Journal of Homosexuality

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Same-Sex Adoption as a Welfare Alternative?

Conservatism, Neoliberal Values, and Support for
Adoption by Same-Sex Couples

Samuel L. Perry MA, PhD & Andrew L. Whitehead MA, PhD

To cite this article: Samuel L. Perry MA, PhD & Andrew L. Whitehead MA, PhD (2015) Same-
Sex Adoption as a Welfare Alternative? Conservatism, Neoliberal Values, and Support
for Adoption by Same-Sex Couples, Journal of Homosexuality, 62:12, 1722-1745, DOI:
10.1080/00918369.2015.1078209

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 Journal of Homosexuality, 62:1722–1745, 2015
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0091-8369 print/1540-3602 online
DOI: 10.1080/00918369.2015.1078209

Same-Sex Adoption as a Welfare Alternative?

Conservatism, Neoliberal Values, and Support
for Adoption by Same-Sex Couples

SAMUEL L. PERRY, MA, PhD

Department of Sociology, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, USA

ANDREW L. WHITEHEAD, MA, PhD

Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina, USA
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Despite conservatives’ long-term opposition to gay and lesbian

parenting, scholars theorize that a strong commitment to neoliber-
alism may influence conservative Americans to become more tol-
erant of same-sex adoption as a way to relieve the government from
subsidizing poor families. Drawing on national survey data (2010
Baylor Religion Survey), we test whether holding neoliberal values
is associated with greater support for same-sex adoption in general
and across political or religious conservatives. We find no support
for either theory—emphatically the opposite, in fact. Neoliberal
values are negatively associated with support for same-sex adoption
for Americans in general and among political and religious con-
servatives. We find little evidence of a tension among conservatives
regarding same-sex adoption as both their neoliberal values and
moral beliefs incline them to oppose same-sex adoption along with
other same-sex family relationships.

KEYWORDS attitudes, conservatism, evangelicals, homosexuality,

neoliberalism, politics, religion, same-sex adoption

INTRODUCTION

Debates surrounding the legalization of same-sex marriage in the United

States are increasingly centered on the children of such unions (Briggs, 2012;

Address correspondence to Samuel L. Perry, Department of Sociology, University of Oklahoma,

780 Van Vleet Oval, Kaufman Hall, Norman, OK 73019, USA. E-mail: samperry@ou.edu

1722
 Same-Sex Adoption as a Welfare Alternative? 1723

Clarke, 2001; Rosenfeld, 2007, 2010; Stacey, 2006). At the forefront of this
debate, traditionalist or conservative Americans vigorously oppose the adoption
of children by gay and lesbian couples primarily on religious and moral
grounds (Clarke, 2001; Wilson, 2004) and, to an increasing degree, on suspi-
cions of harm done to children in same-sex families (Briggs, 2012; Clarke, 2001;
Rogers, 2005). And yet same-sex adoption is not a central wedge issue for
political and religious conservatives the way same-sex marriage has been over
the last decade. Why?
One theory behind why conservatives do not rally to oppose gay and
lesbian adoption as they have to same-sex marriage is that same-sex adop-
tion highlights a unique tension in the values of many conservatives. On the
one hand, conservatives—the vast majority of whom subscribe to tradition-
alist Christian views regarding sexuality—are inclined to oppose same-sex
adoption as an ethically and culturally unacceptable family form (Briggs,
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2012; Clarke, 2001; Herman, 2008; Rogers, 2005). On the other hand, several
scholars argue that the neoliberal1 values—that is, commitments to libertar-
ian-individualism, anti-welfare/small-government politics, and privatized
charity—that have become wedded to the cultural ideology of many con-
servatives (Gross, Medvetz, & Russell, 2011) may incline them to reluctantly
tolerate (or even support) same-sex adoption as an alternative to federal and
state governments subsidizing either those children in foster care or single-
parent families on welfare (Briggs, 2012; Herman, 2008).
Despite the surface validity of this theory, it remains to be tested empiri-
cally. Does neoliberalism, in fact, incline Americans to soften their opinion
toward same-sex adoption? Could this same effect be observed among those
who are most staunchly opposed to same-sex adoption on political or moral
grounds? These questions represent the focus of this study. In this article, we
draw on national-level data to test (1) whether holding neoliberal values is
associated with greater support for same-sex adoption, all else being equal,
and (2) whether this posited relationship holds for (a) primarily political
conservatives or (b) primarily religious conservatives. This study contributes
to the literature on public opinion toward gay and lesbian families in the
United States by examining whether, and to what extent, ostensibly moral
convictions against same-sex family forms may be moderated by political–
economic values among Americans in general and across both political and
religio-political subcultures.
The remainder of our article is structured as follows. First, we briefly
survey trends in support for same-sex families and adoption, both for the
general public and among political and religious conservatives. Second, we
discuss contemporary conservatives’ growing enchantment with adoption,
purportedly due, in part, to their strong neoliberal commitments, and we
highlight the potential ideological conflicts confronting conservatives on the
topic of adoption by same-sex couples. We generate a series of hypotheses
regarding the impact of neoliberal values on support for same-sex adoption
 1724 S. L. Perry and A. L. Whitehead

among the general public and across conservative subgroups. Third, we test
our hypotheses using survey data from a national probability sample (2010
Baylor Religion Survey, N = 1,714). Contrary to our expectations, we find that
neoliberal values are negatively associated with support for same-sex adop-
tion, both for Americans in general and most particularly among political and
religious conservatives. Thus there is little evidence of a tension among
contemporary conservatives, religious or political, regarding same-sex adop-
tion as both their neoliberal values and moral convictions incline them to
oppose same-sex adoption along with other same-sex romantic and family
relationships. We conclude by discussing the limitations of our study, and we
outline directions for future research.

BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

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Conservatism and Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Families and Adoption in

the United States
Though gay and lesbian romantic and family relationships in the United States
are the source of much debate, acceptance toward such relationships has
risen steadily over the past few decades (Baunach, 2012; Rosenfeld, 2007). In
2013, support for legalizing gay marriage stood at above 50% of the popula-
tion even before the Supreme Court rendered a pro-gay marriage ruling on
the Defense of Marriage Act and California’s Proposition 8 (Jones, 2013). A
large and growing amount of research focuses on the social and ideological
correlates of public opinion toward all varieties of same-sex romantic and
family forms. Drawing from a variety of data sources, researchers consistently
find that persons who are more opposed to same-sex intimate relationships
tend to be older, male, Southern, African American, more rural, less educated,
less exposed to diversity, hold to the belief that homosexuality is a choice (not
innate), and, most consistently, tend to be more religious and more politically
conservative (Adamczyk & Pitt, 2009; Baunach, 2012; Becker, 2012; Burdette,
Ellison, & Hill, 2005; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2008; Merino, 2013; Olson,
Cadge, & Harrison, 2006; Perry, 2013a, 2013b; Sherkat, de Vries, & Creek,
2010; Sherkat, Powell-Williams, Maddox, & De Vries, 2011; Whitehead, 2010;
Whitehead & Perry, 2014).
In her recent study of support for same-sex marriage trends from 1988–
2010, Baunach (2012) demonstrated that because opposition to same-sex
marriage was relatively high among all groups in the mid-1980s, religious
factors and conservative political affiliations were not particularly strong pre-
dictors of such opposition. Rather, it was when public opinion toward homo-
sexuality began to soften among the general population that religious
commitment and political conservatism became strongly associated with
opposition toward civil rights for gays and lesbian couples. Republicanism
 Same-Sex Adoption as a Welfare Alternative? 1725

and religious (almost exclusively Christian) conservatism have been closely

linked since the 1980s, and most clearly in the 2004 U.S. presidential race, as
Republicans sought to attract and mobilize White evangelicals on a platform
of traditionalism, family values, and moral conservatism. Although conserva-
tive political ideology and Republican affiliation have an independent effect
on attitudes toward same-sex intimacy, political and religious conservatism
remain closely linked (Baunach, 2012; Becker, 2012; Brewer, 2003; Merino,
2013; Olson et al., 2006; Perry, 2013a; Sherkat et al., 2011; Whitehead, 2010,
2014; Whitehead & Perry, 2015).
Among religious conservatives, there are a number of mechanisms that
potentially lead them to oppose same-sex relationships. First, Christian con-
servatives are generally committed to either a literalist or at least a historical–
exegetical interpretation of the Bible and are influenced by passages explicitly
condemning same-sex intimacy.2 Relatedly, religious conservatives are typi-
cally committed to “traditional” definitions of the family (Bartkowski, 2001,
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2004; Gallagher, 2003)—heternormative, patriarchal typifications found in the

New Testament (one man, one woman, and their biological children)—and
thus reject same-sex families as deviations from the “proper” standard. High-
lighting a shift in same-sex marriage disputes toward focusing on the children
of same-sex couples, religious conservatives have recently adopted pseudos-
cientific arguments supporting their biases about the purported unhealthiness
of gay and lesbian families and the potential negative impact of such families
on (often adopted) children (Clarke, 2001; Rogers, 2005). Most recently,
Merino (2013) demonstrated that having close ties with religious conservatives
not only reduces support for same-sex marriage, but even attenuates the
tolerance-promoting effect of social contact with gays and lesbians. He argues
the relative homogeneity and density of religious conservatives’ networks
makes them particularly resistant to attitudinal change in favor of gay rights
or same-sex families.
The majority of research on support for same-sex romantic and family
relationships has focused on public opinion toward same-sex sexuality and
the legal recognition of same-sex romantic unions (Adamczyk & Pitt, 2009;
Baunach, 2012; Becker, 2012; Brewer, 2003; Burdette et al., 2005; Haider-
Markel & Joslyn, 2008; Merino, 2013; Olson et al., 2006; Perry, 2013b; Sherkat
et al., 2010, 2011; Whitehead, 2010). Far less attention by comparison is given
to predicting attitudes toward same-sex adoption. Nevertheless, extant
research demonstrates that political and religious conservatism is similarly
related to same-sex adoption as it is to same-sex romance, marriage, or civil
partnerships. Persons who espouse more conservative political ideology or
Republican affiliation along with high religiosity, conservative denominational
affiliations, and literalist views of the Bible strongly oppose the adoption of
children by gay and lesbian couples (Averett, Strong-Blakeney, Nalavany, &
Ryan, 2011; Besen & Zicklin, 2007; Lambert, Ventura, Hall, & Cluse-Tolar,
 1726 S. L. Perry and A. L. Whitehead

2006; McLeod, Crawford, & Zechmeister, 1999; Perry, 2013a; Ryan, Bedard, &
Gertz, 2004, 2007; Whitehead & Perry, 2014).

Contemporary Conservatism, Neoliberalism, and Support for the

Adoption Alternative
Despite the historic commitment of conservatives to “traditional” family forms
that consist of two heterosexual married parents and their biological children,
conservative groups have recently rallied behind domestic and international
adoption as an acceptable, if not highly valued, family form (Briggs, 2012;
Joyce, 2013; Perry, 2014a; Smolin, 2012). This is especially true of religious
conservatives such as evangelical Protestants, but it also includes Catholics
and Mormons. For religious conservatives in particular, adoption may serve a
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variety of purposes. First, Christians in general are enjoined throughout the

Bible to “look after orphans” (James 1:27) and “defend the fatherless” (Isaiah
1:17), and thus many view adoption as a form of rescue activism allowing
them to express obedience to their Scriptures (Cruver, 2011; Merida & Morton,
2011; Moore, 2009). Second, adoption allows infertile Christian couples the
opportunity to grow their families without using new reproductive technolo-
gies that conservative Christian subcultures find morally questionable (Moore,
2009). Third, adoption provides a means by which religious conservatives
may live out their pro-life values in a very tangible and visible way, thus
refuting accusations that they are only “pro-birth” and not entirely “pro-life”
(Briggs, 2012; Joyce, 2013; Moore, 2009; Perry, 2014a). Fourth, some argue
that adoption (and particularly international adoption) is a way Christian
couples can proselytize and convert “other” children (Briggs & Marre, 2009;
Joyce, 2013).
One posited reason that conservative Americans are increasingly favor-
able toward adoption is due to their neoliberal convictions (Briggs, 2012;
Perry, 2014b; Solinger, 2001).
Within the past few decades, political conservatives in the United
States and abroad have been increasingly influenced by neoliberal poli-
tical–economic ideologies that valorize libertarian-individualism, support
for free-market principles, and limited government intervention for the
poor in favor of privatizing support through families, churches, and faith-
based nonprofits (Gross et al., 2011; Prasad, 2006). This preference for
free markets and a shrinking welfare-state is also associated with an
increasing demonization of birth mothers in poor minority families who
are often considered “welfare cheats” and “unworthy” of government
assistance (Briggs, 2012; Ortiz & Briggs, 2003; Prasad, 2006; Smith, 2007;
Solinger, 2001). Flowing out from these ideological views, several scholars
have argued that for conservative groups adoption provides an expedient
(and strategically altruistic-looking) solution to the problem of vulnerable
 Same-Sex Adoption as a Welfare Alternative? 1727

children. Adoption helps avoid federal and state governments being

required to subsidize those children in foster care or provide financial
assistance for their purportedly unworthy families by placing those chil-
dren into the homes of more well-to-do (largely White, Christian) families
(Briggs, 2012; Ortiz & Briggs, 2003; Perry, 2014b; Smith, 2007; Solinger,
2001).

