BARELWISM
See also: Deobandis, Wahhabism.
Gavin Picken
BARELWISM
Barelwism takes its name from Bareilly,
the town in Uttar Pradesh where the
movement’s central figure, Ahmad Riza
Khan (1856–1921), was based during
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century India. However, those who fol-
low Riza reject the term ‘Barelwi’ in
favour of Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama’a,
underlining their claim to be authentic
representatives of traditional Sunni
Islam. Riza was a Hanafi ‘alim and
Qadiri Sufi whose precocious talents
saw him follow his father and grand-
father into the study of fiqh. One of the
main functions of Riza’s scholarship
was to defend many of the more cus-
tomary aspects of religious practice that
were being criticised as un-Islamic inno-
vations (bid’a) by reformist movements
of the period. Unlike the Deobandis for
example, he distinguished between
‘good’ and ‘bad’ innovations. In this
respect the Ahl al-Sunna are often seen
as representing resistance to Islamic
revivalism. Nevertheless, as Usha
Sanyal argues in Devotional Islam and
Politics in British India, it is clear that
Riza saw himself as reviving the Pro-
phet’s sunna amongst ‘forgetful’ Mus-
lims in an attempt to recreate the ‘moral
climate’ of early Islam.
The Barelwis under discussion here
are to be distinguished from the ‘anti-
Sufi’ jihad movement of Sayyid Ahmad
Barelwi (1785–1831). While the latter
sought to organise Muslims against the
British and the Sikhs, Riza adopted a
largely apolitical response to the raj,
rejecting pan-Islamic ideals and viewing
the political arena as basically ‘amoral’.
In the aftermath of the so-called ‘Indian
Mutiny’ of 1857, by which time virtually
all military resistance to the British was
90
crushed, the Ahl al-Sunna were one of a
number of neo-traditionalist ‘ulama’-led
movements which ‘turned inwards’ to
reaffirm the authority of the past. Like
their great rivals, the Deobandis, they
accepted British rule in so far as it did
not interfere in Muslim religious affairs.
However, at the same time, the Ahl al-
Sunna actively sought to create an
alternative world to that of the non-
Muslim state.
The Ahl al-Sunna places great stress
on devotion to, and veneration of, the
Prophet Muhammad. It emphasises the
Sufi concept of the ‘light of Muham-
mad’ (nur Muhammad) which, rather
like the Christian logos, is said to have
existed from creation and is derived
from God’s own light (nur khuda).
According to Barelwi scholars,
Muhammad is no mere mortal. He pos-
sesses ‘ilm al-ghayb (knowledge of the
unknown) and is the primary focus for
tawassul (intercession) with God.
Indeed, the Prophet is understood to be
a continuous presence in the life of
Muslims. Riza, for example, wrote
devotional poetry in praise of Muham-
mad (na’t) and always discussed him in
the present tense. Similarly, during the
celebration of the Prophet’s birthday
(mawlid), when Muhammad’s birth is
recalled and blessings are called down
upon him (the salat al-salam), Barelwis
stand believing that the Prophet’s spirit
is present among them.
The Ahl al-Sunna are also dis-
tinguished by the intensity of their
respect for the awliya’ (literally ‘friends
of God’, Sufi pirs or saints). In the same
way that one cannot reach God except
through the Prophet, so too, Barelwis
believe that one cannot expect to reach
the Prophet unless one has access to the
intercession of a holy person. As Riza
suggests, the pir is the ‘qibla of the soul’.
The resulting devotion to the awliya’,
and the desire for their charismatic

blessing (baraka), finds popular expres-
sion in local and regional cults of saints.
The characteristic institution of such
cults is the mazar (shrine) or dargah
(more revealingly, ‘court’), where people
make their ziyara (visitation) to suppli-
cate one of God’s friends. It is believed
that, although dead, the saints are spiri-
tually alive and retain their power of
intercession after death. Indeed, the cel-
ebration of a saint’s ‘urs (death anniver-
sary, literally ‘wedding’), when the soul
of the deceased is ‘married’ to God, can
be one of the main celebrations of the
year.
In the literature it is usual to see
reference to Barelwism as drawing much
of its support from the rural masses in
south Asia for whom Sufi saints and
shrines remain as important as ever.
However, the leadership of the Ahl al-
Sunna consisted mainly of ‘ulama’ and
only those pirs who were self-con-
sciously reformist in character. More-
over, this leadership was drawn mainly
from the prosperous and landowning
families of small agricultural towns and
larger urban settlements. Therefore
while the Ahl al-Sunna was happy to
‘represent’ ordinary Muslims, rural
shrines were not ‘Barelwi’ as such. The
Ahl al-Sunnat ‘ulama’ may have been
sympathetic to ‘popular’ ritual worship,
denying any absolute opposition
between the shrine and the mosque.
However, Ahmad Riza Khan was first
and foremost a Hanafi ‘alim. He was
part of a long tradition of reformed
Sufism which condemns the extra-
vagances of folk Islam, especially those
which reject the shari’a or exhibit evi-
dence of Hindu–Muslim syncretism.
