IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 18, NO.

2, MAY 2003 541

Experience With the Nord Pool Design and

Implementation
Nils Flatabø, Member, IEEE, Gerard Doorman, Ove S. Grande, Hans Randen, and Ivar Wangensteen

Invited Paper

Abstract—The electricity industry of the Nordic countries went

through a major restructuring during the 1990s. A wholesale
market with significant competition has been established. Nord
Pool was established in 1993 as a Norwegian electricity exchange,
and extended its trade to Norway and Sweden in 1996. It thus
became the world’s first multinational exchange for trade in
electric power contracts, and presently it is the only truly interna-
tional electricity market. There is one market operator, and there
are five system operators. Each country has its own regulatory
agency. There are no general cross border tariffs. In 2001, power
contracts worth nearly NOK 412 billion, about 55 billion Euro,
were cleared by Nord Pool, and the combined volume of contracts
traded was 2769 TWh, that is more than seven times the physical
consumption. An open market with a common framework has
made the Nordic market the most liquid electricity market in the
world. Three of the countries have full retail market access. Since
deregulation of the electricity industry started, restructuring has
taken place in all countries resulting in mergers and acquisitions.
There is an ongoing concentration of ownership in the wholesale
market, and the concentration of the production side causes
concern.
Index Terms—Deregulation, electricity markets, power ex-
change. Fig. 1. Nordic countries.

I. DEREGULATION PROCESSES IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES Pool), and there are presently five system operators (Svenska
Kraftnät in Sweden, Fingrid in Finland, Statnett in Norway,

T HE ELECTRICITY industry of the Nordic countries,

Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, as shown in
Fig. 1, went through a major restructuring during the 1990s.
Norway was the first Nordic country introducing market
competition, institutionalized by the Energy Act of June 1990.
The Swedish deregulation that was decided in October 1995
led to the establishment of a common Norwegian–Swedish Ex-
change (Nord Pool). This first electricity market completely
open to trade across national borders has been in operation since
January 1996.
Finland joined the common market in October 1998, Jutland
(West Denmark) in July 1999, and in the course of 2000 also
Zealand (East Denmark) joined the common Nordic market.
The Nordic electricity market is presently the only truly inter-
national electricity market. There is one market operator (Nord
Manuscript received November 14, 2002.
N. Flatabø, G. Doorman, and O. S. Grande are with SINTEF Energy Re-
search, NO-7465, Trondheim, Norway.
H. Randen is with Nord Pool ASA, Lysaker, NO-1326, Norway.
I. Wangensteen is with NTNU, Trondheim, NO-7491, Norway.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TPWRS.2003.810694
0885-8950/03$17.00 © 2003 IEEE
Eltra in western Denmark, and Elkraft System in eastern Den-
mark). There are separate regulatory agencies in the four coun-
tries.
II. INDUSTRY STRUCTURES
A. Ownership Structure
The Nordic countries have a mixed ownership structure with
a predominance of public ownership. Since deregulation of the
electricity industry started in the early nineties, restructuring has
taken place in all countries resulting in mergers and acquisi-
tions in production, network operation, sales, and distribution.
Strategic alliances are established. In addition to high activity in
the Nordic countries, some power companies have expanded to
other European countries, and European companies have estab-
lished business and achieved ownership in Nordic companies.
B. System Size, Generation, Demand
There is a different mix of production resources in the Nordic
countries. Norway has almost 100% hydropower. Sweden and
Finland have a mix of hydro, nuclear and other thermal plants,
542
TABLE I
POWER GENERATION, CONSUMPTION, AND IMPORT/EXPORT WITHIN THE
NORDIC COUNTRIES IN YEAR 2000 (TWH)
TABLE II
GENERATION CAPACITY WITHIN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES IN YEAR 2000 (GW)
and Denmark has almost 100% thermal production. The total
electricity consumption in the Nordic countries was about 385
TWh in the year 2000.
An overview of power generation, consumption, and ex-
port/import within the Nordic countries in the year 2000 is
presented in Table I, while Table II gives an overview of
installed power capacities.
C. Roles in the Deregulated Electricity Industry
A wholesale market with significant competition has been
established in the Nordic region. Nord Pool as an exchange in
combination with several brokers has built a platform for trading
that has been used as a model for other deregulated electricity
markets. An open market with a common Nordic framework has
made the Nordic market the most liquid electricity market in the
world. Fig. 2 gives a principle overview of the Nordic electricity
market with its participants and relations between each other.
