An Industrial Boilers Explosion and How to

Prevent It.
 Mr. Misdeh Bin Rasman
Mr. Hassan Bin Abdul Hamid Mr. Moktar Mat Jin
Electric, Control & Instrumentation
Unit Pembangunan Electrical Department
Ranhill Powertron Sdn Bhd
Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri Sabah ILP Kota Kinabalu
Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia
Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia
misdehrpt@gmail.com
aieqal@gmail.com moktarmatjin@gmail.com

Mr. Joye Tingkolou

Mr. Nail Sausin Mr. Jaikol Udar
Electrical Department
Electrical Department Electrical Department
ILP Kota Kinabalu
ILP Kota Kinabalu ILP Kota Kinabalu
Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia
Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia
joyet777@gmail.com
sk8161.ns@gmail.com jaikoludar@yahoo.com
 Abstract—This _ Grp Joye
Keywords—Boilers, Human-Machine Interface (HMI), PLC,
I/O Module, Dampers, Burner, ID Fan, FD Fan,
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is contained of two major parts. The first
part is the background of providing information of the
equipment associated with the explosion, including the
boilers and descriptions of the control system. The second
part is a summary of incidents and analysis discussing some
of the observations and facts before the accident. The details
summary of accident events explain in this part, but has
been familiar with protecting information that is difficult.
This is followed by a case study section where we identify
the causes of failure. At the end of this paper we are finished
with the Hazard Analysis section, which introduces this field
and explains how we use technique hazard analysis to help
plant staff in preventing recurring crashes. However, all
company names involved with case studies in this paper will
be kept confidential.
II. BACKGROUND _ GRP JOYE
III. DOSH INFO__ GRP JOYE
IV. INCIDENT SUMMARY
Often, we hear an explosion happening in the industrial
boiler. For first example, an accident at a company X last
year, whose company name a kept confidential. The
replacement of ignition burner on the boiler has been done
recently and the commissioning of a new ignition burner
system still in progress. During the accident, only natural
gas ignition was used in boiler and the boiler operator was
aware that he failed to manage the boiler control system.
Then explosion was occurred in it a few minutes later. No
injured personnel in the incident, while facilities
damage was limited to nearby equipment,
boilers and boilers houses. The main reason for
the explosion in boilers and contributors
resulting in the incident will be mentioned later.
These case study will focus on boiler control
systems and industrial boiler itself for the
operators.
An observation of the control system and
the end of the control element in the field was
taken a few minutes before the explosion.
Without operator knowledge, the control system
has stopped its operation. The boiler operators
report a failure of the boiler control system and
try to solve the problem. Various control
elements have been observed and only act
immediately to control the signal from the boiler
operator. Field operators report that the control
of these elements not only reacts but operates
in the wrong control with the direction of the
boiler operators. Boiler operators cannot control
the boiler because the control system does not
respond.
After the incident, the inspection data was
shows that some sensors for the control
element a malfunction or not detected for a few
minutes before the explosion. The historian
data were recorded also show that control of
various process variables was resume as normal
operation. However, the data for incoming and
outgoing pressure contamination equipment
was recorded during interruption. Other than
that, there a no airflow go in to the boiler
firebox during the interruption as stated in
recorded data.
Based on an error analysis and include all
data from evidence, calculations and witness
statements we tend to found that the ignition
approached close to abnormal conditions and
therefore the state of the boiler reached the
gas/air LEL (Explosion Low Explosion). The flow
of air was reduced within the boiler and also the
FD, ID dampers closure because of loss of the
control system.
V. MAJOR EQUIPMENT INVOLVED
Two major parts were involved with the boiler incident
which is boiler equipment and boiler control system. The
boiler equipment are mechanical parts such as feed water
pumps, water drums, burners, fans, valves and boiler tubes.
While the PLCs are algorithm and mathematical modelling
in terms of programming which control the process of boiler
operation. The main function for each part will be described
in details as below.
A. Boiler Equipment
The primary function of a boiler is to generate steam by
heating a water. Steam produced in a boiler can be used for
a variety of purposes including drying, sterilisation, power
generation, space heating and humidification. Modern boiler
design offers several benefits. In the past, improper design
of boilers has caused explosions which led to the loss of life
and property. Figure 1 show the block flow diagram for air
flow and fuel to the boiler. The boiler system consisted of
primary burner and couple with neutral gas fired ignition
burner.
