COSTABELLA V. COURT OF APPEALS (1991) 5.
Respondents thus pray that the original passageway be opened and that
Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: The Costabella Corporation
Respondent: Court of Appeals, Katipunan Lumber Co., Aurora Bustos
Lopez, et al.
Ponencia: DAVIDE, Jr., J.:
DOCTRINE:
... ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of
the purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is
that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the
actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has
not yet been paid.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the
contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But
absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively
transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another. (EDCA
Publishing and Distributing Corp. v. Santos)
FACTS:
1. Petitioner corporation owns two parcels of land where it constructed a
resort and a hotel. This resort and hotel is a beachfront property.
Respondents own the adjacent properties of the Opon Cadastre.
2. Prior to Petitioner’s construction of its beach resort, respondents utilized
a passageway in going between their properties and the public highway.
Said passageway was located in petitioner’s property.
3. In 1981, petitioner closed the passageway when it began constructing its
resort, but it opened an alternate route across its property through which
respondents could pass to get to the public highway.
a. In 1982, phase II of the hotel resort was constructed, and this
alternative route was closed as well.
4. Respondents filed a case for injunction against the petitioner with the
then CFI. They assail that:
a. The passageway is an “ancient road right of way” used since
before World War II
b. The closing had deprived them of their access to their property
c. ADDITIONALLY, respondents aver that petitioner also
constructed a dike on the beach without a permit, leading to the
obstruction of passage for residents and local fishermen. And
that this same dike also caused the accumulation of flotsam and
debris.
the dike be demolished.
6. Petitioner alleges the defenses:
a. No such ancient road right of way exists; it was merely a
temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous use of passage through
its property – an act of mere tolerance and “neighborliness”
b. It walled its property to insure the security of its customers, as
well as for privacy;
c. Respondents could still access public highway through other
properties.
d. RE: DIKE – This was actually a breakwater which benefited the
entire community. The flotsam accumulation is a natural effect
of tides.
7. CFI finds in favor of Petitioner – orders reopening of passageway,
damages.
8. CA reverses on issue of respondents gaining vested right on
passageway – notes that passageway is a discontinuous easement.
HOWEVER, still finds that petitioner must provide passage and be
properly indemnified. No damages.
a. CA Notes: concedes that old road can be closed; second right of
way is inconvenient for respondents (dominant estate), they
should be given the option to pay for a more accessible area (a
matter of equity).
9. Petitioner challenges CA finding.
ISSUE: Have the respondents acquired an easement of right of way over
petitioner’s property?
PROVISIONS:
Civil Code Art. 649: The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right
may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a
public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring
estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be
continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent
passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and
the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation
of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through
the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in
the payment of damage caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to DISPOSITION: CA ruling SET ASIDE. DISMISSED.
the proprietor’s own acts.

Civil Code Art. 650: The easement of right of way shall be established at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with
this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest.

HELD/RATIO:

NO. Respondents do not gain a vested right of easement.

