Africa vs Caltex

Facts:
In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the underground storage of Caltex. Apparently,
a fire broke out from the gasoline station and the fire spread and burned several houses including the house of Spouses
Bernabe and Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was being transferred which
caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented to prove this theory and no other explanation can be had as to the
real reason for the fire.
A report was prepared by an officer who conducted the investigation which some facts the sources thereof are not
identified.

Issue: W/N the said report qualifies as an official information to be admissible as evidence.

Held:
Yes. To qualify their statements as “official information” acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons
who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such
statements for record.1
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by
the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
(There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer,
or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 398).
People of the Philippine vs Joseph Leones
[117 SCRA 382 / G.R. No. L-48727 September 30, 1982]

Facts:
The accused was charged with rape.

Pieces of recorded evidence such as the written entries in the clinical case record prepared and signed by the admitting
physician of the hospital. It shows the date of the victim's admission in the hospital, her complaint of vaginal bleeding and
the diagnosis of "Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen".

Issue:
Were the entries in the medical record made by the physician in a government hospital admissible as the exception to the
hearsay rule?

Held:
YES. The said entries having been made in official records by a public officer of the Philippines in the performance of his
duty especially enjoined by law, which is that of a physician in a government hospital is prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
EMILIO MANALO vs ROBLES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.
[99 Phil. 729 G.R. No. L-8171, August 16, 1956]

Facts:
The plaintiffs are parents of the deceased 11 year old kid who was ran over by a taxi in an accident. They filed the action
against the taxicab company to enforce its subsidiary liability.

To prove their case, the plaintiffs introduced a copy of the decision in the criminal case convicting the driver of homicide
through reckless imprudence,

Issue:
Does the sheriff's return of the writs of execution covered by official record rules as an exception to the hearsay rule?

Held:
YES. A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
the law and forming part of official records, and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The return in itself is
sufficient. The sheriff making the return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry.
People vs Cabuang
G.R. No. 103292. January 27, 1993

Entries in official records like a police blotter are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out, since the entries in
the police blotter could well be incomplete or inaccurate. Testimony given in open court during the trial is commonly much
more lengthy and detailed than the brief entries made in the police blotter and the trial court cannot base its findings on a
police report merely, but must necessarily consider all other evidence gathered in the course of the police investigation
and presented in court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RICARDO SAN GABRIEL
[G.R. No. 107735. February 1, 1996]

Facts:
The accused was charged with murder arising from a stabbing incident. The prosecution witness positively identified the
suspects, thus the conviction.

On appeal,the accused contends that entries in the Advance Information Sheet prepared by police officer, Pat. Steve
Casimiro, did not mention him at all and named only Ramon Doe as the principal suspect. Such sheet however contains
information acquired by said police officer only after his interview of Camba, an alleged eyewitness.

Issue:
Does the Advance Information Sheet constitute an official information, hence, is admissible?

Held:
NO. It could not be categorized as official information because in order to be classified as such, the persons who made the
statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for
the record. In this case, the public officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and personal knowledge of the
stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was acquired from Camba, an alleged eyewitness, who was not legally
so obliged to give such statements.

Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
US vs. Que Ping
[40 Phil. 17 (1919) ]

Facts:
Que Pins was convicted of homicide. Pending his appeal to the SC, he filed a bail bond to secure his release. SC affirmed the
ruling of the lower court. SC ordered the sureties to produce the of the accused so that the judgement can be read to him.
Accused did not appear on the date fixed. The sureties filed a motion to be relieved from obligation because Que Ping has
died. To prove Que Ping’s death, the sureties presented two exhibits, which the lower court did not admit.

Held:
Those documents are admissible but documents are not conclusive evidence. Their probative value may either be
substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.

The exhibits being in the nature of entries in public records, made in the performance of their duty by public officers of the
Philippine Islands, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Escobar vs. Luna
[519 SCRA 1 (2007)]

Facts:

Petitioners Adelaida Escobar and Lolita Escobar separately bought two parcels of land located in Barrio Tolentino, Tagaytay
City on February 28, 1979 and were issued TCT Nos. (T-21294) T-13361 and (T-21295) T-13362, respectively, on the same
date.

Eleven years later, on September 11, 1990, Clodualdo Luna filed a complaint before the RTC of Tagaytay City, Branch 18,
seeking to nullify TCT Nos. (T-21294) T-13361 and (T-21295) T-13362 of the Escobars. Luna claimed that he had been in
actual, public, adverse, continuous, and notorious physical possession of an unregistered parcel of land located in Barrio
Tolentino, Tagaytay City since March 21, 1941, as shown in Tax Declaration No. GR-019-0173, which was issued to him in 1985.4

The Escobars allegedly made it appear that the two titles originated from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5483, which
however, did not exist in the records of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Batangas per certification7 of Atty. Eva
Cainza-Valenton, Acting Register of Deeds, issued on June 11, 1990.