Fig 1. Block Diagram for Burner System
 For the stable combustion, the burners required a
secondary air feed form the air system. Each burner has
installed a natural gas fired igniter complete with air feed
from the wind box to get proper combustion. In additional
air stream supplied by forced draft (FD) fan with constant
speed. The induced draft (ID) fan were draw the exhaust
gases from the furnace and air pollution control device. The
rate of air flow control by both FD and ID fan dampers. The
discharge of exhaust gases exited to the stack.
B. Boiler Control System
Basically, boiler control system divided into several
interfacing components and subsystems, such as Burner
Management System, Human-machine interfacing (HMI),
Combustion Control System and Plant Information System
(PI). Those devices communicated via hard-wire signals,
networking and interfacing using a HMI. The Programmable
Logic Controller for boiler management system and
combustion control system had physical connections to the
field devices, actuators as know field devices. For historian
and data recording system the plant information system was
used. The standard boiler interlock, sensors and safety
functions were represented by boiler management system.
The PLC also consisted of several sub-system such as a
main processor, power supply, networking cards and I/O
modules. Basically, the I/O modules will read the value of
sensors state. Also allowed the PLC to control the output
such as actuators, fans, solenoids and etc. Normally PLC
Fig 2. Programmable Logic Controller
located in cabinet complete with key switch. This key
switch controls the PLC state functions or modes. For
example, run mode will execute the PLC programmed logic,
remote mode will allow the operator control the field
devices from Control Room personal computer and lastly
the program mode use for program execution preparation to
download the new instructions.
VI. CASE STUDY
The investigations included the root cause analysis,
calculations and the equipment affected as mentioned above.
Additionally, the analysis can specialise in the PLC
software, PLC hardware and Programming PLC software
system procedures were needed. With refer to detail of the
case study, a group of causative factors was found for any
thought. These sets of causative factors were reduced to an
additional compendious set for root causes analysis. Several
of the case studies are mentioned below to produce lessons
learned from the case studies. The summary of case studies
and root causes analysis are generalized to safeguard any
confidential details.
A. Case Study 1. Lack of PLC Monitored
The first case study is focus on the lack of an external
monitoring for the Boiler Control System has ceased or
function failed. The condition of the PLC is not monitored
due to malfunction or if a standalone review of the system
has occurred. Such studies may include comparisons to
current standards and proposals [2]. If the burner monitoring
system able to detect that the system does not control a vital
field device, then the burner detection system could act on
this information.
In events of burner malfunction, the Boiler Control
System ought to be detected by the burner detection system
earlier of any protection sensors activated as a result of
malfunction or improper operational conditions. For
example, the loss of the Boiler Control System would be
tripped the boiler. The management change of the system
could have moderately to prevent the previous accident or
similar accidents with considering the incorporating control
specifications, control system testing, procedures and
inspection needs.
B. Case Study 2. Configuration of Input/output (I/O)
Modules
The existing configuration output signal for the I/O
modules will close the induced draft (ID) fan and forced
draft (FD) fan dampers when a PLC malfunction. This is
known as a fail-safe configuration is also taken place if a
functional philosophy had been programmed for the Control
System or if a review of procedures needs the third-party
review for the existing system design has been taken place.
Therefore, a case study should have included a comparison
of recommendations and industry standards, such as a
minimum airflow requirement or maintaining the airflow
with integrating to the logic state operating of the control
system by preventing the dampers from close. Hence, in the
event of a control processor malfunction or stopped, the
logic configuration setting doesn’t cause the dampers to shut
or close.
C. Case Study 3. Minimum Damper Open Position
Based on historical data analysis, the damper was
permitted to fully close, this is not met the requirement of
NFPA 85 standard. The third-party investigation regarding
the airflow requirement and installation for the burner
system should be reviewed for this current issue. In case of
the control system interruption as experienced in the
previous incident then the administrative control able to
limit the minimum set-point to the position of the damper is
insufficient. According to NFPA 85 standards, the airflow
required is not less than 25% level when there is has fuel
flowing to the igniters or burners [1]. Normally, to limit the
minimum position the function of mechanical stops will take
place to ensure the damper system in a safe condition.

D. Case Study 4. Airflow Sensors Limit
The airflow sensor was connected on the terminal screw
were not functional well, therefore, the Boiler Control
System unable to sense a low airflow stage by using the
existing sensors. Referring to the NFPA 85 code, such as at
this condition it must lead to the main fuel tripped [1]. The
analysis of case study was centered on how this situation
was developed in the system and remained hidden during
the upgrade project for the burner system. The history of the
monitoring strategy on the boiler for the minimum airflow
requirement, it was clearly mentioned that this issue was
developed during a previous control system upgrade. The
modified of this strategy ought to have final verification on
the control system elements however apparently didn't.