1. An easement of right of way is discontinuous, and cannot be
acquired by prescription. While the CA made this finding correctly, it
erred in deciding contrary to this finding by not reversing the CFI’s
decision. Instead, it considered it a compulsory (legal) easement
which is demandable by the respondents (dominant estate) on the
petitioners (servient estate).
2. Jurisprudence has clarified four essential requisites for claiming a
compulsory right of way:
a. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and
is without adequate outlet to a public highway;
b. After payment of the proper indemnity;
c. The isolation was not due to the own proprietor’s acts;
d. The right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate.
e. ADDITIONALLY: burden of proof is with the owner of the
dominant estate.
3. The CA found that the old road “could be closed” and that it would be
“inconvenient” on the part of the respondents to have the petitioners
decide where the easement will lie. The basis has never been
CONVENIENCE for easement of right of way – it has always been a
matter of ADEQUACY. To justify the imposition of an easement,
there must be a real necessity for it.
4. There was also no indication that respondents were willing to
indemnify petitioners for the imposed easement. No proof that the
easement sought is the least prejudicial one to the petitioner.
a. Isolation is a matter which is determined by the real
necessity of an easement. TEST: Is there truly a need to
establish the easement? Is there no other way?
5. OBITER: Roman Law basis of right of way: iter, actus, and via.
6. Dominant Estate owner is limited, however, by Art. 650 – he must
have the easement at the least prejudicial area of the servient
estate’s property, and where the distance to a public road is shortest.
Least prejudice > short distance.
Digest Author: Falgui
Cristobal v CA
Petitioner: CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL et al.
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR LEDESMA, INC., SPOUSES
PACIONE
Ponencia: BELLOSILLO, J.
DOCTRINE: To justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there
must be real, not fictitious or artificial necessity for it. When there is already
an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, as
in this case, even if the outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient,
the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners own a house and lot situated at No. 10 Visayas Avenue
Extension, Quezon City.
2. Lots 1 and 2 adjacent to petitioner’s estate were originally part of a
private road known as Road Lot 2 owned exclusively by Cesar
Ledesma, Inc.
3. When Visayas Avenue became operational as a national road in
1979, Cesar Ledesma, Inc., filed a petition before the RTC of
Quezon City to be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into residential lots
which was granted, hence, Road Lot 2 was converted into residential
lots designated as Lot 1 and Lot 2.
4. Cesar Ledesma, Inc., sold both lots to Macario Pacione in whose
favor Transfer Certificates of Title were correspondingly issued. In
turn, Macario Pacione conveyed the lots to his son and daughter-in-
law, respondent spouses Jesus and Lerma Pacione.
5. When the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a house on Lot 1,
visited the property in 1987, they found out that the lot was occupied
by a squatter named Juanita Geronimo and a portion was being
used as a passageway by petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue.
6. Accordingly, the spouses complained about the intrusion into their
property to the Barangay Office. Petitioners offered to pay for the use
of a portion of Lot 1 as passageway but the Pacione spouses
rejected the offer. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement, the spouses started enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete
fence.
7. Petitioners protested the enclosure alleging that their property was
bounded on all sides by residential houses belonging to different
owners and had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue
except through the property of the Paciones.
ISSUES:
WON petitioners have a valid action for an easement of right of way
RULING + RATIO:
NO.
Petitioners failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their property
to a public highway. The true standard for the grant of the legal right is
‘adequacy’ not convenience.
To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions
provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established.
(1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) that proper indemnity has been paid;
(3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate;
(4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The burden of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner
of the dominant estate.
The first element is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, an outlet already exists, which is a
path walk located at the left side of petitioners’ property and which is
connected to a private road about five hundred (500) meters long. The
private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5 meters
wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was determined by the
court a quo to be sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, hence
petitioners have no cause to complain that they have no adequate outlet to
Visayas Avenue.
DISPOSITION: the decision of respondent CA is affirmed
 Floro vs Llenado (1995)
Petitioners: SIMEON FLORO
Respondents: ORLANDO A. LLENADO (Deceased), substituted by his wife
WENIFREDA T. LLENADO, APPEALS,
Ponente: Romeo, J.
DOCTRINE: A legal easement cannot arise merely for the convenience
of the dominant estate. The owner must prove that the easement is
absolutely necessary and at least restrictive on the servient estate.
FACTS:
1. Simeon Floro owned the Floro Park Subdivision situated in Bulacan. The
subdivision has its own access roads from the MacArthur Highway through
road lot 4.
2. Orlando Llenado, owned the Llenado Homes Subdivision. He obtained the
same from Mr. de Castro, when it was known as the Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision,
3. Llenado Homes was bounded on the south by the Palanas Creek, 5 which
separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision. To the west sat the ricelands
belonging to Marcial Ipapo.
4. The controversy brewed since Llenado Homes did not have any passage
to the MacArthur Highway. However, a proposed access road passing the
abandoned riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the
subdivision plan of the former Emmanuel Homes Subdivision. This plan was
approved by the HLURB.
5. Because the access road through the Ipapo Riceland did not exist yet, the
Llenados sought, and were granted, oral permission by the Floros to use
Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park (At this point, the agreement was merely
provisional as the parties were still drafting a contract).
6. Later, Floro discovered grave damage to the lots in question from the
passage of heavy machinery. He then barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of
rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones. He essentially implied Llenados to
keep out off property.
7. Llenado pursued an easement claim with the RTC. The RTC denied the
request. On appeal by LLenado, and ordered that Mr. Floro remove the
barricades. Mr. Floro went to the SC
ISSUE:
1. WON the requirements for legal easement existed to allow Llenado
to claim the same against Floro
PROVISIONS:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate
or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining
to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled
to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of
the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be
continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent
passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and
the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation
of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through
the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in
the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to
the proprietor's own acts.
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
RULING + RATIO: NO
The court held that to be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way,
the preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be
established.
These include:
(1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) that proper indemnity has been paid;
(3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate;
(4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
For this case, it is apparent that the elements have not been met.

The original subdivision development plan presented by Llenado indicates an

existing and prior agreement with Ms. Ipapo to create a right of way through
the abandoned Ipapo ricefield.

Ipapo had long agreed to these terms but Llenado apparently thought it too
much work and cost to develop such road. It was easier for him to create
an easement via the Floro property.

