SECOND DIVISION
Ombudsman for MOLEO having been appointed on 16 December 1999) that the main folder
G.R. No. 207355, February 03, 2016
JENNIFER A. AGUSTIN-SE AND ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-
RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, OVERALL DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND JOHN I.C. TURALBA, ACTING DEPUTY
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 to set aside the 29 November 2012 Decision2 and the 23
May 20133 Resolution of the Court of Appeals upholding the 14 June 20114 Decision of the Office
of the President (OP) to dismiss the complaint of Jennifer A. Agustin-Se and Rohermia J. Jamsani-
Rodriguez (petitioners) against respondents Orlando C. Casimiro (Casimiro) and John I.C. Turalba
(Turalba).chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
Petitioners are Assistant Special Prosecutors III of the Office of the Ombudsman, who have been
assigned to prosecute cases against Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Leopoldo S. Acot (Acot), Bgen. (Ret.)
Ildelfonso N. Dulinayan (Dulinayan) and several others before the Sandiganbayan for alleged
ghost deliveries of assorted supplies and materials to the Philippine Air Force amounting to about
Eighty Nine Million Pesos (P89,000,000.00).
Sometime in early 1995, the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against Acot, Dulinayan and several others
which was eventually docketed as OMB-AFP-CRIM-94-0218. In a Resolution dated 12 April
1996,5 Ombudsman Investigators Rainier C. Almazan (Almazan) and Rudifer G. Falcis II (Falcis)
recommended the filing of Informations against Acot, Dulinayan, and several others for violation
of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019 [RA No. 3019])
and/or for Malversation through Falsification. Casimiro was then the Director of the Criminal and
Administrative Investigation Division of the Office of the Ombudsman and the immediate
supervisor of Almazan and Falcis. Casimiro concurred with and signed the 12 April 1996
Resolution and indorsed the same to Bgen. (Ret.) Manuel B. Casaclang, then Casimiro's
immediate superior.
In a Memorandum dated 10 July 1996,6 then Special Prosecution Officer III Reynaldo L. Mendoza
recommended the modification of the 12 April 1996 Resolution to charge Acot, Dulinayan and
several others only with the violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. In a Memorandum dated 12
January 1998,7Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo (Tamayo) recommended that the charges
against Acot and Dulinayan be dismissed for lack of evidence. Affirming the recommendation of
Tamayo, on 2 March 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the 12 April 1996
Resolution with the modification to dismiss the charges against Acot and Dulinayan.
In a Memorandum dated 29 April 2005,8 Nolasco B. Ducay and Melita A. Cuasay, record officers
of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers
(OMB-MOLEO), brought to the attention of Casimiro (who was then already the Deputy
containing the 12 April 1996 Resolution could not be located despite the records having been
returned to the OMB-MOLEO on 6 March 1998. The discovery of the missing folder was made
when Col. Proceso I. Sabado and Ltc. Jose R. Gadin, who were co-respondents of Acot and
Dulinayan, applied for a clearance with the Office of the Ombudsman. Due to the delay in the
action on the 12 April 1996 Resolution and inexplicable loss of the main folder, Almazan and
Falcis, in a Memorandum dated 7 July 2005,9 strongly recommended a thorough review of the
case. Casimiro forwarded the 7 July 2005 Memorandum to Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo who
directed the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) to study the records and submit a recommendation.
In a Memorandum dated 25 June 2007,10 the OLA noted that the 12 April 1996 Resolution had
"no force and effect because it was never promulgated." The OLA recommended, among others,
the filing of Informations against Acot, Dulinayan and several others. In a Memorandum dated 23
February 2009, Assistant Special Prosecutor II Terence S. Fernando of the Office of the
Ombudsman Proper recommended the approval of the OLA's Memorandum. On 3 March 2009,
acting pursuant to delegated authority, Casimiro approved both the 25 June 2007 and 23 February
2009 Memoranda. The Informations were thereafter filed against Acot, Dulinayan and several
others with the Sandiganbayan.
Acot and Dulinayan filed their respective Motions to Quash/Dismiss and to Defer Arraignment
mainly on the grounds that: (1) the right of the State to prosecute had already prescribed; and (2)
given the amount of time the case was filed after the preliminary investigation was started almost
15 years, their right to speedy disposition of case had been violated. 11 Dulinayan further alleged
that a clearance had been issued by the Office of the Ombudsman stating that there were no
pending cases against him. The Sandiganbayan required petitioners, the assigned prosecutors
for this case, to comment on the motions filed by Acot and Dulinayan.
To determine the veracity of the statement of Dulinayan that he had been issued a clearance
stating that there are no pending cases against him, petitioners confirmed with the Public
Assistance Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman whether such clearance had been
issued.12 Moreover, to determine the events that transpired after the modification of the 12 April
1996 Resolution, petitioners requested certified machine copies of the docket entries with the
Records Division.13 While the issuance of the clearance was timely confirmed, the certified
machine copies of the docket entries were delayed; and thus, petitioners were constrained to file
several Motions for Extension of Time to File Comment/Opposition to the Motions filed by
Dulinayan and Acot.
Based on their evaluation of the records, petitioners found that there were procedural lapses in
the handling of the cases, which they attributed to Casimiro. Thus, instead of filing the required
Comment and/or Opposition with the Sandiganbayan, petitioners submitted a Memorandum dated
5 January 2010,14 which contained their findings against Casimiro. This Memorandum, while
addressed to then Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio, was submitted to Turalba, who was
the Officer-in-Charge, Director, Prosecution Bureau V. Turalba, however, merely attached the said
Memorandum as part of the records and thereafter relieved petitioners from the cases, alluding
that they were remiss in their duty to file the necessary Comment and/or Opposition with the
Sandiganbayan.15 Turalba filed his owa Comment and/or Opposition which prompted petitioners
to seek the approval of Villa-Ignacio of their version of the draft Comment and/or Opposition, which
they eventually filed with the Sandiganbayan.16 However, the Informations against Acot, Dulinayan
and several others were subsequently dismissed by the Sandiganbayan for violation of the
accused's right to speedy disposition of the case.
In the meantime, Turalba furnished Casimiro with the 5 January 2010 Memorandum of petitioners.
Casimiro thereafter required petitioners to explain why they should not be held criminally and
administratively liable for insubordination, gross neglect and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
1
of the service.17 Instead of responding to Casimiro, petitioners submitted a Memorandum dated
20 January 2010 to Villa-Ignacio explaining their actions.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thereafter, on 4 February 2010, Casimiro filed a Complaint19 against petitioners with the Internal
Affairs Board (IAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman for the crime of libel and Section 3(e) of RA
No. 3019, and administratively, for grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, gross neglect of duty, and insubordination. Pending investigation, petitioners were
placed under preventive suspension.
On 3 November 2010, petitioners filed their own Complaint20 before the OP, alleging that Casimiro
and Turalba committed the following administrative infractions: (1) grave misconduct, (2) gross
negligence; (3) oppressions, (4) conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; (5)
violation of the rules on confidentiality; (6) violation of Office Order No. 05-18, and Office Order
No. 05-13; and (7) violation of Section 35 of RA No. 6770, 21 amounting to dishonesty and gross
misconduct.22chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the Office of the President
On 2 November 2011, the OP denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners.26 On 28
November 2011, they filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals to set aside the decision of the OP.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision dated 29 November 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision rendered by
the OP. The Court of Appeals held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As correctly raised by respondent Casimiro, the delay, if any, was necessitated by the layers of
preliminary investigation and multiple reviews conducted by the concerned authorities in the Office
of the Ombudsman over a period of time under different leaderships starting from Ombudsman
Desierto, to Ombudsman Marcelo and thereafter, to Ombudsman Gutierrez. It must be
emphasized that for his part, respondent Casimiro concurred with the findings of his
subordinates, Almazan and Falcis, who conducted the preliminary investigation against
Acot and company, and who issued the 12 April 1996 Resolution recommending the filing
of appropriate criminal Informations against the latter. This, in turn, was recommended for
approval by Casaclang, respondent Casimiro's immediate superior, to Ombudsman Desierto.

