"These People Have An Irrevocable Right To Self-Government": United States Policy and The Palestinian Question, 1977-1979

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“These People Have an Irrevocable Right to Self-Government”: United

States Policy and the Palestinian Question, 1977-1979
Victor V. Nemchenok
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States Policy and the Palestinian Question, 1977-1979', Diplomacy & Statecraft, 20: 4, 595 — 618
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Diplomacy & Statecraft, 20:595–618, 2009
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Self-Government”: United States Policy and

the Palestinian Question, 1977–1979
VICTOR V. NEMCHENOK
United
V. V. Nemchenok
States Policy and the Palestinian Question, 1977–1979
Downloaded By: [Nemchenok, Victor][University of Virginia] At: 14:30 19 December 2009
Upon entering office, Carter Administration officials placed a

heavy emphasis on integrating human rights into United States
foreign policy. They also sought to contain festering Arab–Israeli
tensions in the Middle East. The intersection of these two issues was
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This article examines the Adminis-
tration’s attempts to solve that conflict and to bring peace to the
region. It argues that policymakers developed a sincere dedication
to safeguarding Palestinian rights, but that their understanding of
those rights was limited in scope and defined through the lens of
United States security and strategic interests. In spite of a good-faith
effort to satisfy Palestinian desires while maintaining a constructive
relationship with Israel, the Administration ultimately failed to alter
the status quo because of regional developments. As Washington’s
strategic thinking changed, so did the urgency of Palestinian rights.
Jimmy Carter envisioned a central role for human rights in United States
foreign policy. “Our commitment to human rights,” he proclaimed in his
inaugural address, “must be absolute.” Yet the president neither illuminated
the logic of human rights, nor concretely defined their subjects: although
the nation’s values “dictate[d] a clear-cut preference for those societies” that
shared “an abiding respect for individual human rights,” it was “peoples”
collectively—“more numerous and more politically aware” and now
“demanding their place in the sun”—whom he implicated in the country’s
newly rediscovered humanitarian impulse. Nonetheless, by claiming certain
“moral” duties to be in the country’s “best interests,” Carter shaded “human
rights” with realist implications and further cemented their primacy.1
During the Carter Administration, however, the prominence of human
rights collided with the importance of the Middle East.2 What the Carter
Administration sought in the region was an end to the Arab–Israeli conflict
and a lasting, comprehensive peace. Such a peace was more than a
595
596 V. V. Nemchenok
humanitarian concern; it was a strategic security interest. United States

involvement in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 on Israel’s behalf contributed
to an oil embargo that devastated United States allies, many of whom had
negotiated important base rights with Washington. Desperate for oil and
lacking the domestic reserves enjoyed by the United States, countries like
Italy, Spain, and Turkey became politically alienated from Israel and refused
to allow United States armed forces the use of bases to resupply Israel.3
Policymakers worried that similar restrictions regarding bases and air space
in future conflicts would adversely affect the ability of the military to
achieve American objectives in the Middle East.4 Should a particularly
prolonged engagement occur, Allied intransigence would guarantee Israel’s
complete isolation, the alienation of the United States, and the fragmenta-
tion of the international system. Moreover, another war “would likely gener-
ate a major United States–Soviet confrontation,” argued National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Short of a comprehensive settlement, the fes-
tering situation would further the radicalisation of the Arab world, speed the
re-entry of the Soviet Union into the Middle East, and ensure “serious con-
sequences for Western Europe, Japan, and the United States.”5 Regional
peace was imperative.
How did United States officials conceptualise human rights as a compo-
nent part of Washington’s Middle East policy? How did their understanding
of human rights interact with American interests in ensuring Israeli security,
stemming Arab radicalisation, and maintaining reasonable international oil
prices? In the Middle East, human rights and a comprehensive peace settle-
ment converged into a single issue: the Palestinian problem. Carter and his
senior advisors saw the Palestinians through a humanitarian lens.6 After
1948, Palestinians were a people without a home. Twenty years later, they
were also a people under occupation. Because he had made human rights
“a central tenet” of United States foreign policy, it was impossible for the
president “to ignore the very serious problems on the West Bank” and “the
continued deprivation of Palestinian rights.”7 But from 1977–1981, no Carter
official ever mentioned the plight of the Palestinians in a vacuum. When the
resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict became a concrete interest of the
United States, the Palestinian issue at the root of the conflict also acquired a
strategic dimension. The prevention of Soviet influence, projection of
American power, and protection of access to oil all depended on a compre-
hensive settlement, which was impossible without due attention to the
Palestinians.8 The way in which officials approached Palestinian rights
would have immense significance for Washington’s ability to pursue peace
and to reconcile competing interests, sometimes at the expense of the very
rights Carter claimed to have been defending.9
In Spring 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and his deputy, Warren
Christopher, set out to elucidate the Administration’s human rights thinking.
Appearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Christopher
United States Policy and the Palestinian Question, 1977–1979 597
noted that human rights were vital to preserving America’s leadership and
influence abroad, but they could not be pursued everywhere uniformly.
Officials would need to temper the promotion of American ideals with secu-
rity considerations and “a concern to achieve practical results,” both of
which required a careful country-by-country approach to human rights.10 In
an address at the University of Georgia Law School, Vance in turn identified
three kinds of rights, all adopted from the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, that the Administration would uphold. The first, a right “to
be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person,” con-
cerned torture, cruel and unusual punishment, and arbitrary arrest. Second
was the right “to the fulfilment of vital needs” such as food, shelter, health
care, and education. The last was a right “to enjoy civil and political liber-
ties,” for example, freedom of thought, religion, speech, and assembly; free-
dom of movement; and freedom to take part in government.11
The secretary’s list espoused only those rights that pertained to the individ-
ual, reflecting the traditional values of classical liberalism shaded by Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s freedom from want. But at the heart of the Palestinian problem
lay a collective desire for sovereignty, autonomy, and the exercise of national
will. The emergence among the Palestinian people of a distinct national iden-
tity by the 1920s and the renewal of that identity following the 1967 war
placed collective self-determination, rather than individual rights, at the core
of the Palestinian issue.12 Vance made no mention of such collective rights—
a glaring omission given the Administration’s strategy of basing the definition
of human rights in international law. Its tactics entailed pushing through the
Senate the ratification of several major human rights treaties, including the
Universal Declaration of Human rights and two attendant covenants—the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 1 of
the latter, however, explicitly stated that “all peoples have a right to self-
determination” and that all parties to that covenant, which was binding upon
ratification, would be responsible for “promot[ing] the realisation of the right
of self-determination.” Vance’s failure to refer to self-determination, even as
he acknowledged the ICCPR, suggests that its applicability would be subject
to one of the Justice Department’s reservations.13
Like Christopher, Vance also addressed the issue of perspective: “Have
we been sensitive to genuine security interests, realising that outbreak of
armed conflict or terrorism could in itself pose a serious threat to human
rights?”14 The last point identified a fundamental tension in the pursuit of
human rights. United States security was paramount, and while an emphasis
on human rights would theoretically benefit the nation by fostering “a world
that shares common freedoms and in which prosperity and economic justice
create the conditions for peace,” human rights could also lead to instability
and radicalism. What if their promotion threatened America’s security
interests instead of reinforcing them? To speak of “majority rule and equal
598 V. V. Nemchenok
rights” in Southern Rhodesia or “civil and political” rights in Namibia, two

