1

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 General Background

Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal is a landlocked country in South Asia. It is located

mainly in the Himalayas but also includes parts of the Indo-Gangetic Plain. With an
estimated population of 29.3 million, it is 48th largest country by population and 93rd largest
country by area. It’s borders ware shared with China in the north and India in the south, east,
and west while Bangladesh is located within only 27 km of its southeastern tip and Bhutan is
separated from it by the Indian state of Sikkim. Nepal has a diverse geography,
including fertile plains, subalpine forested hills, and eight of the world's ten tallest mountains,
including Mount Everest, the highest peak on the Earth. Kathmandu is the nation's capital and
largest city. Nepal is a multiethnic nation with Nepali as the official language.

The name Nepal is first recorded in texts from the Vedic Age, the era in which Hinduism was
founded, the predominant religion of the country. In the middle of the first millennium
BC, Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, was born in Kapilbastu of southern Nepal.
Parts of northern Nepal were intertwined with the culture of Tibet. The centrally
located Kathmandu Valley was the seat of the prosperous Newar confederacy known
as Nepal Mandala. The Himalayan branch of the ancient Silk Road was dominated by
the valley's traders. The cosmopolitan region developed distinct traditional art and
architecture of Nepal.

By the 18th century, the Gorkha Kingdom under the leadership of king The Pirthevi Narayan
Shah created a great kingdom of Nepal by doing unification of different small sates into
Nepal. The Shah dynasty established the Kingdom of Nepal and later formed an alliance with
the British Empire, under its Rana regime of premiers. The country was never colonized but
served as a buffer state between Imperial China and Birtish East India
Company. Parliamentary democracy was introduced in 1951, but was twice suspended by
Nepalese monarchs, in 1960 and 2005. The Nepalese Civil War in the 1990s and early 2000s
resulted in the proclamation of a secular republic in 2008, ending the world's
last Hindu monarchy. The Constitution of Nepal, enacted in 2015, establishes Nepal as
a federal secular parliamentary republic divided into seven provinces. Nepal was admitted to
the United Nations in 1955, and friendship treaties were signed with India in 1950 and
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the People's Republic of China in 1960. Nepal hosts the permanent secretariat of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), of which it is a founding member.
Nepal is also a member of the Non Aligned Movement and the Bay of Bengal Initiative.
The military of Nepal is the fifth largest in South Asia; it is notable for its Gurkha history,
particularly during the world wars, and has been a significant contributor to United Nations
peacekeeping operations.

This writing aims to analyze the Nepal through existing geopolitical and geo-strategic aspects
and its possible impact in the in South Asia. This paper tries to address the questions like the
changing geopolitical constellation at the global level as well as in Nepal and its impacts in
geo-strategic position. Whether there is a global linkage of Nepalese internal politics with
south Asian geopolitical and geo-strategic factors? If there is, then, what are possible
implications of those linkages to Nepal’s geopolitical situation? Then what are the responses
from the concerned neighbors like India and China on changing Nepalese politics? What are
the roles the US and the European Union states playing? On the basis of available resources
and the personal interactions with the various foreign policy makers, geo-strategists and with
the view of political experts of Nepal, I will try to find out the concrete assumption of geo-
strategic position of Nepal.

The paper deals the geopolitical specialties of Nepal and its changing characters in line with
the changing global geopolitical situation. The geographical location, size, cultures and
religions, economic strengths, vital resources are the major determining factors in defining
the geopolitics of Nepal and these are the factors in formulating the geo-strategy for survival
and development of the country. The change in the South Asian politics especially after the
establishment of SAARC and adaptation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
processes of decolonization and formation of the Non-aligned Movement were some of the
remarkable development in the South Asian politics and it has had tremendous implications
on Nepal’s foreign policy and internal politics. Though internally the country has been facing
severe political uncertainty in the last five decades, but in the international arena, it had been
playing very less active role in those international organizations and expanding bilateral and
multilateral relations except military diplomacy.

Geopolitics of Nepal is highly linked to the south Asian nations mostly with northern
neighbor china and southern neighbor India. Nepal is landlocked by India on three sides
 3

and China's Tibet Autonomous Region to the north. West Bengal's narrow Siliguri Corridoror
Chicken's Neck separate Nepal and Bangladesh. To the east are India and Bhutan. Nepal
depends on India for goods transport facilities and access to the sea, even for most goods
imported from China. Due to such geography Nepal is forced to be dependent on India for
supplies, but dependence never stays in supplies. Indian polices on Nepal have created
widespread interference in Nepal’s internal politics.

For a small country, Nepal has tremendous geographic diversity. It rises from as low as 59
meters elevation in the tropical Tarai. The northern rim of the Gangetic Plain, beyond the
perpetual snow line to some 90 peaks over 7,000 meters including Earth's highest 8,848
metres Mount Everest or Sagarmatha. In addition to the continuum from tropical warmth to
cold comparable to Polar Regions, average annual precipitation varies from as little as 160
millimeters in the rain shadow north of the Himalaya to as much as 5,500 millimeters on
windward slopes.

Along a south-to-north transect, Nepal can be divided into three belts: Terai, Pahad and
Himal. In the other direction, it is divided into three major river systems, from east to
west: Koshi, Gandaki/Narayani and Karnali including the Mahakali along the western border,
all tributaries of the Ganges.

When we speak of South Asia, we refer to the part of Asia below the Himalayas and
encapsulated between the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Rakhine Mountains
on the border between Myanmar and India, a mountainous range of dense jungle difficult to
traverse. Over 1.7 billion people, or almost a quarter of the world’s entire population, live in
South Asia’s seven countries: India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka and the Maldives, with India accounting for roughly 70 percent of the region’s total
population. The heartland of South Asia is the Indo-Gangetic Plain, a large and fertile region
based around the Indus and Ganges river systems, as well as the Bramaputra in Bangladesh
and eastern India. Though technically two distinct river systems, the Gangers River Basin and
the Indus Valley are fewer than 200 miles apart, and the space between is relatively easy to
navigate. The plain encompasses major population centers stretching from eastern Pakistan,
continuing through northern India, all the way to the Ganges River Delta in Bangladesh and
the Indian state of West Bengal. Over 900 million people live on the Indo-Gangetic Plain.
South Asia is one of the most fertile regions in the entire world, but also one of the most
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poverty-stricken and densely populated. Indeed, according to the World Bank, South Asia
accounts for a third of the entire world are poor. Despite India’s high economic growth rates
and the fact that poverty rates in South Asia have been halved in the last 15 years, the region
is second only to sub-Saharan Africa in terms of the number of people living in extreme
poverty. In 2011, 77.6 percent of Bangladeshis and 58 percent of Indians lived on less than
$3.10 a day according to World Bank statistics.

South Asia can be divided into three main parts. The rings of mountains that stretch from the
Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal encircle the region and also contain South Asia’s main
peripheral states. Afghanistan is a mountainous country that is removed from the Indian
subcontinent but borders on Pakistan. Because Afghanistan is landlocked and relies on
Pakistan for access to the outside world, and because there are cross-border Pashtun
populations where tribes, clans and families live on both sides of the border, Afghanistan can
potentially be an extremely destabilizing force for Pakistan and therefore should be
considered part of South Asia more than any other region. The northern Pakistani highlands
are also included in this region. To the east of the mountain arc, Nepal and Bhutan are
landlocked countries with relatively small populations that abut the Himalayas. The second
part of South Asia is the Indian Peninsula, bordered by the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean,
and the Bay of Bengal. It has many notable river systems, such as the Godarvi and Narmanda
that support large population centers. It also contains the island city of Mumbai, India’s
largest city. The Maldives and Sri Lanka are small island nations in the Indian Ocean south
of the Indian Peninsula.

India is by far the region’s most powerful country, both in terms of military might and
economic resources and potential. More important for understanding the region than India’s
size are its constraints. The Indian subcontinent is essentially an island to itself – bounded on
all sides either by ocean or by impassable terrain. India, therefore, is not a country that
historically projects power outside of its own region.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Nepal is one of the oldest Countries in the South Asia. Throughout the history of is existence
Nepal remain independent and never been colonized. Nepal had battles with then British East
 5

India Company and Tibet but despite outnumbered Nepalese people ware was successful to
safeguard its mother land. Since then Nepal was known as land of Gorkhas and land of
warriors. Despite being this kind of glorious history Nepal now faces lots of difficulties due
geography and external influence in its internal affairs. Political instability and corruption in

every part of governance is the major cause of poverty whether it is in India or Bangladesh or
Nepal or Pakistan. Geo political situation create greater effect on the politics of region like
Nepal and Bhutan's dependence in India. In this paper we will find out the geopolitical
specialty of Nepal and its significance in South Asia

I. What is geo-political situation of Nepal and its implication in South Asia?

II. Why Nepal has deep rooted geo-political implication in South Asian region?

1.3 Objective of the study

Objective of this study is to understand dynamics of Nepalese geopolitics and its significance
in south Asian politics. Despite having long existing history Nepal is sandwiched between
political influence of India and China due to geographical location. India is the dominant
political power in south Asia; and its influence in other nation’s politics is huge. India
projects himself as micro manager of south Asia. Pakistan somehow tries to increase its
influence but despite being nuclear nation is at unable to counter balance India’s influence in
south Asia due to internal conflict and terrorism. South Asia is third unstable region after
Africa and Middle East.

I. To identify the geostrategic significance of Nepal in South Asia.

II. To find out Nepal’s geostrategic implications in South Asian region.

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1.4 Significance of study

Political geography is the one of the most important dimension of understanding politics of
the any country and region. This study will be significant for anyone who desire to
understand South Asian politics. It will be helpful document for Researcher, scholar,
politician and students of political science and international relations for understanding South
Asian politics

Geopolitics of the region affects internal politics of the all the nations. Nepal has gained
peace and stability of nearly after 7 decade of instability and a decade long insurgence. But
this peace has numerous threats and one of them is geopolitical impact on Nepal’s internal
politics. Its geographical location between two Asian giant power nations may pose further
threat of being playground for India, China and other European country. In This paper I will
try to find out the core geopolitical implication of Nepal in South Asia.

1.5 Review of the literature

German geographer Oyvind Osterud described that ‘geopolitics indicates links and causal
relationships between political power and geographic space; in concrete term it is often seen
as a body of thought assaying specific strategic prescription based on the relative importance
of land power and seas power in the world history. The geographical tradition had some
consistent concerns, like the geopolitical correlates of power in world politics, the
identification of international core areas relationships between navel and terrestrial
capabilities’ (Osterud: 1988).

Prof Gharam P. Chapman explained South Asian in his book “The geopolitics of South Asia-
from early empires to nuclear age” According to him geological movements molded the
land of this unique cradle and how they still impact on it. Discussions are woven around the
three major forces of integration. These are 'identities' forces - bonds of language, ethnicity,
religion or ideology; 'utilitarian' forces - bonds of common material interest, and 'coercion' -
the institutional use or threat of physical violence. By studying these forces, Professor
Chapman shows how the organization of territory has been central to the region's historic,
cultural, linguistic and economic development.
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Geopolitics is the analysis of the geographic influences on power relationships

in international relations. The word geopolitics was originally coined by the Swedish
political scientist Rudolf Kjellén about the turn of the 20th century, and its use spread
throughout Europe in the period between World Wars I and II (1918–39) and came into
worldwide use during the latter. In contemporary discourse, geopolitics has been widely
employed as a loose synonym for international politics. Geopolitics is a study of the
relationship between geographical factors and the politics of states and nations and their
interactions with the neighboring countries and international community. The Swedish
political scientist Rudolf Kjellén who used the terminology geopolitics first time in 1899
described that the geographical location, size, natural resources, population and other
physical features and environmental influence a country and determine the political, military,
level of economic development and cultural characteristics of a nation. Kjellen further
explained that the geographical as well as physical features exert impact on relations between
the nations. His focus about the geographical features was more on mountains and oceans
and their impact on international politics as well as interstates’ relations.

Stratfor worldview online portal stats everything that informs geopolitics can be found in
South Asia: challenging demographics, geographic diversity, and contentious, ill-defined
borders. The Himalayan Mountains form the northern border of South Asia, whose two main
rivers, the Indus and the Ganges, support the region’s great population centers. India is the
region’s dominant country, home to the world’s fastest growing economy. But its rivalry with
neighboring Pakistan, a fellow nuclear power and growing consumer market, has made South
Asia one of the world’s most dangerous nuclear flashpoints. The region is also a testament to
how militancy and militarism can undermine the regional integration needed to unleash
higher economic growth.

Arguments about the political effects of geography particularly climate, topography, arable
land, and access to the sea have appeared in Western political thought since at least the
ancient Greek era and were prominent in the writings of philosophers
as diverse as Aristotle (384–322 BC) and Montesquieu (1689–1745). The best-known body
of geopolitical writings is the extensive literature of the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
much of which focused on the impact on world politics of the new technologies of
the Industrial Revolution.
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Traditionally, the factors of geography and other physical features play vital role in any
country’s survival, independence, security and identity. Similarly, the geographical and
physical factors have had greater importance in determining foreign policy matters.
However, with the economic globalization, increasing inter-dependency, introduction of the
international laws on various issues, formation of international organizations like United
Nations, World Trade Organization, evolutions of international regimes such as Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, International Atomic Energy Agency, Environment Protection
Acts, Crime Prevention regimes etc., the traditional roles of the geographical factor described
by various writers in determining a country’s position in international arena have
significantly declined. “The decay of the value of distance has today diminished the
relevance of geography and the nation’s ability to gain power status by geographic means has
markedly declined, even it has not disappeared completely” (Dahal: 1997-p25). Currently,
the geopolitical studies include the country’s territorial size, location, natural resources, level
of economic development, composition of the population and its size, its organizational and
intellectual abilities, communication and circulation and their impact on nations’ role in
international politics as well as country’s foreign policy matters.

The change of global situation especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of
the United States as a sole superpower and the event of September 11 not only influence the
geopolitical definition and scopes of an individual nation but it has tremendous implications
in the global politics as well. The modern technologies in the area of transportation and
communication system have brought a revolution in connecting people and the nations
together. Such a development has incredible impacts and changes in defining the traditional
forms of interstates relations. It also made easier for the people to move around and
communicate each other.

For a small state like Nepal foreign policy maneuverability and roles in the international
politics are limited by a number of factors: the most limiting factors are the location, level of
economic development and territorial size. The strategic location that Nepal occupies has
limited freedom of maneuver. Barston stated, “The freedom of choice and type of external
relations of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland is very limited because of economic
dependence resulting largely from their land locked geographical location vis-à-vis South
Africa and Zimbabe (Barston: 1971-p44). Similarly, the geographical location Nepal
occupies and its economic dependence mainly with India and landlocked position limit the
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freedom to maneuver in its foreign policy. As being in the middle of the two giants, depicted
by king Prithivi Narayan Shah as “Yam between two builders” basically dictated its foreign
policy throughout the history.

However, in the course of time Nepal had adopted foreign policy to protect itself by aligning
with either of two of its neighbors. Only after the 1950's democratic movement, it has been
basically adopting a nonaligned foreign policy. The basic guidelines on its foreign policy and
geo-strategy remained same despite the changed domestic political situation in the last five
decades. After the end of Cold War, the earlier roles the non-alignment movement played in
the international politics is remained in the margin, but the policy it had adopted in the
1950’s still weight great value to a country like Nepal whose geographical location lies in
between two powerful countries. And its slow pace of level of economic development locates
it in the periphery of world capitalist system. Though technological innovation changes in the
global system, but the gap between the powerful and weak, wealthy and poor and big and
small has still been widening. The Third World states are maintained in their subordinate
position within the world’s capitalist economy.

Again, with the tremendous progress in technology, transport and communication system as
well as growing international, regional organizations, and various international regimes have
certainly provided greater scopes not only to the big and developed countries to overarch
their roles but also economically weak, underdeveloped and landlocked country like Nepal to
expand its roles. The development of various laws, networks and forums like the United
Nations, World Trade Organization, Non-Aligned Movement etc. and subsequently obtaining
their membership has provided forums for the small and weak countries to work collectively
on various individual and regional issues of common concern. As of the case of Nepal, it has
been taking comparatively active and assertive foreign policy. One of the strong reasons of
its activeness lies in its early gaining of membership of different international and regional
organizations. It has already elected two times in the United Nation’s Security Council and
become an active member of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
It has also been able to secure membership of World Trade Organization and another
regional forum like BIMSTC. The selection of SAARC Head Quarter in Kathmandu was also
the result of its active and successful foreign relations with the member states of the SAARC.
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Nevertheless, its assertive and active foreign policy, its images of friendly, cooperative with
the other states and peacefulness has been continuously marred by the escalation of domestic
conflicts and violence since last decade. Similarly, the Jun 1, 2001 Royal massacre has also
contributed in damaging its international reputations. Both of these events have tremendously
drawn the international communities’ attentions and raised concerns on Nepal. Owing the
deteriorating security situation in the country, the international communities, immediate
neighbors, European, the American and the international body like the UN have expressed
their concerns over the escalation of violence and abuses of human rights and civilian rights.
Similarly, the growing domestic conflicts have evolved a process of new alignment and
realignment of international forces.

1.6 Conceptual background

The conceptual framework of the research has been presented below in a diagrammatic structure:

South Asian geography Nepalese geography

Assimilation of South Asian geography and

politics

Contemporary South Asian Nepalese politics

politics

Descriptive Analysis Analysis Critical Analysis

Conclusion
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1.7 Research methodology

The study has considered both own analysis and secondary sources of data. However, own
analysis will be the basic for the research.

i. The newspapers, different research reports, books by various authors and data based
on internet will be used as secondary source of data.

ii. Different Web-sites and downloaded soft-copy of reading materials

a Research Designs

This research will be based on the descriptive method to explain the South Asian geopolitical
environment and its impact on the Nepal. In first chapter I would like to present the
geographical data of South Asia and in subsequent chapters I will co-relate those data with
political situations. In the final parts of the paper I will co-relate those facts and findings with
present Nepalese political environment to find out the impact of South
Asian geo-politics in Nepal’s internal politics as well as security and foreign policy

b Universe of the study

This study will be focused on two areas. Those areas will be as follows.

I. The study of political geography of Nepal.

II. The study of political geography of South Asia.

c Sampling procedure and sample size

Sampling for this research paper will be political environment of whole south Asia, where as
for farther explanation of the logics I will give examples of beyond South Asia. Although the
size of the sample is too big but this topic’s rationality is very much important for
understanding future of the South Asian political environment.
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d Data Collection Method, process, Tools and instruments

Data collection method will be collection and assimilation of the experts review and work
done in various time and context. I will make understand through deep study of those works
and relate those findings with contemporary geopolitical environment.

Following will be data collection tool for this research paper.

i. Books, research papers.

ii. Internet search

iii. study of geopolitical sphere of Nepal and South Asia

1.8 Limitation of the study

Limitation of the study of this paper will be following

I. The thesis is based on analysis of experts work of different school of thoughts

which may create ambiguity on finding concrete conclusion

II. The thesis has to cover geography of Nepal and its relation to Nepalese politics,
hence it becomes multi- dimensional study.

1.9 Organization of the study

Organization of my study is divided into six chapter. They are as follows

Chapter 1: introduction.

Chapter 2: Geopolitics of Nepal.

Chapter 3: Brief introduction of South Asian Geopolitics.

Chapter 4: Nepalese politics and South Asian politics.

Chapter 5: Significance Nepalese geopolitics on South Asian politics.

Chapter 6: conclusion.
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Chapter 2: Geopolitics of Nepal

The country’s geographical location, size, population, cultures and religions, its economic
strength, vital resources etc. are the major determining factors in defining the geopolitics of
the country as well as these are the factors in formulating the geo-strategy for survival,
defense and development. It would be appropriate to discuss the determinant factors of
Nepal’s geopolitics and processes of changes since last few decades.

2.1 Size:

The size of a country is defined in terms of power. The power of a country derives from the
size of its territory, the size of the population, national income, natural resources, military
strength etc. By the existing standards of size and power, Nepal is small, weak, and one of
the least developed states (Dahal: 1997-p26). However, various writers argue that in terms of
size Nepal is not as small as it appears. Only because of its surrounding specially its two
geographically largest and most populous neighboring countries of the world: China and
India contributed in creating the image of “small” nation of this country. Nepal’s neighbors
to the south and the north are the most populous countries in the world and their images has
shaped this reflection of “small Nepal” both at home and abroad With an area of 147181
square kilometers, Nepal is bigger than some of its neighbors. According to the 1996 World
Bank Atlas, only 41 countries out of 209 have a population larger than Nepal. The geography
of the country has affected not only the perception of its size but also the substance of its
public policies and performance.

In terms of military strength, it is a fact that Nepal’s military capability is not an element for
comparison with its immediate neighbors but it is still larger than with a vast number of other
countries in the world. Nepal is often described as a small Himalayan Kingdom. It is a
perception that has been created to a country whose geographical size is larger than many of
its immediate neighbors and its population is also bigger than of hundreds of other countries
in the world. Nepal’s perception of insecurity is a psychological phenomenon resulting from
its physical environment which in turn is a consequence of its size (Khadka: 1997-p56).
Since such a perception has also shaped its orientations and relations with the outside world,
it has been preoccupied almost single mindedly as to how best to seek protection from any
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potential risk to its sovereignty. It’s a defensive mentality that has been developed and
somehow created because of its immediate neighbor India is twenty-three, and China sixty-
eight bigger in size. Such a perception needs to be changed in today’s world where not only
the theory of balance of power determines the interstates relations but also equality, mutual
respect and Panchasheel prevail and guide to countries on their foreign policy in this post-
World War world.