In a Decision dated 14 June 2011,23 the OP dismissed the complaint filed against Casimiro and x x x x
Turalba. On the allegation that Casimiro caused the delay in the investigation of the cases against
Acot, Dulinayan and several others, the OP ruled that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary From the foregoing factual antecedents, it becomes evident that upon review of the 12 April 1996
This Office finds that the delay in the preliminary investigation of OMB-AFP-CRM-94-0218 could Resolution, the charges against Acot and Dulinayan were approved for dismissal by Ombudsman
not be validly attributed to respondent Casimiro, whose participation in the disposition of the case Desierto, and not for the filing of Information as recommended and concurred with by Almazan
is his initial review as Director, submission of the Memorandum of 7 July 2005 and the Information and Falcis, and respondent Casimiro, respectively. Thus, respondent Casimiro cannot be faulted
in accordance with the Resolution dated 12 April 1996, as approved by Ombudsman Desierto, in the delay, if any, in filing the appropriate criminal Informations against Acot and Dulinayan
and his approval of the final resolution of the case by delegated authority and of the various considering that Ombudsman Desierto overruled the recommendations and concurrence by the
Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against the accused, now Investigators and Casimiro as to the finding of probable cause against the said military
docketed as SB-09-CRM-0184 to 0189 of the Sandiganbayan. officials. Simply put, there was nothing to be filed before the Sandiganbayan against Acot
and Dulinayan after the approval and modification of the 12 April 1996 Resolution as the
This Office agrees with respondent Casimiro that as a mere Director of a Bureau of the Office of charges against them were approved for dismissal.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
the Deputy Ombudsman for Military and other Law Enforcement Offices and who was thereafter
In a Resolution dated 23 May 2013,28 the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
appointed Deputy Ombudsman only on December 16, 1999, he had every right to presume
Reconsideration29 filed by petitioners on 21 December 2012. Thereafter, this petition for review on
regularity in the investigation of the case.
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was timely filed on 19 June
2013.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In fact, no less than the Office of Legal Affairs of the Office of the Ombudsman, concluded that the
Resolution dated 12 April 1996 had never become final.
The Issues
x x xx
In this petition, petitioners seek a reversal of the decision of the OP and the Court of Appeals, and
No delay, therefore, may be attributed to respondent Casimiro who came across the records of raise the following issues for resolution:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
the case nine (9) years after he signed the Resolution dated 12 April 1996 recommending the filing A. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT
of informations to his superior, if the Office of the Ombudsman itself never considered that the PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS NOT VIOLATED BY RESPONDENT OFFICE
Resolution dated 12 April 1996 as final and executory.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary OF THE PRESIDENT, WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PETITIONERS DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION;
On the issue of whether Casimiro and Turalba violated the rules on confidentiality, the OP
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary B. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED
The Memorandum dated January 5, 2010 is not confidential or classified information within the THAT THERE ARE NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD AS AGAINST RESPONDENT
ambit of R.A. No. 6713 and R.A. No. 3019. CASIMIRO FOR THE DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION AND PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF
OMB-AFP-CRM-94-0218 (SB-09-CRM-0184-0189), AND AGAINST RESPONDENTS CASIMIRO
Therefore, Director Turalba could not be faulted for his act of furnishing a copy thereof to AND TURALBA FOR VIOLATION OF OFFICE ORDER NO. 05-18, OFFICE ORDER NO. 05-13,
respondent Casimiro who was the subject of the investigation which the complainants sought to VIOLATION OF SEC. 35 OF R.A. 6770 AND SEC. 3 (K) OF R.A. 3019;
be conducted. On the other hand, respondent Casimiro cannot be blamed for issuing the
Memorandum dated January 18, 2010 directing complainants to explain their action, in view of the C. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING
latter's insinuation that it was by his fault that the preliminary investigation of OMB-AFP-CRM-94- THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT THAT THE
0218 had been prolonged.25cralawred PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF THE COMPLAINANT WAS BY REASON OF THE "DELAY" IN