countries that had a limited impact on United States security, was one thing,
but to address human rights in “such a crucial area of the world” as the
Middle East was quite another.15
The objective of United States Middle East policy, as defined by Brzezinski
in a memorandum to Carter, was “a comprehensive . . . settlement, without
which the further radicalization of the Arab world and the re-entry of the
Soviet Union into the Middle East could not be avoided.”16 To achieve that
goal, United States officials hoped to garner the agreement of all parties to a
set of principles and to establish a framework upon which they would negoti-
ate at the Geneva Conference.17 This approach presented an immediate obsta-
cle. The United States insisted that any peace be based on United Nations
Security Council Resolution 242, which had established a “land-for-peace”
formula, called on each state in the region to be recognised and, without
ever mentioning the Palestinians explicitly, alluded to a settlement of “the
refugee problem.” At the 1974 Arab summit in Rabat, Morocco, Arab leaders
unanimously approved a resolution recognising the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people. This created an impasse because Israel would not negotiate for fear
that doing so would recognise a Palestinian “people” with collective
Palestinian rights. The PLO likewise refused to recognise Israel, cognisant
that such recognition constituted its only diplomatic leverage. Washington
needed to break the impasse.
On 3 February 1977, William Quandt, the senior staff member of the
National Security Council responsible for the Middle East, sent Brzezinski a
memorandum responding to an updated presidential review of the Middle
East—PRM-3. Quandt found the document unimpressive. Two problems, in
particular, bothered him. The first concerned decisions on aid to Israel. Just
as those responsible for human rights policy were concluding that assis-
tance decisions could, at a minimum, be considered in conjunction with
non-security objectives, the State Department concluded that aid to Israel
could not be used as a form of leverage to help achieve American objec-
tives. Quandt strongly disagreed, stressing that the Administration “should
candidly talk about how we intend to relate future arms and aid decisions to
the upcoming diplomatic effort.” Second, the examination of the impending
peace negotiations was too fuzzy. The objective was to get all the parties to
the Geneva Conference to reach a comprehensive settlement. The PRM,
however, simply “gloss[ed] over the extremely difficult Palestinian issue,”
one of the main factors preventing progress. It gave the impression that the
Arab states would help get Washington “off the hook.” Sceptical, Quandt
emphasised that the Administration would need to come up with a solution
that was acceptable to Arabs and Israelis alike.18
At the policy review meeting the following day, officials showed little
inclination to think about the Palestinians more deeply. To be sure, there
was consensus on the urgency of an American initiative. Enno Knoche, the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative at the meeting, reported
that the Egyptians, Syrians, and Saudi Arabians were being constructive in
trying to convince the PLO to moderate its position. Brzezinski believed the
moment more auspicious for a settlement than any other in the past 23
years. Vance also thought the time was ripe for a breakthrough. Geneva
could not be put off beyond September, because UN Secretary-General Kurt
Waldheim was pressing for a conference, and his approach—a one-day
meeting that would establish a series of working groups and then adjourn—
was “not sensible.”19
Because the short-term goal focused on the conference itself and not
on the potential outcomes of negotiations, the Palestinian issue received

short shrift. Brzezinski stressed that the Arabs needed to articulate a more
explicit definition of peace, which would be difficult if the Palestinians were
present at Geneva. Knoche, paralleling the approach that Quandt had found
so naïve in PRM-3, suggested that “if the Arabs and Palestinians can reach
an accommodation, the Arabs will probably agree to go to Geneva without
the PLO,” thus alleviating the problem altogether. Ultimately, everyone
agreed that a semi-formal round of discussions prior to Geneva would be
helpful in clarifying the long-term objectives of all—all but the Palestinian—
parties. In the context of informal talks, the problem posed by the PLO
would be obviated.20
As Vance travelled the Middle East for consultation with local leaders in
mid-February, however, the Palestinian question rose to the fore. At a news
conference in Cairo, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat stated that the
“Palestinian question is the core of the whole problem.” Sadat’s comments
were substantive. When asked whether Israeli withdrawal to 1967 boundaries
and the “establishment of a Palestinian entity” would be enough for achieving
a comprehensive peace, Sadat pointed to the need for “the creation of a Pal-
estinian state,” albeit one linked to Jordan. Adding that Palestinian participa-
tion was necessary for the desired outcome, the Egyptian president implied
that Palestinians had an inherent right to have a say in the settlement. Con-
trary to Sadat’s substantive focus, Vance concentrated on procedural issues,
despite the agreement in Washington that his trip address substance as well.
When asked whether a Geneva conference would mean that all parties would
be at the conference, Vance minced no words: “it would mean that there
would have been a determination prior to the conference as to who should
attend—that is a procedural question.”21 Since this comment was both pre-
ceded and followed by a question on Palestinians, Vance was clearly referring
to Palestinian representation. Constrained by Israel’s position on the PLO as
an illegitimate negotiating partner, and unwilling to push the Israelis into a
harder bargaining position, he chose not to express himself in the language of
human rights. Carter’s vocabulary of politically aware “peoples” finding “their
place in the sun” for the sake of human rights seemed inapplicable, and the
600 V. V. Nemchenok
secretary would not go beyond the lacklustre formulation of a “resolution of

the Palestinian question.”22
After his trip, Vance distilled the core issues of a potential settlement
for the House International Relations Committee. They involved “the nature
of peaceful relations between Israel and her neighbours, the boundaries of
peace, and”—still vaguely phrased—“the future of the Palestinians.”23 After
meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin the following week, the
president reiterated those three issues, with the Palestinian issue in similarly
amorphous language. 24 But on 16 March, Carter highlighted the humanitar-
ian dimension of the problem, expanding the vocabulary surrounding the
conflict far beyond Washington’s conventional wisdom. “There has to be a
homeland for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many
years,” he told a crowd assembled in Clinton, Massachusetts.25
Carter’s deviation from the traditional script was undoubtedly purpose-
ful. Not only had the Israelis been stonewalling the negotiations, they had
attempted to manipulate the Administration’s policy by appealing to the
American Jewish community and by characterising the Administration’s
position as consonant with Israel’s.26 Just two months into his term and
enjoying approval ratings of over 70 percent, Carter went on the offensive.27
Yet the language he used is instructive. Not wishing to alienate the Jewish-
American community any further, Carter chose to speak in terms of a
“homeland” for “refugees,” making clear that the national consciousness of
a Palestinian “people” and an independent Palestinian state lay outside the
contours of United States policy. The absence of Palestinian rights
contrasted starkly with his observation—made just minutes earlier—that
“Israel’s right to exist, Israel’s right to exist permanently, Israel’s right to
exist in peace” had to be recognised by its Arab neighbours. Whatever the
suffering of Palestinians, the vocabulary of “rights” did not yet apply to
them.
Crucially, after illuminating his view of the humanitarian nature of the
issue, Carter quickly shifted focus. The ultimate focus was not humanitarian-
ism but peace. “What happens in the Middle East in the future,” he
declared, “might very well cause a major war there which would quickly
spread to all the other nations of the world.” He explained that
Many countries depend completely on oil from the Middle East for their
life. We don’t. If all oil was cut off to us from the Middle East, we could
survive; but Japan imports more than 98 percent of all its energy, and
other countries, like in Europe—Germany, Italy, France—are also
heavily dependent on oil from the Middle East.
Carter left the logic implicit: in the absence of peace, mounting tensions in
the Middle East would lead to Arab radicalisation. Were the Arabs to engage
in political blackmail, oil prices would skyrocket, vulnerable American allies
would become politically disaffected, and the United States would be left
dangerously alienated at a moment when the Soviet Union was bound to
take advantage of the situation and when the chances of a superpower
confrontation were greatest. In this context, peace was the ultimate security
interest, with the Palestinian issue just one of its components.
In private, officials also continued to treat the problem strategically.
After many consultations with Sadat and Rabin, the question of Palestinian
representation was still stalemated. Without its resolution, however, conven-
ing a Geneva conference was impossible. The Israelis were adamant about
excluding the PLO from the conference negotiations, but Egypt, Syria,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia upheld its claim to represent the Palestinian
people and would not appear at a conference without its presence. Policy-
makers had initially assumed, in spite of Quandt’s warning, that the Arabs
would be able to resolve the problem among themselves. According to a
new State Department analysis, that now seemed unlikely.
Forging ahead, United States officials had three options. One was to
arrange for a united Arab delegation that included the PLO. Alternately,
Washington could invite the PLO to attend separately, but with the explicit
understanding that Geneva would be based on the right of all states to live
in peace, which would constitute a de facto recognition of Israel. In lieu of
that caveat, the United States could seek Arab and Soviet agreement on a
conference without Palestinian representation on condition that a decision
on the question of representation would be its first order of business.28 Yet
the most intriguing option was the one that seemed the least plausible: that
the Jordanian delegation contain a Palestinian group. On its face, the
suggestion was a non-starter—as the PLO would not be the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people within that arrangement, the Arabs
could not accept it without facing the accusation of turning their backs on
the Rabat declaration and confronting domestic difficulties.
Sensing the Middle East situation steadily deteriorating in the absence of
a comprehensive peace, United States policymakers mulled over sweetening
the offer with an “explicit inclusion of the substantive Palestinian issue on the
agenda for the negotiations or by United States assurance that a Palestinian
homeland, or Palestinian self-determination, would be taken up in the negoti-
ations.” This was a stunning expansion of language. Carter had introduced
the term “homeland” into the dialogue in the hope of putting pressure on
Israel to soften its position without alienating Jewish leaders at home. “Self-
determination” went a step further by implying distinct nationhood. The fact
that it appeared in a paper with a secret classification, written solely for inter-
nal discussion, indicated an understanding on the part of policymakers that
“human rights” could be used, not just as rhetorical flourish to align “politi-
cally aware” people with the United States, but as a means to attain concrete
interests. As officials from the State and Defense departments, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the National Security Council, and the CIA agreed at the policy
602 V. V. Nemchenok
review meeting on 19 April, reconvening a Geneva conference remained a