Such a psychology as well as the projection of a country needs to be overcome and firstly the
political leaderships must rise above such mentality and portray the image of the country as a
player in the regional relations as well as in the international relations. The city state
Singapore with a population of 3.4 million could be cited as an example on how to portray as
a player in the regional as well as in international level being a small in geographical and size
of population. Geographically, it is the smallest country in South East Asia however; its
influences and reputation in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and in
the international stage also are significant and influential than many other countries in the
region which have hundred times larger in terms of population and land size. Though, there
is a tendency in international politics especially among the large countries to either
paternalize or bring smaller countries into their area of influence, but many countries in the
world specially after the end of World War II have been challenging such tendency and
becoming more assertive.

With the change of international relations and the process of globalization and
regionalization, such paternalist attitude has also been declining. There is a tendency counter
such attitudes through playing assertive roles and building positive images in the existing
international and regional forums and help in reformulations of international laws. As Nepal
has also been contributing by sending its troops in the UN peace keeping missions in many
parts of the world and elected two times as the member of the Security Council of the UN
and become one of the active members and host of the Head Quarter of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation and also recently secured a membership of World
Trade Organization and BMSTC, such developments have significantly changed its
traditional isolationist images. It has also gained recognition in the international political
arena.
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2.2 Geography

As described by Nicholas Spykeman, geography is the “most fundamental conditioning

factor in the foreign policy states because it is the most permanent” (Spykeman: 1938-p7).
Anything dictates Nepal’s foreign policy that is its geographical position described by
various Nepalese and Indian writers. Once Indian Foreign Minister Mr. K. Natwar Singh
once said, “Geography dictates Nepal-India relations” Caught in between two largest Asian
countries, the geographical factor that attracted the late king Prithivi Narayan Shah to
pronounce the country as a “Yam between two boulders”. According to the Department of
Survey, HMG, Nepal occupies a 1590 – kilometer-long border with India and 1414-kilometer
border with China, As Dahal argues that ‘Nepal occupies pivotal position in the Himalayas –
between the Central and South Asian regions, a part of Eurasian landmass, to use
Mackinder’s terminology (Dahal: 1997-p27). To the north of this monarchical kingdom is
Tibet, the Autonomous Region of communized China; to the east, west, and south are the
federal states – Bengal, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh – of republican India. Dahal further argues
that such a Nepal’s position forms its geo-strategic setting critically important for India’s
security and stability of its heartland, the Gangetic belt, where an enormous share of its
human and resources base is concentrated. It is the primary reason why India has been
striving toward a firmer influence in Nepal for its territorial and political defense in areas that
border on China, which Indian strategists perceive as the actual rival of India.

Nepal’s geographical location is also very important for India’s defense. Due to its strategic
importance for Indian defense from China to the north, the British had done everything to
transform Nepal into a friendly buffer state between China and British possessions in India.
After the end of British rule in India, the post-colonial government of India had also taken
note of Nepal’s strategic importance and quickly signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship
covering all aspects of Nepal – India relations in 1950, followed by a letter of exchange
subsequently. Similarly, both countries concluded an agreement on arms procurement in
1965 and in 1978 India agreed to sign a trade and transit treaty with landlocked Nepal.

Thus, there are some genuine and legitimate concerns on India’s security viewpoint on
Nepal. While Nepal pursues its foreign policy it is utmost necessary for Nepal to consider
those security sensitivity of India. It is also important to note that while giving due
consideration for India’s security concern does not mean that Nepal has to compromise its
 16

sovereignty and independent stance and neutral foreign policies which Indian policy makers
often demand from Nepal. About the Indian security concerns, the expressions made by the
Indian leaders time to time have become quite controversial. When Nehru in 1950 said,
“Nepal is geographically almost a part of India, although she is an independent country”
what many Nepalese found such a statement a kind of paternalistic and even interpreted it as
Indian attempt to undermine the Nepal’s sovereign and independent status. Such statement
does not help to create healthy environment in two countries relations. Such expressions only
contribute in creating suspicions in a country like Nepal which is weak and small compared
to its immediate neighbors. Indian perceives that Nepal lies in the south of the Himalayas that
Nepal’s geopolitical importance cannot be the same both to the north and the south of the
Himalayas. It is a fact that Nepal’s relations with India and its access to the sea Port in
Calcutta, which is about 1000 kilometer, and also southern border connection due to the plain
lands and open border is easier than with Tibet’s vast mountainous lands. But again it does
not signify that Nepal cannot maintain equal relationships with its two neighbors. It is
important to note here that Nepal has to be sensitive in not allowing its land to be used by
any anti-Indian forces and provide better confidence to the Indian side and should not allow
any activities that undermine the Indian security sensitivity.

Similarly, Nepal has to be equally sensitive about not allowing any anti-Tibet or anti-
Chinese activities in the Nepalese soils. Nepal’s northern neighbor Tibet, the Autonomous
region of China, is also a strategically important location for extending China’s relations with
South Asia. Tibet is regarded as China’s trouble spot where a large number of anti-China
forces have identified of interests. Therefore, Nepal needs to be sensitive about the Tibetan
situation and possible misuse of Nepali land by those anti-Chinese forces. Though after the
establishment of Nepal-China diplomatic relationship in 1955, the relations between two
countries has been regarded as friendly and cordial. Both countries have resolved the border
issues and there are not any contended issues that would likely to create problems in near
future in between these two countries’ relations. China’s concern on Nepal is that any trouble
especially in the area of security and instability in Nepal would strengthen anti-China
elements in its borders. The Khampa uprising in 1960s and 1970s was the most paramount
and sensitive issue for the Chinese in the past. Since last few decades, the Khampa activities
has been somehow contained, however, it has not been completely stopped. Chinese are very
much concerned that Nepal not to be a springboard for the anti-Chinese forces like Khampas.
 17

Therefore, the geographical location of Nepal is also important to China which has been
emerging as a global power. As an emerging global power, China’s interest not only to
secure its borders but also to seek stable, cordial and friendly relations with its immediate
neighbors. A country which cannot secure stable relationships with its neighbors and
maintain stability, it would be difficult for that country to gain international status. China
certainly has geo-strategic importance on Nepal and that need to be given ample
considerations while Nepal pursues its strategic interests.

Therefore, the geographical location of Nepal has had important interests to the both
neighbors and any problem that has emerged here is the matter of concerns for both of our
neighboring countries and attracts their serious concerns.

2.3 Cultural and ethnic links

The cultural and ethnic links are also very important in discussing the geopolitical aspects of
a country. According to Dr. Harka Guruang, “The land corresponding to present-day Nepal
in the Central Himalayan represents an area of interface of two culture worlds: Indic and
Bodic. Their contact zone runs north-west to south west at a tangent to the mountain azis
whereby the Caucasoid (Khas) predominate in the karnali basin and the Mongoloids (Kiranti)
estwards” (Gurung: 1997). Nepal is a meeting point for two specific countries and
civilizations, India and China and for two regions south Asia and Central Asia. Nepal is a
host country of both religions Hindu and Buddhism and these religions are the most
dominant religions in India and China respectively. Being a birthplace of Siddartha Gautam,
Nepal can attract large number of Buddhist pilgrims from China and on the other hand there
are several Hindu shrines where large number of Hindu pilgrims can visit Nepal. “Nepal is
wedged between India on the south and Tibet, China on the north, and this intermediary
position has had definite bearing on the development of her culture. India and Chinese Tibet
were the two countries from which Nepal received cultural contribution through which Nepal
passed her achievements to the outside world” (Sharma: d.n.a.). It is said that the cultural and
religious ties and commonalities are stronger than the geographical proximities or other
economic interests. Nepal as a sandwiched country between two giants needs to explore and
foster commonality of interests.
 18

The northern region of Nepal has been inhabited by immigrants from Tibet and the southern
region by the people of Indian origin. The Nepali of the Terai region, who are of Aryan stock
and predominantly Hindus, have linguistic, cultural and religious bonds with the people of
India. Similarly, the people of the upper hills and mountain region are Mongoloid stock,
share closer cultural, linguistic and religious ties with the people of Tibet, China. Thus,
Nepal is a meeting point for two civilizations. Both the regions of Nepal especially in the
south due to the open border and accessible land have made strong ties with the neighboring
regions Bihar, Utter Pradesh and West Bengal of India.

Other issues between the two countries are the common culture, religion and traditions. Each
year hundreds of thousands of Indian Hindu pilgrims visit Pashupatinath temple in
Kathmandu and also large number of Nepali pilgrims cross border and visit Indian temples.
In the border area, there is a large number of Nepalese people who have family ties with
people in the northern Indian states such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. Such a
close cultural links of two countries have also been promoted by other social and educational
exchanges. It has been a common practice, especially for Nepalese students, to receive higher
education and trainings in India. A large number of Nepalese are working as a migrant labor
in different part of India. Similarly, a large number of Indian citizens are also working in
Nepal in various fields such as teachers, shopkeepers and also occupy the Nepalese
businesses.

The political relationship between the leaders of post-Rana Nepal and newly independent
India is another determinant factor between the two countries. The political leaders of two
countries have had their personal and political association. Large number of Nepalese
politicians had taken their education in India since there were no facilities for higher
education in Nepal for the common people during the Rana oligarchy system (1846-1904)
due to the lack of schools and colleges in the country. During the student time in India, many
Nepalese leaders were put into Indian jails because of their participation in the freedom
against the British colonialism. The two dominant political parties of Nepal were established
in India in the late 40s and they launched pro-democracy movement in Nepal while they
were in exile in India. This had helped to develop a close personal and political association
between the leaders of the two countries. The comradeship between the two countries leaders
had a great bearing on both countries relations when these Nepalese leaders occupied
positions in the government after the overthrow of the Rana’s in 1950
 19

4.4 Border and population move:

Border is another area which does have implications in the geopolitical factors. The northern
Himalayas and the mountains are the natural borders for the protection of the nation; the
malaria prone jungle in the south similarly warded off foreign penetration. With this very
natural safety Nepal’s position as buffer state was secured. However, with the eradication of
malaria and construction of various roads and migration of people from the hills to the south
plains area, Nepal’s buffer position has been changed. Numerous roads and entry points were
built to connect India which enhances economic, trade, cultural, educational, political
permeability of Nepal but it has reduced its natural frontiers with India.

There are a number of passes connecting Nepal with Tibet, such as the Takla Khar pass, the
Mustang pass, the Kuti pass, the Hatia pass etc. but it is extremely hard for Nepal to gain
access to the seas via Tibetan territories to the Chinese ports. The Kodari Highway links
Nepal with Tibet in the north and currently with the Chinese assistance Rasuwa-Syaprobeshi
road has also been being constructed. After the completion of Rasuwa-Syaprubesi road, this
would be the second road link to Tibet. Nepal and China have reached an understanding in
opening up of other links such as in Mustang, Kimathanka– Sankhuwasava and Humla. If
those proposed links are opened, the flow of Nepal-China trade, tourism as well as other
economic and cultural activities like in the past will be speeded up bringing both Nepal and
China much closer. This would certainly reduce Nepal’s hyper-dependence on India.

There are 30 landlocked countries in the world and most of these countries are the
developing countries. These countries are also economically dependent on the larger
neighboring countries and the dependency imposed by their land lockness has led to a
situation where their economic development becomes strongly conditioned by the economic
development of the transit countries. Another problem of these countries is that these
countries have become vulnerable to coercion and manipulation by the transit countries.
Nepal ‘s landlockedness is a problem in itself and its access to the sea is made possible by the
railways. Though the air shipments have been increased in recent years, the possibility of
river navigation has not been exploited yet. Nepal’s transit route is only via India and its
nearest Calcutta port is about 1000 kilometers. Since the country has been facing enormous
problems in its transit routes, it has tried to exploit the alternative route with Bangladesh
again its effective utilization depends on India’s attitude, since Nepal and Bangladesh have
 20

no common borders (Muni: 1992–p65). Though India has not denied the transit routes for
Nepal except a brief period of 1989, the high costs of traffic in transit, there were all sorts of
administrative problems that have been due to the application of India’s domestic laws that
were designed primarily for Indian trade, not for traffic in transit.

Nepal’s open border with India and land locked geography has become a heavy constraint to
its economic development. It has also socio-cultural as well as geo-ethnicity problems. Such
a situation not only needs for frequent discussions and negotiations on transit issues with
India but also drags several unexpected issues between the two countries relationships. This
situation has also forced Nepal to pursue the policy of economic and trade diversification
policy in the past (Khadka: 1997-p65). Nepal’s trade volume with China has been
considerably increased since the open door policy adopted by China. As reported in the
Kantipur Daily that Nepal’s bilateral trade with China has been increasing remarkably and
Nepal’s deficit reached up to NRs. 16 billion in the year 2003/4 with both of its regions;
Tibet and Hong Kong.

The issue of migration has also become one of the issues that the governments and people
across the world are confronting today. International and internal migration is inextricably
connected to a wide range of issues and dilemmas that confront governments and peoples
across the globe today. In Nepal also, the migration from hilly areas to the southern plain and
from India is significant especially since last five decades. With the eradication of malaria
and the clearance of forests in the southern land which is fertile land and provides market
accesses, the people in the mountains specially in the mid-western and eastern regions such a
mobility is a growing trend. The growing trend of concentration in Terai has multi-
dimensional implications in Nepal’s economic heartland with the potential to revisit
psychological prejudices and centrifugal tendencies.

The growing migration would have implications on the ethnic, religious, social and political
composition of a society and a whole country as well. The increasing presence of the diverse
communities would not only change the existing socio-cultural, ethnic and religious
compositions but it would also have effects on national and international politics. As small
number of Jews community in the USA has been playing important roles in the US politics
internally as well as on its foreign policy as well. Similarly, growing number of Nepali
 21

speaking people in some of the states in India does have roles in those respective states
political, social as well as the cultures. Certainly, it would also impact on Indian foreign
policy and in the region as of the people of Indian origin in Nepal have had impact on Nepal.

2.5 Natural resources and economic development:

Nepal’s natural resources specially water and Himalayas, mountains and lakes are the
precious resources which offer Nepal tremendous potentialities for industrialization,
economic development and prosperity of this country. These are not only important in terms
of its scenic beauties but also constitute assets and strength which has strong impact on
Nepal’s geopolitical factors. The total hydro potentiality of this country is 83000 MW which
is the second largest potentiality after Brazil. As water and energy have become very much
scarce resources at the global level, Nepal’s such potentiality in this area certainly gravitates
the attentions from the other economically powerful countries. Similarly, the mountainous
scenic beauties that Nepal occupies are also important for developing a major tourist
destination and preserving the tremendous bio-diversities. The world endanger species it
possess have international interest on Nepal.

Nepal’s energy could also contribute to India and China as well as other South Asian
countries. It has not been able to utilize the tremendous hydro-power potential. Nepal’s rivers
flow south from the north and there are possibilities of developing these rivers as multi-
purposes projects such as irrigation, hydropower production, river transport, flood control
and preservation of ecosystem. As emerging global economic powers, both India and China
have been facing serious energy shortages. They need enormous energy to pursue their fast
economic growth and process of industrialization. And producing surplus power and selling
it to neighboring country is an important aspect for Nepal to speed up its economic
development and improve the living conditions of the poor. Similarly, the scenic beauties of
the Himalayas attract a large number of tourists in this region. And if proper system could be
developed there is also possibility of bringing them in various provinces of India and in Tibet
to familiarize respective regions’ ecology, cultures, traditions and values of life.
 22

However, utilization of Nepal’s resources especially the water resource has always been a
very controversial issue. In the two cases of Koshi and Gandak deals with India in 1954 and
1959, Nepal felt ‘cheated’ and more recently, also in Tanakpur. All has set off a bad
precedent arousing serious national concerns (Dahal: 1997-p30). In the midst of high
controversy, the Government of Nepal and India have signed a treaty with amended version
which included status of the river as well as other projects known as the Integrated
Development of Mahakali River including Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur Barrage and
Pancheswar Project. As Nepal’s future development lies on due proper utilization of its
natural resources specially the water, it is utmost important for it to develop comprehensive
frameworks on its utilization. It is also vital in developing a national consensus among the
major political and social forces about its maximum utilization by considering other social
and geo-ecological impacts. The sharing of water resources requires a comprehensive
framework of national consensus: on procedural matters; on the utilization of the whole river
resources; on the issues of process, strategy, and policies; on distribution; and on a whole
array of foreign policy matters pertaining to the nation’s vital interest.

Considering the vitality of the natural resources in the national development as well as of the
past controversies, a clause has been inserted in the new 1990 Constitution of Nepal that any
agreement with other countries which is related to the natural resources including the water
exploitation that is considered important and having long term effect has to be approved by
the two-third of majority of the member of the Parliament. Such a process not only helps in
building national consensus but also contributes to developing a comprehensive program for
the utilization of the resources aiming to improve the people’s livelihoods and also
strengthens our roles in the international politics. Therefore, the geopolitical aspects of our
natural resources need to be considered in this very changing world and on the basis of that a
comprehensive framework need to be developed for its proper utilization. The utilization of
natural resources demands collective efforts and it does have strategic interests not only for
Nepal but for its neighboring countries as well.

2.6 Economy and trade:

Economic factor has become a very vital for a nation to its roles in the international arena.
Since the early 1990’s, ideological ingredients have become less important when compared
 23

to the economic policies during the Cold War era. Meanwhile, geo-economic activities have
become a prominent phenomenon around the world. Geographical proximity now is seriously
taken into account when a nation or region makes its trade policies and carries out foreign
economic exchanges. The formation of the regional trading and economic blocs like Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), ASEAN Free Trade, MURCOSUR, G-7 and
European Economic Cooperation etc. are some of the examples towards the geo-economic
activities that had developed in recent decades. So, it is possible for the world community to
re-divide the world’s areas according to geopolitics and geo-economics in the future, which
ultimately means the geographic division must serve economic development of that
particular region.

The economic links between Nepal and India is very strong. Due to Nepal’s small size, its
geographical location and its limited size of resources compels it to depend on India for
essential commodities such as fuel, salt, coal and also for manufacturing products. Though,
Nepal had considerable amount of trade with Tibet in the past and also it still imports some
manufacturing products from there, still it is limited and for the basic goods it has to rely on
India. It is also because Nepal shares an open border with India where it can have more
access with India than with Tibet.

It is not only Nepal’s economic dependency on India; the Indian economic interests in Nepal
are also quite profound. All the Nepalese rivers flow to India from Nepal and India has been
able to utilize them to irrigate massive portion of farming lands in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.
Nepal has always been a safe market for Indian manufactured goods. The volume of two
countries annual trade is also significant. There are considerable amount of Indian investment
in Nepal. Due to the economic blockade imposed by India in 1989/90, the volume of trade
between two countries was declined significantly, however, after the reciprocal arrangement,
it has been steadily increasing two countries’ trade and they signed a trade treaty in 1996 by
widening the area of future trade between two countries which was regarded as one of the
best treaties signed between two countries. However, it was amended in 1999 with the
pressure from Indian side and which narrowed the scopes of two countries trade.

Nepal’s economy and volume of its international trade is miniscule compared to its two
giant neighbors. However, the increasing volumes of trades as well as the vital resources that
 24

Nepal possesses have implications in its roles in the regional as well as in the international
politics. Nepal’s trade with India is the largest which occupies of its total 56% trade. It is
steadily increasing and trade deficit is also growing up correspondingly. Similarly, Nepal
China trade has also been growing particularly via Tibet. And the trend of increment is on the
rise due to the increasing connections between the mainland China and Tibet. The
construction of railways up to Lhasa by the year 2006 and opening up of more and more
passes between the two countries will certainly contribute to the two countries economic and
trade activities.

Being in middle of the two growing economic powers, Nepal does have immense
possibilities of exploring and attracting investments from both sides in the area like tourism
and hydropower sectors. Similarly, Nepal can offer a link route between India and Tibet
which was the main passing route between the two countries until two century before.
However, there have been fears that with the opening of Nathula Pass in Sikkim for trade
between China and India, the commerce between Nepal and China via Khasa may dry up.
With China and India already on the path to becoming economic powerhouses and opening
up such passes between the two countries, Nepal needs to study the full implications of this
and other developments should keep ready measures to protect its economic interests. With
the increasing globalization of political economy, the declining importance of the
geographical factors and converge of economy, finance and trades have been increasingly
dominating the interstates relations. Nepal should establish its comparative and competitive
advantages to enable itself to compete for market power.

2.7 Geo-strategic setting of Nepal:

“Geo-strategy defines the capacity that each nation owes to its configuration to its sea and
continental boundaries and to the influence that it exercises through its intrinsic or acquired
power” (Dahal: 2004 p9). Nepal’s geo-strategic interests lie in maintaining the ties with its
two neighbors and expanding its relations with more and more countries in the world.
Similarly, it has to be more active in international and regional organizations and forums
which should be the primary objectives of Nepal’s strategy. Traditionally, Nepal was an
isolated country and its prime foreign policy objective was to preserve its national
sovereignty and independence. However, with the change in the nature of global politics and
 25

its subsequent implication in the region as well as on an individual country, the overall
objectives of the country has also broadened and now is to expand its bilateral relations with
more and more countries and increase its roles in the international organizations and forums.
Except the period of late 18th and early 19th century, Nepal has always been pursuing
defensive policy. Even during the British occupation of India, Nepal preserved its sovereign
status by reconciling with the imperialist regime. India’s independence and the end of Rana
rule in Nepal had provided opportunity for Nepal to expand its relations with the outside
world. The expansion and diversification of Nepal’s participation in the global system got
further impetus under subsequent phases of political development. At present, the country
has diplomatic relations with 113 countries and is represented in all major international
organizations and forums. A fact which has helped the country in developing not only a
distinct personality in the community of nations, but also in diversifying her political and
economic contacts (Mahat: 2004). Over the years, Nepal has been able to expand its relations
and gain comparatively better position as well as reputation in the international stages.
Owing to the changing nature of global politics and perception of security, there are fewer
possibilities in facing external threats. However, with its failure in maintaining order, the
threat it has been facing is tremendous and serious.