The court ruled time and again that one may not claim a legal easement
merely out of convenience. Convenience motivated Llenando to abandon
the Ipapo access road development and pursue an access road through the
Floro estate. He was stacking the cards in his favor to the unnecessary
detriment of his neighbor. The court refused to countenance his behavior.
 QUIMEN v. CA (1996) The Requisites of Right of Way were satisfied
a. Property was hemmed by other estates of other persons
Petition: Appeal including Quimen
Petitioner: ANASTACIA QUIMEN, petitioner b. Offered to pay P200 /sqm for the right of way
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS and YOLANDA Q. c. Did not cause the isolation
OLIVEROS, respondents. d. Right of way was the least prejudicial to the servient estate
Ponencia: BELLOSILLO, J. 2. YES
 When the easement may be established, the way that is shortest and
DOCTRINE: will cause least damages is to be chosen. But if these two do not
concur, the way with least damage prevails
The owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right of way only  B/w a way that will destroy a store of strong materials and that w/c
after he has established the existence of these four (4) requisites: (a) the will destroy only an avocado tree although longer, the second should
estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a be preferred
public highway; (b) after payment of the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation
was not due to the proprietor’s own acts; and (d) the right of way claimed is DISPOSITION:
at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

B/w a way that will destroy a store of strong materials and that w/c will
destroy only an avocado tree although longer, the second should be
preferred

FACTS:

10. Quimen and her siblings inherited a parcel of land in Bulacan, upon
partition, Quimen obtained that near to the municipal road
11. Quimen’s lot was on the extreme left of the road while his sibling’s land
both on the right and behind Quimen’s were sold
12. Quimen assured Yolanda, who bought the lot behind Quimen, a
passageway to the public highway thru Quimen’s land
13. Yolanda also owned another lot of the Quimen’s w/c had a right of way
extending to Quimen’s perimeter fence
14. TC decided that the right of way was thru the destruction of a sari-sari
store w/c the CA reversed w/c decided it’s thru the destruction of
Quimen’s avocado tree

ISSUE:

1. WoN there was an easement of a right of way

2. WoN proposed right of way is least onerous/prejudicial

PROVISIONS:

HELD/RATIO:
1. YES
 6. RTC and CA decided in favor of the Fajardos, ruling that the 4
STA. MARIA v. COURT OF APPEALS (1998) requisites for the establishment of a compulsory servitude were
satisfied.
Petitioner: Spouses Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria
Respondent: Spouses Fajardo ISSUE: WoN there could be a compulsory easement established over
Ponencia: Davide, Jr. the properties of the Sta. Maria

DOCTRINE: Where there are several tenements surrounding the PROVISION:

dominant estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate
the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining
should be chosen. to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled
to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of
FACTS: the proper indemnity.
xxx
1. Spouses Fajardo owned Lot 124, located in Obando Bulacan. This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to
the proprietor's own acts. (564a)
2. Lot 124 is surrounded by the following:
a. NE – Lot 1, a fishpond Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
b. SE – Lot 126 owned by Cruz prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule,
c. SW – Lot 6 a&b owned by the Sta.Marias (Spouses Sta. where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
Maria and Florcerfida) shortest. (565)
d. NW – Lot 122 – Jacinto
RULING + RATIO: YES.
3. Spouses Fajardo filed a complaint against the Sta. Marias for the All 4 requisites to establish a compulsory servitude were satisfied.
establishment of an easement of right of way. Dominant estate is surrounded by  Completely surrounded with
other immovables and has no adobe fence and no means of
4. Spouses Fajardo’s claims: adequate outlet to a public egress and ingress due to the
a. They have no adequate outlet to the provincial road highway surrounding properties
 The “daang tao” (fishpond side)
b. An easement passing through either of their properties which is not sufficient to meet the
are directly abutting the provincial road will be their only needs of the dominant estate.
convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the Owner cannot deny himself of
provincial road use of automobile
Payment of proper indemnity They are willing to pay damages
c. Their predecessors-in-interest have been passing Isolation is not due to the acts of Property was already surrounded
through there the proprietor of the dominant when they purchased it
estate
d. Their mother even promised the right of way to the Right of way claimed is at the There were 3 options but other
Fajardos point least prejudicial and the options were circuitous or too long
shortest distance from the while there was a sufficient vacant
5. The Sta. Marias claim that such will cause them inconvenience dominant estate to the public 11 meter space between the houses
and that there is another access route from the Fajardo’s lot to the highway of Spouses Sta. Maria and
main road through the property of Cruz which was abutting the Florcerfida
provincial road and was being offered for sale.
DISPOSITION: DENIED.
Ramos Sr. vs. Gatchalian Realty G.R. No. 75905
Petitioner: REMIGIO O. RAMOS, SR.
Respondent: GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC., EDUARDO ASPREC, and
COURT OF APPEALS
October 12, 1987 causes inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public
highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite. Petitioner
should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez
Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as
his road right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired
his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec.