Petitioners state that respondents’ evidence are inadmissible for being hearsay.26Respondents counter that they constitute
exceptions to the hearsay rule.

Issue:

Are respondents’ evidence admissible to prove the nullity of the TCTs in question?

Held:

We rule for respondents. Respondents’ evidence are competent evidence, having been issued by government offices,
certified to by authorized personnel who were clothed with authority and duty to issue such certifications. In the case
of People v. Lazaro,28 we held that the certification, without testimony of the person giving the certification, is sufficient and
competent evidence which is an exception to the hearsay rule as provided in Section 44,29 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Section 44 should be read in conjunction with Section 28,30 Rule 132 of the same Rules which allows the admission of
the said document.31
PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION
[G.R. No. 107518. October 8, 1998]

Facts:

This is a civil case for damages arising from a sea collision incident when plaintiff's tanker hit respondent's fishing boat,
causing the boat to sink.

The lower court and CA ruled in favor of respondent on the basis of documentary exhibits presented, mainly the price
quotations. These price quotations were issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of
equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels. However, these are not published in any list, register,
periodical or other compilation nor containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation.T

Issue:

Are price quotations considered commercial list, thus can be admissible in evidence?

Held:

NO. Price quotations are not within the purview of commercial lists as these are not standard handbooks or periodicals,
containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation.These are simply letters
responding to the queries of Del Rosario.

The price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered
along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the
writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price
quotations.

A document is a commercial list if:

(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation;
(2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation;
(3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and
(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Gregorio Estrada vs. Proculo Noble
[ 49 OG 139 (1950)

Facts:
Maximo Noble sold to his son Proculo Noble a lot with a right to repurchase. Maximo conveyed the
same property by absolute sale to Estrada. In computing the amount to be paid by Estrada to Proculo in redeeming the
property, the CFI used the Ballantine Scale of Values. Proculo objected to its use. The CA said that it is an official document
whose publication constituted a leading event of general interest and whose provisions are widely known and have played
an important part in the contemporary political history of the country, of which courts of justice could take judicial
cognizance

Held:
Learned treatises are admissible in evidence if (a) the court takes judicial notice thereof, or (b) the same are tesitifed to by
a witness expert in the subject. The CA took judicial notice of the Ballantyne Scale of Values.
CARMELITA TAN and RODOLFO TAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS et al
[G.R. No. L-22793, May 16, 1967]

Facts:
At first, petitioners, thru their mother as guardian ad litem, sued respondent Tan for acknowledgment and support. The first
civil case was dismissed on the ground that parties have already come to an amicable settlement.

1 year and eight months thereafter, petitioners, this time thru their maternal grandfather as guardian ad litem, commenced
the present action before the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court for acknowledgment and support, involving the same
parties, cause of action and subject matter.The case was again dismissed by reason of res judicata and insufficiency of
evidence.

On appeal, petitioners contends that the testimony of their witnesses, who were unable to testify in the 2nd trial must be
admissible, applying Rule 130 Sec 41.

SEC. 41. Testimony at a former trial. — The testimony of a witness deceased or out of the Philippines, or unable to testify,
given in a former case between the same parties, relating to the same matter, the adverse party having had an opportunity
to cross-examine him, may be given in evidence.

Notably, the witnesses were subpoenaed by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court a number of times. But, they did not
appear to testify. These witnesses were neither dead nor outside of the Philippines.

Issue:

Are the witnesses' testimonies in the former trial within the coverage of the rule of admissibility intended for witnesses of
the class unable to testify?

Held:

NO. They cannot be categorized as witnesses of the class unable to testify. The witnesses in question were available. Only,
they refused to testify. No other person that prevented them from testifying, is cited. Certainly, they do not come within the
legal purview of those unable to testify.

To emphasize, subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or hostility since testifying at the first trial
does not amount to inability to testify. To be qualified, such inability should proceed from a grave cause, almost amounting
to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 140, 17 Ohio Op. 3d 240 (U.S. June 25, 1980)

Brief Fact Summary. Defendant, Herschel Roberts, was charged with forgery for writing checks in the name of Bernard
Isaacs. Defendant was able to question Isaac’s daughter, Anita Isaacs, at a preliminary hearing, but she failed to appear for
the trial. Therefore the state introduced the record of the preliminary hearing as evidence.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Testimony from a preliminary hearing is admissible if the declarant can not be produced for the
trial, but the prior testimony should have factors, such as a prior opportunity for questioning by a defendant’s counsel and
being under oath, to indicate the testimony is reliable and trustworthy.