One main consequence of the deregulation process was a divi-
sion between competitive (i.e., generation and supply) and non
competitive (i.e., grid) activities in the power industry. The main
roles in the Nordic Electricity Market are
Regulator. There are separate regulatory authorities in the
Nordic countries controlling the monopoly functions like net-
work owners and system operator responsibilities. The national
authorities also regulate trading in the physical and financial
markets.
Market operator. The Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool,
is the only common market place for the Nordic power market.
Bilateral trading is to some extent organized in minor market
places.
Transmission system operator (TSO). The five TSOs in the
Nordic area are owners of the respective national main grid and
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 18, NO. 2, MAY 2003
Fig. 2. Nordic Electricity Market 2002.
Fig. 3. Market and control phases.
responsible for coordination between producers, consumers,
and other network owners.
Network owner. Operates and maintains the network and is
obliged to make third party access possible.
Market players. Producers, consumers, or traders who are
registered as exchange members at Nord Pool or operate bilat-
erally. The exchange members are obliged to be connected to,
or be registered as, a balance responsible unit according to the
mandatory balance contract with the TSO.
Retailers. Market players who sell electricity to end-users.
III. TRADING IN THE NORDIC MARKETS
A. From Market to Control Phases
The transition from the market phases to physical operation
is shown in Fig. 3. The market phases start with bilateral con-
tracting and financial trading and end with the spot market set-
tlement every day at noon.
In the preoperational phase, production scheduling is carried
out by each producer and the market players submit bids for
physical power regulation into the balancing market, [in Norway
called regulation power market, (RPM)], which is a real time
market operated by the TSO.
The balancing market is intended for use in load balancing
(secondary control) and for “buy back” congestion management
in the hour of operation. This market is open for both production
and consumption.
Elspot and the balancing market are often referred to as the
physical markets.
FLATABØ et al.: EXPERIENCE WITH THE NORD POOL DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
B. Trading Between Countries and Elspot Areas
The point tariff principle is adapted in all the Nordic coun-
tries and there are no general cross border tariffs between the
countries. However, spot prices may be different on the respec-
tive sides of a congested interconnection, as explained in Sec-
tion IV. Elspot is given full priority to all available transmission
capability in such cases. This means that a bi-lateral contract
between (e.g., a producer and a consumer operating in different
price areas) has to be included in the spot market bids in the
respective areas. Normally there is no reservation of physical
transfer capacity, but there are financial hedging possibilities
against area price differences in the Nord Pool financial market.
IV. NORDIC POWER EXCHANGE—NORD POOL
Nord Pool was established in 1993 as an exchange for the
Norwegian electricity market only. In 1996, the exchange was
extended to include both Norway and Sweden, and thus, became
the world’s first multinational exchange for trade in electric
power contracts. In 2002, Nord Pool was reorganized into three
different entities [1]. Nord Pool (NP) organizes the financial
trade, Nordic Electricity Clearing House (NECH) is responsible
for the clearing of both the financial and the physical market,
both operating under the Norwegian Exchange Act supervised
by BISC (Norwegian Banking, Insurance and Securities Com-
mission), and Nord Pool Spot (NPS) organizms the physical
trade under the Norwegian Energy Act supervised by The Nor-
wegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE).
A. Company Structure in Nord Pool
Nord Pool. NP is presently owned by the two TSOs—Statnett
SF in Norway (50%) and Svenska Kraftnät in Sweden (50%).
Nord Pool owns 17.5% of the new EEX, Germany’s merged
power exchange.
Nord Pool Spot. NPS started operation January 2, 2002.
Nord Pool has initially a 33.3% shareholding in NPS; Stat-
nett SF and Affärsverket Svenska Kraftnät will own the
remaining shares 33.3% each. Fingrid Oyj and the two Danish
TSOs—Eltra and Elkraft System—will probably join as Nord
Pool Spot owners during 2002, and then the three original
owners will have ownership stakes of 20% each.
Nordic Electricity Clearing House. The Exchange Act pro-
hibits Nord Pool from operating its clearinghouse activities in
the same company that operates exchange activities. Thus, Nord
Pool has transferred all clearing and settlement operations to
a wholly-owned clearing company, Nordic Electricity Clearing
House ASA.