“high-priority” concern because it would stem political deterioration in the
Arab world.29 Those present at the meeting understood that human rights,
meaning self-determination, could be the key to the whole process.
As Spring gave way to Summer, the Administration continued to
explore the procedural aspect of the Palestinian issue and began to pay
more attention to substance. Israel’s conservative Likud party had just come
to power, and its constituents looked upon the land-for-peace scheme with
extreme disfavour. Menachem Begin, the new prime minister, loudly pro-
moted Israeli settlements in the occupied territories with the hope that they
would make the future incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel
inevitable. To keep the hopes for Geneva alive, American officials had to
win him over without alienating the key Arab participants.
In the ensuing balancing act, Carter officials put a priority on the
human rights-related components of the Palestinian issue in a way that min-
imised humanitarian concerns, with the result that the tone of official con-
versations lost the kind of moral and humane quality that Carter had
exhibited in Clinton. When the Policy Review Committee discussed the idea
of a trusteeship and an eventual referendum for the West Bank on 10 June,
for example, the participants—Vance, Brzezinski, Defence Secretary Harold
Brown, and Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA—acknowledged
that this scheme was based on the principles of self-determination, but gave
nearly exclusive attention to the fact that it “pre-empt[ed] a Begin move to
incorporate the territory into Israel”30 This would be beneficial to Washing-
ton because Arab leaders expected the Administration to achieve results. If
disappointed, cautioned Quandt, their moderation could give way to radi-
calisation and a strategy of confrontation that would stymie Washington’s
plans for a strategically formulated peace.31
To curry favour with Israel’s supporters, however, statements concern-
ing the West Bank needed to be delicately phrased. Leaders of the Jewish-
American community were initially uneasy about Begin’s election, but
Carter’s public statements about the Palestinian problem gave them the
impression that the Administration espoused an openly pro-Arab line. When
Carter spoke in Clinton in March, his language was infused with earnest-
ness: “There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees
who have suffered for many, many years.”32 Caught between an Israeli
extremist and a seemingly biased, pro-Arab Administration, leaders like
Rabbi Alexander Schindler—chairman of the Conference of Presidents of
Major American Jewish Organisations and a relative “dove” on the question
of Israel’s occupation—made peace with Likud’s hard-line stance.33
To regain the support of the American Jewish community, the Adminis-
tration visibly dampened the intensity of its language concerning Palestinian
rights. At an address in San Francisco in June, Vice President Walter Mon-
dale intimated that
if the Palestinians are willing to exist in peace and are prepared to

demonstrate that willingness by recognising Israel’s right to exist in
peace, the President has made clear that, in the context of a peace
settlement, we believe the Palestinians should be given a chance to
shed their status as homeless refugees and to partake fully in the benefits
of peace . . . including the possibility of some arrangement for a Palestinian
homeland or entity. . . .34
Where Israeli security was concerned, however, Mondale ratcheted up the

emotion. Unlike Carter’s dispassionate statement on Israeli security in Clin-
ton, Mondale emphasised America’s “unique and profound relationship
with the state of Israel,” noting that its survival was not a political issue but
rather a “moral imperative” of United States foreign policy.35 Aware that

Israeli intransigence would derail the progress to Geneva, Mondale sought
to balance the Administration’s humanitarian impulses with reassurances to
Israel and Carter’s domestic detractors that Washington would not abandon
its ally. The strategy worked. By August, the president’s approval ratings
among Jewish Americans reached 66 percent, a figure equal to his approval
among the general population.36
In their private deliberations, policymakers continued explicitly to artic-
ulate the need for balance. Quandt rightfully noted that the necessity of
establishing a working relationship with Begin’s government collided with
that of keeping the confidence of moderate, pro-West Arab leaders and
steering the Palestinians into their sphere.37 With respect to the latter,
American officials would have to convince Begin to refrain from extending
Israeli law into, or otherwise annexing, the occupied territories. Were he to
do so, Washington would be amenable to “leaving aside the details of the
Palestinian question for the moment” and would work for a conference at
which the PLO was initially absent. If that were the case, Quandt quickly
added, the United States would need to contact the Palestinians directly to
explain that Washington remained committed to a solution of the Palestin-
ian problem, but felt obligated to start with other issues. Two paragraphs
later, however, Quandt veered in another direction, suggesting that Vance
should “inject the idea of self-determination for the Palestinians” on his next
visit to the area. The Arabs would then see “a sense of movement on the
Palestinian issue,” and might “agree to sidestep the question of PLO repre-
sentation and a Palestinian state at this stage.”
In addition to placating both the Arabs and the Israelis, Washington
had to take stock of the USSR. Limiting Soviet influence in the Middle East
was a fixture of United States policy, but since the Geneva framework called
for joint co-chairmanship of the conference by the United States and the
Soviet Union, the latter’s presence at the negotiations was unavoidable.
Nonetheless, policymakers initially had sought to limit the extent of
Moscow’s participation and influence. It had been agreed that the Soviets
604 V. V. Nemchenok
“should be kept informed of the progress of our conversations with the

parties, but should not be involved in the substance of negotiations”—at
least at that point in the process.38 Four months into Carter’s term, however,
the focus of the discussions about the role of the Soviets shifted. In Febru-
ary, Brzezinski argued that it was good strategy to pressure the Soviets.
They had always supported the most radical Arab positions, and they would
need to act constructively to gain entry into the substantive negotiations.39
By June, the question was slightly altered, betraying a sense of anxiety.
“How can we keep the Soviet Union sufficiently involved to forestall
obstructionist efforts on Moscow’s part,” asked one PRCM discussion paper,
“without that involvement itself becoming an obstruction?”40 Were the
Soviets shut out of the process, the havoc they would wreak would kill all
prospects for a workable Geneva conference.
By the Autumn, the Administration seemed to have the answer. On 1
October, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint communiqué
that reiterated the necessity of a peace agreement.41 The superpowers
stressed that such an agreement had to be reached within the framework of
the Geneva conference, that all substantive issues needed to be addressed,
and that the conference had to be convened no later than December. The
communiqué was a “tactical device” for advancing toward a conference.42
American officials were pessimistic about the prospects for Geneva in early
September. Internal dissatisfaction in Egypt and Syria; the PLO’s inability to
respond to the American initiative; Soviet tactics of “talking peace while
quietly encouraging Arab intransigence”; and Israeli policies designed to
make Arab participation in the negotiations impossible—all these factors
contributed to the growing sense of futility. Luckily, discussions with Soviet
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in mid-September convinced Vance that the
Soviets were finally willing to moderate their position. They were no longer
calling for a separate Palestinian state, a significant concession suggesting
that United States–Soviet cooperation had the potential to break the impasse
by making Begin uneasy and leading him in a more constructive direction.43
In addition, an agreement with the Soviet Union would pressure Syria and
the PLO to agree to negotiations.44 Officials were certain that United States–
Soviet strategic cooperation would finally clear the path for Geneva.
In their discussions with the Soviets over the communiqué, officials
agreed to invoke the language of “rights” explicitly. Wedged between the
withdrawal of the Israeli Armed Forces and the establishment of normal
peaceful relations was the issue of “the resolution of the Palestinian ques-
tion, including insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.”45
The inclusion of this phrase caused an immediate backlash. Quandt has
argued that the wording was innocuous, and that Begin himself later
referred to “Palestinian rights” at Camp David.46 The language, nonetheless,
significantly departed from earlier formulations used to talk about the Pales-
tinian problem. In Clinton, Carter introduced the idea of a “homeland” for
Palestinian refugees, but steered clear of mentioning either “the Palestinian