Facts. Defendant stayed at Anita Isaacs apartment for a few days. During his stay, Defendant used checks and credit cards
under Bernard Isaacs’s name. At a preliminary hearing, Anita was called by Defendant’s counsel and asked at length about
granting permission to Defendant. She denied granting permission. During the trial, Anita was not available despite an
extensive search by the prosecution and her family. Therefore, the prosecution submitted her preliminary hearing
testimony as evidence. Defendant objected but the trial judge allowed the evidence. Defendant was convicted, but the
appellate court and The Supreme Court of Ohio sided with Defendant in not allowing the evidence.

Issue. The issue is whether the preliminary hearing testimony by an unavailable witness is admissible.

Held. The admission of the preliminary hearing testimony does not violate Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation
Clause of the United States Constitution. The witness was unavailable, but the prosecution made a good-faith effort in trying
to locate her. There were also several factors that demonstrated the reliability of her testimony such as Defendant’s
counsel asked her leading questions at length during the preliminary hearing.

Dissent. The dissent does not believe that the record indicates that the state met its burden in procuring Anita Isaacs. The
only effort in reaching her was sending five subpoenas to her parents’ residence, even though they knew she moved after
the second subpoena. The dissent believes that even if there is a belief that further attempts will be fruitless that they
should nonetheless be attempted in order to satisfy the state’s burden.

Discussion. The court breaks the Confrontation Clause requirements into two parts. First, the state needs to prove that
they made a good-effort attempt to reach the witness. Second, the state has to prove that the prior testimony carries an
indicia of trustworthiness.
Manliclic v. Calaunan
[512 SCRA 642 (2007) ]

Facts:
A Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by Manliclic. collided with an owner-type jeep owned by Calauanan. By reason of such
collision, a criminal case against Manliclic filed before RTC. Subsequently Calaunan filed a complaint for damages against
Manliclic.

Counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes of the testimonies of Calaunan in the criminal
case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as the witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.

Issue:

May transcripts may be admitted in evidence?

Held:

No.

For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satistifed:

a. The witness is dead or unable to testify;

b. His testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the
same parties or those representing the same interests;
c. The former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action;
d. The issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and
e. The adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.

Admittedly, Calaunan failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a
former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)

FACTS:

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave written authority to two lawyers to
sequester any property, documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration order
was issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such order was
void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG
Commissioners.

The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the sequestration since by her acts ( such as
seeking permission from the PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded to the validity of the
sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting as
provided in the Rules; that the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot Resthouse was sequestered;
and that she intended to delay proceedings by filing the motion to quash.

Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration order was void because it was signed not by
the 2 commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.

HELD:
No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a sequestration order may be issued upon a showing of
a prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order, the court does not substitute
its judgment for that of the PCGG.

In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of the prima facie case. The Republic presented
no evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2 PCGG representatives were given the
quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's evidence
does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the property, what makes it “ill-gotten wealth”,and how Ferdinand Marcos
intervened in its acquisition.

As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctine of estoppel.
The Court cannot accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration order. Being void, the
Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.

*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the Olot Resthouse with
respect to the claim of the Republic in another civil case.
DILAG & CO. V. MERCED:

Dilag filed a case against Merced for the theft of his truck. Merced claimed that he purchased the truck in good faith and he
relied on his certified copy of the certificate of registration. Merced impugns the testimony of Aguilar, (as a witness to
testify on the alleged tampering of the motor number), on the ground that he is not qualified as expert on motor numbers.

DOCTRINE: There is no precise requirement as to the mode in which skill or experience shall have been acquired. Scientific
study and training are not always essential to the competency of a witness as an expert. A witness may be competent to
testify as an expert although his knowledge his knowledge was acquired through the medium of practical experience rather
than scientific study and research.

UNITED STATES V. TRONO: Trono et al. were accused of ill treatment of three persons arrested, as a result of which one died.
Defense admits the fact of arrest but denies ill treatment. Dr. Icasiano testified to the effect that the deceased had not died
due to wounds but by hepatic colic, a disease suffered by the deceased for a long time.

DOCTRINE: Courts are not bound to submit to expert testimony. They are free to weigh them. They can give or refuse to give
them any value as poof or they can counterbalance such evidence with other elements of conviction which have been
adduced during the trial.

