in the administrative
proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the parties seemingly felt
that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may "be lawfully
naturalized," and this being a case of first impression in our courts,
we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the
parties herein should be given an opportunity to introduce
evidence, if they have any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no
doubt was left in the above decision as regards the following
propositions: .
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the
Revised Naturalization Law, the marriage of an alien woman to a
Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully
naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization by
marriage, only those disqualified from being naturalized under
Section 4 of the law qouted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may
be presented in the action to recover her bond confiscated by the
Commissioner of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as
Filipina; and
5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the
law, the Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry need be
made as to qualifications,5 specially considering that the decision
cited and footnotes several opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the
immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most
important of which are the following:
Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section
15, Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that "any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines." A similar provision in the naturalization law of
the United States has been construed as not requiring the woman to
have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the
case of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is
of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist.
Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash.
1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s. 1940 of
Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the
clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", should be
construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of
residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by
judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons
who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised
Naturalization Law, it results that any woman who married a citizen
of the Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, and the marriage
not having been dissolved, and on the assumption that she
possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the citizenship of her husband.
(Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only
material point of inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If
he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily
James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No.
473, which reads in part as follows:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as
contained in the above provision, means that the woman who is
married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the
disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization
Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s.
1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the within
papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to be among the disqualified
classes mentioned in the law.
It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was
born as an illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should be considered
as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the well-settled
rule that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his only
legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98
& 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs.
Machura must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines
by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of
Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are,
must have so appealed to this Court that five days later, on May 22,
1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521,
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same ruling on the basis of
the following facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1,
1952, but it turned out that her passport was forged. On December
10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for purpose of
deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she married Ricardo Cua,
a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry
considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however, the
Board of Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with
the deportation proceedings and so, the husband filed prohibition
and mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied the petition.
Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other
hand, that:
Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent
case of Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a
valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to confer his citizenship
upon the wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law requires that
the alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that
she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As
construed in the decision cited, this last condition requires proof
that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified
under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.
No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of
Filipino citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to
petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore, committed no
error in refusing to interfere with the deportation proceedings,
where she can anyway establish the requisites indispensable for her
acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged validity of
her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration
Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.)
[Emphasis supplied] .
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court
expressly gave the parties concerned opportunity to prove the fact
that they were not suffering from any of the disqualifications of the
law without the need of undergoing any judicial naturalization
proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above
decisions, the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of
marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby
becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such
marriage, she does not possess any of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without the
need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings under said
law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no
reference to qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they need
also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of
Justice understood them to mean that such qualifications need not
be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera,
who later became a distinguished member of this Court,6 so ruled in
opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most
illustrative of which held: .
At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to
a Filipino citizen needs only to show that she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized" in order to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Compliance with other conditions of the statute, such as those
relating to the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization
through judicial proceedings, is not necessary. (See: Leonard v.
Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice,
No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et
al., G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where the
Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section of the
Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino does not
vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife," unless she "herself
may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15
excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines
under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other
words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in Section
4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of the
foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The
Commissioner of Immigration does not say so but merely predicates
his negative action on the ground that a warrant of deportation for
"overstaying" is pending against the petitioner.
We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for
disqualification for naturalization are expressly enumerated in the
law, a warrant of deportation not based on a finding of unfitness to
become naturalized for any of those specified causes may not be
invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign
wife of a Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of
Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is
as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation
of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things,
that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not
disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the
filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by
the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino
citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration
conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38, s. 19058 of
Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et
al. (G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957), where the
Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted section in the Revised
Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino does not
vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she herself may
be lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15
excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines
under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other
words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section
4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.
(Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok
Ha case is not a new one. In that case, the Supreme Court held that
under paragraph I of Section 15 Of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to
his foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"',
and, quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice,
namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s.
1948; No. 28. s. 1950, "this limitation of section 15 excludes from
the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from
being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of
said Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, s. 1962 of Justice
Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the
above construction of the law was importantly modified by this
Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as follows:
Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of
temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March
1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked the bondsman to
present her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from
receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be confiscated(Annex 1).
For failure of the bondsman to comply with the foregoing order, on
1 April 1955. the Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash
bond confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an order issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash
bond. Unlike in forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings,
where the Court must enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and
the bondsman must be given an opportunity to present his principal
or give a satisfactory reason for his inability to do so, before final
judgment may be entered against the bondsman,(section 15, Rule
110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the
temporary stay of an alien in the Philippines, no court proceeding is
necessary. Once a breach of the terms and conditions of the
undertaking in the bond is committed, the Commissioner of
Immigration may, under the terms and conditions thereof, declare it
forfeited in favor of the Government. (In the meanwhile, on April 1,
1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in
marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las Piñas, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which
included Justices Concepcion and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok
Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino
citizen does not relieve the bondsman from his liability on the bond.
The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the violation of the
terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond — failure to
depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized
period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955) and
failure to report to the Commissioner of Immigration within 24
hours from receipt of notice — were committed before the
marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien
does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter.
She must possess the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization.* There is no showing that the
appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen
by naturalization.
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is
the one relied upon in the appealed decision now before Us, is the
fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the alien wife
"must possess the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference to Section 15,
Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v. Galang,
supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha,
among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was
clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I
stated that the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized",
should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the
qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of
naturalization by judicial proceedings but merely that she is of the
race by persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously
significant modification of the construction of the law, it could be
said that there was need for clarification of the seemingly new
posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification should have
been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration,
G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua, supra, which
followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no
immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular
point in issue now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly
as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on the said matter would at
best be no more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to
holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act, the wife is
deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized," so that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by
itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court has
previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v.
Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is
here no evidence of record as to the qualifications or absence of
disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without explaining the
apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and
Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a separate
concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together Ly Giok
Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications
and non-disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on
what seemed to be departure from the said first two decisions.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto
Regala fell the task of rationalizing the Court's position. In Lo San
Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638,
the facts were simply these: Lo San Tuang, a Chinese woman,
arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with
authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a Filipino on
January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry date of her
permit, and when she was requested to leave after her authority to
stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a
Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an
affidavit stating explicitly that she does not possess any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law,
Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court, the trial
judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of
the disqualifications referred to, there was need that Lo San Tuang
should have also possessed all the qualifications of residence, moral
character, knowledge of a native principal dialect, etc., provided by
the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was
whether or not the possession of all the qualifications were indeed
needed to be shown apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala
held affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus: .
It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for
citizenship on the basis of the decision laid down in the case of
Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit Court of
Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman "should be a
person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing
laws, and that in respect of the qualifications arising out of her
conduct or opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be
regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a
citizen." (In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: "If,
whenever during the life of the woman or afterwards, the question
of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the party asserting her
citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen must not only
prove such marriage, but also that the woman then possessed all
the further qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized
under existing laws, the statute will be practically nugatory, if not a
delusion and a share. The proof of the facts may have existed at the
time of the marriage, but years after, when a controversy arises
upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.")
In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was
a free white woman or a woman of African descent or nativity, in
order to be deemed an American citizen, because, with respect to
the rest of the qualifications on residence, moral character, etc., she
was presumed to be qualified.
Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927, as amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of
persons who alone might become citizens of the Philippines, even as
it provided who were disqualified. Thus, the pertinent provisions of
that law provided:
Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens — Philippine
citizenship may be acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who are
not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the Insular
possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or
foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become
citizens of said country if residing therein.
Section 2. Who are disqualified. — The following cannot be
naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a) Persons opposed to organized
government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
government; (b) persons defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the
success and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists or
believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental
alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of
nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war.
Section 3. Qualifications. — The persons comprised in
subsection (a) of section one of this Act, in order to be able to
acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one
years of age on the day of the hearing of their petition.
The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one
shall, in addition to being not less than twenty-one years of age on
the day of the hearing of the petition, have all and each of the
following qualifications:
First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of
not less than five years, except as provided in the next following
section;
Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of their residence in
the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which they are living;
Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less
than one thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or have some known
trade or profession; and
Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.