Conservatism, Neoliberalism, and Tension Involving Same-Sex

Adoption
Though neoliberalism may play a role in promoting a positive image of
adoption among conservatives, the issue of same-sex adoption presents a
potential area of tension. Historian of adoption Ellen Herman has
described a “conflict between conservatives’ vocal support for adoption
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and their stated desire to reinstate a strict legal and cultural hierarchy of
acceptable families” because most “child and family welfare policies
favored by New Christian Right organizations, although favorable to adop-
tion, have looked nostalgically for an imagined past when everyone under-
stood exactly what a family was” (2008, p. 292). Recognizing this tension,
historian Laura Briggs (2012) contended that neoliberal values champion-
ing adoption among conservatives are prevailing, to the effect of reshaping
public opinion and policy toward same-sex adoption. She theorized that
despite the moral opposition of conservative groups to gay and lesbian
romantic and family relationships, these groups have grown more tolerant
of adoption by same-sex couples. This, she has argued, is primarily due to
conservatives’ neoliberal value of ensuring that the state is not financially
supporting those children in foster care or their families on welfare. Briggs
contends,

The terrain of [neoliberal] morality and policing have shifted—from what

kind of sex one has to how much money. Middle-class LGBT people were
no longer presumptively child molesters, and their growing moral and
economic stature expanded the state’s confidence in allowing them to
adopt or become foster parents. . . .[M]any people from various points of
the U.S. political spectrum came to accept as commonsense the immor-
ality of the poor and the respectability of upstanding, coupled, well-
educated, and middle-class gay folk (2012, p. 264).

Thus, Briggs argued, middle-class same-sex couples have become a

“safety valve” for the state by taking children that conservatives would rather
the government not pay for. She theorizes,

[W]hat we should expect to see under neoliberalism with respect to gay

adoption is a backing away from the interventionist scrutiny into gay and
 1728 S. L. Perry and A. L. Whitehead

lesbian families, allowing the market to neutrally regulate adoption with-

out its haunting by the mythical gay pedophile—essentially making it
possible for those who can afford to adopt (2012, p. 262).

Briggs’s theory about the ability of neoliberal values to promote tolerance

toward (or even support for) adoption by same-sex couples would suggest
the following general hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. Persons who express greater support for neoliberal views

will be more likely to support same-sex adoption, net of
other factors.

In her discussion of neoliberalism’s influence on support for same-sex

adoption among conservatives, Briggs focused primarily on political conser-
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vatives, oftentimes contrasting them with more religious conservatives whom

she calls “the Christian Right,” particularly on the issue of gay and lesbian
adoption. She contends, “The libertarianism in this [neoliberal] ideological
movement provided much of the force of the opposition—including among
conservatives—to the antigay adoption and marriage forces of the Christian
Right” (2012, p. 262). Thus one might expect that among political conserva-
tives who are less influenced by biblical injunctions against gay and lesbian
family relationships, the influence of neoliberal values to view same-sex
adoption as preferable to government support for poor children and families
would be more powerful. Stated more formally, we would predict that:

Hypothesis 2. Political conservatives who express greater support for

neoliberal views will be more likely to support same-sex
adoption, net of other factors.

Religious conservatives provide a powerful test of Briggs’s hypothesis.

Researchers consistently draw a link between religious conservatism and
neoliberal views with conservative White Christians (including evangelical
Protestants, traditional Catholics, and Mormons) being more likely to favor
privatized, family-based solutions to poverty over government aid (Emerson &
Smith, 2000; Gorski, 2009; Green, 2009; Smith, 2000). In particular, conserva-
tive Protestants or “evangelicals,” who are also closely associated with political
conservatism, are repeatedly linked with neoliberal views and values (Gorski,
2009; Green, 2009; Smith, 2000). Emerson and Smith (2000), for example,
described a cultural link between conservative Protestantism and more indi-
vidualist, anti-structuralist, and relationalist views toward economic
inequality.3 Consequently, conservative Protestants tend to resist the idea
that the government has the primary responsibility of aiding families in need
(Emerson & Smith, 2000; Green, 2009; Smith, 2000). Thus, on the one hand,
conservative Christians—being closely aligned with conservative politics—are
 Same-Sex Adoption as a Welfare Alternative? 1729

more likely to espouse neoliberal views. But on the other hand, evangelicals
and traditional Catholics tend to be the most morally opposed to same-sex
marriage and adoption (Baunach, 2012; Brewer, 2003; Burdette et al., 2005;
Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2008; Merino, 2013; Olson et al., 2006; Sherkat et al.,
2010, 2011; Whitehead, 2010, 2014) and Merino (2013) argued that religious
conservatives are particularly resistant to moral suasion on the issue of same-
sex families. Yet, if Briggs’s theory about the ability of neoliberal values to
soften opinions toward same-sex adoption holds true, we could expect that:

Hypothesis 3. Evangelical Protestants and Catholics who express greater

support for neoliberal views will be more likely to support
same-sex adoption, net of other factors.
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METHODS
Data
To test these hypotheses, we used data from the third wave of the Baylor
Religion Survey (BRS), collected in 2010. The 2010 BRS is a national, random
sample of 1,714 U.S. citizens administered by the Gallup Organization. The
BRS uses a mixed-mode sampling design consisting of two phases. Collec-
tively, these phases produced a total of 3,500 individuals screened with 2,556
respondents agreeing to receive the survey. In all, 1,714 questionnaires were
returned, generating a response rate of 49% (1,714/3,500) among all indivi-
duals screened and a response rate of 67% (1,714/2,556) for those who agreed
to receive a mailed survey. Previous waves of the BRS compare favorably to
other national surveys (Bader, Mencken, & Froese, 2007), and comparisons
between the 2010 BRS and the 2010 GSS are available upon request. We used
the 2010 BRS because it contains questions on attitudes toward adoption by
same-sex couples, neoliberal political views, and a range of sociodemo-
graphic, religious, and ideological measures.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this analysis is a question asking for respondents’
attitudes toward adoption by same-sex couples. This question asks: “How do
you feel about the morality of the following? Adoption of children by homo-
sexual couples.”4 Respondents were allowed to respond with “Always
wrong,” “Almost always wrong,” “Only wrong sometimes,” and “Not wrong
at all.” The analysis is most interested in those who express clear support for
adoption by same-sex couples. Therefore, this measure is coded such that
1 = Not wrong at all, 0 = All other responses. Close to 40% of Americans agree
that adoption by same-sex couples is not wrong at all (see Table 1).
 1730 S. L. Perry and A. L. Whitehead