PEOPLE V. ADOVISO: Adoviso was charged with double murder. He offered in evidence the testimony a NBI polygraph examiner
who conducted a test on him. The examiner’s report revealed that “there were no specific reactions indicative of deception
to pertinent questions relevant to the investigation of the crime.”

DOCTRINE: Courts are not bound to submit to expert testimony. Faith and credit must not be vested upon the lie detector
test, which is not conclusive as the polygraph has not yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means
of ascertaining truth or deception.
US vs. Ridling

Facts:

This is a perjury case. The Defendant is alleged to have made statements under oath before a Grand Jury which he knew
were false. He has pleaded not guilty. As a part of his defense, he has indicated his intention to offer testimony of one or
more polygraph experts who, he asserts will testify that, as a result of their tests, it is their opinion that he is telling the
truth when he makes the statements that are alleged to be the basis for this indictment.

Issue:

whether polygraph evidence would be a valuable aid in connection with the determination of the issues such as the one
facing the Court in this case and in the administration of justice.

CONCLUSION

The evidence of polygraph experts pertaining to the polygraph examination of the defendant and their opinions will be
admitted subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. The parties will meet and will recommend to the Court three competent polygraph experts other than those offered by
the defendant.

2. The Court will appoint one or more of the experts to conduct a polygraph examination.

3. The defendant will submit himself for such examination at an appointed time.

4. The expert appointed by the Court will conduct the examination and report the results to the Court and to the counsel for
both the defendant and the government.

5. If the results show, in the opinion of the expert, either that the defendant was telling the truth or that he was not telling
the truth on the issues directly involved in this case, the testimony of the defendant's experts and the Court's expert will be
admitted.

6. If the tests indicate that the examiner cannot determine whether the defendant is or is not telling the truth, none of the
polygraph evidence will be admitted.

In the event the defendant declines to participate or cooperate in the test, none of the polygraph evidence will be admitted.
People vs Duranan
G.R. Nos. 134074-75. January 16, 2001

Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victim’s mental age was not proven. He argues
that under the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric
evaluation of the complainant’s mental age to determine if her mental age is under twelve. He further claims that only in
cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical deformities symptomatic of mental retardation
can the mental evaluation be waived.

The contention has no merit.

The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence regarding the mental sanity of a
person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition
of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the
matter.

It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the
witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.
Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can
testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: “A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity
or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his
appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness’ own knowledge and observation, he
having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.
ILAO-QUIANAY VS RODOLFO MAPILE G.R. NO. 154087 October 25, 2005
FACTS:
Subject of the case was a parcel of land owned by the deceased Simplicio Ilao, in a judicial settlement of Ilao’s
estate, the heirs found an adverse claim annotated at the back of TCT no. 48529 claimed by certain Juanito Ibarra.
Respondent filed a motion to exclude property from inventory on ground that it does not form part of Ilao’s estate having
disposed of during lifetime. Petitioner’s filed a case for quieting of title and damages before the RTC of Manila. Relevantly,
Ibarra filed a petition for issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy of subject property on the ground that it was lost by fire.
Respondent filed a case for specific performance and declaring a nullity of Contract claiming that claim of Ibarra over the
property was sold to him. Trial Court rendered decision upholding the validity of the notarized Deed of Sale due to the
conflicting testimonies of the two handwriting experts. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was countered
by an Omnibus Motion to strike out Motion for reconsideration of petitioners being pro forma and seek a writ of execution,
the latter was upheld and the former was denied hence, they appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial
courts decision and stated that the appellate court does not take cognizance of cases based on question of fact but only
law via this petition for review hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Is the testimony of an expert witness has more weight in presentation of evidence over the discretion of court with
due regard on evidenciary matters presented?
RULING:
Question on whether Ilao’s signature in the Deed of Sale was a forgery is a question of fact which requires appraisal
and re-evaluation of the evidence presented by parties. Such procedure is beyond the court’s dominion because factual
findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court but admits
certain exceptions found under the 1997 revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Experts are presented to enlighten NOT CONFUSE the courts and for this reason, We do not fault the lower court for
disregarding, in its exasperation, their testimony on record, on doubt, relying on the leeway extended to all courts that they
“are not bound to submit their findings necessarily to such testimony; they are FREE to weigh them and they can
give or REFUSE to give them any value as proof”. Courts are not bound by expert testimonies. The problem of evaluation
of expert testimony is left to the sound discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence
of an ABUSE OF THAT DISCRETION. The validity of the deed of sale should, therefore, be recognized, the only opposition
thereto being the alleged forgery of Ilao’s signature which was not satisfactorily demonstrated. There is no doubt that the
deed of sale was duly acknowledged before a notary public and it enjoys presumption of regularity and carries the
evidenciary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.
TIJING VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 1:45 PM

G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001 [Habeas Corpus]

FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their youngest child, Edgardo Jr., whom
they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the petition and ordered Angelita Diamante to immediately release the
child, now named John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over to his parents. CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered
by the lower court. It questioned the propriety of the habeas corpus in this case.