Similarly, the US interests in Nepal lies in expanding its influence in a location which lies
between two emerging world powers China and India. It also wants to contain the increasing
communist influences. In the aftermath of September 11, one more issue that the US has
been pursuing is to include more and more countries into its anti-terrorist global alliance.
There were reports of seeking Nepal’s cooperation in setting up a military observation post in
northern areas, possibly in the Mustang region bordering, another area of American concern
is to contain violence and abuses of human rights. The UN, the European member states and
the North American states regard themselves as the guardian of human rights.

The post holocaust world the norm of human rights outlaws genocide, torture, and massive
human rights abuses, but what happens if states behave as gangsters towards their own
people, inflicting sovereignty as a license to kill. Sovereign states are expected to act as
guardians of their citizens’. But when a sovereign state fails to protect its citizens, it has
become a practice in the post-World War world especially after the end of Cold War, to
intervene to stop the abuses of human rights. Therefore, the international communities would
not ignore increasing violence and violation of human rights in Nepal and what they call their
 26

strategic interest while initiating steps to curb it. As it has been the practices, the human
rights provisions and international conventions have been drawing attention not only the
central governments but also have enormous influences on their domestic publics.

The post-Cold War period offered two glaring cases. In the cases of Kurdistan and Somalia,
the principal force behind intervention was not state leaders taking the lead in persuading
reluctant publics to respond to human suffering. Rather, it was the media and domestic public
opinion which pressurized policy-makers into taking humanitarian actions. James Mayall
argues that action was only taken to protect the Kurds ‘ because the attention devoted by the
western media to the plight of the Kurds also on the Turkish border threatened the political
dividends that Western governments had secured form their conduct of the war itself.

2.8 Changing geopolitical realities of Nepal

Describing Nepal’s delicate geopolitical realities, founder of modern Nepal king Prithivi
Narayan Shah said, “Nepal is Yam between two boulders”, and suggested that Nepal should
maintain friendly relations with both of its giant neighbors to preserve its national
independence and security. Even today his pronouncement remains as a guiding principle in
formulating the country’s geo-strategy for an active foreign policy. Though the first shah
king’s doctrine is interpreted as a defensive strategy. It still remains the point of reference for
the foreign policy makers. The geographical location that Nepal occupies today is one of the
very basic factors which plays important role in determining its foreign policy as well as
gives milieu for its responsibility in international politics. Nepal’s geographic position has
undoubtedly affected its policies, but it is not the sole causal factor that has predetermined
and protected Nepal’s security. (Dahal: 1997-p27) The basic geographical position of the
country remains the same what the late king described more than two centuries ago.
Nevertheless, the global and regional political situation has been constantly changing since
then. So do their effects on Nepal’s foreign policy. Since the external environment is not
constant and keeps changing, sometimes at a rate beyond projection and predictions, the
effectiveness of foreign policy tools in shaping a nation’s future course of action may be
ineffective (Kadkha: 1997- p52).

Traditionally, geographically disadvantaged poor countries like Nepal were insignificant

actors in influencing external environment. But in the era of post-World War, many of these
 27

nations strive to act in international politics collectively to get their voice and visibility get
heard and needed in policy making. Their joint efforts for securing maximum benefits to the
geographically small, economically weak and backward countries were seen in the
international treaties and agreements. Though they are still limited in playing such roles, they
have been able to secure achievements in some important areas. Securing equal membership
status and voting rights in the UN General Assembly and in the World Trade Organization
and many other international and regional forums are some of remarkable achievements in
favor of small, landlocked and least developed countries. It is generally perceived that the
roles in international politics of individual poor countries like Nepal are mere in takers to
maintain their presence in international arenas as well as to make attempts to circumvent any
unwanted inputs that could have adverse effects on their regimes or political system.
However, such perceptions are also undergoing substantial change. One remarkable feature
of Nepal since advent of Rana regime is that it has acted as producer of security commodity
for Anglo-Saxon defense and UN Peace Keeping operations.

Similarly, while discussing about the geo-strategy of our country, the normalization of Sino-
India relations need to be considered. The adversary relationships between the two countries
of last four decades have been changing. The growing bilateral trades, investments, science
and technology and common sharing on international issues would have implications on
Nepal’s foreign policy settings.

The issue of foreign policy and geopolitical factors has been playing a quite strong role in
Nepal’s domestic politics too. Due to its geographical location Nepal’s linkage with the
global environment has always been within the context of the neighborhood environment.
However, during its last 236 years of its modern history, Nepal attempted to challenge those
geopolitical dictate time to time. Many times in the history, Nepal tried to counteract
unwarranted obstructions posed by the surrounding environment especially after the 1950s to
its foreign policy goals. It has been vigorously pursuing high degree of interactions with the
global forces. Before 1951, Nepal had diplomatic relations with only five countries. Today,
the number has grown to 113, with permanent diplomatic missions in 22 countries
(Diplomatic List: 2004). The expansion of Nepal’s role in the international arena could also
be viewed in the economic front. The foreign debts, aids as well as grants in the last fifty
years have been dramatically increased. As Madan Dahal states that since the first five years
plan Nepal received $ 2.4 billion by the time of last decade (Dahal: 1999-p10). It is a huge
 28

amount of money for a comparatively small country like Nepal. However, about its
utilization, over 60% of the total foreign assistance drives back to donor countries (Ibid).
This gives the indication that the politics of aid and debts has strategic motive of big powers
rather than expanding the production structure of Nepalese economy to support a cohesive
welfare state.

2.9 The changing security considerations

Securing a territorial border and nation’s integrity was the paramount objectives of any
sovereign country. However, in the last few decades, the conventional perception of security
has gone profound change and the focus on military and strategic consideration has
significantly declined. Human security has been taking center stage. Security of the people
and their welfare has become a focal issue for the governments. According to the Human
Development Report, South Asian, that national security cannot be achieved in a situation
where people starve and arms accumulate, social expenditure falls and administrative
expenditure rises. Like the concept of development, the concept of security has increasingly
become people-centered. South Asia today is the most militarized region of the world, but
that does not make the region any more secure.

In this very changing concept of security and strategic considerations, Nepal has been facing
a tremendous pressure in setting the people free and securing the basic needs such as
sufficient food, shelters, education, and health care and maintains law and order etc. for its
citizens than anything else. The state’s failure to initiate the socio-economic development has
become the major cause of conflict which has led the country virtually fall in the state of
chaos, instability and violence in Tarai region. It has been argued that the root cause of
increasing violence in the country is the subsequent government’s failure to provide basic
needs to the people of minority . The challenge posed by the C.K. Rout group to the state
does have immense ramifications not only to the immediate neighbors but also to the region.
The origin of factionist rebellion from the Madeshi people in Tarai, the heartland of the
nation weakened the possibilities of defense and seriously affected the affection of people to
the space. It also made the territorial ideology of the state, nationalism very weak.
 29

Chapter 3: Brief introduction of South Asian Geopolitics.

The total area of South Asia and its geographical extent is not clear cut as systemic and
foreign policy orientations of its constituents are quite asymmetrical. Aside from the central
region of South Asia, formerly part of the British Empire, there is a high degree of variation
as to which other countries are included in South Asia.

Modern definitions of South Asia are consistent in including Afghanistan, India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives as the constituent countries. Myanmar is
included by some scholars in South Asia, but in Southeast Asia by others. Some do not
include Afghanistan; others question whether Afghanistan should be considered a part of
South Asia or the Middle East.

The current territories of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, which were the core of the British
Empire from 1857 to 1947, form the central region of South Asia, in addition to
Afghanistan, which was a British protectorate until 1919, after the Afghans lost to the British
in the Second Anglo-Afghan war. The mountain countries of Nepal and Bhutan, and the
island countries of Sri Lanka and Maldives are generally included as
well. Myanmar (formerly Burma) is often added, and by various deviating definitions based
on often substantially different reasons, the British Indian Ocean Territory and the Tibet
Autonomous Region are included as well.

The common concept of South Asia is largely inherited from the administrative boundaries
of the British Raj, with several exceptions. The Aden Colony, British
Somaliland and Singapore, though administered at various times under the Raj, have not
been proposed as any part of South Asia. Additionally Burma was administered as part of the
Raj until 1937, but is now considered a part of Southeast Asia and is a member state
of ASEAN. The 562 princely states that were protected by but not directly ruled by the Raj
became administrative parts of South Asia upon joining Union of India or Dominion of
Pakistan. Geopolitically, it had formed the whole territory of Greater India,

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a contiguous block of
countries, started in 1985 with seven countries – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka and added Afghanistan as an eighth member in
2007. China and Myanmar have also applied for the status of full members of SAARC. This
 30

block of countries includes two independent countries that were not part of the British Raj –
Nepal, and Bhutan.

Afghanistan was a British protectorate from 1878 until 1919, after the Afghans lost to the
British in the Second Anglo-Afghan war. The World Fact book, based on geo-politics,
people, and economy defines South Asia as comprising Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
British Indian Ocean Territory, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The South
Asia Free Trade Agreement incorporated Afghanistan in 2011, and the World Bank grouping
of countries in the region also includes all eight members comprising South Asia and
SAARC as well, and the same goes for the United Nations Children's Fund

The United Nations Statistics Division's scheme of sub-regions include all eight members of
the SAARC as part of Southern Asia, along with Iran only for statistical purposes. Population
Information Network (POPIN) includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, India, Nepal,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka as part of South Asia. Maldives, in view of its characteristics, was
admitted as a member Pacific POPIN sub-regional network only in principle. The hirchment
index of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific for
the region includes only the original seven signatories of SAARC.

The British Indian Ocean Territory is connected to the region by a publication of Jane's for
security considerations. The region may also include the disputed territory of Aksai Chin,
which was part of the British Indian princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, but is now
administered as part of the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang.

The inclusion of Myanmar in South Asia is without consensus, with many considering it a
part of Southeast Asia and others including it within South Asia. Afghanistan was of
importance to the British colonial empire, especially after the Second Anglo-Afghan
War over 1878–1880. Afghanistan remained a British protectorate until 1919, when a treaty
with Vladimir Lenin included the granting of independence to Afghanistan. Following India's
partition, Afghanistan has generally been included in South Asia, with some considering it a
part of Southwest Asia. During the Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989) American foreign
policy considered Pakistan and Afghanistan in Southwest Asia, while others included it as a
part of South Asia. There is no universal agreement among scholars on which countries
should be included within South Asia.
 31

In the past, a lack of a coherent definition for South Asia resulted in not only a lack of
academic studies, but also in a lack interest for such studies. Identification with a South
Asian identity was also found to be significantly low among respondents in an older two-year
survey across Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. However, modern
definitions of South Asia are very consistent in including Afghanistan, India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives as the constituent countries.

3.1 Concept of Indian subcontinent

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term subcontinent signifies a subdivision of
a continent which has a distinct geographical, political, or cultural identity and also a large
land mass somewhat smaller than a continent. Historians Catherine Asher and Cynthia Talbot
state that the term Indian subcontinent describes a natural physical landmass in South Asia
that has been relatively isolated from the rest of Eurasia. The Indian subcontinent is also a
geological term referring to the land mass that drifted northeastwards from
ancient Gondwana, colliding with the Eurasian plate nearly 55 million years ago, towards the
end of Paleocene. This geological region largely includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

The use of the term Indian subcontinent began in the British Empire, and has been a term
particularly common in its successors. This region has also been labeled as India or South
Asia.

According to anthropologist Jhon R. Lukacs "the Indian Subcontinent occupies the major
landmass of South Asia", while the political science professor Tatu Vanhanen states, "the
seven countries of South Asia constitute geographically a compact region around the Indian
Subcontinent". According to Chris Brewster, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal
and Bhutan constitute the Indian subcontinent; with Afghanistan and Maldives included it is
more commonly referred to as South Asia. The geopolitical boundaries of Indian
subcontinent, according to Dhavendra Kumar, include "India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and other small islands of the Indian Ocean". Maldives, the country
consisting of a small archipelago southwest of the peninsula, is considered part of the Indian
subcontinent.
 32

The terms Indian subcontinent and South Asia are sometimes used interchangeably. The
South Asia term is particularly common when scholars or officials seek to differentiate this
region from East Asia. According to historians Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, the Indian
subcontinent has come to be known as South Asia in more recent and neutral parlance. This
neutral notion refers to the concerns of Pakistan and Bangladesh, particularly given the
recurring conflicts between India and Pakistan, wherein the dominant placement of India as a
prefix before the subcontinent might offend some political sentiments.

There is no globally accepted definition on which countries are a part of South Asia or Indian
subcontinent. While Afghanistan is not considered as a part of the Indian subcontinent,
Afghanistan is often included in South Asia. Similarly, Myanmar is included by some
scholars in South Asia but not in Indian subcontinent.

3.2 Ancient era

The Indus Valley Civilization, which spread and flourished in the northwestern part of South
Asia from c. 3300 to 1300 BCE in present-day Northern India, Pakistan and Afghanistan,
was the first major civilization in South Asia. A sophisticated and technologically advanced
urban culture developed in the Mature Harappan period, from 2600 to 1900 BCE.

The Vedic period, named after the Vedic religion of the Indo-Aryans, lasted from 1900 to
500 BC. The Indo-Aryans were pastoralists who migrated into north-western India after the
collapse of the Indus Valley Civilization, Linguistic and archaeological data show a cultural
change after 1500 BC, with the linguistic and religious data clearly showing links with Indo-
European languages and religion. By about 1200 BCE, the Vedic culture and agrarian
lifestyle was established in the northwest and northern Gangetic plain of South
Asia. Rudimentary state-forms appeared, of which the Kuru-Pañcāla union was the most
influential. The first recorded state-level society in South Asia existed around 1000 BC. In
this period, states Samuel, emerged the Brahmana and Aranyaka layers of Vedic texts, which
merged into the earliest Upanishads. These texts began to ask the meaning of a ritual, adding
increasing levels of philosophical and metaphysical speculation, or Hinduism.

The Greek army led by Alexander the Great stayed in the Hindu Kush region of South Asia
for several years and then later moved into the Indus valley region. Later, the Maurya
 33

Empire extended over much of South Asia in the 3rd century BC. Buddhism spread beyond
south Asia, through northwest into Central Asia.

The Bamiyan Buddha’s of Afghanistan and the edicts of Aśoka suggest that the Buddhist
monks spread Buddhism in eastern provinces of the Seleucid Empire, and possibly even
farther into West Asia. The Theravada school spread south from India in the 3rd century
BCE, to Sri Lanka, later to Southeast Asia. Buddhism, by the last centuries of the 1st
millennium BCE, was prominent in the Himalayan region, Gandhara, Hindu Kush region.

3.3 Medieval era

Islam came as a political power in the fringe of South Asia in 8th century when the Arab
general Muhammad bin Qasim conquered Sindh and Multan in southern Punjab in modern-
day Pakistan. By 962, Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms in South Asia were under a wave of
raids from Muslim armies from Central Asia. Among them was Mahmud of Ghazni, who
raided and plundered kingdoms in north India from east of the Indus river to west of Yamuna
river seventeen times between 997 and 1030. Mahmud of Ghazni raided the treasuries but
retracted each time, only extending Islamic rule into western Punjab.

The wave of raids on north Indian and western Indian kingdoms by Muslim warlords
continued after Mahmud of Ghazni, plundering and looting these kingdoms. The raids did
not establish or extend permanent boundaries of their Islamic kingdoms. The Ghurid
Sultan Mu'izz al-Din Muhammad began a systematic war of expansion into north India in
1173. He sought to carve out a principality for himself by expanding the Islamic
world. Mu'izz sought a Sunni Islamic kingdom of his own extending east of the Indus river,
and he thus laid the foundation for the Muslim kingdom that became the Delhi
Sultanate. Some historians chronicle the Delhi Sultanate from 1192 due to the presence and
geographical claims of Mu'izz al-Din in South Asia by that time. The Delhi Sultanate
covered varying parts of South Asia, and was ruled by a series of dynasties, called Mamluk,
Khalji, Tughlaq, Sayyid and Lodi dynasties. Muhammad bin Tughlaq came to power in
1325, launched a war of expansion and the Delhi Sultanate reached it largest geographical
reach over the South Asian region during his 26-year rule. A Sunni Sultan, Muhammad bin
 34

Tughlaq persecuted non-Muslims such as Hindus, as well as non-Sunni Muslims such as Shia
and Mahdi sects.

Revolts against the Delhi Sultanate sprang up in many parts of South Asia during the 14th
century. After the death of Muhammad bin Tughlaq, the Bengal Sultanate came to power in
1352, as the Delhi Sultanate began disintegrating. The Bengal Sultanate remained in power
through the early 16th century. It was conquered by the armies of the Mughal Empire. The
state religion of the Bengal Sultanate was Islam, and the region under its rule, a region that
ultimately emerged as the modern nation of Bangladesh, saw a growth of a syncretic form of
Islam. In the Deccan region, the Hindu kingdom Vijayanagara Empire came to power in
1336 and remained in power through the 16th century, after which it too was conquered and
absorbed into the Mughal Empire.

About 1526, the Punjab governor Dawlat Khan Lodī reached out to the Mughal Babur and
invited him to attack Delhi Sultanate. Babur defeated and killed Ibrahim Lodi in the Battle of
Panipat in 1526. The death of Ibrahim Lodi ended the Delhi Sultanate, and the Mughal
Empire replaced it.

3.4 Modern era

The modern history period of South Asia, that is 16th-century onwards, witnessed the start of
the Central Asian dynasty named the Mughals, with Turkish-Mongol roots and Sunni Islam
theology. The first ruler was Babur, whose empire extended the northwest and Indo-Gangetic
Plain regions of South Asia. The Deccan and northeastern region of the South Asia was
largely under Hindu kings such as those of Vijayanagara Empire and Ahom kingdom, with
some regions such as parts of modern Telangana and Andhra Pradesh under local Sultanates
such as the Shia Islamic rulers of Golconda Sultanate.

The Mughal Empire continued its wars of expansion after Babur's death. With the fall of
Rajput kingdoms and Vijayanagara, its boundaries reached all of west, as well as the Marathi
and Kannada speaking regions of the Deccan peninsula. The Mughal Empire was marked by
a period of artistic exchanges and a Central Asian and South Asian architecture synthesis,
with remarkable buildings such as the Taj Mahal. It also marked an extended period
of religious persecution. Two of the religious leaders of Sikhism, Guru Arjanand Guru Tegh
 35

Bahadur were arrested under orders of the Mughal emperors, asked to convert to Islam, and
executed when they refused. Religious taxes on non-Muslims called jizya were imposed.
Buddhist, Hindu and Sikh temples were desecrated. However, not all Muslim rulers
persecuted non-Muslims. Akbar, a Mughal ruler for example, sought religious tolerance and
abolished jizya. After his death, the persecution of non-Muslims in South Asia returned. The
persecution and religious violence in South Asia peaked during Aurangzeb era, with him
issuing orders in 1669, to all his governors of provinces to "destroy with a willing hand the
schools and temples of the infidels, and that they were strictly enjoined to put an entire stop
to the teaching and practice of idolatrous forms of worship". In Aurangzeb's time, almost all
of South Asia was claimed by the Mughal Empire. However, this claim was violently
challenged in various regions of South Asia, particularly by the Sikh Guru Gobind Singh in
the northwest, and by Shivaji in the Deccan regions.

Maritime trading between South Asia and European merchants began after the Portuguese
explorer Vasco de Gama returned to Europe. After the death of Aurangzeb and the collapse
of the Mughal Empire, the region came under the rule of many small Islamic sultanates and
Hindu kingdoms. British, French, Portuguese colonial interests struck treaties with these
rulers, and established their trading ports. In the northwest South Asia, a large region was
consolidated into the Sikh Empire by Ranjit Singh. After his death, the British Empire
expanded their interests till the Hindu Kush region. In the east, the Bengal region was split
into Muslim East Bengal and Hindu West Bengal, by the colonial British empire, in early
1900s, a split that was reversed. However, after the World War II, at the eve of India's
independence, the region was split again into East Pakistan and West Bengal. East Pakistan
became Bangladesh in 1971.

According to Saul Cohen, early colonial era strategists treated South Asia with East Asia, but
in reality the South Asia region excluding Afghanistan is a distinct geopolitical region
separated from other nearby geostrategic realms, one that is geographically diverse. The
region is home to a variety of geographical features, such
as glaciers, rainforests, valleys, deserts, and grasslands that are typical of much larger
continents. It is surrounded by three water bodies – the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and
the Arabian Sea – and has acutely varied climate zones. The tip of the Indian Peninsula had
the highest quality pearls.
 36

3.5 Boundary

The boundaries of South Asia vary based on how the region is defined. South Asia's
northern, eastern, and western boundaries vary based on definitions used, while the Indian
Ocean is the southern periphery. Most of this region rests on the Indian Plate and is isolated
from the rest of Asia by mountain barriers. Much of the region consists of a peninsula in
south-central Asia, rather resembling a diamond which is delineated by the Himalayas on the
north, the Hindu Kush in the west, and the Arakanese in the east, and which extends
southward into the Indian Ocean with the Arabian Sea to the southwest and the Bay of
Bengal to the southeast.

3.6 Indian plate

Most of this region is resting on the Indian Plate, the northerly portion of the Indo-Australian
Plate, separated from the rest of the Eurasian Plate. It may be noted
that geophysically the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet is situated at the outside of the border
of the regional structure, while the Pamir Mountains in Tajikistan are situated inside that
border.

It was once a small continent before colliding with the Eurasian Plate about 50–55 million
years ago and giving birth to the Himalayan range and the Tibetan plateau. It is
the peninsular region south of the Himalayas and Kuen Lun mountain ranges and east of
the Indus River and the Iranian Plateau, extending southward into the Indian Ocean between
the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal.

