Pleading Basics For Plaintiffs

Pleading From A Plaintiff’s View
Mark Rouleau ©
Pleading Basics from a Plaintiff’s Perspective .................................................................. 3
Know the Law ................................................................................................................ 3
Basic Form 735 ILCS 5/2-603 ....................................................................................... 3
Prayer for relief. 735 ILCS 5/2-604 ............................................................................... 3
Punitive Damages 735 ILCS 5/2-604.1 ......................................................................... 3
Verification of pleadings 735 ILCS 5/2-605 ................................................................... 3
Exhibits 735 ILCS 5/2-606 ............................................................................................. 4
Bills of particulars 735 ILCS 5/2-607 ............................................................................. 4
Counterclaims 735 ILCS 5/2-608................................................................................... 4
Pleadings to be specific 735 ILCS 5/2-610 .................................................................... 4
Insufficient pleadings 735 ILCS 5/2-612 ........................................................................ 5
Separate counts and defenses 735 ILCS 5/2-613 ......................................................... 5
Joinder of causes of action and use of counterclaims 735 ILCS 5/2-614 ...................... 5
Motions with respect to pleadings 735 ILCS 5/2-615 .................................................... 5
Amendments 735 ILCS 5/2-616 .................................................................................... 6
Seeking wrong remedy not fatal 735 ILCS 5/2-617. ...................................................... 7
Involuntary dismissal based upon certain defects or defenses 735 ILCS 5/2-619 ........ 7
Combined motions 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1......................................................................... 8
Product liability actions 735 ILCS 5/2-621 ..................................................................... 8
Healing art malpractice 735 ILCS 5/2-622 ..................................................................... 8
DRAFTING YOUR COMPLAINT .................................................................................... 10
Contract Basics: (Burrell v. City of Mattoon, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2004, 378 F.3d 642).............. 10
Tort Basics................................................................................................................... 11
Fact Pleading versus Notice Pleading ......................................................................... 11
What Does Fact Pleading Mean? ................................................................................ 12
Conclusions of Law...................................................................................................... 12
Examples of Conclusions of Law................................................................................. 12
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 15
FORMS ........................................................................................................................... 16
Summons..................................................................................................................... 17
Premises Complaint..................................................................................................... 18
Complaint Auto Intersectional Collision ....................................................................... 24
Rear End Chain Collision With Consortium Claim ....................................................... 31
Products Liability – Loss of Consortium....................................................................... 43
Wrongful Death – Watercraft Collision......................................................................... 69
Easement Dispute ....................................................................................................... 77
Verified Complaint – Quite Title ................................................................................... 96
Medical Malpractice – Medical Student – Perforated Uterus – Affidavit of Merit ....... 105
Affidavit of Merit ......................................................................................................... 112
Forcible Entry & Detainer – Breech of Contract......................................................... 114
Promissory Estoppel & Detrimental Reliance ............................................................ 118
Pleading Basics from a Plaintiff’s Perspective
Know the Law
You need to be conversant with sections Article II Part 6 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure
735 ILCS 5/2-101 through 5/2-622.
Basic Form 735 ILCS 5/2-603
1. All pleadings shall contain a plain and concise statement of the pleader's cause of
action, counterclaim, defense, or reply;
2. Each separate cause of action shall be stated in a separate count or counterclaim,
3. Each count, counterclaim, defense or reply, shall be separately pleaded, designated

and numbered, and each shall be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, each
paragraph containing, as nearly as may be, a separate allegation.
Prayer for relief. 735 ILCS 5/2-604
1. Every count in every complaint and counterclaim shall contain specific prayers for the
relief
2. No dollar amount may be pleaded except to the minimum extent necessary to comply
with the circuit rules of assignment where the claim is filed.
3. Relief may be requested in the alternative.
4. Except in case of default, the prayer for relief does not limit the relief obtainable.
Punitive Damages 735 ILCS 5/2-604.1
1. No complaint shall be filed containing a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages in
actions on account of bodily injury or physical damage to property, based on
negligence, or product liability unless the court after hearing on a motion allows such
pleading.
2. Any such motion shall be made not later than 30 days after the close of discovery.
Verification of pleadings 735 ILCS 5/2-605
1. Any pleading may be verified by the oath of the party filing it or of any other person or
persons having knowledge of the facts pleaded.
2. If any pleading is so verified, every subsequent pleading must also be verified, unless
the court excuses verification.
3. In pleadings which are so verified, the several matters stated shall be stated positively or
upon information and belief only, according to the fact.
4. Verified allegations do not constitute evidence except by way of admission.

5. The allegation of the execution or assignment of any written instrument is admitted
unless denied in a pleading verified by oath, except in cases in which verification is
excused by the court. (Note: this happens even in cases where the complaint is not
verified. It is extremely important to review the cases in this area if you plan to question a
written document upon which a claim or defense is founded.)
Exhibits 735 ILCS 5/2-606
1. If a claim or defense is founded upon a written instrument a copy must be attached

to the pleading as an exhibit (or recited therein) unless the pleader attaches to his or her
pleading an affidavit stating facts showing that the instrument is not accessible to him or
her.
2. In pleading any written instrument a copy thereof may be attached to the pleading as an
exhibit.
3. In either case the exhibit constitutes a part of the pleading for all purposes.
Bills of particulars 735 ILCS 5/2-607
If allegations are so wanting in details that the responding party should be entitled to a bill of
particulars, file and serve a notice demanding it. The notice shall point out specifically the defects
complained of or the details desired. The pleader shall have 28 days to file and serve the bill of
particulars, and the party who requested the bill shall have 28 days to plead after being served
with the bill.
Counterclaims 735 ILCS 5/2-608
1. Any claim by one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs, or against one or
more codefendants (cross-claim), of any nature or type pleaded shall be called a
counterclaim.
2. The counterclaim shall be a part of the answer, and shall be designated as a

counterclaim.
3. They shall be pleaded in the same manner and with the same particularity as a
complaint, and shall be complete in itself.
4. An answer to a counterclaim and pleadings subsequent thereto shall be filed as in the

case of a complaint and with like designation and effect.
Pleadings to be specific 735 ILCS 5/2-610
1. Every answer and subsequent pleading shall contain an explicit admission or denial of
each allegation of the pleading to which it relates.
2. Every allegation, except allegations of damages, not explicitly denied is admitted,

unless the party states in his or her pleading that he or she has no knowledge thereof
sufficient to form a belief, and attaches an affidavit of the truth of the statement of
want of knowledge, or unless the party has had no opportunity to deny.
3. Denials must not be evasive, but must fairly answer the substance of the allegation
denied.
4. If a party wishes to raise an issue as to the amount of damages only, he or she may do
so by stating in his or her pleading that he or she desires to contest only the amount of
the damages.
Insufficient pleadings 735 ILCS 5/2-612
1. If any pleading is insufficient in substance or form the court may order a fuller or more
particular statement. If the pleadings do not sufficiently define the issues the court may
order other pleadings prepared.
2. No pleading is bad in substance which contains such information as reasonably informs

the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he or she is called upon to
meet.
3. All defects in pleadings, either in form or substance, not objected to in the trial court are
waived.
Separate counts and defenses 735 ILCS 5/2-613
1. Parties may plead as many causes of action, counterclaims, defenses, and matters in
reply as they may have, and each shall be separately designated and numbered.
2. Pleading in the alternative is permitted without prejudice.
3. The facts constituting any affirmative defense which seeks to avoid the legal effect of or
defeat, in whole or in part, the cause of action set forth in the opposing pleading, and any
ground or defense, whether affirmative or not, which, if not expressly stated in the
pleading, would be likely to take the opposite party by surprise, must be plainly set
forth in the answer or reply.
Joinder of causes of action and use of counterclaims 735 ILCS 5/2-614
Illinois recognizes permissive joinder of causes of action.
Motions with respect to pleadings 735 ILCS 5/2-615
1. All objections to pleadings shall be raised by motion.
a. The motion shall point out specifically the defects complained of, and shall ask
for appropriate relief, such as: that a pleading or portion thereof be stricken
because substantially insufficient in law, or that the action be dismissed, or that a
pleading be made more definite and certain in a specified particular, or that
designated immaterial matter be stricken out, or that necessary parties be added,
or that designated misjoined parties be dismissed, and so forth.
2. If a pleading or a division thereof is objected to by a motion to dismiss or for judgment or

to strike out the pleading, because it is substantially insufficient in law, the motion must
specify wherein the pleading or division thereof is insufficient.
3. Upon motions based upon defects in pleadings, substantial defects in prior pleadings
may be considered.
4. After rulings on motions, the court may enter appropriate orders either to permit or
require pleading over or amending or to terminate the litigation in whole or in part.
5. Any party may seasonably move for judgment on the pleadings.
Amendments 735 ILCS 5/2-616
1. At any time before final judgment amendments may be allowed on just and reasonable
terms, introducing any party who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant,
dismissing any party, changing the cause of action or defense or adding new causes of
action or defenses, and in any matter, either of form or substance, in any process,
pleading, bill of particulars or proceedings, which may enable the plaintiff to sustain the
claim for which it was intended to be brought or the defendant to make a defense or
assert a cross claim.
2. Relation Back: The amended pleading relates back to the original filing and is not time
barred
a. if the time prescribed or limited had not expired when the original pleading
was filed, and
b. if it shall appear from the original and amended pleadings that the cause of
action asserted, or the defense or cross claim interposed in the amended
pleading grew out of the same transaction or occurrence set up in the original
pleading, even though the original pleading was defective in that it failed to allege
the performance of some act or the existence of some fact or some other matter
which is a necessary condition precedent to the right of recovery or defense
asserted, if the condition precedent has in fact been performed, and for the
purpose of preserving the cause of action, cross claim or defense set up in the
amended pleading, and for that purpose only, an amendment to any pleading
shall be held to relate back to the date of the filing of the original pleading so
amended.
3. A pleading may be amended at any time, before or after judgment, to conform the
pleadings to the proofs, upon terms as to costs and continuance that may be just.
4. Misnomer: A cause of action against a person not originally named a defendant is not
barred by lapse of time under any statute or contract prescribing or limiting the time within
which an action may be brought or right asserted, if all the following terms and conditions
are met:
a. the time prescribed or limited had not expired when the original action was
commenced;
b. the person, within the time that the action might have been brought or the
right asserted against him or her plus the time for service permitted under
Supreme Court Rule 103(b), received such notice of the commencement of the
action that the person will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the
merits and knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the
identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him or
her; and
c. it appears from the original and amended pleadings that the cause of action
asserted in the amended pleading grew out of the same transaction or
occurrence set up in the original pleading, even though the original pleading was
defective in that it failed to allege the performance of some act or the existence of
some fact or some other matter which is a necessary condition precedent to the
right of recovery when the condition precedent has in fact been performed, and
even though the person was not named originally as a defendant. For the
purpose of preserving the cause of action under those conditions, an
amendment adding the person as a defendant relates back to the date of
the filing of the original pleading so amended.
5. Land Trust Relation Back: A cause of action against a beneficiary of a land trust not
originally named a defendant is not barred by lapse of time under any statute or contract
prescribing or limiting the time within which an action may be brought or right asserted, if
all the following terms and conditions are met:
a. the cause of action arises from the ownership, use or possession of real estate,
record title whereto is held by a land trustee;
b. the time prescribed or limited had not expired when the original action was
commenced;
c. the land trustee of record is named as a defendant; and
d. the plaintiff proceeds with reasonable diligence subsequent to the

commencement of the action to serve process upon the land trustee, to
determine the identity of the beneficiary, and to amend the complaint to name the
beneficiary as a defendant.
Seeking wrong remedy not fatal 735 ILCS 5/2-617.
In Illinois if you ask for the wrong form of relief in your complaint you will be allowed to
amend your pleading to seek the appropriate relief.
Involuntary dismissal based upon certain defects or defenses 735 ILCS 5/2-619
1. Defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion for dismissal of the action or for
other appropriate relief upon any of the following grounds. If the grounds do not appear
on the face of the pleading attacked the motion shall be supported by affidavit:
§2-619(a)
(1) That the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action,
provided the defect cannot be removed by a transfer of the case to a court
having jurisdiction.
(2) That the plaintiff does not have legal capacity to sue or that the defendant
does not have legal capacity to be sued.
(3) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause.
(4) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment.
(5) That the action was not commenced within the time limited by law. (Statute
Of Limitations)
(6) That the claim set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been released, satisfied
of record, or discharged in bankruptcy.
(7) That the claim asserted is unenforceable under the provisions of the Statute
of Frauds.
(8) That the claim asserted against defendant is unenforceable because of his
or her minority or other disability.
(9) That the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative
matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.
2. If, upon the hearing of the motion, the opposite party presents affidavits or other proof
denying the facts alleged or establishing facts obviating the grounds of defect, the court
may
a. hear and determine the same and may grant or deny the motion. If a material
and genuine disputed question of fact is raised the court may decide the
motion upon the affidavits and evidence offered by the parties, or
b. may deny the motion without prejudice to the right to raise the subject matter of
the motion by answer and shall so deny it if the action is one in which a party
is entitled to a trial by jury and a jury demand has been filed by the opposite
party in apt time.
3. The raising of any of the foregoing matters by motion under this Section does not
preclude the raising of them subsequently by answer unless the court has disposed of
the motion on its merits; and a failure to raise any of them by motion does not preclude
raising them by answer.
4. Pleading over after denial by the court of a motion under this Section is not a waiver of
any error in the decision denying the motion.
Combined motions 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1
Motions with respect to pleadings under Section 2-615, motions for involuntary dismissal or other
relief under Section 2-619, and motions for summary judgment under Section 2-1005 may be filed
together as a single motion in any combination. A combined motion, however, shall be in parts.
Each part shall be limited to and shall specify that it is made under one of Sections 2-615, 2-619,
or 2-1005. Each part shall also clearly show the points or grounds relied upon under the Section
upon which it is based.
Product liability actions 735 ILCS 5/2-621
Defendants other than the manufacturer may file an affidavit certifying the correct identity of the
manufacturer of the product where they were merely distributors of the product and the court can
dismiss them from the case. The section also provides for reinstatement against the distributor if
any one (1) of a number of problems arises in asserting the cause of action against the certified
manufacturer.
Healing art malpractice 735 ILCS 5/2-622
Sets forth a detailed requirement that before filing suit plaintiff’s obtain a separate written opinion
of an appropriate medical expert stating that the plaintiff has a meritorious cause of action against
each defendant named in the complaint. The attorney is required to file an affidavit stating that:
1. That the affiant has consulted and reviewed the facts of the case with a health
professional who the affiant reasonably believes:
a. is knowledgeable in the relevant issues involved in the particular action;
b. practices or has practiced within the last 5 years or teaches or has taught within
the last 5 years in the same area of health care or medicine that is at issue in the
particular action; and
c. meets the expert witness standards set forth in paragraphs (a) through (d) of
Section 8-2501;
d. that the reviewing health professional has determined in a written report, after a
review of the medical record and other relevant material involved in the particular
action that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of such
action; and
e. that the affiant has concluded on the basis of the reviewing health professional's
review and consultation that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for filing
of such action.
2. A single written report must be filed to cover each defendant in the action.
3. As to defendants who are individuals, the written report must be from a health
professional licensed in the same profession, with the same class of license, as the
defendant.
4. For written reports filed as to all other defendants, who are not individuals, the written
report must be from a physician licensed to practice medicine in all its branches who is
qualified by experience with the standard of care, methods, procedures and treatments
relevant to the allegations at issue in the case.
5. In either event, the written report must identify the profession of the reviewing health
professional.
6. A copy of the written report, clearly identifying the plaintiff and the reasons for the
reviewing health professional's determination that a reasonable and meritorious cause for
the filing of the action exists, including the reviewing health care professional's name,
address, current license number, and state of licensure, must be attached to the
affidavit. (Note: extensive litigation on the conflict of powers wherein the legislature
seeks to require plaintiff’s to disclose consulting experts where the courts do not see
Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(3))
7. Information regarding the preparation of a written report by the reviewing health