TABLE 1 Descriptive and bivariate statistics for full sample (MI data)

Correlation
Mean or with Same-Sex
Variable Description % SD Adoption

Support Same-Sex 1 = Not wrong at all 38.4% — —

Adoption
Gov’t Does Too Much 1 = Gov’t does too much to solve 43.8% — −0.37***
country’s problems
No Unemployment 1 = No unemployment for Able- 77.8% — −0.18***
bodied people passing up jobs
they can perform
Control Variables
Age Age in years 55.9 16.21 −0.18***
Female 1 = Female 54.1% — 0.07**
Non-White 1 = Non-White 5.6% — 0.03
Married 1 = Married 63.0% — −0.09***
Education 1 = 8th grade or less, 4.62 1.62 0.17***
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7 = Postgraduate work/degree
Income 1 = $10,000 or less to 7 = $150,000 4.26 1.61 0.11***
or more
South 1 = South 35.2% — −0.10***
Urban 1 = Urban 16.9% — 0.09***
Politically Conservative 1 = Extremely liberal to 4.42 1.66 −0.59***
7 = Extremely conservative
Homosexuality Innate 1 = Homosexuality innate 57.4% — 0.44***
Religious Practice Standardized and summed index 0 2.61 −0.40***
(α = 0.84) −4.07 = least involved to
3.98 = most involved
Biblical Literalist 1 = Biblical literalist 20.9% — −0.30***
Evangelical Protestant† 1 = Evangelical Protestant 31.0% — −0.10***
Mainline Protestant 1 = Mainline Protestant 24.8% — −0.04
Black Protestant 1 = Black Protestant 2.3% — −0.01
Catholic 1 = Catholic 24.2% — −0.04
Jewish 1 = Jewish 1.6% — 0.03
Other 1 = Other 5.5% — −0.00
No Religion 1 = No religion 10.3% — 0.25***
Source: BRS (2010).
†Contrast Category
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Neoliberalism Measures
In order to operationalize the neoliberal mindset of some conservatives, this
analysis used two separate questions contained in the 2010 BRS. The first
asks, “Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do
too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses.
Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve
our country’s problems. Still, others have opinions somewhere in between.
Which one of the following statements best applies to you?” Possible
responses were “Government should do more,” “Government does too
 Same-Sex Adoption as a Welfare Alternative? 1731

much,” and “Agree with both.” Reponses were recoded such that 1 = Govern-
ment does too much, 0 = All other responses. This coding scheme was chosen
due to preliminary bivariate analyses (available upon request), which showed
that believing the government does too much is significantly and negatively
correlated with support for adoption by same-sex couples, while believing the
government should do more, or agreement with both views, are positively
and significantly associated with support for same-sex adoption. Almost 44%
of the sample believes the government does too much to solve the country’s
problems (see Table 1).
The second neoliberalism measure asks respondents to “Strongly agree,”
“Agree,” “Disagree,” or “Strongly disagree” with the following statement:
“Able-bodied people who are out of work shouldn’t receive unemployment
checks if they are passing up jobs they can do.” Responses were recoded such
that 1 = Strongly agree and Agree, 0 = Strongly disagree and Disagree. Over
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three fourths of Americans (77.8%) agree that unemployment checks should

not be sent to those who are passing up jobs they could perform (see
Table 1).

Control Variables
We used a variety of relevant sociodemographic, ideological, and religious
controls in the multivariate models. The sociodemographic controls include
age (in years), gender (1 = female), race (1 = non-White), marital status
(1 = married), education (1 = 8th grade or less to 7 = postgraduate work/
degree), income (1 = $10,000 or less to 7 = $150,000 or more), region
(1 = South), and city type (1 = urban). Ideological controls include both
political ideology (1 = Extremely Liberal to 7 = Extremely Conservative) and
whether the respondent believes homosexuality is innate (1 = Innate). The
religion measures control for the effects of religious belief, behavior, and
affiliation. To control for religious belief, we used respondents’ views of the
Bible. Responses were recoded such that 1 = Biblical literalists, 0 = All other
responses. These analyses use an index to control for the effects of religious
behavior. This index combines frequency of prayer/meditation, frequency of
religious service attendance, and frequency of reading sacred scriptures. The
items for reading sacred scriptures and religious service attendance range
from 1 = Never to 9 = Several times a week. The item concerning prayer
ranges from 1 = Never to 6 = Several times a day. Each of these measures of
religious behavior load onto the same factor, with factor loadings all above
0.86. The measures were standardized and then summed due to unit mea-
surement differences. The alpha reliability coefficient for the index is 0.84 (see
Table 1). A benefit of the index is that it measures multiple forms of religious
practice rather than focusing only on frequency of attendance or prayer,
which for different traditions can vary in meaning. Finally, the analyses control
 1732 S. L. Perry and A. L. Whitehead

for religious affiliation by employing a typology of religious tradition

(RELTRAD). The religious traditions include Evangelical Protestant, Mainline
Protestant, Black Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Other, and No affiliation
(Steensland et al., 2000). Evangelical Protestants serve as the reference
category.