2
FILING THEIR COMMENT IN SB-09-CRM-0184-0189, TO THE MOTION TO QUASH
SEPARATELY FILED BY ACCUSED ACOT AND DULINAYAN;
D. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING
THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT AGAINST RESPONDENTS, WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD, BUT CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS PREVIOUS
RULINGS;
E. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE
PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13;
F. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING
THE RULING OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON VARIOUS
ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONERS, SUCH AS:
1. WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN C.A.
G.R. 114210 ENTITLED JENNIFER AGUSTIN-SE ET AL. VS. INTERNAL AFFAIRS BOARD ET
AL.;
2. TO RULE ON THE ISSUE THAT RESPONDENT [OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT]
ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF THE
COMPLAINANT WAS JUSTIFIED BY REASON OF THE DELAY IN FILING THEIR COMMENT
IN SB-09- CRM-0184-0189;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDING OF THE RESPONDENT [OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT]
IS CORRECT THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO THE UNDUE INJURY CAUSE
[SIC] TO THE PEOPLE AND TO PETITIONERS.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Question of Law v. Question of Fact
At the outset, we note that questions of fact are raised in this petition which are not proper under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
A question of law arises when there is a doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 31 For
a question to be a question of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of facts and circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review
of the evidence presented, the question is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one
of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather,
it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue without examining or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of
fact.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, petitioners allege, among others, that (1) the Court of Appeals did not consider their
evidence during the administrative adjudication; (2) the Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling
that there is no substantial evidence on record against Casimiro for the delay in the disposition
and preliminary investigation, and against Casimiro and Turalba for violations of Office Order No.
05-18, Office Order No. 05-13, Section 35 of RA No. 6770 and Section 3(k) of RA No. 3019; (3)
the Court of Appeals gravely erred in sustaining the finding of the OP that they were preventively
suspended by reason of their delay in filing their Comment, (4) the Court of Appeals gravely erred
in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint by the OP which is not in accord with the evidence on
record but contrary to established jurisprudence and its previous rulings; and (5) the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in sustaining the OP without ruling on the finding of the OP that there was
no evidence relative to the undue injury caused to the people and the petitioners. 33 These issues
all involve a review of the facts on record or the examination of the probative value of the evidence
submitted.
Applying the test of whether the question is one of law or of fact, the aforementioned are questions
of fact because petitioners assail the appreciation of evidence by the Court of Appeals. 34 We have
previously held that questions on the probative value of the evidence, or those which relate to the
analysis of the records by the lower courts are questions of fact which are not proper for review
by this Court:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or should be
rejected as feeble or spurious; or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and
convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue; whether or not the body of proofs
presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse
party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented
by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious
character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of
such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight - all these are issues of fact. Questions
like these are not reviewable by the Supreme Court whose review of cases decided by the CA is
confined only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set
forth.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Moreover, it is well-settled that as a general rule, this Court is not a trier of facts.36 Thus, absent
the recognized exceptions to this general rule, this Court will not review the findings of fact of the
lower courts.37 In this case, petitioners failed to show that the exceptions to justify a review of the
appreciation of facts by the Court of Appeals are present.
On the contrary, the findings of the Court of Appeals are all supported by the evidence on record
and further, are in accordance with the findings of the OP. In fact, other than the bare and general
allegation that the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence presented, petitioners were not
able to identify the Court of Appeals' alleged error in the appreciation of facts. A reading of the
assailed decisions shows that both the OP and the Court of Appeals considered the pleadings
and corresponding evidence submitted by both parties in arriving at their respective decisions.
Thus, we find no error in the appreciation of facts by the Court of
Appeals.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Due Process
Petitioners allege that their right to due process was violated when the OP (1) did not consider the
evidence they have presented and (2) issued its decision without the recommendation of the Office
of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) as provided in Executive Order
(EO) No. 13.
We find these contentions untenable.
Essence of Due Process in Administrative Cases
The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard - as applied to administrative
proceedings, it is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.38 In this case, petitioners were given both opportunities - the
opportunity to explain their side by filing their pleadings which contained all their allegations and
evidence in support of their arguments, and the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the ruling
3
complained of, as shown by their motions for reconsideration and appeals. As long as parties are
afforded these opportunities, the requirement of due process in administrative proceedings is
sufficiently met. As evidenced by the pleadings filed during the administrative proceeding, and
their subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeals and now to this Court, they have been afforded
the fullest opportunity to establish their claims and to seek a reconsideration of the ruling
complained of.
Moreover, a reading of the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the OP shows that the evidence
petitioners presented had been duly considered. Indeed, aside from their general allegation that
the Court of Appeals did not consider their evidence, petitioners failed to identify any conclusion
arrived at by the Court of Appeals or the OP that was not supported by the evidence on record.
Moreover, both the Court of Appeals and the OP addressed the issues raised by the parties, and
subsequently cited the proper evidence on record and quoted the applicable laws and
jurisprudence to support their findings. The bare allegation that they were denied due process
cannot overcome the clear fact that they were given every opportunity to establish their claims.
Recommendation of ODESLA
Petitioners further allege that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in applying the provisions of EO
No. 13,39 as the decision of the OP was approved only by the Executive Secretary without the
recommendation of the ODESLA. They argue that their right to due process was violated as the
decision was rendered by only one person rather than through the recommendation of a collegial
body - namely the Investigative and the Adjudicatory Division of the ODESLA.
We find this argument patently baseless. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, there
is nothing in EO No. 13 which states that findings on the complaints against a presidential
appointee, such as a Deputy Ombudsman, must be issued by a collegial body. The ODESLA is
merely a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President; and thus, it does not have the
power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. In Pichay, Jr. v. ODESLA-IAD,40 the Court
held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against all presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report and
recommendations to the President." The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body
to the President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court
ruled in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine
Truth Commission:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of
receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by
the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law.
x x x x
While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause
and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD-
ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and
recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no usurpation
of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Moreover, as the report of the ODESLA is merely recommendatory in nature, its absence does
not negate the validity of the decision of the OP. There is nothing in EO No. 13 which states that
the lack of recommendation of the ODESLA renders the OP's decision in an administrative case
void. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of their right to due process.
Inordinate Delay
Petitioners posit that the delay in the filing of the Informations against Acot, Dulinayan and several
others should be attributed to Casimiro. They further argue that this delay amounts to grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service, and gross neglect of duty.
While it is unfortunate that the filing of the Informations has taken an inexplicable amount of delay
from the preliminary investigation, this cannot be blamed solely on Casimiro. The records show
that the initial delay was incurred because of the procedural layers of review done to the 12 April
1996 Resolution recommending the filing of Informations against Acot, Dulinayan and several
others. Moreover, considering that the 12 April 1996 Resolution was modified to dismiss the
charges against Acot and Dulinayan, Casimiro cannot be faulted for the delay in the filing of the
Informations against them as there was nothing to be filed. Casimiro was appointed Deputy
Ombudsman only on 16 December 1999 and thus, had every right to presume regularity in the
investigation of the cases. The delay, therefore, cannot be attributed to Casimiro.
Petitioners also bewail the fact that there was no apparent movant in the case against Acot,
Dulinayan and several others; and thus, Casimiro, by reviewing this case, showed unusual
interest. However, the records show that the case was brought to the attention of the MOLEO
when Col. Sabado and Ltc. Gadin, co-respondents of Acot and Dulinayan, requested for their
Ombudsman Clearance. This was when the record officers found out that the first folder of the
case was missing and that the action taken on the 12 April 1996 Resolution after its 2 March 1998
modification was unknown. As these facts were brought to the attention of Casimiro, it would have
been highly irresponsible for him to turn a blind eye to the irregularities uncovered. To expect
Casimiro, who was then the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO, to turn a blind eye to this
anomaly would have been more suspect and highly irregular.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Confidentiality of Memorandum
Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it affirmed the decision of the OP
holding that Casimiro did not violate Section 3(k) of RA No. 3019, Office Order No. 05-13 and
Office Order No. 05-18.
In particular, petitioners aver that Casimiro and Turalba, in conspiracy with each other, violated
Section 3(k) of RA No. 3019, as well as Section 7, paragraph (c) of RA No. 6713,42 when the latter
furnished Casimiro with the 5 January 2010 Memorandum which they alleged was of a confidential
nature. Petitioners further allege that they are considered "whistleblowers" under Office Order No.
05-18, Series of 2005 (Rules on Internal Whistleblowing and Reporting); and thus, they should be
protected against any retaliatory action of Casimiro. This allegation is again based on the premise
that their 5 January 2010 Memorandum calling for the investigation of Casimiro is a "protected
disclosure" which should not have been disclosed by Turalba to Casimiro.
We find these contentions to be without merit.
Protected disclosure is defined as "the deliberate and voluntary disclosure by an official or
employee who has relevant information of an actual, suspected or anticipated wrongdoing by any
official or employee, or by any OMB organizational unit."43 On the other hand, a whistleblower
refers "to an official or employee who makes protected disclosure to his immediate supervisor,
other superior officers, the Tanodbayan and/or his duly authorized/designated representative or
the Internal Affairs Board (IAB)."44 Petitioners insist that based on the foregoing definitions, the 5
January 2010 Memorandum is a protected disclosure; and thus, they are considered
whistleblowers who should be protected from retaliatory action. 45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A reading of the Rules on Internal Whistleblowing and Reporting, however, will show that the
4
conditions for "protected disclosure" have not been met in this case. Specifically, Section 7 subject to a penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months imprisonment and a fine
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
Section 7. Conditions for Protected Disclosure. -
In turn, malicious prosecution has been defined as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this jurisdiction, the term malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages
Whistleblowers shall be entitled to the benefits under these Rules, provided that all the following
brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been
requisites concur:
instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit,
or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. While generally associated with unfounded
(a) The disclosure is made voluntarily, in writing and under oath;
criminal actions, the term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex
and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause.
(b) The disclosure pertains to a matter not yet the subject of a complaint already filed with, or
investigated by the IAB or by any other concerned office; unless, the disclosures are necessary
x x x x
for the effective and successful prosecutions, or essential for the acquisitions of material evidence
not yet in its possession;
This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to concur to recover damages for
malicious prosecution. Therefore, for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must
(c) The whistleblower assists and participates in proceedings commenced in connection with the
prove the following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor
subject matter of the disclosure; and
or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3)
in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was
(d) The information given by the whistleblower contains sufficient particulars and, as much as
impelled by legal malice - an improper or a sinister motive. The gravamen of malicious prosecution
possible, supported by other material evidence.
is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of
The 5 January 2010 Memorandum does not meet the conditions set forth in Section 7; and thus, an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and
it does not qualify as a protected disclosure under the rules. The Memorandum fails to meet the groundless.48chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
first requirement as the disclosure, while made voluntarily and in writing, was not executed under
Based on the foregoing, we see that the elements of malicious prosecution are wanting in this
oath. Contrary to the allegations of petitioners, there is also no indication that the document was
case. Based on the Complaint filed by Casimiro before the IAB, there had been probable cause
to be treated as confidential. If indeed they had intended that the Memorandum be considered of
for him to initiate the charges against petitioners. It is of record that petitioners had indeed filed
a confidential nature, they should have indicated it clearly, such as by putting the word
several motions for extension of time, and that instead of filing the necessary Comment, they had
"confidential" on the face of the document. This they failed to do; and thus, the Memorandum was
submitted the 5 January 2010 Memorandum. This could have constituted conduct prejudicial to
treated as a regular office memorandum.
the best interest of the service or gross neglect of duty. Moreover, when they were asked by
Casimiro to explain their actions, they did not respond, but merely submitted another
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals and OP, the allegations made by
Memorandum, addressed to Villa-Ignacio, which were considered actions that evinced resistance
petitioners could all be easily verified through the records and thus do not fall under the ambit of
to authority.49 In fact, the IAB found petitioners guilty of Simple Discourtesy in the Course of Official
protected information. There was nothing confidential about the Memorandum. Neither did it
Duties and were reprimanded for their conduct.50 Thus, the gravamen of malicious prosecution -
contain any classified information. Thus, there could have been no violation of Section 3(k) of RA
the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless
No. 301946 or of Section 7(c) of RA No. 6713.47 Moreover, as there was no violation of Section
- was absent on the part of Casimiro.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
7(c) of RA No. 6713, there is also no violation of Office Order No. 05-13 which provides in
part:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 1. OMB officials and employees shall not disclose any confidential information acquired Stare Decisis and Res Judicata
by them in the course of their employment in the Office. Pursuant to Section 7(c) of Republic Act
6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Petitioners further allege that the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it failed to take judicial
Employees, they shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to notice of CA-G.R. No. 114210, where the Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals found that
them by reason of their office and not made available to the public either: (1) to further their private petitioners were not remiss in performing their duties in relation to the criminal cases against Acot,
interest or give undue advantage to anyone; or (2) to prejudice the public interest, x x x. Dulinayan and several others.
To reiterate, the 5 January 2010 Memorandum was bereft of any confidential character - it was Again, we do not find any reversible error.
not a protected disclosure nor did it contain any confidential or classified information as provided
under the law. As such, Turalba could not have violated any rules on confidentiality when he Petitioners, in essence, are arguing that the Court of Appeals should have applied the doctrine
provided Casimiro with a copy of the said Memorandum.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary of stare decisis, which enjoins adherence to judicial precedence, such that lower courts are bound
to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court, 51 or the doctrine of res judicata,
Malicious Prosecution which provides that a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points
As for the allegation that Casimiro was liable for malicious prosecution under Section 35 of RA and matters determined in the previous suit.52chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
No. 6770, we find that this argument must also fail.
However, we note that the decision being relied on by petitioners was rendered merely by another
Section 35 of RA No. 6770 provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary division of the Court of Appeals, and not this Court. We have previously settled that the decision
Section 35. Malicious Prosecution. — Any person who, actuated by malice or gross bad faith, files of a division of the Court of Appeals is not binding on a co-division.53 We
a completely unwarranted or false complaint against any government official or employee shall be held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