professional shall not be used to discriminate against that professional in the issuance of
medical liability insurance or in the setting of that professional's medical liability insurance
premium.
8. Filing Report is excused where
a. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: That the affiant was unable to obtain the required
consultation before the expiration of the statute of limitations. The affidavit and
written report required above shall be filed within 90 days after the filing of the
complaint. No additional 90-day extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall
be granted, except where there has been a withdrawal of the plaintiff's counsel.
The defendant shall be excused from answering or otherwise pleading until 30
days after being served with an affidavit and a report required by paragraph 1.
b. Medical Records Not Provided: that a request has been made by the plaintiff or
his attorney for examination and copying of records pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/8-
2001 and the party required to comply under those Sections has failed to
produce such records within 60 days of the receipt of the request. If an affidavit
is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the affidavit and written report required
by paragraph 1 shall be filed within 90 days following receipt of the
requested records. All defendants except those whose failure to comply with
735 ILCS 5/8-2001 is the basis for an affidavit under this paragraph shall be
excused from answering or otherwise pleading until 30 days after being served
with the affidavit and report required by paragraph 1.
9. Separate Report for Each Defendant: Where an affidavit and written report are required
pursuant to this Section a separate affidavit and written report shall be filed as to each
defendant who has been named in the complaint and shall be filed as to each defendant
named at a later time.
10. Res Ipsa Loquiter: Where the plaintiff intends to rely on the doctrine of "res ipsa
loquitur", as defined by Section 2-1113 of this Code, the affidavit and written report must
state that, in the opinion of the reviewing health professional, negligence has occurred in
the course of medical treatment. The affiant shall certify upon filing of the complaint that
he is relying on the doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur".
11. Informed Consent: When the attorney intends to rely on the doctrine of failure to inform
of the consequences of the procedure, the attorney shall certify upon the filing of the
complaint that the reviewing health professional has, after reviewing the medical record
and other relevant materials involved in the particular action, concluded that a reasonable
health professional would have informed the patient of the consequences of the
procedure.
12. Failure to File Affidavit and Report are Grounds for Dismissal: The failure of the
plaintiff to file an affidavit and report in compliance with this Section shall be grounds for
dismissal under Section 2-619.
DRAFTING YOUR COMPLAINT

You need to know the substantive issues presented in the area of law pertaining to your pleading.
This usually begins with knowledge of the elements of the claim. This requires researching the
case law and the jury instructions on the applicable theories of liability and recovery.
Contract Basics: (Burrell v. City of Mattoon, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2004, 378 F.3d 642)
1. Existence of a Contract
a. Offer
i. Terms (Village of South Elgin v. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., App.
2 Dist. 2004, 284 Ill.Dec. 868, 348 Ill.App.3d 929, 810 N.E.2d 658;
Romanek v. Connelly, (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2001) 753 N.E.2d 1062, 324
Ill.App.3d 393; Brown and Kerr, Inc. v. American Stores Properties,
Inc., 306 Ill.App.3d 1023, 1030, 240 Ill.Dec. 117, 715 N.E.2d 804, 810
(1999); Barille v. Sears Roebuck and Company, 289 Ill.App.3d 171,
175, 224 Ill.Dec. 557, 682 N.E.2d 118, 121 (1997)
1. Quantity
2. Price
3. Time
4. etc.
b. Acceptance
c. Consideration
2. Plaintiff’s performance under the contract
3. Defendants' breach
4. Damages
Tort Basics
1. Duty
a. Due Care etc.
b. Statutory
c. Standard of Care
2. Breach
3. Causation proximate and direct
4. Damages
Fact Pleading versus Notice Pleading
Illinois is a fact pleading state unlike many jurisdictions including the federal courts. Knox
College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill.2d 407, 426-27, 58 Ill.Dec. 725, 430 N.E.2d 976 (1981); Richco
Plastic Co. v. IMS Co., App. 1 Dist.1997, 224 Ill.Dec. 74, 288 Ill.App.3d 782, 681 N.E.2d 56;
Lempa v. Finkel, App. 2 Dist.1996, 215 Ill.Dec. 408, 278 Ill.App.3d 417, 663 N.E.2d 158.
Frequently pleaders will assert that because pleadings are to be liberally construed (735 ILCS
5/2-603(c), 2-612(b) ) Illinois is a notice pleading state. This is incorrect and has been rejected by
our courts numerous times, See Richco Plastic Co. v. IMS Co., App. 1 Dist.1997, 224 Ill.Dec.
74, 288 Ill.App.3d 782, 681 N.E.2d 56 citing to Knox, 88 Ill.2d at 423-27, 58 Ill.Dec. 725, 430
N.E.2d 976.
The rule applies to all pleadings including affirmative defenses:
“In order to set forth a good and sufficient claim or defense, a pleading must allege
ultimate facts sufficient to satisfy each element of the cause of action or affirmative
defense pled. As to the pleading of affirmative defenses, section 2-613(d) of the Code
specifically provides that "[t]he facts constituting any affirmative defense * * * must be
plainly set forth in the [defendant's] answer". (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-613(d)
(West 1994). In determining the sufficiency of any claim or defense, the [288 Ill.App.3d
785] court will disregard any conclusions of fact or law that are not supported by
allegations of specific fact. Knox, 88 Ill.2d at 426, 58 Ill.Dec. 725, 430 N.E.2d 976;
Curtis v. Birch, 114 Ill.App.3d 127, 69 Ill.Dec. 873, 448 N.E.2d 591 (1983)” Richco
Plastic Co. v. IMS Co., App. 1 Dist.1997, 224 Ill.Dec. 74, 288 Ill.App.3d 782, 681 N.E.2d
56.
Pleadings are strictly construed against pleader and conclusions of law should not be contained
in a pleading. People v. Northbrook Sports Club, App. 1 Dist. 1977, 11 Ill.Dec. 112, 53
Ill.App.3d 331, 368 N.E.2d 663. Complaint may not rest upon conclusions of fact unsupported by
allegations of specific facts from which such conclusions may be drawn. Plocher v. City of
Highland, 1978, 16 Ill.Dec. 909, 59 Ill.App.3d 697, 375 N.E.2d 1016; Henkhaus v. Barton,
1977, 14 Ill.Dec. 113, 56 Ill.App.3d 767, 371 N.E.2d 1166.
What Does Fact Pleading Mean?
It does not mean that you need to lay out each and every “evidentiary fact” that you intend to
prove at trial in your pleading. It merely means that you must plead “ultimate facts” that support
your client’s right to the relief sought.
“[A] complaint must only contain "a plain and concise statement" of the plaintiff's cause of
action. 735 ILCS 5/2-603 (West 1994). It is unnecessary for a complaint to set forth the
evidence that the plaintiff intends to introduce at trial.” Rodgers v. Whitley, App. 1
Dist.1996, 218 Ill.Dec. 191, 282 Ill.App.3d 741, 668 N.E.2d 1023, appeal denied 219
Ill.Dec. 576, 168 Ill.2d 624, 671 N.E.2d 743.
Some courts have held it improper to plead evidence in complaint. Savka v. Smith, App. 3
Dist.1978, 15 Ill.Dec. 579, 58 Ill.App.3d 12, 373 N.E.2d 1051; O'Brien v. Matual, App.1957, 14
Ill.App.2d 173, 144 N.E.2d 446. Therefore it is not necessary for a plaintiff in a premises liability
action to plead the specific evidentiary details but may plead the ultimate fact that the defendant
failed “to maintain stairway in reasonably safe condition” Gula v. Gawel, App.1966, 71 Ill.App.2d
174, 218 N.E.2d 42.
Evidentiary facts are those facts which tend to prove the ultimate facts. ( Levinson v. Home Bank
& Trust Co., 337 Ill. 241, 244, 169 N.E. 193 (1929).)
“'There is no clear distinction between statements of 'evidentiary facts,' 'ultimate facts,'

and 'conclusions of law.' There is no provision in the Civil Practice Act defining a
conclusion, and a precise definition as to what constitutes conclusions of law is
impossible.' Nichols, Illinois Civil Practice, Revised Edition (1961), Vol. 2, s 777, p. 27.”
Herman v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., App.1968, 92 Ill.App.2d 222, 235 N.E.2d 346,
affirmed in part, reversed in part 41 Ill.2d 468, 244 N.E.2d 809. See John Burns Const.
Co. v. City of Chicago, (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1992) 601 N.E.2d 1024, 234 Ill.App.3d 1027 at
1029.
Conclusions of Law
A conclusion of law is a mere paraphrase of the law which does not contain facts which lead to
that conclusion Tru-Link Fence Co., Inc. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., App. 1 Dist.1982, 60
Ill.Dec. 289, 104 Ill.App.3d 745, 432 N.E.2d 1188. It is improper to plead “conclusions of law”
and the court will disregard any “conclusion of law” when considering the sufficiency of a
pleading. Richco Plastic Co. v. IMS Co., App. 1 Dist.1997, 224 Ill.Dec. 74, 288 Ill.App.3d 782,
681 N.E.2d 56; Harris v. Johnson, App. 2 Dist.1991, 161 Ill.Dec. 680, 218 Ill.App.3d 588, 578
N.E.2d 1326.
As stated above the distinction between “conclusions of law” and “ultimate facts” is a fine line.
Wait v. First Midwest Bank/Danville, (Ill.App. 4 Dist. 1986) 491 N.E.2d 795 at 800, 142 Ill.App.3d
703; Van Dekerkhov v. City of Herrin (1972), 51 Ill.2d 374, 376, 282 N.E.2d 723; Tru-Link
Fence Co., Inc. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1982) 432 N.E.2d 1188, 104
Ill.App.3d 745. There is some clear guidance to allegations which constitute improper
conclusions of law.
Examples of Conclusions of Law
In a case alleging improper influence on plaintiff's mother in having plaintiff committed to a

hospital for the insane, a motion to dismiss in nature of a special demurrer on ground that both
counts in amended declaration related to a purported influence and failed to show a conspiracy
and that allegations of influence were conclusions of pleader and insufficient to connect
defendant with insanity proceeding, met requirements of the Practice Act. Krug v.
Schwarzentraub, App. 3 Dist.1939, 19 N.E.2d 214, 298 Ill.App. 630.
Negligent Performance: Trial court did not err in dismissing count of property owners' complaint
against appraiser for failure to state cause of action, in that only negligence charged against
appraiser was that he conducted his inspection in a negligent manner and improperly rendered
his opinion, which was a mere conclusion of the pleader. Buzzard v. Bolger, App. 2 Dist.1983,
73 Ill.Dec. 140, 117 Ill.App.3d 887, 453 N.E.2d 1129.
Fraud Conspiracy or Collusion: The complaint must show facts on which allegation is based,
not mere conclusions of pleader. In re Hansen's Estate, App.1969, 109 Ill.App.2d 283, 248
N.E.2d 709.
Fire Hazard: An allegation that inflammable and combustible materials created a fire hazard"
was conclusion of pleader, absent a factual allegation as to why or how they created a fire
hazard. Netherton v. Arends, App.1967, 81 Ill.App.2d 391, 225 N.E.2d 143.
Investment or Business Damage: Minority stockholders assertion that both they and
corporation were seriously and irreparably damaged by the corporation directors in failing to
install lights for night games at Wrigley Field was mere conclusion of law and not averment of
fact. Shlensky v. Wrigley, App.1968, 95 Ill.App.2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776.
Willful & Wanton or Negligent: when properly employed in context with allegations setting forth
factual circumstances which such words characterize are not mere legal conclusions which are to
be disregarded in determining sufficiency of pleading. Church v. Adler, App.1953, 113 N.E.2d
327, 350 Ill.App. 471. The mere characterization of acts or conduct, without any supporting
facts, are improper conclusions of pleader. Atwood Vacuum Mach. Co. v. Continental Cas.
Co. of Chicago, App.1969, 107 Ill.App.2d 248, 246 N.E.2d 882; Cannon v. Thompson,
App.1962, 34 Ill.App.2d 204, 181 N.E.2d 186.
Solvency or Insolvency: Allegation in complaint that business or person was insolvent is

insufficient as "conclusion of law". Drewrys, Ltd., U.S. A. v. Drewrys Beers, App. 1 Dist.1942,
44 N.E.2d 454, 316 Ill.App. 307.
Opponents Knowledge: Allegations of a defendant's knowledge, especially the defendant's

knowledge of someone else's future conduct, are conclusory absent facts that might reasonably
lead one to attribute such knowledge to the defendant (Van Horne v. Muller, 185 Ill.2d 299, 313-
14, 235 Ill.Dec. 715, 705 N.E.2d 898, 906 (1998)); Bates v. Richland Sales Corp., (Ill.App. 4
Dist. 2004) 803 N.E.2d 977, 346 Ill.App.3d 223.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The allegation "that the [standard] grievance process
is futile" is insufficient to plead the “futility” exception to the requirement to exhaust administrative
remedies. Beahringer v. Page, (Ill. 2003) 789 N.E.2d 1216, 204 Ill.2d 363.
Pleading Duty: It is not sufficient that a complaint merely allege a duty; the plaintiff must allege
facts from which the law will raise a duty and specific facts showing an omission of that duty and
resulting injury. Gallagher Corp. v. Russ, (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1999) 309 Ill.App.3d at 197, 242
Ill.Dec. 326, 721 N.E.2d at 610; Taake v. WHGK, Inc., 228 Ill.App.3d 692, 716, 170 Ill.Dec. 479,
592 N.E.2d 1159, 1176 (1992); Weidner v. Midcon Corp., (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 2002) 767 N.E.2d 815,
328 Ill.App.3d 1056.
Due Process: The allegations of violations of due process, that someone acted arbitrarily,
unjustly, or maliciously are mere conclusions of law which did not require reply. Housing
Authority of Franklin County v. Moore, App.1972, 5 Ill.App.3d 883, 284 N.E.2d 456.
Principal Agent Relationship: The general averment of a relationship of principal and agent is a
legal conclusion. Bray v. Illinois Nat. Bank of Springfield, App. 4 Dist.1976, 37 Ill.App.3d 286,
345 N.E.2d 503. It is insufficient to merely plead the legal conclusion of agency. Connick v.
Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill.2d 482, 498, 221 Ill.Dec. 389, 675 N.E.2d 584, 592 (1996).
Purpose: The general allegation that an act was done with a specific purpose or intent, without a
statement of facts showing the purpose or intent, is a “conclusion of law.” Bergfeld v. Stork,
App.1972, 7 Ill.App.3d 486, 288 N.E.2d 15; Essaness Theatres Corp. v. Northern Trust Co.,
App.1952, 104 N.E.2d 510, 346 Ill.App. 214; Aaron v. Dausch, App.1942, 40 N.E.2d 805, 313
Ill.App. 524.
Nuisance: An allegation that something constitutes a nuisance without facts is a mere conclusion
of law. Labadie v. Morris, (Ill. 1922) 135 N.E. 733, 303 Ill. 321.
Transfer of Title or Ownership: The allegation as to the passage of title is unmistakably a