Doctrine: a mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve
as a basis for an easement of a right of way. To justify the imposition of this
servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.
FACTS:
• Ramos is the owner of a house and lot at Parañaque, Metro Manila
acquired by from Science Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision.
• Two road lots abut petitioner's property: lot 4133-G-12, clearly
appearing as a proposed road in the Lombos subdivision plan, and
Lot 4135, owned by respondents Asprec, known as Pambansa Road but
more commonly referred to as Gatchalian Avenue.
• a complaint for an easement of a right of way with preliminary mandatory
injunction was filed by Ramos against the private respondents alleging:
that Gatchalian Realty built a 7-8 feet high concrete wall right infront of
petitioner's premises, blocking his entrance/exit to Gatchalian Road, the
nearest, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public
road/highway Sucat Road now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue.
• Gatchalian Realty averred that it has never entered into a verbal
agreement with petitioner to grant the latter a road right of way.
To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue
inspite of a road right of way provided by the petitioner's subdivision for its
buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater
ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely
ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained regarding an
easement of a right of way, that "mere convenience for the dominant estate
is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude,
there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."
Additional Facts:
• Petitioner’s were constrained to pass through the back portion of their lot
bounded by other lots belonging to different owners, which is grassy and
cogonal as temporary ingress/egress with great inconvenience and
hardship, and this becomes all the more pronounced during the rainy
season due to flood and mud
• The aforesaid concrete wall is dangerously leaning towards appellant's
premises posing great danger or hazard
• Gatchalian Avenue is a private street established and constructed by the
defendant Corporation intended for the sole and exclusive use of its
residents and lot buyers of its subdivisions,

ISSUE:
w/n petitioner has successfully shown that all the requisites necessary for the
grant of a legal or compulsory easement of a right of way in his favor are
present.

Held: No, petitioner has failed to prove the existence of the first requisite.
(1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate
outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
(2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, p. 1. end);
(3) That the isolation was not due to the Petitioner’s own acts (Art. 649,
last par.); and
(4) That the right of way claimed is "at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest." (Art.
650).

A right of way, Lot 4133-G-12, was provided by the Lombos Subdivision in its
subdivision plan for the buyers. The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and
Digest Author: Fredrick Atienza
Mejorada vs. Vertudazo
Petitioner: Sps. Manuel Mejorada and Rosalinda P. Mejorada
Respondent: Glorificacion Vertudazo, Sol Vertudazo, Sps. Jimmy and
Glosita T. Galvizo, Sps. Fermin Cabrera and Ariate, and Sps. Raul Arlalejo
and Arcila Arlalejo.
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J:
DOCTRINE:
The owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right of way only
after he has established the existence of these four (4) requisites: (a) the
estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a
public highway; (b) after payment of the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation
was not due to the proprietor’s own acts; and (d) the right of way claimed is
at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
FACTS:
1. 1981, Glorificacion and Sol Vertudazo and their co-respondents
established their permanent residence on a 300 sqm lot at
Telaje, Surigao Del Sur.
2. The property is surrounded on all sides by different lots.
3. An access route going to Quinones Street and the public
highway was located on a property owned by Rosario
Quinones. This property was then sold to Manuel and Rosalinda
Mejorada.
4. The Sps. Mejorada closed the passageway by building a new
garage for their service jeep.
5. The Vertudazos filed a complaint praying for a grant of
easement of right of way.
6. The Mejoradas claimed that there is an alternate route although
it was long circuitouts and muddy. They also claimed that the
respondent’s property were due to the fence build by them.
7. RTC ruled in favor of the Vertudazos and ruled for the
establishment of a compulsory easement of right of way over
the passageway which was 55.5 sqm.
8. CA Affirmed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Vertudazos are entitled to the easement of
right of way on the property owned by the Mejoradas.
PROVISION: Article 649 and Article 650
1. Art. 649 – The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other
immovable pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet
to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of proper indemnity.
2. Art. 650 – The easement of right of way shall be established at
the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distances from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
RULING + RATIO:
1. Yes. A legal or compulsory easement is that which is
constituted by law for public use or for private interest.
Pursuant to the above provisions, the owner of an estate may
claim a legal or compulsory right of way only after he has
established the existence of these four (4) requisites: (a) the
estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway; (b) after payment of the proper indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the proprietor’s own acts; and (d) the
right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate.
a. First, as found by the Court of Appeals, there is no other
road which respondents could use leading to Quiñones
Street except the passageway on petitioners’ property.
b. Second, respondents have offered to pay petitioners
proper indemnity for the easement of way.
c. Third, the Court of Appeals likewise found that the isolation
of respondents’ property was not due to their acts.
d. Fourth, the easement is at the point least prejudicial to
petitioners’ property. In fact, the area of the easement
which is 55.5 square meters is located at the corner of
petitioners’ landholding, hence, does not cause them
inconvenience in anyway.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 62900 is AFFIRMED. Cost against
petitioners.
Digest Author: Anjo A. Alvañiz
Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos (2011)
Petitioners: CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR.,
EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ, and ROSEMARIE DICHOSO PE BENITO
Respondent: PATROCINIO L. MARCOS
Ponencia: NACHURA, J.
DOCTRINE: The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the
gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true
standard for the grant of the legal right is “adequacy.”
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are alleged owners of Lot No. 21553 in Laoag City.
2. Respondent is the owner of Lot No. 1.
3. Petitioners had no access to a public road to and from their property,
they claimed to have used a portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road
since 1970.
4.Respondent, however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand.
5. Though petitioners have been granted another passageway by the
spouses Benjamin and Sylvia Arce (Spouses Arce), the owners of another
adjacent lot, designated as Lot No. 21559-B, the former instituted the
complaint.
6. Petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, and they have
to pass through other lots owned by different owners before they could
get to the highway.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the legal easement of
right of way over the respondent's lot.
PROVISION: Articles 649 & 650 of the Civil Code:
Article 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to
a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its
use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate,
establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the
value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the
servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for
the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering
of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the
indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damages caused by such
encumbrance.
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts.
Article 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at
the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest.
RULING + RATIO:
1. No.
 To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following
requisites should be met:
1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has
no adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; and
4. The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
Petitioners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the
above-enumerated requirements.
Petitioners had been granted a right of way through the other
adjacent lot owned by the Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners
use the said outlet in going to and coming from the public
highway. Clearly, there is an existing outlet to and from the public
road.
 Petitioners’ concept of what is “adequate outlet” a complete
disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that in order to justify
the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real,
 not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for
the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of
setting up a compulsory easement.