5
In the case at bar, this Court holds that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as stated in the
or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals in not questioned Decision[9], are as follows:
giving due deference to the decision of its co-division. As correctly pointed out by the Special
Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, the decision of its co-division is not binding on its On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its
other division. Further, it must be stressed that judicial decisions that form part of our legal airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. x x x
system are only the decisions of the Supreme Court. Moreover, at the time petitioners made
the aforesaid Manifestation, the Decision dated 14 December 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96717 of On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco
dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both
the Special Tenth Division was still on appeal before this Court.
Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their hotels,
Therefore, the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for not giving due they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in te
(sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape
deference to the said Decision of its co-division, and its actuation cannot be considered grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction. 54(Boldfacing and underscoring plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for
supplied) help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and
Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the subject matter in CA-G.R. No.
114210 is different from the issues involved in this case. While this petition involves the When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials
administrative complaint filed by petitioners against Casimiro in relation to the alleged failure of interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to
Casimiro to file the Informations against Acot, Dulinayan and several others, the petition involved Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal
in CA-G.R. No. 114210 is the administrative complaint filed by petitioners which relates to the Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the
delay incurred by petitioners in filing the necessary pleadings before the Sandiganbayan. Thus, immediate release of the detained crew members but did not succeed because plaintiff
the Court of Appeals did not err in not taking judicial notice of CA-G.R. No. 114210. refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked into something she did
not want because of her inability to understand the local dialect. She also declined to
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 29 November 2012 Decision and the 23 sign a blank paper and a document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA
May 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the 14 June 2011 Decision of the allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.
Office of the President.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of
detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDI (sic). In
Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur. September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
Leonen, J., on leave. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already
behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of
SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police
station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta
incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a
statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so
[G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998] did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of
Jeddah.