In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare
in writing and under oath his intention of renouncing absolutely and
perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or
sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject.
Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to our
law as it then stood, alien women married to citizens of the
Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the Philippines,
be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof
under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of
the United States, or (3) citizens of the United States or foreigners
who under the laws of the United States might become citizens of
that country if residing therein. With respect to the qualifications
set forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have
the same for all intents and purposes.
But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has since
discarded class or racial consideration from the qualifications of
applicants for naturalization (according to its proponent, the
purpose in eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the
features of the existing naturalization act which discriminated in
favor of the Caucasians and against Asiatics who are our neighbors,
and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to foster amity
with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 — 11 ed.]), even as it
retained in Section 15 the phrase in question. The result is that the
phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must be
understood in the context in which it is now found, in a setting so
different from that in which it was found by the Court in Leonard v.
Grant.
The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial
consideration is that, as the Solicitor General points out, the phrase
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be
understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are
qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.
There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as
requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class
of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization
Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v.
Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to
become a citizen of the Philippines, because the law treats
"qualifications" and "disqualifications" in separate sections. And
then it must not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation
given to the former law, it was to be understood that the alien
woman was not disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v.
Grant did not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not
belong to the class of disqualified persons in order that she may be
deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband: What that case
held was that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized,
merely means that she belongs to the class or race of persons
qualified to become citizens by naturalization — the assumption
being always that she is not otherwise disqualified.
We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of
the Naturalization Law, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen
of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she
has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
by law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has all the
qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to a
Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen.
Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in any way disqualified to
become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the
trial court, the same being self-serving.
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of
Immigration, G.R. No. L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875,
wherein the Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous
resolution of the preceding administration to allow Sun Peck Yong
and her minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino
citizenship of her husband two years after the decision granting him
nationalization and required her to leave and this order was
contested in court, Justice Barrera held:
In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R.
No. L-18775, promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, promulgated October 31,
1963), we held that the fact that the husband became a naturalized
citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the
Philippines. It must also be shown that she herself possesses all the
qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, to become a citizen.
In this case, there is no allegation, much less showing, that
petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself.
Furthermore, the fact that a decision was favorably made on the
naturalization petition of her husband is no assurance that he (the
husband) would become a citizen, as to make a basis for the
extension of her temporary stay.
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136,
December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same
ruling and citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the
marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on November 12, 1960 at
Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before
the Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did
not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and
obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-year residence in the
Philippines required by the law.
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter
under discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a reexamination
thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26,
1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's husband was granted Philippine
citizenship on January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of
the same year. Choy King Tee first came to the Philippines in 1955
and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her
last visa before the case being due to expire on February 14, 1961.
On January 27, 1961, her husband asked the Commissioner of
Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well as
their child's, for the reason that they were Filipinos, and when the
request was denied as to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which
the trial court granted. Discussing anew the issue of the need for
qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only reiterated the arguments
of Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further that the ruling is
believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission
to Philippine citizenship.7
No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-
20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily
reversed the decision of the lower court granting the writs of
mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of
Immigration, considering that Austria's wife, while admitting she did
not possess all the qualifications for naturalization, had submitted
only an affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor.
So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito v.
Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case8 wherein Justice J. B. L.
Reyes took occasion to expand on the reasoning of Choy King Tee by
illustrating with examples "the danger of relying exclusively on the
absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other
affirmative requirements of the law."9
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30,
1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien woman
who is widowed during the dependency of the naturalization
proceedings of her husband, in order that she may be allowed to
take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with
the requirements of Republic Act 530, show that she possesses all
the qualifications and does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under the Naturalization Law, citing in the process
the decision to such effect discussed above, 11 even as he impliedly
reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-
13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the
assumption that the point now under discussion is settled law.
In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the
same issue. Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,
Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:
SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any
woman, who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been
born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time
of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a
Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in the
Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a
Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he
will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his
parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen unless within one
year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as
a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where
he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino
or who is married to a man who subsequently becomes a Filipino,
may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering
from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law, she must
also possess all the qualifications required by said law? if nothing
but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted
above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative
answer to the question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted
that the present case was actually submitted for decision on January
21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck
Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King Tee, supra, were
decided. There are other circumstances, however, which make it
desirable, if not necessary, that the Court take up the matter anew.
There has been a substantial change in the membership of the Court
since Go Im Ty, and of those who were in the Court already when
Burca was decided, two members, Justice Makalintal and Castro
concurred only in the result, precisely, according to them, because
(they wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so far
as they are concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and arguments
discussed at length with copious relevant authorities, in the motion
for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici
curae 13 in the Burca case cannot just be taken lightly and
summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful manner,
not only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the
imperative practical aspects thereof in the light of the actual
situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who have so
long, even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have
always lived and acted as such, officially or otherwise, relying on the
long standing continuous recognition of their status as such by the
administrative authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the
courts. Under these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an
opportunity to consider the views of the five justices who took no
part in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court
decided to further reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling first
laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee stand
the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically repudiate the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly
Giok Ha. Besides, some points brought to light during the
deliberations in this case would seem to indicate that the premises
of the later cases can still bear further consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal
provision We are construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the
Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted
from its American counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision
is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. A
brief review of its history proves this beyond per adventure of
doubt.
The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the
Philippine Legislature under American sovereignty was that of
March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of the
Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the Organic
Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States
Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact,
Act No. 2927 was enacted pursuant to express authority granted by
the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines gained
autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after
the effectivity of the Philippine Independence Act. This made it
practically impossible for our laws on said subject to have any
perspective or orientation of our own; everything was American.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside herein who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto,
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and
as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of
Congress of March 23, 1912, by adding a provision as follows:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein.
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .
SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected
to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens
of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions,
the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of
the United States under the laws of the United States if residing
therein.
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic
laws regarding the effect of marriage to a Filipino upon the
nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code
provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were, however,
abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable
that the citizenship of the wife always followed that of the husband.
Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of
naturalization of an alien, upon the citizenship of his alien wife, nor
of the marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or
one who had become a Filipino before the marriage, although
Section 13 thereof provided thus: .
SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died.
— In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has been
rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the
proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the
widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal
effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448,
amending Act 2977, that the following provisions were added to the
above Section 13:
SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted
between sections thirteen and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-
nine hundred and Twenty-seven:
SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands and who might herself
be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine
Islands.
SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly
naturalized under this law, being under the age of twenty-one years
at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in
the Philippine Islands, be considered citizens thereof.
SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who
have been born in the Philippine Islands after the naturalization of
their parents shall be considered citizens thereof.
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was
enacted on June 17, 1939, the above Section 13 became its Section
15 which has already been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be
seen, Section 13 (a) abovequoted was re-enacted practically word
for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the
change of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could not have
been on any other basis than this legislative history of our
naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions of this
Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were
rendered.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the
first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear that for an alien woman who
marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no
need for any naturalization proceeding because she becomes a
Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided she
does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4
of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of whether
or not the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be
shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of
qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in
Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession
of the qualifications provided by the law should also be shown to be
possessed by the alien wife of a Filipino, for her to become a Filipina
by marriage.
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala
was briefly as follows: That "like the law in the United States, our
Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons who alone might
become citizens, even as it provided who were disqualified," and
inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since
1939 did not reenact the section providing who might become
citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in favor of
Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the only logical deduction ... is that
the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be
understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are
qualified to become citizens of the Philippines" and "there is simply
no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as requiring merely
that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified
persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for
ready reference may be qouted:
The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in
a number of cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first
prove that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 and
none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen
(Lao Chay v. Galang, L-190977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v.
Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-
21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has
submitted the question anew to the court for a possible
reexamination of the said ruling in the light of the interpretation of
a similar law in the United States after which Section 15 of our
Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2 of the Act
of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the
U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on November 30,
1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine Naturalization Law,
Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26, 1920. Under this
Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited
to three classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were
not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other insular possessions of
the United States; and (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners
who, under the laws of the United States, may become citizens of
the latter country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c)
to foreigners who may become American Citizens is restrictive in
character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified
thereunder. In other words, in so far as racial restrictions were
concerned there was at the time a similarity between the
naturalization laws of the two countries and hence there was reason
to accord here persuasive force to the interpretation given in the
United States to the statutory provision concerning the citizenship
of alien women marrying American citizens.
This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist
since the enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law,
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial
restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision
found in Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume
that when Congress chose to retain the said provision — that to be
deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be
one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized," the reference is no
longer to the class or race to which the woman belongs, for class or
race has become immaterial, but to the qualifications and
disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and
4 of the statute. Otherwise the requirement that the woman "might
herself be lawfully naturalized" would be meaningless surplusage,
contrary to settled norms of statutory construction.
The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore
decided is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective
admission to Philippine citizenship, which after all is a privilege
granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and not
indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a
man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral
character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals,
customs and traditions.
Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the
qualifications for naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none of
the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition as a
Philippine citizen.
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments
in favor of the same conclusion thus:
On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1)
she has been residing in the Philippines for a continuous period of at
least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13, t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can
speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages
(pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).
While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the
words emphasized indicate that the present Naturalization Law
requires that an alien woman who marries a Filipino husband must
possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to not
being disqualified under any of the eight ("a" to "h") subheadings of
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our
citizenship by marriage, both the appellee and the court below (in
its second decision) sustain the view that all that the law demands is
that the woman be not disqualified under section 4.
At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin
(1960) the question at issue could be regarded as not conclusively
settled, there being only the concise pronouncement in Lee Suan
Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect
that:
The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically
confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the
qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization.
Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has
firmly established the rule that the requirement of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an alien
woman married to a citizen should be one who "might herself be
lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free from the
disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of the Act but also one
who possesses the qualifications prescribed by section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30,
1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dee. 27,
1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v.
Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351,
March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30,
1965).
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications
prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the
disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually
exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a
Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be
that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the
policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only —
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses,
not previously convicted by a competent court would not be
thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend
such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement
of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship "must be of good moral
character."
Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial
supremacy, in government by certain selected classes, in the right to
vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not
be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not "opposed to
organized government," nor affiliated to groups "upholding or
teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments", nor
"defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of
their ideas." Et sic de caeteris.
The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of
relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without
taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law,
which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does
not possess.
As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully
naturalized" was derived from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section
1994) and should be given the same territorial and racial
significance given to it by American courts, this Court has rejected
the same in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963;
and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965.
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing
rationalizations, but a closer study thereof cannot bat reveal certain
relevant considerations which adversely affect the premises on
which they are predicated, thus rendering the conclusions arrived
thereby not entirely unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating
Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are eligible for Philippine
citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised
Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements for
naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to
Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians
only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note, to
start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole
Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. — Philippine
citizenship may be acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines who
are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the other
Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United
States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may
become citizens of said country if residing therein.
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole
provision was there any mention of race or color of the persons who
were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more evident
from said provision is that it reflected the inevitable subordination
of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth American regime
to the understandable stations flowing from our staffs as a territory
of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1
of Act 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express authority
without which it could not have been done, granted by an
amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by
the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which
was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent
provisions of which have already been footed earlier. In truth,
therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine
Commonwealth and in the exercise of our legislative autonomy on
citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence Act that
Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to
eliminate any racial discrimination contained in our Naturalization
Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our
Naturalization Law from the impositions of American legislation. In
other words, the fact that such discrimination was removed was one
of the effects rather than the intended purpose of the amendment.
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that
"the reference in subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to
foreigners who may become American citizens is restrictive in
character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified
thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said
subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to
confine the grant under it of Philippine citizenship only to the three
classes of persons therein mentioned, the third of which were
citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who could be
American citizens under her laws. The words used in the provision
do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or
color and of excluding others, but more accurately, they refer to all
the disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship under the
laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long
before 1920, when our Act 2927 became a law, the naturalization,
laws of the United States already provided for the following
disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906:
SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to
organized government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any
organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or
opposition to organized government, or who advocates or teaches
the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing
of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers
generally, of the Government of the United States, or of any other
organized government, because of his or their official character, or
who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the
United States.
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for
Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they
happened to be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of fact,
said American law, which was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization and to provide for a Uniform Rule
for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United States" contained
no racial disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act
of May 6, 1882 not being among the expressly repealed by this law,
hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was enacted, subdivision (e) of
its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion
necessarily, even if it were traced back to its origin in the Act of the
United States Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. 16 Thus,
it would seem that the rationalization in the qouted decisions
predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act
2927 by Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end
than the abolition of racial discrimination in our naturalization law
has no clear factual basis. 17
3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no
cogent reason why the construction adopted in the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the
Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that the first
paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment
of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and that the
latter is nothing but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section
1994 of the Raised Statutes of the United States as it stood before
its repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the phrase "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a
definite unmistakable construction uniformly foIlowed in all courts
of the United States that had occasion to apply the same and which,
therefore, must be considered, as if it were written in the statute
itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said
section, they knew of its unvarying construction in the United States
and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the American statute, they
have in effect incorporated into the provision, as thus enacted, the
construction given to it by the American courts as well as the
Attorney General of the United States and all administrative
authorities, charged with the implementation of the naturalization
and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil.,
635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v.
Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [19353;
Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938];
Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536,
59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the
American courts and administrative authorities is contained in
United States of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod,
Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 295 Fed. 523, decided
November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta.
Anno. 2d ed. p. 117) provides as follows: "Any woman who is now or
may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen."
Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of
Congress of February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in
its second section provided "that any woman, who might lawfully be
naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall be
married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken
to be a citizen."
And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the
earlier British Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844, which
provided that "any woman married, or who shall be married, to a
natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and
taken to be herself naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges
of a natural born subject."
The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021,
chap. 411, Comp. Stat. 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255),
being "An Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of
Married Women," in 2, provides "that any woman who marries a
citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, ... shall not
become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage ..."
Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised Statutes
... are repealed."
Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate
citizenship acquired or retained under either of such sections, ..."
meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of September 22, 1922, has no
application to the facts of the present case, as the marriage of the
relator took place prior to its passage. This case, therefore, depends
upon the meaning to be attached to 1994 of the Revised Statutes.
In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L.
ed. 283, 284, construed this provision as found in the Act of 1855 as
follows: "The term, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws," only limits the application of the law to free white
women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only
required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free
white person," and not an alien enemy."
This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens
who belonged to the class or race which might be lawfully
naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other provisions of the
naturalization laws as to residence or moral character, or to any of
the provisions of the immigration laws relating to the exclusion or
deportation of aliens.
In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady
also construed the Act of 1855, declaring that "any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States,
and might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen." He held that "upon the authorities, and the reason, if not
the necessity, of the case," the statute must be construed as in
effect declaring that an alien woman, who is of the class or race that
may be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and who
marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it
was not necessary that it should appear affirmatively that she
possessed the other qualifications at the time of her marriage to
entitle her to naturalization.
In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in
the circuit court, in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien
woman, a subject of Prussia came to the United States and married
here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the concurrence
of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a
citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all of
the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He
added: "There can be no doubt of this, in view of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United, States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496,
19 L. ed. 283." The alien "belonged to the class of persons" who
might be lawfully naturalized.
In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien
woman came to the United States from France and entered the
country contrary to the immigration laws. The immigration
authorities took her into custody at the port of New York, with the
view of deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ of
habeas corpus, and pending the disposition of the matter she
married a naturalized American citizen. The circuit court of appeals
for the ninth Circuit held, affirming the court below, that she was
entitled to be discharged from custody. The court declared: "The
rule is well settled that her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the
United States entitled her to be discharged. The status of the wife
follows that of her husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her
husband's domicil became her domicil." .
In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re
Rustigian, 165. Fed. 980, had before it the application of a husband
for his final decree of naturalization. It appeared that at that time
his wife was held by the immigration authorities at New York on the
ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious
disease. Counsel on both sides agreed that the effect of the
husband's naturalization would be to confer citizenship upon the
wife. In view of that contingency District Judge Brown declined to
pass upon the husband's application for naturalization, and thought
it best to wait until it was determined whether the wife's disease
was curable. He placed his failure to act on the express ground that
the effect of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At the
same time he express his opinion that the husband's naturalization
would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could
become lawfully naturalized. "Her own capacity (to become
naturalized)," the court stated "is a prerequisite to her attaining
citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the married status
cannot confer it upon her." Nothing, however, was actually decided
in that case, and the views expressed therein are really nothing
more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as something
more than that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for the
learned judge, unable to accept them.
In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626,
District Judge Learned Hand held that an alien woman, a subject of
the Turkish Empire, who married an American citizen while visiting
Turkey, and then came to the United States, could not be excluded,
although she had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under
the immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for her
exclusion, if she bad not had the status of a citizen. The case was
brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed, in 106
C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the
relators married, they might have been lawfully naturalized, and we
said: "Even if we assume the contention of the district attorney to
be correct that marriage will not make a citizen of a woman who
would be excluded under our immigration laws, it does not affect
these relators."
We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens;
and it was also said to be inconsistent with the policy of our law that
the husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien. The
distinction between that case and the one now before the court is
that, in the former case, the marriage took place before any order of
exclusion had been made, while in this the marriage was celebrated
after such an order was made. But such an order is a mere
administrative provision, and has not the force of a judgment of a
court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on
the circumstances that existed at the time the order of exclusion
was made. If the circumstances change prior to the order being
carried into effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of
exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien was at the
time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should be made
satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual deportation, that the alien
had entirely recovered from the disease, we think it plain that the
order could not be carried into effect. So, in this case, if, after the
making of the order of exclusion and while she is permitted
temporarily to remain, she in good faith marries an American
citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she
thereby acquired, under international law and under 1994 of the
Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and ceased to be an alien.
There upon, the immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over
her, as that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and not to citizens.
In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694,
sustained the right of the officials to deport a woman under the
following circumstances: She entered this country in July, 1910,
being an alien and having been born in Turkey. She was taken into
custody by the immigration authorities in the following September,
and in October a warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending
hearings as to the validity of that order, she was paroled in the
custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for her deportation was
that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at
the time of her entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat
deportation was that the woman had married a citizen of the United
States pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge
declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under such
circumstances "is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of
the facts shown." He held that it was no part of the intended policy
of 1994 to annul or override the immigration laws, so as to
authorize the admission into the country of the wife of a naturalized
alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who
is of a class of persons excluded by law from admission to the
United States does not come within the provisions of that section.
The court relied wholly upon the dicta contained in the Rustigian
Case. No other authorities were cited.
In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449,
construed 1994 and held that where, pending proceedings to deport
an alien native of France as an alien prostitute, she was married to a
citizen of the United States, she thereby became a citizen, and was
not subject to deportation until her citizenship was revoked by due
process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was contended, her
marriage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws and preventing her
deportation, such fact should be established in a court of competent
jurisdiction in an action commenced for the purpose. The case was
appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed.
1022.
It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the
language of the statute by the Department of Justice. In 1874,
Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon the
Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence within the United
States for the period required by the naturalization laws was riot
necessary in order to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she
having married a citizen of the United States abroad, although she
never resided in the United States, she and her husband having
continued to reside abroad after the marriage.
In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of
May 5, 1907, in an opinion rendered by Attorney General
Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight years
of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at
once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About
fifteen months after her arrival she was taken before a United
States commissioner by way of instituting proceedings under the
Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. 4242, 3
Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground
that she had entered this country for the purpose of prostitution,
and had been found an inmate of a house of prostitution and
practicing the same within three years after landing. It appeared,
however, that after she was taken before the United States
commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the
Department of Justice, she was lawfully married to a native-born
citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time of her
marriage an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and to
remove with her husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew
what her mode of life had been, but professed to believe in her
good intentions. The question was raised as to the right to deport
her, the claim being advance that by her marriage she bad become
an American citizen and therefore could not be deported. The
Attorney General ruled against the right to deport her as she had
become an American citizen. He held that the words, "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized," refer to a class or race who might
be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other
conditions of the naturalization laws was not required. 27 Ops. Atty.
Gen. 507.
Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped
our observation that Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act of
1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that the marriage to an American
citizen of a female of the sexually immoral classes ... shall not invest
such female with United States citizenship if the marriage of such
alien female shall be solemnized after her arrest or after the
commission of acts which make her liable to deportation under this
act."
Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change
in the law:
(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of
the immoral class avoiding deportation through the device of
marrying an American citizen.
(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American
citizen with an alien woman of any other of the excluded classes,
either before or after her detention, should not confer upon her
American citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the country, its
intention would have been expressed, and 19 would not have been
confined solely to women of the immoral class.
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on
the subject and We have found no warrant for the proposition that
the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes was meant solely as a racial bar, even if
loose statements in some decisions and other treaties and other
writings on the subject would seem to give such impression. The
case of Kelley v. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited
among the first of the decisions 19 simply held:
As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon
women married to citizens of the United States, if they are of the
class of persons for whose naturalization the previous Acts of
Congress provide. The terms "married" or "who shall be married,"
do not refer in our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of
marriage is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They mean that,
whenever a woman, who under previous Acts might be naturalized,
is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship existed
at the passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the
marriage, she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His citizenship,
whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship upon her. The
construction which would restrict the Act to women whose
husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens, would exclude far
the greater number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act was
intended. Its object, in our opinion, was to allow her citizenship to
follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any application
for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is no
reason for the restriction suggested.
The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing
laws," only limit the application of the law to free white women. The
previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time only required that
the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white person,"
and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.
A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals
of New York, in Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one which
gives the widest extension to its provisions.
Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might
lawfully be naturalized under existing laws" only limit the
application to free white women" 20 it hastened to add that "the
previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, ... required that the
person applying for its benefits should be (not only) a "free white
person" (but also) ... not an alien enemy." This is simply because
under the Naturalization Law of the United States at the time the
case was decided, the disqualification of enemy aliens had already
been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the
corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case
of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was mentioned, the
reason was that there was no other non-racial requirement or no
more alien enemy disqualification at the time; and this is
demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear
that under the previous naturalization law, there was also such
requirement in addition to race. This is impotent, since as stated in
re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used by Mr. Justice
Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms "who might lawfully be
naturalized under existing laws" only limit the application of the law
to free white women, must be interpreted in the application to the
special facts and to the incapacities under the then existing laws,"
(at p. 982) meaning that whether or not an alien wife marrying a
citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her race and
nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there were other
disqualifications under the law in force at the time of her marriage
or the naturalization of her husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the
second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the evidence that because
Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473, it
follows that in place of the said eliminated section particularly its
subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife
"may be lawfully naturalized," what should be required is not only
that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must
also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as
those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the
underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable
conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity
to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local
languages, education of children in certain schools, etc., thereby
implying that, in effect, sails Section 2 has been purposely intended
to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further
consideration of the proper premises, We have come, to the
conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently justified.
To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We
have already explained above of the mentioned provisions has been
shown or can be shown to indicate that such was the clear intent of
the legislature. Rather, what is definite is that Section 15 is, an exact
copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,
which, at the time of the approval of Commonwealth Act 473 had
already a settled construction by American courts and
administrative authorities.
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent
American decisions quoted above, there can be no doubt that in the
construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised
Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which was taken, from
the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United States are
unanimously agreed that the qualifications of residence, good moral
character, adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to
be considered, and that the only eligibility to be taken into account
is that of the race or class to which the subject belongs, the
conceptual scope of which, We have just discussed. 21 In the very
case of Leonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo
San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the American
authorities was made thus:
The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev. St., or
as it was in the Act of 1855, supra, "shall be deemed and taken to be
a citizen" while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has
not actually become a citizen by ordinary means or in the usual way,
as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application
and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account
practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the
equivalent of "considered" or "judged"; and, therefore, whatever an
act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any
person or thing, must, in law, be considered as having been duly
adjudged or established concerning "such person or thing, and have
force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares
that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances, be
"deemed' an American citizen, the effect when the contingency
occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an act of
Congress, or in the usual mode thereby prescribed.
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory
construction that in a situation like this wherein our legislature has
copied an American statute word for word, it is understood that the
construction already given to such statute before its being copied
constitute part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how
We can give a different connotation or meaning to the provision in
question. At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining
the contrary conclusion appear to be based on in accurate factual
premises related to the real legislative background of the framing of
our naturalization law in its present form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility
requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny
from any point of view. There is no question that Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially the same as
Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-
existed already with practically the same provision as Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the phrase "who may
be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as amended by
Act 3448, referred to the so-called racial requirement in Section 1 of
the same Act, without regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof,
how could the elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the
reference to Section 3, when precisely, according to the American
jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act
473 was approved, such qualifications as were embodied in said
Section 3, which had their counterpart in the corresponding
American statutes, are not supposed to be taken into account and
that what should be considered only are the requirements similar to
those provided for in said Section 1 together with the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be
lawfully naturalized" in Section 15 could have been intended to
convey a meaning different than that given to it by the American
courts and administrative authorities. As already stated, Act 3448
which contained said phrase and from which it was taken by
Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By that, time, Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was no longer in
force because it had been repealed expressly the Act of September
22, 1922 which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien
wives of American citizens and required, instead, that they submit
to regular naturalization proceedings, albeit under more liberal
terms than those of other applicants. In other words, when our
legislature adopted the phrase in question, which, as already
demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the
Americans had already abandoned said phraseology in favor of a
categorical compulsion for alien wives to be natural judicially.
Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the
time of the approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt the
phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled construction and the
other to follow the new posture of the Americans of requiring
judicial naturalization and it appears that they have opted for the
first, We have no alternative but to conclude that our law still
follows the old or previous American Law On the subject. Indeed,
when Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939, the Philippine
Legislature, already autonomous then from the American Congress,
had a clearer chance to disregard the old American law and make
one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S.
Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to maintain the
language of the old law. What then is significantly important is not
that the legislature maintained said phraseology after Section 1 of
Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it
even after the Americans had amended their law in order to provide
for what is now contended to be the construction that should be
given to the phrase in question. Stated differently, had our
legislature adopted a phrase from an American statute before the
American courts had given it a construction which was acquiesced
to by those given upon to apply the same, it would be possible for
Us to adopt a construction here different from that of the
Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our legislature
borrowed the phrase when there was already a settled construction
thereof, and what is more, it appears that our legislators even
ignored the modification of the American law and persisted in
maintaining the old phraseology. Under these circumstances, it
would be in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory
construction to say that Section 15 has a nationalistic and selective
orientation and that it should be construed independently of the
previous American posture because of the difference of
circumstances here and in the United States. It is always safe to say
that in the construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible
judicial fiat or perspective when the demonstrated legislative point
of view seems to indicate otherwise.
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to
emphasize that in reality and in effect, the so called racial
requirements, whether under the American laws or the Philippine
laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in the same
sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they have
always been considered as disqualifications, in the sense that those
who did not possess them were the ones who could not "be lawfully
naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of the
disqualifications under Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those under
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are
practically identical to those in the former law, except those in
paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is the clear
impression anyone will surely get after going over all the American
decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited in the latest USCA
(1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of
this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing
with approval the opinions of the secretary of Justice. 23 Such being
the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements were always
treated as disqualifications in the same light as the other
disqualifications under the law, why should their elimination not be
viewed or understood as a subtraction from or a lessening of the
disqualifications? Why should such elimination have instead the
meaning that what were previously considered as irrelevant
qualifications have become disqualifications, as seems to be the
import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the
retention in Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same
language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended
by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the
latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making
the phrase in question "who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no
longer to any racial disqualification but to the qualification under
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act
2927, there were two groups of persons that could not be
naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling
under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those
belonging to Section 1, could not have had, by any process of
reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, the
disqualifications that used to be before such elimination. We cannot
see by what alchemy of logic such elimination could have convicted
qualifications into disqualifications specially in the light of the fact
that, after all, these are disqualifications clearly set out as such in
the law distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as already
demonstrated, in American jurisprudence, qualifications had never
been considered to be of any relevance in determining "who might
be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in the statute
governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our law
on the matter was merely copied verbatim from the American
statutes.
6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable
legal provisions and judicial opinions, whether here or in the United
States, there are practical considerations that militate towards the
same conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for reconsideration
of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in
the case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:
Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove "qualifications" —
There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a
construction that Section 15 of the law requires that an alien wife of
a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she possesses the
qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before she may be
deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife,
becomes unreasonably onerous and compliance therewith
manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such requirement is
shown by the following:
1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for
naturalization under Section 2 of the law is that the applicant "must
have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less
than ten years." If this requirement is applied to an alien wife
married to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of ten years
at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her husband.
If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country whose law declares
that upon her marriage to a foreigner she automatically loses her
citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her husband, this could
mean that for a period of ten years at least, she would be stateless.
And even after having acquired continuous residence in the
Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee that her petition for
naturalization will be granted, in which case she would remain
stateless for an indefinite period of time.
2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for
naturalization that he "must own real estate in the Philippines worth
not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have
some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation."
Considering the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by an
alien of real estate except in cases of hereditary succession (Art. XIII,
Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire the citizenship
of her husband must have to prove that she has a lucrative income
derived from a lawful trade, profession or occupation. The income
requirement has been interpreted to mean that the petitioner
herself must be the one to possess the said income. (Uy v. Republic,
L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30,
1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-20912, November 29, 1965). In
other words, the wife must prove that she has a lucrative income
derived from sources other than her husband's trade, profession or
calling. It is of common knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken
of the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not have gainful
occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the
dependence of the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter
the duty of supporting the former. (Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be
borne in mind that universally, it is an accepted concept that when a
woman marries, her primary duty is to be a wife, mother and
housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be remiss in this duty, how
can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify her
for citizenship?
3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization
"must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the
public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of the
Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum during the entire period of residence in the Philippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization
as Philippine citizen." If an alien woman has minor children by a
previous marriage to another alien before she marries a Filipino, and
such minor children had not been enrolled in Philippine schools
during her period of residence in the country, she cannot qualify for
naturalization under the interpretation of this Court. The reason
behind the requirement that children should be enrolled in
recognized educational institutions is that they follow the
citizenship of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666, March
30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v.
Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29,
1953; Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950). Considering
that said minor children by her first husband generally follow the
citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such requirement as
applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous
residence prescribed by Section 2 "shall be understood as reduced
to five years for any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino
woman." It is absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino wife
should be required to reside only for five years in the Philippines to
qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a Filipino
husband must reside for ten years.
Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult
for an alien wife related by marriage to a Filipino citizen to become
such citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so related. And yet, it
seems more than clear that the general purpose of the first
paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman,
by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly
granted to other aliens. It will be recalled that prior to the
enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old
Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special privilege
to alien wives of Filipinos. They were treated as any other foreigner.
It was precisely to remedy this situation that the Philippine
legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the observation
made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is enlightening:
It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife
follows the nationality of the husband; but the Department of State
of the United States on October 31, 1921, ruled that the alien wife
of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino citizen, pointing out that our
Supreme Court in the leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23
Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code being political
have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to
the United States. Accordingly, the stated taken by the Attorney-
General prior to the envictment of Act No. 3448, was that marriage
of alien women to Philippine citizens did not make the former
citizens of this counting. (Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928) .
To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in
1928 adding section 13(a) to Act No. 2927 which provides that "any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippine Islands, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized,
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s.
1941; emphasis ours).
If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be
interpreted, as this Court did, in such a way as to require that the
alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in Section 2, the
privilege granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is
submitted that such a construction, being contrary to the
manifested object of the statute must be rejected.
A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object,
and if the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which
will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should
receive the former construction. (In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493,
45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 89 L. ed. 285. See
also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85
[1910).
... A construction which will cause objectionable results should be
avoided and the court will, if possible, place on the statute a
construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance
with the decisions construing statutes, a construction which will
result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also be
avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public interest,
or construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a
construction which will result in absurd consequences.
So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would
be an apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been
determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in
futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the
legislature; and the court should adopt that construction which will
be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have
been the intention of the legislature, an interpretation which would
render the requirements of the statute uncertain and vague is to be
avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to
confer an illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632).
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was
laid on the need for aligning the construction of Section 15 with "the
national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship." But
the question may be asked, is it reasonable to suppose that in the
pursuit of such policy, the legislature contemplated to make it more
difficult if not practically impossible in some instances, for an alien
woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any ordinary
applicant for naturalization, as has just been demonstrated above?
It seems but natural and logical to assume that Section 15 was
intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by
marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions,
their fate and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen of
this country, "for better or for worse." Perhaps there can and will be
cases wherein the personal conveniences and benefits arising from
Philippine citizenship may motivate such marriage, but must the
minority, as such cases are bound to be, serve as the criterion for
the construction of law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe
that in joining a Filipino family the alien woman is somehow
disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos
among whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but surely, no
one should expect her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it
may be considered that in reality the extension of citizenship to her
is made by the law not so much for her sake as for the husband.
Indeed, We find the following observations anent the national policy
rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be
quite persuasive:
We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy
begs the question. The avowed policy of "selectives admission"
more particularly refers to a case where citizenship is sought to be
acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case,
the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting
only those who are worthy to become citizens. There is here a
choice between accepting or rejecting the application for
citizenship. But this policy finds no application in cases where
citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts
have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming
citizenship by operation of law proves in legal proceedings that he
satisfies the statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise
than to declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an
individual who is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen,
is a citizen of the Philippines, "irrespective of his moral character,
ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs,
and traditions." A minor child of a person naturalized under the law,
who is able to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is
likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has lucrative income, or
he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an alien
wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to prove only that she
may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to
establish her citizenship status as a fact.
A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be
overlooked in this regard, for it explains and justifies the obviously
deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted that a State, in
extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its
citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity
of allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson,
113 Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention on the
Nationality of Married Women: Historical Background and
Commentary." UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and
Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be
satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship
derivatively through the husband. This is particularly true in the
Philippines where tradition and law has placed the husband as head
of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of
the family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the
unity and solidarity of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose
preservation of State as a vital and enduring interest. (See Art. 216,
Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our country,
there is a theoretic identity of person and interest between husband
and wife, and from the nature of the relation, the home of one is
that of the other. (See De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should
likewise be said that because of the theoretic identity of husband
and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of
husband should be the nationality of the wife, and the laws upon
one should be the law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v.
Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: "The status
of the wife follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue of her
marriage her husband's domicile became her domicile." And the
presumption under Philippine law being that the property relations
of husband and wife are under the regime of conjugal partnership
(Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that of the other.
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family
unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an
alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different
from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's
interests in property and business activities reserved by law to
citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be
denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own
efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests.
Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be
refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship
laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers from
the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization
Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in
the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was
understood and construed when the phrase "who may be lawfully
naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was
borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts
and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course in the view
that Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of Philippine
circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization
laws. We should realize the disparity in the circumstances between
the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all
over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose
Constitution is nationalistic almost in the come. Certainly, the writer
of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that
our jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to
American authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration, and
respect, should not be regarded as source of pride and indisputable
authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that
the provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin and
orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily from
American law when the Philippines was under the dominating
influence of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad
commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's
and 1930's that given the opportunity to break away from the old
American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed, even
after America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of
September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot
be citizens of the United States without undergoing naturalization
proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous
American law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994
of the Revised Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth reiterating, was
consistently and uniformly understood as conferring American
citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without
having to submit to any naturalization proceeding and without
having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of
residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals and
American constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from
any of the disqualifications enumerated in the American
Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions
of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married
to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath
as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it,
doubtless there will be instances where unscrupulous persons will
attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into
fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot
as a matter of law hold that just because of these possibilities, the
construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated
inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal,
juridical and practical. There can always be means of discovering
such undesirable practice and every case can be dealt with
accordingly as it arises.
III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of
the ruling of this Court in Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial
naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a Filipino may
herself be considered or deemed a Filipino. If this case which, as
already noted, was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only
been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing discussions
would have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have
held that despite her apparent lack of qualifications, her marriage to
her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her undergoing any
naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain, her claim
that she is not disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things
stand now, with the Burca ruling, the question We have still to
decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina without submitting to a
naturalization proceeding?
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this
question must necessarily be in the affirmative. As already stated,
however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final because
there is still pending with Us a motion for its reconsideration which
vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious consideration by this
Court. On this account, and for the reasons expounded earlier in this
opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine
the issue.
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino
who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefore by
filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the
qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said
petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner
has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the
petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or
official, administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a
competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien
wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared
null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or,
in the words of law, a "petition for citizenship". This is as it should
be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts
were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards,
compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization law.
The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as one for
naturalization, and, in fact, declared petitioner "a citizen of the
Philippines."
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman
marrying a Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not
enough that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2
of the law and none of the disqualifications enumerated in its
Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole
process of judicial naturalization apparently from declaration of
intention to oathtaking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain
words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to
her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she remains to
be the national of the country to which she owed allegiance before
her marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality with her
husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other applicant
for naturalization needs to complete, the required period of ten
year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of
the principle local languages, make her children study in Filipino
schools, acquire real property or engage in some lawful occupation
of her own independently of her husband, file her declaration of
intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with
the affidavits of two credible witnesses of her good moral character
and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is ordered in her
favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of probation,
and only then, but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will she
begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines. Briefly, she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial
declaration.
Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite
obvious, on the other hand, upon a cursory reading of the provision,
in question, that the law intends by it to spell out what is the "effect
of naturalization on (the) wife and children" of an alien, as plainly
indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the language of the provision
itself clearly conveys the thought that some effect beneficial to the
wife is intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner to
be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take a second hard look at
the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court might have
overlooked any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion
different from that complained therein. It is undeniable that the
issue before Us is of grave importance, considering its consequences
upon tens of thousands of persons affected by the ruling therein
made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever
possible, that Our decision in any case should produce any adverse
effect upon them not contemplated either by the law or by the
national policy it seeks to endorse.
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their
number and standing in the Bar and well known for their reputation
for intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive and
comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly evident in the
quality of the memorandum they have submitted in said case, invite
Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus:
The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in
the present case -- that an alien woman who marries a Philippine
citizen not only does not ipso facto herself become a citizen but can
acquire such citizenship only through ordinary naturalization
proceedings under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that all
administrative actions "certifying or declaring such woman to be a
Philippine citizen are null and void" — has consequences that reach
far beyond the confines of the present case. Considerably more
people are affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N.
Burca. The newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand women
married to Philippine citizens are affected by this decision of the
Court. These are women of many and diverse nationalities, including
Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian, Finnish, Japanese,
Chilean, and so on. These members of the community, some of
whom have been married to citizens for two or three decades, have
all exercised rights and privileges reserved by law to Philippine
citizens. They will have acquired, separately or in conjugal
partnership with their citizen husbands, real property, and they will
have sold and transferred such property. Many of these women may
be in professions membership in which is limited to citizens. Others
are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees in companies
engaged in business activities for which a certain percentage of
Filipino equity content is prescribed by law. All these married
women are now faced with possible divestment of personal status
and of rights acquired and privileges exercised in reliance, in
complete good faith, upon a reading of the law that has been
accepted as correct for more than two decades by the very agencies
of government charged with the administration of that law. We
must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit
such comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives and
mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and
reexamination.
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended
to in Gan Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19
SCRA 401 — when Chief Justice Concepcion observed:
The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and
Delgado cases — although referring to situations the equities of
which are not identical to those obtaining in the case at bar — may
have contributed materially to the irregularities committed therein
and in other analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned to
believe, although erroneously, that the procedure followed was
valid under the law.
Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under
consideration, the Solicitor General was required, not only, to
comment thereon, but, also, to state "how many cases there are,
like the one at bar, in which certificates of naturalization have been
issued after notice of the filing of the petition for naturalization had
been published in the Official Gazette only once, within the periods
(a) from January 28, 1950" (when the decision in Delgado v.
Republic was promulgated) "to May 29, 1957" (when the Ong Son
Cui was decided) "and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29,
1965" (when the decision in the present case was rendered).
After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in
appellant's motion for reconsideration and in the reply thereto of
the Government, as well as of the data contained in the latter, the
Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui case shall
apply and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization issued
after, not on or before May 29, 1957.
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the
Court had to expressly enjoin the prospective application of its
construction of the law made in a previous decision, 24 which had
already become final, to serve the ends of justice and equity. In the
case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As already observed, the
decision in Burca still under reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee
Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that followed
them have at the most become the law of the case only for the
parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We have to
do now is to reexamine the said rulings and clarify or modify them.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been
born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time
of naturalization of the parents, shall automatically become a
Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the
Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a
Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he
will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his
parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one
year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as
a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where
he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the
statute, the Revised Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act 473,
as a whole, is to establish a complete procedure for the judicial
conferment of the status of citizenship upon qualified aliens. After
laying out such a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful
inclusion of all safeguards against the possibility of any undesirable
persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but
categorically states the consequence of the naturalization of an
alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon the members of
his immediate family, his wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in
no uncertain terms it ordains that: (a) all his minor children who
have been born in the Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also;
(b) all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines but
dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically
become" Filipinos also, but those not born in the Philippines and not
in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are also
redeemed citizens of this country provided that they shall lose said
status if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign
country before becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if born
outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be
"considered" Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by
failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American) Consulate
of the country where they reside and take the necessary oath of
allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of
the Philippines" if she is one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized". 26
No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as
to the point that the minor children, falling within the conditions of
place and time of birth and residence prescribed in the provision,
are vested with Philippine citizenship directly by legislative fiat or by
force of the law itself and without the need for any judicial
proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed, the
language of the provision, is not susceptible of any other
interpretation. But it is claimed that the same expression "shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the wife, does
not necessarily connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by
legislative fiat because the antecedent phrase requiring that she
must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" implies
that such status is intended to attach only after she has undergone
the whole process of judicial naturalization required of any person
desiring to become a Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is
that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative naturalization
as to the minor children, the same section deliberately treats the
wife differently and leaves her out for the ordinary judicial
naturalization.

Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the
constitutional authority of the Congress of the Philippines to confer
or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Tañada & Carreon, Political
Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it has done so for
particular individuals, like two foreign religious prelates, 27 hence
there is no reason it cannot do it for classes or groups of persons
under general conditions applicable to all of the members of such
class or group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether native-
born or naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is whether or
not the legislature hag done so in the disputed provisions of Section
15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the
most respect authorities on political law in the Philippines 28
observes in this connection thus: "A special form of naturalization is
often observed by some states with respect to women. Thus in the
Philippines a foreign woman married to a Filipino citizen becomes
ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of the classes who may
apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws." (Sinco, Phil.
Political Law 498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment
is substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and
Ricardo Cua, supra.)
More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in
construing the provision of the United States statutes from which
our law has been copied, 28a the American courts have held that
the alien wife does not acquire American citizenship by choice but
by operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the words "and taken"
are omitted. The effect of this statute is that every alien woman
who marries a citizen of the United States becomes perforce a
citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization, and
regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601 [1970 ed.],
citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36
S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.) .
We need not recount here again how this provision in question was
first enacted as paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of an insertion
into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and that, in turn,
and paragraph was copied verbatim from Section 1994 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States, which by that time already
had a long accepted construction among the courts and
administrative authorities in that country holding that under such
provision an alien woman who married a citizen became, upon such
marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a consequence of
the marriage itself without having to undergo any naturalization
proceedings, provided that, it could be shown that at the time of
such marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized under the
laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We already made of
these undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this decision
doubly extensive. The only point which might be reiterated for
emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the United States, the
American Congress, recognizing the construction, of Section 1994 of
the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable
to avoid the effects of such construction, approved the Act of
September 22, 1922 Explicitly requiring all such alien wives to
submit to judicial naturalization albeit under more liberal terms than
those for other applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the
Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting such a
requirement, enacted Act 3448 on November 30, 1928 which copied
verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes,
thereby indicating its preference to adopt the latter law and its
settled construction rather than the reform introduced by the Act of
1922.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this
Court may feel that as the United States herself has evidently found
it to be an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the alien
wives of her citizens to discontinue their automatic incorporation
into the body of her citizenry without passing through the judicial
scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used to be before 1922,
it seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial
mentality, that as a developing country, the Philippines adopt a
similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which our own
legislature has enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above,
provides no basis for Us to construe said law along the line of the
1922 modification of the American Law. For Us to do so would be to
indulge in judicial legislation which it is not institutionally
permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this court would be going
precisely against the grain of the implicit Legislative intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it
seems it is quite clearly implied that this Court is of the view that
under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and children
of an applicant for naturalization who dies during the proceedings
do not have to submit themselves to another naturalization
proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the proceedings
involving the husband. Section 16 provides: .
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died.
— In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has been
rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the
proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the
widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal
effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383,
this Court held:
Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants
argue (1) that under said Sec. 16, the widow and minor children are
allowed to continue the same proceedings and are not substituted
for the original petitioner; (2) that the qualifications of the original
petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the widow and
minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether the
petitioner dies before or after final decision is rendered, but before
the judgment becomes executory.
There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second
sentence of said Section 16 contemplate the fact that the
qualifications of the original petitioner remains the subject of
inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that "The decision
rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children
are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been
rendered during the life of the petitioner." This phraseology
emphasizes the intent of the law to continue the proceedings with
the deceased as the theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it
would have been unnecessary to consider the decision rendered, as
far as it affected the widow and the minor children.
xxx xxx xxx
The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a
dead person can not be bound to do things stipulated in the oath of
allegiance, because an oath is a personal matter. Therein, the widow
prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance for the
deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that
she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance and the proper
certificate of naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of
her deceased husband, shall have been completed, not on behalf of
the deceased but on her own behalf and of her children, as
recipients of the benefits of his naturalization. In other words, the
herein petitioner proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a
citizen of the Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that "any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons
naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines
shall be considered citizens thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth
Act No. 473). The decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the
record of the case at bar, do not show that the petitioning widow
could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed his
petition, apart from the fact that his 9 minor children were all born
in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the Petition of Lee Pa
to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI,
Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference to
Chua Chian case is, therefore, premature.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If
the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies
during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino
citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino
cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense
and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to
treat them differently.
Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced
in the motion for reconsideration in Burca, and We see no reason to
disagree with the following views of counsel: .
It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of
who may be considered citizens of the Philippines. It is a proposition
too plain to be disputed that Congress has the power not only to
prescribe the mode or manner under which foreigners may acquire
citizenship, but also the very power of conferring citizenship by
legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890
[1898] ; see 1 Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines
152 [1961 ed.]) The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine
citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section
1[5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization,
under this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in
accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship,
but also those who acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization"
or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an
alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage
of an alien woman to a citizen. (See Tañada & Carreon, op. cit.
supra, at 152, 172; Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization
2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3
Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found in
Section 14 of the Revised Naturalization Law clearly manifests an
intent to confer citizenship. Construing a similar phrase found in the
old U.S. naturalization law (Revised Statutes, 1994), American courts
have uniformly taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the alien
woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United States
as fully as if she had complied with all the provisions of the statutes
upon the subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S.
Opinions of the US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op.
4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28 Op. 508],
Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398]).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in Section 1994 Revised
Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was in the Act of 1855
(10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be deemed and taken to
be a citizens" while it may imply that the person to whom it relates
has not actually become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the
usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper
application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on
that account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is
the equivalent of "considered" or "judged," and therefore, whatever
an Act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of
any person or thing must, in law, be considered as having been duly
adjudged or established concerning such person or thing, and have
force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares
that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances, be
"deemed" an American citizen, the effect when the contingency
occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an Act of
Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van Dyne,
Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo, Philippine
Citizenship and Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.]; emphasis ours).
That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it
enacted the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Law is shown by a textual analysis of the entire
statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15 reads:
(See supra).
The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall
automatically become" as used in the above provision, are
undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of the
provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law
upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their
relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already
citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the
persons enumerated in the provision concurs with the fact of
citizenship of the person to whom they are related, the effect is for
said persons to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso
facto" as here used does not mean that all alien wives and all minor
children of Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship,
necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the
statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must
apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does
mean, however, is that in respect of those persons enumerated in
Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the
operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time
at which such citizenship commences. Thus, under the second
paragraph of Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized under
the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto a
citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of relationship
concurs with the fact of citizenship of his parent, and the time when
the child became a citizen does not depend upon the time that he is
able to prove that he was born in the Philippines. The child may
prove some 25 years after the naturalization of his father that he
was born in the Philippines and should, therefore, be "considered" a
citizen thereof. It does not mean that he became a Philippine citizen
only at that later time. Similarly, an alien woman who married a
Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after her
marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage
that her citizenship status became in question), that she is one who
might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to
conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had
proven that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not
reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only
after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized."
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the
very phraseology of the law, the legislature could not have intended
that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless
and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized.
Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting
or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact
necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e.,
as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as
used in that phrase, precisely replies that at the time of her
marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power"
to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force.
(Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L
ed 283 [1869). That she establishes such power long after her
marriage does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a
citizen.
(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not
acquire the status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof
that she herself may be lawfully naturalized" (Decision, pp. 3-4).
Under this view, the "acquisition" of citizenship by the alien wife
depends on her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that
is, she is not a citizen unless and until she proves that she may
herself be lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law
that the proviso does not mean that she must first prove that she
"might herself be lawfully naturalized" before she shall be deemed
(by Congress, not by the courts) a citizen. Even the "uniform"
decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its holding did not
rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen only after she has proven
her qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions ruled was
that the alien wives in those cases failed to prove their qualifications
and therefore they failed to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus
in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [l957], the case was remanded
to the lower court for determination of whether petitioner, whose
claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was disputed by the
Government, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," for the
purpose of " proving her alleged change of political status from alien
to citizen" (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien
wife who was being deported, claimed she was a Philippine citizen
by marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that there was no proof
that she was not disqualified under Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such evidence appearing on
record, the claim of assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu
Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable." (at 523) It will
be observed that in these decisions cited by this Court, the lack of
proof that the alien wives "might (themselves) be lawfully
naturalized" did not necessarily imply that they did not become, in
truth and in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the
decisions merely held was that these wives failed to establish their
claim to that status as a proven fact.
In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law,
the time when citizenship is conferred should not be confused with
the time when citizenship status is established as a proven fact.
Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose
citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be required
to prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in
order to factually establish his claim to citizenship.* His citizenship
status commences from the time of birth, although his claim thereto
is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien
woman who might herself be lawfully naturalized becomes a
Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino husband,
not at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven fact
by showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Indeed,
there is no difference between a statutory declaration that a person
is deemed a citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such
citizen from a declaration that an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself be lawfully
naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former
becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon
marriage.
It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might
herself be lawfully naturalized, it cannot be said that she has
established her status as a proven fact. But neither can it be said
that on that account, she did not become a citizen of the
Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any legal
proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to establish her status
as a fact. In such a case, the presumption of law should be that she
is what she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905]; Hilado v.
Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a presumption that a
representation shown to have been made is true. (Aetna Indemnity
Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321).
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the
foregoing views is, what substitute is them for naturalization
proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have
the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she
may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to
perform an act or enter in to a transaction or business or exercise a
right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question
is that as the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural,
stand today, there is no such procedure, but such paucity is no proof
that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date of
marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may
be, for the truth is that the same situation objections even as to
native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as
res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as
the occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which
Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v.
Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of
those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort
easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on
the antecedent official findings, even if these are not really binding.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a
good starting point and so that the most immediate relevant public
records may be kept in order, the following observations in Opinion
No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G.
Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate initial step by
the interested parties:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is
as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation
of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things,
that she is married to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not
disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the
filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by
the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino
citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration
conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition.
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's
registration as an alien, there will probably be less difficulty in
establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding,
depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the opposition.

Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We

have passed upon was not touched by the trial court, but as the
point is decisive in this case, the Court prefers that the matter be
settled once and for all now.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo

dismissing appellants' petition for injunction is hereby reversed and
the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized
representative is permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and
deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen
Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen
from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim
Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25,
1962. No costs.

Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183110 October 7, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of
citizenship to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no
other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the
members of the family."1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the May 23, 2008
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) G.R. CV No. 00523, which
affirmed the January 31, 2005 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for
Naturalization5 of respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas
(Azucena).
Factual Antecedents
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization
before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. The case was docketed as
Naturalization Case No. 03-001 and raffled to Branch 29 of said
court.
Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution; that she has conducted
herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the period of
her stay in the Philippines, as well as in her relations with the
constituted Government and with the community in which she is
living; that she has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace their customs,
traditions, and ideals; that she has all the qualifications required
under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA473);6 that she is not
opposed to organized government nor is affiliated with any
association or group of persons that uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments; that she is not defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of men’s ideas; that
she is neither a polygamist nor believes in polygamy; that the nation
of which she is a subject is not at war with the Philippines; that she
intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to
renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to
China; and that she will reside continuously in the Philippines from
the time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her
naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 97 of
CA 473had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground that Azucena failed
to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some
known lucrative trade. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG
to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion.9
Thereafter, the hearing for the reception of Azucena’s evidence was
then set on May 18, 2004.10
Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
appeared on the day of the hearing. Hence, Azucena’s counsel
moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC
granted. Accordingly, the RTC designated its Clerk of Court as
Commissioner to receive Azucena’s evidence.11 During the
November 5, 2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from the
OSG appeared despite due notice.12
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to
Chinese parents,13 Azucena has never departed the Philippines
since birth. She has resided in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur from
1941-1942; in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur from 1942-1968; in
Bogo City for nine months; in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur from 1969-
1972; in Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from 1972-1976; and, in
Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, thereafter, up to the filing of her
Petition.
Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her
primary, secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine
schools,i.e., Margosatubig Central Elementary School in 1955,14
Margosatubig Academy in1959,15 and the Ateneo de Zamboanga in
1963,16 graduating with a degree in Bachelor of Science in
Education. She then practiced her teaching profession at the Pax
High School for five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two
years, and in Talisayan High School in Misamis Oriental for another
two years.17
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas18
(Santiago),a natural-born Filipino citizen.19 They have five children,
namely Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen, Dennis Emmanuel, and Edsel
James.20 All of them studied in Philippine public and private schools
and are all professionals, three of whom are now working abroad.21
After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena and her husband,
as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of and later on
in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their
income, Azucena submitted their joint annual tax returns and
balance sheets from 2000-200222 and from 2004-2005.23 The
business name and the business permits issued to the spouses’
store, ‘Azucena’s General Merchandising,’ are registered in
Santiago’s name,24 and he is also the National Food Authority
licensee for their rice and corn business.25 During their marital
union, the Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio
Lombog, Margosatubig.26
To prove that she has no criminal record, Azucena submitted
clearances issued by the Philippine National Police of Zamboanga
del Sur Provincial Office and by the National Bureau of
Investigation.27 She also presented her Health Examination
Record28 declaring her as physically and mentally fit.
To further support Azucena’s Petition, Santiago and witnesses
Eufemio Miniao and Irineo Alfaro testified.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 31, 2005, the RTC found that Azucena has amply
supported the allegations in her Petition. Among these are her lack
of a derogatory record, her support for an organized government,
that she is in perfect health, that she has mingled with Filipinos
since birth and can speak their language, that she has never had any
transgressions and has been a law abiding citizen, that she has
complied with her obligations to the government involving her
business operations, and that the business and real properties she
and Santiago own provide sufficient income for her and her family.
Thus, the RTC ruled:
x x x In sum, the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines in
accordance with the provisions of the Naturalization Law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted.
SO ORDERED.29
In its Omnibus Motion,30 the OSG argued that the ex-parte
presentation of evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court violates
Section 10 of CA 473,31 as the law mandates public hearing in
naturalization cases.
Rejecting this argument in its March 21, 2005 Order,32 the RTC held
that the public has been fully apprised of the naturalization
proceedings and was free to intervene. The OSG and its delegate,
the Provincial Prosecutor, are the only officers authorized by law to
appear on behalf of the State, which represents the public. Thus,
when the OSG was furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing for
the reception of evidence ex-parte, there was already a sufficient
compliance with the requirement of a public hearing.
The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA,33 contending
that Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement under
CA 473. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the
Retail Trade Law (Republic Act No. 1180) to engage directly or
indirectly in the retail trade. Hence, she cannot possibly meet the
income requirement. And even if she is allowed, her business is not
a "lucrative trade" within the contemplation of the law or that
which has an appreciable margin of income over expenses in order
to provide for adequate support in the event of unemployment,
sickness, or disability to work. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s
claim that she owns real property because aliens are precluded from
owning lands in the country.
The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte proceeding before the
commissioner is not a "public hearing" as ex-parte hearings are
usually done in chambers, without the public in attendance. It
claimed that the State was denied its day in court because the RTC,
during the May 18, 2004 initial hearing, immediately allowed the
proceeding to be conducted ex-parte without even giving the State
ample opportunity to be present.
Azucena countered that although she is a teacher by profession, she
had to quit to help in the retail business of her husband, and they
were able to send all their children to school.34 It is highly unlikely
that she will become a public charge as she and her spouse have
enough savings and could even be given sufficient support by their
children. She contended that the definition of "lucrative
trade/income" should not be strictly applied to her. Being the wife
and following Filipino tradition, she should not be treated like male
applicants for naturalization who are required to have their own
"lucrative trade."
Azucena denied that the hearing for her Petition was not made
public, as the hearing before the Clerk of Court was conducted in
the court’s session hall. Besides, the OSG cannot claim that it was
denied its day in court as notices have always been sent to it. Hence,
its failure to attend is not the fault of the RTC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the OSG’s appeal,35 the CA found that Azucena’s
financial condition permits her and her family to live with
reasonable comfort in accordance with the prevailing standard of
living and consistent with the demands of human dignity. It said:
Considering the present high cost of living, which cost of living tends
to increase rather than decrease, and the low purchasing power of
the Philippine currency, petitioner-appellee, together with her
Filipino husband, nonetheless, was able to send all her children to
college, pursue a lucrative business and maintain a decent
existence. The Supreme Court, in recent decisions, adopted a higher
standard in determining whether a petitioner for Philippine
citizenship has a lucrative trade or profession that would qualify
him/her for admission to Philippine citizenship and to which
petitioner has successfully convinced this Court of her ability to
provide for herself and avoid becoming a public charge or a financial
burden to her community. x x x36
As for the other issue the OSG raised, the CA held that the RTC had
complied with the mandate of the law requiring notice to the OSG
and the Provincial Prosecutor of its scheduled hearing for the
Petition.
Thus, the instant Petition wherein the OSG recapitulates the same
arguments it raised before the CA, i.e., the alleged failure of
Azucena to meet the income and public hearing requirements of CA
473.
Our Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship
through either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative
naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative
naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine
citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is
neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other
qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do
they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying
from similar laws in the United States which has since been
amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473,
which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the
alien wife thru derivative naturalization.37
Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v.
Commissioner of Immigration:38
Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court
indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is
not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of
the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of
her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4.39
As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to
formalize the conferment of Filipino citizenship is as follows:

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is
as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation
of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things,
that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not
disqualified from acquiring her husband’s citizenship pursuant to
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the
filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by
the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino
citizen x x x, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation
and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying
the petition.40
Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied
before the then Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID)
for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No.
03070541 by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID
granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside
the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that
Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen42 as only their marriage
certificate was presented to establish his citizenship.
Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was
constrained to file a Petition for judicial naturalization based on CA
473. While this would have been unnecessary if the process at the
CID was granted in her favor, there is nothing that prevents her
from seeking acquisition of Philippine citizenship through regular
naturalization proceedings available to all qualified foreign
nationals. The choice of what option to take in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship rests with the applicant. In this case, Azucena
has chosen to file a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473.
The fact that her application for derivative naturalization under
Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her from
seeking judicial naturalization under the same law. It is to be
remembered that her application at the CID was denied not because
she was found to be disqualified, but because her husband’s
citizenship was not proven. Even if the denial was based on other
grounds, it is proper, in a judicial naturalization proceeding, for the
courts to determine whether there are in fact grounds to deny her
of Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization
proceedings.
As the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino citizenship
has been adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago
submitted his birth certificate indicating therein that he and his
parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s registration, land
titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of which are public
records. He has always comported himself as a Filipino citizen, an
operative fact that should have enabled Azucena to avail of Section
15 of CA473. On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that
Azucena suffers from any of the disqualifications under Section 4 of
the same Act.
However, the case before us is a Petition for judicial naturalization
and is not based on Section 15 of CA 473 which was denied by the
then Ministry of Justice. The lower court which heard the petition
and received evidence of her qualifications and absence of
disqualifications to acquire Philippine citizenship, has granted the
Petition, which was affirmed by the CA. We will not disturb the
findings of the lower court which had the opportunity to hear and
scrutinize the evidence presented during the hearings on the
Petition, as well as determine, based on Azucena’s testimony and
deportment during the hearings, that she indeed possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground that Azucena
does not have the qualification required in no. 4 of Section 2 of CA
473 as she does not have any lucrative income, and that the
proceeding in the lower court was not in the nature of a public
hearing. The OSG had the opportunity to contest the qualifications
of Azucena during the initial hearing scheduled on May 18,
2004.However, the OSG or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
failed to appear in said hearing, prompting the lower court to order
ex parte presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court on
November 5, 2004. The OSG was also notified of the ex parte
proceeding, but despite notice, again failed to appear. The OSG had
raised this same issue at the CA and was denied for the reasons
stated in its Decision. We find no reason to disturb the findings of
the CA on this issue. Neither should this issue further delay the
grant of Philippine citizenship to a woman who was born and lived
all her life, in the Philippines, and devoted all her life to the care of
her Filipino family. She has more than demonstrated, under judicial
scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine citizen. On the second
issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that since the
government who has an interest in, and the only one who can
contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly notified through the
OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor’s office, the proceedings have
complied with the public hearing requirement under CA 473.
No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a
Philippine citizen:
4. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than
five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her
profession before she had to quit her teaching job to assume her
family duties and take on her role as joint provider, together with
her husband, in order to support her family. Together, husband and
wife were able to raise all their five children, provided them with
education, and have all become professionals and responsible
citizens of this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both
husband and wife’s lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional
and can resume teaching at anytime. Her profession never leaves
her, and this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a
charge to the only country she has known since birth.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of
extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a
unity of allegiance among family members, thus:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family
unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an
alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different
from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s
interests in property and business activities reserved by law to
citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be
denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own
efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests.
Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be
refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship
laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers from
the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization
Law.43
We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no
proceeding authorized by the law or by the Rules of Court, for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.44 "Such
judicial declaration of citizenship cannot even be decreed pursuant
to an alternative prayer therefor in a naturalization proceeding."45

This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of

Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial naturalization
under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino
citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a
Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is
an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of be
coming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under
CA 473.Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny,
that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will
not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 23, 2008 Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00523 which affirmed the
January 31,2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29,
Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for Naturalization, is
hereby

AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance with the period and the

requirements under Republic Act No. 530which supplements the
Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of Naturalization be
issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien
Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is:
Who should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon -
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest
number of votes in three successive elections but who was twice
declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to
his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his
lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but
who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be
considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured
the most number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who
obviously was not voted directly to the position of governor, but
who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said
post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent
vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on
repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on
citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial
justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of
Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a
Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec),
First Division,1 promulgated on December 19, 19952 and another
Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 19963
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in
the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R.
Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with the Comelec docketed
as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet
being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of
Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the
Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting the petition with the
following disposition6:
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and
declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of
Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the
Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is
canceled.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted
upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy
continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said
date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the
aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the
election returns and a Certificate of Votes8 dated May 27, 1995 was
issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for
the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental)
petition9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor
of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to
the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed
"the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for
the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning
gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,
1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee
was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11
docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June
30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He
alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his
oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition
for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special
Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted".
As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the
Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal
impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the
alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs.
Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said
position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the
herein assailed Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered
the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be
proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having
garnered the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on
June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . .
. (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore
RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the
proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby
ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the
highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.

Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R.
Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately
reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim
petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon
having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus,
qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His
Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this
resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14
promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the
present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary
restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a
Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the
status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be
capsulized in the following propositions"15:
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form
and substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said
petition;
Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was
a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be
elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;
Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor
is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify
him to hold the Office of Governor; and
Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully
supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected
Governor of Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent
Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755,
as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May
1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not
a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May
11, 1995; and
3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on
May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others,
Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No.
123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions
on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because
they were not rendered "within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not
later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec
to act on the petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen
days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect
which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos.
120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related in their factual
environment and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz.,
who should occupy the position of governor of the province of
Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties
and required them thereafter to file simultaneously their respective
memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be
restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it
seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be
proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be
given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of
Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be
elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the
initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that said petition is
not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto
case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election,
valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its
jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which
prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon,
considering that they were not rendered within the period referred
to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than
fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota,
the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised are
secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine
citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that
of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or
member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities
must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-
citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has
reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications
prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this
Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the oral argument in this
case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress,
but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize,
notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House
of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his
political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was
rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and
procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was
overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon,
with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992,
and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was
judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from
holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us
a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a
favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot.
Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the
third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under
P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who
was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this
time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of
his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes,
Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said
Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he
insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the duly-
elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of
Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and
unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the
elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his
citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with
serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed",
asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative
powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive
Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of
policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence
and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her
memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special
Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of
Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to
cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within
your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of
Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch
of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or
authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is
obvious that no express repeal was made because then President
Aquino in her memorandum -- based on the copy furnished us by
Lee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was
being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In
fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text.
On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that
repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be
allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated
that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent
that they cannot co-exist".26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be
regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement
of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her
law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive
policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance
and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever
"judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might
make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725
but left it to the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with the
matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have
unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress.
The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms
that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in
the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter
of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said
Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the
Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon
statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities
flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's
application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was
approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented
a judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo
counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the Office
of the President in Malacañang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is
confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee
was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said
Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he
filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required.
Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was
"indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special
Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for the personal
interest of respondent,"27 the Solicitor General explained during
the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply
baseless as there were many others who applied and were
considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to
this Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and
the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not
been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the
proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude
that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the
requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to
comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules
and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the
Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in
naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into
Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former
natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous
citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-
born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his
province prior to his naturalization in the United States -- a
naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron
clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience
embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-
establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to
his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his
people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the
Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues convincingly and
conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited
by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's
repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself,
and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation
to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of
June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by
the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election,
if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision
in G.R. 10465430 which held that "both the Local Government Code
and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run
and be elected to public office." Obviously, however, this was a
mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's
naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof.
Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue
of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT
resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly
rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local
official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province . . . where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language
or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . .
must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's
residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at
least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective public office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people
and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins
to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation
and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since
Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very
day32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials)
began -- he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to
hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities
thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already
qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on
qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was
enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such qualification
be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the
certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such
qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the
case of age and residence -- should thus be possessed when the
"elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30,
1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li
Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is
to ensure that our people and country do not end up being
governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation,
that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during
the oral argument34 to the effect that the citizenship qualification
should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter
the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart
from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another
item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And, under the
law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore,
Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered
one -- if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of
the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to
be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of
being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a
SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore
stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter
presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter
requirement was included as another qualification (aside from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require
that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY
he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be
elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code
requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not
require him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual
voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's
purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the
prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to
govern -- and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has
not disputed -- that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon,
and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial
declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8,
1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained
that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon.
He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In
fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed
(sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he
voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995."3 7
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province
where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship
should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily
the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter,
presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to
question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the
only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to
contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from
failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the
Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be
availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning
candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility
may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the
very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan
G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his
oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he
should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably
garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding
elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-
declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that
the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of
his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But
there are settled exceptions40 to this general rule, such as when the
statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES
NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which
undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating
judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or
private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce
their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability
or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate
on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in
operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes
are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of
enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are intended to supply
defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils.
. . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and)
reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to
render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise
ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes
relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create
new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of
the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come
within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the
general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right,
and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in
our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the
plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the
existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until
"after the death of their husbands or the termination of their
marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973
Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who
marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because
"such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino
women who had married aliens before said constitution took
effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the
right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital
coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other
hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in
favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine
citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship",
because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos
would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of
naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-
acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure
of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA,
96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata,
14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the
existing naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married
Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of
their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship
by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing
the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the
aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are
considered essentially remedial and curative.
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the
preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to
give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation
is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should
so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a
whole, or from the terms thereof."45 It is obvious to the Court that
the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and
transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and
jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a
political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of
speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights,
therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to
P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said
that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect
the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason
of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the
future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in
terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or
violate some constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more true of
P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or
qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the
retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law
was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for
repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that
Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the
law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even
the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995
is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application
therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in
this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law
should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions
existing even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit
the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling
them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of
citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest
effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the
law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That
is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and
should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier
mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would
show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority;
and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or
anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to
his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested
right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly,
Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and
whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be
deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it
would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be
given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to
act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial
length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as
Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American citizenship -- was,
may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not
be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice
to prevail.4 7
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to
process, act upon and grant applications for repatriation within
relatively short spans of time after the same were filed.48 The fact
that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the
likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of giving
retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court,
direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's
repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the
government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an
alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between application
and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already
twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the circumstances,
there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's
repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his
application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions
about his possession of the nationality qualification -- whether at
the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election
(May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20,
1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a
registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is
considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino citizenship
restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter
is likewise deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an
American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively
give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any
elective local position?"49 We answer this question in the negative,
as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS
at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that,
when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote
that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was
stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship."50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated
December 19, 1995:51
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his
American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992,
and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality
long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted
by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission
are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec
Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En
Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory
after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having
been issued by this Honorable Court.54 Hence, before Lee "was
proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was
already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee
adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes
were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become
final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these
"judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American
citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running
for, and holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193
disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988
elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the
1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final
and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent
Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution:55
The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided
that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the
purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no
record of any "final judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a
candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said
in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995),
directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not
a Filipino citizen "having been declared by the Supreme Court in its
Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines." This
declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection with
the 1992 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship
cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because
a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his
citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in
a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court
or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again, as the occasion demands.
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible
types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a
pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case".
Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but
that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's)
proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day
reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse
was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the
Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at
length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its
constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this
Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear
and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC
No. 95-317 obviously is one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59
we ruled:
The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of
office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed,
we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies
may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning
candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187
SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs.
COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an
assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the
proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the
COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing
Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186
SCRA 484.)
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a
proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days following the
proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6)
days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec
correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him
for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact
remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and
in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, . . . just that, a
second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the
pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as
follows:
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in
fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast
their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of
their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing
away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the
next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has
not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was
notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the
electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner
Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its
resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city
Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to
petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final
and subject to the final outcome of this case.
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the
ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an
identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on
election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for
reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus)
resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several
others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact,
he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to
show that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in
law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the
voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of
their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at
all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro-
claimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo
again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is
the emphatic teaching of Labo:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably
reacquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest
number of votes in the 1995 elections, he -- not Lee -- should be
proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and
should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of
the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the
confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him
for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were
rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section
78, of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions
are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the
Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en
banc63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his election. At any
rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions
for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. (emphasis supplied)
Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. argues that President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27,
1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by
Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a
purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not a
statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the
first Frivaldo case;64 viz., "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.
473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by . . .
repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register
and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this
Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring
him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The
retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured
whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter
for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not
change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the
subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole
remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the
Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a
false material representation therein as required by Section 74.
Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding that
Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point
is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the
Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11,
1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen
days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing
the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not
commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646
authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after
the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e.,
that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr.
Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One
other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition
to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day
period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the
period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we
hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period
mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated
by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that
a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no
inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given
the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be
given retroactive effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes"
our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the
second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a
mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question
that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his
qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his
supervening repatriation has changed his political status -- not in
1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was
stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation
or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship". Since
our courts are charged only with the duty of determining who are
Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who
are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law that a
State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens -- not who are
the citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is: the Comelec
made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding
has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus,
following settled case law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic
margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be
declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an
American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical
evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such
knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous
elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still
deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995
elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government
Code refers to the qualifications of elective local officials, i.e.,
candidates, and not elected officials, and that the citizenship
qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by
candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by
election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a)
thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to
"candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to
apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would
have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the
paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship
qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it
would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in
pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates for governor,
mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to
Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law
specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance
that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. We do not question what the provision states. We hold
however that the provision should be understood thus: that after
taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or
repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have
retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of
the word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of the Local Authority
Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very
wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken
up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court
must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree -- we must all
follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is
how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can
be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy
and perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to
elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit, the naked
provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial
justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly
against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying
election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular
sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood
legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the
electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial
tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local
Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the
latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of
office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to
be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been
suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and
Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly
granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the
remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to
resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as
well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his
citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime
he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of
the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which
he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in
contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino
citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and
should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his
registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated
as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely
consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement
is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold
public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous
rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear
and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the
electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest
will of our people,66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and
technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
Consistently, we have held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations
omitted).67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible
protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will.
Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving
effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our
democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the
popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to
resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of
the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective
offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the
petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent
will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the
very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this
undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault
with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity
to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to
his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter
before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual
findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of
repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But
the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut
consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate
development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against
and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh
anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the
larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he
sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the
dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt
about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first
opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people
once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him
three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every
time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed
naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated
tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of
birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in
fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming
intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines
even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of
country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of
justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up.
After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen
of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay,
single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his
struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every
liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor.
And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the
indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be
governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The
assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being
moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.
and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concurs in the result.
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban
which is pro-people and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding
the sovereign will of the people which is the be-all and the end-all of
republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its
tempest.
The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987
Constitution. For this reason, it appears as the first in our
declaration of principles and state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article
II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a
democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them." The same
principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935
Constitutions.1 It is one of the few principles whose truth has been
cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of
the U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to
guarantee to every state a "republican form of government." With
understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed
republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then
being crafted by its Filipino framers.2
Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987
Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II
provides as a state policy that the prime duty of the Government is
"to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides
that ". . . public officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the
people . . ." Sections 15 and 1 of Article XIII define the role and
rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates
that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist
consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the
performance of their duty." And section 2 of Article XVII provides
that "amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative . . ." All these provisions and more are intended to
breathe more life to the sovereignty of our people.
To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle
whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds
are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in
its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus
summi imperu, the absolute right to govern.3 Former Dean Vicente
Sinco4 states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal
omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain essential
qualities inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The first is legal
omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent
and absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power
to determine exclusively its legal competence. Its powers are
original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what it should do at
any given time."5 Citing Barker,6 he adds that a more amplified
definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal
adjustment of all legal issues." The U.S. Supreme Court expressed
the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,7
where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to
law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while
sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government,
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom
all government exists and acts."
In our Constitution, the people established a representative
democracy as distinguished from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani
Cruz explains:8
xxx xxx xxx
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and
for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern
themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation
and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public
functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on
their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are
replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a
republican government is a responsible government whose officials
hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall,
according to the Constitution, "at all times be accountable to the
people" they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican
government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of the
common welfare according to the will of the people themselves.
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that
sovereignty is indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the
people together, all the time.9 For this reason, the Constitution and
our laws provide when the entire electorate or only some of them
can elect those who make our laws and those who execute our laws.
Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only our
district electorates vote for our congressmen, only our provincial
electorates vote for the members of our provincial boards, only our
city electorates vote for our city councilors, and only our municipal
electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes
for our President and Vice-President but only our provincial
electorates vote for our governors, only our city electorates vote for
our mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our mayors.
By defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the
sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed
that said sovereignty has been fragmented.
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not
whether the people of Sorsogon should be given the right to defy
the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather, the
issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly choosing
Frivaldo as governor ought to be given a decisive value considering
the uncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the
qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and
jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this legal issue cannot be
denied. In the United States, 10 there are two (2) principal schools
of thought on the matter. One espouses the view that a candidate
must possess the qualifications for office at the time of his election.
The other ventures the view that the candidate should satisfy the
qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of the office. I am
unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this
difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban
adhered to the second school of thought while Mr. Justice Davide
dissents.
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our
law on the matter for this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice
Davide that my opinion can bring about ill effects to the State. Mr.
Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo
continues to be disqualified and we cannot allow him to sit as
governor without transgressing the law. I do not concede this
assumption for as stressed above, courts have been sharply divided
by this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see how we
can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more
weight to the votes of the people of Sorsogon.
Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a
rebellion, we cannot prosecute them "because of the doctrine of
people's sovereignty." With due respect, the analogy is not
appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a
crime, a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, an
offense against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it
cannot be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon violated
the law by voting for Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's name was in
the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At
that time too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino
citizenship. And even our jurisprudence has not settled the issue
when a candidate should possess the qualification of citizenship.
Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot
imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance
in the case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people
should be resolutory of the case at bar which is one of its kind,
unprecedented in our political history. For three (3) times, Frivaldo
ran as governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he
was disqualified on the ground of citizenship. The people of
Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite his
disqualification. The people never waffled in their support for
Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in
1992, they gave him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted
a margin of 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming
choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we should strive
to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will
of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to
reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent
prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle
of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established
authority."11 The choice of the governed on who shall be their
governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of
government. In cases where the sovereignty of the people is at
stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct.
We cannot fail by making the people succeed.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions
reached by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, I find myself unable to join him.
I
I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but
not on the ground that President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March
1987 memorandum "effectively repealed" P.D. No. 725. In my view,
the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of the
latter decree by divesting the Special Committee on Naturalization
of its authority to further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No.
270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No. 1379; and
"any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and
regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum
can lead to no other conclusion, thus:
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the
Special Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease
and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your
functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instruction
No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No.
836 dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree
No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of citizenship
under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, issuances
and rules and regulations. (emphasis supplied)
It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those
related to LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no
doubt in my mind that P.D. No. 725 is one such "related law" as it
involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by repatriation
and designates the Special Committee on Naturalization created
under LOI No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove)
applications under the said decree. The power of President Aquino
to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27 March 1987
memorandum is beyond question considering that under Section 6,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative
power until the Congress established therein convened on the
fourth Monday of July 1987.
I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the
memorandum of 27 March 1987 was merely a declaration of
"executive policy," and not an exercise of legislative power. LOI No.
270, P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such
as P.D. No. 725, were issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative powers -- not executive power. These laws
relate to the acquisition (by naturalization) and reacquisition (by
repatriation) of Philippine citizenship, and in light of Sections 1(4)
and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution (naturalization and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with
law), it is indubitable that these subjects are a matter of legislative
prerogative. In the same vein, the creation of the Special Committee
on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the power
to accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly
legislative acts.
Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the
reactivation or revival of the Committee can be done only by
legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress, since the President had long lost his
authority to exercise "legislative power." Considering that Congress
has not seen it fit to do so, the President cannot, in the exercise of
executive power, lift the cease and desist order nor
reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the
Committee cannot validly accept Frivaldo's application for
repatriation and approve it.
II
Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did
not "cure his lack of citizenship." I depart from the view in the
ponencia that Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991
does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be
met, and that being the case, then it suffices that citizenship be
possessed upon commencement of the term of the office involved;
therefore, since Frivaldo "re-assumed" his Philippine citizenship at
2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of office of Governor
commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied
with the citizenship requirement.
In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of
elective local officials and not those of an elected local official.
These adjectives are not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to
suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires
the process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second
refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The section
unquestionably refers to elective -- not elected -- local officials. It
falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1
entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof
begins with the phrase "An elective local official," while paragraphs
(b) to (f) thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or
member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities
must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of
independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities
must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18)
years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member
of the sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of
age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least
fifteen (15) years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of
age on election day (emphasis supplied)
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the
qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their
election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to mean
that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the
commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate.
For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the
time when the citizenship requirement must be possessed. I submit
that the requirement must be satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship
must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term,
but at an earlier time, the latest being election day itself. Section 39
is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one
basic qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A
REGISTERED VOTER IN THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR
PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This simply means
that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of
suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this
sovereign right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No less
than the Constitution makes it the first qualification, as Section 1,
Article V thereof provides:
Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of
age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. . . . (emphasis supplied)
And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines
(B.P. Blg. 881) expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter.
Thus:
Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines,
not otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over,
who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city
or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election, may be a registered voter.
(emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as
Governor in the 1988 and 1992 elections on the ground that for lack
of Philippine citizenship -- he being a naturalized citizen of the
United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as
such and to serve the position (Frivaldo vs. Commission on
Elections, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De la
Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]). This disqualification inexorably nullified
Frivaldo's registration as a voter and declared it void ab initio. Our
judgments therein were self-executory and no further act, e.g., a
COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical
destruction of his voter's certificate, was necessary for the
ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a registered voter for
the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing
that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections.
Even if he did -- in obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification --
this did not make him a Filipino citizen, hence it was equally void ab
initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections
and was even allowed to vote therein were of no moment. Neither
act made him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this
Court. On the contrary, said acts made a mockery of our judgments.
For the Court now to validate Frivaldo's registration as a voter
despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said
judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability dependent
on a COMELEC order cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the
physical destruction of his certificate of registration as a voter
which, of course, was never our intention. Moreover, to sanction
Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in
favor of form (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of
voters or voter's ID), and abet the COMELEC's incompetence in
failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and allowing him to vote.
The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship
disqualification should be reckoned not from the date of the
election nor the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but from the
date of proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question
the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate is a petition for quo
warranto which, under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code,
may be filed only within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.
I beg to differ.
Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a
candidate's ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allows the filing of a petition to deny due course to or
cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material
representation contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false.
Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the certificate of
candidacy must state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office,
which means that he has all the qualifications (including, of course,
fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the
disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78
may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The section reads in full as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections
(216 SCRA 760, 768 [1992]), where this Court held:
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain
candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period Section
78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave
him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the
disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto
within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the
election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Rule
21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides that any
voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city
official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the
Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be
filed within ten (10) days from the date the respondent is
proclaimed (Section 2).
Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows
the filing of a petition for disqualification on the ground of failure to
possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided by the
Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day for filing
of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:
Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not
possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by
law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day
after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later
than the date of proclamation.
While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for
disqualification on the ground of lack of all qualifications may be
doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue here.
In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last
issue grappled within the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The answer is provided in
Loong.
We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent
Commission that in the light of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of
Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as long as it is filed within a
reasonable time from the discovery of the ineligibility.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to
petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the
25- day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the
appropriate action to cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of
any false representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section
7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the Code.
We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification
case which may be based on grounds other than that provided
under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646
also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to
disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the period
within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This is
because there are provisions in the Code which supply the periods
within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates
must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253
on petitions for quo warranto.
I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section
78 is merely directory because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes
the COMELEC to try and decide petitions for disqualification even
after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications
under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and
consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court
or the COMELEC are granted the authority to continue hearing the
case after the election, and during the pendency of the case,
suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the
evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code
provide:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be
deemed removed upon declaration by competent authority that
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent
in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this
Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections
80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph
6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless
said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The
Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a
final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections
shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
III
Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by
the arguments in support of the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation
may be given retroactive effect, as such goes against the spirit and
letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that
acquisition or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship is not a right,
but a mere privilege. Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the
following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army, Navy, or Air Corps
deserters; and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her
marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2], C.A.
No. 63). P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who
lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the
death of their alien husbands, or the termination of their marital
status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine
citizenship but subsequently desired to reacquire the latter.
Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides
that repatriation takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, thus:
. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the
Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction
No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and capitalization supplied)
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by
repatriation under the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2)
action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if
the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the
oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application,
then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's
pronouncement in the first Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship requires is an act "formally rejecting [the]
adopted state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines."
That act meant nothing less than taking of the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. If we now take this revision of
doctrine to its logical end, then it would also mean that if Frivaldo
had chosen and reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization
or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of
the petition for naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine
citizenship. This is a proposition which both the first and second
Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.
The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the
proposition that P.D. No. 725 can be given retroactive effect is its
alleged curative or remedial nature.
Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal
hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be characterized as a curative or
remedial statute:
Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by
curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations. The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing
omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect
sought to be removed or made harmless, is something the
legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it may
do so by a subsequent one.
Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are
intended to enable a person to carry into effect that which they
have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal
consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in
their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment
of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory
Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations omitted).
P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
lost through the marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through
naturalization in a foreign country of natural-born Filipino citizens. It
involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of citizenship. To
those for whom it is intended, it means, in reality, the acquisition of
"a new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it
may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect considering that
one who has lost Philippine citizenship does not have the right to
reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that
citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner
provided by law. Moreover, it has also been observed that:
The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes
are statutes relating to procedure and not substantive rights.
(Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], §5704
at 74, citations omitted).
If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is
curative or remedial statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give
it a retroactive effect since it explicitly provides the date of its
effectivity. Thus:
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy five.
Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship, then nothing therein supports such theory,
for as the decree itself unequivocally provides, it is only after taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that the
applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.
IV
Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath
of allegiance retroacted to the date of Frivaldo's application for
repatriation, the same could not be said insofar as it concerned the
United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the
laws of the United States of America, Frivaldo remained an
American national until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance
thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of the
Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides
that a person who is a national of the United States of America,
whether by birth or naturalization, loses his nationality by, inter alia,
"(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal
declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S.
Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of the
United States of America, Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then
that on election day and until the hour of the commencement of the
term for which he was elected - noon of 30 June 1995 as per Section
43 of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual
citizenship, viz., (a) as an American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino
citizen through the adoption of the theory that the effects of his
taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective. Hence, he was
disqualified to run for Governor for yet another reason: possession
of dual citizenship, in accordance with Section 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code.
V XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II, Section
The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered
STATELESS on the basis of his claim that he "had long renounced
and had long abandoned his American citizenship - long before May
8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based on
Frivaldo's unproven, self-serving allegation; second, informal
renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the status of a
STATELESS person attach to Frivaldo.
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of
individuals stripped of their nationality by their former government
without having an opportunity to acquire another; or de facto,
which is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose
country does not give them protection outside their own country,
and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees
(JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and
Comments, 1995 ed., 290).
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations
Convention Regarding the Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine
Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III,
363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its
law." However, it has not been shown that the United States of
America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at any time
before he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 30 June 1995.
VI
Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join
him in his statement that "[t]he sovereignty of our people is the
primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the said
Constitution is "more people-oriented," "borne [as it is] out of the
1986 people power EDSA revolution." I would even go further by
saying that this Constitution is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people
(Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section 1, Article
XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI,
Sections 5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14;
Article XIV, Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor
(Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article
12), and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).
Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of
sovereignty beyond what I perceive to be the reasonable
constitutional parameters. The doctrine of people's sovereignty is
founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and
refers exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines.
Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this, thus:
Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a
clause "We, the sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty
is an attribute of the Filipino people as one people, one body.
That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized
by looking at it as the supreme authority of the people of any of the
political subdivisions to determine their own destiny; neither can we
convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this
Court would provide the formula for the division and destruction of
the State and render the Government ineffective and inutile. To
illustrate the evil, we may consider the enforcement of laws or the
pursuit of a national policy by the executive branch of the
government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If these
are opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a
certain province, or even a municipality, it would necessarily follow
that the law, national policy, or judgment must not be enforced,
implemented, or executed in the said province or municipality.
More concretely, if, for instance, the vast majority of the people of
Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the Government for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the
Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature,
wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives, then
those who did so -- and which are composed of the vast majority of
the people of Batanes -- a political subdivision -- cannot be
prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion in violation of Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of peoples'
sovereignty. Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by
investing upon the people of a mere political subdivision that which
the Constitution places in the entire Filipino people, may be
disastrous to the Nation.
So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion.
Thus, simply because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000
votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e., a vast majority of the voters of
Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the former, then
this Court must yield to that will and must, therefore, allow to be set
aside, for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of candidates
and elective officials and naturalization and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding decisions of
this Court affecting him.
This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to
DISMISS G.R. No. 120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban
which is pro-people and pierces the myopia of legalism. Upholding
the sovereign will of the people which is the be-all and the end-all of
republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its
tempest.
The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987
Constitution. For this reason, it appears as the first in our
declaration of principles and state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article
II of our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a
democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them." The same
principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935
Constitutions.1 It is one of the few principles whose truth has been
cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of
the U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to
guarantee to every state a "republican form of government." With
understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed
republicanism as the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then
being crafted by its Filipino framers.2
Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987
Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II
provides as a state policy that the prime duty of the Government is
"to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides
that ". . . public officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the
people . . ." Sections 15 and 1 of Article XIII define the role and
rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates
that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist
consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the
performance of their duty." And section 2 of Article XVII provides
that "amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative . . ." All these provisions and more are intended to
breathe more life to the sovereignty of our people.
To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle
whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds
are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in
its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus
summi imperu, the absolute right to govern.3 Former Dean Vicente
Sinco4 states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal
omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain essential
qualities inherent in the nature of sovereignty. The first is legal
omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent
and absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power
to determine exclusively its legal competence. Its powers are
original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what it should do at
any given time."5 Citing Barker,6 he adds that a more amplified
definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power of final legal
adjustment of all legal issues." The U.S. Supreme Court expressed
the same thought in the landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,7
where it held that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to
law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while
sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government,
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom
all government exists and acts."
In our Constitution, the people established a representative
democracy as distinguished from a pure democracy. Justice Isagani
Cruz explains:8
xxx xxx xxx
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and
for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern
themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation
and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public
functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on
their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are
replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a
republican government is a responsible government whose officials
hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall,
according to the Constitution, "at all times be accountable to the
people" they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican
government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of the
common welfare according to the will of the people themselves.
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that
sovereignty is indivisible but it need not always be exercised by the
people together, all the time.9 For this reason, the Constitution and
our laws provide when the entire electorate or only some of them
can elect those who make our laws and those who execute our laws.
Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only our
district electorates vote for our congressmen, only our provincial
electorates vote for the members of our provincial boards, only our
city electorates vote for our city councilors, and only our municipal
electorates vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes
for our President and Vice-President but only our provincial
electorates vote for our governors, only our city electorates vote for
our mayors, and only our municipal electorates vote for our mayors.
By defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise the
sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed
that said sovereignty has been fragmented.
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not
whether the people of Sorsogon should be given the right to defy
the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather, the
issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly choosing
Frivaldo as governor ought to be given a decisive value considering
the uncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the
qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and
jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this legal issue cannot be
denied. In the United States, 10 there are two (2) principal schools
of thought on the matter. One espouses the view that a candidate
must possess the qualifications for office at the time of his election.
The other ventures the view that the candidate should satisfy the
qualifications at the time he assumes the powers of the office. I am
unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this
difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban
adhered to the second school of thought while Mr. Justice Davide
dissents.
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our
law on the matter for this is vital to dispel the fear of Mr. Justice
Davide that my opinion can bring about ill effects to the State. Mr.
Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo
continues to be disqualified and we cannot allow him to sit as
governor without transgressing the law. I do not concede this
assumption for as stressed above, courts have been sharply divided
by this mind boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see how we
can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more
weight to the votes of the people of Sorsogon.
Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a
rebellion, we cannot prosecute them "because of the doctrine of
people's sovereignty." With due respect, the analogy is not
appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a
crime, a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, an
offense against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it
cannot be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon violated
the law by voting for Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's name was in
the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At
that time too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino
citizenship. And even our jurisprudence has not settled the issue
when a candidate should possess the qualification of citizenship.
Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot
imagine how it will be disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance
in the case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people
should be resolutory of the case at bar which is one of its kind,
unprecedented in our political history. For three (3) times, Frivaldo
ran as governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he
was disqualified on the ground of citizenship. The people of
Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite his
disqualification. The people never waffled in their support for
Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning margin of 27,000; in
1992, they gave him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted
a margin of 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming
choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we should strive
to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will
of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to
reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the eloquent
prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle
of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established
authority."11 The choice of the governed on who shall be their
governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of
government. In cases where the sovereignty of the people is at
stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct.
We cannot fail by making the people succeed.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions
reached by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, I find myself unable to join him.
I
I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but
not on the ground that President Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March
1987 memorandum "effectively repealed" P.D. No. 725. In my view,
the said memorandum only suspended the implementation of the
latter decree by divesting the Special Committee on Naturalization
of its authority to further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No.
270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No. 1379; and
"any other related laws, orders, issuances and rules and
regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum
can lead to no other conclusion, thus:
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the
Special Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease
and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your
functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instruction
No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No.
836 dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree
No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of citizenship
under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders, issuances
and rules and regulations. (emphasis supplied)
It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those
related to LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no
doubt in my mind that P.D. No. 725 is one such "related law" as it
involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by repatriation
and designates the Special Committee on Naturalization created
under LOI No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove)
applications under the said decree. The power of President Aquino
to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27 March 1987
memorandum is beyond question considering that under Section 6,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative
power until the Congress established therein convened on the
fourth Monday of July 1987.
I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the
memorandum of 27 March 1987 was merely a declaration of
"executive policy," and not an exercise of legislative power. LOI No.
270, P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such
as P.D. No. 725, were issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative powers -- not executive power. These laws
relate to the acquisition (by naturalization) and reacquisition (by
repatriation) of Philippine citizenship, and in light of Sections 1(4)
and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution (naturalization and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with
law), it is indubitable that these subjects are a matter of legislative
prerogative. In the same vein, the creation of the Special Committee
on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the power
to accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly
legislative acts.
Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the
reactivation or revival of the Committee can be done only by
legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress, since the President had long lost his
authority to exercise "legislative power." Considering that Congress
has not seen it fit to do so, the President cannot, in the exercise of
executive power, lift the cease and desist order nor
reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the
Committee cannot validly accept Frivaldo's application for
repatriation and approve it.
II
Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did
not "cure his lack of citizenship." I depart from the view in the
ponencia that Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991
does not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be
met, and that being the case, then it suffices that citizenship be
possessed upon commencement of the term of the office involved;
therefore, since Frivaldo "re-assumed" his Philippine citizenship at
2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995 and the term of office of Governor
commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied
with the citizenship requirement.
In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of
elective local officials and not those of an elected local official.
These adjectives are not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to
suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires
the process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second
refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The section
unquestionably refers to elective -- not elected -- local officials. It
falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1
entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof
begins with the phrase "An elective local official," while paragraphs
(b) to (f) thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or
member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities
must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of
independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities
must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18)
years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member
of the sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of
age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least
fifteen (15) years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of
age on election day (emphasis supplied)
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the
qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their
election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to mean
that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the
commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate.
For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the
time when the citizenship requirement must be possessed. I submit
that the requirement must be satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship
must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term,
but at an earlier time, the latest being election day itself. Section 39
is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one
basic qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A
REGISTERED VOTER IN THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR
PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This simply means
that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of
suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the exercise of this
sovereign right is the possession of Philippine citizenship. No less
than the Constitution makes it the first qualification, as Section 1,
Article V thereof provides:
Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of
age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. . . . (emphasis supplied)
And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines
(B.P. Blg. 881) expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter.
Thus:
Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines,
not otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over,
who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the city
or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election, may be a registered voter.
(emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as
Governor in the 1988 and 1992 elections on the ground that for lack
of Philippine citizenship -- he being a naturalized citizen of the
United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as
such and to serve the position (Frivaldo vs. Commission on
Elections, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De la
Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]). This disqualification inexorably nullified
Frivaldo's registration as a voter and declared it void ab initio. Our
judgments therein were self-executory and no further act, e.g., a
COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical
destruction of his voter's certificate, was necessary for the
ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a registered voter for
the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing
that Frivaldo registered anew as a voter for the latter elections.
Even if he did -- in obvious defiance of his decreed disqualification --
this did not make him a Filipino citizen, hence it was equally void ab
initio. That he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections
and was even allowed to vote therein were of no moment. Neither
act made him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this
Court. On the contrary, said acts made a mockery of our judgments.
For the Court now to validate Frivaldo's registration as a voter
despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said
judgments by making their effectivity and enforceability dependent
on a COMELEC order cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the
physical destruction of his certificate of registration as a voter
which, of course, was never our intention. Moreover, to sanction
Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be to sacrifice substance in
favor of form (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of
voters or voter's ID), and abet the COMELEC's incompetence in
failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and allowing him to vote.
The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship
disqualification should be reckoned not from the date of the
election nor the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but from the
date of proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question
the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate is a petition for quo
warranto which, under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code,
may be filed only within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.
I beg to differ.
Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a
candidate's ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allows the filing of a petition to deny due course to or
cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material
representation contained therein, as required by Section 74, is false.
Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the certificate of
candidacy must state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office,
which means that he has all the qualifications (including, of course,
fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the
disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78
may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The section reads in full as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections
(216 SCRA 760, 768 [1992]), where this Court held:
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain
candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period Section
78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave
him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the
disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto
within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the
election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Rule
21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure similarly provides that any
voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city
official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the
Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be
filed within ten (10) days from the date the respondent is
proclaimed (Section 2).
Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows
the filing of a petition for disqualification on the ground of failure to
possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided by the
Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day for filing
of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:
Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not
possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by
law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day
after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later
than the date of proclamation.
While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for
disqualification on the ground of lack of all qualifications may be
doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue here.
In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last
issue grappled within the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The answer is provided in
Loong.
We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent
Commission that in the light of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of
Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as long as it is filed within a
reasonable time from the discovery of the ineligibility.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to
petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the
25- day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the
appropriate action to cancel a certificate of candidacy on account of
any false representation made therein. On the contrary, said Section
7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the Code.
We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification
case which may be based on grounds other than that provided
under Section 78 of the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646
also makes the effects referred to in Section 6 applicable to
disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the period
within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This is
because there are provisions in the Code which supply the periods
within which a petition relating to disqualification of candidates
must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253
on petitions for quo warranto.
I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section
78 is merely directory because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes
the COMELEC to try and decide petitions for disqualification even
after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications
under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and
consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court
or the COMELEC are granted the authority to continue hearing the
case after the election, and during the pendency of the case,
suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the
evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code
provide:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be
deemed removed upon declaration by competent authority that
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent
in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this
Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections
80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph
6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless
said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The
Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a
final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections
shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
III
Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by
the arguments in support of the thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation
may be given retroactive effect, as such goes against the spirit and
letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that
acquisition or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship is not a right,
but a mere privilege. Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the
following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army, Navy, or Air Corps
deserters; and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her
marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2], C.A.
No. 63). P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who
lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the
death of their alien husbands, or the termination of their marital
status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine
citizenship but subsequently desired to reacquire the latter.
Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides
that repatriation takes effect only after taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, thus:
. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the
Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction
No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and capitalization supplied)
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by
repatriation under the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2)
action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if
the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the
oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application,
then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's
pronouncement in the first Frivaldo case that what reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship requires is an act "formally rejecting [the]
adopted state and reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines."
That act meant nothing less than taking of the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. If we now take this revision of
doctrine to its logical end, then it would also mean that if Frivaldo
had chosen and reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization
or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of
the petition for naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine
citizenship. This is a proposition which both the first and second
Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.
The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the
proposition that P.D. No. 725 can be given retroactive effect is its
alleged curative or remedial nature.
Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal
hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be characterized as a curative or
remedial statute:
Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by
curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations. The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if the thing
omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect
sought to be removed or made harmless, is something the
legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it may
do so by a subsequent one.
Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. They are
intended to enable a person to carry into effect that which they
have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal
consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in
their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment
of the statute, was invalid. (RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory
Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations omitted).
P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
lost through the marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through
naturalization in a foreign country of natural-born Filipino citizens. It
involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of citizenship. To
those for whom it is intended, it means, in reality, the acquisition of
"a new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it
may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect considering that
one who has lost Philippine citizenship does not have the right to
reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that
citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner
provided by law. Moreover, it has also been observed that:
The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes
are statutes relating to procedure and not substantive rights.
(Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], §5704
at 74, citations omitted).
If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is
curative or remedial statute, it would be an inexcusable error to give
it a retroactive effect since it explicitly provides the date of its
effectivity. Thus:
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy five.
Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship, then nothing therein supports such theory,
for as the decree itself unequivocally provides, it is only after taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that the
applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.
IV
Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath
of allegiance retroacted to the date of Frivaldo's application for
repatriation, the same could not be said insofar as it concerned the
United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the
laws of the United States of America, Frivaldo remained an
American national until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance
thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of the
Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides
that a person who is a national of the United States of America,
whether by birth or naturalization, loses his nationality by, inter alia,
"(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal
declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S.
Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of the
United States of America, Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then
that on election day and until the hour of the commencement of the
term for which he was elected - noon of 30 June 1995 as per Section
43 of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual
citizenship, viz., (a) as an American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino
citizen through the adoption of the theory that the effects of his
taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective. Hence, he was
disqualified to run for Governor for yet another reason: possession
of dual citizenship, in accordance with Section 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code.
V XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II, Section
The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered
STATELESS on the basis of his claim that he "had long renounced
and had long abandoned his American citizenship - long before May
8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based on
Frivaldo's unproven, self-serving allegation; second, informal
renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the status of a
STATELESS person attach to Frivaldo.
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of
individuals stripped of their nationality by their former government
without having an opportunity to acquire another; or de facto,
which is the status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose
country does not give them protection outside their own country,
and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees
(JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and
Comments, 1995 ed., 290).
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations
Convention Regarding the Status of Stateless Persons (Philippine
Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III,
363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its
law." However, it has not been shown that the United States of
America ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at any time
before he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 30 June 1995.
VI
Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I am absolutely happy to join
him in his statement that "[t]he sovereignty of our people is the
primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the said
Constitution is "more people-oriented," "borne [as it is] out of the
1986 people power EDSA revolution." I would even go further by
saying that this Constitution is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people
(Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section 1, Article
XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI,
Sections 5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14;
Article XIV, Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor
(Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article
12), and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).
Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of
sovereignty beyond what I perceive to be the reasonable
constitutional parameters. The doctrine of people's sovereignty is
founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and
refers exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the Philippines.
Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this, thus:
Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a
clause "We, the sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty
is an attribute of the Filipino people as one people, one body.
That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized
by looking at it as the supreme authority of the people of any of the
political subdivisions to determine their own destiny; neither can we
convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this
Court would provide the formula for the division and destruction of
the State and render the Government ineffective and inutile. To
illustrate the evil, we may consider the enforcement of laws or the
pursuit of a national policy by the executive branch of the
government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If these
are opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a
certain province, or even a municipality, it would necessarily follow
that the law, national policy, or judgment must not be enforced,
implemented, or executed in the said province or municipality.
More concretely, if, for instance, the vast majority of the people of
Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the Government for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the
Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature,
wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives, then
those who did so -- and which are composed of the vast majority of
the people of Batanes -- a political subdivision -- cannot be
prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion in violation of Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of peoples'
sovereignty. Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by
investing upon the people of a mere political subdivision that which
the Constitution places in the entire Filipino people, may be
disastrous to the Nation.