 The fact that Spouses Arce are not insisting on a right of way
through respondent’s property, although an opening on the
latter’s property is undoubtedly the most direct and shortest
distance to P. Gomez St. from the former’s property, bolsters our
conviction that they have adequate outlet to the highway which
they are now likewise making available to petitioners.

 There is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant

estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said
outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to
open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.

 DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED. CA AFFIRMED.

 NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION v. CA
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari
Petitioner: National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
Respondent: Court of Appeals, Dick Manglapus
Ponente: Pardo, J
DOCTRINE:
One who deals with property registered under the Torrents system is
charged with notice of burdens and claims that are annotated on the
title.
FACTS:
1. A free patent over a three-hectare land in Baybayog, Alcala in the province
of Cagayan was granted in favor of Vicente Manglapus.
2. The title contained the provision "and subject finally to all conditions and
public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law
especially those mentioned in sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended"
3. Respondent Dick Manglapus obtained the land by absolute sale.
4. NIA entered into a contract with Villamar Development Construction to
construct canals in Alcala wherein diggings and fillings were made on
Manglapus' property.
5. Manglapus filed a complaint for damages where the RTC ruled in favor of
him. The CA affirmed the decision hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a
portion of his property for use as easement of a right of way.
PROVISION:
Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either
by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter
voluntary easements."
RULING + RATIO:
No, NIA is under no such obligation.
We agree with NIA that the Transfer Certificate of Title and the Original
Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land contained a
reservation granting the government a right of way over the land
covered therein.
This reservation, unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant, was not
limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition.
Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands granted by
patent,
"shall further be subject to a right of way not exceeding twenty meters in
width for public highways, railroads, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs
and telephone lines, and similar works as the Government or any public or
quasi-public service or enterprises, including mining or forest
concessionaires may reasonably require for carrying on their business, with
damages for the improvements only"
The canal NIA constructed was only 11 meters giving Manglapus no cause to
complain.
The land was originally of public character and would only be subject to just
compensation if it were originally private property.
The annotation on the transfer certificate of title imposed on Manglapus the
duty to refer to the conditions annotated on the back of the original certificate
of title. This, he did not do. One who deals with property registered under the
Torrens system is charged with notice of burdens and claims that are
annotated on the title.
DISPOSITION:
Petition GRANTED.
Digest Author: Dorothy Orial
Edited by Veron Requejo
Abellana, Sr. vs CA (1992)
Petitioner: Concordio Abellana, Sr., et al
Respondent: Hon. Court of Appeals, Municipal Govt. of Talisay, Cebu
Ponencia: J. Grino-Aquino
DOCTRINE:
An easement of right of way is not acquirable by prescription – The use
of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement
because its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of man; thus, it’s
not acquirable by prescription. In order to utilize private roads as public, the
local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or
expropriation.
FACTS:
8. Petitioners live in the northwestern side of the Nonoc Homes
Subdivision.
9. Respondents constructed a wall around the subdivision, which
deprived the petitioners of the use of a subdivision road, providing
access to the public highway.
10. They sued to establish that they have acquired by prescription an
easement of right of way over such subdivision road, which,
according to the petitioners, used to be a FOOTPATH which they
and their ancestors have been using since time immemorial.
11. Petitioner wishes that the high concrete walls enclosing the
subdivision and cutting off their access to the subdivision road be
REMOVED and that the road be opened to them.
12. Respondents DENIED 2 things:
a. That there was a pre-existing footpath before they developed
the subdivision
b. That Nonoc Subdivision roads are not the shortest way to a
public road for there is a more direct route from the
petitioners’ land to the public highway
13. Trial Court rendered judgement in favor of the herein petitioners,
ordering respondents to demolish the subject walls at certain areas
at their expense, and to leave them open for the use of the
petitioners and general public.
14. Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court, and denied
the MR of petitioners.
ISSUES: W/N an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription
HELD: No, there’s no easement.
PROVISION: Articles 649 and 650
RULING + RATIO:
a. The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a
continuous easement because its use it at intervals and depends
upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or