B. Nord Pool’s Products and Services
Elspot offers spot market trade in power contracts for
next-day physical delivery. Prices are determined through a
double auction system for each hour in the day. The Elspot
system price is the reference price for settling financial power
contracts traded in the Nordic market.
In situations where capacity limitations in the main grid may
occur, Norway is subdivided into two or more geographically
differentiated Elspot areas. These areas are fixed for a period
543
Fig. 4. Prices at Nord Pool.
of at least three to four months. Sweden, West- and East-Den-
mark, and Finland always constitute one separate Elspot area
each. The actual division into Elspot areas is the result of a com-
bination of the TSOs’ projection of which areas/interfaces will
experience power transmission demand exceeding grid capacity,
and on national borders. The TSOs division is based on antici-
pated transmission demand, revision plans, and other conditions
that may affect the flow and availability of electric power pro-
duction.
Initially, a system price is calculated based on the assumption
that there are no transmission restrictions in the overall grid.
Fig. 4 shows the development of the system price from 1996
to the beginning of 2002, as calculated by Nord Pool. When
the system price calculation shows that the capacity between
Elspot areas is not exceeded, there will be one single Elspot
price; thus all area prices are equal to the system price. If the
system price calculation shows that the power flow between two
or more Elspot areas exceeds grid capacity limits, two or more
area prices are calculated.
Elbas is a market for power trading that leads to physical de-
livery. It enables real time trading around the clock every day
of the year, covering individual hours up to 1 h before delivery.
Its function is to be the aftermarket to the spot market at Nord
Pool. The participants are power producers, distributors, indus-
tries, and brokers from Finland and Sweden. EL-EX Nord Pool
in Helsinki maintains the Elbas Market.
C. Financial Market Trade
Eltermin is a financial market for trading contracts used pri-
marily for price hedging and risk management of trade in elec-
tric power. Contracts have a trading horizon of up to four years;
different contract series cover days, weeks, blocks, seasons, and
years. Fig. 4. indicates Eltermin prices for periods up to 2005.
Eloption are financial instruments for risk management and
price hedging of future income and costs related to trade in elec-
tric power contracts. Nord Pool offers trade in European-style
power options with forward contracts as their underlying instru-
ments.
The contracts only require financial delivery and use the
Elspot system price as the reference for settlement. It is also
possible to hedge the basis risk by trading contracts for the
544
difference between the system price and the different area
prices.
D. Clearing
Clearing of power contracts through NECH reduces finan-
cial counter party risk for market participants, as NECH enters
into the contracts as a contractual counter party. NECH auto-
matically clears all contracts traded on the Nord Pool and Nord
Pool Spot’s financial and physical delivery markets. NECH also
clears financial, standardized bilateral (OTC) market contracts
once they are registered for clearing.
E. Nord Pool Members
At year-end 2001, Nord Pool had a total of 295 members,
seventeen more than the year before. Nord Pool’s members are
largely from the Nordic countries. However, in recent years
the proportion of non-Nordic members has risen significantly.
During 2000 and 2001, the Nordic Power Exchange added new
financial market participants from the U.S., France, Germany,
Switzerland, the U.K., and elsewhere; organizations from a
total of ten countries are now Nord Pool or Nord Pool Spot
participants.
V. RETAIL MARKET
All of the Nordic countries introduced in principle full retail
access from the start except Denmark where full retail access is
planned from 2003.
However, change of supplier was unattractive for small con-
sumers in the beginning because of the requirement of hourly
metering, which had to be paid by the consumer. Gradually the
requirement for hourly metering has been replaced by profile-
based settlement for small consumers in three of the countries.
Profile-based settlement implies that each consumer’s hourly
demand is estimated based on a chosen profile [2]. Slightly dif-
ferent rules are applied. In Norway, one profile for each distribu-
tion company (total demand profile less all hourly metered con-
sumption) is used, whereas Finland and Sweden use different
profile for different classes of consumers.
A small fee for change of supplier was removed in Norway in
1997, and from 1998 all consumers can change supplier every
week if they want to. Change of supplier is a simple process,
mainly involving conveying the necessary information to the
new supplier. Price information is readily provided on the In-
ternet by the competition authorities, and a number of suppliers
actively advertise in the media. Change of supplier has increased
significantly in Norway since 1998.