conclusion of law rather than an allegation of fact. Leitch v. Hine, 393 Ill. 211, 66 N.E.2d 90;
Wolcott v. Village of Lombard, 387 Ill. 621, 626, 57 N.E.2d 351; Grove v. Templin, 320 Ill.
597, 602, 151 N.E. 514; Miller Brewing Co. v. Korshak, (Ill. 1966) 219 N.E.2d 494, 35 Ill.2d 86.
Contract was Entered into or Accepted: To merely state that a contract "was entered" or that
the defendant "accepted" is to state mere legal conclusions which are insufficient to state a cause
of action in breach of contract. Wait v. First Midwest Bank/Danville, (Ill.App. 4 Dist. 1986) 491
N.E.2d 795, 142 Ill.App.3d 703.
Agreement was Formed: allegation that "an agreement was formed" states no more than a legal
conclusion without any factual support. OnTap Premium Quality Waters, Inc. v. Bank of
Northern Illinois, N.A., (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994) 634 N.E.2d 425, 262 Ill.App.3d 254
Waiver: The allegation that defendant waived the conditions of its offer states no more than a
legal conclusion. OnTap Premium Quality Waters, Inc. v. Bank of Northern Illinois, N.A.,
(Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994) 634 N.E.2d 425, 262 Ill.App.3d 254.
Capacity: The allegation that someone qualifies in a certain capacity in a pleading is nothing
more than setting forth a mere conclusion of law. People v. Opie, 304 Ill. 521, 524, 136 N.E.
752; Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 636, 181 N.E. 417. Connett v. Winget, (Ill. 1940) 30
N.E.2d 1, 374 Ill. 531.
Wrongful Issuance of Document: Allegation that opposing party acquired interests in property
by reason of wrongful issuing and recording an instrument and that they unlawfully conspired
with trustee are mere conclusions of law. Mancou v. Trust Co. of Chicago, App.1946, 66
N.E.2d 515, 328 Ill.App. 592.
Nature of Interest – Contingent Remainder: Phrase in pleading in a partition action alleging

that someone had a contingent remainder in realty and by acts and conduct was so construed
by him and other remaindermen during their lifetime and also by opposing party prior to
commencement of the pending action was an improper conclusion of the pleader. Barker v.
Walker, 1949, 85 N.E.2d 748, 403 Ill. 302.
Lack of Jurisdiction: Allegation in second husband's complaint for annulment, to establish that
court granting spouses first divorce lacked jurisdiction was a mere conclusion where it failed to
state specific facts in the positive showing lack of jurisdiction. Cullen v. Stevens, 1944, 58
N.E.2d 456, 389 Ill. 35.
Abuse of Discretion: Allegations that government and employees had abused discretion in
wrongfully avoiding the use of guidelines requiring an environmental impact study did not specify
facts upon which it could be reasoned that the government officials had abused discretion and
constituted mere conclusions of the pleaders. Rocke v. Cook County, App. 1 Dist.1978, 18
Ill.Dec. 134, 60 Ill.App.3d 874, 377 N.E.2d 287.
Conspiracy: A general allegation that a party participated in conspiracy is deficient as being

merely a conclusion. Skolnick v. Nudelman, App.1968, 95 Ill.App.2d 293, 237 N.E.2d 804;
Miles Homes, Inc., of Illinois v. Mintjal, App. 4 Dist.1974, 17 Ill.App.3d 642, 307 N.E.2d 724.
Bailment: Allegation of bailment which did not allege express bailment agreement, did not
contain allegation of change of possession of property subject to the agreement, did not contain
allegation of express or implied acceptance of the property by the bailee, and did not allege
property was in fact transferred to bailor, but, merely alleges a general conclusion of law that
bailment relationship arose is insufficient. Kirby v. Chicago City Bank and Trust Co., App. 1
Dist.1980, 38 Ill.Dec. 489, 82 Ill.App.3d 1113, 403 N.E.2d 720.
Constitutionality: Broad allegation that provisions of a statute were unconstitutional is a mere

conclusion of law. Pierce v. Carpentier, 1960, 20 Ill.2d 526, 169 N.E.2d 747.
False Arrest: Allegations that there was no reason for police to incarcerate the plaintiff, that the
defendant officer knew the plaintiff and had committed no crime whatsoever and that certain
actions of the defendant officer constituted deprivation by the defendant of plaintiff's "liberty and
property without due process of law," are mere conclusions of law. Bohacs v. Reid, App. 2
Dist.1978, 20 Ill.Dec. 304, 63 Ill.App.3d 477, 379 N.E.2d 1372.
Conclusion
The drafter needs to carefully review their pleading with each of these rules in mind. It is very
important not to merely parrot some statement on the law but rather show how the specific facts
bring the pleaders cause within the rules of the law. It is much like the formula for answering law
school exams. You need to identify the issue, know the applicable rule of law and then apply the
facts (in this case plead the facts) to the rule.
FORMS
Summons
STATE OF ILLINOIS
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO
<<PLAINTIFF>>,
Plaintiff, In Chancery
vs.
CASE NO. 2000 CH 368
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Serve the defendant at:
Director of the Illinois Department of Insurance
Defendant. Nat Shapo
320 W. Washington
Springfield, 62767
SUMMONS
To Defendant:
You are summoned and required to file an answer to the complaint in this case, a copy of which is hereto attached,
or otherwise file your appearance, in the office of the clerk of this court within 30 days after service of this summons, not
counting the day of service. If you fail to do so, a judgment by default may be entered against you for the relief asked in
the complaint.
To the officer:
This summons must be returned by the officer or other person to whom it was given for service, with indorsement of
service and fees, if any, immediately after service. If service cannot be made, this summons shall be returned so indorsed.
This summons may not be served later than 30 days after its date.
Witness ___________________, 2007

(Seal of Court)
___________________________
Clerk of Court
Date of service __________________, 20___ (to be inserted by officer on copy left with defendant or other person).
Mark A. Rouleau
5301 E. State St., Suite 215D
Rockford, Illinois 61108
(815) 229-7246
Premises Complaint
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO
<<PLAINTIFF>>,
Plaintiff, At Law
vs. CASE NO.
<<PROPERTY OWNER>>,
Defendant.
COMPLAINT
(Contract)
NOW COMES, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, by and through her attorney

Mark Rouleau, and complaints of the defendant <<PROPERTY OWNER>> as follows:
1) That at the time of all of the events stated herein the defendant, <<PROPERTY
OWNER>>, owned and operated a certain apartment house located at 1210 N. Main,
in the City of Rockford and State of Illinois, which contained various apartments,
flats, and rooms, which leased to various people for residential purposes.
2) At the time of the occurrence complained of herein the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>,

was a resident of Apt 2N of said building, having entered into a verbal lease of the
rooms, from month to month, for a rental fee to be paid monthly.
3) In consideration of the lease and the monthly rental that the plaintiff,
<<PLAINTIFF>>, agreed to pay, the defendant, <<PROPERTY OWNER>>, agreed
with plaintiff to make certain repairs in the rooms and premises, and agreed to repair
the windows where the had become cracked and failed to otherwise properly
function. And agreed to put and keep the premises and its various rooms in good and
safe condition and repair.
4) Regardless of the agreements and his duty under them having knowledge of the
conditions, the defendant, <<PROPERTY OWNER>>, negligently failed to repair the
window in the ______________ and allowed it to become and remain in a defective
and unsafe condition, in that they were broken and would not easily and safely open.
5) That the condition of the window in being broken and not safely opening presented an
unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff and others lawfully upon the premises.
6) That the defendant, <<PROPERTY OWNER>>, had actual knowledge of condition

of the window.
7) That the defendant, <<PROPERTY OWNER>>, frequently undertook to inspect the

premises, including the plaintiff’s apartment.
8) On __________, 2002 at approximately ___________ while the plaintiff was

attempting to open the aforesaid window the glass in the window broke cutting the
plaintiff and causing her to suffer the injuries and damages stated elsewhere herein.
9) As a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s failure to perform his agreement to
repair said window the plaintiff sustained sever and permanent injuries both external
and internal, to various parts of her head, body and limbs. More specifically, she
suffered a ____________________________________. Because of these injuries,
she has become and will continue to be, lame and disordered. During all of this time
she has suffered, and will suffer great physical pain and mental anguish. She has
been prevented from attending her usual and regular affairs and employment, and has
been deprived of wages that she would otherwise have earned. In endeavoring to be
cured of injuries and disabilities, she has had to expand large sums of money for
medical and other expenses all to the plaintiffs damage in a sum in excess of $50,000.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant,

<<PROPERTY OWNER>>, and each of them for a sum that will adequately and
fairly compensates her for the damages sustained and the cost of the action.
COUNT II
(Defective Repairs – Negligent Performance of Voluntary Undertaking)


3) <<PROPERTY OWNER>>, made certain repairs in the rooms and premises,

including painting the windows frames and sashes.
4) The defendant, <<PROPERTY OWNER>>, negligently painted the window frames

and sashes in the ______________ and allowed them become and remain in a
defective and unsafe condition, in specific that said window would not safely open as
designed.

6) As a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s failure to perform his agreement to
repair said window the plaintiff sustained sever and permanent injuries both external
and internal, to various parts of her head, body and limbs. More specifically, she
suffered a ____________________________________. Because of these injuries,
she has become and will continue to be, lame and disordered. During all of this time
she has suffered, and will suffer great physical pain and mental anguish. She has
been prevented from attending her usual and regular affairs and employment, and has
been deprived of wages that she would otherwise have earned. In endeavoring to be
cured of injuries and disabilities, she has had to expand large sums of money for
medical and other expenses all to the plaintiffs damage in a sum in excess of $50,000.

<<PROPERTY OWNER>>, and each of them for a sum that will adequately and fairly
compensates her for the damages sustained and the cost of the action.
COUNT III
(Strict Liability – Ordinance Violation)


3) The window in the ______________ of the apartment rented to the plaintiff by the
defendant was in a defective and unsafe condition, in specific that said window would
not safely and easily open.
4) That the City of Rockford, in its Code of Ordinances has adopted the 2000
International Property Maintenance Code. (Art. XVI Existing Structures Code –
Section 6-225).
5) That the 2000 International Property Maintenance Code provides in part:
303.13 Window, skylight and door frames. Every window skylight, door and frame
shall be kept in sound condition, good repair and weather tight.
303.13.1 Glazing. All glazing materials shall be maintained free from
cracks and holes.
303.13.2 Openable windows. Every window, other than a fixed window,
shall be easily openable and capable of being held in position by window
hardware.

7) As a direct and proximate result of the condition window and its failure to be easily
openable as required by the Ordinances of the City of Rockford, the plaintiff
sustained sever and permanent injuries both external and internal, to various parts of
her head, body and limbs. More specifically, she suffered a
____________________________________. Because of these injuries, she has
become and will continue to be, lame and disordered. During all of this time she has
suffered, and will suffer great physical pain and mental anguish. She has been
prevented from attending her usual and regular affairs and employment, and has been
deprived of wages that she would otherwise have earned. In endeavoring to be cured
of injuries and disabilities, she has had to expand large sums of money for medical
and other expenses all to the plaintiffs damage in a sum in excess of $50,000.

<<PROPERTY OWNER>>, and each of them for a sum that will adequately and fairly
compensates her for the damages sustained and the cost of the action.
<<PLAINTIFF>>
By:
Mark A. Rouleau (291)

(815) 229-7246
Complaint Auto Intersectional Collision
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO
<<PLAINTIFF>>,
Plaintiff, At Law
vs. CASE NO.
<<DEFENDANT>>,
Defendant.
COMPLAINT
The plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, by Mark Rouleau, her attorney, complains of

the defendant and for her first cause of action alleges:
1. The plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, is an adult resident of Winnebago County,

residing at 3533 Jamestown Dr., Rockford, Illinois and is a machinist by
occupation.
2. The defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, is an adult resident of Winnebago County,

residing at 3504 Captains Court, Rockford, Illinois and her occupation is
unknown to the plaintiff.
3. In the City of Rockford and County of Winnebago, State of Illinois, 11th Street
(U.S. 251) runs generally in a northerly and southerly direction and Sandy Hollow
Road runs generally in an easterly and westerly direction, and said streets cross
and intersect each other at right angles. Said intersection is controlled by a traffic
control signal which was working on the date and time in question.
4. On May 20, 1994 at approximately 3:50 p.m., of that day, the plaintiff,
<<PLAINTIFF>>, was the driver on one 1984 Buick Skylark automobile which
was traveling eastbound on Sandy Hollow Road at the aforesaid intersection.
5. The plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, had a green light in her direction of travel at the
time of the collision complained of.
6. The defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, was the owner and operator of one Lincoln
Town Car which was traveling in a westerly direction on Sandy Hollow Road
towards and into said intersection.
7. That the light for Sandy Hollow Road was green and the Plaintiff ,
<<PLAINTIFF>>, drove her automobile into the aforesaid intersection while at
the same time the defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, made a left hand turn from
westbound Sandy Hollow Road onto Southbound 11th street at said intersection
with the direct and proximate result that the vehicle driven by the defendant,
<<DEFENDANT>>, collided with the vehicle driven by the Plaintiff,
<<PLAINTIFF>>, in said intersection and proximately caused the plaintiff
personal injuries and damages as hereinafter more particularly specified.
8. At the time and place in question the defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, was

negligent in one or more of the following respects:
a) She failed to keep a proper lookout for other persons and property upon
the highway contrary to the duty of all drivers to maintain a proper
lookout;
b) She operated her motor vehicle at a speed greater than was reasonable and
prudent under the conditions and without regard for the actual and
potential hazards then existing contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a);
c) She failed to have the motor vehicle that she was operating under proper
control;
d) She failed to reduce the speed of her vehicle in order to avoid colliding
with the vehicle of the Plaintiff contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a);
e) She failed to reduce the speed of her vehicle upon approaching and
crossing an intersection contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a);
f) She failed to sound her horn to warn of the impending collision, contrary
to 625 ILCS 5/11-904.
g) She failed to yield the right of way to the Plaintiff, who was lawfully
traveling through said intersection with the green light in her favor, where
the Plaintiff’s vehicle was approaching in the opposite direction and was
so close as to constitute an immediate hazard contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-
902.
h) She failed to continuously signal her intention to turn her vehicle to the
left within the last 100 feet traveled by her vehicle before making the turn
contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-804.
i) She operated her motor vehicle at a speed greater than the posted speed
limit contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-601(b);
9. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the defendant and as a

proximate cause of the collision in question, and as a direct consequence of such
collision, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, sustained severe bodily injuries in that
she suffered sever cervical strain and post traumatic migraine headaches. Plaintiff
was further damaged in that she incurred, medical, nursing, and various other
expenses. The plaintiff further suffered a substantial loss of earnings, and also
suffered property damage, all to her damage in the sum of $30,000.
Wherefore, the plaintiff prays for judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant in the sum of thirty thousand dollars together with her costs and disbursements
in this action.
COUNT II
NOW COMES, the Plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, and for her second an further
cause of action against the Defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, states as follows:
1-6. The Plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, repeats and realleges the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 through 6 of Count I as the allegations of paragraph 1
thorough 6 of Count II.
7. At the time and place in question the defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, was willful
and wanton in one or more of the following respects:
a) She recklessly and without regard for the safety of persons or property
failed to keep a proper lookout for other persons and property upon the
highway contrary to the duty of all drivers to maintain a proper lookout;
b) She recklessly and without regard for the safety of persons or property
operated her motor vehicle at a speed greater than was reasonable and
c) She recklessly and without regard for the safety of persons or property
failed to have the motor vehicle that she was operating under proper
control;
d) She recklessly and without regard for the safety of persons or property
failed to reduce the speed of her vehicle in order to avoid colliding with
the vehicle of the Plaintiff contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a);
e) She recklessly and without regard for the safety of persons or property
failed to reduce the speed of her vehicle upon approaching and crossing an
intersection contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a);
f) She recklessly and without regard for the safety of persons or property
failed to yield the right of way to the Plaintiff, who was lawfully traveling
through said intersection with the green light in her favor, contrary to 625
ILCS 5/11-904.
g) She recklessly and without regard for the safety of persons or property
failed to sound her horn to warn of the impending collision, contrary to
625 ILCS 5/11-904.
h) She failed to yield the right of way to the Plaintiff, who was lawfully
traveling through said intersection with the green light in her favor, where
the Plaintiff’s vehicle was approaching in the opposite direction and was
so close as to constitute an immediate hazard contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-
902.
i) She failed to continuously signal her intention to turn her vehicle to the
left within the last 100 feet traveled by her vehicle before making the turn
contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-804.
j) She recklessly and without regard for the safety of persons or property
operated her motor vehicle at a speed greater than the posted speed limit
contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-601(b);
8. As a direct and proximate result of the willful and wanton conduct of the
defendant and as a proximate cause of the collision in question, and as a direct
consequence of such collision, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, sustained severe
bodily injuries in that she suffered sever cervical strain and post traumatic
migraine headaches. Plaintiff was further damaged in that she incurred, medical,
nursing, and various other expenses. The plaintiff further suffered a substantial
loss of earnings, and also suffered property damage, all to her damage in the sum
of $30,000.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays for judgment in favor of the plaintiff,

