Alfon v.

Republic
FACTS: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15
May 1952 at the UST Hospital to Filomeno Duterte and Estrella.
She was registered at the Local Civil Registrar’s Office as
Maria EstrellaVeronica Primitiva Duterte. On 15 June 1952, she
was baptized as MariaEstrella Veronica PrimitivaDuterte at the
St. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong, Manila. Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and
Mrs. Hector Alfon. She lived in Mandaluyong for 23 years with
her uncle, Hector Alfon. When Maria Estrella started schooling,
she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first
grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College
using the name Estrella S. Alfon. After graduating from high
school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished
Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from
elementary to college show that she was registered by the name
of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of
suffrage under the same name. She has not committed any felony
or misdemeanor. She filed a verified petition on 28 April 1978
praying that her name be changed from Maria EstrellaVeronica
Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.

ISSUE: The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially denied petitioner’s

prayer on 29 December 1978, granting the change of first name
but not the surname.

HELD: The Supreme Court modified the appealed order in as much

as that petitioner is allowed to change not only her first name
but also her surname so as to be known as Estrella S. Alfon;
without costs.
1. Principally is not equivalent to exclusively
The word principally as used in article 364 of the Civil
Code is not equivalent to exclusively so that there is no legal
obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose
to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally
entitled. In the case at bar, the lower court erred in reasoning
that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon
she should principally use the surname of herfather.
2. Grounds for change of name
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or
reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for
change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2)
when the request for change is a consequence of a change of
status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or
legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid
confusion (1 Tolentino 660, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953
ed; Haw Liong v. Republic). In the case at bar, to avoid
confusion, the petition of name should be granted as the
petitioner has been using the name of Estrella S. Alfon since
childhood.

Ching v. Goyanko
FACTS: Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz were married.
During the marriage, they acquire a certain property in Cebu. In
1993, Joseph executed a deed of sale over the property in favor
of his common-law-wife Maria B. Ching. After Joseph's death, his
children with Epifania discovered the sale. They thus filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for recovery
of property and damages against Ching, praying for the
nullification of the deed of sale and of the TCT and the
issuance of a new one in favor of their father Goyanko.

ISSUE: Was the sale made by Joseph Goyanko in favor of his

common-law wife valid?

HELD: No. The proscription against sale of property between

spouses applies even to common law relationships.
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts
whose cause, object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy are void and
inexistent from the very beginning.

Article 1352 also provides that: “Contracts without cause,

or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause
is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.”

Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from

selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions.
Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are
prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances
between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy
the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law.
It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence
by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the
institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law.
The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage, otherwise, “the condition of those
who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.”
As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of
his common- law-wife, it was null and void.
Matabuena v. Cervantes
FACTS: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this
period, Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land.
Later the two were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena,
his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation
citing Art.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void.”
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the
prohibition because the donation was made at the time the
deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply
cohabitating.

ISSUE: W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in

partners.

HELD: Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory

construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for
the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage
is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper
pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no
reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law
relationships. The court, however, said that the lack of
the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not
necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive
rights to the disputed property because the relationship between
Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.

Vda. de Ape v. CA
FACTS: Cleopas Ape died in 1950 and left a parcel of land (Lot
2319) to his 11 children. The children never formally divided
the property amongst themselves except through hantal-hantal
whereby each just occupied a certain portion and developed each.
On the other hand, the spouses Lumayno were interested in the
land so they started buying the portion of land that each of the
heirs occupied. On 11 Apr 1973, one of the children, Fortunato,
entered into a contract of sale with Lumayno. In exchange of his
lot, Lumayno agreed to pay P5,000.00. She paid in advance
P30.00. Fortunato was given a receipt prepared by Lumayno’s son
in law (Andres Flores). Flores also acted as witness. Lumayno
also executed sales transactions with Fortunato’s siblings
separately.

In 1973, Lumayno compelled Fortunato to make the the delivery to

her of the registrable deed of sale over Fortunato’s portion of
the Lot No. 2319. Fortunato assailed the validity of the
contract of sale. He also invoked his right to redeem (as a co-
owner) the portions of land sold by his siblings to Lumayno.
Fortunato died during the pendency of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid contract of sale?