In Sweden, the total number of domestic consumers buying
from external supplier is roughly the same as in Norway,
implying the relative number is considerably lower. The main
reason is probably the shorter time the opportunity to change
supplier has existed.
Also Finland has used the same principles from November
1998. However, the number of small consumers that have
changed supplier is considerably lower than in Sweden and
Norway, presently 3 to 4%. For commercial and industrial
consumers, the numbers are similar to Norway.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 18, NO. 2, MAY 2003
VI. SYSTEM OPERATION
Altogether five independent TSOs are responsible for the co-
ordination of the physical operation in the Nordic countries.
These are all owners of the national main grids and cooperate
according to the recommendations from the Nordel organiza-
tion [3]. The five TSOs have signed a system operation agree-
ment which contains following aspects: reliability, operation
limits, outage coordination, ancillary services, congestion man-
agement, emergency operation, balance operation, power ex-
change, settlement, and exchange of information.
With regard to market operation, the main tasks carried out
by the TSOs are: Definition of available transmission capability
(ATC) between the price areas, load/frequency balancing, and
congestion management.
ATC. The main principle for calculation of ATC is the
criterion. The experience shows that this relatively conservative
criterion in some cases might lead to unreasonably high conges-
tion costs due to low estimate of the transfer limit. An alternative
criterion based on minimization of the socioeconomic conges-
tion cost and the interruption cost is now under evaluation [4].
Balancing. The TSOs are responsible for the balancing mar-
kets, which are used when imbalance occurs in the operational
phase. The regulation objects for up and down regulation are
used both in load frequency balancing and in “buy back” con-
gestion management, which is described below. The response
requirement for these “fast reserves” is 15 min. Although the
TSOs in the Nordic system operate individually in the control
phase, there is close cooperation with regard to secondary fre-
quency regulation, and from 2002 a common Nordic balance
market was introduced.
The Nordic TSOs have chosen different solutions to cope
with scarcity of reserves. The Swedish TSO, Svenska Kraftnät
has bought additional production capacity while the Norwegian
TSO, Statnett, has introduced a market based Power Reserves
Acquirement from autumn 2000 [5]. This new “product” rep-
resents a kind of medium term ancillary service market where
both producers and consumers are allowed to bid in reserves.
The participants in this market are paid an “option” price for
availability, which in this connection implies an obligation to
bid load reduction into the balancing market, RPM, for prede-
fined hours of the day during the contract period which is either
three months (Nov.–Jan. and Feb.–Apr.) or one month.
With this new market arrangement, the TSO has succeeded
in including a considerable share of reserves from the demand
side. As a consequence, load reduction from “power intensive
industry” like paper mills and smelting plants is regularly bid
into the RPM. In the winter period 2001/2002, up to 70% of the
contracted reserve capacity came from the demand side.
Congestion management. Two different models are used to
handle congestions in the Nordic power system: The area price
model (also called market splitting), leading to different area
prices calculated by Nord Pool in the “spot phase,” and the “buy
back” (also called counter trade) model that is used when con-
gestion occurs within the defined price areas during the “oper-
ational phase.”
When using the “area price model” in the spot phase, and
the transmission between the two areas is expected to be above
FLATABØ et al.: EXPERIENCE WITH THE NORD POOL DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
Fig. 5. Area price model.
Fig. 6. Buy back model.
ATC, the spot price in the surplus area will be reduced, and
the spot price in the deficit area is increased. The effects of
the adjustment of prices are that production decreases and de-
mand increases in the surplus area, while production increases
and demand decreases in the deficit area. Spot prices are de-
termined such that the expected transmission between the two
areas equals ATC, denoted as . By using this model, all
the potential regulating objects in the two areas in Fig. 5 are af-
fected.
When using the “buy back” model in the operational phase,
only the selected regulating objects, as indicated in Fig. 6, are
used to adjust the actual transmission between the two areas to
comply with ATC. The regulation objects, including both pro-
duction and consumption, are selected from the merit order list
in the balancing market.
The two models shown before have different economic con-
sequences for the TSO. The economic surplus in the area price
model, equal to the price difference multiplied by the corre-
sponding transmission through the congested path, is credited
to the TSO. (Note that because the TSO has a regulatory cap on
income in Norway, this income will not represent a real profit,
but will eventually be paid back to the users of the transmission
system.) With buy back, the TSO buys up or down regulation
on each side of the congested path. This means that buy back
represents a net cost to the TSO.