people” or their “legitimate rights.” Three months later in San Francisco,
Mondale once mentioned the “Palestinian people.” He framed the discus-
sion very narrowly, however, pointing out that the Geneva conference
would address the Palestinians’ “legitimate political aspirations.” In two
ways, that qualification adroitly circumvented the implications of a Palestin-
ian “people.” First, it suggested that they had no national aspirations, re-
enforcing Israel’s position that “the Palestinians as individuals possessed
rights which had to be recognised, but that they had no rights or status as a
people or a nation.”47 Equally importantly, the term “aspiration” conveyed
empathy with certain Palestinian desires and ambitions, but implied none of
the entitlement of “rights.” “Legitimate political aspirations” could be

granted to the Palestinians by other parties as a reward for good behaviour;
they were not something to which the Palestinians had an irredentist claim.
By combining “legitimate rights” and “Palestinian people” into a single
clause, then, the communiqué gave the impression that the United States
government was significantly expanding its support for the Palestinian
cause at Israel’s expense. Because the document spoke, moreover, of both
the United States and the Soviet Union as guarantors of a future settlement,
many sensed that Washington was needlessly allowing Moscow influence in
the Middle East.48 Seeking to soften hard positions and to move all parties
closer to the negotiating table, the communiqué backfired, creating an
intense backlash in the American press and public. Within days, the State
Department distanced itself from the document and, by November, Carter’s
approval ratings dropped to 55 percent.49
By the time Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near East and South
Asian Affairs Alfred Atherton appeared before Congress on 19 October
1977, it became clear that no greater commitment to the Palestinians accom-
panied the sharpened language of Palestinian rights. Atherton explained
that the shift in language had less to do with commitment to rights and
more to a change in context:
Historically we have spoken of the legitimate interest of the Palestinians

for a very good reason. We used that formulation in circumstances
where the phrase “legitimate rights” often is described as “legitimate
national rights,” “legitimate rights of an independent state” and so forth.
These were used in a context which was ambiguous as to whether or
not this was to be at the expense of Israel’s rights of sovereignty.
In the context of the joint communiqué, noted Atherton, the use of “rights”
was unambiguous.50 Yet to speak of “ambiguous” and “unambiguous” con-
texts was misleading for, as Atherton had explained earlier in the hearing,
sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza was by definition a murky issue
that could only be addressed in negotiations. The United States supported
606 V. V. Nemchenok
the principle of self-determination “as a principle,” but absent consensus

over whether, how, and at what time the inhabitants of these regions
should practice self-determination, the best thing was to commence the
negotiating process and to see what happened.51 Irrespective of context,
Atherton elucidated that “rights,” to the extent that they connoted entitle-
ments, were irrelevant.
Congressman Lee Hamilton of Indiana pressed the point: “you don’t
recognise the principle of self-determination as a controlling factor?” Self-
determination was one of many factors to take into consideration during the
negotiations, replied Atherton. The problem was that “translating that princi-
ple into practice in a specific political context” was very difficult. American
interests lay clearly in regional peace; Palestinian “rights” like self-determi-

nation were important only to the extent they contributed to that peace. By
noting that America’s “priority objective” was to get the negotiations started,
Atherton reiterated that the communiqué’s heightened rhetoric was simply a
policy instrument designed to achieve United States policy objectives.52
Amidst Israeli, Syrian, and Palestinian intransigence, Washington could
not get the parties to agree to a set of principles for reconvening the
Geneva conference. Yet, a desperate Sadat was unwilling to give up. With
Egypt’s economy stalled and unrest rising, he sought to achieve a break-
through that would allow him to tap into United States aid and alleviate
domestic problems. On 9 November, he publicly announced his willingness
“to go to the ends of the earth”—to the Knesset itself, in fact—to talk with
the Israelis about peace. Sadat’s visit to Israel came at a price. Although he
unequivocally renounced the idea of a separate Israeli–Egyptian treaty
unaccompanied by a broader peace, and although he made numerous ref-
erences to a Palestinian right to statehood and a Palestinian right of return,
the PLO and Syria turned against him, with some in Iraq and Libya calling
for his assassination.53
The Carter Administration, however, chose to focus on the silver
lining—that Israel and Egypt, the strongest and most populous regional
powers, were conducting direct negotiations.54 Although it quickly became
clear that Sadat’s initiative would fail to lead to a reconvening of the Geneva
conference, Carter decided to stake his own prestige, and the prestige of the
United States, on one final push for negotiations. As before, American inter-
ests were foremost on his mind. Egypt and Israel were far apart on points of
substance. During the early months of 1978, Begin’s intransigence and
Sadat’s impatience continued unabated. Carter worried that the Egyptian
president would precipitate a conflict. “The Arabs are really pushing Sadat,”
he noted in his diary, “and, [so as] not to stay vulnerable in the long run, I
think he is wanting either to come back to them or to some resolution of
the question.”55 If Sadat was trying strategically to engineer a crisis, Americans’
worries were justified.56 In the wake of the sharp Arab reaction following
Sadat’s outreach to Begin, and with memories of 1973 still intact, United
States officials could logically expect rapid radicalisation in the Arab world
and among the OPEC countries. Notwithstanding the moderating influence
of Saudi Arabia, such radicalisation might spike already-inflated oil prices,
harm the global economy and exacerbate America’s relations with its oil-
strapped allies. Carter could ill-afford to do nothing as the Middle East
seemed to drift toward another war. Against the unanimous advice of senior
Democratic leaders to avoid direct involvement in negotiations, Carter
invited Sadat and Begin to Camp David.57
Although human rights gained relevance in discussions concerning the
Palestinian question in the months surrounding the Camp David talks—
Atherton spoke of meeting the “humanitarian needs” of the Palestinians and
of Washington’s role in “efforts to end a conflict which has taken countless

thousands of innocent victims and has deflected the nations of the area
from using their bountiful resources and talents for bettering the lives of
their people”—they did not overlap with “Palestinian” rights.58 The State
Department had unfurled its human rights policy to “reduce the identifica-
tion of the United States with repugnant regimes” that were anti- or non-
communist.59 To be sure, some of them were vitally important to United
States national security interests—an unfortunate fact that Christopher had
acknowledged to the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance in March
1977. But a policy of alleviating human rights abuses would help the United
States regain its position of moral leadership in the wake of Vietnam whilst
mitigating the appeal of the Soviet Union abroad.
The three types of rights that the Administration incorporated into its
human rights policy were formulated specifically in the context of opposing
dictatorship. The right to be free of arbitrary arrest, torture, and execution;
the right to food, shelter, health care, and education; and the ability to exer-
cise civil and political rights—all were informed by the fact that dictatorial
regimes in countries like Argentina, Nicaragua, South Korea, and Uganda
were denying these rights, which they had a moral commitment to uphold,
to their own people. The dynamics of the Palestinian problem, however, did
not fit this framework. They involved the democratic government of Israel
administering, under military occupation, foreign territories and foreign
people to whom the governing power had no inherent moral obligation.
The United States did not take issue with Israel’s military occupation per se.
Although Washington discouraged Israel from promoting new civil settle-
ments and “thickening” old ones, the occupation of the West Bank was not
the equivalent of Anastacio Somoza’s regime in Nicaragua, for example, and
thus not at heart a moral issue.60 Where, in the political and legal morass
that comprised the Palestinian problem, did Palestinian rights meet human
rights?
Originally, the crux of United States human rights policy lay with free-
dom from arbitrary government action.61 With respect to torture and arbitrary
arrest in the occupied territories, however, Palestinian rights came up against
608 V. V. Nemchenok
the sanctity of Israeli security, to which Carter’s personal commitment was