HELD: No. Fortunato was a “no read no write” person. It was

incumbent for the the other party to prove that details of the
contract was fully explained to Fortunato before Fortunato
signed the receipt.

A contract of sale is a consensual contract, thus, it is

perfected by mere consent of the parties. It is born from the
moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the
object of the sale and upon the price. Upon its perfection, the
parties may reciprocally demand performance, that is, the vendee
may compel the transfer of the ownership and to deliver the
object of the sale while the vendor may demand the vendee to pay
the thing sold. For there to be a perfected contract of sale,
however, the following elements must be present: consent,
object, and price in money or its equivalent.

For consent to be valid, it must meet the following requisites:

(a) it should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the
matter to which it refers;
(b) it should be free and
(c) it should be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is
vitiated by error; freedom by violence, intimidation or undue
influence; spontaneity by fraud.

Lumayno claimed that she explained fully the receipt to

Fortunato, but Flores’ testimony belies it. Flores said there
was another witness but the other was a maid who also lacked
education. Further, Flores himself was not aware that the
receipt was “to transfer the ownership of Fortunato’s land to
her mom-in-law”. It merely occurred to him to explain the
details of the receipt but he never did.

Melchor vs. COAMARIO R. MELCHOR, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON

AUDIT, respondent.G.R. No. 95398August 16, 1991GUTIERREZ, JR.,
J.

FACTS:Petitioner Mario R. Melchor entered into a contract with

Cebu Diamond Construction for the construction ofPhase I of the
home Technology Building of Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of
Alangalang, Leyte, for theprice of P488, 000. Pablo Narido,
chief accountant of the school, issued a certificate of
availability of funds to cover the construction cost. Narido,
however, failed to sign as a Witness to the contract, contrarily
to the requirement of Section I of Letter of Instruction (LOI)
No. 968.While the construction of Phase I was under way, the
contractor, in a letter dated November 8, 1983addressed to
Melchor, sought an additional charge of P73,000 equivalent to
15% of the stipulated amount due to an increase in the cost of
labor and construction materials. The petitioner then sent a
letter asking for the approval of the Regional Director of the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) on the
contractor's additional charge which the latter later approved.
The contractor requested series of extensions for the completion
of the construction which the petitioner granted. However, the
contractor later gave up the project mainly to save itself from
further losses due to, among other things, increased cost of
construction materials and labor. The Commission on Audit
Regional Director, Cesar A. Damole, disallowed the payment of
P515,305.60 in post-audit on the ground that the contract was
null and void for lack of signature of the chief accountant of
the school as witness to it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be held personally

liable for the amount paid for the construction of a public
school building on the ground that the infrastructure contract
is null and void for want of one signature?

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of

the respondent COA denominated as 11th Indorsement dated
November 11, 1988 and its resolution dated July 31, 1990 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent COA is directed to
allow in post-audit the payment of P344,430.80.

The Court finds that the contract executed by the petitioner and
Cebu Diamond Construction is enforceable and, therefore, the
petitioner should not be made to personally pay for the building
already constructed. In the case before us, the chief accountant
issued a certificate of availability of funds but failed to sign
the contract as witness. But since Section 86 states that the
certificate shall be attached to and become an integral part of
the proposed contract, then the failure of the chief accountant
to affix his signature to the contract was somehow made up by
his own certification which is the basic and more important
validating document. We agree with the petitioner's view that
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI
968 in the execution of the contract.
*It is a rule of statutory construction that the court may
consider the spirit and reason of a statute where a literal
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice or
would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.*

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-36897. June 25, 1980.]

SPOUSES FLORENTINO S. TOMAS and FRANCISCA CARINO, Plaintiffs-

Appellees, v. EUSEBIA TOMAS, defendant, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, SANTIAGO, ISABELA BRANCH, Defendant-Appellant.