<<PLAINTIFF>>, and against the defendant in the sum of thirty thousand dollars
together with her costs and disbursements in this action.
COUNT III
NOW COMES, the Plaintiff, (PLAINTIFF.2), by Mark Rouleau, her attorney,
complains of the defendant and for her first cause of action alleges:
1-7. The Plaintiff, (PLAINTIFF.2), repeats and realleges the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1-7 of Count I of the complaint as the allegations of paragraphs 1-7 of
Count III.
8. The Plaintiff, (PLAINTIFF.2), was lawfully married to the Plaintiff,

<<PLAINTIFF>>, at all times herein stated.
9. That as a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid negligent acts of the
Defendant the Plaintiff, (PLAINTIFF.2), suffered and has been deprived of the
love, companionship, society, relations and normally expected and rendered
household duties and chores performed and rendered by the Plaintiff,
<<PLAINTIFF>>, prior to the aforesaid automobile collision, and which such
spouse was able to and in fact did perform and render prior to the collision
complained of herein, such loss of consortium subject to proof at trial as to extent,
duration and amount, all to his damages the sum of $30,000.00.

(PLAINTIFF.2), and against the defendant in the sum of thirty thousand dollars
together with her costs and disbursements in this action.
COUNT IV
NOW COMES, the Plaintiff, (PLAINTIFF.2), by Mark Rouleau, her attorney,
complains of the defendant and for his second and further cause of action alleges:
1-7. The Plaintiff, (PLAINTIFF.2), repeats and realleges the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1-7 of Count II of the complaint as the allegations of paragraphs 1-7
of Count IV.
8. The Plaintiff, (PLAINTIFF.2), was lawfully married to the Plaintiff,

9. That as a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid willful and wanton acts of
the Defendant the Plaintiff, (PLAINTIFF.2), suffered and has been deprived of
the love, companionship, society, relations and normally expected and rendered
household duties and chores performed and rendered by the Plaintiff,

(PLAINTIFF.2), and against the defendant in the sum of thirty thousand dollars together
with her costs and disbursements in this action.
THE PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY OF TWELVE PERSONS
<<PLAINTIFF>> and
(PLAINTIFF.2)
By:
Mark Rouleau
MARK A. ROULEAU (291)

(815) 229-7246
Rear End Chain Collision With Consortium Claim
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO
<<PLAINTIFF>> and
<<PLAINTIFF SPOUSE>>, At Law
Plaintiff, CASE NO.
vs.
<<DEFENDANT>>,
Defendant.
COMPLAINT
COUNT I
the defendant and for her first cause of action alleges:
1. The plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, is an adult resident of Illinois, residing at 6521

Davis School Rd. Belvidere, Illinois.
2. The defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, is an adult resident of Winnebago County,

residing at 1520 Hackberry, Machesney Park, Illinois and her occupation is
3. In the City of Rockford and County of Winnebago, State of Illinois, Mulford

Road runs generally in a northerly and southerly direction.
4. On September 6, 2001 at approximately 3:38 p.m. o'clock in the morning, of that

day, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, was the passenger in one 1998 Cadillac
Deville automobile which was stopped in southbound traffic approaching the
intersection of Mulford Road with Executive Parkway.
5. The defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, was the operator of one 1998 Hyundai
Accent which was owned by her father Donald Pershing. Said motor vehicle was
traveling in a southerly direction on Mulford towards said intersection.
6. The defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, failed to stop her vehicle before striking a

vehicle operated by Deborah Bowers, who in turn struck the motor vehicle that
the plaintiff was a passenger in, with the direct and proximate result causing the
plaintiff personal injuries and damages as hereinafter more particularly specified.
7. At the time and place in question the defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, was

lookout;
control;
e) She failed to sound her horn to warn of the impending collision, contrary
to 625 ILCS 5/11-904.
f) She operated her motor vehicle at a speed greater than the posted speed
g) She failed to maintain a safe distance between her vehicle and the vehicle
in front of her contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a);
h) She followed the vehicle in front of her more closely than is reasonable
and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the
traffic upon and the condition of the highway contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-
710.

she suffered injuries to her body. Plaintiff was further damaged in that she
incurred, medical, nursing, and various other expenses.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays for judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant in the sum not in excess of fifty thousand dollars together with her
costs and disbursements in this action.
COUNT II
NOW COMES, the Plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, and for her second an further
cause of action against the Defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, states as follows:

contained in paragraphs 1 through 6 of Count I as the allegations of paragraph 1
thorough 6 of Count II.
7. At the time and place in question the defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, was willful
and wanton in one or more of the following respects:
operated his motor vehicle at a speed greater than was reasonable and
control;
625 ILCS 5/11-904.
failed to maintain a safe distance between her vehicle and the vehicle in
front of her contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a);
h) She recklessly and without regard for the safety of persons or property
followed the vehicle in front of her more closely than is reasonable and
prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic
upon and the condition of the highway contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-710.
bodily injuries in that she suffered injuries to her body. Plaintiff was further
damaged in that she incurred, medical, nursing, and various other expenses.
COUNT III
NOW COMES, the Plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF SPOUSE>>, by Mark Rouleau,

his attorney, complains of the defendant and for his first cause of action alleges:
1-8. The Plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF SPOUSE>>, repeats and realleges the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1-8 of Count I of the complaint as the allegations of
paragraphs 1-8 of Count III.
9. The Plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF SPOUSE>>, was lawfully married to the Plaintiff,

Defendant the Plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF SPOUSE>>, suffered and has been
deprived of the love, companionship, society, relations and normally expected and
rendered household duties and chores performed and rendered by the Plaintiff,
against the defendant in the sum not in excess of fifty thousand dollars together with his
COUNT IV

his attorney, complains of the defendant and for his second and further cause of action
alleges:
contained in paragraphs 1-7 of Count II of the complaint as the allegations of
paragraphs 1-8 of Count IV.

the Defendant the Plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF SPOUSE>>, suffered and has been
COUNT V

the defendant, DEBORAH E. BOWERS, and for her first cause of action alleges:
10. The plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, is an adult resident of Illinois, residing at 6521

Davis School Rd. Belvidere, Illinois.
11. The defendant, DEBORAH E. BOWERS, is an adult resident of Winnebago

County, residing at 308 Oak St., Belvidere, Illinois and her occupation is
12. In the City of Rockford and County of Winnebago, State of Illinois, Mulford
Road runs generally in a northerly and southerly direction.
13. On September 6, 2001 at approximately 3:38 p.m. o'clock in the morning, of that
day, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, was the passenger in one 1998 Cadillac
Deville automobile which was stopped in southbound traffic approaching the
intersection of Mulford Road with Executive Parkway.
14. The defendant, DEBORAH E. BOWERS, was the owner and operator of one
2000 Oldsmobile Intrigue. Said motor vehicle was traveling in a southerly
direction on Mulford towards said intersection.
15. The defendant, DEBORAH E. BOWERS, failed to stop her vehicle before
striking the motor vehicle that the plaintiff was a passenger in, with the direct and
proximate result causing the plaintiff personal injuries and damages as hereinafter
more particularly specified.
16. At the time and place in question the defendant, DEBORAH E. BOWERS, was
lookout;
control;
e) She failed to sound her horn to warn of the impending collision, contrary
to 625 ILCS 5/11-904.
f) She operated her motor vehicle at a speed greater than the posted speed
g) She failed to maintain a safe distance between her vehicle and the vehicle
in front of her contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a);
h) She followed the vehicle in front of her more closely than is reasonable
and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the
traffic upon and the condition of the highway contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-
710.
she suffered injuries to her body. Plaintiff was further damaged in that she
incurred, medical, nursing, and various other expenses.
COUNT VI
NOW COMES, the Plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, and for her second and further
cause of action against the Defendant, DEBORAH E. BOWERS, states as follows:

contained in paragraphs 1 through 6 of Count V as the allegations of paragraph 1
thorough 6 of Count VI.
7. At the time and place in question the defendant, DEBORAH E. BOWERS, was
willful and wanton in one or more of the following respects:
operated his motor vehicle at a speed greater than was reasonable and
control;
625 ILCS 5/11-904.
failed to maintain a safe distance between her vehicle and the vehicle in
front of her contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a);
h) She recklessly and without regard for the safety of persons or property
followed the vehicle in front of her more closely than is reasonable and
prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic
upon and the condition of the highway contrary to 625 ILCS 5/11-710.
bodily injuries in that she suffered injuries to her body. Plaintiff was further
damaged in that she incurred, medical, nursing, and various other expenses.
COUNT VII

his attorney, complains of the defendant and for his first cause of action against the
Defendant, DEBORAH E. BOWERS, alleges:
contained in paragraphs 1-8 of Count V of the complaint as the allegations of
paragraphs 1-8 of Count VII.

Defendant the Plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF SPOUSE>>, suffered and has been
against the defendant in the sum not in excess of fifty thousand dollars together with his
COUNT VIII

his attorney, complains of the defendant and for his second and further cause of action
against the Defendant, DEBORAH E. BOWERS, alleges:
contained in paragraphs 1-7 of Count VI of the complaint as the allegations of
paragraphs 1-8 of Count VIII.

the Defendant the Plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF SPOUSE>>, suffered and has been
THE PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY OF TWELVE PERSONS
<<PLAINTIFF>> and
<<PLAINTIFF SPOUSE>>
By:
MARK A. ROULEAU (291) Mark Rouleau
(815) 229-7246
Products Liability – Loss of Consortium
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO
DAVID SCANLAN, and VICKY
SCANLAN
Plaintiff, At Law
vs. CASE NO.
GANDER MOUNTAIN COMPANY, Jury Demanded

DEBORAH St. MARIE and BGHA, Inc. a
foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in Illinois
Defendant.
COMPLAINT
NOW COMES the plaintiffs DAVID SCANLAN, and VICKY SCANLAN by

and through his attorney Mark Rouleau and for his complaint against the defendants states
the following, to-wit:
Count I
For DAVID SCANLAN’s first cause of action against the defendant GANDER
MOUNTAIN COMPANY, the plaintiff alleges the following, to-wit:
1. On the tenth day of November 2005, and for some time prior to that date, the
defendant, BGHA, Inc. a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
Illinois and GANDER MOUNTAIN COMPANY, a corporation, were the
manufacturers or distributors of a certain tree stand, and that the defendants
manufactured, sold and distributed the product through various dealers and outlets
throughout the United States, including GANDER MOUNTAIN COMPANY, at
3068 McFarland Road, in the city of Rockford, Winnebago County, State of
Illinois.
2. On or about tenth day of November, 2005, defendant GANDER MOUNTAIN
COMPANY (retailer) sold a "tree stand" manufactured or distributed by the
defendants BGHA, Inc. a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
Illinois and GANDER MOUNTAIN COMPANY (manufacturer) to plaintiff.
3. That the defendant GANDER MOUNTAIN COMPANY has a registered office in

the state of Illinois at C T Corporation System 208 So LaSalle St, Suite 814,
Chicago, IL 60604.
4. That the defendant BGHA, Inc. is not registered with the Illinois Secretary of
State as a corporation doing business within the State of Illinois.
5. The defendant BGHA, Inc. sells or distributes its products including its treestands
for sale and use throughout the entire United States of America and intentionally
sold its products knowing and intending that said products would reach retailers
and end consumers in the State of Illinois.
6. The defendant BGHA, Inc. a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in

Illinois maintains an office, among others, at 1680 N Redding Ave PO Box 382, in
the City of Windom, and State of Minnesota, 56101.
7. The defendant BGHA, Inc. manufactured, sold or distributed the “tree stand” that
was purchased by the plaintiff on the tenth day of November 2005.
8. That the defendant DEBORAH St. MARIE at all times relevant herein was the
operations manager of the GANDER MOUNTAIN COMPANY store in
Rockford, IL.
9. The operations manager for the GANDER MOUNTAIN COMPANY store in