“unshakeable.”62 The section on Israel within the Country Reports on Human
Rights, prepared by the State Department and submitted to Congress in
February 1978, acknowledged this tension but played down the seriousness
of the violations. It referenced allegations of “a widespread pattern of offi-
cially condoned use of torture during interrogations in the occupied territo-
ries,” but seemed to lend credence to the Israeli government’s quick rebuttal
by noting that The Sunday Times of London, which ran the original article,
“later narrowed the scope of its allegations.” The authors noted the lack of
evidence to prove that Israel was systematically torturing Palestinians. They
also attenuated Israeli culpability for cruel, inhuman, and degrading treat-
ment: the use of excessive force was usually performed by “inexperienced

reservists” and did not reflect “government policy”; the selective expulsion of
Palestinians from the occupied territories stemmed from terrorist activity,
though that practice, too, had “declined greatly in recent years.”63
Concerning arbitrary arrest, the report contended that three-fourths of
the non-Israelis imprisoned were held for security offenses—with the impli-
cation that this was a legitimate reason for incarceration—whilst the rest
were under administrative detention that was provided under Israeli, Jorda-
nian, and British Mandate codes prior to 1967 and, therefore, legal. Admin-
istrative detention even allowed inmates the right to appeal and the right to
petition for writs of habeas corpus.64 The overall logic, if not compelling,
exhibited a certain clarity. Israel was not “systematically” engaging in a pol-
icy of arbitrary arrest, torture, and imprisonment. It took action only when
its security was endangered, so its behaviour was, by definition, not arbi-
trary. From that point of view, a concern for the integrity of the individual in
the occupied territories seemed to lie outside the human rights framework.
A Library of Congress report on human rights six months later, which
exhibited much sharper conclusions, further illuminates Washington’s outlook.
That report referenced the UN Special Committee’s investigation of human
rights abuses in the occupied territories and its determination that prison
detainees were subjected to treatment “which cannot be described as
other than torture.”65 The Library report departed widely from the Country
Reports in its conclusions, with the focus on Israeli transgressions implying
that the Palestinian problem constituted an instance where United States
interests outweighed Washington’s humanitarian ideals.
The Administration considered economic rights no more salient, in
spite of an outpouring of suggestions focusing both on the Palestinians and
the region as a whole. Mildred Robbins Leet, a philanthropist seeking to
alleviate worldwide poverty, proposed to Brzezinski an employment pro-
gramme to help solve the Palestinian refugee problem. Given the opportu-
nity to perform community projects, she argued, refugees would improve
their material existence while enhancing their “dignity, independence, and
self-reliance.”66 Senator Richard Stone of Florida pitched the creation of an
Inter-Agency Task Force for Development in the Middle East to help coun-
tries participating in peace negotiations with economic development.67
Another proposal called for “a cross between the Marshall Plan and the Tru-
man Doctrine—a Carter Doctrine” that would work toward regional peace
by promoting potash development in the Dead Sea and economic and
industrial development in the West Bank.68 And, according to George
Assousa of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, American officials had to
assess the economic and social infrastructure of the West Bank and Gaza,
because social and economic projects would effectively relieve the Palestin-
ians’ “deep sense of hopelessness and growing radicalisation.”69
None of these schemes were implemented by the Carter Administration
due partially to a lack of local support. Many of the proposals were

designed explicitly to invest the Arab states in a negotiated peace settle-
ment, and American officials knew as much. Gary Sick, Quandt’s colleague
on the NSC, wrote to Brzezinski that “to strike sparks” and “to enlist the
necessary genuine support in the region,” the “Carter Doctrine” proposal
would have to come at a dramatic moment in the peace process so as not to
look like a ploy.70 Brzezinski agreed that without Arab support, any plan for
economic development would be ineffectual.71 With a radical rejectionist
stance adopted by most Arab leaders after the Camp David Accords, such
support was not forthcoming.
Nor were domestic factors conducive to American spending abroad in
the aftermath of Camp David. As part of its guarantees to Egypt and Israel
for accepting a peace treaty, the United States promised to provide both
with military assistance. But United States citizens were not keen on such
expenditures. Although Carter’s approval rating jumped by 17 points to 56
percent following Camp David, public good will did not last long. A month
before the talks, Gallup polls registered a 62 percent disapproval rating of
Carter’s handling of the economy.72 By February 1979, the same percentage
of Americans considered a recession likely, and the president’s overall pop-
ularity receded to 43 percent.73 Atherton, now Ambassador-at-Large,
acknowledged the “gut reaction among many people: ‘Why should the
United States pay for peace in the Middle East?’” Yet in comparison to the
“tens of billions of dollars in direct costs and billions more in inflation and
loss of jobs” that American taxpayers paid in the course of four Arab–Israeli
wars, he answered, $4.5 billion for peace was a comparatively small out-
lay.74 Nonetheless, with Americans reluctant to pay for a strategic Egyptian–
Israeli peace, it would have been difficult to convince taxpayers that an eco-
nomic development plan for the Palestinian people—with whom only 14
percent of the population sympathised—would be worth the price.
Ultimately, even those programmes explicitly concerned with the Pales-
tinian problem did not accord with the logic of economic human rights. The
violation of such rights consisted of a government diverting resources to
elites at the expense of the poor.75 Here too, however, Israel’s guilt was
610 V. V. Nemchenok
murky. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on which

Carter’s human rights policy was based, stated that “everyone has the right
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and
of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and neces-
sary social services.”76 The Declaration said nothing, however, of an occu-
pier’s obligation to ensure that right. The Fourth Geneva Convention, which
concerned protection of civilians in wartime, was also silent on that issue.
Washington deemed that document applicable to Israel’s occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza, but it called upon an occupier only to allow the free
passage of consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies, and clothing to
inhabitants.77 Israel’s obligation under the Convention, therefore, concerned
the distribution of already-provided consignments, not their production and

provision. The point, in any case, was moot: the Country Reports indicated
that economic wellbeing within the territories was increasing. Despite
Palestinian complaints that Israel was deliberately restricting economic
development, “real per-capita income has more than doubled during the
occupation, largely because of the thousands of jobs now held by Palestin-
ian Arab workers who commute to Israel proper.” Mitigated by a finding
that income levels in Israel and the territories had steadily converged since
1967, economic rights would not factor into United States policy toward the
Palestinian problem.78
Where “human rights” penetrated the Palestinian conflict, they did so as
civil and political rights—the third leg of the human rights tripod. Although
officials had found a more humane language with which to approach the Pal-
estinian problem in the first year of Carter’s presidency, everyone understood
that the most salient issues involving the occupied territories were political.
The Palestinian inhabitants in those territories wanted an independent state
within which to exercise autonomy, but American officials could not com-
pletely acquiesce to Palestinian demands because of a commitment to Israeli
security. Regional politics further complicated matters. Sadat needed peace
with Israel to revitalise his nation but could not afford to be seen as abandon-
ing the Palestinian cause. While he insisted on “linkage” between Israel’s
withdrawal from the occupied territories and Egypt’s goal of regaining the
Sinai, Begin sought explicitly to negotiate a single agreement over the latter.
Washington could not alienate Sadat; to maintain peace, it had to neutralise
Egypt as a belligerent. The West Bank thus became the lynchpin through
which the United States could both secure its interest in regional peace and
work toward Palestinian rights.
When Begin came to Washington to present American officials with his
plan for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, his ideas carried
a positive gloss. He proposed to abolish the military government adminis-
tering the territories and to grant the inhabitants home rule. An elected
Administrative Council would govern all domestic affairs, and residents
would have the option of Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. Although a step in
the right direction, this proposal disappointed Carter officials because Begin
purposely omitted the issue of sovereignty and remained vague on how
much control the Administrative Council would exercise. He made clear that
on crucial issues like land and immigration, Council authority would be
subject to Israel’s security and interest in public order. “Does the Military
Government reserve the right to revoke the powers that [the military gover-
nor] has delegated?” asked Vance. “In principle, yes,” replied Israeli
Attorney General Aharon Barak, leaving those present to conclude that
Begin’s self-rule proposal was designed as a substitute for Israeli withdrawal
and Palestinian self-determination, not as the first step in a longer process to
transfer political control to Palestinian Arabs. Lack of self-determination, no
formal withdrawal from the West Bank, and a devolution of power from the
Israeli military governor instead of the international community—these,
summarised Brzezinski, were the “bad aspects” of the proposal.79
The issue of Palestinian self-rule remained unsettled prior to Camp
David, but the national security advisor continued to mull over the problem
in terms of “rights” as well as United States interests. Brzezinski wanted
Washington to seek from Israel “a visible termination of the military occupa-
tion” at the start of a five-year transitional period and the granting of “gen-
eral self-government for the Palestinians,” both of which corresponded to
what Vance had called “freedom to take part in government” at the Univer-
sity of Georgia Law School. Knowing that the negotiations would end in
failure short of a commitment to Palestinian self-rule and an abrogation of
Israeli military control, which Sadat could not afford lest his moderating
influence in the Arab world deteriorate further and the Soviet Union “find
opportunities to strengthen its position . . . at [his] expense as well as our
own,” Brzezinski stressed that Palestinian self-government constituted an
“absolute minimum” to which Begin would need to agree.80
Carter pushed hard for Israeli acknowledgement of Palestinian rights at
Camp David. “A continuing military occupation and deprivation of basic cit-
izenship rights among the Arabs,” he told Begin, Defence Minister Ezer
Weizman, and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, “was unacceptable to the
world,” stressing that the strategic dimension of these rights was important
and relevant. In case of another war to liberate the Palestinian territories
from Israeli control, the moderate powers that provided stability in the
Middle East and prevented its radicalisation—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan,
and Iran—would be left vulnerable. The president included Iran for strate-
gic emphasis: Israel depended heavily on Iranian oil, and were Iran to be
destabilised and turn against it, Israel would experience wrenching disrup-
tions in its access to petroleum. Carter was especially exasperated by the
duplicity of Begin’s position regarding autonomy. The prime minister’s com-
ments implied that he would not allow the Palestinians “any appreciable
control” over their own affairs. “No self-respecting Arab would accept this,”
Carter noted. “We are talking about full autonomy—self-control,” he told
612 V. V. Nemchenok
Begin, and “you are not giving them autonomy if you have to approve their
laws.” Begin protested that autonomy was not equivalent to sovereignty,
which elicited a sharp reaction from the president: “What is important is
whether these people have an irrevocable right to self-government. If I
were an Arab, I would prefer the present Israeli occupation to this proposal
of yours.”81
The tortuous talks at Camp David did conclude, ultimately, in a
“Framework for Peace” that, all parties agreed, would serve as the basis for
negotiations over the West Bank and Gaza.82 This document sought three
developments. First, free elections would produce a self-governing authority
to replace the Israeli military government, at which point all Israeli authority
would withdraw, leaving armed forces in specified locations to assure