3.7 Climate

The climate of this vast region varies considerably from area to area from tropical monsoon
in the south to temperate in the north. The variety is influenced by not only the altitude, but
also by factors such as proximity to the sea coast and the seasonal impact of the monsoons.
Southern parts are mostly hot in summers and receive rain during monsoon periods. The
 37

northern belt of Indo-Gangetic plains also is hot in summer, but cooler in winter. The
mountainous north is colder and receives snowfall at higher altitudes of Himalayan ranges.

As the Himalayas block the north-Asian bitter cold winds, the temperatures are considerably
moderate in the plains down below. For most part, the climate of the region is called
the Monsoon climate, which keeps the region humid during summer and dries during winter,
and favor the cultivation of jute, tea, rice, and various vegetables in this region.

South Asia is largely divided into four broad climate zones:

• The northern Indian edge and northern Pakistani uplands have a dry
subtropical continental climate

• The far south of India and southwest Sri Lanka have a equatorial climate

• Most of the peninsula have a tropical climate with variations:

• Hot subtropical climate in northwest India

• Cool winter hot tropical climate in Bangladesh

• Tropical semi-arid climate in the center

• The Himalayas have an Alpine climate

Maximum relative humidity of over 80% has been recorded in Sri Lanka, while the area
adjustment to Pakistan and western India records lower than 20%–30%. Climate of South
Asia is largely characterized by monsoons. South Asia depends critically on monsoon
rainfall. Two monsoon systems exist in the region:

• The summer monsoon: Wind blows from southwest to most of parts of the region.
It accounts for 70%–90% of the annual precipitation.

• The winter monsoon: Wind blows from northeast. Dominant in Sri Lanka and
Maldives.

The warmest period of the year precedes the monsoon season (March to mid-June). In the
summer the low pressures are centered over the indo gigantic plain and high wind from the
Indian Ocean blows towards the center. The monsoons are second coolest season of the year
 38

because of high humidity and cloud covering. Moderately vigorous monsoon depressions
form in the Bay of Bengal and make landfall from June to September.

3.8 Languages

There are numerous languages in South Asia. The spoken languages of the region are largely
based on geography and shared across religious boundaries, but the written script is sharply
divided by religious boundaries. In particular, Muslims of South Asia such as in Afghanistan
and Pakistan use the Arabic alphabet and Persiann Nastaliq. Till 1971, Muslim Bangladesh
(then known as East Pakistan) too mandated only the Nastaliq script, but thereafter has
adopted regional scripts and particularly Bengali. Non-Muslims of South Asia, and some
Muslims in India, on the other hand use their traditional ancient heritage scripts such as those
derived from Brahmin script for Indo-European languages and non-Brahmi scripts
for Dravidian languages and others.

The Nagari script has been the primus inter pares of the traditional South Asian scripts. The
Devnagari script is used for over 120 South Asian
languages, including Hindi, Marathi, Nepali, Pali, Konkani, Bodo, Sindhi and Maithili amon
g other languages and dialects, making it one of the most used and adopted writing
systems in the world. The Devanagari script is also used for classical Sanskrit texts.

The largest spoken language in this region is Hindi, followed by Bengali, Tamil, Telugu,
Marathi, Gujarati and Punjabi. In the modern era, new syncretic languages developed in the
region such as Urdu that is used by Muslim community of northern south Asia (particularly
Pakistan and northern states of India). The Punjabi language spans three religions: Islam,
Hinduism and Sikhism. The spoken language is similar, but it is written in three scripts. The
Sikh use Gurmukhi alphabet and Muslim Punjabis in Pakistan use the Nastaliq script,
while Hindu Punjabis in India use the Gurmukhi. The Gurmukhi and Nagari scripts are
distinct but close in their structure, but the Persian Nastaliq script is very different. English,
with British spelling, is commonly used in urban areas and is a major economic lingua
franca of South Asia
 39

3.9 Religions

South Asia had the world's largest population of Hindus, Jains and Sikhs, about 510
million Muslims, as well as over 25 million Buddhists and 35 million Christians. Hindus
make up about 68 percent or about 1 billion and Muslims at 31 percent or 510 million of the
overall South Asia population, while Buddhists, Jains, Christians and Sikhs constitute most
of the rest. The Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs and Christians are concentrated in India,
Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bhutan, while the Muslims are concentrated in Afghanistan (99%),
Bangladesh (90%), Pakistan (96%) and Maldives (100%).

Indian religions are the religions that originated in the India;

namely Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism. The Indian religions are distinct yet
share terminology, concepts, goals and ideas, and from South Asia spread into East Asia and
southeast Asia. Early Christianity and Islam were introduced into coastal regions of South
Asia by merchants who settled among the local populations. Later Sindh, Balochistan, and
parts of the Punjab region saw conquest by the Arab caliphates along with an influx of
Muslims from Persia and Central Asia, which resulted in spread of both Shia and Sunni Islam
in parts of northwestern region of South Asia. Subsequently, under the influence of Muslim
rulers of the Islamic sultanates and the Mughal Empire, Islam spread in South Asia.

3.10 Economy

India is the largest and fastest growing economy in the region (US$2.180 trillion) and makes
up almost 82% of the South Asian economy; it is the world's 7th largest in nominal terms
and 3rd largest by purchasing power adjusted exchange rates (US$8.020 trillion). India is the
only member of powerful G-20 major economies and BRICS from the region. It is the fastest
growing major economy in the world and one of the world's fastest registering a growth of
7.3% in FY 2014–15. Pakistan has the next largest economy ($304.3 billion) and the 5th
highest GDP per capita in the region, followed by Bangladesh and then by Sri Lanka which
has the 2nd highest per capita and is the 4th largest economy in the region. According to
a World Bank report in 2015, driven by a strong expansion in India, coupled with favorable
oil prices, from the last quarter of 2014 South Asia become the fastest-growing region in the
world
 40

The Major Market stock exchanges in the region are Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) with
market Capitalization of $2.298 trillion (11th largest in the world), National Stock Exchange
of India (NSE) with market capitalization of $2.273 trillion (12th largest in the
world), Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) with market capitalization of $72 billion. and Dhaka
Stock Exchange with market capitalization of $320 billion in 2015. Economic data is sourced
from the International Monetary Fund, current as of April 2017, and is given in US dollars.

3.11 Countries and territories from extended definitions

India and Pakistan are the dominant political powers in the region. India is by far the largest
country in the area covering around three-fourths the land area of the South Asian region.
India has the largest population of around three times the combined population of the 6 other
countries in the region. India is also the world's largest democracy India's annual defense
budget for 2013–14 is $39.2 billion which is equal to the whole Pakistan's Federal budget of
$39.3 billion for 2014–15 Bangladesh is a unitary state and parliamentary
democracy. Bangladesh also stands out as one of the few Muslim-majority democracies. “It
is a moderate and generally secular and tolerant though sometimes this is getting stretched at
the moment alternative to violent extremism in a very troubled part of the world”, said Dan
Mozena, the U.S. ambassador to Bangladesh.

Diplomacy among the countries of South Asia has been mainly driven by populist politics,
with the centre-stage taken by India-Pakistan conflict ever since their independence in 1947,
and then the creation of Bangladesh under tense circumstances in 1971. During the height
of Cold war, the elite political leaders of Pakistan aligned with the US, while India played
crucial role in forming the Non-Aligned Movement and while maintaining goodwill relations
with the USSR. Pakistan's governance is one of the most conflicted in the region. The
military rule and the unstable government in Pakistan has become a concern for the South
Asian region. In Nepal, the governance has struggled to come in the side of democracy and it
only showed signs in the recent past, basically in the 21st century, to support the democratic
system. The political situation in Sri Lanka has been dominated by an increasingly
assertive Sinhalese nationalism, and the emergence of a Tamil separatist movement
under LTTE, which was suppressed in May 2009. Myanmar's politics is dominated by a
military Junta, which has sidelined the democratic forces led by Aung San Suu Kyi.
 41

Chapter 4: Nepalese politics and South Asian politics.

South Asian region is characterized by developing economies with varying degrees of socio-
economic development. These economies find low position in terms of human development
at the global level. The South Asian economies are now being looked upon with high growth
potentials. India is emerging as one of the fastest Though the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA) is the government agency responsible for the conduct of foreign relations of
Nepal, historically, it is the Office of Prime Minister that has exercised the authority to
formulate and conduct policies related to Nepal's foreign affairs. As a landlocked country
wedged between two larger and far stronger powers, Nepal has tried to maintain good
relations with both of its neighbor, People's Republic of China and Republic of India.
However, relationship with India, the country with greater hegemonic power over Nepal, has
seen major ups and downs in recent years. Given Nepal's geographical vulnerabilities,
traditionally Nepal's southern neighbor India has been able to shape Nepal's foreign policy to
serve India's interest even to the detriment of Nepal's own interest. However, with the
ongoing democratization of Nepal, and, shifting of the state-power from the hands of few
elitists to democratically elected government institution, India has been facing increasing
resistance within Nepal in implementing foreign policies that are detrimental to Nepal's own
interest. In recent years, Indian government's attempts to deny landlocked Nepal 'Transit
rights' via India as a fundamental right for a member of the UN, as guaranteed in the UN
charter, and, the issues of occupation of some Nepalese territories by Indian forces have
significantly hampered the relationship between the two countries. For most part
though, Nepal has traditionally maintained a non-aligned policy and enjoys friendly relations
with neighboring countries and almost all the major countries of the world.

4.1 Nepal-India relations

The Republic of India and the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal initiated their
relationship with the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship and accompanying
secret letters that defined security relations between the two countries, and an agreement
governing both bilateral trade and trade transiting Indian territory. The 1950 treaty and letters
exchanged between the Indian government and Rana rulers of Nepal, stated that "neither
 42

government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor" and
obligated both sides "to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with
any neighboring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between
the two governments." These accords cemented a "special relationship" between India and
Nepal. The treaty also granted Nepalese, the same economic and educational opportunities as
Indian citizens in India, while accounting for preferential treatment to Indian citizens and
businesses compared to other nationalities in Nepal. The Indo-Nepal border is open;
Nepalese and Indian nationals may move freely across the border without passports or visas
and may live and work in either country. However, Indians aren't allowed to own land-
properties or work in government institutions in Nepal, while Nepalese nationals in India are
allowed to work in Indian government institutions and some civil services. After years of
dissatisfaction by the Nepalese government, India in 2014, agreed to revise and adjust the
treaty to reflect the current realities. However, the modality of adjustment hasn't been made
clear by either side.

The foundation of friendship between India and Nepal was laid with Indo-Nepalese
friendship treaty in 1950. In the 1950s, the Rana rulers of Nepal welcomed close relations
with India, fearing a China-backed communist overthrow of their autocratic
regime. Rana rule in Nepal however collapsed within 3 months of signing the 1950 Indo-
Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, only to be replaced by the only pro-Indian party of the
time Nepali Congress. As the number of Indians living and working in Nepal's Terai region
increased and the involvement of India in Nepal's politics deepened in the 1960s and after, so
too did Nepal's discomfort with the special relationship. India's influence over Nepal
increased throughout the 1950s. The Nepalese Citizenship Act of 1952 allowed Indians to
immigrate to Nepal and acquire Nepalese citizenship with easily, a source of huge resentment
in Nepal. This policy was not changed until 1962 when several restrictive clauses were added
to the Nepalese constitution. Also in 1952, an Indian military mission was established in
Nepal, which consisted of a Major General and 20 other Indian army personnel. At the same
time, Nepal's Royal family's dissatisfaction with India's growing influence began to emerge,
and overtures to China were initiated by Nepal as a counterweight to India. Further the
Nepalese government, as a deliberate attempt to show pro-USA tilt in Nepalese foreign
 43

policy, established diplomatic ties with the state of Israel in June 1, 1960, while the Indian
government supported Palestine and remained pro-USSR throughout the cold war.

Following the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, the relationship between Kathmandu and New
Delhi thawed significantly. India suspended its support to India-based Nepalese opposition
forces opposing the dissolution of democratic government by King Mahendra, which India
had been doing in violation of 1950's PFT. That clearly stated 'not to allow any country's soil
to be used against the other'. The defeat of Indian forces in 1962 provided Nepal with the
breathing space and Nepal extracted several concessions in trade. In exchange, through a
secret accord concluded in 1965, similar to an arrangement that had been suspended in 1963,
India won a monopoly on arms sales to Nepal and thus preventing the possibility of China
from supplying any arms to Nepalese Armed forces.

In 1969 relations again became stressful as Nepal challenged the existing mutual security
arrangement and asked that the Indian security check posts and liaison group be withdrawn.
Resentment also was expressed against the 1950s TPF. India withdrew its military check-
posts and liaison group consisting of 23 military personnel in 1970 from Nepal, although the
treaty was not abrogated.

Tensions came to a head in the mid-1970, when Nepal pressed for substantial changes in the
trade and transit treaty and openly criticized Sikkim's 1975 annexation by India. In 1975 King
Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev against the backdrop of Indian annexation of Nepal's close
neighbor 'The Kingdom of Sikkim' proposed Nepal to be recognized internationally as a
'Zone of Peace' where military competition would be off limits. Nepal's proposal immediately
received support from Pakistan and China, but not from India. In New Delhi's view, if the
king's proposal did not contradict the 1950 treaty that the-then Indian government had signed
with the Rana rulers of Nepal, it was unnecessary; if it was a repudiation of the special
relationship, it represented a possible threat to India's security and could not be endorsed. In
1984 Nepal repeated the proposal, but there was no reaction from India. Nepal continually
promoted the proposal in international forums and by 1990 it had won the support of 112
countries including the USA, the UK, and France.

In 1978 India agreed to separate trade and transit treaties, satisfying a long-term Nepalese
demand. However, much to the annoyance of Nepalese Royal Palace and in continued
violation of the 1950s PFT, India consistently allowed the opposition parties of Nepal to use
 44

Indian soil to launch agitation against the Nepalese government and refused to endorse Nepal
as a Zone of Peace.

In 1988, when the two treaties were up for renewal, Nepal refused to accommodate India's
wishes for a single trade and transit treaty stating that 'it violates the principle of freedom to
trade'. Thereafter, both India and Nepal took a hard-line position that led to a serious crisis in
India–Nepal relations. Nepalese leaders asserted the position that as per the UN charter,
transit privileges were a fundamental and a permanent right of a land-locked country and thus
India's demand for a single treaty was unacceptable. So, after two extensions, the two treaties
expired on 23 March 1989, resulting in a virtual Indian economic blockade of Nepal that
lasted until late April 1990. As time passed Indian economic sanctions over Nepal steadily
widened. For example, preferential customs and transit duties on Nepalese goods entering or
passing through India whether imports or exports were discontinued. Thereafter India let
agreements relating to oil processing and warehouse space in Calcutta for goods destined to
Nepal expire. Aside from these sanctions, India cancelled all trade credits it had previously
extended to Nepal on a routine basis.

To withstand the renewed Indian pressure, Nepal undertook a major diplomatic initiative to
present its case on trade and transit matters to the world community. The relationship with
India was further strained in 1989 when Nepal decoupled its rupee from the Indian rupee
which previously had circulated freely in Nepal. India retaliated by denying port facilities in
Calcutta to Nepal, thereby preventing delivery of oil supplies from Singapore and other
sources. In historian Enayetur Rahim's view the economic consequences of the dispute were
enormous. Nepal's GDP growth rate plummeted from 9.7% in 1988 to 1.5% in 1989. This
had a lot to do with the decreased availability of goods. Shortly after the imposition of
sanctions, Nepal experienced serious deficiencies of important goods such as coal, fuel, oil,
medicine and spare parts. Nepal also suffered economically from higher tariffs, the closure of
border points and the tense political atmosphere. From one of the most thriving economies in
Asia, Nepal was now quickly finding itself in the league of World's poorest nation." Although
economic issues were a major factor in the two countries' confrontation, Indian dissatisfaction
with Nepal's decision to impose work permits over Indians living in Nepal and Nepal
government's attempt to acquire Chinese weaponry in 1988 played an important role. India
linked security with economic relations and insisted on reviewing India–Nepal relations as a
whole. After failing to receive support from wider international community, Nepalese
 45

government backed down from its position to avoid the worsening economic conditions.
Indian government, with the help of Nepalese opposition parties operating from India,
managed to bring a change in Nepal's political system, in which the king was forced to
institute a parliamentary democracy. The new government, led by pro-India parties, sought
quick restoration of amicable relations with India.

The special security relationship between New Delhi and Kathmandu was re-established
during the June 1990 New Delhi meeting of Nepal's prime minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai
and Indian prime minister V.P. Singh, after India ended its 13-month-long economic
blockade of Nepal. During the December 1991 visit to India by Nepalese prime
minister Girija Prasad Koirala, the two countries signed new, separate trade and transit
treaties and other economic agreements designed to accord Nepal additional economic
benefits. Indian-Nepali relations appeared to be undergoing still more reassessment when
Nepal's prime minister Man Mohan Adhikary visited New Delhi in April 1995 and insisted
on a major review of the 1950 peace and friendship treaty which Nepal believed was enabling
an ongoing demographic shift in Nepal's Terai region. In the face of benign statements by his
Indian hosts relating to the treaty, Adhikary sought greater economic independence for his
landlocked nation while simultaneously striving to improve ties with China.

In June 1990, a joint Kathmandu-New Delhi communiqué was issued pending the finalization
of a comprehensive arrangement covering all aspects of bilateral relations, restoring trade
relations, reopening transit routes for Nepal's imports, and formalizing respect of each other's
security concerns. Essentially, the communiqué announced the restoration of the status quo
ante and the reopening of all border points, and Nepal agreed to various concessions
regarding India's commercial privileges. Kathmandu also announced that lower cost was the
decisive factor in its purchasing arms and personnel carriers from China and that Nepal was
advising China to withhold delivery of the last shipment.

In 2005, after King Gyanendra took over, Nepalese relations with India soured. However,
even after the restoration of democracy, in 2008, Prachanda, the Prime Minister of Nepal,
visited India, in September 2008 only after visiting China, breaking the long-held tradition of
Nepalese PM making India as their first port-of-call. When in India, he spoke about a new
dawn, in the bilateral relations, between the two countries. He said, "I am going back to
Nepal as a satisfied person. I will tell Nepali citizens back home that a new era has dawned.
 46

Time has come to effect a revolutionary change in bilateral relations. On behalf of the new
government, I assure you that we are committed to make a fresh start."

In 2006, the newly formed democratic parliament of Nepal passed the controversial
citizenship bill that led to distribution of Nepalese citizenship to nearly 4 million stateless
immigrants in Nepal's Terai by virtue of naturalisation. While the Indian government
welcomed the reformed citizenship law, certain section of Nepalese people expressed deep
concerns regarding the new citizenship act and feared that the new citizenship law might be a
threat to Nepalese sovereignty. The citizenship bill passed by the Nepalese parliament in
2006 was the same bill that was rejected by Late King Birendra in 2000 before he along with
his entire family was massacred. Indian government formally expressed sorrow at the death
of Late King Birendra of Nepal.

In 2008, Indo-Nepal ties got a further boost with an agreement to resume water talks after a
4-year hiatus. The Nepalese Water Resources Secretary Shanker Prasad Koirala said the
Nepal-India Joint Committee on Water Resources meet decided to start the reconstruction of
the breached Koshi embankment after the water level went down. During the Nepal PM's
visit to New Delhi in September the two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction at the age-old
close, cordial and extensive relationships between their states and expressed their support and
co-operation to further consolidate the relationship.

However, in recent years, the increasing dominance of Maoism in Nepal's domestic

politics, along with the strengthening economic and political influence of the People's
Republic of China has caused the Nepalese government to gradually distance its ties with
India, though Nepal still does support India at the UN. Prime Minister of India Narendra
Modi visited Nepal in August 2014, marking the first official visit by an Indian prime
minister in 17 years. During his visit, Indian government agreed to provide Nepal with USD
1 billion as concessional line of credit for various development purposes and a HIT formula,
but he insisted that Indian immigrants in Nepal don't pose a threat to Nepal's sovereignty and
therefore open border between Nepal and India should be a bridge and not a barrier.

A perpetual issue for many people of Nepali origin; the birthplace of Gautama Buddha has
long been a cultural and social issue devoid from the political landscape of both Nepal and
India. However, since the souring of relations between the two countries, the issue has been
used to undermine relations between the two countries both politically and socially. The two-
 47

day-long International Buddhist conference in Kathmandu which ran from May 19–20, 2016
marked Vesak and the 2,560th birthday of the Buddha was also used to promote the Buddha's
birthplace which lies in modern-day Nepal. Nepali Prime Minister, K.P. Oli told the media
that the conference "should help us make clear to the world that Buddha was born in Nepal
and that Buddhist philosophy is the product of Nepal".

In early March 2017, the fatal shooting of a Nepali man who was protesting Indian-
occupation on disputed territory between India and Nepal sparked protests in the capital
Kathmandu, Nepal. Indian troops had previously prevented Nepal from completing
a culvert in the disputed area which ultimately led to protests. It was considered rare for India
to retaliate with gunfire.