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA
and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.
One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes
before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane
and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her
to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told
her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned
out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff
then returned to Manila.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set
aside the Resolution[1] dated September 27, 1995 and the Decision[2] dated April 10, 1996 of the
Court of Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533,[4] and the Orders[5] dated August 29, 1994[6] and
February 2, 1995[7] that were issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-93-18394.[8]
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once
again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after
receiving assurance from SAUDIAs Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the
investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June
27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated
plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to

6
 take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take flight.At
the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick
took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until
further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where
the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in
English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did
she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what
happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,
dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with
the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.[10]
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner
SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy
in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked
on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the international
flights.[11]
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against
her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila,[12] she was
terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint[13] for damages against SAUDIA, and
Khaled Al-Balawi (Al- Balawi), its country manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss[14] which raised the
following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action against Saudia; (2) that
defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or demand set forth in the
Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has
no jurisdiction to try the case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss)[15] Saudia filed a
[16]
reply thereto on March 3, 1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint[17] wherein Al-Balawi was dropped
as party defendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint[18].
The trial court issued an Order[19] dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.
From the Order of respondent Judge[20] denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on
September 20, 1994, its Motion for Reconsideration[21] of the Order dated August 29, 1994. It
alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of
the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On
October 14, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition[22] (To Defendants Motion for Reconsideration).
In the Reply[23] filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that since its
Motion for Reconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion
Rule does not apply, even if that ground is raised for the first time on appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA
alleged that the Philippines does not have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant
case, and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order[24] dated February 2, 1995, denying
SAUDIAs Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of the assailed Order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed,
thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed,
thru counsel, on October 14, 1994, as well as the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi
Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994, considering that a perusal
of the plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which is one for the recovery of actual, moral
and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees, upon the basis of the applicable
Philippine law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, within
the jurisdiction of this Court as regards the subject matter, and there being nothing
new of substance which might cause the reversal or modification of the order sought
to be reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration of the defendant, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order[26] with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary Restraining
Order[27] dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge from further conducting any
proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the interim.
In another Resolution[28] promulgated on September 27, 1995, now assailed, the appellate
court denied SAUDIAs Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February
18, 1995, to wit:
The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED,
after considering the Answer, with Prayer to Deny Writ of Preliminary Injunction
(Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it appearing that herein petitioner is not
clearly entitled thereto (Unciano Paramedical College, et. Al., v. Court of Appeals, et.
Al., 100335, April 7, 1993, Second Division).
SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant Petition[29] for
Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order dated October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court of Appeals rendered
the Decision[30] dated April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an
appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaints basis for recovery of damages is
Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further
held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the
petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an
appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order[31] dated April 30, 1996, given due course by this Court. After both
parties submitted their Memoranda,[32] the instant case is now deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
I
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 based on Article 21
of the New Civil Code since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
inasmuch as this case involves what is known in private international law as a conflicts
problem. Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippines will sit in judgment of the acts done by another
sovereign state which is abhorred.
7
 II.
Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a jurisdictional requirement. Besides,
the matter as to absence of leave of court is now moot and academic when this Honorable Court
required the respondents to comment on petitioners April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For
Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From Notice
Thereof. Further, the Revised Rules of Court should be construed with liberality pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III.
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 entitled
Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al. and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental
Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m.
or within the 15-day reglementary period as provided for under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 has not yet become final and
executory and this Honorable Court can take cognizance of this case.[33]
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following issues emerge for our
resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND
TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394 ENTITLED MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI
ARABIAN AIRLINES.
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THE
CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the
outset. It maintains that private respondents claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant
case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti
commissi rule.[34]
On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based
on Articles 19[35] and 21[36] of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic
law.[37]
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that the interplay of
events occurred in two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint[38] dated June 23, 1994:
2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign airlines corporation
doing business in the Philippines. It may be served with summons and other court
processes at Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building,
114 Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government,
the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of
detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In
September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was
already behind her, her superiors requested her to see MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to
the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the
Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make
a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do
so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out
of Jeddah.
8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few
minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board
the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, the
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office
brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in
Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and
Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on
June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah
once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did
so after receiving assurance from SAUDIAs Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that
the investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on
June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge
interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour
of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about
to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take that
flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr.
Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew
quarters, until further orders.
11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court
where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to
her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only
then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and
Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2)
going to a disco, dancing, and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case, plaintiff sought the help
of the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah. The latter helped her pursue an appeal from
the decision of the court. To pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flights
of defendant SAUDIA while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely served the
international flights.[39]
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element,
we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a conflicts case.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two
or more states is said to contain a foreign element. The presence of a foreign element is inevitable
8
since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the
geographic limits of their birth or conception.[40]
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many.[41] The foreign element may
simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile,
or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In
other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.[42]
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada
is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also,
by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events
did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.
We thus find private respondents assertion that the case is purely domestic,
imprecise. A conflicts problem presents itself here, and the question of jurisdiction[43] confronts the
court a quo.
After a careful study of the private respondents Amended Complaint, [44] and the Comment
thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New
Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides;
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals,[45] this Court held that:
The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept
of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the
statutes.
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its
provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondents assertion that violations of Articles 19 and 21
are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal forum.
Based on the allegations[46] in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court
on jurisdiction[47] we find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit.[48] Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxxxxxxxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxxxxxxxx
And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Courtthe venue, Quezon City, is
appropriate:
SEC. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. [Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) x x x x x x x x x
(b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or
any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in
favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the
litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and
obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum,
vex, harass, or oppress the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or
disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed.[49]
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in
the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private
respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where
she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental
unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now
private respondent) should be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By
filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions[50] praying for the
dismissal of Moradas Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex Abundante
Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that
SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has
effectively submitted to the trial courts jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended
Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.:[51]
We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside from disputing
the lower courts jurisdiction over defendants person, prayed for dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that plaintiffs cause of action has prescribed. By interposing
such second ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd. availed of an
affirmative defense on the basis of which it prayed the court to resolve controversy
in its favor. For the court to validly decide the said plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd.,
9
 it necessarily had to acquire jurisdiction upon the latters person, who, being the
proponent of the affirmative defense, should be deemed to have abandoned its
special appearance and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that:
When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion made for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a general
appearance, if the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal of the
action upon the further ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.[52]
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Thus, we find that the trial court has jurisdiction over the case and that its exercise thereof,
justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal
system regulate the situation.[53]
Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that should
ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both
notions of justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with the
problem of deciding which of these two important values should be stressed. [54]
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a
certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as characterization, or the doctrine of
qualification. It is the process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question
specified in a conflicts rule.[55] The purpose of characterization is to enable the forum to select the
proper law.[56]
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or
operative fact.[57] An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a test or connecting
factor or point of contact.Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as
property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of
the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. [58]
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the
determination of the applicable law.[59] These test factors or points of contact or connecting factors
could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or
his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be
situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place
where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort
committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be
exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or
done. The lex forithe law of the forumis particularly important because, as we have
seen earlier, matters of procedure not going to the substance of the claim involved
are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the
otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the
reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual
relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.[60] (Underscoring ours.)
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended
Complaint deemed submitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that there
is reasonable basis for private respondents assertion that although she was already working in
Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an
investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on
her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very
serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the handing over or turning over
of the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties
as employer.Petitioners purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused
additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly
facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitioners
authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As
purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private
respondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person
and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress
for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting factor
or point of contact could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci
actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines
could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This
is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in
the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, act with justice, give her her due and
observe honesty and good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain
acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment.For in our view
what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the fatality of the alleged injury to
the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according
to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the
Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi,
modern theories and rules on tort liability[61] have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches
to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here
an occasion to apply the State of the most significant relationship rule, which in our view should
be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case.
10
 In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship,
the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if
any, between the parties is centered.[62]
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in
the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national,
working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of
international air carriage. Thus, the relationship between the parties was centered here, although
it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the
claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute,[63] raised
by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been
properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complaint of and
the place having the most interest in the problem, we find, by way of recapitulation, that the
Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the resolution of
the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is
in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioners
insistence that [s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and
proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter.[64] As aptly said by private respondent, she has no
obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is
based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and
subsequent pleadings she never alleged that Saudi law should govern this case. [65] And as
correctly held by the respondent appellate court, considering that it was the petitioner who was
invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, thus the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead
and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is.[66]
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the trial
courts denial of defendants (herein petitioners) motion to dismiss the case. Not only was
jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was obviously available, and the
expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is
the state intimately concerned with the ultimate outcome of the case below not just for the benefit
of all the litigants, but also for the vindication of the countrys system of law and justice in a
transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed to try and adjudge
the case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign element or
elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging the results
of the case in any manner whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-
93-18394 entitled Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines is hereby REMANDED to Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G .R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside
the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in
toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be
recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid
trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old,
single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments,
Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed
to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore
agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year;
petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with
him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before
the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of
not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's
fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the
parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts
are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the
consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat
her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived
him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a
representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is
baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court
and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation,
he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral
damages.
11
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying
the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic)
of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to
the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern,
Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,
Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a
(sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the
plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16
October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay
the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00)
pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable
virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and
false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to
marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise,
private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for
pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not
fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and
traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia,
she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and
reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for
the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that
she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few
days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and
she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987,
on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to
"E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or
with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told
plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during
the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought
he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry
their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep
with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff
and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together
in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987,
defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he
even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the
whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in
relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some
medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and
kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could
not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was
the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan
City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the
barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry
plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was
already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by
the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had
informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors
for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and
chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the
forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed
the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not
dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in
toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact,
respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was
already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals.
It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience
with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower
12
 court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life",
and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise
made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court
that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff
must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she
would not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public
in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D"
and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was
a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate.
Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27,
1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the
manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p.
50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother
who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have
left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to
go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some
kind of special relationship between them? And this special relationship must
indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites
Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where
defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and
defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had
accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for
Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City
for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City.
In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then,
that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and
promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to
satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to
marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and
to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are
palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy,
and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women,
coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of
our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under
Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral
damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered
him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises
therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any
moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or
proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the
trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that
since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As
an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he
had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable
because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows
a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in
ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law
life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian
Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even
if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should
also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if
it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had
also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances
of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the
petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his
thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses,
are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's
findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having
had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial
court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had
overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are,
however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the
time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
13
 (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in the damage.
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
(Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan,
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can
142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though
citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the
the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring
are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the
action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
would have such a right of action.
contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242
[1970]).
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must
statutes. 21
be respected.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