Israeli security. Second, the elected representatives would participate in
negotiations over the future of the territories and, therefore, the Palestinian
people. Third, the self-governing authority would establish “a strong, local
police force” to assist in providing security. The commitment to Palestinian
political and civil rights within this broad outline was unmistakable.
Immediately after the talks, however, Begin publicly reneged on many
of the agreements he made regarding Israeli settlements in, and withdrawal
from, the West Bank and Gaza.83 As negotiations between Egypt and Israel
over their peace treaty began to waver, the Administration attenuated its
commitment to Palestinian rights. Those rights were important, but an
Egyptian–Israeli treaty was imperative to prevent backsliding into war and
the political chaos that followed. Begin demanded that the Palestinian issue
be divorced from any Egyptian–Israeli treaty. By mid-October, argues
Quandt, Carter seemed to give up on forcing Begin to change his position
on settlements, for fear that dwelling on them “would risk the Sinai agree-
ment he so badly wanted.” To bolster the forces of moderation in the
Middle East, ensure reasonable oil prices, and maintain secure access to oil,
Egyptian–Israeli peace had to be achieved. Moving forward, American dip-
lomats and officials would not revisit the linkage question.84
Yet Palestinian rights were still indispensable: without them, Sadat
would destroy his credibility in the Arab world. Carter knew as much. If any
hope remained of convincing Sadat to negotiate a treaty, Carter would need
to alleviate the political pressure placed upon him by the Arab rejectionists.
When he travelled to the Middle East for a last-ditch effort to hammer out a
peace, the president pledged to Egypt’s national assembly that he remained
“personally committed to move on to negotiations concerning the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip and other issues of concern to the Palestinians.”85
Two months after the treaty was concluded, Administration officials still
considered West Bank negotiations “critical” because they would factor into
American efforts “to reconcile Sadat and the rest of the Arab world.”86 Pales-
tinian rights remained relevant, but more “for the stability of the Egypt-Israel
treaty and for the trends in the Arab World” than in themselves.87
Peace between Egypt and Israel was a major success of Carter’s foreign
policy, but negotiations over Palestinian autonomy soon stalemated. Tired
of trying to find common ground between the Arabs and the Israelis and in
need of bolstering the meagre 29 percent approval rating his performance
was garnering by June 1979, the president distanced himself from further
negotiations, appointing Robert Strauss and then Sol Linowitz to head
efforts to resolve the Palestinian problem.88 With a peace treaty signed,
American officials turned their attention to other concerns—the fallout from
the Iranian revolution; SALT II negotiations; and the opening of diplomatic
relations with China.89
From Carter’s inauguration until the conclusion of the Egyptian–Israeli
treaty in March 1979, Administration thinking about human and Palestinian

rights was strategic and tightly connected to American interests in the Middle
East. State Department officials consistently maintained that human rights
could not be the sole consideration in United States foreign policy and, for
the sake of national security, could not be uniformly applied everywhere. The
Administration’s over-arching policy goal in the region was peace, without
which Arab radicalisation, the resumption of war, oil embargos, surging oil
prices, global economic dislocation, the alienation of American allies, Soviet
re-entry into the region and the prospects of superpower conflict all seemed a
distinct possibility. Because the Palestinian problem was at the heart of the
Arab–Israeli conflict, Palestinian rights were a meaningful part of the equa-
tion. By invoking and incorporating a limited definition of those rights into
United States policy, the Administration hoped to create a window of oppor-
tunity in which Israeli flexibility, Egyptian willingness, and Arab moderation
would converge to produce a settlement conducive to American objectives.
Regional developments, however, led the Administration to alter its
strategic thinking. The United States and its allies, maintained Undersecre-
tary of Defense for Policy Robert Komer, became sensitised “to the vulnera-
bility of Persian Gulf oil-producing states by the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the chaos in Iran.” Even a partial cut-off of American access
to Persian Gulf oil was “widely recognized as meaning economic havoc to
the West.”90 Securing access to reasonably priced oil was one major motiva-
tion to a regional peace settlement, but following the Islamic Revolution,
Washington turned to its relationship with Saudi Arabia to achieve its
goals.91 Whereas the Administration had earlier maintained that “progress
toward achievement of a durable Middle East peace is seen as the primary
requirement for long-term security and political tranquility” and “the most
effective means we possess to protect our interests in the region,” by 1980
the Administration espoused a new regional security framework, with Saudi
Arabia at its centre.92 The Saudis had displaced the Palestinians as the strate-
gic lynchpin to United States regional interests.
In an effort to secure American interests while working toward the “just
and peaceful world” that Carter had outlined in his inaugural address, officials
614 V. V. Nemchenok
had initially tried to channel the president’s humanitarian impulse into their
Palestinian policy. They were unsuccessful. With so much on the line, the
“legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” could not but be defined in strate-
gic terms. Precisely for that reason, Washington backed away from them
whenever they proved a stumbling block to United States objectives.
Scholars have both praised Jimmy Carter for devoting substantial atten-
tion to the issue of Palestinian rights93 and criticised him for abandoning
them in the face of immense pressure.94 Whatever the merits of these con-
clusions, they cannot be made on the basis of the Administration’s record of
promoting human rights, for as defined by American officials, human rights
were inapplicable to the Palestinian issue. Although Carter decried “the very
serious problems on the West Bank” and the “continued deprivation of