Rockford, IL was responsible to make sure that no dangerous product was sold
without all of its parts, original instruction and warnings.
10. The “tree stand” that was sold to the plaintiff was a floor model sold and new and
complete.
11. When the “tree stand” was sold to the plaintiff it was not in any carton or packaging
and the lose parts (ratchet straps etc.) were placed into a plastic bag and handed to
the plaintiff.
12. When the “tree stand” was sold to the plaintiff it was not accompanied by any
written or verbal instructions.
13. When the “tree stand” was sold to the plaintiff it was not accompanied by any
warnings.
14. The plaintiff erected the aforesaid “tree stand” for use in deer hunting.
15. The “tree stand” was, at the time of its manufacture and at the time it left the
possession of each of the defendants, unreasonably dangerous by reason of one or
more of the following defects or conditions of the product:
(a) The “tree stand” did not contain any safety lock, dog or other means to
prevent the “tree stand” from shifting or pulling away from a tree during use.
(b) There were an insufficient number of ratcheted straps intended to hold the
“tree stand” to the tree.
(c) There were an insufficient number of stabilizer straps intended to hold the
(d) The “tree stand” did not have sufficient locations for the ratcheted straps to
secure the stand to the tree.
(e) The end consumer packaging for the “tree stand” contained inadequate
warnings.
(f) The end consumer packaging for the “tree stand” contained inadequate
instructions.
(g) The “tree stand” was not accompanied by any instructions for assembling,
installing/erecting, or using said “tree stand.”
(h) There were no warnings given regarding the safety issues involved in the use of
the “tree stand” although the risks and hazards of the use of the “tree stand” were
well known to sellers and manufactures of “tree stands.”
(i) There was no safety belt or harness, intended to protect the users of said tree
stand from falls included in the “tree stand” materials or parts sold to the
plaintiff.
16. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of the above-stated unreasonably
dangerous defects or conditions, on November 11, 2005 the “tree stand” shifted and
gave way while plaintiff was resting upon it, causing plaintiff to fall striking the
ground with great force, and to sustain severe and permanent injuries, including
fractures to his spinal column, impairment of his spinal cord; and plaintiff has
suffered and will in the future suffer from these injuries excruciating pain and mental
anguish; and plaintiff has expended and will in the future expend large sums of
money for medical care; and plaintiff has been and in the future will be prevented
from engaging in gainful employment by reason of the injuries sustained and that he
has lost the household services that he previously was capable of providing to
himself.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendant in a the sum in
excess of $50,000.00.
Count II
For DAVID SCANLAN’s second cause of action against the defendant GANDER
1-14. The plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1
through 14 in Count I as the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 14 of Count II as
if fully set forth herein.
15. On November 11, 2005, the plaintiff, DAVID SCANLAN, while in the exercise of
ordinary care and caution, was resting upon the above-described “tree stand.”
16. That when the plaintiff purchased the aforesaid “tree stand” the defendant’s
employees or agents in assisted the plaintiff in selecting an appropriate hunting stand
for his use.
17. That when the plaintiff purchased the aforesaid “tree stand” the defendants were
aware of the purpose that the plaintiff intended to use the aforesaid “tree stand.”
18. That when the plaintiff purchased the aforesaid “tree stand” from the defendants said
“tree stand was not fit for the particular purpose for which it was intended, as
required by 810 ILCS 5/2-315, in one (1) or more of the following particulars:
warnings.
instructions.
(h) There were no warnings given regarding the safety issues involved in the use
of the “tree stand” although the risks and hazards of the use of the “tree stand”
although the risks were well known to sellers and manufactures of “tree stands.”
(i) There was no safety belt or harness, intended to protect the users of said
tree stand from falls included in the “tree stand” materials or parts sold to the
plaintiff.
“tree stand was not merchantable, as required by 810 ILCS 5/2-314, in one (1) or
more of the following particulars:
warnings.
instructions.
plaintiff.
20. That when the plaintiff purchased the aforesaid “tree stand” the defendants
represented to him that the “tree stand” was full and complete with all of its parts,
instructions, warnings and safety devices and guards.
21. The defendants through their agents and employees expressly stated that said “tree
stand” would be safe and fit for use by the plaintiff for the purpose of hunting from
an elevated position; and that plaintiff DAVID SCANLAN, relied upon said
representations; but that the defendants breached their warranties, express and
implied, in violation of Sections 2-313 to 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
in that the “tree stand”:
warnings.
instructions.
plaintiff.
himself.
excess of $50,000.00.
Count III
For DAVID SCANLAN’s third cause of action against the defendant GANDER
through 14 in Count I as the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 14 of Count III as
15. The plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 15 of
Count II as the allegations of paragraphs 15 of Count III as if fully set forth herein.
16. The defendant GANDER MOUNTAIN COMPANY, was then and there guilty of
one or more of the following negligent acts or omissions:
(a) Failed to provide any safety lock, dog or other means to prevent the “tree
stand” from shifting or pulling away from a tree during use.
(b) Failed to provide the proper number of ratcheted straps intended to hold
the “tree stand” to the tree.
(c) Failed to provide the proper number of stabilizer straps intended to hold
(d) Failed to provide a proper “tree stand” which had sufficient locations for the
ratcheted straps to secure the stand to the tree.
(e) Failed to provide the end consumer packaging for the “tree stand”
containing safety warnings.
(f) Failed to provide the proper end consumer packaging for the “tree stand”
containing instructions on assembly installation and use.
(g) Failed to provide the proper instructions for assembling,

(h) Failed to provide the proper warnings given regarding the safety issues
involved in the use of the “tree stand” although the risks and hazards of the use
of the “tree stand” were well known to defendant as well as other sellers and
manufactures of “tree stands.”
(i) Failed to provide a proper safety belt or harness, to protect the users of
said tree stand from falls.
(j) Failed to provide all of the proper parts for the safe assembly, installation
and use of the “tree stand” sold to the plaintiff.
(k) Failed to adequately inspect the “tree stand” prior to its sale to the plaintiff to
insure it was in good working order with all of its parts, warnings and
instructions.
(l) Failed to adequately train employees and agents not to sell dangerous
devices such as tree stands without all of their original consumer packaging,
parts, safety devices, instructions and warnings.
(m) Failed to make sure that no employees and agents sold tree stands without all
of their original consumer packaging, parts, safety devices, instructions and
warnings.
(n) Failed to adequately train employees and agents in properly assisting

customers to select an appropriate hunting stand.
(o) Failed to adequately train employees and agents to explain to consumers the
risks associated with tree stands including the likelihood of falls and the need for
proper installation and safety equipment.
17. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of the above-stated negligent acts or
omissions, on November 11, 2005 the “tree stand” shifted and gave way while
plaintiff was resting upon it, causing plaintiff to fall striking the ground with great
force, and to sustain severe and permanent injuries, including fractures to his spinal
column, impairment of his spinal cord; and plaintiff has suffered and will in the
future suffer from these injuries excruciating pain and mental anguish; and plaintiff
has expended and will in the future expend large sums of money for medical care;
and plaintiff has been and in the future will be prevented from engaging in gainful
employment by reason of the injuries sustained and that he has lost the household
services that he previously was capable of providing to himself.
excess of $50,000.00.
Count IV
For DAVID SCANLAN’s first cause of action against the defendant DEBORAH
St. MARIE, the plaintiff alleges the following, to-wit:
Count II as the allegations of paragraphs 15 of Count III as if fully set forth herein.
16. The defendant DEBORAH St. MARIE, was then and there guilty of one or more
of the following negligent acts or omissions:
(a) She failed to provide any safety lock, dog or other means to prevent the
“tree stand” from shifting or pulling away from a tree during use.
(b) She failed to provide the proper number of ratcheted straps intended to
hold the “tree stand” to the tree.
(c) She failed to provide the proper number of stabilizer straps intended to
(d) She failed to provide a proper “tree stand” which had sufficient locations
for the ratcheted straps to secure the stand to the tree.
(e) She failed to provide the end consumer packaging for the “tree stand”
(f) She failed to provide the proper end consumer packaging for the “tree
stand” containing instructions on assembly installation and use.
(g) She failed to provide the proper instructions for assembling,

(h) She failed to provide the proper warnings given regarding the safety issues
(i) She failed to provide a proper safety belt or harness, to protect the users of
(j) She failed to provide all of the proper parts for the safe assembly,
installation and use of the “tree stand” sold to the plaintiff.
(k) She failed to adequately inspect the “tree stand” prior to its sale to the
plaintiff to insure it was in good working order with all of its parts, warnings and
instructions.
(l) She failed to adequately train employees and agents not to sell dangerous
devices such as tree stands without all of their original consumer packaging,
parts, safety devices, instructions and warnings, although she knew or in the
reasonable exercise of good judgment should have known that such failure to
adequately train employees could or might lead to sever injury to other persons
including consumers.
(m) She failed to adequately train employees and agents in properly assisting
customers to select an appropriate hunting stand although she knew or in the
(n) She failed to adequately train employees and agents to explain to consumers
the risks associated with tree stands including the likelihood of falls and the need
for proper installation and safety equipment although she knew or in the
17. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of the above- stated negligent acts or
excess of $50,000.00.
Count V
For VICKY SCANLAN’s first cause of action against the defendant GANDER
through 16 in Count I as the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 16 of Count V as
17. At all times herein mentioned the plaintiff VICKY SCANLAN was married to
the plaintiff DAVID SCANLAN.
dangerous defects or conditions, plaintiff VICKY SCANLAN has in the past and will in
the future lose support, care, comfort, companionship and consortium of her husband
DAVID SCANLAN.
excess of $50,000.00.
Count VI
For VICKY SCANLAN’s second cause of action against the defendant GANDER
1–22. The plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 22 in Count II as the allegations of paragraphs 1
through 22 of Count VI as if fully set forth herein.
23. At all times herein mentioned the plaintiff VICKY

SCANLAN was married to the plaintiff DAVID
SCANLAN.
24. That as a direct and proximate result of one or more

of the aforesaid acts or omissions of the defendant, plaintiff
VICKY SCANLAN has in the past and will in the future
lose support, care, comfort, companionship and consortium
of her husband DAVID SCANLAN.
excess of $50,000.00.
Count VII
For VICKY SCANLAN’s third cause of action against the defendant GANDER
1–17. The plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1
through 17 in Count III as the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 17 of Count VII
as if fully set forth herein.
19. That as a direct and proximate result of one or more of the aforesaid acts or
omissions of the defendant, plaintiff VICKY SCANLAN has in the past and will
in the future lose support, care, comfort, companionship and consortium of her
husband DAVID SCANLAN.
excess of $50,000.00.
Count VIII
For VICKY SCANLAN’s first cause of action against the defendant DEBORAH
St. MARIE, the plaintiff alleges the following, to-wit:
1–12. The plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1
through 12 in Count IV as the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 12 of Count
VIII as if fully set forth herein.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendant in a sum in

excess of $50,000.00.
Count IX
For DAVID SCANLAN’s first cause of action against the defendant BGHA, Inc. a
foreign corporation not licensed to do business in Illinois, the plaintiff alleges the
following, to-wit:
1. On the tenth day of November, 2005, and for some time prior to that date, the
defendant, BGHA, Inc. a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
Illinois and GANDER MOUNTAIN COMPANY, a corporation, were the
manufacturers or distributors of a certain tree stand, and that the defendants
manufactured, sold and distributed the product through various dealers and outlets
throughout the United States, including GANDER MOUNTAIN COMPANY, in
the city of Rockford, Winnebago County, State of Illinois.
2. On or about tenth day of November, 2005, defendant GANDER MOUNTAIN

COMPANY (retailer) sold a "tree stand" manufactured or distributed by the
defendants BGHA, Inc. a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
Illinois and GANDER MOUNTAIN COMPANY (manufacturers) to plaintiff.
3. That the defendant BGHA, Inc. is not registered with the Illinois Secretary of
State as a corporation doing business within the State of Illinois.
4. The defendant BGHA, Inc. sells or distributes its products including its treestands
for sale and use throughout the entire United States of America and intentionally
sold its products knowing and intending that said products would reach retailers
and end consumers in the State of Illinois.
5. The defendant BGHA, Inc. a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in

Illinois maintains an office, among others, at 1680 N Redding Ave PO Box 382, in
the City of Windom, and State of Minnesota, 56101.
6. The defendant BGHA, Inc. manufactured, sold or distributed the “tree stand” that
was purchased by the plaintiff on the tenth day of November 2005.
7. The “tree stand” that was sold to the plaintiff was sold as new and complete.
8. When the “tree stand” which was sold to the plaintiff, left the control of the
defendant BGHA, Inc. it was not in any carton or packaging and the lose parts
(ratchet straps etc.) were placed into a plastic bag and handed to the plaintiff.
defendant BGHA, Inc. it was not accompanied by any written or verbal instructions.
defendant BGHA, Inc. it was not accompanied by any warnings.
11. The plaintiff erected the aforesaid “tree stand” for use in deer hunting.
12. The “tree stand” was, at the time of its manufacture and at the time it left the
possession of each of the defendants, unreasonably dangerous by reason of one or
more of the following defects or conditions of the product:
(j) The “tree stand” did not contain any safety lock, dog or other means to
(k) There were an insufficient number of ratcheted straps intended to hold the
(l) There were an insufficient number of stabilizer straps intended to hold the
(m) The “tree stand” did not have sufficient locations for the ratcheted straps to
(n) The end consumer packaging for the “tree stand” contained inadequate
warnings.
(o) The end consumer packaging for the “tree stand” contained inadequate
instructions.
(p) The “tree stand” was not accompanied by any instructions for assembling,
(q) There were no warnings given regarding the safety issues involved in the use of
the “tree stand” although the risks and hazards of the use of the “tree stand” were
well known to sellers and manufactures of “tree stands.”
(r) There was no safety belt or harness, intended to protect the users of said tree
stand from falls included in the “tree stand” materials or parts sold to the
plaintiff.
himself.

excess of $50,000.00.
Count X
For DAVID SCANLAN’s second cause of action against the defendant BGHA,
Inc., the plaintiff alleges the following, to-wit:
through 11 in Count IX as the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 11 of Count X
12. On November 11, 2005, the plaintiff, DAVID SCANLAN, while in the exercise of
ordinary care and caution, was resting upon the above-described “tree stand.”
13. That when the plaintiff purchased the aforesaid “tree stand” the defendants were
aware of the purpose that the plaintiff intended to use the aforesaid “tree stand.”
“tree stand was not fit for the particular purpose for which it was intended, as
required by 810 ILCS 5/2-315, in one (1) or more of the following particulars:
warnings.
instructions.
plaintiff.
“tree stand was not merchantable, as required by 810 ILCS 5/2-314, in one (1) or
more of the following particulars:
warnings.
instructions.
plaintiff.
16. That when the plaintiff purchased the aforesaid “tree stand” the defendants
represented to him that the “tree stand” was full and complete with all of its parts,
instructions, warnings and safety devices and guards.
17. The defendants through their agents expressly stated that said “tree stand” would be
safe and fit for use by the plaintiff for the purpose of hunting from an elevated
position; and that plaintiff DAVID SCANLAN, relied upon said representations;
but that the defendants breached their warranties, express and implied, in violation
of Sections 2-313 to 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, in that the “tree
stand”:
(a) The “tree stand” did not contain any safety lock, dog or other
means to prevent the “tree stand” from shifting or pulling away from a tree
during use.
(b) There were an insufficient number of ratcheted straps intended to

(c) There were an insufficient number of stabilizer straps intended to

(d) The “tree stand” did not have sufficient locations for the ratcheted
straps to secure the stand to the tree.
(e) The end consumer packaging for the “tree stand” contained
inadequate warnings.
(f) The end consumer packaging for the “tree stand” contained
inadequate instructions.
(g) The “tree stand” was not accompanied by any instructions for
assembling, installing/erecting, or using said “tree stand.”
(h) There were no warnings given regarding the safety issues involved
in the use of the “tree stand” although the risks and hazards of the use of the
“tree stand” although the risks were well known to sellers and manufactures of
“tree stands.”
(i) There was no safety belt or harness, intended to protect the users
of said tree stand from falls included in the “tree stand” materials or parts sold
to the plaintiff.
himself.