The Barelwis’ beliefs and practices
drew them into polemical conflicts with
their fellow Sunni Muslims, especially
the Deobandis, Tablighi Jama‘at, Ahl-i
Hadith and the Nadwat al-’Ulama’. It
was not unusual for Riza to publicly
BARELWISM
attack an opponent as a kafir (unbelie-
ver). He refused to have any social rela-
tions with Shi‘ites and condemned
Deobandis for their lack of respect for
the awliya’. Moreover, he would corre-
spond with Sunni ‘ulama’ in Mecca and
Medina, where he had long-standing
contacts and some authority, seeking
wider endorsement for his rulings. In
turn, Riza’s opponents would retort that
Barelwi beliefs and practices were
‘backward’ and ‘ignorant’. Such con-
troversies were played out very publicly
during preaching tours, oral disputa-
tions and in an increasingly elaborate
sectarian literature. This provided the
main medium for educated Muslims to
debate their faith towards the end of the
nineteenth century. For example, the
1880s witnessed a massive increase in
the number of printing presses in India
and the Ahl al-Sunna published around
1000 of Riza’s Urdu fatwa in news-
papers, pamphlets and books. They also
produced a monthly journal and their
own annual newspaper.
Such activities were supported by the
subscriptions of the educated and afflu-
ent core of the Ahl al-Sunna’s member-
ship, which included some of the old
aristocracy, the newer professions and
those working in the British administra-
tion. For this reason, Sanyal contests
the common misperception that Riza
and the Ahl al-Sunna did not promote
the ‘modern’ turn towards a more self-
conscious and individualised religious
identity evident amongst other move-
ments. Like the Deobandis and others,
the emergence of the Ahl al-Sunna
reflected a time when the State provided
no symbolic focus for ideas about Mus-
lim ‘community’. Sanyal considers that
Riza’s major achievement in this respect
was in creating an overarching identity
for an expression of Islamic belief and
practice which is naturally diverse and
fragmented. Indeed, compared to the
91
BARMAKIDS
Deobandis, the Barelwis were much
slower in developing educational insti-
tutions and achieved a much less cen-
tralised, and generally less well-
organised, structure than their rivals. To
this day, so-called ‘Barelwis’ will iden-
tify most closely with an individual Sufi
pir or tariqa rather than any ‘ulama’ or
organisation.
After, Riza’s death, and as move-
ments for Indian independence gathered
pace in the early to mid-twentieth cen-
tury, some members of the Ahl al-
Sunna, came to support the com-
munalist project of a Muslim homeland
as eventually advocated by the secular-
nationalist elites of the Muslim League.
This represented quite a shift from
Riza’s uncompromising position of
refusing to engage with those Muslims
he regarded as being in error on matters
of religion. Of course, some Barelwis
held fast to such a stance and did not
leave India for Pakistan when Partition
finally came in 1947. Others stayed sim-
ply because they had a dargah to look
after. However, once in Pakistan, the
Barelwi ‘ulama’, represented by Jami‘at-
i ‘Ulama’-i Pakistan (JUP), became
increasingly active in the political arena,
forming an ‘ulama’ party, as did the
Deobandis. This was at least in part a
response to the activism of a new rival,
Mawdudi’s Islamist organisation,
Jama‘at-i Islami (JI). Like JI, these
‘ulama’ parties have been courted at
times by Pakistan’s rulers, all keen to
have their policies ‘Islamically’
endorsed. For example, during the
‘Islamisation’ of Pakistan by General
Zia (r. 1977–88), there was state-spon-
sorship for a huge expansion in madrasa
numbers. Zaman, for example, shows
that the number of Barelwi institutions
grew from under 100 in 1971 to over
1,000 in 1994. However, Zia’s interven-
tions escalated sectarian competition,
conflict and violence both between Sun-
92
nis and Shi‘ites and between Sunnis of
different persuasions. Since the 1980s,
the JUP has split into different factions
and an expanding urban middle class
has seen support grow for the Deo-
bandis, especially, at the expense of the
Barelwis.
References
Sanyal (1996), Zaman (2002).
See also: Deobandism, Muslim League.
Sean McLoughlin
BARMAKIDS
Barmakids, also known as Barmecides
(Arabic al-Baramika), a prominent
family of state viziers and secretaries
under the early ‘Abbasid caliphs. Their
name was derived from barmak, the
custodian of a former Buddhist shrine at
Balkh in eastern Khorasan. A member
of the family, Khalid ibn Barmak, took
part in the ‘Abbasid insurrection that
originated in Khurasan and which led
eventually to the overthrow of the
Umayyads in ad 750, and Khalid’s
family, who saw themselves as succes-
sors to the Sasanian administrative tra-
dition, quickly rose to prominent
positions under the new ‘Abbasid
dynasty.
Khalid himself, who died in ad 781/2,
had served under the first ‘Abbasid
caliphs in various administrative capa-
cities, holding at different times the
important positions of governor of Fars
and governor of Tabaristan. The
family’s influence at the caliphal court
reached its peak, however, with the
accession in ad 786 of Harun al-Rashid,
who appointed Khalid’s son Yahya as
vizier with unlimited powers, and gave
Yahya’s two sons, al-Fadl and Ja‘far,
charge of the caliph’s personal seal. For
the next decade at least, the family had