The Territorial disputes of India and Nepal include Kalapani 400 km2 at India-Nepal-China
tri-junction in Western Nepal and Susta 140 km2 in Southern Nepal. Nepal claims that the
river to the west of Kalapani is the main Kali river hence the area should belong to Nepal.
But India claims that the river to the west of Kalapani is not the main Kali river, and,
therefore the border there should be based on the ridge lines of the mountains Om Parvat to
the east of the river. The river borders the Nepalese zone of Mahakali and the Indian state of
Uttarakhand. The Sugauli Treaty signed by Nepal and British India on 4 March 1816 locates
the Kali River as Nepal's western boundary with India. Subsequent maps drawn by British
surveyors show the source of the boundary river at different places. This discrepancy in
locating the source of the river led to boundary disputes between India and Nepal, with each
country producing maps supporting their own claims. Indian government, however, from
1962 onward, forwarded the argument that border should be based on the ridge lines of the
mountain Om Parvat. The Kali River runs through an area that includes a disputed area of
about 400 km² around the source of the river although the exact size of the disputed area
varies from source to source. The dispute intensified in 1997 as the Nepali parliament
considered a treaty on hydro-electric development of the river. India and Nepal differ as to
which stream constitutes the source of the river. Nepal has reportedly tabled an 1856 map
from the British India Office to support its position. Kalapani has been controlled by India's
Indo-Tibetan border security forces since the Sino-Indian War with China in 1962. In 2015,
the Nepalese parliament objected an agreement between India and China to trade
through Lipulekh Pass, a mountainous pass in the disputed Kalapani area, stating that the
agreement between India and China to trade through Kalapani violates Nepal's sovereign
 48

rights over the territory. Nepal has called for the withdrawal of the Indian border forces from
Kalapani area.

As the first step for demarcating Indo-Nepal border, survey teams from both countries located
and identified missing pillars along the border, and, an agreement was reached to construct
new pillars in some places. According to the Nepalese government estimates, of the 8000
boundary pillars along the border, 1,240 pillars are missing, 2,500 require restoration, and,
400 more need to be constructed. The survey teams conducted survey of the border pillars
based on the strip maps prepared by the Joint Technical Level Nepal-India Boundary
Committee (JTLNIBC). The JTLNIBC was set up in 1981 to demarcate the India-Nepal
border and after years of surveying, deliberations and extensions, the Committee had
delineated 98 per cent of the India-Nepal boundary, excluding Kalapani and Susta, on 182
strip maps which was finally submitted in 2007 for ratification by both the countries.
Unfortunately neither country ratified the maps. Nepal maintained that it cannot ratify the
maps without the resolution of outstanding boundary disputes, i.e. Kalapani and Susta. India,
on the other hand, awaited Nepal’s ratification while at the same time urging it to endorse the
maps as a confidence building measure for solving the Kalapani and Susta disputes. In
absence of ratification, the process of completely demarcating the India-Nepal boundary
could not be undertaken.

Nepal promulgated its new Constitution in 2015 but the Madheshis, the Janajatis and
the Tharus, who are considered as the marginalized groups felt they were being left out in the
new constitution. These groups, Madheshi in particular, then blockaded the border points.
The Nepalese government accused India of deliberately worsening the embargo by not
allowing vehicles to pass from check-points where no protests were held, questioning 'How
could a handful of protesters possibly block the 1100 km long Indo-Nepal border. Indian
government however denied all allegations of any involvement in the blockade.

India’s response to the Nepal’s politics is taken as a matter of great interest. It is not only
because India is a closest neighbor of Nepal and one of the largest suppliers of arms and
ammunitions to the Nepali security forces, but also because the cross boarder criminal and
political activities Due to the 1800 kilometers open border with India.

India also does not like to see the third parties involvement in the Nepal’s affairs and India
wants to show world Nepal through indian eyes. India’s political hegemony is the one of the
 49

major reason for instability in the south Asia. China is another major player in the south
Asian politics despite being out of south Asia and geographically un-accessible. In brief we
can say whole of the south Asia is ground of political turmoil created by greed of gaining
influence of south Asian nations to become power house. India, China and USA are the
major player and word power dominating south Asian politics.

4.2 Nepal-China relations

The bilateral relation between Nepal and China has been friendly and is defined by the Sino-
Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on April 28, 1960 by the two countries. The
government of Nepal, though initially unenthusiastic about its ties with People's Republic of
China, has been of late making efforts to increase trade and connectivity with China.
Relations between Nepal and China got a boost when both countries solved all border
disputes along the China–Nepal border by signing the Sino-Nepal boundary agreement on
March 21, 1960. The government of both Nepal and China ratified the border agreement
treaty on October 5, 1961. From 1975 onward, Nepal has maintained a policy of balancing
the competing influence of China and Nepal's southern neighbor India, the only two
neighbors of the Himalayan country after the annexation of the Kingdom of Sikkim by India
in 1975. Since 1975, Sino-Nepal relations have been close and grown significantly with
China being the largest source of FDI, while India still remains one of the major sources of
remittance to Nepal. As per the estimate of Nepalese government, there are around 1-2
million Nepalese migrant workers in India while the number of Nepalese in china is
minuscule (3,500 in Mainland and 15,950 in Hong Kong) as of 2017.

The relationship between Nepal and Tibet are centuries old, with the Sherpa people,
the Gurung people and the Thajali people of Nepal sharing close linguistic, cultural, marital,
and, ethnic ties with the Tibetan people of Tibet. However, the people to people ties between
these groups have been affected since 1950 onwards, after the absorption
of Tibet into China resulting in the regulated border between Nepal and Tibet. Despite the
fluctuating political scenarios in Nepal's neighborhood and within Nepal itself, influence
of Buddhism still remains strong in day-to-day life of Nepalese people living in
the Himalayan Region. The Buddhist monarchy in The Kingdom of Lo (Upper Mustang),
 50

previously a part of the Tibetan Empire now in Nepal, was terminated only in 2008. The area
of Lo Manthang, however, still remains quasi-restricted to foreigners.

Around 600-650 CE, Nepalese Princess Bhirkuti got married to Songtsän Gampo, the earliest
known Emperor of Tibet. Princess Bhrikuti, as a part of her dowry, is widely believed to have
brought Buddhists relics and Thangkas to Tibet, and therefore, is attributed for establishing
Buddhism as the Royal religion in Tibet. Bhrikuti is usually represented as Green Tara in
Tibetan iconography. The Red Palace on Marpo Ri in Lhasa, which was later rebuilt into the
thirteen stores Potala Palace by the Fifth Dalai Lama, was constructed by Newari craftsmen
according to her wishes, who came to Tibet from Kathmandu with her, as a part of her dowry.
She also instructed her craftsmen to construct the Tub-wang and other statues in Samye, the
first Buddhist gompa in Tibet. One of her craftsmen, Thro-wo, also carved the revered statue
of Chenresig, Thungji Chen-po rang-jung nga-ldan.

During the Tang dynasty, the Chinese envoy Wang Xuance led an army of Nepalese and
Tibetans to defeat an usurper in the Indian Kingdom of Magadha. In 1260 CE during
the Yuan dynasty, Nepali craftsmen Araniko, on the decree of Chinese/Mongolian
Emperor Kublai Khan, traveled to Shangdu and built the White Stupa of Miaoying Temple in
Beijing, which was the largest structure in Beijing at that time. Taking almost ten years
(1279-1288 CE) to complete, the Stupa better known as White Dagoba, is still standing today
and is considered to be one of the oldest Buddhist Stupa in China.

The Treaty of Betrawati signed by Nepal and Tibet on October 2, 1792 stipulated that both
Nepal and Tibet recognize the suzerainty of the Quing Emperor jiaqing, and further, stated
that the Qiung court would be obliged to help Nepal defend against any external aggression.
However, during the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814–16), the Qing Emperor refused the
Nepalese government's request to provide support to Nepalese forces, and, the latter's defeat
led to the establishment of the British Empire in India. Then after, Nepal initiated a policy of
balancing the influence of Imperial China and British India. Through the tenth quinquennial
mission to China (1837), under the leadership of Chautariya Puskar Shah, the Nepalese
government again requested the quing Emperor court to either send troops or a subsidy of
Twenty million rupees to oppose the British. However, the Nepalese delegation was said to
have been met with a stern refusal of its petition for monetary support, and opposition to the
furtherance of hostility by Nepal against the British. Soon after Nepal's defeat in the Anglo-
 51

Nepalese war, from 1840 onward, Tibetan government again stopped the use Nepalese coins
for trade. In an attempt to preserve the lucrative coin export business and trade advantages,
the Nepalese Kingdom, under the leadership of Jung Bahadur Rana again invaded Tibet in
1855 during the second Nepalese-Tibetan War, and raided the Tashilhunpo Monestry in
shigetse , home to the Panchen Lama at that time. The invading Nepalese army was ordered
to vacate the occupied Tibetan territories by the Qing Court, which was rapidly losing its hold
over frontier territories due to turmoil inside China proper. Nepal's refusal to hand back the
control of Tashilhunpo Monestry led to the second Sino-Nepalese War which resulted in a
stalemate; a major setback for Tibetans, ultimately culminating into the Treaty of
Thapathali in March 24, 1856. Through the Treaty of Thapathali, Nepal expressed
commitment to help Tibet in the event of foreign aggression while authorities in Tibet were
obliged to pay the Nepalese government a sum of Nepalese Rupees 10,000 every year.
Further, Nepalese government stopped paying tribute to the rulers in Beijing after signing the
Treaty of Thapathali. The withdrawal of Nepalese forces from Tibetan areas adjacent to
Tibet-Nepal border in 1856 provided the Qing court with the opportunity to firmly tighten its
grip in and around Lhasa and throughout Tibet. Soon after the Treaty of Thapathali ,
the Quing court also issued an edict which among other dispositions stipulated the
introduction of a new silver coinage in Tibet, struck in the name of the Qianlong Emperor,
the then ruler of China, while at the same time, Nepalese coins were completely forbidden
in Tibet from then onward.

During the late 19th century, after the rise of the British Raj as the unchallenged and the
dominant power in the sub-continent, Nepal aligned itself with the British Raj in India and
supported its invasion of Tibet in 1908. When China sought to claim Tibet in 1910, Nepal
sided with Tibet and Britain and broke relations with China after Tibet drove Chinese forces
out in 1911. The 1950 military occupation of Tibet by the People's Liberation Army raised
significant concerns of security and territorial integrity in Nepal, drawing Nepal into a close
relationship with extensive economic and military ties with Republic of India. China ordered
restrictions on the entry of Nepalese pilgrims and contacts with Tibet. The 1950 Indo-Nepal
Treaty of Peace and Friendship that had established a close Indo-Nepalese relationship on
commerce, and foreign relations, was increasingly resented in Nepal, which began seeing it
as an encroachment of its sovereignty and an unwelcome extension of Indian influence; the
 52

deployment of an Indian military mission in Nepal in the 1950s and unabated migration of
millions of Bihari Indians into Nepal's Terai region increased these concerns.

In 1955, Nepal restored diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and
exchanged resident ambassadors by 1960. In 1956, both nations signed a new treaty
terminating the Treaty of Thapathali of 1856 and Nepal recognized Tibet as a part of China.
In 1960, Nepal and China signed a boundary settlement agreement and a separate 'Sino-Nepal
Treaty of Peace and Friendship'. Nepal also began supporting the change of China's seat in
the United Nations. In 1961, Nepal and China agreed to build an all-weather road connecting
the Nepalese capital Kathmandu with Tibet. During the Sino-Indian War of 1962, Nepal
maintained neutrality.

4.3 Nepal Pakistan relations

Nepal and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan enjoy excellent bilateral relations. The two
countries established diplomatic relations on 29 March 1960. Nepal established a residential
Embassy in Islamabad in 1962 and Honorary Nepali Consulate General in Karachi in 1975.
The bilateral relations between the two countries are based on goodwill, mutual cooperation
and friendship. Both the Governments hold similar views on many issues of common
interests and work closely at various international and regional forums such as the UN, NAM,
and SAARC. A Foreign Secretary level bilateral consultation mechanism has been
established to review the bilateral relations comprehensively. The third round of bilateral
consultations was held in June 2009 in Kathmandu.

Nepal established diplomatic relations with India after the latter's independence in 1947, but
did not do so with Pakistan. In 1950, Nepal signed a Treaty of Peace and
Friendship with India, creating an extensive relationship of economic, strategic and defence
cooperation. Nepal thus remained aloof from Pakistan, which was at conflict with India.
However, Nepal's resentment of Indian influence perceived to be excessive prompted the
Nepalese government to develop relations with the People's Republic of China and Pakistan.
Diplomatic relations between Nepal and Pakistan were established on 20 March 1960. After
the establishment of diplomatic relations, the bonds of friendship and cordiality between
these two countries, propelled by understanding and cooperation, have strengthened. The
 53

state of bilateral relations at present is based on goodwill, mutual cooperation and friendship.
Nepal established a residential Nepalese Embassy in Pakistan in 1962 and Honourary
Nepalese Consulate General in Karachi in 1975

Nepal and Pakistan signed a protocol for establishing diplomatic relations in 1962. They
exchanged ambassadors and set up embassies in 1963, when Ayub khan, the President of
Pakistan made a special visit to Nepal. Both nations also signed agreements to reciprocate the
Most Favored nation status of importance for developing trade and cooperation. In 1963,
Pakistan agreed to provide Nepal with free trade access and transport facilities through the
port of Chittagong in East Pakistan and established an air link. This arrangement reduced
Nepal's dependence on India for trading privileges. Although Nepal officially
maintained neutrality during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, it was one of the first to
recognise the independence of Bangladesh. As a retaliation, Islamabad severed ties with
Kathmandu two days later. Politically, Nepal and Pakistan have remained good friends over
the decades. Pakistan has extended its support for the democratic process in Nepal, after the
successful People's Movement-II. Pakistan welcomed the restoration of Nepal's parliament
following the popular movement and hoped that the breakthrough would usher in an era of
durable peace and prosperity in Nepal. Pakistan has been reiterating its support for Nepal's
sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful development.

The 19th SAARC summit was a scheduled diplomatic conference, which was originally
planned to be held in Islamabad, Pakistan on 15–16 November 2016. Following the rising
diplomatic tensions after the Uri terrorist attack, India announced its boycott of the summit,
alleging Pakistan's involvement in the attack. Nepal, the current chair of SAARC, urged that
"a conducive environment be created soon to ensure the participation of all member states in
the 19th SAARC summit in line with the spirit of the SAARC charter".

In recent years, both countries began developing military cooperation, with Nepal importing
arms from Pakistan. Condemned and isolated from India, Great Britain and the United
States between 2004 and 2006 for repressing democracy, the Nepalese monarchy developed
military cooperation with China and Pakistan, who offered extensive military support, arms
and military equipment to Nepal for the monarchy to stay in power and fight the Maoist
insurgency. Both Pakistan and China have provided medium-tech weapons to Nepal.
 54

4.4 Nepal-Bangladesh relation

The bilateral relations between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the Federal
Democratic Republic of Nepal have been progressive since the foundation of Bangladesh in
1971. The two nations are separated by the Siliguri corridor, a small stretch of territory of
the Indian state of West Bengal lies between southern Nepal and northern Bangladesh.
Both South Asian nations are members of the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectorial Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).

Although it maintained a neutral stance on the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the then-
Kingdom of Nepal became one of the first nations to recognize Bangladesh, on January 16,
1972; in retaliation, Pakistan broke off relations with Nepal. With Bangladesh, Nepal saw an
opportunity to obtain access to port facilities in the Bay of Bengal to bolster foreign trade -
something it had sought when Bangladesh was part of Pakistan, to limited success. Bilateral
relations improved considerably when the 1975 military coup in Bangladesh brought to
power a government that distanced the country from India, with both nations seeking to
counter the influence of their largest neighbor. In April 1976, both nations signed bilateral
agreements to develop trade, transit and civil aviation. The transit agreement exempted all
traffic-in-transit from duties and other charges. Six points of entry and exit for Nepalese
traffic were set up. However, the Nepalese goods had to be unloaded at the border, due to the
absence of an agreement allowing Nepalese trucks direct access to the ports. In 1986,
Bangladesh demanded the participation of Nepal in talks with India over the distribution of
water from the Ganges River.

4.5 Nepal-Sri lanka relation

Sri Lanka has maintained and expanded into a multifaceted and mutually rewarding
historically admirable relationship with Nepal since the two countries established diplomatic
relations in 1957. Sixty years of diplomatic relations with Nepal is an important milestone in
our bilateral ties. These relations have grown in strength over the years across the spectrum
to include cultural exchanges and people to people contact. Our people to people contacts
have existed even before formal Diplomatic relations began in 1957. Both countries share
 55

warmest relations based on Cultural & Religious ties. Religious link between the two
countries is considered as one of the main aspects of bilateral ties. Lumbini, the birthplace of
Lord Gautama Buddha, attracts a large number of Buddhist pilgrims every year and Sri
Lanka has been on the top in terms of tourists visiting Lumbini. The Pilgrims’ Rest and Sri
Lanka Mahavihara temple in Lumbini are symbolic of the Sri Lanka’s close friendship with
Nepal.A considerable number of Buddhist monks and nuns follow Buddhist studies in Sri
Lanka at present. The assistance provided by Sri Lanka to those affected by the earthquake in
Nepal was further expanded by the financial assistance to rebuild the two heritage temples
i.e. Anandakuti MahaVihar and Rato Machchindranath Hindu Temple, which were damaged
by the earthquake.

The Government of Sri Lanka is committed to further strengthening the existing relations
between the two countries. The Exchange of visits by political leaders, Cabinet ministers and
Representatives from various Ministries have benefited both countries bilaterally. Sri Lanka
and Nepal have signed number of bilateral Agreements, MOUs and Agreement on Joint
Commission with a view to foster understanding and promote bilateral cooperation in various
sectors. In addition, both countries assist each other by offering training programmes in
defence areas and Sri Lanka is offering scholarships for Nepali students under the
Presidential Scholarship Programme. A large number of Sri Lankan students are studying in
various universities in Nepal and Manipal Medical College in Pokhara. We are extremely
happy to note that there is a potential to increase tourism between the two countries due to
commencement of direct flights between Kathmandu and Colombo by Himalaya Airlines
since last year. Sri Lanka’s relations with Nepal rest on a strong foundation of age old
historical, social. Cultural and commercial interactions further consolidated over the years
with mutual goodwill and understanding. Both countries work closely within the non-
Aligned Movement and United Nations and have shared views on many issues of common
concern. Sri Lanka and Nepal are members of SAARC, BIMSTEC and Colombo plan.
SAARC has provided opportunities to understand the problems and aspirations of our
peoples. Our countries are committed to expanding the regional-cooperation for the mutual
benefit of the people of the region. Together with other members of SAARC, we are
endeavoring to harness our efforts and energies to develop our region as a vibrant economy.
Sri Lanka is deeply appreciative of the strong commitment of Nepal to the SAARC as the
current Chair. Sri Lanka and Nepal have been engaged in a purposeful exercise of rebuilding
 56

our nations to better reflect the aspirations of our peoples. As you are aware, Sri Lanka faced
terrorism for almost 30 years and in May 2009 conflict ended with the defeat of the LTTE
(Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). Following the Parliamentary election in August 2015,
traditional rivals in Sri Lankan politics, the United National Party and Sri Lanka Freedom
Party came together to form a Government of National Unity for the first time since
independence. Today under the leadership of Maithripala Sirisena, President and Ranil
Wickreme singhe, Prime Minister, Sri Lankan Government has taken several steps that are
necessary for consolidating democracy, freedom, good Governance and rule of law. Also
they have laid the foundation necessary to forge national reconciliation and ensure non-
recurrence of conflict in Sri Lanka. The main objectives of Sri Lankan Government are
economic development, poverty alleviation, reconciliation and establishment of friendly
relations with all the countries. The National Unity Government, therefore, is taking steps
towards achieving the twine objectives of reconciliation and development as it is not possible
to achieve one without the other. One of our key priorities, while pursuing our development
and reconciliation objectives, is the adoption of a new Constitution based on the
fundamentals of democracy, human rights and equal dignity for all citizens by virtue of their
citizenship. Nearly after three decades of conflict, Sri Lanka has entered a new era of
economic progress with the aim of achieving equitable distribution of dividends of peace to
all. Sri Lanka is developing rapidly with higher GDP per capita and GDP growth at present
and the country is fast becoming the latest most important global center for trade. It offers
various benefits for foreign investors to attract foreign direct investment. South Asia has the
potential to become a major economic zone of the world. This region has the largest
concentration of the population in the world and there are vast resources, potential markets
and opportunities for economic growth. Sri Lanka and Nepal can work together in reaping
the economic benefits for the development of both countries. I am confident that the multi-
faceted relations between Sri Lanka and Nepal will continue to be strengthened to the mutual
benefit of our two peoples in the years ahead.

4.6 Nepal- Bhutan relation

Bhutan and Nepal are both Himalayan countries and until 2008, Nepal was also a monarchy.
Both nations were founding members of the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC). The Nepal-Bhutan Friendship and Cultural Society was established
in Kathmandu to facilitate good relations in 1969. The two nations had formally established
 57

diplomatic relations in 1983. Bhutanese King Jigme Singye Wangchuck visited Nepal to
attend the 3rd SAARC summit in 1987. Nepal's late King Birendra visited Bhutan to attend a
SAARC meeting in 1988. More recently, the Prime Minister of Bhutan visited Nepal in
2002. PM Tshering Tobgay of Bhutan visited Nepal on 2015 to attend a SAARC summit.

A major issue confronting both nations is the presence of Bhutanese refugees, residing in
seven UNHCR camps in eastern Nepal. Estimates of their numbers vary from 85,000 to
107,000. While most refugees claim Bhutanese nationality, Bhutan claims that they are
voluntary emigrants who forfeited their citizenship rights, denying their refugee status. Most
of the refugees are Lhotshampa - Nepali-speaking Hindus of Nepalese descent who had
settled in Bhutan. Several insurgent groups, including those with Maoist affiliations, have
arisen from the refugee camps, whom Bhutanese security forces blamed for a series of
bombings in Bhutan before the 2008 parliamentary elections. After years of talks and efforts
produced no results, several other nations, most notably the United States agreed to absorb
60,000 refugees. he growth of trade between the two nations has been affected by the refugee
crisis. In 2008-09, Bhutan's exports to Nepal stood at Rs. 300 million, while Nepal's exports
to Bhutan amounted to Rs. 200 million. In 2004, Nepal and Bhutan signed an agreement to
increase the number of flights between Paro and Kathmandu from twice a week to seven
flights a week. Delegations of chambers of business of both nations have exchanged visits,
and both nations recently held joint secretary-level talks to work towards a trade agreement.