excess of $50,000.00.
Count XI
For DAVID SCANLAN’s third cause of action against the defendant BGHA, Inc.,
the plaintiff alleges the following, to-wit:
through 11 in Count IX as the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 11 of Count XI
Count II as the allegations of paragraphs 15 of Count XI as if fully set forth herein.
13. The defendant BGHA, Inc., was then and there guilty of one or more of the
following negligent acts or omissions:
(o) Failed to provide any safety lock, dog or other means to prevent the “tree
stand” from shifting or pulling away from a tree during use.
(p) Failed to provide the proper number of ratcheted straps intended to hold
(q) Failed to provide the proper number of stabilizer straps intended to hold
(r) Failed to provide a proper “tree stand” which had sufficient locations for the
ratcheted straps to secure the stand to the tree.
(s) Failed to provide the end consumer packaging for the “tree stand”
(t) Failed to provide the proper end consumer packaging for the “tree stand”
containing instructions on assembly installation and use.
(u) Failed to provide the proper instructions for assembling,

installing/erecting, or using said, “tree stand.”
(v) Failed to provide the proper warnings given regarding the safety issues
(w) Failed to provide a proper safety belt or harness, to protect the users of
(x) Failed to provide all of the proper parts for the safe assembly, installation
and use of the “tree stand” sold to the plaintiff.
(y) Failed to adequately inspect the “tree stand” prior to its distribution or sale to
insure it was in good working order with all of its parts, warnings and
instructions.
(z) Failed to adequately train employees and agents not to sell ship or distribute
dangerous devices such as tree stands without all of their original consumer
packaging, parts, safety devices, instructions and warnings.
(aa) Failed to make sure that no employees and agents sold, shipped or
distributed tree stands without all of their original consumer packaging, parts,
safety devices, instructions and warnings.
14. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of the above-stated negligent acts or

excess of $50,000.00.
Count XII
For VICKY SCANLAN’s first cause of action against the defendant BGHA, Inc.,
through 13 in Count IX as the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 13 of Count
XII as if fully set forth herein.
14. At all times herein mentioned the plaintiff VICKY SCANLAN was
married to the plaintiff DAVID SCANLAN.
15. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of the above-stated

unreasonably dangerous defects or conditions, plaintiff VICKY SCANLAN has in
the past and will in the future lose support, care, comfort, companionship and
consortium of her husband DAVID SCANLAN.

excess of $50,000.00.
Count XIII
For VICKY SCANLAN’s second cause of action against the defendant BGHA, Inc., the
plaintiff alleges the following, to-wit:
through 18 in Count IX as the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 18 of Count
XIII as if fully set forth herein.
19. At all times herein mentioned the plaintiff VICKY SCANLAN was married
to the plaintiff DAVID SCANLAN.
excess of $50,000.00.
Count XIV
For VICKY SCANLAN’s third cause of action against the defendant BGHA, Inc.,
through 14 in Count XI as the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 17 of Count
XIV as if fully set forth herein.

excess of $50,000.00.
THE PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY OF SIX (6) PERSONS.
David Scanlan
By:
Mark A. Rouleau
Mark A. Rouleau
(815) 229-7246
Wrongful Death – Watercraft Collision
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF OGLE
BRIAN TRACY as Executor of the Estate

of RITA TRACY
Plaintiff,
Case No.
vs.
JAMES GOVRO and DAVE SMITH,
DefendantS.
COMPLAINT
The plaintiff, BRIAN TRACY AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF RITA

TRACY, by Mark Rouleau, his attorney, complains of the defendant and for his first
cause of action alleges:
1. The plaintiff, BRIAN TRACY AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF RITA

TRACY, is the Executor of the Estate of RITA TRACY.
2. RITA TRACY died leaving the following people as next of kin Bryan Tracy,
Darren Glickstein, Lynda Chavietz.
3. On or about August 27, 2004 RITA TRACY was a passenger in a motorboat

owned and operated by the defendant JAMES GOVRO.
4. That said motorboat was being operated on the Rock River at or near the town of
Byron, Illinois.
5. That at the same time and date the defendant DAVE SMITH was operating a jet
ski on the Rock River at or near the town of Byron, Illinois.
6. That the defendant’s JAMES GOVRO and DAVE SMITH were engaged in
horseplay whereby both were weaving back and forth on the river dodging each
other.
7. As a direct and proximate result of said conduct on the part of the defendants their
watercraft collided causing the deceased RITA TRACY to be violently thrown
about causing her death.
8. In Illinois there exists certain statutes governing the use and operation of
watercraft on navigatible waterways.
9. The aforesaid collision was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s death and
damages as hereinafter more particularly specified.
10. The Illinois Statutes 625 ILCS 45/6-2 provides: operator of a watercraft is liable
for any injury or damage occasioned by the negligent operation of such
watercraft, whether such negligence consists of a violation of the provisions of the
Statutes of this State, or in the failure to observe such ordinary care in such
operation as the rules of the common law require.
11. At the time and place in question the defendant’s JAMES GOVRO, was
a) He failed to keep a proper lookout for other persons and property upon the
highway contrary to the duty of all boaters to maintain a proper lookout;
b) He operated the watercraft in a careless or heedless manner so as to

endanger persons or property in violation of 625 ILCS 45/5-1.
c) He operated the watercraft at a rate of speed greater than will permit him
in the exercise of reasonable care to bring the watercraft to a stop within
the assured clear distance ahead contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-1;
d) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to willfully or wantonly
endanger the life, limb or property of any person contrary to 625 ILCS
45/5-2.
e) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to weave through

congested traffic contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-1;
f) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to jump the wake of

another vessel unreasonably or unnecessarily close to the other vessel or
when visibility around the other vessel is obstructed contrary to 625 ILCS
45/5-1;
g) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to wait until the last

possible moment to swerve to avoid collision contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-
1;
h) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to operate any watercraft

so as to approach or pass another watercraft contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-1;
i) He operated the watercraft in such a manner or at such a rate of speed as to

create a hazardous wake or wash contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-1;
j) He operated the watercraft in such a manner which unreasonably or

unnecessarily interferes with other watercraft or with the free and proper
navigation of the waterways of the State contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-3;
k) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to fail to yield the right of

way to the other watercraft contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-13;
l) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to improperly overtake

another watercraft contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-13;
m) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to allow a person in the

motorboat to ride or sit on the gunwales, tops of seat backs, or on the
decking over the bow or stern of the motorboat while the motorboat is
underway contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-21; and
n) He failed to have the watercraft that he was operating under proper

control.
12. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the defendant and as a
collision, the plaintiff, RITA TRACY, sustained the following damages:
a) Medical expenses attendant with her injuries;
b) Funeral expenses attendant to her death that resulted from her injuries;
c) Loss of future earnings;
d) Loss of future work related benefits;
e) Loss of inheritance caused by the untimely death;
f) Loss of society and companionship suffered by the surviving next of kin

including deprivation of love, companionship, and affection from RITA
TRACY;
defendant, defendant’s JAMES GOVRO,a sum in excess of $50,000 dollars together
with his costs and disbursements in this action.
COUNT II
The plaintiff, BRIAN TRACY AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF RITA

TRACY, by Mark Rouleau, his attorney, complains of the defendant DAVE SMITH and
for his first cause of action alleges:
1. The plaintiff, BRIAN TRACY AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF RITA
TRACY, is the Executor of the Estate of RITA TRACY.
2. RITA TRACY died leaving the following people as next of kin Bryan Tracy,
Darren Glickstein, Lynda Chavietz.
3. On or about August 27, 2004 RITA TRACY was a passenger in a motorboat

owned and operated by the defendant JAMES GOVRO.
4. That said motorboat was being operated on the Rock River at or near the town of
Byron, Illinois.
5. That at the same time and date the defendant DAVE SMITH was operating a jet
ski on the Rock River at or near the town of Byron, Illinois.
6. That the defendant’s JAMES GOVRO and DAVE SMITH were engaged in
horseplay whereby both were weaving back and forth on the river dodging each
other.
7. As a direct and proximate result of said conduct on the part of the defendants their
watercraft collided causing the deceased RITA TRACY to be violently thrown
about causing her death.
8. In Illinois there exists certain statutes governing the use and operation of
watercraft on navigatible waterways.
9. The aforesaid collision was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s death and
damages as hereinafter more particularly specified.
10. The Illinois Statutes 625 ILCS 45/6-2 provides: operator of a watercraft is liable
for any injury or damage occasioned by the negligent operation of such
watercraft, whether such negligence consists of a violation of the provisions of the
Statutes of this State, or in the failure to observe such ordinary care in such
operation as the rules of the common law require.
11. At the time and place in question the deceased, DAVE SMITH, was negligent in
one or more of the following respects:
a) He failed to keep a proper lookout for other persons and property upon the
waterway contrary to the duty of all boaters to maintain a proper lookout;
b) He operated the watercraft in a careless or heedless manner so as to

endanger persons or property in violation of 625 ILCS 45/5-1.
c) He operated the watercraft at a rate of speed greater than will permit him
in the exercise of reasonable care to bring the watercraft to a stop within
the assured clear distance ahead contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-1;
d) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to willfully or wantonly

endanger the life, limb or property of any person contrary to 625 ILCS
45/5-2.
e) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to weave through

congested traffic contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-1;
f) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to jump the wake of

another vessel unreasonably or unnecessarily close to the other vessel or
when visibility around the other vessel is obstructed contrary to 625 ILCS
45/5-1;
g) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to wait until the last

possible moment to swerve to avoid collision contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-
1;
h) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to operate any watercraft

so as to approach or pass another watercraft contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-1;
i) He operated the watercraft in such a manner or at such a rate of speed as to

create a hazardous wake or wash contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-1;
j) He operated the watercraft in such a manner which unreasonably or
unnecessarily interferes with other watercraft or with the free and proper
navigation of the waterways of the State contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-3;
k) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to fail to yield the right of

way to the other watercraft contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-13;
l) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to improperly overtake

another watercraft contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-13;
m) He operated the watercraft in such a manner as to allow a person in the

motorboat to ride or sit on the gunwales, tops of seat backs, or on the
decking over the bow or stern of the motorboat while the motorboat is
underway contrary to 625 ILCS 45/5-21; and
n) He failed to have the watercraft that he was operating under proper

control.
12. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the defendant and as a
collision, the plaintiff estate and next of kin, sustained the following damages:
a) Medical expenses attendant with RITA TRACY’s injuries;
b) Funeral expenses attendant to her death that resulted from RITA

TRACY’s death;
c) Loss of future earnings of RITA TRACY;
d) Loss of future work related benefits;
e) Loss of inheritance caused by the untimely death;
f) Loss of society and companionship suffered by the surviving next of kin

including deprivation of love, companionship, and affection from RITA
TRACY;
defendant in a sum in excess of $50,000 dollars together with his costs and disbursements
in this action.
BRIAN TRACY AS EXECUTOR OF
THE ESTATE OF RITA TRACY,
By:
Mark Rouleau
Mark A. Rouleau
(815) 229-7246
Easement Dispute
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO
ELIZABETH S. REENTS personally and
as Trustee of the ELIZABETH S. REENTS
FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiff, At Law
vs. CASE NO.
DEAN IMPEY, CATHERINE IMPEY,

DCCI ENTERPRISES, INC.,
ROCKFORD LOCAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, and UNKNOWN
OWNERS (Doe #1 – Doe #10),
Defendants.
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
NOW COMES, the Plaintiff, ELIZABETH S. REENTS, personally and as

TRUSTEE OF THE ELIZABETH S. REENTS FAMILY TRUST alleges:
COUNT I
1. Plaintiff, ELIZABETH S. REENTS, is, and at all times mentioned in this

complaint was, a resident of Winnebago County, Illinois.
2. Plaintiff, ELIZABETH S. REENTS, is, and at all times mentioned in this

complaint was, the trustee of the ELIZABETH S. REENTS FAMILY TRUST.
3. The ELIZABETH S. REENTS FAMILY TRUST, is the owner of 910 & 914
24th Street, which parcels are designated upon the plat of the “Subdivision” as
Lots #5 & 6 described in further detail below.
4. Defendants, DEAN IMPEY, CATHERINE IMPEY, DCCI ENTERPRISES,

INC., ROCKFORD LOCAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION are, and at
all times mentioned in this complaint were, residents of, Winnebago County,
Illinois.
5. The defendant DCCI ENTERPRISES, INC. is an Illinois Domestic for Profit

Corporation, whose registered agent is Curtis D Worden and has its registered
offices at 124 N. Water St. - Suite 300, Rockford, IL; and said corporation
conducts business under the assumed name “TRI-B-HARDWARE & SUPPLY.”
Upon information and belief the defendant DCCI ENTERPRISES, INC. is a
tenant of the defendants DEAN IMPEY, CATHERINE IMPEY, and conducts a
business on the property which is further described below as Lot #4.
6. The defendant ROCKFORD LOCAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION is

a domestic not for profit corporation whose registered agent is John J Phelps and
has its registered offices at 124 N. Water St. - Suite 204, Rockford, IL. Upon
information and belief the defendant ROCKFORD LOCAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION is a mortgage lender of the defendants DEAN IMPEY,
CATHERINE IMPEY, and holds a mortgage on property which is further
described below as Lot #4 and the “parking lot.”
7. Plaintiff does not know the true names of defendants “unknown owners,”
claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the property
described in the complaint adverse to plaintiff’s title, or any cloud on Plaintiff title
thereto and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, and therefore sues them "by those
fictitious names” plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that,
each of the, Doe defendants claims, or may claim, some interest in the property
interests described in paragraphs 5, 6 or 8, of this complaint.
8. Plaintiff is informed and, believes, and on that basis alleges, that at all times
mentioned in this complaint, defendants were the agents and employees of their
codefendants, and in doing the things alleged in this complaint were acting within
the course and scope of that agency and employment.
9. Paul C. Rosenquist subdivided and platted the Plat of Subdivision of part of Block
1 Stockholm Park Subdivision of a part of the Southwest Quarter of Section 30 in
Township 44 North Range 2 East of the 3rd P.M., The Plat of which subdivision is
recorded in Book 26 of Plats on Page 143 in the Recorder’s Office of Winnebago
County, Illinois. Said subdivision is above and hereinafter referred to as the
“Subdivision.” (A true and accurate copy of said Plat is attached hereto and
marked as Exhibit “A”)
10. Upon the plat of the “Subdivision” there is an area designated as “parking lot”
(hereinafter referred to as “parking lot”), which is legally described as.
A part of the Subdivision of part of Block 1 Stockholm Park Subdivision

of a part of the Southwest Quarter of Section 30 in Township 44 North
Range 2 East of the 3rd P.M., The Plat of which subdivision is recorded in
Book 26 of Plats on Page 143 in the Recorder’s Office of Winnebago
County, Illinois; bounded and described as follows, to-witness: beginning
at the Southeast Corner of Lot 4, of said subdivision, being a point on the
East line of said subdivision, a distance of 132.36 feet, South of the
Northeast Corner of said Subdivision; thence West along the South line of
said lot 4 and an extension thereof, a distance of 81.52 feet to the
Northeast corner of Lot 6, in said Subdivision; thence South along the East
line of said Lot 6, a distance of 55 feet, to the South line of said
Subdivision; thence East along said South line of said subdivision, a
distance of 81.72 feet, to the Southeast corner of said Subdivision; thence
North along the East line of said Subdivision, a distance of 55 feet, to the
place of beginning.
11. The ELIZABETH S. REENTS FAMILY TRUST is the owner of the "real
property and improvements located at 910 & 914 24th St. Rockford, IL, and more
specifically described as Lots 5 & 6 as designated upon the Plat of Subdivision of
part of Block 1 Stockholm Park Subdivision of a part of the Southwest Quarter of
Section 30 in Township 44 North Range 2 East of the 3rd P.M., The Plat of which
subdivision is recorded in Book 26 of Plats on Page 143 in the Recorder’s Office
of Winnebago County, Illinois situated in Winnebago County, State of Illinois;
and an easement appurtenant in gross to the area designated as the driveway
easement and parking lot as designated upon said Plat of Subdivision of part of
Block 1 Stockholm Park Subdivision of a part of the Southwest Quarter of
Section 30 in Township 44 North Range 2 East of the 3rd P.M., The Plat of which
subdivision is recorded in Book 26 of Plats on Page 143 in the Recorder’s Office
of Winnebago County, Illinois.
12. Plaintiff is the owner of an easement appurtenant to the real property described in
paragraph 10 of this complaint. The easement consists of an easement in gross to
the area designated as the driveway easement and parking lot as afore described
including the right-of-way freely to pass by-all means of conveyance over the
aforesaid a strip of land affording plaintiff ingress and egress to and from Plaintiff
property and the use of the parking area as designated upon the plat of said
“Subdivision.” This easement is referred to in this complaint as "the easement."
13. The plat of the subdivision designates six (6) lots and a separate parking lot with a
driveway easement. Said driveway easement runs across the northernmost part of
lot five (5) to the aforesaid parking lot, and the parking lot is adjacent to the
easternmost portions of lots five (5) and six (6).
14. Paul C. Rosenquist, the subdivider, conveyed lot #6 of said subdivision to Richard
K. Freeberg and Louise V. Freeberg, husband and wife as joint tenants and not as
tenants in common (Document Number 1025739, Book 1290 Page 378
Winnebago County Recorder of Deeds dated September 28, 1961), subject to all
easements and restrictions of record. (A true and accurate copy of which is
attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “B”)
15. Paul C. Rosenquist, the subdivider, conveyed lot #5 of said subdivision to