Plan of Analysis
This analysis begins with the descriptive statistics and bivariate associations
between the dependent variable and each of the independent and control
variables in Table 1. Table 2 shows the percent of conservatives, indepen-
dents, and liberals who support same-sex adoption and maintain the two
neoliberalism views. Table 2 also displays the percent of Evangelical
Protestants, Catholics, Mainline Protestants, and the religiously unaffiliated
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that support same-sex adoption and neoliberalism.5 The relationship

between neoliberal political views and attitudes toward same-sex adoption
will be analyzed for each of these political ideologies and religious tradi-
tions independently after analyzing the full sample. By allowing us to focus
on political conservatives, evangelical Protestants, and Catholics, these
separate analyses will provide direct tests of hypotheses 2 and 3. Including
groups from other political ideologies (liberals and independents) and
religious traditions (mainline Protestants and the unaffiliated) allows us to
compare the direction and size of the effects of neoliberalism with groups
who tend to be more supportive of adoption by same-sex couples. Table 3
moves on to the multivariate analyses for the full sample. Due to the
coding of the dependent variable, logistic regression analysis is used.
Model 1 displays the baseline model. Model 2 includes the “Government
does too much” measure, and Model 3 includes the “No unemployment”

TABLE 2 Percent of political ideologies and religious traditions that support same-sex adop-
tion and neoliberalism (MI data)

Percent that Support Percent that Believe Percent Who Support

Same-Sex Adoption Gov’t Does Too Much No Unemployment

Political Ideology
Conservative 13.9 73.8 87.2
Independent 44.7 28.8 77.2
Liberal 74.5 6.9 62.1
Religious Traditions
Evangelical Protestant 31.5 48.3 80.0
Catholic 35.1 46.3 78.2
Mainline Protestant 35.1 46.3 79.5
Unaffiliated 73.9 22.5 67.8
Source: BRS (2010).
 Same-Sex Adoption as a Welfare Alternative? 1733

TABLE 3 Logistic regression analysis predicting support for same-sex adoption for full sample
(MI data)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

β OR β OR β OR

Control Variables
Age −0.19*** 0.98 −0.02*** 0.98 −0.19*** 0.98
Female 0.12** 1.52 0.11* 1.48 0.12** 1.53
Non-White 0.00 — −0.00 — −0.00 —
Married −0.14*** 0.58 −0.14*** 0.59 −0.14*** 0.59
Education 0.10* 1.12 0.10* 1.11 0.09* 1.11
Income 0.14** 1.17 0.15** 1.19 0.15** 1.18
South −0.08* 0.73 −0.08* 0.73 −0.08* 0.74
Urban 0.05 — 0.04 — 0.05 —
Politically Conservative −0.60*** 0.52 −0.53*** 0.56 −0.58*** 0.53
Homosexuality Innate 0.40*** 4.33 0.40*** 4.26 0.40*** 4.26
Religious Practice −0.21*** 0.86 −0.21*** 0.86 −0.22*** 0.86
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Biblical Literalist −0.15** 0.51 −0.15** 0.52 −0.15** 0.50

Mainline Protestant −0.01 — −0.00 — −0.01 —
Black Protestant 0.02 — 0.02 — 0.02 —
Catholic −0.00 — −0.00 — −0.00 —
Jewish −0.01 — −0.01 — −0.00 —
Other 0.01 — 0.01 — 0.01 —
No Religion 0.05 — 0.05 — 0.05 —
Neoliberalism Measures
Gov’t Does Too Much — — −0.14** 0.61 — —
No Unemployment — — — — −0.08* 0.71
Intercept 1.49** 1.35** 1.68***
N 1,714 1,714 1,714
PRE 0.369 0.373 0.371
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; two-tailed significance tests.
β = Standardized coefficient.
OR = Odds ratio.
PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error (Likelihood Ratio/–2 Log Likelihood).
Note: Evangelical Protestant is contrast category for other religious traditions.

measure. Models 2 and 3 separately test the first hypothesis, that persons
who express greater support for neoliberal views will be more likely to
support same-sex adoption.6 Table 4 displays the separate multivariate
analyses for the three political ideologies. Table 5 presents the full models
for the “Government does too much” and “No unemployment” measures
for Evangelicals, Catholics, mainline Protestants, and the unaffiliated. In
order to account for missing data, we used multiple imputation techniques
(Rubin, 1987, 1996).7 The standardized coefficients for each of the logistic
regression models are provided to allow for the interpretation of substan-
tive significance above and beyond statistical significance alone
[B
yx ¼ byx ðsx /sy )] (Pampel, 2000).8
 Downloaded by [190.233.197.184] at 13:45 16 June 2016

TABLE 4 Logistic regression analysis predicting support for same-sex adoption by political ideology (MI data)

Conservatives Independents Liberals

β OR β OR β OR β OR β OR β OR

Control Variables
Age −0.20* 0.98 −0.19* 0.98 −0.21** 0.98 −0.21** 0.98 −0.21** 0.98 −0.22** 0.98
Female 0.06 — 0.08 — 0.11† 1.52 0.11† 1.50 0.16* 1.78 0.18* 1.94
Non-White −0.00 — −0.01 — 0.07 — 0.07 — −0.07 — −0.08 —
Married −0.08 — −0.08 — −0.09 — −0.09 — −0.26** 0.38 −0.26** 0.38
Education −0.03 — 0.03 — 0.23** 1.29 0.23** 1.30 0.04 — 0.04 —
Income 0.07 — 0.06 — 0.13 — 0.13 — 0.23* 1.29 0.25** 1.32
South −0.02 — −0.02 — −0.14* 0.59 −0.13* 0.60 −0.07 — −0.05 —
Urban 0.06 — 0.06 — 0.07 — 0.08 — −0.04 — −0.03 —
Homosexuality Innate 0.50*** 6.15 0.50*** 6.30 0.31*** 3.06 0.30*** 2.96 0.42*** 4.72 0.42*** 4.71
Religious Practice −0.20* 0.87 −0.22** 0.86 −0.29*** 0.82 −0.30*** 0.81 −0.17† 0.89 −0.16 —
Biblical Literalist −0.27* 0.31 −0.26* 0.31 −0.10 — −0.10 — −0.14 — −0.17 —
Mainline Protestant 0.04 — 0.04 — −0.07 — −0.07 — 0.01 — 0.00 —

1734
Black Protestant 0.09 — 0.10 — −0.02 — −0.02 — 0.02 — 0.01 —
Catholic 0.03 — 0.04 — −0.04 — −0.05 — 0.02 — 0.02 —
Jewish −0.01 — −0.01 — −0.06 — −0.05 — 0.08 — 0.08 —
Other −0.00 — 0.01 — 0.04 — 0.04 — −0.03 — −0.03 —
No Religion 0.04 — 0.03 — 0.04 — 0.03 — 0.07 — 0.08 —
Neoliberalism Measures
Gov’t Does Too Much −0.15* 0.58 — — −0.09 — — — −0.18 — — —
No Unemployment — — −0.17* 0.48 — — −0.06 — — — −0.09 —
Intercept −1.66* −1.42† −1.15 −1.01 0.17 0.30
N 792 792 466 466 456 456
PRE 0.224 0.226 0.205 0.203 0.204 0.204
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; two-tailed significance tests.
β = Standardized coefficient.
OR = Odds ratio.
PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error (Likelihood Ratio/–2 Log Likelihood).
Note: Evangelical Protestant is contrast category for other religious traditions.
 Downloaded by [190.233.197.184] at 13:45 16 June 2016