4.7 Maldives

Diplomatic relations between Nepal and the Maldives were established on 1st August 1980.
These relations are marked by cordiality, goodwill, cooperation and mutual understanding.
They are further strengthened by the exchange of visits at various levels. Both Nepal and
Maldives are committed to the Principles and Purposes of the UN, Non-Aligned Principles
and SAARC Charter goals. Maldives has been playing an instrumental role in the evolution
of regional cooperation in South Asia and in institutionalizing SAARC process. The Embassy
of Nepal in Colombo has been accredited to Maldives and the Maldivian High Commission
in New Delhi is accredited to Nepal. Tourism and trade are the two potential areas that both
Nepal and Maldives can cooperate in real earnest to enhance their economic relations. The
two countries also need to work actively towards improving connectivity between
 58

Kathmandu and Male. Recently, in November 2012 Maldives has proposed a draft of
agreement on Tourism Co-operation between the two countries.

Since 2002, Nepalese workers have been going to the Maldives for employment. At present
about 5,000 Nepalese nationals are employed in various establishments like the Presidential
Secretariat, hotels, resorts and private companies. There is growing demand of Nepalese
workers in the security services and restaurants in Maldives. In view of this, Nepal is
planning to conclude a Labor Agreement with Maldives. As part of educational cooperation
between Nepal and Maldives, students from the Maldives have been pursuing their higher
studies in Nepal especially in MBBS and the Nursing programs. Nepal has waived visa fees
for all SAARC countries’ nationals including the Maldives.

4.8 Afghanistan relation

Republic of Afghanistan is a landlocked country located within South Asia. Afghanistan is

bordered by Pakistan in the south and east; Iran in the west; Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Tajikistan in the north; and in the far northeast, China. Its territory covers 652,000 square
kilometers and much of it is covered by the Hindu Kush mountain range, which experience
very cold winters. The north consists of fertile plains, whilst the south-west consists of
deserts where temperatures can get very hot in summers. Kabul serves as the capital and its
largest city.

Human habitation in Afghanistan dates back to the Middle Paleolithic Era, and the
country's strategic location along the Silk Road connected it to the cultures of the Middle East
and other parts of Asia. The land has historically been home to various peoples and has
witnessed numerous military campaigns, including those by Alexander the
Great, Mauryas, Muslim Arabs, Mongols, British, Soviet, and since 2001 by the United
States with NATO allied countries. It has been called unconquerable and nicknamed the
"graveyard of empires". The land also served as the source from which
the Kushans, Hephthalites, Samanids, Saffarids, Ghaznavids, Ghorids, Khaljis, Mughals, Hot
aks, Durranis, and others have risen to form major empires.

The political history of the modern state of Afghanistan began with the Hotak and Durrani
dynasties in the 18th century. In the late 19th century, Afghanistan became a buffer state in
 59

the Great Game between British India and the Russian Empire. Its border with British India,
the Durand Line, was formed in 1893 but it is not recognized by the Afghan government and
it has led to strained relations with Pakistan since the latter's independence in 1947.
Following the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919 the country was free of foreign influence,
eventually becoming a monarchy under King Amanullah, and later for 40 years under Zahir
Shah. In the late 1970s, Afghanistan in a series of coups first became a socialist state and then
a Soviet Union protectorate. This evoked the Soviet–Afghan War in the 1980s against rebels.
By 1996 most of Afghanistan was captured by the fundamentalist Islamic group the Taliban,
who ruled most of the country as a totalitarian regime for almost five years. The Taliban
were forcibly removed by the NATO-led coalition, and a new democratically-elected
government political structure was formed.

Afghanistan is a unitary presidential Islamic republic with a population of 35 million, mostly

composed of ethnic Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. It is a member of the United
Nations, the Organizations of Islamic Cooperation, the Group of 77, the Economic
Cooperation Organization, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Afghanistan's economy is the
world's 108th largest, with a GDP of $64.08 billion; the country fares much worse in terms of
per-capita GDP (PPP), ranking 167th out of 186 countries in a 2016 report from
the International Monetary Fund.
 60

Chapter 5: Significance Nepalese Geo-politics on South Asian

politics.

The increment of foreign power’s involvement in our internal affairs has increased. The
Nepal’s independent role as sovereign state in the international forums has been reduced
significantly and it has also been losing its image as well as the reputations. Such a situation
does not contribute in enhancing our country’s reputations and images in the international
level. As noted foreign policy analyzer Ramesh Nath Pandey said that ‘due to the increasing
violence and internal conflict, there has been remarkable decline in state visits by the foreign
head of the states and also head of the governments to Nepal. Similarly, apart from the
attending regular conferences and meetings, Nepali head of the state and the Prime Minister
have also not received invitations from the friendly countries’ (interaction with the author on
August 9, 2004).

The deteriorating situation of the country also increased the possibilities of using Nepali land
by other extremist’s forces in the region. With the breakdown of the law and order in most
part of the country, the other vested interest groups who want to create troubles in this region
would have chance to play in such a very critical time. Nepal is adjacent to Tibetan
Autonomous Region of China and we know that this is one of the trouble part of China
where anti-Chinese forces like Khampas organized activities in the past. Though their
activities since last few decades have declined significantly, however, they are not ended. If
the Khampa rebels started to reorganize in our land, that would be a serious jitters for the
Chinese government. China has been making considerable efforts for the development of
Tibetan Region and consequently the political and law and order situation have also
remarkably improved there. Any trouble that it has to face because of Nepal conflicts,
certainly it won’t tolerate it and take steps which may undermine our national sovereignty
and national interests.

As it stated earlier, India has already expressed its dissatisfaction about the increasing
involvement of the US and other European countries in Nepal because India regards Nepal as
its area of influence. China has not expressed such views publicly, but as an emerging global
power which is increasingly becoming a competitive country after the US, it could be
 61

understood that the Chinese government would not take positively the increasing US and
other Western countries activities inside Nepal. All the countries in South Asia are facing
internal conflicts and the threats arise from internal tensions and conflict except the Indo-Pak
tension which invited three wars, nuclear threat and continuous geopolitical low-intensity
skirmishes.

Now, the pertinent question is that does such an increasing nexus among the insurgence
groups in the region provide any ground to build up a regional level response to devise the
common strategy to counter the insurgencies? The answer came flatly ‘no’ from those
individuals and academic personalities with whom this author held interactions during the
process of writing this paper. They argue that it is simply not possible because India as
dominant power in the region does not want to bring the issue at the regional level. One of
the reasons India does not want to bring at the regional level because it still does not feel the
issue need to be dealt jointly. Secondly, because of the Kashmiri conflict, if other internal
conflicts of different individual countries’ started to bring in the regional forums this will set
up a precedent by Pakistan and the Islamic militants. Therefore, India is reluctant to deal
issue in the regional level.

Due to the existing geopolitical situation of South Asia, until India is not ready in jointly
dealing the issue, there will be no use of the rest of other countries to come together. It is not
only because it is a dominant power but also the rest of the south Asian countries do not
share common borders each other and without India’s initiation, it would be practically
useless for other countries to devise the joint programs in dealing the insurgency. Another
reason of not seeing possibility is because of the existing SAARC Charter. The existing
SAARC provision does not allow any individual countries’ to take up bilateral problems of
political nature to be discussed in the regional forums.
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5.1 Nepal’s international politics after new constitution and geopolitical

effects on South Asia

Due to power struggles, the Constituent Assembly (CA) elected in 2008 was dissolved in
2012 without delivering a new constitution. These are just the political causalities of power
tussles; the country’s social and economic sectors were badly hampered as well.

After the promulgation of the new constitution last year, there was an expectation among the
people that Nepal would embark on a journey of political stability, resulting in economic
growth and development. But those expectations have been trashed as the political parties are
still first and foremost vying for power.

Due to the lack of political stability, economic growth has completely stalled, triggering
unemployment which pushed millions of youth abroad to search for jobs. According to
government reports, every day 1,500 young Nepalis go abroad seeking employment due to
the lack of opportunities at home. With the political situation uncertain, foreign investors are
reluctant to spend money in Nepal. Domestic industries are facing a lot of challenges due to
the political situation.

Along with this, Nepal is yet to heal the wounds of last year’s earthquake, which claimed the
lives of nearly 9,000 and left millions of people homeless. Though government has started to
provide money to construct new houses, most people have yet to receive the funds. Thanks to
the painfully slow rebuilding process, people are still living in temporary shelters in the rainy
season. Health and education facilities are still left in ruins, but there have not been sufficient
efforts to cope with those problems.

Aside from rebuilding, Nepal’s main priority is the implementation of the constitution
adopted in September last year. But there has been very little or no progress in that field
either. To implement the constitution, Nepal will need to address the demands of Madhesh-
based parties. But in the last six months there has not been any sincere progress between the
major parties and Madhesi parties of southern Nepal. Last month, the Madhesh-based parties
protested in Kathmandu in order to make their voices heard.

Without addressing the demands of Madhesh parties, it seems that it will not be possible to
hold elections as called for by the constitution. But there is a sharp division between the
 63

major parties and Madhesh-based parties, mainly centered on the boundaries of federal states
in the southern part of the country, bordering India.

The Madhesh-based parties want two provinces in the southern belt of Nepal but major
parties are not ready to accept this demand, fearing that it might lead to the disintegration of
the country. Instead, the government maintains that the issue is resolved. “The constitution
has been already addressed to meet the demands of Madhesh-based parties,” outgoing Prime
Minister Oli has told Parliament. Without addressing the demands of Madhesh-based parties
it would be very hard to maintain stability in the country, which again affects development
and economic growth.

Implementing the constitution is not the concern of the major parties; what they want is
power, in order to bolster their own positions. As per the constitutional provisions, Nepal
should hold national, provincial, and local elections. The hidden agenda is that the major
parties the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML and CPN(M-C) want to hold those elections under
their leadership. Madhesh-based parties and other fringe parties also want their piece of
action.

The current tussle is aimed at securing the leadership of government during the elections. All
parties prefer to be in government during election season because they are accustomed use
state power and resources to bolster their candidates and win more position. Madhesh-based
parties are also expecting a change in government, with the expectation that the new
government would be more favorable to them. There is a real danger for Nepal should the
current power struggle continue and the parties fail to unite when it comes time to hold
elections. If elections are not held within the next 20 months, the chances of a political and
constitutional crisis are high.

Ordinary people are not concerned about who will come to lead the government but there is
worry across the board that political instability has badly affected every sector in the country.
The country has been riding a wave of political chaos since Maoist rebels launched their war
in 1996 two decades of political instability. Nepal’s larger neighbors also seek to influence
the political turmoil to their own benefit. China reportedly strongly backed the Oli
government, as it signed a trade and transit treaty with China ending India’s monopoly.
Similarly, there were reports that India wanted to see the Oli government toppled. Though it
is difficult to ascertain the degree of interference, India has huge influence in the internal
 64

political affairs of Nepal and China too is increasing its influence among the political parties
and other key institutions.

Despite the promulgation of the constitution, it seems that Nepal is doomed to face further
political instability. Unless the major parties come together, there cannot be progress on
addressing the key issues facing the country, whether rebuilding after the earthquake,
implementing the constitution by holding layers of elections, or simply growing the economy.

5.2 SAARC Perspective of Nepalese geopolitics

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is the

regional intergovernmental organization and geopolitical union of nations in South Asia. Its
member states include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal,
the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. SAARC comprises 3% of the world's area, 21% of the
world's population and 3.8% (US$2.9 trillion) of the global economy, as of 2015. SAARC
was founded in Dhaka on 8 December 1985. Its secretariat is based in Kathmandu, Nepal.
The organization promotes development of economic and regional integration. It launched
the South Asian Free Trade Area in 2006. SAARC maintains permanent diplomatic relations
at the United Nations as an observer and has developed links with multilateral entities,
including the European Union.

The idea of co-operation in South Asia was discussed in at least three conferences: the Asian
Relations Conference held in New Delhion April 1947; the Baguio Conference in
the Philippines on May 1950; and the Colombo Powers Conference held in Sri Lanka in April
1954.

In the ending years of the 1970s, the seven inner South Asian nations that
included Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka agreed upon
the creation of a trade bloc and to provide a platform for the people of South Asia to work
together in a spirit of friendship, trust, and understanding. President Ziaur Rahman later
addressed official letters to the leaders of the countries of the South Asia, presenting his
vision for the future of the region and the compelling arguments for region. During his visit
to India in December 1977, Rahman discussed the issue of regional cooperation with
the Indian Prime Minister, Morarji Desai. In the inaugural speech to the Colombo Plan
 65

Consultative Committee which met in Kathmandu also in 1977, King Birendra of Nepal gave
a call for close regional cooperation among South Asian countries in sharing river waters.
After the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan, the efforts to establish the union was
accelerated in 1979 and the resulting rapid deterioration of South Asian security situation.
Responding to Rahman and Birendra's convention, the officials of the foreign ministries of
the seven countries met for the first time in Colombo in April 1981.The Bangladeshi proposal
was promptly endorsed by Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and the Maldives but India and
Pakistan were sceptical initially.The Indian concern was the proposal’s reference to the
security matters in South Asia and feared that Rahman's proposal for a regional organization
might provide an opportunity for new smaller neighbors to renationalize all bilateral issues
and to join with each other to form an opposition against India. Pakistan assumed that it
might be an Indian strategy to organize the other South Asian countries against Pakistan and
ensure a regional market for Indian products, thereby consolidating and further strengthening
India’s economic dominance in the region.

However, after a series of diplomatic consultations headed by Bangladesh between South

Asian U.N. representatives at the UN headquarters in New York, from September 1979 to
1980, it was agreed that Bangladesh would prepare the draft of a working paper for
discussion among the foreign secretaries of South Asian countries. The foreign secretaries of
the inner seven countries again delegated a Committee of the Whole in Colombo on
September 1981, which identified five broad areas for regional cooperation. New areas of co-
operation were added in the following years.

In 1983, the international conference held in Dhaka by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
foreign ministers of the inner seven countries adopted the Declaration on South Asian
Association Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and formally launched the Integrated Program
of Action (IPA) initially in five agreed areas of cooperation namely, Agriculture; Rural
Development; Telecommunications; Meteorology; and Health and Population Activities.
Officially, the union was established in Dhaka with Kathmandu being union's secretariat-
general. The first SAARC summit was held in Dhaka on 7–8 December 1985 and hosted by
the President of Bangladesh Hussain Ershad. The declaration signed by King of Bhutan Jigme
Singye Wangchuk, President of Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq, Prime Minister of India Rajiv
Gandhi, King of Nepal Birendra Shah, President of Sri Lanka JR Jayewardene, and President
of Maldives Maumoon Gayoom. Lasting peace and prosperity in South Asia has been elusive
 66

because of the various ongoing conflicts in the region. Political dialogue is often conducted
on the margins of SAARC meetings which have refrained from interfering in the internal
matters of its member states. During the 12th and 13th SAARC summits, extreme emphasis
was laid upon greater cooperation between the SAARC members to fight terrorism, The 19th
SAARC summit scheduled to be held in Pakistan was called
as India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan decided to boycott it.

It was for the first time that four countries boycotted a SAARC summit, leading to its
cancellation. The 20th SAARC summit is the 20th meeting of the heads of state or heads of
government of the eight SAARC countries after their previous meeting in Pakistan was
boycotted by all SAARC members. The Summit will take place in 2018. Pakistan is
aggressively seeking support from smaller South Asian nations to host the SAARC summit in
Islamabad. Sri Lanka and Nepal have already shown support, but analysts doubt India will
agree as it holds Pakistan responsible for numerous terrorist activities in its homeland.

Nepal Prime Minister K P Oli’s visit to India not only refreshed bilateral relations but also
contributed to the resumption of discussions on South Asian regionalism. Prime Minister
Narendra Modi’s response on the 19th South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) Summit in Islamabad, an issue raised by his Nepali counterpart, conveys that India
is not keen on reviving the now-defunct SAARC. Citing cross-border terrorism perpetrated
by Pakistan, Modi is reported to have indicated that it is difficult to proceed with SAARC in
these circumstances.

The 19th SAARC Summit was originally scheduled to be held in Islamabad in November
2016. However, following the pull-out of India and three other countries after the Uri terrorist
attack, the Summit was postponed indefinitely. In March 2018, during his visit to
Kathmandu, Pakistan Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi sought the help of Nepal, the
chair of SAARC, to revive the organizations by convening the pending Summit in Islamabad.
Pakistan has also solicited the support of Sri Lanka in this regard. Two major factors,
cooperative outcomes and socialisation of member states, determine the vitality and necessity
of international organizationss. In the case of SAARC, both these factors have been in short
supply. The organizations “continue to operate, but without making any progress toward its
mandate”, akin to a ‘zombie.’ Given the structural fragility of SAARC and its inability to
 67

promote South Asian regional integration, an attempt to reboot the organization would be
futile.

A SAARC: An example of retarded regionalism

SAARC was founded in 1985 with seven South Asian countries — Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The membership grew to eight when
Afghanistan joined in 2007. The organizations aim to achieve peace, freedom, social justice,
and economic prosperity by promoting a shared understanding, good neighbor relations, and
meaningful cooperation. Improving the quality of life in the member countries by fostering
self-reliance, promoting mutual assistance, and strengthening collaboration with other
regional and international organizations are its core objectives.

However, the mismatch between SAARC’s ambitions and achievements has been profound.
No tangible economic or political benefits have been realized by SAARC, with analysts
terming its performance as a case of ‘retarded regionalism’. SAARC occupies a land area
larger than the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). In terms of population as well, it is superior with approximately 22.5 per cent of
the world populace. Nonetheless, despite such statistics, it has failed to achieve a majority of
its stated objectives. South Asia, at present, is “one of the least integrated regions” in the
world.7 Promoting intra-regional connectivity through trade is one of the primary focus areas
of SAARC However, even after three decades of existence, intra-SAARC trade stands at a
meagre five percent of South Asia’s total trade.

Nepal Prime Minister K P Oli’s visit to India not only refreshed bilateral relations but also
contributed to the resumption of discussions on South Asian regionalism. Prime Minister
Narendra Modi’s response on the 19th South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) Summit in Islamabad, an issue raised by his Nepali counterpart, conveys that India
is not keen on reviving the now-defunct SAARC. Citing cross-border terrorism perpetrated
by Pakistan, Modi is reported to have indicated that it is difficult to proceed with SAARC in
these circumstances.

The 19th SAARC Summit was originally scheduled to be held in Islamabad in November
2016. However, following the pull-out of India and three other countries (Bangladesh,
 68

Bhutan, and Afghanistan) after the Uri terrorist attack, the Summit was postponed
indefinitely. In March 2018, during his visit to Kathmandu, Pakistan Prime Minister Shahid
Khaqan Abbasi sought the help of Nepal, the chair of SAARC, to revive the organizations by
convening the pending Summit in Islamabad. Pakistan has also solicited the support of Sri
Lanka in this regard.

Two major factors, cooperative outcomes and socialization of member states, determine the
vitality and necessity of international organizations. In the case of SAARC, both these factors
have been in short supply. The organizations “continue to operate, but without making any
progress toward its mandate”, akin to a ‘zombie.’ Given the structural fragility of SAARC
and its inability to promote South Asian regional integration, an attempt to reboot the
organizations would be futile.

SAARC was founded in 1985 with seven South Asian countries — Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The membership grew to eight when
Afghanistan joined in 2007. The organizations aim to achieve peace, freedom, social justice,
and economic prosperity by promoting a shared understanding, good neighbor relations, and
meaningful cooperation. Improving the quality of life in the member countries by fostering
self-reliance, promoting mutual assistance, and strengthening collaboration with other
regional and international organizations are its core objectives.

A range of factors including the motives of an international organization’s formation, its

structure, mandate, working methods and the relationship among member states have
undeniable sway on the outcomes it produces and the success it attains. In the case of
SAARC, all these contribute to its zombie status in varying degrees. First, for the member
countries, SAARC was an unwanted child. Secondly, various structural and organizational
issues make SAARC not only vulnerable but reforms implausible as well. Finally, conflict
and power asymmetry among members impede it from making any progress in regional
cooperation.

B. An Unwanted Child

The motives that trigger the creation of a regional organizations play a significant role in its
success. Theories of regionalism identify four principal motives that individually or
collectively work as catalysts in the creation of regional organizations: functional,
 69

instrumental, normative–contractual and solidarist.11 The functionalist logic that technical

and economic cooperation will lead to political harmony played a vital role in the
development of regionalism in Europe. The EU was an outcome of intense longing for
political rapprochement and rebuilding through economic integration after the devastation of
the Second World War.12 In contrast, the instrumental, security motive – a wish to dampen
intra-regional differences and band together to deal with an external security threat – drove
cooperation in South East Asia.13 While the formation of the Economic Commission for
Latin America illustrates the normative–contractual rationale,14 the African Union is an
example of the role played by shared identity (solidarism) in forging regional integration.

In the case of South Asia, however, the need to evade the embarrassment of being a region
devoid of a regional entity was the principal instigator for the formation of SAARC. South
Asia was one of the few regions that did not make any attempt to build a regional
organization until the 1980s and the idea of SAARC was borne out of this dilemma. This
perceived lacuna, not a genuine concern for economic or security cooperation or shared
identity, pushed South Asian countries to create an institution.16 In other words, it was not
the pursuit of economic and developmental cooperation as a means to lift the region out of
poverty17 or shared threat perception or even shared identity18 that pushed South Asian
countries to establish a regional organization.