puts his feet over somebody else’s land. Hence, a right of way is not
acquirable by prescription.
b. Also, the footpaths did NOT acquire the status of public streets, as
petitioners alleged.
Relevant to Legal Easement (Art. 649-650):
 CA made a ruling reversing the decision of the trial court. CA held
that the essential requisites for the grant of an easement of right of
way are not obtained in this case.
 SC affirms this decision, ruling that CA did not commit any error in
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the requisite conditions
do not exist for the grant of an easement of right of way in favor of
the petitioners’ land under Art. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, it’s correct that the road lots in a private subdivision are
private property, hence, the local government should first acquire
them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be
utilized as a public road.
 The municipal ordinances which declared subdivision roads open to
public use “when deemed necessary by the proper authorities”
simply allow persons other than the residents of Nonoc Homes
Subdivision, to use the roads therein when they are inside the
subdivision, but those ordinances do not give outsiders a right to
open the subdivision walls so they can enter the subdivision from the
back.
 Lacks requisite #1. There exists another adequate outlet which has
access to the public highway other than the subdivision road.
DISPOSITION:
No merit in the petition for review, thus DENIED with costs against the
petitioners.
 ENCARNACION VS. CA (1991)
Petitioners: TOMAS ENCARNACION, petitioner,
Respondents: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EUSEBIO DE SAGUN and THE HEIRS
OF THE LATE ANICETA MAGSINO VIUDA DE SAGUN, respondents.
Ponente: Fernan
DOCTRINE: There is a legal easement of a right of way when a private
property has no access to a public road. The needs of the dominant
estate determine the width of the easement, requiring payment of
indemnity, which, if permanent, consists in the value of the land, and
damages.
Dominant Estate – Estate of Tomas Encarnacion
Servient Estate – Estate of Sagun and Magsino
FACTS:
1. Tomas Encarnacion (Petitioner) and Heirs of the late Aniceta
Magsino Viuda de Sagun (Respondent) are the owners of two
adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas
2. Encarnacion owns the dominant estate which has an area of 2,590
sqm. Bounded in the following manner:
a. On the NORTH by the estate of Sagun and Magsino
(Respondents)
b. On the SOUTH by the Taal Lake
c. On the EAST by Felino Matienzo
d. On the WEST by Pedro Matienzo
3. Sagun and Magsino co-own the 405 sqm servient estate which is
bounded on the NORTH by the national highway, meaning it stands
between the estate of Encarnacion (dominant) and the national
road.
4. Prior to 1960, when the Servient estate was not yet enclosed with a
concrete fence, anyone going to the national highway just crossed
the Servient Estate at any point. However, in 1960, they
constructed a fence around the estate, and a road path was
constructed to provide access to the highway, measuring 25
meters long, and 1 meter wide.
5. Encarnacion meanwhile started a plant nursery business on his land,
he would use the pathway as passage to the highway for his family
and his customers.
6. Encarnacion’s business flourished and it became more difficult to
transport the plants and garden soil from the estate to the highway
using just PUSHCARTS. In 1984, he was able to buy a jeep to
transport the plants, but it could not pass thru the road path. So
he approached the Owners of the Servient Estate and requested that
they sell to him 1 ½ (one and one-half) meters of their property to be
added to the pathway, but he was refused.
7. There actually existed another exit to the highway, only 80 meters
away from Encarnacion’s estate, which is a dried river bed.
8. Encarnacion then filed with RTC to issue a writ of easement of right
of way over an additional width of at least 2 meters over the Servient
estate’s property.
nd
9. RTC dismissed saying the 2 pathway thru the dried river bed was
sufficient and Servient’s already small land should not be further
decreased just because it is more convenient for Encarnacion.
10. CA affirmed.
.
ISSUE:
2. WoN the writ of easement of right of way over the servient estate
should be granted
PROVISIONS:
Art. 651 of the CC:
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES. The writ of easement should be granted.
 Generally, a right of way may be demanded:
i. When there is absolutely no access to a public
highway
ii. When even if there is one, it is difficult, dangerous to
use or grossly insufficient
 The pathway thru the dried river bed was found to be
grossly inadequate. It is traversed by a semi-concrete
bridge, and there is no ingress or egress from the highway.
For the jeep to reach the highway, it must literally jump 4-5
meters up. During the rainy season, it is impassable due to
floods.
 Thus passage over the river bed is difficult if not impossible;
it is as if there was no outlet at all.
 Where a private property has no access to a public road, it
has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as
a matter of law.
 There is a real and compelling need for an easement in his
favor, not merely just for convenience.
 By art. 651 of the CC, it is the needs of the dominant
property which ultimately determine the width of the
passage, and these needs may vary from time to time.
 i. With the growth of Encarnacion’s business, his
needs changed and he needed a wider pathway for
the jeep.
 Encarnacion must indemnify the owners of the servient
estate, consisting of the VALUE OF THE LAND and
DAMAGES caused (Permanent in nature).