TABLE 5 Logistic regression analysis predicting support for same-sex adoption by religious traditions (MI data)

Evangelical Protestants Catholics Mainline Protestants Unaffiliated

β OR β OR β OR β OR β OR β OR β OR β OR

Control Variables
Age −0.15† 0.98 −0.14† 0.98 −0.18* 0.98 −0.15† 0.98 −0.18* 0.98 −0.19* 0.98 −0.35* 0.96 −0.36* 0.96
Female 0.09 — 0.11 — 0.09 — 0.12 — 0.08 — 0.10 — 0.29* 2.87 0.28† 2.75
Non-White 0.10 — 0.10 — 0.16 — 0.16† 4.21 −0.07 — −0.06 — −0.22* 0.17 −0.23* 0.17
Married −0.17* 0.52 −0.18* 0.50 −0.18* 0.50 −0.18* 0.52 −0.09 — −0.09 — −0.22 — −0.24 —
Education 0.09 — 0.09 — 0.04 — 0.03 — 0.07 — 0.07 — 0.27† 1.37 0.26† 1.35
Income 0.10 — 0.10 — 0.26** 1.35 0.24* 1.31 0.17† 1.21 0.16† 1.20 0.11 — 0.15 —
South −0.07 — −0.06 — −0.12 — −0.11 — −0.09 — −0.09 — 0.03 — 0.03 —
Urban −0.00 — 0.00 — −0.01 — 0.01 — 0.05 — 0.07 — 0.03 — 0.02 —
Politically Conservative −0.51*** 0.57 −0.53*** 0.55 −0.49*** 0.57 −0.57*** 0.52 −0.52*** 0.55 −0.58*** 0.51 −0.62*** 0.49 −0.55*** 0.53

1735
Homosexuality Innate 0.51*** 6.37 0.52*** 6.65 0.42*** 4.68 0.42*** 4.76 0.32*** 3.27 0.32*** 3.23 0.31* 3.77 0.31* 3.76
Religious Practice −0.22** 0.85 −0.23** 0.84 −0.22* 0.85 −0.22* 0.85 −0.11 — −0.11 — −0.15 — −0.16 —
Biblical Literalist −0.20† 0.70 −0.21* 0.45 −0.08 — −0.09 — −0.16 — −0.16 — — — — —
Neoliberalism Measures
Gov’t Does Too Much −0.10 — — — −0.23* 0.43 — — −0.17† 0.54 — — 0.09 — — —
No Unemployment — — −0.11 — — — −0.12 — — — −0.07 — — — −0.08 —
Intercept 1.04 1.33 1.17 1.50 1.62 1.93† 1.75 1.74
N 535 535 423 423 428 428 180 180
PRE 0.388 0.390 0.354 0.346 0.320 0.314 0.356 0.356
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; two-tailed significance tests.
β = Standardized coefficient.
OR = Odds ratio.
PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error (Likelihood Ratio/–2 Log Likelihood).
Note: Evangelical Protestant is contrast category for other religious traditions.
 1736 S. L. Perry and A. L. Whitehead

RESULTS
Bivariate Analyses
Table 1 shows that over one third of Americans believe there is nothing at all
wrong with adoption by same-sex couples (38.4%). About 44% believe the
government does too much to try to solve the country’s problems, and almost
78% do not believe able-bodied people who are passing up jobs they could
do should receive unemployment checks. We also find that both measures of
smaller government are significantly and negatively related to support for
adoption by same-sex couples. Figure 1 clearly illustrates that, compared
with the full sample, individuals who believe the government does too
much to solve the country’s problems disagree with the morality of adoption
by same-sex couples to a greater extent than those who do not believe the
government does too much. Fewer individuals who support withholding
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unemployment from able-bodied individuals support adoption by same-sex

couples. These bivariate findings would appear to contradict Brigg’s theory
about the ability of neoliberal views to increase tolerance toward same-sex
adoption.
Table 2 displays the percentage of each political ideology and religious
tradition that support adoption by same-sex couples and each neoliberalism
measure. It is clear that within the different political ideological groups and
religious traditions support for same-sex adoption varies drastically. Around
14% of political conservatives support adoptions by same-sex couples, while
75% of political liberals do. Roughly one third of respondents in each religious
tradition support same-sex adoption, while close to three fourths of the
unaffiliated do. There is considerable variation between each of these groups
concerning neoliberalism attitudes as well.

100
90
81.2
80
70 66.1
61.6
60
Percent

Not Wrong At All

50
40 38.4 Wrong or
33.9 Sometimes Wrong
30
20 18.8

10
0
Full Sample Government Does Too No Unemployment for
Much Able-bodied

FIGURE 1 Percentage of support for adoption by same-sex couples by neoliberalism

measures.
 Same-Sex Adoption as a Welfare Alternative? 1737

Multivariate Analyses
Table 3 displays the results from the logistic regression predicting support for
adoption by same-sex couples with the full sample. Model 1 is the baseline
model that includes all of the sociodemographic, religious, and ideological
controls. Consistent with previous research on support for same-sex romance
and families, increasing age, marriage, being from the South, political con-
servatism, increasing levels of religious practice, and biblical literalism are all
significantly and negatively associated with support for same-sex adoption.
Women, increasing levels of education and income, and believing homosexu-
ality is innate are all significantly and positively associated with support for
same-sex adoption. In this model, political conservatism is the strongest
predictor of a person’s attitudes toward same-sex adoption (β = −.60;
p < .001). With each decrease on the political conservatism scale toward
more liberal political views, the odds that an individual will support same-
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sex adoption almost double (odds ratio = .52).9