In short, for member countries, SAARC was an unwanted child not only when it was
conceived but after its birth and adolescence as well. In the last 33 years, SAARC has held
only 18 Summits, and many have been postponed or cancelled due to various issues.19
Further, in the last decade, the frequency of summits has also reduced compared to the first
two decades. While the first decade witnessed eight Summits, the second had six, and the
third only four.20 The cancellation and postponement of regular meetings embody the
persistence of this indifference today as well.

C Structural Problems

SAARC’s emphasis on the principle of unanimity for decision making and exclusion of
contentious bilateral issues from deliberations makes the organizations fragile and vulnerable.
Its Charter says: decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity and bilateral
 70

and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations. While the unanimity clause
enables any member at any time to veto any proposal, the prohibition on the raising of
bilateral issues reduces the possibility of solving conflicts among, and addressing concerns
of, the member states. Given the level of suspicion, power asymmetry and persistence of
bilateral conflicts, it has seemingly proven hard for SAARC countries to come to a
unanimous agreement on vital issues. The trans-South Asian road connectivity project is a
case in point of how one member could hinder a regional initiative that was supported by the
rest.

Contrasting SAARC’s decision-making process with those of the EU and ASEAN, which
employ the qualified majority and consensus procedures, respectively, shows how the
decision making procedure of an organizations influences its success and failure. In the EU,
one of the most successful cases of regional integration, a decision requires only 55 per cent
of member states (16 out of 28) to vote in favour. Besides, to block a decision at the
European Council, four members representing at least 35 per cent of the EU population is
necessary. These structural characteristics not only make the decision-making process in the
EU relatively easy but vetoing a decision hard as well. Similarly, though ASEAN employs
consensus to arrive at decisions, unanimity is not an absolute in decision-making.
Additionally, to circumvent the painstakingly slow consensus process.

Similarly, barring discussions on contentious bilateral issues also contributes to making

SAARC a zombie. South Asian countries are beset by many inter-state and intra-state
conflicts. It is a region that has witnessed five full-scale inter-state conflicts, and some of its
states have earned the distinction of becoming a part of the hub of global terrorism. There is
no doubt that these conflicts, especially hostile bilateral relationships, affect the regional
integration process. Unless and until all members discuss bilateral disputes with an intention
to resolve them, the chances of enhancing regional cooperation will remain dim. By
prohibiting the discussion of bilateral issues at its summits, SAARC has crippled itself.

Conflicting interests of members

To be sure, violent conflict among members does decrease organizationsal vitality. Since its
inception, the regular activities of SAARC have been restrained by the tense bilateral
relationships including violent conflicts among its members. Scholars contend that two
factors, power-asymmetry and lack of common strategic thinking, make South Asia an
 71

unusually fragile strategic environment where genuine cooperation is impossible. When one
of the constituents is too big and powerful compared to the rest, it will naturally affect the
progress of cooperation. In the region, the basis of power-asymmetry is India’s
preponderance, which represents more than two-thirds of the region’s area and more than
three-fourths of the region’s population, GDP, and military strength.

India’s dominance causes mistrust and suspicion about its motives in the smaller South Asian
countries. As Bimal Prasad had noted, the smaller states consider India as the “main source of
threat to their security even if they continue to express interest in maintaining friendly
relations with India. While India considers its neighbors as an integral part of its security
system, the latter perceive it as a threat to their security. This perception among the smaller
countries of South Asia has enabled external powers such as the United States and China to
acquire a role in the region, which, in turn, introduces a further stumbling block for regional
cooperation.

India has been particularly chary of the idea of a Chinese role in South Asia since that would
severely restrict its own influence in the region. For their part, India’s neighbors have
“always tried, and often succeeded, in evading Indian pressure, by internationalizing their
bilateral conflicts by turning to either great powers or international organizations for
support.” Thus, while China has been a key security concern for India, others, particularly
Pakistan and Nepal, have for long viewed China as a balancer against Indian preponderance.
And with China emerging as the principal trading partner of many countries in the region as
well as the leading supplier of arms to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, the issue of
granting China membership in SAARC has gathered momentum. While India opposes the
move, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives are all in favor.

But the most important factor for making SAARC dysfunctional is the conflict between India
and Pakistan. While SAARC has survived various Indo-Pak crises, the organization could not
isolate itself from their ill effects completely. In particular, the lingering Kashmir dispute has
become a significant obstacle to regional integration, with Pakistan insisting on a settlement
before normalisation of the bilateral relationship with India and greater bilateral and regional
cooperation. Further, this state of affairs keeps the threat of open conflict a possibility, as the
Kargil War demonstrated and is also contributing to the persistence of cross-border terrorism
and tensions along the Line of Control.
 72

Though SAARC has made some progress in the last three decades, India-Pakistan bilateral
issues have hampered meaningful regional cooperation. For instance, even years after India
granted Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan, the latter has not reciprocated citing
pending bilateral disputes. India perceives Pakistan’s conduct in SAARC as obstructive as
well as a means to restrict Indian influence in the region. According to New Delhi, Islamabad
has a history of obstructing significant initiatives under SAARC. It has opposed connectivity
initiatives and pulled out of the SAARC satellite project a well. Pakistan’s dilemma in
SAARC is apparent. It realises the impossibility of avoiding development cooperation with
other countries in the region, but fears genuine integration in a group where India is the
dominant actor. It also fears that greater cooperation with India would imperil its political and
strategic identity as the not-India. But, at the same time, Pakistan continues to blame India for
the failure of SAARC. According to Islamabad, it was New Delhi’s unwillingness to develop
the SAARC satellite as a collaborative project that led to Pakistan’s exit from the project.

D Is revival realistic and possible?

Two questions are pertinent for any discussion on reviving SAARC: Is it realistic? And, is it
possible? International organizations achieve cooperative outcomes through the transmission
of information or socialization. States use organizations to both reduce transaction costs and
create information, ideas, norms, and expectations. States also legitimize or delegitimize
particular ideas and practices and enhance their capacities and power through international
organizations. These functions constitute international organizations as agents, which, in turn,
influence the interests, inter-subjective understandings, and environment of states. An
organization can only be useful if member states share the view that it meets, or at least has
the potential to meet, their respective interests.

In the case of SAARC, a fragile structure, weak mandate, mistrust and misperceptions, and
conflict among member countries have impeded it from performing any of the above
mentioned functions smoothly. For instance, SAARC has two sets of goals. First, the
immediate and non-political aims such as national development through regional socio-
economic and cultural cooperation. Second relates to the long-term, political objective of
creating a durable, stable, and peaceful regional order. The organization was a product of the
functionalist optimism that economic cooperation will circumvent political issues. However,
it could contribute to solving neither economic problems nor political issues. Further, it has
 73

also failed to modify the perceptions and conduct of its members. At this juncture, the idea
that economic integration will lead to peace and that the ‘peace dividend’ will bring progress
and development to the whole region is far from reality. Therefore, even if reinvigorated
through structural reforms, the organization will not be able to contribute to regional
cooperation and development.

But can the structural and other issues be fixed? First, the likelihood of amending the SAARC
Charter to make the organization’s structure and mandate effective is limited due to the
conflicting views of member countries to structural reforms. For instance, India “remains
convinced that more harm than good would come from amending the Charter.” In contrast,
Pakistan argues for Charter reform and especially amending the provision pertaining to the
discussion of bilateral security issues in the regional platform. While Bangladesh shares
India’s position, Sri Lanka supports Pakistan’s viewpoint. Since the unanimity principle of
the organization provides veto power to each member, amending the Charter will be
extremely difficult.

Second, the chances of resolving India-Pakistan conflict, the prominent factor behind the
comatose status of the organization are limited. Kashmir is the bone of contention between
these two leading South Asian powers. On the one hand, neither the use of force nor
diplomacy is expected to bring peace to Kashmir in the near future. On the other, the
likelihood of India-Pakistan relationship deteriorating further appears high. The steep
increase in ceasefire violations in recent months and the recurrence of Pakistan backed
terrorist attacks on Indian soil have intensified tensions. Since India’s decision to boycott the
Islamabad meeting of SAARC and its cancellation, more than 350 ceasefire violations have
been reported in Jammu and Kashmir. The year 2017 has been the bloodiest on the LoC and
the international border in the Jammu sector since the ceasefire agreement (CFA) was agreed
to in 2003 with more than 160 soldiers losing their lives.

Finally, since India-Pakistan rivalry has been the primary factor hampering the process of
regional integration, many analysts have proposed a SAARC minus one. This could be a
SAARC without India or without Pakistan. Both prospects, however, have serious
drawbacks. First, without involving Pakistan, the possibility of integrating South Asia and
resolving the economic and security challenges that the region faces will be almost
impossible. The most pressing issue in the region is terrorism and Pakistan stands at its core
 74

as both perpetrator and victim. Moreover, the other members of the organization, who have a
good relationship with Pakistan, are not likely to favor the idea of a SAARC minus Pakistan.
The consequence of an Indian exit from SAARC is likely to be worse. It would possibly
cause the death of the SAARC ‘zombie’. India enjoys substantial regional influence across
South Asia due to its size, population, and economic might. Without India, meaningful
regional cooperation in South Asia would not be possible.

5.3 BIMISTEC Perspective of Nepalese geopolitics

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectorial Technical and Economic

Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is an international organization of seven nations of South
Asia and South East Asia, housing 1.5 billion people and having a combined gross domestic
product of $3.5 trillion (2018). The BIMSTEC member states Bangladesh, India, Myanmar,
Sri lank, Thailand, Nepal, and Bhutan are among the countries dependent on the Bay of
Bengal. Fourteen priority sectors of cooperation have been identified and several BIMSTEC
centers have been established to focus on those sectors. A BIMSTEC free trade agreement is
under negotiation.

The 14 main objective of BIMSTEC is technological and economic cooperation among south
Asian and southeast Asian countries along the coast of the bay of Bengal. Commerce,
Investment, Technology, Tourism, Human Resource Development, Agriculture, Fisheries,
Transport and Communication, Textiles, Leather etc. have been included in it. Provide
cooperation to one another for the provision of training and research facilities in educational
vocational and technical fields. Promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in
economic, social, technical and scientific fields of common interest. It also provides help to
increase the socio-economic growth of the member countries.

BIMSTEC Free Trade Area Framework Agreement (BFTAFA) has been signed by all
member nations to stimulate trade and investment in the parties, and attract outsiders to trade
with and invest in BIMSTEC at a higher level. Subsequently, the Trade Negotiating
Committee (TNC) was set up, with Thailand as the permanent chair, to negotiate in areas of
trade in goods and services, investment, economic co-operation, trade facilitations and
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technical assistance for LDCs. Once negotiation on trade in goods is completed, the TNC
would then proceed with negotiation on trade in services and investment.

BIMSTEC Coastal Shipping Agreement draft was discussed on 1 December 2017 at New
Delhi, to facilitate coastal shipping within 20 nautical miles of the coastline in the region to
boost trade between the member countries. Once the agreement becomes operational after it
is ratified, a lot of cargo movement between the member countries can be done through the
cost effective, environment friendly and faster coastal shipping routes.

The regional grouping’s Kathmandu Declaration focuses on backing of terror by state and
non-state actors, apart from connectivity among the member nations. Describing terrorism as
a great threat to international peace and security, India and six other BIMSTEC nations on
Friday called for identifying and holding accountable states and non-state entities that
encourage, support or finance terrorism, provide sanctuaries to terrorists and falsely extol
their virtues. Terrorism and transnational organized crimes continue to pose a great threat to
international peace and security including in the BIMSTEC countries.

The unanimously adopted declaration said the “fight against terrorism should target not only
terrorists, terror organizations and networks but also identify and hold accountable states and
non-state entities that encourage, support or finance terrorism, provide sanctuaries to
terrorists and terror groups and falsely extol their virtues.” The declaration did not name any
specific country, but Pakistan is often accused by its neighbors, including India, of providing
safe havens to terrorists. The declaration underlined the importance of multidimensional
connectivity, which promotes synergy among connectivity frameworks in the region, as a key
enabler to economic integration for shared prosperity. Nepal within a week of hosting the
BIMSTEC Summit has tried to play SAARC card ostensibly at the behest of Pakistan and
made progress in BIMSTEC conditional on reviving SAARC.

Former Nepalese PM Prachanda during his just concluded Delhi trip asserted that Nepal
wants to revive SAARC and get its stalled summit convened at the earliest. This has been
demand made by the Imran Khan government and it had tried to reach out to Delhi by urging
India’s participation at the SAARC Summit. Nepal. Prachanda speaking to a select audience
on Friday further suggested that SAARC and BIMSTEC complements each other and cannot
substitute one another. Nepal on Saturday pulled out of the proposed BIMSTEC military
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exercise in Pune a week after the Kathmandu Summit of the grouping and earlier last
Thursday gained access to Chinese ports to reduce dependence on India in what could be
viewed as exploring alternatives to BIMSTEC connectivity proposals.

5.4 BBIN perspective of Nepalese geopolitics

The Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) Initiative is a sub-regional architecture of

countries in Eastern South Asia, a sub region of South Asia. It meets through official
representation of member states to formulate, implement and review quadrilateral agreements
across areas such as water resources management, connectivity of power, transport, and
infrastructure.

In light of economic interdependence demonstrated by growth triangles across Asia and

hitherto unheeded concerns of eastern subcontinent nations, its Council of Ministers in May
1996 approved a sub-regional body of Nepal, Bhutan, north east India and Bangladesh as
the South Asian Growth Quadrangle. A Malé summit one year later agreed to co-ordinate
efforts catered to the special individual needs of three or more Member States, and
formalized procedures focused on the subcontinent's north east to develop intra-regional trade
and investment, tourism, communication, and energy resources. Particular areas of
collaboration were targeted to channel growth and complementarity.

As the mechanism operated through specific projects, constituent members endeavored to

integrate without requiring alteration in broader policy or methods of governance. It sought to
impel the sub region’s latent socio economic potential, harnessing disparate stages of
development to augment each other. Borders of member states rest within 50 kilometers
of Siliguri, ergo contiguous norms, tradition and lifestyle amongst inhabitants underscore the
importance of an integrated market. Considerable emphasis was placed upon power trading
between naturally abundant and energy-scarce localities to address the impact of shortages on
industrial production, reverse consequently depressed rates of growth, reduce transmission
and distribution losses through interconnected grids, and provide needed revenue for
upstream nations with adverse balance of payments. However, the benefits of such trade
remain untapped in the absence of concerted strategy to remove barriers.

Over years its objectives expanded to incorporate land and port connectivity. Procurement of
funds for this purpose was discussed at ADB headquarters, Manila, where formulation of the
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South Asia Sub regional Economic Cooperation Program within auspices of ADB concluded
in March 2001. The formation worked toward economic synergy through arterial channels of
trade and cross border initiatives. For instance, to link West Bengal and remote north eastern
states through Bangladesh by rail, highway and maritime corridors, alongside north-south
transport routes that span Nepal, Bhutan and Indian hill states to northern Bay of
Bengal ports. These grids would then bridge extraneous regions throughout member states
and beyond eastwards. With accession of Maldives and Sri lanka to SASEC in March 2014,
notions of quadripartite integration appeared subsumed or rendered dormant.

5.5 OBOR

One Belt One Road (OBOR), an ambitious initiative of China, is the plan to build a wide
network of land and sea routes to global connectivity the initiative is inspired by Silk Road,
the medieval trade routes between Europe and Asia, will be a vast network of sea and land
routes across dozens of countries impacting 4.4 billion people. Boosting global trade along
with building infrastructure in the countries that they cannot afford themselves is the main
expectation of OBOR concept. It is said that China is making investments of USD 1 trillion
on this mega project which includes building of railways, roads, ports and other
infrastructure. The main reason for China on the OBOR initiative could be;

(i) Falling exports.

(ii) Sluggish economic growth both globally and locally

(iii) Persistent need for China to structurally transform its economy from
being driven by government investments and exports to a more
consumer driven model.

Due to the nature of its economic growth model, China has created a problem of serious
overcapacity in many of its industries. China’s enduring emphasis on heavy industries over
the past two decades, as well as government being a decisive force in the country’s economy
are two of the key reasons for this overcapacity. In terms of infrastructure and trade, the
participating countries who have no or less capacity to build the infrastructures which they
cannot make themselves will definitely be benefited. Besides, such countries will have easy
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and fast access to those projects and their products are easily tradable in the international
market. On the other hand, the trade routes will give China new markets. It can put its
infrastructural footprints in dozens of countries in Asia and Africa. Its presence in many
small countries in the long term way will give China an edge over its rivals in trading with
these small countries. It will be easier to China to impart its manufacturing process into those
small developing countries at cheaper labor costs. Also, OBOR initiative could create a vast
economic empire in Asia and Africa, if turned into reality.

Nepal has ample opportunities to be in between two big giants in terms of global trade.
Anything produced can easily be traded in the global markets. Nepal is touted as a transit
bridge for the second biggest economy in the world to reach South Asia. Nepal, though a
poor underdeveloped nation, is rich in terms of natural resources. Hydropower, tourism and
agriculture are three prominent sectors for converting the country from poor to developing
and then ultimately a developed nation. To best utilize those natural resources it needs huge
investments in mega infrastructural projects. Development of those sectors is only possible
with wide network of seas and land routes across many countries. For example, there is
possibility and technical feasibility to generate 42,000 MW electricity from various rivers of
Nepal. With access to dozens of countries through OBOR, the produced electricity can easily
be saleable in the global market. Similarly, even if a small fraction of people from the two big
giant neighboring countries entered Nepal as tourists it would be a milestone achievement for
Nepal to lift the economy.

There will be a positive environment for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) wherein the
confidence of international investors increases along with access to a wide network. Nepal
can take benefit of FDI and can be a user of global products. Joining the OBOR will bring
Nepal investments and experience from across the world. Every coin has two sides. OBOR is
also not an exception. It is criticized that China will lend money for OBOR projects to host
countries at high rates of interest which the countries may not be able to repay. This can lead
to China acquiring equity and then controlling stakes in these projects, getting a permanent
footprint in several small countries which is nearly impossible for it to achieve otherwise.
Another criticism is that China’s plan to build ports, roads and railways in under-developed
Eurasia and Africa is out of political motivation rather than real demand for infrastructure.
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Nepal has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China for participation
in OBOR which aims at promoting cooperation on promoting connectivity of facilities, trade
connectivity, financial integration and connectivity of people. Irrespective of criticized factor
of OBOR, Nepal is in need of investment to build the infrastructure which may take years to
build by itself. Also, it should plan, design and start building infrastructures directly linked to
the OBOR projects. Economic transformation is only possible once mega projects materialize.
It may be an opportunity for Nepal to convert from a land locked county to a ‘land linked’
country. Though some SAARC countries like India and Bhutan are unwilling to participate in
OBOR, it may a great opportunity for Nepal to play a bridging role between two big giant
countries, and to have global connectivity. Attracting FDI into the country with flexible
policies and legislation could be the need in the initial period of economic transformation
which in turn will change the economic prospect of the country.

After nearly 40 years of reform and opening up, China has made remarkable achievements in
economic development. However, the advancement of sustainable development is faced with
more difficult internal choices and huge external challenges. At present, the imbalance of
economic development in the eastern, central and western regions of China is prominent, and
the industrial structure is in urgent need of being further adjusted and optimized, particularly
the traditional industries that are faced with great difficulties in development and reform. At
the same time, due to the characteristics of China’s economic structure and the changes of the
international economic environment in recent years, China’s economy has shown a clear
imbalance to the outside, which in turn exacerbates the imbalance in the economy, wherein
the continued expansion of the trade surplus is not only an outstanding performance of
China’s internal and external economic imbalances, but also a “lame excuse” used by western
countries led the United States to promote and implement trade protectionism. In addition,
the sign of recession is obvious in Europe, the economic recovery in the United States lacks
motive power, and Japan’s economy is in continuous downturn. The world powers seem
vulnerable, and the chaos of the world economic pattern has been looming out of the crisis of
global governance. At the same time, influenced by the development trend of the multi-level
world structure and the strategic layout of the world and regional powers in the Asia Pacific
region, China’s surrounding environment is becoming more and more complicated. In view
of this, the challenge of the international pattern is not the new cold war, but the disorder of
the world order. The disorder brings anxiety, and the anxiety leads to populism. The Brexit,
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Trump phenomenon and Erdogan phenomenon are all expressions of anxiety. How will
China safe against a rainy day? How to maintain a strategic concentration in the complex and
unpredictable international situation and furthest avoid the cooperation dilemma in the
development of relations with neighboring countries through playing the linkage effects of
internal and external development based on geographical advantage and competitive
advantage?

5.6 India-Nepal-China

The fourth heads-of-state summit of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) in Kathmandu on August 30 and 31 will bring
together seven countries, five from South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri
Lanka) and two from Southeast Asia (Myanmar and Thailand). BIMSTEC, formed in 1997 in
Bangkok, had been moribund for much of its existence, with the last summit held in
Naypyidaw, Myanmar in March 2014. Lately, however, the forum has gotten a new lease on
life thanks to India’s renewed interest.

India, by far the largest country both economically and militarily in BIMSTEC, has tried to
promote the forum in lieu of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC), the eight-country grouping which includes Afghanistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh,
India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka as members. The reason for the switch is
the growing realization in New Delhi that the India-Pakistan rivalry will never allow for
meaningful regional cooperation from within the SAARC framework.

All the major decisions in SAARC, which has been in existence since 1985, have to be taken
by consensus. Because India and Pakistan seldom accept each other’s proposals, there has
been little headway made in terms of bringing South Asia closer economically. India refused
to take part in the 19th SAARC summit that had been scheduled for Islamabad in 2016,
saying that there would be no engagement with Pakistan unless the latter stopped providing
safe haven to terrorists. India now seems intent on pushing regional initiatives like BIMSTEC
that do not include Pakistan. But while Pakistan could arguably have done more to rein in
anti-India terrorism that originates on its soil, India’s overall role within SAARC has also
been dubious. When SAARC was founded under the initiative of Bangladesh and Nepal,
India suspected smaller countries in the region were trying to “gang up” against New Delhi.
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Hence, India has never been keen on SAARC. Perennial India-Pakistan tensions only made
the situation worse.