Facts: Plaintiff spouses, Florentino S. Tomas and Francisca

Cariño, are the owners of a parcel of land located in Malasian,
Santiago, Isabela (now Saguday, Nueva Vizcaya) since 1929, which
they obtained through a homestead patent with Original
Certificate of Title No. 1-4620. Through fraud and
misrepresentation, one Eusebia Tomas succeeded in having OCT No.
1-4620 cancelled, and obtained in her name TCT No. 8779,
Isabela, now TCT 350 Nueva Vizcaya, with which she obtained a
loan from the Philippine National Bank branch in Santiago,
Isabela, as a security, mortgaging the land with the bank for
the loan of P2,500.00. Florentino Tomas discovered the
fraudulent acts of Eusebia Tomas when he himself applied for a
loan from the Philippine National Bank, and offered as a
collateral the same land already mortgaged by Eusebia Tomas to
the bank.

In the action plaintiffs filed on April 14, 1964 to declare TCT-

350, Nueva Vizcaya, null and void, against Eusebia Tomas, it was
found by the court (Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya)
that Eusebia Tomas succeeded in having plaintiffs’ OCT No. I-
4620 (Isabela) 1 cancelled and having TCT No. 8779 (Isabela) 2
issued in her name, by executing a deed of extra-judicial
settlement 3 in which she made it appear that she is the lone
heir of the registered owner, Florentino Tomas, to whom she was
not even known before, and who was at the time very much alive.
She then petitioned for the issuance of another owner’s
duplicate of OCT No. I-4620, alleging loss of said owner’s
duplicate. On Order of the court (Court of First Instance of
Isabela) where the petition was filed, a new owner’s duplicate
was issued to Eusebia Tomas as the petitioner. Upon the
registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement (Exhibit
"J"), OCT No. I-4620 was cancelled, and TCT No. 8779, now TCT-
350 Nueva Vizcaya was issued in the name of Eusebia Tomas on
March 14, 1957.

In the same action, the Philippine National Bank was made a co-
defendant as the mortgagee of the land, the plaintiffs alleging
that the mortgage is null and void, the mortgagor not being the
owner of the property mortgaged. After trial in which Eusebia
Tomas never appeared to present any evidence, the court a quo
rendered judgment dated June 9, 1967, the dispositive portion 4
of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, decision is hereby

rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
(a) declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8779, now
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-350 in the name of defendant
Eusebia Tomas null and void; (b) declaring the deed of extra-
judicial settlement executed by defendant Eusebia Tomas null and
void; (c) declaring Original Certificate of Title No. I-4620 and
its file and owner’s copy revived; (d) condemning defendant
Eusebia Tomas to pay the plaintiffs in the amount of P950.00 as
attorney’s fee and P55.80 representing the Actual expenses of
the plaintiffs; (e) declaring the mortgage in favor of the
Philippine National Bank without force and effect against the
plaintiffs, and (f) ordering defendant Eusebia Tomas to pay the
costs of this proceedings."cralaw virtua1aw library

From the portion of the foregoing judgment declaring the

mortgage in its favor without force and effect, the Philippine
National Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, however,
certified the appeal to this Court, the issue presented being
purely legal.

Issue: Whether or not the mortgage of the land in favor of

the appellant bank is valid or not as against appellees.

Ruling: The decision of this Court in the aforecited case

promulgated on May 30, 1967 preceded the decision of the lower
court in this case dated June 7, 1967, by only a few days.
However, the court a quo went along the doctrine as laid down in
the Pichay v. Celestino case even perhaps without having
actually read the decision, although a similar rule had earlier
been laid down in Blondeau, Et. Al. v. Nano, Et. Al. 10 We,
therefore, find no error in the holding of the court a quo that
the mortgage executed by Eusebia Tomas, appellant’s co-defendant
in favor of said appellant bank over the land in question which
the former never owned, is without effect as against appellees
herein.

We, indeed, find more weight and vigor in a doctrine which

recognizes a better right for the innocent original registered
owner who obtained his certificate of title through perfectly
legal and regular proceedings, than one who obtains his
certificate from a totally void one, as to prevail over judicial
pronouncements to the effect that one dealing with a registered
land, such as a purchaser, is under no obligation to look beyond
the certificate of title of the vendor, for in the latter case,
good faith has yet to be established by the vendee or
transferee, being the most essential condition, coupled with
valuable consideration, to entitle him to respect for his newly
acquired title even as against the holder of an earlier and
perfectly valid title.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed,

without pronouncement as to costs.