VII. EXPERIENCE GAINED
A. Market Growth by Nord Pool
In 2001, power contracts worth nearly NOK 412 billion ( 55
billion Euro) were cleared by Nord Pool, including all trade con-
545
Fig. 7. Traded volumes on the Nordic Power Exchange.
ducted on the Nordic Power Exchange. Fig. 7 shows the devel-
opment of the traded volumes on the Nordic Power Exchange
from its start in 1993 up to year 2001.
The combined volume of contracts traded on the Nordic
Power Exchange’s spot market and financial derivatives market
and Nord Pool’s clearing of contracts traded in the bilateral
(OTC) market in 2001 was 2769 TWh. This volume is more
than seven times the physical consumption in the four Nordic
countries.
B. Market Information and Statistics
Nord Pool is the leading market data provider delivering in-
formation from the Nordic power market. Developing the in-
formation system has been one of the important success-criteria
for the Nord Pool trade. At NP home page, statistics concerning
production, consumption, exchange, and hydro reservoirs are
distributed. Urgent market messages (UMM) concerning main-
tenance and failures are updated within short time limits. In this
way, all market participants get equal information at the same
time. The companies holding UMM-information are defined as
insiders until the information is published and are not allowed
to take financial positions at the exchange in this period.
C. Reporting of Non Exchange Trades
Nord Pool, under the Exchange Act, must comply with
the rules of adopting price transparency in regulated markets.
Therefore Nord Pool’s member rules include the duty of
reporting bilateral trades in listed products cleared by NECH to
Nord Pool and Nord Pool shall publish the market prices and
volumes of such trades.
D. Retail Market
The gradual simplifications in the retail market, as described
in Section V, have had a clear impact on the number of domestic
consumers changing supplier. While there were only 30 000
consumers buying from an “external” supplier in Norway at
the beginning of 1998, this number has presently grown to
360 000 or about 16%. This is still a minor share, but the threat
of shifts probably keeps prices down. Within commerce and
546
Fig. 8. Household and spot prices in Norway, excluding network fees.
industry, the share of consumers buying from external suppliers
is almost 23%.
In Fig. 8 household and spot prices during the last three years
are given, and here it can be seen how household prices follow
the spot price. There is a small time lag, but generally the house-
hold prices reflect the spot price quite well. That is a good indi-
cation that the retail market is efficient.
VIII. FUTURE CHALLENGES IN THE NORDIC REGION
A. Harmonization Between the Nordic TSOs
The Nordic physical and financial market has been a success
and is a common integrated international market. To develop the
market further there is considerable focus on the harmonization
of the market functions and the tariff structure handled by the
different Nordic TSOs, and the taxes handled by the authorities
in each country.
One of the topics is the definition of Elspot areas. In the fu-
ture these are expected to follow the technical limitations in the
Nordic main grid system and not as today follow the national
borders. There has already been great progress concerning a
common balancing market in the Nordic region, and common
handling of reserves is also under evaluation.
B. Concentration in the Wholesale Market
There is an ongoing concentration in the wholesale market
both on the production and the retail side. Especially the con-
centration of the production side causes concern. A continuation
of the present trend can be a threat to the market and may de-
crease market participants’ trust in the market prices. It takes
time to build liquidity and it is important to keep the trust in
the market also in the future to allow for a further development
of the market. Building of new grid capacity and better ways
of handling the existing capacity also have focus with respect
to possible reduction of market power enforced by dominant
market players in some of the areas.
C. Congestion
The ATC on the corridor between Southern Norway and
Southern Sweden is the most frequent reason for price dif-
ferences, and subsequently socio economic costs due to
congestion in the Nordic market [6]. Fig. 9 gives an example of
price differences occurring in a 16-month period.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 18, NO. 2, MAY 2003
Fig. 9. Price differences across congestion.
D. Peaking Capacity
Although Nordic deregulation has been a success with respect
to system operations, it is still unclear if and how a satisfactory
capacity balance can be maintained during extreme demand [7].
Periods with scarcity of reserves and failure to clear the spot
market might occur. Following solutions are now under evalua-
tion:
1) encourage higher degree of price flexibility from the de-
mand side;
2) create more stable long-term price signals to encourage
investments in production and transmission capacity.