VII. SAFETY AND HAZARD_ MOK & HASSAN
VIII. ANALYSIS OF HAZARD
An industrial definition of hazard is a chemical and
physical unsafe situation that has a potential of causes harm
to the environment, human and property [4]. A plant has
boiler is a specific type of process that may involve with a
larger process of chemical or as the sources for the power
generation. Normally the process hazards from the steam of
the boiler will produce steam, high pressure, high
temperature and combustion together with the machinery.
Another hazard is the occupational hazards, such as falling
object, rotating machine, slip and electricity. It is strongly
recommended by NFPA 85 to review both initial design and
system of boiler safety should be changed. Referring to
NFPA 85 codes, they provide several prescriptive guidelines
for commissioning, designing, maintaining and operating of
the boiler systems. However, there is no specific hazard
evaluation methods or techniques had mentioned in NFPA
85 to comply with safety objectives.
In the process of hazard evaluation, many procedures
can be applied to identify the potential hazards on the steam
boiler frameworks at the different condition in the existing
cycle of the processing unit. The process unit life-cycle
incorporates the phases of designing, commissioning,
maintaining and operating. The different purposes for the
process life after beginning commissioning, minor
modification might be attempted to electrical, control
systems and mechanical that adjust the actual function
specification or characteristics. Basically, the minor of
modifications might fall under the definition of an
organization's administration for the modification
procedures. Normally a process of hazard analysis must be
recommended or suggested for any such changes, be that as
it may, the complexity of the progressions ought to be
viewed as while figuring out what sort of process hazard
analysis is to be directed.
Subjective situation driven danger examination methods,
for example, Hazard Identification Studies, Preliminary
Hazard Analyses, Risk and feasibility studies are very
importance in the process industries, these are more
qualified to develop a procedure and beginning the system
designs. The investigation of the boiler in this paper has
been securely in service for more than twenty years
preceding the occurrence; along these lines, most of hazard
things that might be distinguished by the sooner ways were
seemingly already mitigated for the current design. In any
case, the incident occurred throughout a structure
adjustment, which may be utilized to trigger a restricted to
handle the new changes.
An efficient variety of methodology hazards analysis can
be a detailed guidance and checklist of analysis is also found
in reference [3]. A list could also be a table of things or
written list that are accustomed to verify the standing of a
system. An individual checklist is also extremely related to a
specific process; however, they are oftentimes used to
ensure the compliance to the standards and pointers [4].
Most of a list provide criteria against that a given system has
been evaluated. The case studies were found that sensible
success in developing of safety checklist for the boiler to be
used within the management of amendment activities when
the existing system upgrades and commission. From a
generic list and rationalization of however this list would
have known the particular root causes are provided below.
The provisions NFPA 85 checklist-based analysis would
doubtless has observed the possible causes known within
the previous part once employed by knowledgeable about
and knowledgeable 4 Copyright © 2015 by ASME
personnel as a part of the facility’s management of
amendment. For example, attentive consideration of part
4.6.3.2.3 of NFPA 85 could have addressed the situations
that contribute the main causes for case studies 1, 2 and 3 as
it clearly needs evaluating for failure modes like a
malfunction of processors.
According to ABMA-Boiler 307 Combustion control
guideline for single burner fire-tube, chapter 3.3, the
implementing of the checklist was able to detect the lack of
a state-of-health monitor between burner and control system
(Referring to case study 1). This chapter mentioned that the
control system will send a fault signal to the control system
anytime when there is an internal fault or abnormal
condition in the burner system to take care of safe operation.
For case study 4, the minimum airflow sensor non-
operating may have described in chapter 6.6.5.2.1.1-(14) of
NFPA 85. This chapter mentioned that a complete functional
test of the interlocks should be carried out after any
modification and an overhaul on the interlock system. If the
functional test has been conducted during the system
upgrades before, so that the malfunction of the sensor can be
detected before the special necessities resulting in the
incident were an occurrence.
IX. CONCLUSION_MOK & HASSAN
REFERENCES
[1] National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 85; Boiler and
Combustion System Hazards Code. Pp 26-41, 2015.
[2] American Boiler Manufacturers Association (ABMA)– Addressing
Common Issues Impacting Safety & Performance of Boilers, June
2018
[3] Fecke M, Morrison DR, Martens J, Cowells J. “A guide to developing
and implementing safety checklists: Plant steam utilities.” American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2010.
[4] CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety), Guidelines for Hazard
Evaluation Procedures, 3rd Edition, April 2008.