ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

SECTION 16
DE VENECIA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR 130240, February 5, 2002

FACTS: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857)

was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman
Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended).
After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a “Motion To
Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the
accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18
August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion
for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming
that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to
House Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia,
Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within
10 days from notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the
House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier,
House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of
Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a penalty or a

precautionary measure; and
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress
from the mandate of R.A. 3019.

HELD: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8

August 1995), the suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory
and is of different nature and purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a
penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of valid
Information.
As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the
doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the members of Congress
from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic
Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks
under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a
determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, upon an erring member.

RATIO: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his
prosecution by influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence
and from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an
incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand, the
suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed
sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior
to enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor
and integrity.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have
effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from
its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government – the Legislative,
the Executive and the Judiciary – has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance
within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from
unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.