Model 2 includes the “Government does too much” measure. As in the
bivariate results, individuals who believe that the government does too much
to try to solve the country’s problems are much less likely to support adoption
by same-sex couples, net of the effects of all other variables (OR = .61;
p < .01). In fact, the odds that this group would support same-sex adoption
are 1.6 times lower than the odds for those who believe the government
should do more.10 Political conservatism is still the strongest predictor of
attitudes in this model (β = −.53; p < .001). Though the effect size is somewhat
attenuated, individuals who are politically conservative are still much less
likely to support same-sex adoption. As in Model 1, increasing age, married
individuals, Southerners, the religiously active, and biblical literalists are all
also less likely to support adoption by same-sex couples. Women, highly
educated individuals, those with higher incomes, and those who believe
homosexuality is innate are all more likely to support same-sex adoption.
Model 3 turns to the final neoliberalism measure, which concerns atti-
tudes toward unemployment benefits for those who are physically able to
work. The results show that respondents who believe that unemployment
subsidies should be withheld from those who are turning down jobs they
could physically do are less likely to support adoption by same-sex couples,
net of all other effects (OR = .71; p < .05). The odds that these individuals
would support same-sex adoption are almost 1.5 times lower than individuals
who do not support withholding unemployment. Thus Hypothesis 1 remains
unsupported. Even after controlling for relevant sociodemographic, political–
ideological, and religious factors, neoliberal views are associated with lower
levels of support for adoption by same-sex couples, not greater.
Yet again, in Model 3, political conservatism is the strongest predictor of
attitudes toward same-sex adoption (β = −.58; p < .001). Age, gender, marital
status, education, income, region of the country, beliefs about the cause of
 1738 S. L. Perry and A. L. Whitehead

homosexuality, religious practice, and beliefs about the Bible all maintain their
previous significant associations as well as the direction of associations.
Table 4 displays the separate multivariate analyses for each political
ideology as a direct test of Hypothesis 2. Here we find in Model 1 that,
even after controlling for religious factors and ideological beliefs about the
cause of homosexuality, political conservatives who subscribe to more neo-
liberal views are less likely to support adoption by same-sex couples. More
specifically, political conservatives who believe the “government does too
much” are significantly less likely to support same-sex adoption (OR = .58;
p < .05), as are those who believe unemployment benefits should be withheld
from able-bodied persons (OR = .48; p < .05). The second hypothesis is
therefore also contradicted by the data. Moreover, for independents and
political liberals, neither measure of neoliberalism is significantly associated
with support of adoption by same-sex couples. Thus, while neoliberal views
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may influence political conservatives to be even less inclined to support same-

sex adoption, neoliberal views do not seem to be associated with support for
same-sex adoption among persons who would already be more inclined to
support such a relationship (e.g., political liberals, independents; see Table 2).
Table 5 presents the full models for Evangelicals, Catholics, mainline
Protestants, and the unaffiliated. For Evangelicals, neither measure of neoli-
beralism is significantly associated with support for adoption by same-sex
couples. Catholics who believe the “government does too much” are signifi-
cantly less likely to support same-sex adoption (OR = .43; p < .05).11 How-
ever, there is no significant association between the “no unemployment”
measure and support for adoption by same-sex couples. These findings
contradict the third hypothesis predicting that neoliberal views would be
associated with greater support for same-sex adoption by evangelicals and
Catholics. Instead, neoliberal views are either not associated (Evangelicals) or
negatively associated (Catholics) with support for adoption by same-sex
couples. For comparison, the “government does too much” measure reaches
marginal significance (OR = .54; p < .10) for mainline Protestants, indicating
that mainliners who hold this view are also less likely to support adoption by
same-sex couples, and there is no significant association in the “no unemploy-
ment” model for mainline Protestants. Neoliberal views in this case may
actually influence persons who tend to be more supportive of same-sex
adoption (e.g., mainline Protestants; Table 2) to become less supportive of
that practice. Finally, for the unaffiliated, neither measure of neoliberalism is
significantly associated with support for adoption by same-sex couples.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Following theories put forth by adoption scholars (Briggs, 2012; Herman,

2008; Ortiz & Briggs, 2003; Solinger, 2001), this article tests whether strong
 Same-Sex Adoption as a Welfare Alternative? 1739

neoliberal commitments—for example, favoring smaller government, priva-

tized charity, and suspicion of welfare recipients—increases tolerance toward
adoption by same-sex couples as an alternative to welfare. This theory is
thoroughly unsupported by our analyses. Rather, our results reveal that
neoliberal views—specifically, beliefs that the government is doing too
much to solve the country’s problems and unemployment subsidies should
not be given to able-bodied persons—are not associated with increased
tolerance for adoption by same-sex couples, either among Americans in
general or across political-ideological and religious spectrums. In fact, even
after controlling for relevant social-demographic, religious, and political-ideo-
logical factors, neoliberal views are associated with more negative views
toward same-sex adoption among the general public, as well as political
conservatives, Catholics, and liberal Protestants.
These findings suggest that that neoliberalism does not provoke a tension
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in the minds of conservatives regarding adoption by same-sex couples. Amer-

icans who are more conservative in their political and religious leanings tend
to be more opposed to same-sex adoption on the basis of their religious
beliefs, their traditionalist cultural views of family life, and, in part, because of
their commitments to neoliberal political-economic policies. Thus, not only do
Briggs and her colleagues overestimate the power of neoliberal ideology to
soften Americans’ moral and religio-cultural views related to family formation,
neoliberalism appears to have the opposite effect.
Why would neoliberal views lead to lower approval of same-sex adop-
tion? It is possible that, rather than neoliberalism promoting tolerance for
adoption by same-sex couples as a way to relieve the government from
subsidizing poor families, neoliberal views actually incline persons to desire
adoption by more traditional (middle-class, heterosexual, patriarchal) families
specifically. In this case, same-sex couples are potential competitors for the
poor minority children targeted by neoliberal, pro-adoption enthusiasm and
policies. Alternatively, neoliberal views, because they are so interconnected
with contemporary conservatism, may also be associated with negative atti-
tudes toward anything considered liberal. In this case, persons who hold
strongly to neoliberal political-economic convictions might simply view the
subject of same-sex adoption or any other same-sex romantic and family
relationship as associated with political liberalism and, consequently, some-
thing to be opposed. Future qualitative research should seek to flesh out the
mechanisms at work in this relationship. Qualitative interviews in particular
may help to draw out the ways in which neoliberal views might incline
persons to oppose adoption by same-sex couples.
A question that remains unanswered is why adoption by same-sex
couples is not a central wedge issue for many religious and political conser-
vatives as same-sex marriage has been over the past decade. The neoliberal
views held by these groups were a possible explanation, but the previous
analyses cast serious doubt on that narrative. It could be that being a child’s
 1740 S. L. Perry and A. L. Whitehead