And now to the legal issue.

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law
is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much
Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led
general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission
to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain
the American states. . . . 19
exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have
the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
and punish in the statute books. 20 scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than
the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless
the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It
is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.

14
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive And in American Jurisprudence we find:
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In
the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
to warrant a recovery.
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal
seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness
private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction. arises out of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and
the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity
for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise
that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to
to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of
the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses
would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than
xxx xxx xxx
the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that, year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse.
her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy. voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had
she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and
wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces,
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there
much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that
promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon
such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to
said case:
fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21
of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired
mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S.
vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due
to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960;
Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to
sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there
yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart
from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and
wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
do have that effect, and which result in her person to
ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces
of her seducer (27 Phil. 123). Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

15
 It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction,
not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But
when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of
age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the
action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act
which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as
to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act
is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an
acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless
also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1)
of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent
cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the
private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because
of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a
mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988)
in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her
economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN,
pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a
proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not
have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms
of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not
going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At
most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence
of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or
where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no
action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate
or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that
this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay
together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn
duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of
morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors
a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's Republic of the Philippines
ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable SUPREME COURT
employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and Manila
an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely
occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly EN BANC
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he
loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the
Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard vs.
of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
obligations.
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

16
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral, The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that
the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being
a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have
Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused
liable for moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters,
his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to prove that
dismissing the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In
the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who
deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are
sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and
purely of law.
Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against
their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married
Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and man."
unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection
occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son
cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery,
of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and
seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that
the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to
a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the
pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with
access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the
each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where
two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan
Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the contents
but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit
of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried
affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house
their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents
and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who
sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from
is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she
further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a
disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of
Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.
events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in
winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54- he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married
B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good
she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note,
written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the
be that of defendant's. In English it reads:
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigations. Costs against appellee.
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will
have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.

Reply
[G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005]

Love

The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a.
present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts. AMAY BISAYA, respondent.