Yet there continues to be considerable goodwill for SAARC in its smaller member states like
Nepal. Traditionally, Nepal has seen SAARC as a forum where it could stand as an equal
with India, the big brother next door. There is also a feeling that India, the undisputed
fulcrum of South Asia, could have done more to promote regional cooperation in South Asia.
This is why many analysts in Kathmandu are suspicious of India’s intent behind its backing
of BIMSTEC.

Most don’t expect anything substantial to come out of the fourth BIMSTEC summit Nepal is
hosting. After all, BIMSTEC has not managed to draft a guiding charter in over two decades
of existence. Interestingly, the Nepal government has already started chalking up successes
on the bilateral front with India, like rail and road connectivity projects, as prospective
BIMSTEC success stories. This means Nepal will allow India to place many of these bilateral
projects under BIMSTEC, just like it has allowed China to club most of its bilateral projects
with Nepal under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The China factor is vital. During the last SAARC summit in Kathmandu in 2014, Nepal, with
Pakistan’s support, had proposed that China be included as a full SAARC member state, a
development that India did not appreciate. Traditionally, India has seen South Asia as its
backyard and has not been ready to let in a third party. There was a perception in New Delhi
that Beijing was looking to spread its footprints in South Asia via SAARC. This is another
reason Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wanted to revive BIMSTEC, which, unlike
SAARC, has a distinct anti-China whiff.

With this background, Nepal’s foreign policy of late has been rather curious. New Nepali
Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli seems to believe that if he has both India and China on board
he does not need the rest of the international community. So as Sino-India ties have warmed,
Oli has relentlessly pushed the idea of Nepal-India-China trilateral cooperation. Before, the
Indians did not even want to hear of it. Now they are more sympathetic. Nepal will hence
look to derive maximum benefit from China’s BRI, while also not desisting from using
multilateral forums like BIMSTEC to enhance ties with India. This may not be wise. India
and China have never cooperated for a third country’s benefit in South Asia, and it would be
naïve to think they will do so for Nepal. But Oli is determined to give it a go.
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Just as joining the BRI helped Oli curry the favor with the Chinese, he seems to believe that
following India’s lead on BIMSTEC will help him cement ties with the Indian establishment.
With both India and China on his side, he will also feel he has enough international support to
serve out his five-year term. On the eve of the BIMSTEC summit, the big question that is
being asked in Kathmandu is whether India is ready to overcome its security sensitivities and
allow Nepali trucks and trains to use its territory to directly connect with Bangladesh and
Myanmar. If not, BIMSTEC will prove to be no more than a geopolitical chessboard for
bigger powers, and one which has little room for smaller players in the region like Nepal.

China wants to invest in big connectivity projects in Nepal but prefers to bring its Asian
competitor, India, on board. Some Nepali and Chinese scholars see this as an opportunity for
trilateral cooperation between Nepal, India, and China, but Indian policy makers and
academics have not shown much interest. Chinese engagement in Nepal is sharply increasing
with new areas of cooperation, making India uncomfortable. India views Nepal as its
traditional sphere of influence, and wants to contain Chinese influence. Thus New Delhi is
rejecting the proposal for trilateral cooperation, originally floated by China and later backed
by some academics and political leaders in Nepal. In November 2016, during the BRICS
summit in Goa, India, there was an unplanned meeting between then-Prime Minister of Nepal
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Chinese President Xi
Jinping. When the meeting was publicized as the beginning of trilateral cooperation, the
Indian Ministry of External Affairs was very quick to say that this was not a trilateral
meeting, more evidence that India is not in favor of trilateral cooperation.

After creating positive vibes in Nepal-India relations, Nepal’s Prime Minister K.P. Sharma
Oli is now investing his time and energy in deepening ties with China, which is being keenly
observed across the political and diplomatic arena. Under the previous Oli government,
Nepal’s relationship with India hit a low in 2015. Now newly installed as prime minister once
again, Oli paid an official visit to India from April 6-8, and returned from Nepal’s southern
neighbor saying that relations are back on track and misunderstandings have been cleared. Oli
has already made it clear that a balanced relationship with India and China, and cordial
relations with all countries, will be the cornerstone of his foreign policy, with the highest
priority given to economic diplomacy. More precisely, Oli wants to change the old pattern of
a heavy economic dependence on India by expanding large-scale ties with China.
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While maintaining a good relationship with India, Oli plans to diversify the areas for and
scope of engagement with China. China, meanwhile, is keen to increase its economic,
military, and strategic influence in Nepal without direct confrontation with India. The first
priority of China is to forge trilateral cooperation among Nepal, India, and China, but India
has not shown any interest thus far. If trilateral cooperation is not possible, China wants to
gradually enhance its presence in Nepal without upsetting India, as Beijing is doing in other
South Asian countries. With Nepal’s left alliance government and Oli as prime minister,
China believes that it is a fertile time to make further inroads in Nepal. Wang also said that
the two foreign ministers had discussed trade, transit, and connectivity issues. “We have also
agreed to develop the transit and connectivity between our two countries including better
services of the ports, and the repair and opening of two important roads. The Arniko
Highway and Syafrubesi-Rasuwagadhi Highway and we will make sure that we will have
greater cooperation in civil aviation as well have agreed to expedite the process regarding the
agreements on utilization of existing highways of Tibet for cargo transport for Nepal and
transit transportation.

When it comes to transit, a Nepal-China railway link has been much discussed in the national
and international arena in the last three years. In his recent visit to India, Oli signed an
agreement on expanding railway links between Kathmandu and Raxual in India; many took
this agreement as India’s countermove to the proposed Chinese railway link. During last
year’s campaign, Oli voiced his ambition to link Chinese railways to Nepal and now he is in a
position to deliver on his promises. The question is whether India or China will deliver first
when it comes providing a railway link with Nepal. China and Nepal are also looking to
finalize projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In May 2017, Nepal and China
signed a framework agreement on the BRI and now the onus lies on Nepal to select the
projects under the BRI framework. China is growing impatient over Nepal’s foot-dragging.
Nepal and China are expected to sign some projects under the BRI during Oli’s visit to
China.

China and Nepal are also exploring the possibility of a free trade agreement (FTA). Nepal,
however, is of the view that such an agreement should be signed on the condition of bringing
Chinese investment and enhanced connectivity. China is also pressing Nepal to sign a Peace
and Friendship Treaty and mutual legal assistance treaty. Some areas of cooperation between
Nepal and China are already seeing progress. Some China-funded projects such as
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constructing Pokhara International Airport and the Kathmandu Ring Road expansion are
underway. Chinese investment in various sectors is increasing, motivating India to increase
the amount of its assistance to Nepal in its 2018-2019 budget and work to speed up projects
in Nepal. Even cooperation between the Nepal Army and People’s Liberation Army of China
is on the rise, after their first joint military exercise last year. The number of high-level visits
between the two countries has sharply increased, with 40 such visits in the last six years.
However, Chinese President Xi Jinping has not yet visited Nepal.

As Oli prepares to deepen ties with China, the domestic atmosphere is also very favorable.
There is a sort of consensus among political parties that agreements signed with China must
be implemented. Similarly, mainstream media and public intellectuals are overwhelmingly
positive about China and the implementation of agreed-upon projects. Mainstream media
outlets often write news and editorials asking the government to take serious steps to take
benefit from China’s BRI projects. While China is perceived as a trusted neighbor,
agreements, treaties, and conventions with India are greeted with suspicion. India’s failure to
complete past projects on time has created frustrations and there are hopes that China-funded
projects will be completed more quickly.

China’s noninterference policy seems to have played a vital role in creating positive public
opinion toward China. During each and every high-level visit, China reiterates its support for
the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Nepal, pledging that Beijing will
not interfere in Nepal’s internal affairs. By contrast, there are widespread perceptions that
India interferes in Nepal’s politics. In 2015, when India objected to Nepal’s constitution and
exerted pressure for Nepal to accommodate the voices of Madhesi people, China welcomed
the promulgation of the constitution in Nepal, lauding it as a historic progress. With a sizable
majority in the legislature and public support on his side, the Oli government will be
empowered to implement the agreements reached with China. Oli is expecting huge
economic support from China to fulfill his domestic commitment to stability and
development.
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5.7 Nepal USA and other South Asian nations

The Asia-Pacific is home to several nations, but it doesn’t seem to be big enough to
accommodate the rivalry between the world’s two top economic powers. In the fall of 2011,
the U.S. administration announced its policy to rebalance, or “pivot,” towards Asia, followed
by its decision to deploy 60 percent of its naval fleet to the area by 2020. The United States
has stepped up diplomatic efforts in the Asia-Pacific, and President Barack Obama himself
visited Vietnam and Japan towards the end of his term to erase bitter memories of the past
and turn over a new leaf.

None of this has gone down well with China, which views these developments as an attempt
to contain its influence. Presenting his own country’s security concept for the neighborhood,
Chinese President Xi Jinping has gone out of his way to advice outside powers not to
interfere in the region’s affairs. His May 2014 assertion that Asia’s problems must be
resolved by Asians was primarily a signal to the Americans that China was not pleased with
the thrust of their diplomacy.

The United States did not scale back its diplomatic offensive. It launched several naval
exercises with its Asian allies, highlighted Beijing’s aggressive posture in the South China
Sea, and repeatedly emphasized that it wanted freedom of navigation and secure commercial
sea lanes. It was clear, on the other hand, that Beijing would not easily abandon its claim to
the South China Sea, an energy-rich area and a conduit for $5 trillion in annual ship-borne
trade. Meanwhile, China turned its attention to its ambitious One Belt One Road connectivity
initiative to its west, where the United States has little influence. The project aims to link
Asia, Europe, and Africa through a complex network of land-based routes, but it also has
another component that requires China to build economic corridors to connect its landlocked
western regions with the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.

A. Implications for South Asia

This is particularly true of South Asia, where the repercussions of this rivalry amidst the
existing political fault lines are increasingly apparent. According to Bruce Riedel of the
Brookings Institution, the region is moving towards a bipolar alliance system between the
United States and India on the one hand, and Pakistan and China on the other. While the
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Chinese are building an economic corridor in Pakistan that will connect its landlocked
Xinjiang region to the Arabian Sea and enable it to bypass the strategic chokepoint at the
Strait of Malacca, the Americans are heavily investing in India as a counterweight. From
Pakistan’s perspective, the Chinese corridor and port facilities are a welcome opportunity to
put its sputtering economy back on track, but in Washington and New Delhi these are widely
viewed as part of Beijing’s attempt to establish a permanent naval presence in the Indian
Ocean, a matter of some concern to India, which has fought wars with both China and
Pakistan.

B Meeting South Asia’s Development Challenges

None of this bodes well for a region that faces plenty of development challenges. South Asia
could benefit immensely from working with the world’s two greatest economic powers.

The smaller states of South Asia do not want to choose sides or be arm-twisted into an
exclusive relationship. Their aspirations are clear: they want greater regional integration,
infrastructure development, economic prosperity, and social progress. They have used
SAARC forums to discuss energy, water, and food security; climate change; disaster
management; alleviating poverty; and other regional issues of far greater moment to them
than questions of global or regional preeminence.

Climate change is rampant but the climate change is not the only development challenge the
region is facing. The South Asian population is young. Roughly 30 percent, according to the
Population Reference Bureau, are below the age of 15. With the right policies, this youthful
population could provide the states of the region with a huge demographic dividend. Yet, at
the same time, South Asia is home to half of the world’s poor, and there are not enough
educational resources and employment opportunities to fully realize its demographic
advantage.

5.8 Nepal Army’s role in creating international identity of the nation

Nepal’s three main security agencies Army, Armed Police Force and Police all contribute to
UN peacekeeping. Civilian administrators and technical staff from Nepal also participate in
UN peace operations both on an individual basis and when seconded from the government.
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The Nepal Army is regarded as disciplined and professional, maintaining international

standards and qualifications. Almost all Army personnel take part in a UN mission at least
once in their military career, with officers typically deploying more than once. To manage the
increasing demand for Nepali troops in UN missions, the Nepal Army created a Directorate
of Peacekeeping in the Army headquarters. It is responsible for managing the contribution
process, including selection, pre-mission training and operational environment familiarization
for complex peacekeeping situations.

In order to deploy suitably trained and qualified troops to international peacekeeping

operations, the Government of Nepal established the Birendra Peace Operation Training
Centre (BPOTC) in 1986 at Panchkhal in Kavre District, about one hour drive from
Kathmandu. The BPOTC includes an Army Headquarters Element Training Unit, an
Administration and Logistic Unit, a Research and Development Unit, and a Demonstration
and Security Unit. The main intent behind establishing this center was to provide a nucleus of
expertise within the Army, responsible for the development of Peace Support Operations
based on lessons learned, training methodologies, training standards and the provision of
training and training support.[4] Recently, the BPOTC has also served as a regional training
center. With the partnership of US Pacific Command, it organized a three week training
known as Shanti Prayas 2 in which 875 soldiers from 23 countries from different regions
participated.

Nepal’s Permanent Mission in New York plays the main role in facilitating communication
between the Government of Nepal and the UN. Apart from the mission’s civilian staff, the
Permanent Mission has an Army liaison officer to communicate with the UN secretariat on
peacekeeping issues. The officer represents the Nepal Army, Armed Police Force and the
Nepal Police in the mission and advises the Permanent Representative of Nepal. The Nepali
Permanent Mission forwards requests from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a carbon copy to Nepal Army, Nepal Police
and Armed Police Force so that the concerned security agencies can start immediate
preparations. After receiving the requests, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also sends it to the
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Home Affairs depending on the nature of the request.
If the request is for army personnel, the Ministry of Defense would take the decision, and if
the request is for Nepal Police or Armed Police Force, then the Home Affairs Ministry makes
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the necessary decision. The head of government is not directly involved in the decision-
making, but is well informed by the relevant ministries.

Within its region, Nepal is one of the oldest countries and one of the first to obtain UN
membership. As a comparatively small country located in a sensitive geopolitical
environment, Nepal has adopted a neutral international stance since it became a member of
the UN, including as an active, original member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Its foreign
policy advocates adherence to the UN Charter and its principles, particularly emphasizing the
importance of maintaining international peace and security. Nepal practiced this principle by
being one of the few countries to contribute troops to the UN during the Cold War. Nepal
was also for a time a contributor to the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan in
the State of Jammu and Kashmir, established in 1948. Successive Nepali governments
viewed the regular contribution of Nepali troops to UN missions as a contribution to good
international citizenship and a way to raise Nepal’s international profile. Additionally, the
country’s policymakers expected that being a UN TCC could also help protect and strengthen
Nepal’s sovereignty and independence. As such, UN peacekeeping operations have become
an important aspect of Nepal’s foreign policy, helping Nepal project a favorable international
image and simultaneously pursue its national interests. It is said that Nepal’s election as a
non-permanent member of the UN Security Council on two occasions, 1969-70 and 1988-89,
was aided by its peacekeeping contributions.

5.10 Building Institutional Rationales through military diplomacy

The Nepal Army’s long involvement in peacekeeping missions has changed its nature and
working methods, including bridging a gap with the civilian community. The regular
participation of the Nepal Army and Nepal Police in UN peacekeeping has helped
participants understand the universal values and norms of human rights, rule of law and
increase professionalism. Moreover, the pre-deployment training at the world-class training
center has helped Nepali troops succeed in the complex operational environments of modern
peacekeeping. This in turn has provided opportunities for professional development.
Similarly, the Nepal Police and Armed Police Force have gained knowledge and experience
during their missions abroad. The activities Nepali police conduct during UN peacekeeping
missions are much broader than the responsibilities they have on the domestic front.
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Nepal’s unstable domestic political situation represents the major challenge for deploying its
troops as UN peacekeepers. For almost two decades Nepal has faced political instability and
a Maoist insurgency. The frequent change of government became the main obstacle to
developing a coherent and effective domestic policy on peacekeeping. Successive
governments have therefore given a low priority to peacekeeping issues. Even when a
government has taken the initiative to develop or revise its peacekeeping policy, it has not
had sufficient time in office to make a substantial contribution. This situation, as well as a
lack of vision, coordination and supervision, has kept the issue less prioritized.

With the support of US Pacific Command, Nepal hosted a training seminar of the Asia
Pacific Peacekeeping Leaders in March 2013 to address the modern challenges in UN
peacekeeping operations. More than 30 participants from 23 countries of the Asia and Pacific
region took part in the seminar where they recognized that UN peacekeepers are facing very
complex challenges and are often required to implement intricate mandates. Protection of
civilians, preventing sexual and gender based violence, sexual exploitation and abuse, and
human security are all matters of great concern for the UN. A number of other issues that
TCCs, including Nepali troops on UN missions, have to deal with better include:
understanding the culture of the local population, the often vast areas covered by small
numbers of peacekeepers, the complexities of multi-national military operations, coordination
with the police and humanitarian components of peacekeeping missions, dealing with
transnational crimes, violation of human rights and the need to provide timely and accurate
information.

The Government of Nepal should upgrade the capabilities of its official representation to the
UN. The Permanent Mission could more widely promote the extensive experience of Nepali
peacekeepers in UN missions to the UN Secretariat and other Member States. Additionally,
lessons from the scandals mentioned above could help to improve health and other pre-
deployment requirements for future deployments. The mission should also be equipped with
sufficient, qualified staff and other required facilities such as sufficient office space and
financial support. The Nepal Army organizes visit programs of Nepali media on a regular
basis as a part of its efforts to provide them first-hand information about the Nepali
peacekeeping activities in the field. Although Nepal has contributed UN peacekeepers for the
last six decades, there are no civil society organizations or think tanks that work exclusively
on peacekeeping issues in Nepal. All political parties, regardless of their ideological position,
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support sending security forces to UN missions. In the last 60 years, successive governments
have praised the role of Nepalese personnel in the UN, and the Nepalese people maintain
positive attitudes towards the UN which, in their view, works for peace, stability, and protects
the interests of the small and weaker states.

Due to its long involvement in the UN missions, Nepalese security agencies, particularly the
Nepal Army, have gained extensive experience and understanding of UN
peacekeeping. Recently, the government has provided support for establishing an
international-standard training center known as BPOTC to strengthen training. Given its
overall level of economic development, Nepal’s ability to contribute high-tech or expensive
military equipment, such as helicopters, is limited. However, the Nepalese government has
committed to contributing up to 5,000 Nepalese Army personnel if the country is so
requested by the UN.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion.
With steadily declining the roles of geographical factors in the foreign policy as well as in the
international relations, the issue of geopolitics is undergoing tremendous change. Burgeoning
of international organizations and regional forums has changed the traditional forms of
interstates relations based on Westphalia mode. Similarly with the growing global
connections among the states has also posed new challenges to them. Such challenges is not
only in dealing with the multi-tracks relationships between the governments and peoples of
different countries but also facing issues like security threats, outbreak of diseases, financial
crisis, trade disputes, political and economic hegemony, cultural and religious domination
etc. and require all the nations work together to deal the issues.

In this very global situation, the crisis that Nepal has been facing today has also implications
in our country’s geopolitics, geo-economy and geo-strategic situation. The increasing
violence and deteriorating human rights situation has already tarnished our country’s image
in the international level and drawn international community’s attention. To renovate new
dimension of Nepal-India relation both the government formed the EPG. The EPG has been
mandated to come up with a comprehensive report on anything that needs to be updated,
adjusted or amended in all exiting bilateral treaties, agreements, understandings, including
the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950. The group, however, has not made public the
details of the joint report, and said the details would be made public by the two governments.
Both Nepal and India have agreed to strengthen their security coordination as well as beef up
the border monitoring activities. Though up to now, there is no possibility of direct
involvement of the neighboring countries as well as other international powers in dealing the
Nepal’s internal politics, but if we, domestic stakeholders are unable to deal the our issues,
the possibility of the direct involvement of the international actors including our immediate
neighbors cannot be denied. And if the foreign actors are directly involve in dealing our
internal issues, this would have severe implications not only in our national sovereignty and
survivability of a nation state, but it would also have implications in the geopolitical situation
of this region as well as in the international level too.

Similarly, the US interests in Nepal lies in expanding its influence in a location which lies
between two emerging world powers China and India. It also wants to contain the increasing
communist influences. Another area of American concern is to contain violence and abuses
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of human rights. The UN, the European member states and the North American states regard
themselves as the guardian of human rights. The post-Cold War period offered two glaring
cases. In the cases of Kurdistan and Somalia, the principal force behind intervention was not
state leaders taking the lead in persuading reluctant publics to respond to human suffering.
Rather, it was the media and domestic public opinion which pressurized policy-makers into
taking humanitarian actions. Concepts such as demography, human rights, prevention of
counter-revolution social movements etc. have been used to broaden conflicts beyond the
constitutional bounds of the state.

In recent years separatist have been raising there voices in Madhes for separation. These
issues have been fueled national and international actors’ dissatisfaction of Nepal’s
constitution and some evidences shows that they have huge support non-state actors and
foreign powers. This is the direct challenge to the nationality and it should be addressed
timely. Madhesi ethnicity have to be addressed timely to prevent farther harms. Madhesi
identity have been imposed om them eliminating Methela, Awadh and Bhojpuri cultures.

One another challenge is to cope with rapid expansion and promotions of Christianity in
Nepal. Its been heard that few NGO have been spending millions of moneys to turn people
into Christianity. Increasing Christianity will create tremendous implications on political
balance of power. Nepalese people and government have greater challenges to address those
kinds of racial and ethnicity conflicts.
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