caretaker, whether the caretaker is gay or not, does not carry the cultural and
institutional importance that being legally married does. The reality is that all
sorts of adults in varying situations care for children, and so trying to limit who
is legally allowed to do so is too large a task politically for religious and
political conservatives. Also, marriage in the United States brings with it a host
of legal and economic benefits for the couple, and religious and political
conservatives might be more easily activated to limit who receives them.
Becoming a legal parent or guardian does provide some legal and economic
benefit, but not to the extent of marriage. Continuing to explore adoption by
same-sex couples, including how and why reactions toward it differ from
same-sex marriage, is an important task for future research.
This study has several limitations that should be addressed. First, the 2010
BRS data are cross-sectional—thus causal direction cannot be conclusively
determined. Although the causal direction proposed in this article seems more
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probable than the alternative order, causal arguments must be made with
caution. Second, the dependent variable does not distinguish between atti-
tudes toward adoption by “gay couples” and “lesbian couples.” Despite this
weakness, the public rhetoric surrounding gays and lesbians tends to focus on
homosexuality as a whole. Social movements both supporting and opposing
gay rights tend to either seek equality for both gays and lesbians or oppose
them equally. Herek (2002) made the case that gays and lesbians are both part
of a “quasi-ethnic group” with similar cultural and political concerns. In this
way, the dependent variable does measure a portion of this larger set of
attitudes held by many (see note 4). Third, the neoliberalism measures in
this study consist of only two questions, and thus are somewhat limited.
Despite this weakness, the measures used still tap two important aspects of
neoliberal ideology: (1) a belief in a smaller role of government and a larger
role for the private sector, and (2) antagonism toward individuals who are
perceived to be unwilling to take responsibility for themselves.
These few limitations notwithstanding, this study extends our knowledge
of the ways in which political-economic ideologies such as neoliberalism may
shape public opinion—and, ultimately, public policy—toward gay and lesbian
family relationships across the ideological spectrum. Briggs’s (2012) theory
about the potential of neoliberal views to promote tolerance toward gay and
lesbian adoption implied that same-sex couples hoping to adopt might have
unlikely advocates among more libertarian conservatives whose political
views are less influenced by biblical moralism. This is highly unlikely. Rather,
our findings suggest that public support for same-sex romantic and family
relationships will come in spite of neoliberal ideology along with the tradi-
tional “family-values” conservatism that has long opposed gay rights or same-
sex families. Neoliberal ideology thus may not draw Americans away from
interventionist moralism of the welfare state as some might predict but is
rather complicit in bolstering conservative social views and policies related
to family life. Future research should further explore the ways that neoliberal
 Same-Sex Adoption as a Welfare Alternative? 1741

views potentially shape public opinion toward other social issues such as
abortion, stem cell research, pornography, recreational drug use, and physi-
cian-assisted suicide.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank the editor and anonymous reviewers for their
feedback. Thanks also go to Jill Perry and Kelly Whitehead.

NOTES
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1. Neoliberalism is an approach to economic and social policy that essentially seeks to increase the
role of the private sector over the public sector, decreasing government regulations and social welfare
expenses; opening free markets; and promoting global trade, privatization, and individual (consumer)
freedom. Drawing largely on the theories of F. A. Hayek, neoliberalism has gained considerable traction
in the West since the 1980s, following the elections of Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret
Thatcher in the UK (Prasad, 2006; Smith, 2007).
2. For example: Leviticus 18:22, 20:13; Romans 1:26–27; 1 Corinthians 6:9–11.
3. Emerson and Smith (2000) argued that these views influence conservative Protestants to be less
willing to attribute economic disparities between Whites and Blacks to structural inequalities (discrimina-
tion, lack of educational opportunities) and more likely to blame poor Blacks’ supposed lack of motivation
and dysfunctional family relationships. This helps account for why White conservative Protestants tend to
favor neoliberal policies.
4. A possible weakness of this question is how it asks for respondents’ views toward “homo-
sexual couples” instead of “lesbian couples” or “gay couples.” However, Herek (2002) makes clear that
the public rhetoric surrounding homosexuality focuses on “homosexuality” with no distinction between
gays and lesbians. Most groups opposed to homosexuality do not distinguish between gays and lesbians
either. Herek (2002, p. 42) pointed out that gays and lesbians share a “common characteristic that makes
them members of a distinct quasi-ethnic group with its own culture and political concerns.” By asking
about attitudes toward “homosexual couples” generally, this question is tapping into this common
characteristic.
5. The Black Protestant and Jewish traditions are not analyzed independently due to extremely
small sample sizes, making multivariate analyses impossible. The Other religious tradition category is not
because it is a conceptual catch-all category that helps to maintain the purity of the other religious
traditions. This makes interpretation of associations for this category imprecise.
6. Interaction effects between the neoliberalism measures and the religion and political conserva-
tism measures were also tested. These interactions yielded no significant effects.
7. The MI procedure generates five imputations using multiple Markov chains based on all vari-
ables included in each model, resulting in an overall N of 8,570 (1,714 × 5). All results use the MI dataset.
The correlations reported in Table 1 and all the results reported in Tables 2 and 3 are from the MIANALYZE
procedure in SAS. This procedure combines all of the results from each of the five imputations resulting in
overall estimates, standard errors, and significance levels. The standardized coefficients and odds ratios for
each model were calculated using these overall estimates. The proportional reduction in errors (PRE)
reported in Table 2 for each model are the average of the PREs for each individual iteration.
8. This analysis follows Pampel’s (2000) assumption that the standard deviation of logit(y) = 1.8138.
9. In order to compare negative odds ratios, which are bounded between 0 and 1, with positive odds
ratios, which are unbounded, we divide 1 by the negative odds ratio, which produces an odds ratio that is no
longer bounded between 0 and 1. So for political conservatism (OR = 0.52) the equation is: 1/0.52 = 1.92.
10. Government does too much OR = 0.61. 1/0.61 = 1.64. See note 8 for an explanation on
transforming negative odds ratios.
 1742 S. L. Perry and A. L. Whitehead

11. Although the significance levels for Tables 4 and 5 are not particularly large, much of this is due
to the reduction in sample size after splitting the full sample into subgroups. Moreover, the consistent
direction of the effects across all analyses and the persistence of these effects despite the inclusion of
relevant controls provide strong evidence for the robustness of the effects observed.

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