So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion.

Thus, simply because Frivaldo had obtained a margin of 20,000
votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e., a vast majority of the voters of
Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the former, then
this Court must yield to that will and must, therefore, allow to be set
aside, for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of candidates
and elective officials and naturalization and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding decisions of
this Court affecting him.

This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to
DISMISS G.R. No. 120295 and GRANT G.R. No. 123755.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO,
respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective
operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987
Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the election."2 The mischief which
this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution —
seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and
not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
providing the following information in item no. 8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and
seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a
candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging
that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement
for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of
declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an
order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the
certificate of candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to
"since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the
same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate
of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline
for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995.
The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been
filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA
No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day.
In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an
"honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding
the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate
of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as
her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in
filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was
intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress
in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her
intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a
resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After
respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion
of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition
with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the
Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as
petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First
District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen,
seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the
town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose.
However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such
moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the
First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean
elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a
Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995;
and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing
with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the
original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for
filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the
one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the
printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an
amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she
thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence
in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First
Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since
childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her
domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which
she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has
never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to
discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she
has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality
of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before
coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration
in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in
Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District.
However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the
Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a
resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim
and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation
or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks
for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite
aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban
City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate
of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was
her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe
because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa.
In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of
"Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of
respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment
may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957).
The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The
case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot
affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions
intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of
elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the
amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the
amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of
residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a
substantial matter which determines her qualification as a
candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the
filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils
brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month
period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was
"since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed
before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months
residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy
can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a
resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the
said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further
buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of
her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she
can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The
dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's
consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of
time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8,
1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore,
cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that
it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is
clear that respondent has not complied with the one year residency
requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered
as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon
vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226
SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the
Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but
San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to
Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of
the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a
color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally
disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted
by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she
studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban
City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband
was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro
Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she
served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative
of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro
Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not
been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed
her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992,
she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter
of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the
election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that
she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident
of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many
places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to
her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to
make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different
places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of
Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is
considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs.
RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new
domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When
respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled
with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and
expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must
likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's
statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that
intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent
has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year
prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse,
what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had
been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of
the First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a
resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year,
petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995
respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration
Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of
six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the
respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But
her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of
Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a
convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six
months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections,
the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her
not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The
Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters
having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the
resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing
petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show
that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional
elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however,
the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution
directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the
event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred
that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the
congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995
based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass
showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the
36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said
Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running
for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public
respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner
comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental
Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general
areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of
the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the
May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the
Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of
the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division
reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of
"Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile,
the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the
concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended
for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for
election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil
rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20
this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's
"permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21
Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the
fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which
the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent
be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon
as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite
perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile,
unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in
favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we
laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence"
is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may
have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence
is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention
to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile
for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of
domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is
synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to
reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs.
Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the
qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal
President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27
held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where
one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is
the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other
election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an
individual from his permanent residence without the intention to
abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence
qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt
the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in
election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the
1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's
concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular
members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed
section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof",
that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the
1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2.
I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at
the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by
law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this
Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously
adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election
law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda
Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated
by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is
the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating
her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not
and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there
is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an
honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for
the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading
to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the
subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the
space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed
in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit
with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make
her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo
opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa,
not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual
residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which
she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A
close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the
confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed
immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a
candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________
Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of
actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it
appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her
legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7
and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second
requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
writing down an unintended entry for which she could be
disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to
negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were
established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece
of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not
possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the
COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that
"except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative
of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where
she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First,
according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan,
Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965,
following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency,
she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and
thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and
Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the
COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not
lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in
different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from
legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do
other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not
constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC
that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions
between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his
own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without
having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having
lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his
residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and
having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions,
stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener
pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course
includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging
in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his
birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town
to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any
other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or
business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has
the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the
opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the
animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin
has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin
has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss
of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and
longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong
feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome
by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited
statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible
to run for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only
ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the
deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which
establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim
from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She
studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949
when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college
studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in
Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952
she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954,
she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When
her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and
her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered
as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace
and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were
abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991,
she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy
wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC,
what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for
different purposes during the last four decades. None of these
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner
was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile
of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood
there and eventually established residence in different parts of the
country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency,
at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her
close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal
milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects
for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close relatives held
positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment,
always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized
ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the
quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were
entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of
the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always
knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not
petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until
she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in
1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years
and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once
acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite
of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was
her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte
contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria,
the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with
evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at
bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice
indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary
act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to
supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing
(domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost
her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage
to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a
clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
"domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife
automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law
upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term
"residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is
one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo
Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile
and residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a
place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it
is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical
presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But
the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he
should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts
of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon
marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse
automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's
choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su
residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa
eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su
residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in
the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband)
wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive
act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this
interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el
marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means,
"when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to
another positive act of relocating the family to another home or
place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be
understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of
transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often
as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance
more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony
with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family,
recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for
the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband
to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V
under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND
AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which
obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together,
observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and
support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and
wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations
where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of
their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order
that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we
shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile
while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of
their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used
with reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile"
is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be
made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the
word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other
times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile
can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for
domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place,
there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is
also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the
husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad
principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized
certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to
live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain
a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously
practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being
allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court
held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the existence of the
marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note
that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to
choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife
actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her
husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile
of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to
live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de
Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not
within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal
rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of
the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be
maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to
compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At
best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience
of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of
the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly
the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of
conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the
facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory
decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience,
requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render
conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by
the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v.
Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of
Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was
not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of
adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could
not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the
growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act
(1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for
the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order
for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one
court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a
preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the
other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow
and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City
of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La.
Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana
similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many
years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in
the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the
idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected.
(21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears
to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid
requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the
alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular
disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and
to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial
property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her
from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur.
Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return
of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other
penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not
appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have
been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman
Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of
the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence
fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had
several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and
Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr.
Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr.
Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence,
what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did
not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial
domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference
between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code
drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term
domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in
meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision
recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights
in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product
of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may
mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite
another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the
Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted
to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived
from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a
new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to
choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following
her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly
but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by
operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our)
ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's
house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have
gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of
disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes"
and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro
Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not
domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing
out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her
domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of
the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband
absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist
within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a
domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile
enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the
facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already
lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on
April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner
contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of
members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article
VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment
within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory,
49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the
judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result
it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a
mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of
necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American
authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is
often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that
less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a
statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a
decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held
that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from
with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory
proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of
doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case,
the statute under examination was construed merely to be
directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should
have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in
the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the
fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then
refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to
reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in
relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the
respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and
decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881
even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins
only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the
1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make
distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a
petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a
ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of
election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during
the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including
the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established
principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she
justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves
to repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25,
1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should
be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated
unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.1 Like other candidates,
petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by
Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.2 We cannot disqualify her
and treat her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal
protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal
propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in
Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their
ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the
place. Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I
consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin
and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the
domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of
choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of
majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner
married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting
marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the
right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the
court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should
live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.3 (Emphasis
supplied)
In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano,4 this Court explained why the
domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the husband. We held:
"The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and
interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption
that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home
of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their
interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and
harmony prevail."5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the
Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's
marriage to former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss
of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by
itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article
110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the
domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may
explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the
wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly
acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we
held in de la Viña,6
. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental
authority live, with the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in
a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own
independent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate
choice of a different domicile by the husband that will change the
domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The
domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the
right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any
and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the
domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the
domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only
because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also
because they are contrary to law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos
exercised his right to fix the family domicile and established it in
Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that
particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner
lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac
domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in
1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in
San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also
affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President, when
they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she registered as a voter
in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements
and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her
husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil
Code, it was only her husband who could change the family domicile
in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change.
To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on
her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law,
acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually
lives or what she believes or intends."7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the
death on September 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on
petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our
jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance.
One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide,
Jr., heavily relying on American authorities.8 He echoes the theory
that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of
her husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that
the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile is based on ancient
common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting
today. The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of
the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of
her own separate and apart from him.9 Legal scholars agree that
two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first reason
as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view
that "the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband."10 The second reason lies in "the desirability of
having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by
the same law."11 The presumption that the wife retains the
domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common
law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of
the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under
common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12
was decided where women were denied the right to practice law. It
was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many
of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator."
Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS 13 and
AM JUR 2d14 are American state court decisions handed down
between the years 191715 and 1938,16 or before the time when
women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the
women's liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state
legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality.17
Starting in the decade of the seventies, the courts likewise
liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected
with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in
Reed v. Reed,18 struck a big blow for women equality when it
declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate
courts to choose male family members over females as estate
administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience
cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant changes
both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually
obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of
married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of
the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors
did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as
they observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern
statutes changing the status of married women and departing from
the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife
may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the
law."19 In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second
(Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable American Law Institute also
categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer
held. As the result of statutes and court decisions, a wife now
possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried
sister."20
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue
clinging to the anachronistic common law that demeans women,
especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice
except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the
many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws
particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations
against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida
Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as follows:21
xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives
suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife
cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or
the value of the gift, other than from her very close relatives,
without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her
parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the
so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious
grounds or if his income is sufficient to support their family in
accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes
"serious grounds" for objecting, this is within the discretion of the
husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to
the Civil Law being proposed by the University of the Philippines
Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the
matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free to get
married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However,
in order to place the husband and wife on an equal footing insofar
as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified
as the grounds for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a
paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways specified
in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent
against the life of the petitioner which amounts to attempted
parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the
petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a period of
three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the
administrator of the conjugal property owned in common by the
married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or
enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to
decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the
husband is authorized to engage in acts and enter into transactions
beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot
similarly bind the partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children,
it is the father whom the law designates as the legal administrator
of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally
through legislations, to eliminate inequality between men and
women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when
our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the
unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and
responsibilities.22
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights
to married women and by abolishing sex-based privileges of
husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint
right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute
community system or in the system of conjugal partnership;23 joint
parental authority over their minor children, both over their persons
as well as their properties;24 joint responsibility for the support of
the family;25 the right to jointly manage the household;26 and, the
right to object to their husband's exercise of profession, occupation,
business or activity.27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is
Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of
the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it jointly to the
husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case
of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the
latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the
duty of the husband and wife to live together, former Madam
Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the
instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband,
thus:28
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may
refuse to do so in certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is
dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive
conduct or insults, making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she
cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they have constant
quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations
for 10 years with different women and treated his wife roughly and
without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no
money to his family for food and necessities, and at the same time
insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34
OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond
life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home
(Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely
emancipated the wife from the control of the husband, thus
abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than
the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code
Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view
in one of his rare lectures after retirement:29
xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as
to emancipate the wife from the exclusive control of the husband
and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is
concerned. The wife and the husband are now placed on equal
standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the
family properties and exercise joint authority over the persons and
properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the
family. The husband will no longer prevail over the wife but she has
to agree on all matters concerning the family. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between
husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the common law,
there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still
retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil
Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been
repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a
dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it
further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the
petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead
husband.

Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our
Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and equal
protection of
law.30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on
a married woman of her dead husband's domicile even beyond his
grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based
discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of
promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional
challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws,
the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between
sexes as it explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure
fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To be
exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role
of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality
before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the
sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on
giving our women the caveman's treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the
better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban
domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the
necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated
domicile did not continue after her husband's death; otherwise, she
would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that
no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This
stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile
before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right
now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the
Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the common law
requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before
she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her
Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her
deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her
husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law
disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed.
Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on
petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's
domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based
burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof
that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the
records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit
submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country,
after several requests for my return were denied by President
Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to
issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my
beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the
Government considered a threat to the national security and
welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately
live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my
residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and
cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the
Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala
Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented,
and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in
the residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued
my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in
Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All
Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial grounds and
entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and
scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman
Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to —
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse
in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us the Marcos family to
have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG
Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG
Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my
Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission,
that she intends to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please
allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and renovation
of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood
that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take
over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account
and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto.
Niño Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and
reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August
1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and
live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in
the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first
lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and
later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot
are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished
her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than
complied with the constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the
Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He presented petitioner's
Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein
she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6)
months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's Registration
Record on January 28, 1995.31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's
Registration Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution
requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in which the
candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the
First District of Leyte. Petitioner's statement proved that she resided
in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove
that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As
aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District
of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot should be
counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also
presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8,
199532 where she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which
called for information regarding "residence in the constituency
where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value
because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote
"since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate
of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this
Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in
Alialy v. COMELEC,34 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter
N.P in the original certificate of candidacy presented before the
deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid.
The amendment of the certificate, although at a date after the
deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with
the law, and the defect was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot be used as evidence
against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of
petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of
documentary evidence — petitioner's Voter's Registration Record
and her original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the
evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with
Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too
insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to
represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have
overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that
"bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any
form of harassment and discrimination."35 A detached reading of
the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and
extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent
her from running as the people's representative in the First District
of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she
averred:36
xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in
filing the instant petition is devious. When respondent (petitioner
herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte,
petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration
by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but
of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's
affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-
month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition
with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove
respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent
in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill,
along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another
legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First
District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his
purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed
on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the
same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself
along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and
verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest,
orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were
not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his
Dissenting Opinion,37 held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date — January 28, 1995 the petitioner
(herein private respondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of
Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register
thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The
purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic)
the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative
Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of
Which the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were
Respectively Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of
Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the Second
District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the
Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner
(Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29,
1994), the Commission on Elections refused to make the proposed
transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for Reconsideration of
Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution
promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a
petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo
Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702)
questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he
could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner
(Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner
herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to
run as Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme
Court unanimously promulgated a "Decision," penned by Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it
transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and
the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also
deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province
of Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent
(petitioner herein) was constrained to register in the Municipality of
Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In
any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the First Legislative
District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms
of rank harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner
to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any
hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning
of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and
discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past
of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all
Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different"
Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to
inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,38 we explained that the reason for this
residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and
not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District
of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not
acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place.
None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the
need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The election results
show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only
Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes.
Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of
the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We
cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical
considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that
will give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare
opportunity to rectify the inequality of status between women and
men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the
domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord
with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married
woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead
husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of
advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead
to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears seduce us to
shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based
discrimination against married women and we should not excavate
what has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution
forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner
qualified for the position of Representative of the First
Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few
comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's
habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing
therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in
which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a
mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of
making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. §1). It denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business, or
pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong
Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice.
The law attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is
the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the
person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth.
While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born
or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. §5). Domicile of choice, on
the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and
chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its
true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. §6). In
order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and
acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following
requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in
the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi,
and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non
revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408,
415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which
attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention
or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic
relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of
a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. §7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for
election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52
Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on
Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to
petitioner's disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply
with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence
requirement. Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as
conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in many places
as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile
of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court
has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other
than his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment
or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300).
Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from
this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her
domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was
supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a domicile by
operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her
husband in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac,
Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this
proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was
involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon
her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal
fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the
reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform
their marital duties and obligations to one another.1 The question
of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal
or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S.
§11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the
marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's
termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise,
petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her
husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of
having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to
one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original
domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death without even
signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent
to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has
effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for
some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein
private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost
his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly
such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S.
§16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or
former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. §16). Private
respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the
record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired
whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her
domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has
complied with the constitutional one-year residence requirement.
After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to
reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on
Good Government which sequestered her residential house and
other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in
various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the
Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her
certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila.
After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her
residence certificate2 and resided with her brother in San Jose. She
resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she
was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered
residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).3 It was in the
same month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her
previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register
anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28,
1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use
as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the
date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous
registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private
respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner
transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from
San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided
therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban City and
Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it
indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in the
constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has
satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by
the 1987 Constitution.
I vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC
ruled that she was disqualified from running for Representative of
her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless,
muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not
by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision
as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling
succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting stance
vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of
its Second Division disqualifying her and canceling her original
Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the
denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration
on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she
persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her
proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass should
show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously
noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent),
but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if
she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by
the case at bench is the interpretation to be given to the one-year
residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for
a Congressional seat.1
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be
synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes, it is important to
determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of
Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period
of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where
her parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory
one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married
Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law.
Assuming it did, his death certainly released her from the obligation
to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime.
What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term
"domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or
"domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor
since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other
separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal
opinion as to the effect of the husband's death on the domicile of
the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains
unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind
the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow
cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed
by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband
unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of the family, as laid
down in the Civil Code,2 but to continue giving obeisance to his
wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the
spouses to live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the
stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically
reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise of her husband.
Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed
somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from
rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic principles of
domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only
a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once
established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no
person lives who has no domicile, as defined by the law be is subject
to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain
in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the conflicting opinions
of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is
imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the
beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of
according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with
the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human
rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as
civil, political and social rights are concerned, is a relatively recent
phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a
historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been
colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which
transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and
attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of
the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women,
had no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's being
the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority.
In such role, his was the right to make vital decisions for the family.
Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the
issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of
the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the
wife and the rest of the family, 4 he is also empowered to be the
administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions 5 and
may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the
purposes specified under the law;6 whereas, as a general rule, the
wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's
consent.7 As regards the property pertaining to the children under
parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in
his absence may the mother assume his powers.8 Demeaning to the
wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms,
practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled
persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's
consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants,
descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the
fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband
wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her profession or
occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient
for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is
founded on serious and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not
repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a
widow to get married till after three hundred days following the
death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth
to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage
loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased
husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that
his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she
should keep and exercise parental authority over their children. 12
Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from
beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for
hundreds of years evoked no protest from them until the concept of
human rights and equality between and among nations and
individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter
of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then,
the Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown by the
American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N.
Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit,
owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist movement. What
may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was
implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly which entered into force as an international
treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the
Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter,
for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One such
principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women
"the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of
persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile."
14 (Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino
women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines and
later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved
by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino.
Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and
its bias for equality between the sexes are the following provisions:
"The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights"16 and "The State recognizes the role
of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men."17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with
men and the elimination of discriminatory provisions of law was the
deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable
strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to
that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now
given the right jointly to fix the family domicile;18 concomitant to
the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is
the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;19 the
administration and the enjoyment of the community property shall
belong to both spouses jointly;20 the father and mother shall now
jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their
unemancipated common child21 and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as
women's rights are concerned, Congress passed a law popularly
known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act"22
Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity
to act in contracts equal to that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans
and execute security and credit arrangements under the same
conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and
private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non
material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian
reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and
enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married
men in applying for passports, secure visas and other travel
documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of
Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first to respond to its
clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All
obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all
levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself
a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International
Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too
keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women
the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accepted as
equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold
them back from their proper places under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global,
legislative, executive and judicial, according more rights to women
hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of
discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it
still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their
domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the
same, regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly
situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed
husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically
revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt
to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and
subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in
the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt
acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to
her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up
her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year
requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our
legal system that sets up ideals and directions and render steady our
strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the
past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution
belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may
well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must
be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance.
Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the
answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or
the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in
character unless, either by express statement or by necessary
implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz,
121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and
Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law. These provisions
read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,
able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally
bound to enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that,
there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority
to pass upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law
of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation
controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction
to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the
constitutional one-year residency requirement. The issue (whether
or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a
question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination.
The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the
long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions
under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not
reviewable by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to
me to be a plain matter. Generally, the term "residence" has a
broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official
(place where one's official duties may require him to stay) or
temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable
length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of
civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a
natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50,
Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore
announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court,
Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as
synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the
election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only
an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. . . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by
adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a
new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the
COMELEC with having committed grave abuse of discretion in its
assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections,
ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned
begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been
duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or
the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on
whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial
function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the
number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A
ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being
adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or
discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the
full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as
may be required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any
undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the
Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a
constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The
nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the
Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral
Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest
"relating to the election, returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base
on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of Republic Act No.
6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each
providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The
Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a
final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not
declared by final, judgment before an election to be disqualified,
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding
sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be
preferable to look for not so much the specific instances they
ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I
will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that
votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever
ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her
favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The
argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the
now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs.
Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in
Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC
(137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of
Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA
1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992])
and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs.
Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and
concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For
easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the
petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission
on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the
votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and
considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect,
the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by
eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay
and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee,
Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two
reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official
leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it
should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v.
Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was
supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente,
with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without
any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.) another
took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando,
C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd,
S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office
to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate
who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the
winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative
policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that
the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the
dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on
Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that
they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I
think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may
be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition
for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum,
not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took
part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such
proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by
their agreement to submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized
proceedings for determining a candidate's qualifications for an
office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No.
6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No.
7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation
contests but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings
against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification,"
but they are not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibility of a
candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due
to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person
either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for public
office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of
certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false
representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in
the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus
Election Code:
§ 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be
deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
(Emphasis added)
§ 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent
in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this
Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections
80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph
6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless
said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
§ 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. (Emphasis added).
§ 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to
petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
§ 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative
case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of
allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here
or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who
have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the
COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation and Disqualification,"
contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-
Marcos made material representations in her certificate of
candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the
ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and
Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the
position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8,
1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months in the
district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the
COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995,
cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of
candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified
to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives
for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any
finding that she had made false representations as to material
matters in her certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a
petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under § 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private
respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will
presently be explained, proceedings under § 78 have for their
purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo
warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person
from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto
proceedings involving members of the House of Representatives is
vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for
the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the allegations were
that the respondent candidates had made false representations in
their certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship,1 age,2
or residence.3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court
passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court
did so in the context of election protests4 or quo warranto
proceedings5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or
protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a
candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed
elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the
office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a
candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying,
over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial
question which should be determined lest he wins because of the
very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it
is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a
candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in
his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been
voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his
proclamation will be set aside.6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility,
e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long
time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the
office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No.
120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of
Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the
elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character
of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the
law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty
of the COMELEC and its officers.7 The law is satisfied if candidates
state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the
position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their
qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event
they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false
representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC
given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-
proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President,
Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No.
7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals
as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.
By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for
determining an elected official's qualifications after the results of
elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a
pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus
Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not
authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless
they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for
declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its
rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, § 1 the
following:
Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess
all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by
law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is
equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive
matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power
under Art. IX, A, § 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy
that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power
to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves
an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship
of voters. (Art. IX, C, § 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the
evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in
their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different
from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in §§
12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual
from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for
public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate
from the race either from the start or during its progress.
"Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for
declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a
public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from
becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public
office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
qualifications prescribed in § 2 of the law does not imply that he
does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in § 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the
candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or offenses, like
other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable
practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election
protest,"8 through the use of "manufactured" election returns or
resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the
election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a
candidate's qualifications for office before the election. To the
contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for
disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he
could be prevented from assuming office even though in end he
prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may
only be sought in an election protest or action for quo warranto
filed pursuant to § 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days
after his proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g.,
Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the
COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as
provided in Art. IX, C, § 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the
President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in
the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in
the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17) There is greater reason for not
allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings
based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for President,
Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of
pre-proclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no
jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its proceedings in that case,
including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of
petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of
Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired
into by the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the
proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-009,
including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995,
May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as
Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the
extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes
proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of
ineligibility for the office, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the
proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the
well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the
inquiry must begin and end with the provision itself. The
controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic
disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional
provision on point states that — "no person shall be a member of
the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
(25) years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section
6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term
residence has been understood as synonymous with domicile. This
argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous
cases1 where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and
convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose his
domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with
his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of
different modalities within which the phrase "a resident thereof
(meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one
year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile
coincide in which case a person only has to prove that he has been
domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before
the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart
from his domicile in which case he would have the luxury of district
shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence
period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the
position of congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for
abandoning his residence in order to return to his domicile of origin,
or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified
for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in
the district where he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a
person maintains several residences in different districts. Since his
domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no
effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically
choose the district most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the
unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a
resident in the district where he desires to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of
whether or not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with
"domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual
presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of
time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a
definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the
environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in
Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the
minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are
distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd
Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc)
—
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She
studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948
when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college
studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of
Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In
1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still
a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos
Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was
elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965
when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered
as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and
Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she
and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii.
In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent
ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident
and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994,
respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro
Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994,
respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's
Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly
registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she
intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct
No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election
Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-
3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in the
municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also
alleged that she has been a resident in the constituency where she
seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries
therein are as follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social
Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years
Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT
TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal
orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-constituted
authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of Candidate)2
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March
1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her
disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven
months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I
seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave
abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is disqualified from the
position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte
in the elections of
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year
residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately
preceding the day of election
(8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative
of the first district of Leyte, the next important issue to resolve is
whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates for representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the
case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1
which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of
Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by
those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority
or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris
2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office
to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate
who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the
winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative
policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that
the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the
Electoral System and for other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February
1988) it is provided that:
. . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain
and unambiguous meaning of the provision quoted above. As the
law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with
the effect of a final judgement of disqualification only before the
election, but even during or after the election. The law is clear that
in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL
NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the
Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition
for disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and receives the
highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to
suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt is strong) is also
explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections
are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall
not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received
the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the
second placer the winner simply because a "winning candidate is
disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who
had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes
cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then
there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and
consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been
stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot
be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility"
most especially when it is mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate
receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified
candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of
Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion,
I cannot arrive conjointly at the same conclusion drawn therefrom
Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis
of the personality of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts,
insofar as the same are pertinent to this case, and which I have
simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her
childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a legitimate
daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent
residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a time,
taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was
then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she
acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that
happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as a Senator
and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San
Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually
voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San
Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of
suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had
assumed those lofty positions successively, ever abandoned his
domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his
residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in
1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii,
U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and
resided in different places which she claimed to have been merely
temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the
Philippines and in her certificate of candidacy she indicated that she
was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of
her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157
of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she
followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of
Voter's Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a
registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan,
Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at
Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed
with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration
record form alleging that she had resided in that municipality for six
months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven
Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her answer in the original
certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE
CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new
entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her
candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency requirement
of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a
dissertation on the difference between residence and domicile. We
have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of
political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is
understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so understood
in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to
the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and
procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or
controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's
residence is integrated in and inseparable from her domicile, I am
addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter
term, specifically its permutations into the domicile of origin,
domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood
in American law from which for this case we have taken our
jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time
of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin," constitutes the
domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a
new domicile in a different place.1 In the instant case, we may grant
that petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is
now Tacloban City.

Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds,
that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by
operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth
or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily
acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is
consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,3 is
sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that
the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice
or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the
party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep.
Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or American but
of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of
origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own
domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to
San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now
San Juan, Metro Manila — do not appear to have resulted in her
thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that
her having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or
misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the
assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her
residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the
Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or only for
transient purposes which could not have invested them with the
status of domiciles of choice.5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the
present imbroglio over her requisite residency in Tacloban City or
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to
acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in
the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On
that score, we note the majority's own submission 6 that, to
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a)
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the
purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the
acquisition of a domicile of choice apply whether what is sought to
be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium
originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium).
Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been
replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her
continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the
object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the
dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong in SPA
95-009 of the Commission on Elections,7 and advances this novel
proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation
of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium
necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became
Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an
intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin. Because of
her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the
provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time,
however, her legal domicile automatically reverted to her domicile
of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had
acquired a domicilium necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the
majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to
abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this
situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at
any given time, and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on
to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission
that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,8 the
majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban City
as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the
equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or
residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be
recovered likewise in accordance with law. However, we are here
being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or
reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the
cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that since
petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the
termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am
impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that,
indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find
some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this
argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of
choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the
latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not
per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts
legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to
establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what
petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her
candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot
automatically restore his domicile of origin, not only because there
is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd
Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion
would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have
obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law,
other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this
reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes,
advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge
on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned
her domicile of choice (unless we assume that she entered into the
marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment
was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by
operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and
legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason,
therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the
termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per
se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in
1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during
the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in
possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in
a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the
husband's death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile,9
she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband
until she makes an actual change. 10 In the absence of affirmative
evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile
or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue
after his death. 11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the
majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code. All
that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right
and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I
cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was
never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by
the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior
thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to
determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing
on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her
children having gotten married and established their own respective
domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer
called for or material in the present factual setting of this
controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the
matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing
and expanded participation of women in the affairs of the nation,
with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory
conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or
judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary
implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic
reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner.
Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that
should govern this issue, there is a world of difference; and,
unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation
but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin
since 1954 and not having automatically reacquired any domicile
therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political
constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the
present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting
her pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate
of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original
certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only
seven months prior to the election. These considerations render it
unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by
petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for
lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr.
Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more particularly on the issue of the
petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution,
decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be brought to this
Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario
vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC
has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's
petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of
24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc
resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the
Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute
details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein
petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of
residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not
misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or
circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings
of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as
her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First
Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the
COMELEC, either by admission or by documentary evidence,
overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of
origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that
she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that became her
second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for
only seven months before the day of the election. She was then
disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of
the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary
would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice
was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it
by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to
the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A
domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law
attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or actual
residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the
wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7, 11). Under the
governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile
or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which
was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the
court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should
live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the
husband has a predominant right because he is empowered by law
to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over some
rights recognized by law in the wife. For instance, under article 117
the wife may engage in business or practice a profession or
occupation. But because of the power of the husband to fix the
family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it
impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her profession.
For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be exempted from
living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot
validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses to follow him to a
new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for
years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice
of a different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed.,
339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own
domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no
matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends.
Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same
as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile
by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family
Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no longer the sole
prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the
spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The
said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family
residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the
wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may
destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its
corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the
Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin
upon the death of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts
to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her
domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled
doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a right to
elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her
husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12,
27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to
acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the
power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his
death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 62, 45). Note that what is revived is
not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own
domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's
domicile was that of her husband at the time of his death — which
was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro
Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for
convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his
official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and
it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a
widow. In her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the
President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated
therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also
voted in the said elections in that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when
she exercised her right as a widow to acquire her own domicile in
Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election
Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the
permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she
be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the
place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit
"B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's
Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn statement
regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to
on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3,"
Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995
(photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her
Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of
Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared that
she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it
Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit attached to her
Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition),
she declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban
City." If she did intend to return to such domicile or residence of
origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she
would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's
Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her
residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not
important insofar as residence in the congressional district is
concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already
lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by
virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished her
power of recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on
Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the subsequent cases
which established the principle that absence from original residence
or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or
engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of such
residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the
Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to
any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession;
employment in private and public service; educational activities;
work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or
air force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement
or detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is
not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal
provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the
exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the
intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage
of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an
abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases
and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of
the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC
SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or
residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended
to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she]
always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of
intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil
Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the
petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively establish
that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had
acquired a new one animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A
Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's
claim that she "merely committed an honest mistake" in writing
down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency
qualification requirement in the certificate of candidacy. Such a
claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions,
would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not
commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the
truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he
who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of
proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178
[1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]).
Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the
petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the
change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion
rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium
necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage
automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is
consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed
to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her
revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her
to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own
domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should
be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated
unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.1 Like other candidates,
petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by
Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.2 We cannot disqualify her
and treat her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal
protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal
propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in
Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their
ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the
place. Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I
consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin
and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the
domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of
choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of
majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner
married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting
marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the
right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the
court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should
live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.3 (Emphasis
supplied)
In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano,4 this Court explained why the
domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the husband. We held:
"The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and
interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption
that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home
of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their
interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and
harmony prevail."5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the
Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's
marriage to former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss
of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by
itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article
110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the
domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may
explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the
wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly
acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we
held in de la Viña,6
. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental
authority live, with the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in
a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own
independent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate
choice of a different domicile by the husband that will change the
domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The
domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the
right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any
and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the
domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the
domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only
because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also
because they are contrary to law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos
exercised his right to fix the family domicile and established it in
Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that
particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner
lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac
domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in
1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in
San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also
affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President, when
they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she registered as a voter
in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements
and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her
husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil
Code, it was only her husband who could change the family domicile
in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change.
To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on
her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law,
acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually
lives or what she believes or intends."7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the
death on September 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on
petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our
jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance.
One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide,
Jr., heavily relying on American authorities.8 He echoes the theory
that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of
her husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that
the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile is based on ancient
common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting
today. The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of
the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of
her own separate and apart from him.9 Legal scholars agree that
two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first reason
as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view
that "the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband."10 The second reason lies in "the desirability of
having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by
the same law."11 The presumption that the wife retains the
domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common
law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of
the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under
common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12
was decided where women were denied the right to practice law. It
was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many
of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator."
Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS 13 and
AM JUR 2d14 are American state court decisions handed down
between the years 191715 and 1938,16 or before the time when
women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the
women's liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state
legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality.17
Starting in the decade of the seventies, the courts likewise
liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected
with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in
Reed v. Reed,18 struck a big blow for women equality when it
declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate
courts to choose male family members over females as estate
administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience
cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant changes
both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually
obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of
married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of
the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors
did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as
they observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern
statutes changing the status of married women and departing from
the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife
may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the
law."19 In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second
(Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable American Law Institute also
categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer
held. As the result of statutes and court decisions, a wife now
possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried
sister."20
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue
clinging to the anachronistic common law that demeans women,
especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice
except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the
many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws
particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations
against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida
Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as follows:21
xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives
suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife
cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or
the value of the gift, other than from her very close relatives,
without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her
parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the
so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious
grounds or if his income is sufficient to support their family in
accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes
"serious grounds" for objecting, this is within the discretion of the
husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to
the Civil Law being proposed by the University of the Philippines
Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the
matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free to get
married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However,
in order to place the husband and wife on an equal footing insofar
as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified
as the grounds for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a
paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways specified
in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent
against the life of the petitioner which amounts to attempted
parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the
petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a period of
three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the
administrator of the conjugal property owned in common by the
married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or
enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to
decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the
husband is authorized to engage in acts and enter into transactions
beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot
similarly bind the partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children,
it is the father whom the law designates as the legal administrator
of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally
through legislations, to eliminate inequality between men and
women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when
our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the
unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and
responsibilities.22
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights
to married women and by abolishing sex-based privileges of
husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint
right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute
community system or in the system of conjugal partnership;23 joint
parental authority over their minor children, both over their persons
as well as their properties;24 joint responsibility for the support of
the family;25 the right to jointly manage the household;26 and, the
right to object to their husband's exercise of profession, occupation,
business or activity.27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is
Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of
the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it jointly to the
husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case
of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the
latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the
duty of the husband and wife to live together, former Madam
Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the
instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband,
thus:28
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may
refuse to do so in certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is
dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive
conduct or insults, making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she
cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they have constant
quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations
for 10 years with different women and treated his wife roughly and
without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no
money to his family for food and necessities, and at the same time
insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34
OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond
life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home
(Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely
emancipated the wife from the control of the husband, thus
abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than
the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code
Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view
in one of his rare lectures after retirement:29
xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as
to emancipate the wife from the exclusive control of the husband
and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is
concerned. The wife and the husband are now placed on equal
standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the
family properties and exercise joint authority over the persons and
properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the
family. The husband will no longer prevail over the wife but she has
to agree on all matters concerning the family. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between
husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the common law,
there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still
retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil
Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been
repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a
dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it
further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the
petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead
husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our
Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and equal
protection of
law.30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on
a married woman of her dead husband's domicile even beyond his
grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based
discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of
promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional
challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws,
the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between
sexes as it explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure
fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To be
exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role
of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality
before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the
sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on
giving our women the caveman's treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the
better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban
domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the
necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated
domicile did not continue after her husband's death; otherwise, she
would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that
no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This
stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile
before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right
now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the
Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the common law
requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before
she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her
Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her
deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her
husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law
disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed.
Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on
petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's
domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based
burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof
that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the
records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit
submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country,
after several requests for my return were denied by President
Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to
issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my
beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the
Government considered a threat to the national security and
welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately
live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my
residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and
cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the
Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala
Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented,
and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in
the residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued
my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in
Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All
Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents' burial grounds and
entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and
scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman
Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to —
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse
in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us the Marcos family to
have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG
Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG
Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my
Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission,
that she intends to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please
allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and renovation
of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood
that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take
over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account
and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto.
Niño Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and
reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August
1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and
live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in
the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first
lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and
later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot
are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished
her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than
complied with the constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the
Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He presented petitioner's
Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein
she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6)
months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's Registration
Record on January 28, 1995.31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's
Registration Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution
requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in which the
candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the
First District of Leyte. Petitioner's statement proved that she resided
in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove
that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As
aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District
of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot should be
counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also
presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8,
199532 where she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which
called for information regarding "residence in the constituency
where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value
because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote
"since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate
of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this
Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in
Alialy v. COMELEC,34 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter
N.P in the original certificate of candidacy presented before the
deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid.
The amendment of the certificate, although at a date after the
deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with
the law, and the defect was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot be used as evidence
against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of
petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of
documentary evidence — petitioner's Voter's Registration Record
and her original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the
evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with
Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too
insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to
represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have
overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that
"bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any
form of harassment and discrimination."35 A detached reading of
the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and
extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent
her from running as the people's representative in the First District
of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she
averred:36
xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in
filing the instant petition is devious. When respondent (petitioner
herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte,
petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration
by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but
of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's
affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-
month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition
with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove
respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent
in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill,
along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another
legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First
District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his
purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed
on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the
same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself
along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and
verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest,
orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were
not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his
Dissenting Opinion,37 held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date — January 28, 1995 the petitioner
(herein private respondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of
Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register
thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The
purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic)
the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative
Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of
Which the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were
Respectively Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of
Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the Second
District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the
Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner
(Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29,
1994), the Commission on Elections refused to make the proposed
transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for Reconsideration of
Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution
promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a
petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo
Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702)
questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he
could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner
(Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner
herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to
run as Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme
Court unanimously promulgated a "Decision," penned by Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it
transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and
the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also
deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province
of Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent
(petitioner herein) was constrained to register in the Municipality of
Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In
any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the First Legislative
District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms
of rank harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner
to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any
hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning
of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and
discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past
of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all
Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different"
Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to
inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,38 we explained that the reason for this
residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and
not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District
of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not
acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place.
None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the
need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The election results
show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only
Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes.
Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of
the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We
cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical
considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that
will give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare
opportunity to rectify the inequality of status between women and
men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the
domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord
with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married
woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead
husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of
advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead
to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears seduce us to
shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based
discrimination against married women and we should not excavate
what has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution
forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner
qualified for the position of Representative of the First
Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few
comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's
habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing
therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in
which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a
mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of
making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. §1). It denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business, or
pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong
Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice.
The law attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is
the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the
person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth.
While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born
or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. §5). Domicile of choice, on
the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and
chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its
true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. §6). In
order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and
acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following
requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in
the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi,
and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non
revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408,
415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which
attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention
or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic
relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of
a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. §7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for
election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52
Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on
Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to
petitioner's disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply
with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence
requirement. Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as
conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in many places
as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile
of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court
has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other
than his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment
or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300).
Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from
this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her
domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was
supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a domicile by
operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her
husband in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac,
Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this
proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was
involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon
her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal
fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the
reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform
their marital duties and obligations to one another.1 The question
of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal
or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S.
§11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the
marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's
termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise,
petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her
husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of
having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to
one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original
domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death without even
signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent
to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has
effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for
some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein
private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost
his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly
such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S.
§16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or
former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. §16). Private
respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the
record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired
whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her
domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has
complied with the constitutional one-year residence requirement.
After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to
reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on
Good Government which sequestered her residential house and
other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in
various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the
Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her
certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila.
After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her
residence certificate2 and resided with her brother in San Jose. She
resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she
was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered
residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).3 It was in the
same month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her
previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register
anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28,
1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use
as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the
date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous
registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private
respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner
transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from
San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided
therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban City and
Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it
indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in the
constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has
satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by
the 1987 Constitution.
I vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC
ruled that she was disqualified from running for Representative of
her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless,
muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not
by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision
as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling
succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting stance
vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of
its Second Division disqualifying her and canceling her original
Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the
denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration
on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she
persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her
proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass should
show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously
noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent),
but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if
she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by
the case at bench is the interpretation to be given to the one-year
residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for
a Congressional seat.1
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be
synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes, it is important to
determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of
Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period
of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where
her parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory
one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married
Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law.
Assuming it did, his death certainly released her from the obligation
to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime.
What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term
"domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or
"domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor
since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other
separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal
opinion as to the effect of the husband's death on the domicile of
the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains
unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind
the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow
cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed
by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband
unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of the family, as laid
down in the Civil Code,2 but to continue giving obeisance to his
wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the
spouses to live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the
stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically
reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise of her husband.
Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed
somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from
rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic principles of
domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only
a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once
established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no
person lives who has no domicile, as defined by the law be is subject
to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain
in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the conflicting opinions
of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is
imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the
beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of
according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with
the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human
rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as
civil, political and social rights are concerned, is a relatively recent
phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a
historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been
colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which
transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and
attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of
the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women,
had no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's being
the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority.
In such role, his was the right to make vital decisions for the family.
Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the
issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of
the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the
wife and the rest of the family, 4 he is also empowered to be the
administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions 5 and
may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the
purposes specified under the law;6 whereas, as a general rule, the
wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's
consent.7 As regards the property pertaining to the children under
parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in
his absence may the mother assume his powers.8 Demeaning to the
wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms,
practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled
persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's
consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants,
descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the
fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband
wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her profession or
occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient
for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is
founded on serious and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not
repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a
widow to get married till after three hundred days following the
death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth
to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage
loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased
husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that
his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she
should keep and exercise parental authority over their children. 12
Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from
beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for
hundreds of years evoked no protest from them until the concept of
human rights and equality between and among nations and
individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter
of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then,
the Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown by the
American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N.
Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit,
owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist movement. What
may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was
implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly which entered into force as an international
treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the
Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter,
for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One such
principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women
"the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of
persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile."
14 (Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino
women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines and
later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved
by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino.
Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and
its bias for equality between the sexes are the following provisions:
"The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights"16 and "The State recognizes the role
of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men."17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with
men and the elimination of discriminatory provisions of law was the
deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable
strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to
that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now
given the right jointly to fix the family domicile;18 concomitant to
the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is
the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;19 the
administration and the enjoyment of the community property shall
belong to both spouses jointly;20 the father and mother shall now
jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their
unemancipated common child21 and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as
women's rights are concerned, Congress passed a law popularly
known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act"22
Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity
to act in contracts equal to that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans
and execute security and credit arrangements under the same
conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and
private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non
material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian
reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and
enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married
men in applying for passports, secure visas and other travel
documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of
Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first to respond to its
clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All
obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all
levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself
a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International
Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too
keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women
the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accepted as
equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold
them back from their proper places under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global,
legislative, executive and judicial, according more rights to women
hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of
discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it
still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their
domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the
same, regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly
situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed
husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically
revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt
to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and
subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in
the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt
acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to
her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up
her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year
requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our
legal system that sets up ideals and directions and render steady our
strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the
past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution
belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may
well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must
be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance.
Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the
answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or
the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in
character unless, either by express statement or by necessary
implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz,
121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and
Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law. These provisions
read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,
able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally
bound to enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that,
there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority
to pass upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law
of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation
controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction
to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the
constitutional one-year residency requirement. The issue (whether
or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a
question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination.
The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the
long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions
under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not
reviewable by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to
me to be a plain matter. Generally, the term "residence" has a
broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official
(place where one's official duties may require him to stay) or
temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable
length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of
civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a
natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50,
Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore
announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court,
Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as
synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the
election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only
an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. . . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by
adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a
new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the
COMELEC with having committed grave abuse of discretion in its
assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections,
ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned
begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been
duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or
the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on
whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial
function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the
number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A
ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being
adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or
discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the
full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as
may be required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any
undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the
Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a
constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The
nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the
Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral
Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest
"relating to the election, returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base
on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of Republic Act No.
6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each
providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The
Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a
final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not
declared by final, judgment before an election to be disqualified,
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding
sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be
preferable to look for not so much the specific instances they
ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I
will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that
votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever
ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her
favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The
argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the
now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs.
Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in
Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC
(137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of
Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA
1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992])
and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs.
Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and
concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For
easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the
petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission
on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the
votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and
considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect,
the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by
eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay
and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee,
Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two
reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official
leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it
should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v.
Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was
supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente,
with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without
any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.) another
took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando,
C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd,
S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office
to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate
who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the
winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative
policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that
the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the
dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on
Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that
they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I
think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may
be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition
for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum,
not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took
part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such
proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by
their agreement to submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized
proceedings for determining a candidate's qualifications for an
office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No.
6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No.
7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation
contests but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings
against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification,"
but they are not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibility of a
candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due
to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person
either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for public
office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of
certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false
representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in
the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus
Election Code:
§ 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be
deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
(Emphasis added)
§ 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent
in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this
Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections
80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph
6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless
said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
§ 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. (Emphasis added).
§ 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to
petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
§ 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative
case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of
allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here
or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who
have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the
COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation and Disqualification,"
contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-
Marcos made material representations in her certificate of
candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the
ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and
Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the
position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8,
1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months in the
district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the
COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995,
cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of
candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified
to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives
for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any
finding that she had made false representations as to material
matters in her certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a
petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under § 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private
respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will
presently be explained, proceedings under § 78 have for their
purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo
warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person
from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto
proceedings involving members of the House of Representatives is
vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for
the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the allegations were
that the respondent candidates had made false representations in
their certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship,1 age,2
or residence.3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court
passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court
did so in the context of election protests4 or quo warranto
proceedings5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or
protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a
candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed
elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the
office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a
candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying,
over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial
question which should be determined lest he wins because of the
very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it
is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a
candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in
his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been
voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his
proclamation will be set aside.6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility,
e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long
time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the
office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No.
120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of
Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the
elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character
of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the
law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty
of the COMELEC and its officers.7 The law is satisfied if candidates
state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the
position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their
qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event
they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false
representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC
given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-
proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President,
Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No.
7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals
as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.
By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for
determining an elected official's qualifications after the results of
elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a
pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus
Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not
authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless
they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for
declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its
rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, § 1 the
following:
Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess
all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by
law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is
equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive
matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power
under Art. IX, A, § 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy
that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power
to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves
an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship
of voters. (Art. IX, C, § 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the
evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in
their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different
from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in §§
12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual
from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for
public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate
from the race either from the start or during its progress.
"Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for
holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for
declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a
public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from
becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public
office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
qualifications prescribed in § 2 of the law does not imply that he
does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in § 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the
candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or offenses, like
other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable
practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election
protest,"8 through the use of "manufactured" election returns or
resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the
election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a
candidate's qualifications for office before the election. To the
contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for
disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he
could be prevented from assuming office even though in end he
prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may
only be sought in an election protest or action for quo warranto
filed pursuant to § 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days
after his proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g.,
Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the
COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as
provided in Art. IX, C, § 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the
President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in
the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in
the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17) There is greater reason for not
allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings
based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for President,
Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of
pre-proclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no
jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its proceedings in that case,
including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of
petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of
Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired
into by the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the
proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-009,
including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995,
May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as
Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the
extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes
proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of
ineligibility for the office, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the
proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the
well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the
inquiry must begin and end with the provision itself. The
controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic
disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional
provision on point states that — "no person shall be a member of
the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
(25) years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section
6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term
residence has been understood as synonymous with domicile. This
argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous
cases1 where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and
convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose his
domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with
his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of
different modalities within which the phrase "a resident thereof
(meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one
year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile
coincide in which case a person only has to prove that he has been
domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before
the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart
from his domicile in which case he would have the luxury of district
shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence
period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the
position of congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for
abandoning his residence in order to return to his domicile of origin,
or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified
for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in
the district where he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a
person maintains several residences in different districts. Since his
domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no
effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically
choose the district most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the
unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a
resident in the district where he desires to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of
whether or not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with
"domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual
presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of
time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a
definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the
environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in
Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the
minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are
distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd
Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc)
— On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She
studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948
when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college
studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of
Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In
1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still
a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos
Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was
elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965
when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered
as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and
Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she
and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii.
In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent
ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident
and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994,
respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro
Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994,
respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's
Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly
registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she
intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct
No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election
Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-
3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in the
municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also
alleged that she has been a resident in the constituency where she
seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries
therein are as follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social
Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years
Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT
TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal
orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-constituted
authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of Candidate)2
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March
1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her
disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven
months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I
seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave
abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is disqualified from the
position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte
in the elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than
one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte)
immediately preceding the day of election (8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative
of the first district of Leyte, the next important issue to resolve is
whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates for representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the
case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1
which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of
Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by
those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority
or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris
2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office
to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate
who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the
winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative
policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that
the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the
Electoral System and for other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February
1988) it is provided that:
. . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain
and unambiguous meaning of the provision quoted above. As the
law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with
the effect of a final judgement of disqualification only before the
election, but even during or after the election. The law is clear that
in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL
NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the
Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition
for disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and receives the
highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to
suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt is strong) is also
explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections
are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall
not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received
the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the
second placer the winner simply because a "winning candidate is
disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who
had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes
cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then
there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and
consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been
stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot
be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility"
most especially when it is mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate
receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified
candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of
Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion,
I cannot arrive conjointly at the same conclusion drawn therefrom
Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis
of the personality of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts,
insofar as the same are pertinent to this case, and which I have
simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her
childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a legitimate
daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent
residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a time,
taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was
then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she
acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that
happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as a Senator
and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San
Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually
voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San
Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of
suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had
assumed those lofty positions successively, ever abandoned his
domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his
residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in
1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii,
U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and
resided in different places which she claimed to have been merely
temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the
Philippines and in her certificate of candidacy she indicated that she
was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of
her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157
of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she
followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of
Voter's Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a
registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan,
Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at
Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed
with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration
record form alleging that she had resided in that municipality for six
months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven
Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her answer in the original
certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE
CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new
entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her
candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency requirement
of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a
dissertation on the difference between residence and domicile. We
have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of
political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is
understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so understood
in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to
the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and
procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or
controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's
residence is integrated in and inseparable from her domicile, I am
addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter
term, specifically its permutations into the domicile of origin,
domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood
in American law from which for this case we have taken our
jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time
of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin," constitutes the
domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a
new domicile in a different place.1 In the instant case, we may grant
that petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is
now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds,
that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by
operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth
or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily
acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is
consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,3 is
sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that
the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice
or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the
party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep.
Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or American but
of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of
origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own
domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to
San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now
San Juan, Metro Manila — do not appear to have resulted in her
thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that
her having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or
misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the
assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her
residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the
Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or only for
transient purposes which could not have invested them with the
status of domiciles of choice.5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the
present imbroglio over her requisite residency in Tacloban City or
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to
acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in
the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On
that score, we note the majority's own submission 6 that, to
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a)
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the
purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the
acquisition of a domicile of choice apply whether what is sought to
be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium
originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium).
Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been
replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her
continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the
object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the
dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong in SPA
95-009 of the Commission on Elections,7 and advances this novel
proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation
of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium
necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became
Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an
intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin. Because of
her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the
provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time,
however, her legal domicile automatically reverted to her domicile
of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had
acquired a domicilium necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the
majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to
abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this
situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at
any given time, and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on
to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission
that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,8 the
majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban City
as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the
equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or
residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be
recovered likewise in accordance with law. However, we are here
being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or
reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the
cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that since
petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the
termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am
impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that,
indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find
some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this
argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of
choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the
latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not
per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts
legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to
establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what
petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her
candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot
automatically restore his domicile of origin, not only because there
is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd
Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion
would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have
obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law,
other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this
reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes,
advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge
on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned
her domicile of choice (unless we assume that she entered into the
marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment
was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by
operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and
legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason,
therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the
termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per
se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in
1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during
the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in
possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in
a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the
husband's death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile,9
she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband
until she makes an actual change. 10 In the absence of affirmative
evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile
or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue
after his death. 11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the
majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code. All
that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right
and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I
cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was
never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by
the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior
thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to
determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing
on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her
children having gotten married and established their own respective
domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer
called for or material in the present factual setting of this
controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the
matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing
and expanded participation of women in the affairs of the nation,
with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory
conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or
judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary
implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic
reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner.
Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that
should govern this issue, there is a world of difference; and,
unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation
but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin
since 1954 and not having automatically reacquired any domicile
therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political
constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the
present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting
her pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate
of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original
certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only
seven months prior to the election. These considerations render it
unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by
petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for
lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr.
Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more particularly on the issue of the
petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution,
decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be brought to this
Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario
vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC
has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's
petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of
24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc
resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the
Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute
details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein
petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of
residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not
misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or
circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings
of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as
her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First
Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the
COMELEC, either by admission or by documentary evidence,
overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of
origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that
she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that became her
second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for
only seven months before the day of the election. She was then
disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of
the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary
would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice
was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it
by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to
the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A
domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law
attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or actual
residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the
wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7, 11). Under the
governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile
or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which
was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the
court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should
live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the
husband has a predominant right because he is empowered by law
to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over some
rights recognized by law in the wife. For instance, under article 117
the wife may engage in business or practice a profession or
occupation. But because of the power of the husband to fix the
family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it
impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her profession.
For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be exempted from
living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot
validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses to follow him to a
new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for
years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice
of a different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed.,
339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own
domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no
matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends.
Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same
as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile
by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family
Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no longer the sole
prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the
spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The
said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family
residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the
wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may
destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its
corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the
Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin
upon the death of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts
to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her
domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled
doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a right to
elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her
husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12,
27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to
acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the
power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his
death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 62, 45). Note that what is revived is
not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own
domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's
domicile was that of her husband at the time of his death — which
was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro
Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for
convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his
official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and
it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a
widow. In her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the
President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated
therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also
voted in the said elections in that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when
she exercised her right as a widow to acquire her own domicile in
Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election
Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the
permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she
be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the
place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit
"B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's
Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn statement
regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to
on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3,"
Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995
(photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her
Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of
Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared that
she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it
Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit attached to her
Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition),
she declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban
City." If she did intend to return to such domicile or residence of
origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she
would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's
Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her
residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not
important insofar as residence in the congressional district is
concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already
lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by
virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished her
power of recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on
Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the subsequent cases
which established the principle that absence from original residence
or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or
engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of such
residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the
Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to
any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession;
employment in private and public service; educational activities;
work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or
air force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement
or detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is
not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal
provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the
exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the
intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage
of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an
abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases
and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of
the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC
SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or
residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended
to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she]
always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of
intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil
Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the
petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively establish
that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had
acquired a new one animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A
Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).

Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's

claim that she "merely committed an honest mistake" in writing
down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency
qualification requirement in the certificate of candidacy. Such a
claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions,
would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not
commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the
truth.

The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he

who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of
proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178
[1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]).
Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the
petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the
change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion
rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium
necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage
automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is
consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed
to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her
revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her
to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own
domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.

I vote to deny the petition.