ISSUE:Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of the minor.

RULING:
Yes. SC upheld the decision of the trial court.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person withheld from the persons entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the
proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It must be stressed out that in habeas corpus proceeding, the question of identity is relevant
and material, subject to the usual presumption, including those as identity of the person.

The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the parents and by the witness who is the
brother of the late common-law husband of Angelita. Furthermore, there are no clinical records, log book or discharge
from the clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born were presented. Strong evidence directly proves that Thomas Lopez,
Angela's "husband", was not capable of siring a child. Moreover, his first marriage produced no offspring even after almost
15 years of living together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore no offspring.

The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was filed by Thomas Lopez, the alleged father.
Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law), the attending physician or midwife in attendance of the birth should cause
the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child.
Certificate must be filed with the LCR within 30 days after the birth. The status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth
certificate were typed in as legally married, which is false because Angelita herself had admitted that she is a "common-
law wife."

Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage. Lastly, the spouses presented clinical records and testimony of the midwife who attended Bienvenida's
childbirth.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RUFINO UMANITO G.R. No. 172607, April 16, 2009
Criminal Case Digest / Digested Case

Use of DNA Evidence in Rape

FACTS:

In a Supreme Court Resolution dated 26 October 2007, the Court Resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then
recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence (DNA Rules)in a case pending before it – this case. The SC remanded the
case to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence in accordance with the terms of said Resolution, and in light of the fact that
the impending exercise would be the first application of the procedure, directed Deputy Court Administrator Reuben Dela
Cruz to: (a) monitor the manner in which the court a quo carries out the DNA Rules; and (b) assess and submit periodic
reports on the implementation of the DNA Rules in the case to the Court.

To recall, the instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito (UMANITO) was found by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. UMANITO was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the private complainant in the sum of
P50,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals offered the judgment of the trial court. UMANITOappealed the decision of the
appellate court to this court.

In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged "many incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the defense."At the
same time, the alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, a
girl hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, a well as the defense of alibi raised by UMANITO, the Court deemed
uncovering of whether or not UMANITO is the father of BBB greatly determinative of the resolution of the appeal.

There is a COMPLETE MATCH in all the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino UMANITO y Millares and [BBB].

NOTE:

UMANITO in this case filed an action to withdraw appeal.

RULING:

By filing such motion, UMANITO is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals finding him
guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the indemnification of the
private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00. Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the
conclusions of the lower courts, and that no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the
Court sees no reason to deny UMANITO’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Consequently, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 15 February 2006 would otherwise be deemed final if the appeal is not withdrawn.
Bautista vs. Sarmiento
[138 SCRA 587 (1985) ]

Facts:

An information charging Fe Bautista, Milagros Corpus and Teresita Vergere with estafa was filed before the sala of Judge
Malcolm G. Sarmiento. The third accused, Teresita Vergere, was granted a separate trial. To prove its case, the prosecution
presented during the trial the private complainant, Dr. Leticia C. Yap, as its only witness. Thereafter, petitioners, believing
the prosecution failed to prove their guilty beyond reasonable doubt, moved to dismissal the case by way of demurrer to
the evidence.

The Court believes that the prosecution established a prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the Information against said
accused on the evidence presented so far on record.

the Court hereby denies the defense' Motion to Dismiss and orders the trial of this case for the reception of evidence of the
accused.

It is the contention of petitioners that respondent Judge lost jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the case and that he
was in duty-bound to acquit them, considering his findings in denying their motion to dismiss that "....the prosecution
established a prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the Information against said accused on the evidence presented so far
on record". Petitioners further argue that in a criminal case, conviction can be had only upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt and not on a mere prima facie case.

Held:

There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
he is entitled to an acquittal. But when the trial court denies petitioners' motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence
on the ground that the prosecution had established a prima facie case against them, they assume a definite burden. It
becomes incumbent upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against
them. 7 This is due to the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners would seem to
believe.

When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the burden of proof
does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed—the prosecution. It is
the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the
trial. 8 This burden of going forward with the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced by the
prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.