17
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel
Nikko)[1] and Ruby Lim assail the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001
reversing the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as
the Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human
relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes,
more popularly known by the screen name Amay Bisaya, alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the
evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, [5] he was
spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him. [6] Mrs. Filart
invited him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels
manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.[7] Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she
replied: of course.[8] Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits
which was the latters present for the celebrant.[9] At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken
with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. [10] After a couple of hours,
when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock,
shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak
for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.[11] In a loud voice and within the presence and
hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to
leave the party (huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang).[12] Mr. Reyes tried
to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.[13] Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however,
completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.[14] Not long after, while he was
still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to
step out of the hotel.[15] Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the
policeman.[16] Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One
Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys
fees.[17]
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under
the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotels
Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.[18] One of her functions included organizing the
birthday party of the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. [19] The year 1994 was no
different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended
invitations accordingly.[20] The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas
closest friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.[21] At
the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.[22] Mindful of Mr.
Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the captain
waiter, to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.[23] Mr. Miller replied that he
saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.[24] As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with
another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr.
Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. [25] Ms. Lim then
requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.[26] Mr. Reyes,
however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not
want to leave.[27] When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain
Batung whom she later approached.[28] Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each
other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell
Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.[29] Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim
spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were no other
guests in the immediate vicinity.[30] However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the
food, she decided to wait.[31] When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim
approached him and said: alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho
kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo.[32] She
then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her
surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on
her.[33]
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her
version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.[34] According to her,
it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was
likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. [35] When they reached
the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not
invited.[36] All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at
the bar talking to Col. Batung.[37] Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes
shouting.[38] She ignored Mr. Reyes.[39] She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to
think that she invited him.[40]
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,[41] giving more credence
to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial
court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he
was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the
birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he
was not invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the
breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she
allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.[42]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more
commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice
within hearing distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food
and to leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to
morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage
suffered by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises
from the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good
customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally
cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs.[43]
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people
to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as
she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in
private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to
approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that
the latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary
that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that
occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filarts invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation.
For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.
18
...
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack
of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of
such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable
for damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or
ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).[44]
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta
Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000).[45] On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as
the argument raised in the motion had been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision
sought to be reconsidered.[46]
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of
Appeals seriously erred in
I.
NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY
ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
II.
HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR.
FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA COULD NOT HAVE
SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION, WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILARTS INVITATION
III.
DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
IV.
IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS
POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS
PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
V.
IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANTS BRIEF,
THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria,
they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked
to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a gate-crasher.
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as
injury[47]) refers to self-inflicted injury[48] or to the consent to injury[49] which precludes the recovery
of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is
not negligent in doing so.[50] As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find
application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked
to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under
obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto
Reyes, a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof
thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby
Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions
concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its
latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of
facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law. [51] One of the exceptions
to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court.[52] The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr.
Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the
other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by
telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests.
Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filarts invitation that brought Mr. Reyes
to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower courts findings of
fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,[53] for-invitation-only, thrown for
the hotels former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited
(by the celebrant)[54] and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many,
being an actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very
person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his
presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally
want to get rid of the gate-crasher in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a
glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant,
her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly
reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close
friends and some of the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that
indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation
why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes,
on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to
him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the
buffet table? How close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?
19
 A: Yes. She said, wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang.
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.[55]
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose
him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close
distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and
discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does
not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the
party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by
him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It
was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what
transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.[56]
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is unsupported. It
is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented
any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander
Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.[57]
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was
not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that
of its employee.[58]
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights,[59] is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.[60] The object of this article, therefore, is
to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in
the performance of ones duties.[61]These standards are the following: act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.[62] Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act
evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.[63] When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of
the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law[64] which does not
obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on
the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21[65] refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act
which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and
(3) it is done with intent to injure.[66]
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,[67] and that is, the act complained of must
be intentional.[68]
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim
was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before
the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms.
Lims alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years old, had
a very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her
work at the hotel with foreign businessmen.[69] The lameness of this argument need not be
belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must
necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise
acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on
the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without
first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action
predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only
protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity.[70] Without proof of any ill-motive on her
part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because
she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr.
Reyes.[71] If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot
amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel
Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages[72] especially for the reason stated by the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latters lowly station in life.
This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social
equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and
propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and
to avert further commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon
appellees.[73]
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of
the case and the evidence on hand. It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in question,
Mr. Reyes was an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board
Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a
showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for
Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the
Philippines.[74] During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had
income[75] and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any
information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the
conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes
might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of
propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
20
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila
Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its
Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. AND
ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
“The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for [one’s]
personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and [non]-interference demands
respect.”1
2
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 10,
2007 Decision3 and the September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01473.
Factual Antecedents
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil
Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and
Allan Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue,
Cebu;6 that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at
Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an
auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a
case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO,
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were
constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall
of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s
application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations; 10 that, in order to get
evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on
the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners’
property;11 that respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also
took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and that the acts of respondents violate
petitioners’ right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the
video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14
In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the video
surveillance cameras,16 nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners’
construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
19
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the application for a TRO. The
dispositive portion of the said Order reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the application for a [T]emporary [R]estraining [O]rder or a [W]rit of [P]reliminary
[I]njunction is granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by [petitioners], which the Court
sets at P50,000.00, let a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction issue against the [respondents]
Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove
the revolving camera that they installed at the left side of their building overlooking the side of
[petitioners’] lot and to transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back where [petitioners’] property
can no longer be viewed within a distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec,
facing the road.
IT IS SO ORDERED.20
Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its Order22 dated
February 6, 2006.23 Thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a [W]rit
of [P]reliminary [I]njunction in consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005.
IT IS SO ORDERED.24nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
26
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled
that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because
petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA explained
that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since
the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence. 28 The CA also said that since
respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance
cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical
personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.31 The falloreads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by
us GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and
February 6, 2006 issued by the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.32nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
Issues
Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
21
I.
THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE
THE ORDERS OF THE [RTC] DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING
THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
that they had nothing to do with the installation of the video surveillance cameras as these were
installed by Aldo, the registered owner of the building, 41 as additional security for its
building. 42 Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this case.43
Our Ruling

II. The Petition is meritorious.

THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE
GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is defined as “the right to
TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS [OF] THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities
CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities.” 45 It is the right of an
CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the
OF PETITIONER SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES. public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned.”46 Simply put, the right to privacy
is “the right to be let alone.”47
III.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s
THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE THE abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE houses. No one, not even the State, except “in case of overriding social need and then only under
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTE[S] A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED the stringent procedural safeguards,” can disturb them in the privacy of their homes. 48
PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.
The right to privacy under Article 26(1)
of the Civil Code covers business offices
IV. where the public are excluded therefrom
and only certain individuals are allowed
THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE SERIOUS to enter.
FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENT[S] CHOACH[U]Y AND GAVE Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and
X X X THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33 provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It
states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy,
and (2) whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit. Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
Petitioners’ Arguments criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction because
respondents’ installation of a stationary camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving (1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
camera covering a significant portion of the same property constitutes a violation of petitioners’
right to privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying xxxx
into the private lives of others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s
residence, petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M.
Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for business, it is This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be
still covered by the said provision.37 denied or even restricted by others. It includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering
inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter.” 49 The phrase “prying
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitioners claim that into the privacy of another’s residence,” however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled
respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the real owners of the building, where
the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular Our Code specifically mentions “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” This does not
inspection conducted by the court.39 mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also “similar
acts.” A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded
Respondents’ Arguments therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke their
right to privacy since the property involved is not used as a residence. 40 Respondents maintain
22
 preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and
Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined should not be interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the
to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public court.56 Here, there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in
or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” therefore, finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.
covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long
as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
A real party defendant is one who has a
The “reasonable expectation of privacy” correlative legal obligation to redress
test is used to determine whether there a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason
is a violation of the right to privacy. of the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the former.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. 51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated
that “the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.” Customs, community norms, and authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s “reasonable expectation of the real party-in-interest.
privacy.”53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined
on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.54
A real party defendant is “one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the
protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover former.”57
places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual,
whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own
into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would be no different from the building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras. 58 Such reasoning,
eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law. however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building
does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance
In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled cameras.
that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras
in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case. 59 During the
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order.
hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents
The operation by [respondents] of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building,
installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not
violated the right of privacy of [petitioners], who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera
seem to care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually,
does not only focus on [respondents’] property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo
filed a Complaint against respondents before the RTC. 61 He also admitted that as early as 1998
Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of [the] land of
there has already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the
[petitioners].
boundaries of their respective properties.62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe
that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why [petitioner] Hing was so unyielding in
asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders,
in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of [Aldo]. If the
records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63
purpose of [respondents] in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory
premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back.
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners
[Respondents’] camera cannot be made to extend the view to [petitioners’] lot. To allow the
of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection.
[respondents] to do that over the objection of the [petitioners] would violate the right of [petitioners]
The counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and
as property owners. “The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure
answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance
the rights of a third person.”55
cameras.64 And when respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005
of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their surveillance cameras are removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the
property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.
video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion
thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the
issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing,