E. Extreme System Conditions
The Nordic power system is highly dependent on the hydro
reservoir conditions. Long periods of little precipitation, com-
bined with low temperatures, create need for considerable en-
ergy import to the area. This might cause very high prices in
the spot market and following increases in consumer prices. Till
now, the market itself has solved conditions like this, but longer
periods of high prices may raise the question of more regulation
of the market. The market has developed new products and so-
lutions, and greater flexibility on the demand side as well as the
generation side have been introduced, thus facilitating system
and market operation. It is a challenge for politicians and reg-
ulatory bodies not to interfere with short-term solutions during
difficult situations in the market, but rather contribute to achieve
a predictable framework for future market development.
REFERENCES
[1] [Online]. Available: http://www.nordpool.com/.
[2] N. Flatabø, K. Livik, G. Tangen, and P. Støa, “Information Technology
related to challenges in a liberalised power market,” in Proc. Second
IEEE Int. Caracas Conf. Devices, Circuits and Syst., Isla de Margarita,
Venezuela, Mar. 1998, pp. 307–313.
[3] [Online]. Available: http://www.nordel.org/.
[4] K. Uhlen, G. Kjølle, G. Løvås, and Ø. Breidablikk, “A probabilistic cri-
terion for determination of Power transfer limits in a deregulated envi-
ronment,” in CIGRE Session 2000, Paris, 2000.
[5] G. Nilssen and B. Walther, “Market-based power reserves acquirement,”
in Market Design 2001, Stockholm, Sweden.
[6] O. S. Grande and I. Wangensteen, “Alternative models for congestion
management and pricing. Impact on network planning and physical op-
eration,” in CIGRÉ Session 2000, Paper no. 37-203..
FLATABØ et al.: EXPERIENCE WITH THE NORD POOL DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
[7] O. S. Grande, G. L. Doorman, and I. Wangensteen, “Peaking capacity in
restructured power systems: Experience and solutions,” in Porto Power
Tech, Porto, Portugal, September 10–13, 2001.
Nils Flatabø (M’91) received the M.Sc. and Ph.D.
degrees in electrical engineering in 1969 and 1972,
respectively, from the Norwegian Institute of Tech-
nology (NTH), Trondheim.
He has been employed by the Norwegian Institute
of Technology, 1969–1972, by the Norwegian State
Power Board, System Operation Dept., 1972–1976,
by the BKK Power Company, Section of Electrical
Engineering, 1976–1978. Since 1978 he has been
with SINTEF Energy Research firstly as a researcher,
from 1991–2001 as Research director, and presently
as Senior Advisor.
Gerard Doorman received the M.Sc. degree in
electrical engineering from the Norwegian Institute
of Technology (NTH), Trondheim, in 1981, and
the Ph.D. degree from the Norwegian University
of Science and Technology (NTNU, former NTH),
Trondheim, in 2000.
He started his career as a research scientist at
EFI. Later he worked with a power company with
hydropower optimization, and as a consultant,
among others with demand-side management. Since
1992, he has been with SINTEF Energy Research,
working with hydropower optimization and deregulation issues, presently as a
senior research scientist.
547
Ove S. Grande received the M.Sc. degree in
electrical engineering from the Norwegian Institute
of Technology (NTH), Trondheim, in 1976.
He worked at the Norwegian Power Pool from
1977 to 1980 and 1981 to 1992, then as section
manager at the Norwegian Transmission System
Operator (Statnett) 1993–1994. He was in 1980
and is from 1994 employed by SINTEF Energy
Research (formerly EFI), currently working as
Senior Research Scientist and manager of projects
regarding power system operation and control and
end user issues.
Hans Randen received the M.Sc. degree in electrical
engineering from the Norwegian Institute of Tech-
nology (NTH), Trondheim, in 1980.
Currently, he is Manager of Market Surveillance
at Nord Pool ASA where he has been since 1993. He
worked at the Norwegian Power Pool from 1981 to
1993.
Ivar Wangensteen received the M.Sc. and Ph.D.
degrees in electrical engineering from the Norwe-
gian Institute of Technology, Trondheim, in 1971
and 1974, respectively, and the M.Sc. degree in
economics from the University of Oslo in 1984.
He has worked for Statkraft, The Norwegian
Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE),
and the Norwegian Research Council. Since 1986,
he has been with SINTEF Energy Research. In
2002, he was appointed Professor at the Norwegian
University of Science and Technology (NTNU).