Palestinian rights,” the collective and national rights of Palestinians claiming
the occupied territories as their own lay outside the purview of the individ-
ual human rights delineated by the State Department.95 Nor did they fit the
context: United States human rights policy sought to create pressure on the
USSR within international society by targeting dictatorships who shirked
certain moral duties toward their citizens. The Israeli occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza was a political problem and not a moral one to be resolved
through exhaustive negotiations and careful diplomacy.
Ultimately, to pursue Palestinian rights was to cultivate American inter-
ests, and so long as officials conceived of comprehensive, regional peace in
those terms, Palestinian rights had a meaningful role to play in United States
policy. In the absence of a coherent framework specifically tailored to
Palestinian rights, however, safeguarding them proved difficult. With the
demise of détente, policymakers re-defined American interests in military
terms. The Palestinians would have to wait.
NOTES
For their comments and suggestions in the preparation of this article, the author would like to
thank James Wilson, Barin Kayaoglu, and Stephen Macekura, and Melvyn Leffler for his feedback,
guidance, and support.
1. “Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter,” 20 January 1977, Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977 (Washington, DC, 1977), pp. 1–4. Italics appearing within direct
quotations have been added for emphasis.
2. For specific studies of Carter Administration human rights policy, see Donna R. Jackson, “The
Carter Administration and Somalia,” Diplomatic History, 31 (2007), pp. 703–21; Kenton Clymer, “Jimmy
Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia,” Diplomatic History, 27 (2003), pp. 245–78; Andrew J. Deroche,
“Standing Firm for Principles: Jimmy Carter and Zimbabwe,” Diplomatic History, 23 (1999), pp. 657–85;
Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the
Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ, 1994), pp. 239–65. The Administration’s human rights policy respect-
ing the Palestinian conflict, however, remains largely unexplored.
3. Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, United States
Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean: Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe
and the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations. 95th Cong., 1st Session, 27 March 1977
(Washington, DC, 1977), p. 10n3; United States House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States–European
Relations and the 1973 Middle East War: Hearings before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Near East and
South Asia. 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1 November 1973, 19 February 1974 (Washington, DC, 1974).
4. Installations and Objectives, p. 48.
5. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977–
1981 (New York, 1983), p. 83; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York, 1982), p.
278; Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War
(New York, 2007), p. 263.
6. Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy (Berkeley,
CA, 1999), pp. 165–66.
7. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 277.
8. Janice Terry, “The Carter Administration and the Palestinians,” in Michael W. Suleiman, ed.,
U.S. Policy on Palestine from Wilson to Clinton (Normal, IL, 1994), p. 165.
9. Within the robust literature on Carter Administration Middle East policy, few scholars have
given sustained attention to the substance and rhetoric of Palestinian rights in the formation of policy.
William Quandt’s Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967
(Washington, DC, 2001) analyses Carter’s attempt to balance peace between Egypt and Israel with a
solution to the Palestinian issue, but focuses more on the way domestic political factors and regional
events affected the conduct of foreign policy. In Perceptions of Palestine, Christison identifies a “frame of
reference” that limited Carter’s thinking and actions, as well as his understanding of the Palestinian
desire for nationhood. Donald Neff’s negative portrayal of Carter in Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy towards
Palestine and Israel since 1945 (Washington, DC, 1995) hinges on the president’s fear of the pro-Israel
lobby and a weak commitment to Palestinian rights. Terry, “Carter Administration” concludes that
despite their greater sympathy for the Palestinians and willingness to pursue a comprehensive settle-
ment, the Administration deeply misinterpreted the realities of intra-Arab politics and continued, in
altered form, Henry Kissinger’s step-by-step diplomacy.
10. For detailed examination of the development of Carter’s human rights policy, see David F.
Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development
of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 28(2004), pp. 113–44, especially 117–38.
11. Address by the Secretary of State (Vance) Before the University of Georgia Law School, April
30, 1977, in United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, American Foreign Policy: Basic
Documents, 1977–1980 (Washington, DC, 1983), p. 409.
12. Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (New York, 1988); Rashid Khalidi,
Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York, 1997), pp. 145–75.
13. Joshua Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights
Policy (New York, 1986), pp. 75–105. After noting that human rights officials like Patricia Derian,
Andrew Young, and Jessica Tuchman recognised the attraction of social and economic rights to the
Third World, Muravchik contends, somewhat polemically, that the Administration chose to conceptualise
these rights in the same way as the Third and Communist worlds so as to find “a common tongue in
which to communicate” with them. His argument that self-determination was not part of the lexicon of
“human rights” is, nonetheless, incisive.
14. American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, p. 410.
15. Ibid., pp. 407, 411; “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at the Clinton Town Meet-
ing,” 16 March 1977, Public Papers . . . Carter, 1977, pp. 386–87.
16. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 54–5.
17. In the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the Geneva conference was the forum agreed upon
to reach a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States and the Soviet Union were to serve as
co-chairmen. The participants gathered for a plenary session on 21 December 1973. Soon thereafter,
however, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger began his shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, and the con-
ference was not convened again during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. In their
search for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, Carter officials made the convening of a Geneva
conference a major policy objective.
18. Memorandum, Quandt to Brzeznski, “PRM-3—Middle East,” 3 February 1977, “Meetings-PRC 2:
2/4/77,” Folder, Box 24, Brzezinski Collection [Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection—Subject File, Jimmy
Carter Library (JCL)].
19. Summary of Conclusion, “Policy Review Committee Meeting,” 4 February 1977, ibid.
20. Brzezinski memorandum to Carter, “Summary Report to Conclusions on PRC Meeting on the
Middle East,” 4 February 1977, ibid.
616 V. V. Nemchenok
21. “News Conference by Secretary Vance and President Sadat, Cairo,” 17 February 1977,
Department of State Bulletin, 76 (14 March 1977), pp. 211–13.
22. “News Conference, Damascus,” 21 February 1977, ibid., p. 220.
23. “Statement Before the House Committee on International Relations,” 1 March 1977,
Department of State Bulletin, 76 (21 March 1977), p. 269.
24. “The President’s News Conference of March 9, 1977,” Public Papers . . . Carter, 1977, pp. 342–43.
25. “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at the Clinton Town Meeting,” 16 March 1977,
ibid., pp. 386–87; Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, p. 160.
26. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 91; Richard C. Thornton, The Carter Years: Toward a New
Global Order (New York, 1991), p. 143.
27. In Gallup polls conducted 18–21 February, 4–7 March, and 18–21 March, Carter’s approval rat-
ings registered at 71 percent, 70 percent, and 75 percent, respectively. See George H. Gallup, The Gallup
Poll: Public Opinion, 1972–1977 (Wilmington, DE, 1978), pp. 994, 1023, 1036.
28. Paper, “Discussion Paper for the PRC Meeting on Middle East—April 19, 1977,” Undated,
“Meetings—PRC 13: 4/19/77” Folder, Box 24, Brzezinski Collection Subject File.
29. Summary of Conclusions, Policy Review Committee Meeting, “Middle East,” 19 April 1977,
“Meetings—PRC 13: 4/19/77” Folder, ibid.
30. Summary of Conclusions, Policy Review Committee Meeting, “Middle East,” 10 June 1977,
“Meetings—PRC 17: 6/10/77”, Folder, ibid.
31. “Discussion Paper for the PRC Meeting on Middle East—June 22, 1977,” Undated. “Meetings—
PRC 18: 6/25/77” Folder, ibid.
32. “Clinton Town Meeting,” 16 March 1977, Public Papers . . . Carter, 1977, pp. 386–87.
33. Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, pp. 170–72.
34. Address by the Vice-President (Mondale) Before the World Affairs Council of Northern California,
San Francisco, 17 June 1977, American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, p. 616.
35. Ibid., p. 614.
36. Gallup, Gallup Poll . . . 1972–1977, p. 1171.
37. “Discussion Paper for the PRC Meeting on Middle East—June 22, 1977,” Undated, “Meetings—
PRC 18: 6/25/77” Folder, Box 24, Brzezinski Collection Subject File.
38. Brzezinski memorandum Carter, “Summary Report to Conclusions on PRC Meeting on the
Middle East,” 4 February 1977, “Meetings—PRC 2: 2/4/77” Folder, ibid.
39. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 87.
40. “Discussion Paper for the PRC Meeting on Middle East—June 22, 1977,” Undated. “Meetings—
PRC 18: 6/25/77” Folder, Box 24, Brzezinski Collection Subject File.
41. “Joint U.S.-Soviet Statement,” 1 October 1977, Department of State Bulletin, 77(7 November
1977), pp. 639–40.
42. Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from
Truman to Reagan (Chicago, IL, 1985), p. 338.
43. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 106, 108.
44. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 188.
45. “Joint U.S.-Soviet Statement,” 1 October 1977, Department of State Bulletin, 77(7 November
1977), p. 639.
48. Ibid., 293; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 108.
49. Gallup, Gallup Poll . . . 1972–1977, p. 1225.
50. United States House Committee on International Relations, Israeli Settlements in the Occupied
Territories: Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and on Europe and the
Middle East. 95th Congress, 1st Session, 19 October 1977 (Washington, DC, 1978), p. 162.
51. Ibid., pp. 139, 154–5.
52. Ibid., p. 155.
53. Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, The Search for
Peace in the Middle East: Documents and Statements, 1967–79. Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on
Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (Washington, DC, 1979), pp. 223, 225, 227.
54. “The President’s News Conference of November 30, 1977,” Public Papers . . . Carter, 1977,
p. 2054.
55. Quoted in Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 316.