ELIZABETH S. REENTS and HELEN LONGSHORE as joint tenants and not
as tenants in common (Document Number 1040737, Book 1333 Page 10
Winnebago County Recorder of Deeds dated June 26, 1962), subject to all
easements and restrictions of record. ((A true and accurate copy of which is
attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “C”)
16. Richard K. Freeberg and Louise V. Freeberg, husband and wife as joint tenants
and not as tenants in common conveyed lot #6 of said subdivision to
ELIZABETH S. REENTS and HELEN LONGSHORE as joint tenants and not
as tenants in common (Document Number 1112170, Book 1518 Page 181
Winnebago County Recorder of Deeds dated June 2, 1965), subject to all
attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “D”)
17. ELIZABETH S. REENTS has had a continueous uninterrupted interest (either

as titleholder or beneficiary of a land trust) in said lots five (5) and six (6) since
their acquisition as stated above.
18. As owner of the easement, plaintiff is entitled to the rights and privileges over,
through, and on the easement as alleged elsewhere herein.
19. Paul C. Rosenquist, the subdivider, conveyed lot #2 of said subdivision to

Norman H. Nielsen, a bachelor (Document Number 1921746, Book 1279 Page
482 Winnebago County Recorder of Deeds dated August 11, 1961), subject to all
attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “E”)
20. Paul C. Rosenquist, the subdivider, conveyed lot #1 of said subdivision to Emmett
J. Gray and Louise C. Gray, husband and wife as joint tenants and not as tenants
in common (Book 1260 Page 537 Winnebago County Recorder of Deeds dated
April 28, 1961), subject to all easements and restrictions of record. (A true and
accurate copy of which is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “F”)
21. On or about June 10, 1964 Norman H. Nielsen, a bachelor conveyed a quit claim
deed to Eugene Aspling conveying all interest in the property designated upon the
plat of the “Subdivision” as the “parking lot.” (Book 1476 Page 477 and dated
June 10, 1964). (A true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto and marked
as Exhibit “G”)
22. Defendants, DEAN IMPEY, CATHERINE IMPEY, are owners of a portion of

the real property subject to the easement described as “parking lot” in the
aforesaid plat of said subdivision by way of Quit claim deeds from their
predecessors in title Paul C. Rosenquist to Eugene Aspling (document 1096840
dated September 22, 1964 a true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto
and marked as Exhibit “H”) and Norman Nielsen (owner of Lot #2, Book 1476
Page 477 and dated June 10, 1964, Exhibit “G”)
23. Plaintiff received the letter attached as Exhibit “I” from the defendants DEAN
IMPEY, CATHERINE IMPEY.
24. The plaintiff is informed and believes based upon conversations with the
defendant, DEAN IMPEY, that the defendants intend to build upon the aforesaid
easements and on that basis alleges, that defendants claim interests adverse to
plaintiff's title, to the easement. These claims are without any right and defendants
have no right, title, estate, exceeding plaintiff’s title to the easement.
25. The parcels of Plaintiff and Defendants are contiguous and were in the past
owned by the same individual, Paul C. Rosenquist.
26. Plaintiff and Defendant thus have a common grantor to their respective parcels.
The conveyance to Plaintiff’s predecessor by the common grantor left the rear
portion of Plaintiff’s property “landlocked” so that Plaintiff has no practical
access to city streets and more particularly to 24th Street, thus leaving the rear
portion of Plaintiff’s property cut off from access to a road for the purpose of
entering or exiting the garages at the rear of her premises. Further, customers
would be unable to access Plaintiff’s parking area located at the back of the
business if Defendants construct the fence on the property line.
27. The common grantor of the parties Paul C. Rosenquist designed and built the
dwellings located on 910 and 914 24th Street including the garages that are located
on the East end of said properties.
28. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to enforce interference with the aforesaid
easement.
29. Plaintiff seeks determination of her title to the easement in this action.
30. That Plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits of their complaint.

Plaintiff requests judgment against defendant for:
A. Judgment quieting plaintiff’s title to easement and that defendants have no

right, title or interest superseding plaintiff’s title to the easement;
B. That Defendants, their agents and servants and each of them, be

temporarily and permanently be enjoining and restraining from the placing or
construction of any fence or other obstruction on the “parking lot” or “easement”
which would interfere with Plaintiff access to any part of 910 or 914 24th Street
or the aforesaid “parking lot.”
C. That Defendants, their agents and servants and each of them, be

temporarily and permanently be enjoined and restrained from any interference
with Plaintiff access to any part of 910 or 914 24th Street or the aforesaid
“parking lot.”
D. Attorney fees and costs incurred in this action; and
E. Such other and further relief as this court may deem just and proper.
COUNT II
EASEMENT BY NECESSITY
NOW COMES the Plaintiff, ELIZABETH S. REENTS, by and through their
attorney, Mark Rouleau, and for this Count I of their Complaint against Defendant(s)
DEAN IMPEY, CATHERINE IMPEY, DCCI ENTERPRISES, INC., ROCKFORD

LOCAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and UNKNOWN OWNERS (Doe #1
– Doe #10) and states as follows:
1 – 30. The plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1

31. The parcels of Plaintiff and Defendants are contiguous and were in the past
owned by the same individual, Paul C. Rosenquist.
32. Plaintiff and Defendant thus have a common grantor to their respective parcels.
The conveyance to Plaintiff’s predecessor by the common grantor left the rear
portion of Plaintiff’s property “landlocked” so that Plaintiff has no practical
access to city streets and more particularly to 24th Street, thus leaving the rear
portion of Plaintiff’s property cut off from access to a road for the purpose of
entering or exiting the garages at the rear of her premises. Further, customers
would unable to access Plaintiff’s parking area located at the back of the business
if Defendants construct the fence on the property line.
33. By reason of the preceding, Plaintiff is entitled to an easement of necessity along,
through, or over Defendant’s land to the driveway easement located on the
northern edge of Lot #5 allowing ingress and egress to 24th Street and the
“parking lot” as designated upon the Plat of the “Subdivision.”
34. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and Defendant
concerning their respective rights and duties in that Plaintiff contends it has or is
entitled to an easement by necessity and Defendant disputes this contention and
contends there is no easement by necessity.
35. That Plaintiff was advised on August 10, 2007 and since that time that Defendants
intend to prevent the plaintiff and her customers from ingress and egress to the
garages located at the eastern end of 914 and 910 24th Street and that the
defendants intend to build on said land and to fence said land off to the rear of the
both parcels which would make access to the garages and “parking lot” practically
impossible.
36. Plaintiff desires a judicial determination of their rights and duties, and declaration
as to the extent and parameters of the easement. That declaration is necessary and
appropriate at this time in order that Plaintiff may ascertain their rights and duties.
37. Plaintiff has no plain, adequate, speedy remedy at law to obtain an easement by
necessity.
38. Plaintiff will suffer certain irreparable loss without the ability to gain ingress and
egress to the rear areas of the property for the purpose of her and her customers
accessing the garages with little or no corresponding injury or expense to the
Defendants.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against defendant as follows:
A. Declaration that plaintiff has or is entitled to an easement by necessity over
defendant’s property;
B. Declaration of the extent and parameters of the easement;
C. That Defendants, their agents and servants and each of them, be temporarily
and permanently be enjoining and restraining from the placing or construction of any
fence or other obstruction on the “parking lot,” “easement” or “driveway easement”
which would interfere with Plaintiff access to any part of 910 or 914 24th Street or the
aforesaid “parking lot.”

D. That Defendants, their agents and servants and each of them, be temporarily
and permanently be enjoined and restrained from any interference with Plaintiff access to
any part of 910 or 914 24th Street or the aforesaid “parking lot.”
E. Any other and further relief as the court may deem proper.
COUNT III
EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION
attorney, Mark Rouleau, and for this Count III of their Complaint against Defendant(s)

– Doe #10) states as follows:
31. That both parcels were owned in common by Paul C. Rosenquist until September
28, 1961 and June 26, 1962, when he sold one (1) of the properties (lot #6) now
owned by the Plaintiff to Richard K. Freeberg and Louise V. Freeberg and in and
June 26, 1962, when he sold Lot #5 to ELIZABETH S. REENTS and Helen
Longshore for use as multifamily residential dwellings.
32. That at the time of conveyance, the only way for vehicles to enter the rear of 910
& 914 24th Street and the “parking lot” as designated upon the plat of the
“Subdivision,” for which the “parking lot” remains today, was by using the
driveway along the property line of Lot #5 and the “parking lot” located to the
south of Lot #4 of said “Subdivision.”
33. That Freeberg, Reents and all subsequent owners of 910 & 914 24th Street,
including the Plaintiff have, since 1966, used the common driveway along the
North property line of Lot #5 and the “parking lot” to the south of Lot #4 to
access the rear of said 910 & 914 24th Street for the purpose of accessing the
garages and parking lot and other business purposes.
34. By reason of the preceding, Plaintiff is entitled to an easement by implication

along, through, or over Defendant’s land to access the “parking lot” and garages
on the rear of 910 & 914 24th Street.
35. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and Defendant
concerning their respective rights and duties in that Plaintiff contends it has or is
entitled to an easement by implication and Defendant disputes this contention and
contends there is no easement by implication.
impossible.
38. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law to obtain an easement by implication.
39. Plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss without the ability to gain ingress and egress
to the rear areas of the property and “parking lot” for the purpose of accessing the
aforesaid garages and “parking lot” and as a result of which Plaintiff would be
unable to access said areas with little or no corresponding injury or expense to the
Defendants.
40. That Plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits of her complaint.

A. Declaration that plaintiff has or is entitled to an easement by implication over
fence or other obstruction on the “parking lot” or “easement” which would interfere with
Plaintiff access to any part of 910 or 914 24th Street or the aforesaid “parking lot.”
any part of 910 24th Street or the aforesaid “parking lot.”
COUNT IV
EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION
attorney, Mark Rouleau, and for this Count IV of their Complaint against Defendant(s)
through 30 in Count I as the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 30 of Count IV
31. That Plaintiff and their predecessors in title at 910 & 914 24th Street, since 1966,
have openly, continuously and exclusively used the common driveway along the
North property line of Lot #5 to the “Subdivision” and the “parking lot” as
designated upon the plat of the “Subdivision” to access the “parking lot” and rear
of said 910 & 914 24th Street for the purpose of using the garages and “parking
lot.”
32. That since 1966, Plaintiff and their predecessors in title at 910 & 914 24th Street
have used the driveway and “parking lot” with the knowledge and acquiescence
of the owners of Lot #4 of said “Subdivision.”
33. That since 1966 until August of 2007, Plaintiff and their predecessors in title at
910 & 914 24th Street have had uninterrupted used of the driveway and “parking
lot” as designated upon the Plat of the “Subdivision.”
34. That Plaintiff presently intends to retain exclusive use of the subject driveway and
“parking lot.”
impossible.
42. That Defendant’s proposed fence and continued interference with Plaintiff’s use
of the common driveway and “parking lot” will cause substantial irreparable
injury and harm to Plaintiff’s business and property with little or no
corresponding injury or expense to the Defendants.
44. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.

A. Declaration that plaintiff has or is entitled to an easement by prescription over
defendant’s property in the area designated upon the plat of the “Subdivision” as the
“parking lot”;
fence or other obstruction which would interfere with Plaintiff access to any part of 910
& 914 24th Street or the “parking lot.”
any part of 910 24th Street or the “parking lot.”
COUNT V
EASEMENT BY ESTOPPEL
attorney, Mark Rouleau, and for this Count V of their Complaint against Defendant(s)
31. That in June 26, 1962, Plaintiff trustee, through her predecessor in title,
ELIZABETH S. REENTS, purchased Lot #5 to be used as a multi family
residence.
32. In June 2, 1965 Plaintiff trustee, through her predecessor in title, ELIZABETH S.
REENTS, purchased Lot #6 to be used as a multi family residence.
33. That as soon as the Plaintiff opened the four (4) family residence on Lot #5 for
business, cars began using the driveway and “parking lot” as designated on the
Plat of the “Subdivision” to park in the garages on said properties and to park in
the “parking lot.”
34. In 1968 in reliance on the existence of reasonable access to the rear of Lot #6
based on previous usage without objection or protest from the owner of Lots #1,
2, 3 & 4 or their predecessors in title, Plaintiff began construction of permanent
and valuable improvements to the premise in the form of a six (6) family
residence on Lot #6 with a parking garage at the rear of said lot at a very
substantial expense.
35. That while construction was proceeding; Plaintiff had numerous conversations
with the owners of Lots 1, 2, 3, & 4, again without any objection or protest being
raised by any of the owners of said lots.
36. That based on the conduct of the owners of Lots 1, 2, 3, & 4, Plaintiff reasonably
believed she had an easement over and to the driveway and “parking lot” as
designated on the Plat of the “Subdivision.”
37. Only more than 30 years after Plaintiff completed construction of the six (6)
family dwelling and parking garage at the rear of Lot #6 addition did defendants
DEAN IMPEY, CATHERINE IMPEY began to threaten interference with
Plaintiff’s use of the driveway and “parking lot.”
impossible.
39. That based on the foregoing, Defendants should be estopped from denying
Plaintiff use of the driveway and “parking lot” as designated on the Plat of the
“Subdivision.”
41. That Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.