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in conformity with the foregoing discussion,

the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1987 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion is hereby
declared entitled to an additional easement of right of way of twenty-five (25)
meters long by one and one-half (1 1/2) meters wide over the servient estate
or a total area of 62.5 square meters after payment of the proper indemnity.
 Vda. De Baltazar v CA (1995)
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari
Petitioner: LORETO VDA. DE BALTAZAR and NESTOR BALTAZAR
Respondent: CA and DANIEL PANGANIBAN
Ponencia: Romero, J
DOCTRINE: Four requisites for establishing a compulsory right of
ways: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper
indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4)
the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate,
and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
FACTS:
1. Daniel Panganiban is the owner of a residential land in Sta. Ines,
Bulacan.
a. Immediately to the front of his land is lot of Loreto Vda. de
Baltazar and her son Nestor.
b. Behind his lot is the Sta. Ana River.
c. On either side are lots owned by Calimon (west) and
Legaspi (east)
2. Braulio Street, a provincial road, runs along the frontage of Lots of
Vda, Baltaar, Calimon, and Legaspi
3. Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars for the
establishment of a permanent and perpetual easement of right
of way for him to have access to the provincial road
4. Baltazars opposed the establishment claiming that there exists two
other rights of way adjacent to Panganiban’s property. They
likewise argue that Panganiban had already abandoned the first right
of way.
5. Trial Courts found the following facts relevant in ruling in favor of the
Baltazars:
a. There used to be a 1.20-meter wide, 10.40 meter long
passageway in Baltazar’s property which Panganiban had
made use of
b. Aside from this passageway, there were two alternative right
of ways to Braulio Street:
i. Passageway along Legaspi’s lot
ii. Passageway along Calimon’s property
6. CA found the ff. facts relevant and reversed the decision of the trial
court:
a. The right of way in Baltazar’s property had been existing for
30 years since the time of grandfather Fidel
b. That passageway was closed and obstructed by the
Baltazars when it closed the gate and placed plants across
the gate
c. That the two alternative passageways were only temporary
and established upon Panganiban’s request when the
Baltazar’s closed the passageway on their property
ISSUE:
1. WoN Panganiban is entitled to claim an easement of right of
way over the Baltazars' property
PROVISIONS: Article 649 and 650, CC
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES Panganiban is entitled to claim a compulsory easement of right
of way over Baltazars’ lot because the four requisites for establishing a
compulsory right of ways is met:
4 reqs:
(1) The estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway
 Established by facts that Panganiban’s property was surrounded
(2) After payment of the proper indemnity;
 Remanded to trial court to fix proper indemnity
(3) The isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts
 Panganiban his lot from Baltazar’s predecessors-in-interest
 It was the Baltazars fault for blocking and covering with plants the
passageway
(4) The right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
 Passageway in Baltazar’s lot is the shortest distance from
Panganiban’s lot to Braulio Street.
 Baltazars were not inconvenienced as passageway was separate
and distinct from the gate used by them to enter their lot and
residence.
DISPOSITION: The decision appealed from is affirmed
 Almendras v CA
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari
Petitioner: Linda Almendras
Respondent: CA and Urcicio Tan Pang Eng and Fabiana Yap
Ponencia: Mendoza, J
DOCTRINE: Where an easement may be established on any of the
several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the
way is shortest and will cause the least damage must be chosen
FACTS:
1. Petitioner is an owner of a land in Banilad, Cebu. Such land is bounded on
the north and east by the lots of respondents and on the south by Bongo,
and on the west by Opone.
2. There is an existing private road on the west of petitioner which passes
through the lots of Opone which leads to another road on the property of the
Tudtuds and connects to the provincial road.
3. Respondents built a concrete wall on their property on the north and east
sides, causing petitioner to write to them to buy a portion of that lot for an
access to the road.
4. Respondents denied this saying that there is an existing road on the west
side. They said that it would reduce the value of their property. Bongo and
Opone also closed their properties by fencing it, making petitioner's land
inaccessible.
5. Petitioner filed a case for a right of way and rendered judgment by granting
her a right of way by paying indemnity but the private respondents appealed.
a preliminary question was decided because of the time of filing the appeal
(there was a holiday in commemoration of the EDSA revolution)
Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to a right of way in respondents'
property
PROVISIONS: Article 614, CC
Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one