58. “Middle East Peace Process: A Status Report,” Current Policy, No. 17, pp. 2, 4.
59. Lincoln Bloomfield paper, “The Carter Human Rights Policy: A Provisional Appraisal,” 11
January 1981, “NSC Accomplishments—Human Rights” Folder, Box 34, Brzezinski Collection Subject File.
60. When Atherton appeared before the Sub-committees on International Organizations and on
Europe and the Middle East on 19 October 1977, his main contention was that Israeli settlements were
“inconsistent” with international law, which stemmed from an interpretation of the Fourth Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War that differed from Washington’s.
Israel considered the Fourth Geneva Convention inapplicable to Israel’s military occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza, which it had acquired following the 1967 war, because there was never a legitimate sov-
ereign in those areas in 1948, when the Convention was adopted. Atherton noted that Washington
disagreed with this reading, but he accepted the implication that the parameters of the whole question
were political and legal, not moral. See Israeli Settlements, pp. 93–5, 139.
61. Warren Christopher, “PRM on Human Rights.” Jimmy Carter Library and Museum (20 May
1977): www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/prmemorandums/prm28.pdf (13 April 2008). Christopher

observed that, while there was uncertainty about the inclusion of economic, civil, and political rights in
United States foreign policy, “no one question[ed] that the first group [on governmental violations of the
integrity of the person] ought to be included.” The only choice Christopher identified was between
giving priority to this first set of rights or giving equal weight to the others as well. This lent de facto
primacy to the prevention of arbitrary government action.
63. Department of States, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Report Submitted to the
Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate (Washington, DC, 1978), p. 365.
64. Ibid., p. 366.
65. Congressional Research Service. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. Human Rights
Conditions in Selected Countries and the U.S. Response: Prepared for the Subcommittee on International
Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington,
DC, 1978), p. 150.
66. Leet to Brzezinski, 20 December 1977, “CO 120: 1/20/77-1/20/81” Folder, Box 13, Brzezinski
Collection Geographic Files.
67. Stone to Carter, 20 December 1977, “CO 1-7, 1/20-77—12/31/78” Folder, Box CO-6, WHCF –
Subject File [JCL].
68. Sanders and Lewis memorandum to Carter, 11 January 1978; Brzezinski memorandum to
Carter, 16 February 1978, both ibid.
69. Assousa to Carter, 3 March 1978, “CO 120: 1/20/77–1/20/81” Folder, Box 13, Brzezinski Collection—
Geographic File.
70. Eck and Sick memorandum to Brzezinski, 7 February 1978, “CO 1-7, 1/20/77–12/31/78”
Folder, Box CO-6, WHCF – Subject File.
71. Brzezinski memorandum to Carter, 16 February 1978, ibid.
72. George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1978 (Wilmington, DE, 1979), p. 212.
73. George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1979 (Wilmington, DE, 1980), pp. 69, 74.
74. “Peace in the Middle East: Achievement and Future Challenge,” United States Department of
State, Current Policy, No. 63 (April 1979), p. 2.
75. Address by Secretary of State (Vance), American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, p. 409.
76. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1948–1998”: http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.
77. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm. Articles 59–62 of
Part III of the Convention address the topic of consignments.
78. Country Reports on Human Rights, p. 368.
79. Carter meeting with Begin, 16 December 1977, “Middle East—Negotiations: 10/77–12/77”
Folder, Box 13, Brzezinski Collection Geographic File. Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in
America’s Foreign Policy (New York, 1983), p. 199; Quandt, Peace Process, p. 193.
80. Brzezinski memorandum to Carter, “Strategy for Camp David,” Undated, “Middle East—
Negotiations: 1/78–7/28/78” Folder, Box 13, Brzezinski Collection Geographic File.
618 V. V. Nemchenok
81. Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 348, 335, 376–77. Spiegel, Other Arab–Israeli Conflict, p. 357
suggests that Carter and Vance actually understood themselves to be working toward a Palestinian state.
Carter, however, separated self-government from statehood and national rights. See Carter, Keeping
Faith, pp. 290–91; Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, p. 161.
82. “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed At Camp David,” 17 September 1978,
Public Papers . . . Carter, 1978 (Washington, DC, 1979), pp. 1523–526.
84. William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, DC, 1986), pp. 289,
315; Quandt, Peace Process, p. 209; Spiegel, Other Arab–Israeli Conflict, p. 361.
85. “Address Before the People’s Assembly,” Cairo, 10 March 1979, Public Papers . . . Jimmy
Carter, 1979 (Washington, DC, 1980), p. 414.
86. Presidential Review Committee Meeting, “West Bank/Gaza Negotiations,” 17 May 1979,
“Meetings—PRC 107: 5/17/79” Folder, Box 25, Brzezinski Collection Subject File.
87. Summary of Conclusions, President Review Committee Meeting, “West Bank/Gaza Negotia-
tions,” 17 May 1979, ibid.
88. Gallup, Gallup Poll . . . 1979, p. 185; Quandt, Peace Process, pp. 238–39; Gaddis Smith, Moral-
ity, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York, 1986), p. 9.
89. Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, p. 189.
90. Komer, “Oil and Western Security,” Undated, “Meetings—Vance/Brown/Brzezinski: 3/80–9/80”
Folder, Box 34, Brzezinski Collection Subject File.
91. Ermath memorandum to Brzezinski, 4/16/80, ibid; Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power,
pp. 9–10, 178.
92. United States House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Review of Recent Developments in the
Middle East, 1979: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs. 96th Congress, 1st Session, 26 July 1979 (Washington, DC, 1979).
93. Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, pp. 157, 180.
94. Neff, Fallen Pillars, p. 118.

"These People Have An Irrevocable Right To Self-Government": United States Policy and The Palestinian Question, 1977-1979

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“These People Have an Irrevocable Right to

Self-Government”: United States Policy and

Upon entering office, Carter Administration officials placed a

humanitarian concern; it was a strategic security interest. United States

rights” in Southern Rhodesia or “civil and political” rights in Namibia, two

was consensus on the urgency of an American initiative. Enno Knoche, the

on the potential outcomes of negotiations, the Palestinian issue received

secretary would not go beyond the lacklustre formulation of a “resolution of

review meeting on 19 April, reconvening a Geneva conference remained a

if the Palestinians are willing to exist in peace and are prepared to

Where Israeli security was concerned, however, Mondale ratcheted up the

rather a “moral imperative” of United States foreign policy.35 Aware that

“should be kept informed of the progress of our conversations with the

Palestinian refugees, but steered clear of mentioning either “the Palestinian

the entitlement of “rights.” “Legitimate political aspirations” could be

Historically we have spoken of the legitimate interest of the Palestinians

the principle of self-determination “as a principle,” but absent consensus

interests lay clearly in regional peace; Palestinian “rights” like self-determi-

of Washington’s role in “efforts to end a conflict which has taken countless

the sanctity of Israeli security, to which Carter’s personal commitment was

ment: the use of excessive force was usually performed by “inexperienced

due partially to a lack of local support. Many of the proposals were

murky. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on which

the distribution of already-provided consignments, not their production and

would withdraw, leaving armed forces in specified locations to assure

treaty in March 1979, Administration thinking about human and Palestinian

serious problems on the West Bank” and the “continued deprivation of

56. Quandt, Peace Process, p. 197.

1977): www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/prmemorandums/prm28.pdf (13 April 2008). Christopher

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