23
we find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit. same took place while respondent was off duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was
supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson’s, but the latter again refused to receive
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the it.12 Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was
Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling
hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, respondent’s Robinson’s credit card. Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy
200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are of said damaging letter.13 With the above experience, respondent claimed to have suffered
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched
reputation, moral shock and social humiliation.14 She thus filed the Complaint for
SO ORDERED. Damages15 before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing),
Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybañez. She demanded
the payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.16
G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAÑEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of Court are the Court
of Appeals Decision1 dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution2 dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 80309. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984; while the
assailed resolution denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Michelle Ybañez
(Ybañez).
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific
Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of Robinson’s
Department Store (Robinson’s) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a
shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans worth ₱2,098.00. 4 Respondent allegedly paid to
the cashier evidenced by a receipt5 issued by the store.6
While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and Mercury Drug Store
(Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached and informed her that she
failed to pay the item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the
receipt issued in her favor.7 She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office
located at the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the Guess employees as
agreed upon.8
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to
humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the black
jeans.9 They supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had, followed
by another argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.10
In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of
payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official receipt,
it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They explained that there was
miscommunication between the employees at that time because prior to the issuance of the
receipt, Villagonzalo asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which the former
believed to mean that the item has already been paid.18 Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed
outside to look for respondent and when he saw the latter, he invited her to go back to the shop
to make clarifications as to whether or not payment was indeed made. Instead, however, of going
back to the shop, respondent suggested that they meet at the Cebu Pacific Office. Villagonzalo,
Hawayon and Ybañez thus went to the agreed venue where they talked to respondent. 19 They
pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that respondent could not recall whom she gave
the payment.20 They emphasized that they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it
was the latter who was arrogant in answering their questions.21 As counterclaim, petitioners and
the other defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses.22
On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint and counterclaim
of the parties. From the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the petitioners and the
other defendants believed in good faith that respondent failed to make payment. Considering that
no motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the court held that when
they demanded payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right under the honest belief
that no payment was made. The RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when the
confrontation took place in front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who
put herself in that situation by choosing the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu
Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take it against the Guess employees, because they merely
asked for assistance and not to embarrass or humiliate respondent. In other words, the RTC found
no evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the Guess employees to warrant the award of
damages.23
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for: Damages) is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Defendants Michelle Ybañez and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay
plaintiff-appellant Shirley G. Quiñones jointly and solidarily moral damages in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) and attorney’s fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00).

On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air SO ORDERED.24
narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and the
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While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith when they
confronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the alleged non-payment, the CA,
however, found preponderance of evidence showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the
demand letter to respondent’s employer. It found respondent’s possession of both the official
receipt and the subject black jeans as evidence of payment.25 Contrary to the findings of the RTC,
the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu Pacific’s director was sent to respondent’s
employer not merely to ask for assistance for the collection of the disputed payment but to subject
her to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury such that she would be pressured to
pay.26 Considering that Guess already started its investigation on the incident, there was a taint of
bad faith and malice when it dragged respondent’s employer who was not privy to the transaction.
This is especially true in this case since the purported letter contained not only a narrative of the
incident but accusations as to the alleged acts of respondent in trying to evade payment. 27 The
appellate court thus held that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent to collect
moral damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made liable for its
failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection of its employees; while
Ybañez’s liability stemmed from her act of signing the demand letter sent to respondent’s
employer. In view of Hawayon and Villagonzalo’s good faith, however, they were exonerated from
liability.28
Ybañez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the same was denied in the
assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.
Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LETTER SENT TO
THE CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT HEREIN RESPONDENT TO
RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES.30
The petition is without merit.
Respondent’s complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights provided
for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners
allegedly embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she
purchased from their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt issued by
the shop. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from
respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not.
However, the exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such
right and in the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the
Civil Code. The Court’s pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte31 is noteworthy:
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done
willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or
injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also
universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain
of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these
fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the
Civil Code. It provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith."x x
x32 The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.33
In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the
invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized the
mistake, they made a cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price
of the black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make
such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent whether she indeed
paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such right
was exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against
them.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the
exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith,
with intent to prejudice another.34 Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the
acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.35 Malice or bad faith, on the other hand,
implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity.36
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not. The
Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation
started well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held
by both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting
views insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was in
possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment
issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a
mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper
forum.
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force
respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance,
petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondent’s employer not only informing it of the incident
but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.1âwphi1 Petitioners claimed that after
receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent "was noted to hurriedly left
(sic) the store." They also accused respondent that she was not completely being honest when
she was asked about the circumstances of payment, thus:
x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store.
xxx
When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank expression and told
me, "I can’t remember." Then I asked her how much money she gave, she answered, "₱2,100; 2
pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no such
denomination in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and if she
received change from the cashier, she then answered, "I don’t remember." After asking these
simple questions, I am very certain that she is not completely being honest about this. In fact, we
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invited her to come to our boutique to clear these matters but she vehemently refused saying that
she’s in a hurry and very busy.37

Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not only
did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without
paying for it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment. These accusations were made
despite the issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was,
likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade payment. Contrary to petitioners’
claim, respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact
that the Guess employees did not have a hard time looking for her when they realized the
supposed non-payment.

It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer,
petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish
respondent’s reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial
evidence and despite the latter’s possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly
impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,
otherwise, he opens himself to liability.38

The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh.39 In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.

Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 2 of the Civil
Code which read:40

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney s fees.
Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant s wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the
cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. 41 Moral damages
are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They should, thus,
reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. 42 They are
awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions, or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone.43 We find that the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the CA is reasonable under the
circumstances. Considering that respondent was compelled to litigate to protect her interest,
attorney s fees in the amount of of₱20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 80309, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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