or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong
RULING + RATIO:
1. No.
Petitioner has failed to prove that she has a right to the
establishment of such an easement.
The Opone road is indeed an existing, passable road which connects
to the Tudtud road which connects to the Cebu-Banilad Cadre Provincial
Board. The lots traversed by the private road are from one lot and was
subdivided into 7 lots. Because of this, a right of way was established from
Lot 1G to Lot 1 A. Almendras' property abuts 9.74m of such right of way.
This right of way was constituted by Bienvenido Tudtud in favor of
the owners of the lots as a gesture of his love and service to his fellowmen.
CA pointed out that there is already an existing permanent easement with the
Tudtud and Opone roads. The Tudtud easement was interpreted to mean for
the benefit of the public in general.
An owner can demand a right of way from the neighboring
estates and the easement must be the least prejudicial to the servient
estate and if possible the shortest. If these 2 conditions exist on
different properties, the easement that will be least prejudicial should
be chosen, even though not the shortest.
When the CA pointed out the easement for the longer way, it
considered that it was already existing and does not preclude the use of the
parties other than the owners of Lot 1A to lot 1G. However this can only be
done if the several lot owners (Opones and their buyers and those of Tudtud)
are before the court for the determination of the point least prejudicial. It
requires an evaluation of the physical conditions of the estates.
It is impossible to determine at the time which estate would be least
prejudiced because the parties have not been heard yet. Any decision would
not be binding to them since they are not parties to this action. This case
should be remanded and that respondents could file a third party complaint
to the owners of the servient estates which they believe the right of way
should be established.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE the decision of the CA and the RTC be set
aside and case remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
 Dionisio vs. Ortiz
The right of easement granted in favor of private respondents expired in
Petition: Motion Reconsideration December 1988. The continued use of the easement enjoyed by QCIEA
Petitioner: Adriana Dionisio is by mere tolerance pending the renegotiation. This is shown by the two
Respondent: Judge Rodolfo Ortiz letters to the QCIEA requesting for an increase in compensation for the
Ponencia: Gutierrez, Jr., J use of Howmart Road. Absent an agreement of consideration, no
contract of easement of right of way has been validly entered into by
petitioners and QCIEA.
DOCTRINE: (Easment of right of way Isolated estates, when not
compulsory) The records show that there are 2 other gates which the private
The easement of right of way for isolated immovable is not compulsory if the respondents may pass to have direct access to EDSA, the northern and
isolation if due to the proprietors’ own acts. the southern gate. The argument of the Private Respondents that they
need to open a new gate because of the subdivision of the land where a
FACTS: wall was constructed in between is untenable. The private Respondents
1. Petitioners are co-owners of lots which are adjacent to the 2 lots (Lot cannot assert a right of way when by their own voluntary act, they
272-A, Lot 272-B [this was subdivided into 2 lots]) co-owned by the themselves have caused the isolation of their property from the access
Private Respondents. road.
2. A private road, Howmart Road, traverses the lots owned by
Petitioners. By virtue of an agreement entered into between the The construction of a wall between the 2 lots leaving only a small
petitioners and the members of the Quezon City Industrial Estates passageway between them is an act imputable to the private
Associations (QCIEA), a right of way was granted over Howmart respondents which precludes them from asserting a right of way. The
Road. In return of its use, QCIEA paid compensation to the opening of a new gate would only be for their convenience and is not
petitioners for this right of way. The Private Respondents are bona enough to serve as basis for the assertion of a right of way.
fide members of the QCIEA.
3. The Easment has allegedly expired on December 1988 as the
petitioners sent two letters to the QCIEA requesting for an increase
in compensation for the use of Howmart Road.
4. In order to have access to Howmart Road, a gate was constructed in
the upper part of Lot 272-B and another gate in Lot 272-A. However
because of the subdivision of the Lot 272-B where a wall was
constructed in the middle to effect the subdivision, creating only a
small passageway too small for vehicles to pass, Private
Respondents opened a new gate to allow vehicles from the lower
part of Lot 272-B to have access to the main road. This is now the
gate in question.
5. Petitioners put up steel posts in fron of the newly constructed gate of
private respondents because the gate exposed them to the air and
noise pollution from the respondent’s delivery trucks.

ISSUES:
WON private respondents have an easement of right of way over Howmart
Road.

RULING + RATIO:
1. NO they no longer have an easment of right of way over
Howmart Road.