A. Declaration that plaintiff has or is entitled to an easement by estoppel over
COUNT VI
IRREVOCABLE LICENSE
attorney, Mark Rouleau, and for this Count VI of their Complaint against Defendant(s)
31. That based on the conduct of the Defendants predecessors in title, Plaintiff
reasonably believed she had permission to use the driveway and “parking lot” as
designated on the Plat of the “Subdivision” and constructed valuable and
permanent improvements on Lots 5 & 6 in reliance thereon which could only be
reached by use of said driveway and “parking lot”.
32. That based on the foregoing, Plaintiff has an irrevocable license to use the
driveway and “parking lot” as designated on the Plat of the “Subdivision.”
33. That only after Plaintiff completed construction of the warehouse addition did
Defendants DEAN IMPEY, CATHERINE IMPEY threatens interfering with
Plaintiff’s use of the driveway and “parking lot.”
impossible.
35. That permitting Defendants to revoke said license, after Plaintiff had made
valuable and permanent improvements to Lots 5 & 6, which can only be reached
by using the driveway, and “parking lot” as designated on the Plat of the
“Subdivision” would operate as a fraud on the Plaintiff.
37. That Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.

A. Declaration that plaintiff and her customers have or are entitled to an
irrevocable license over defendant’s property;
B. Declaration of the extent and parameters of the license;
ELIZABETH S. REENTS
By:
Mark A. Rouleau
VERIFICATION BY CERTIFICATION
Under penalties provided by law, ELIZABETH S. REENTS, Plaintiff herein,
certifies that she has read the foregoing and that the statements contained therein are true
and correct, except for matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to
such matters, the undersigned certifies that she verily believe same to be true.
_________________________
ELIZABETH S. REENTS
Mark A. Rouleau
(815) 229-7246
Verified Complaint – Quite Title
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO
<<PLAINTIFF>>,
Plaintiff, In Chancery
vs. CASE NO. 05 CH 823
WILHELM KUNZ,
Defendant.
COMPLAINT
NOW COMES the plaintiff <<PLAINTIFF>>, by and through her attorney

Mark Rouleau and for her complaint states the following:
1. On June 1, 2005 and prior to that time the plaintiff owned in fee and possessed
real estate and premises located in Winnebago County, Illinois, and described as
follows:
Lots 194-195 as designated upon the plat of Factory addition to the city of
Rockford, the plat of which addition is recorded in Book 11 of Plats on page
9 in the recorder’s office of Winnebago County Illinois situated in
Winnebago County, Illinois.
Said property is commonly known as 2629 Hanson Street Rockford, Illinois

61104 with a PIN of 15-01-127-018.
Being financially distressed and facing mortgage foreclosure the plaintiff placed her
home for sale.
2. The plaintiff had received offers to purchase her home in excess of $50,000 and
one for $48,000.
3. Said property has an assessed value of $22,325 with a fair market value of
$50,000.00. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “A” is a true and accurate copy
of the current Winnebago County Supervisor of Assessment’s information for the
property commonly known as 2629 Hanson Street Rockford, Illinois 61104 with a
PIN of 15-01-127-018.
4. Said property had a judgment for foreclosure constituting a lien for $24,070.99
against said property.
5. On June 1, 2005, in the evening the defendant WILHELM KUNZ and others
came to the plaintiff’s home. The plaintiff had been drinking alcohol and was
intoxicated at the time that the defendant came to her home.
6. At said meeting, at the plaintiff’s home, the defendant WILHELM KUNZ had the
plaintiff sign the attached undated “CASH SALE REAL ESTATE SALES
CONTRACT” that contains no purchase price and requires the plaintiff to convey to
the purchaser good title free and clear from any mortgages. Attached hereto and
marked as Exhibit “B” is a true and accurate copy of the aforesaid CASH SALE
REAL ESTATE SALES CONTRACT.
7. At said meeting, the defendant had the plaintiff complete the AUTHORIZATION
TO RELEASE MORTGAGE INFORMATION, which on its face indicates that the
property was subject to a mortgage default. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit
“C” is a true and accurate copy of the AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE
MORTGAGE INFORMATION.
8. The defendant WILHELM KUNZ knew that said property was encumbered by a
mortgage and was aware of the mortgage foreclosure judgment against said property.
9. At said meeting at plaintiff’s home, the defendant WILHELM KUNZ had the
plaintiff sign the attached undated “Warranty Deed” along with himself. Attached
hereto and marked as Exhibit “D” is a true and accurate copy of the deed as it was
prior to its recording.
10. After the time the parties signed the deed it was altered before being recorded.
The deed and Plat Act Affidavit as recorded are attached hereto and marked as
Exhibit “E”
11. The deed on its face states that it was prepared by one Mary Kaye Graham of
1401 9th Street, Rockford, IL 61104 although she is neither a grantor or grantee to
said transaction and is not an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois.
12. The Plat Act Affidavit (Exhibit “E” page 3) purports to have been signed by a
Mary Kaye Graham claiming under oath to be a resident of 2629 Hanson Street,
Rockford, Illinois. Mary Kaye Graham was not then and is not now a resident of said
property as the plaintiff along with Michael Harezlak were the only residents of said
property at said time.
13. The aforesaid deed called for the defendant WILHELM KUNZ to pay the plaintiff
$10.00 and other consideration. The defendant has never paid the plaintiff any sum
of money for said deed.
14. That at the aforesaid meeting the defendant WILHELM KUNZ had the plaintiff
and another resident of her home Michael Harezlak sign an undated three-month lease
for her home. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “F” is a true and accurate copy
the aforesaid lease.
15. That at the aforesaid meeting the defendant WILHELM KUNZ and the plaintiff
signed a bill of sale for her personal property at her home for $400. Attached hereto
and marked as Exhibit “G” is a true and accurate copy of the aforesaid bill of sale.
16. The aforesaid bill of sale called for the defendant WILHELM KUNZ to pay the
plaintiff $400.00 and other consideration. The defendant has never paid the plaintiff
any sum of money for said goods.
17. Although, the deed was altered after and no sum of money was ever paid to the
plaintiff by the defendant WILHELM KUNZ, the aforesaid deed was recorded with
the Winnebago County Recorder of Deeds.
18. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “H” is a true and accurate copy of a letter
that the plaintiff received from Wells Fargo Home Mortgage indicating that the
mortgage that was the subject of the foreclosure suit is still in full force and effect in
her name.
19. That on or about July 13, 2005 the plaintiff received a demand for rent from the
defendant WILHELM KUNZ. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “I” is a true
and accurate copy of said demand for rent.
20. The plaintiff stands prepared to do equity.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays that this court enter a judgment:
Declaring the Warranty Deed and Record void and ordering them canceled;
Reinvesting the plaintiff with all possession and title of and to the real estate and
premises
That plaintiff may have any other relief the court deems equitable and proper; and
For plaintiff’s costs in this action.
COUNT II
NOW COMES the plaintiff <<PLAINTIFF>>, by and through her attorney

Mark Rouleau and for her additional complaint adding the defendant, JOHN FOX,
complaining of the defendant JOHN FOX as follows:
1. On June 1, 2005 and prior to that time the plaintiff owned in fee and possessed real
estate and premises located in Winnebago County, Illinois, and described as follows:
Lots 194-195 as designated upon the plat of Factory addition to the city of
Rockford, the plat of which addition is recorded in Book 11 of Plats on page
9 in the recorder’s office of Winnebago County Illinois situated in
Winnebago County, Illinois.
Said property is commonly known as 2629 Hanson Street Rockford, Illinois

61104 with a PIN of 15-01-127-018.
Being financially distressed and facing mortgage foreclosure the plaintiff placed her
home for sale.
2. The plaintiff had received offers to purchase her home in excess of $50,000 and one
for $48,000.
3. Said property has an assessed value of $22,325 with a fair market value of
$50,000.00. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “A” is a true and accurate copy
of the current Winnebago County Supervisor of Assessment’s information for the
property commonly known as 2629 Hanson Street Rockford, Illinois 61104 with a
PIN of 15-01-127-018.
4. Said property had a judgment for foreclosure constituting a lien for $24,070.99
against said property.
5. On June 1, 2005, in the evening the defendant, JOHN FOX, and others came to the
plaintiff’s home. The plaintiff had been drinking alcohol and was intoxicated at the
time that the defendant came to her home.
6. At said meeting, at the plaintiff’s home, the defendant, JOHN FOX, and other
persons had the plaintiff sign the attached undated “CASH SALE REAL ESTATE
SALES CONTRACT” that contains no purchase price and requires the plaintiff to
convey to the purchaser good title free and clear from any mortgages. Attached
hereto and marked as Exhibit “B” is a true and accurate copy of the aforesaid CASH
SALE REAL ESTATE SALES CONTRACT.
7. At said meeting, the defendant, JOHN FOX, and other persons had the plaintiff
complete the AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE MORTGAGE INFORMATION,
which on its face indicates that the property was subject to a mortgage default.
Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “C” is a true and accurate copy of the
AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE MORTGAGE INFORMATION.
8. The defendant, JOHN FOX, knew that said property was encumbered by a mortgage
and was aware of the mortgage foreclosure judgment against said property.
9. At said meeting at plaintiff’s home, the defendant, JOHN FOX, and other persons
had the plaintiff sign the attached undated “Warranty Deed”. Attached hereto and
marked as Exhibit “D” is a true and accurate copy of the deed as it was prior to its
recording.
10. After the time the plaintiff signed the deed it was altered before being recorded. The
deed and Plat Act Affidavit as recorded are attached hereto and marked as Exhibit
“E”
11. Upon information and belief prior to and during the events complained of herein the
defendant, JOHN FOX, one Mary Kaye Graham had a personal and or business
relationship with Mary Kaye Graham.
12. The deed on its face states that it was prepared by one Mary Kaye Graham of 1401 9th
Street, Rockford, IL 61104 although she is neither a grantor or grantee to said
transaction and is not an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois.
13. The Plat Act Affidavit (Exhibit “E” page 3) purports to have been signed by a Mary
Kaye Graham claiming under oath to be a resident of 2629 Hanson Street, Rockford,
Illinois. Mary Kaye Graham was not then and is not now a resident of said property
as the plaintiff along with Michael Harezlak were the only residents of said property
at said time.
14. The aforesaid deed called for the defendant WILHELM KUNZ to pay the plaintiff
$10.00 and other consideration. The defendant, WILHELM KUNZ, has never paid
the plaintiff any sum of money for said deed.
15. That at the aforesaid meeting the defendant, JOHN FOX, and others had the plaintiff
and another resident of her home Michael Harezlak sign an undated three-month lease
for her home. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “F” is a true and accurate copy
the aforesaid lease.
16. That at the aforesaid meeting the defendant WILHELM KUNZ and the plaintiff
signed a bill of sale for her personal property at her home for $400. Attached hereto
and marked as Exhibit “G” is a true and accurate copy of the aforesaid bill of sale.
17. The aforesaid bill of sale called for the defendant WILHELM KUNZ to pay the
plaintiff $400.00 and other consideration. The defendant has never paid the plaintiff
any sum of money for said goods.
18. Although, the deed was altered after and no sum of money was ever paid to the
plaintiff by the defendant WILHELM KUNZ, the aforesaid deed was recorded with
the Winnebago County Recorder of Deeds.
19. The defendant, JOHN FOX, has never paid any sum of money to the plaintiff.
20. Upon information and belief prior to the time of execution of the deed from the
plaintiff to the defendant, WILHELM KUNZ, the defendant, JOHN FOX, reached
an agreement to transfer the aforesaid subject property to the defendant, JOHN FOX.
21. After WILHELM KUNZ obtained a deed from the plaintiff he transferred title to the
aforesaid subject property to the defendant, JOHN FOX, by way of a Warranty Deed
a copy of which is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “J.”
22. Mary Kaye Graham prepared Exhibit “J” for WILHELM KUNZ and the defendant,
JOHN FOX.
23. At the time that Mary Kaye Graham prepared Exhibit “J” for WILHELM KUNZ and
the defendant, JOHN FOX, she was not a licensed attorney in the State of Illinois.
24. At the time that Mary Kaye Graham prepared Exhibit “J” the defendant, JOHN FOX,
knew that she was not a licensed attorney in the State of Illinois.
25. At the time that the defendant, JOHN FOX, filed Exhibit “J” he also caused to be
filed Exhibit “K” with the Winnebago County Recorder of Deeds.
26. Exhibit “K” is an Affidavit of Exception to the Plat Act 765 ILCS 205 and was signed
by Mary Kaye Graham on or about July 14, 2005.
27. At the time that Mary Kaye Graham prepared Exhibit “K” the defendant, JOHN
FOX, knew that Mary Kaye Graham had not resided in the premises commonly
known as 2629 Hanson Street Rockford, Illinois 61104 with a PIN of 15-01-127-018.
28. In spite of his knowledge that Mary Kaye Graham had not resided in the premises
commonly known as 2629 Hanson Street Rockford, Illinois 61104 with a PIN of 15-
01-127-018, JOHN FOX, filed Exhibit “K” knowing the statement of Mary Kaye
Graham that she resided at the subject property to be false.
29. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “H” is a true and accurate copy of a letter that
the plaintiff received from Wells Fargo Home Mortgage indicating that the mortgage
that was the subject of the foreclosure suit is still in full force and effect in her name.
30. That on or about July 13, 2005 the plaintiff received a demand for rent from the
defendant, JOHN FOX, and others. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “I” is a
true and accurate copy of said demand for rent.
31. At the time that the defendant, JOHN FOX, obtained an interest in the subject
property he knew that when the plaintiff signed the deed to WILHELM KUNZ that
the plaintiff had been drinking alcohol and was intoxicated.
property he was aware that the plaintiff had not received any monies for the sale of
her home.
property he knew that Mary Kaye Graham drafted the deed from the plaintiff to
WILHELM KUNZ.
property he knew that Mary Kaye Graham was not an employee of the plaintiff at the
time that Mary Kaye Graham drafted the deed from the plaintiff to WILHELM
KUNZ.
property he knew that Mary Kaye Graham was not a attorney licensed in the State of
Illinois at the time that she drafted the deed from the plaintiff to WILHELM KUNZ.
property he knew that Mary Kaye Graham had made changes to the face of the deed
from the plaintiff to WILHELM KUNZ, after the plaintiff signed that deed and prior
to the recording of the deed.
property he knew that Mary Kaye Graham had not resided in the premises commonly
known as 2629 Hanson Street Rockford, Illinois 61104 with a PIN of 15-01-127-018.
38. The plaintiff stands prepared to do equity.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays that this court enter a judgment:
Declaring the Warranty Deed and Record void and ordering them canceled;
Reinvesting the plaintiff with all possession and title of and to the real estate and
premises
That plaintiff may have any other relief the court deems equitable and proper; and
For plaintiff’s costs in this action.
<<PLAINTIFF>>
By:
Mark A. Rouleau
State of Illinois
County of Winnebago } Ss
I, <<PLAINTIFF>> under the penalties of perjury as provided for in the Code of

Civil Procedure do depose and state that the information contained in this complaint is
true and to correct the best my knowledge.
Mark A. Rouleau
5301 E. State St., Suite 215D <<PLAINTIFF>>
(815) 229-7246
Medical Malpractice – Medical Student – Perforated Uterus – Affidavit of Merit
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO
<<PLAINTIFF>>,
Plaintiff, At Law
vs. CASE NO.
<<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, and

<<DEFENDANT MEDICAL
PROFESSOR>>.,
Defendant.
NOW COMES, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, and for her complaint against the
defendants states the following:
COUNT 1
NOW COMES, the plaintiff <<PLAINTIFF>>, and for her first cause of action
against the defendant <<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, MD states the following to-wit:
1 The defendant, <<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, MD, at all times alleged herein was
and is a medical resident student of UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF
MEDICINE ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS.
2 At all times relevant to the allegations contained in this complaint the defendant,
<<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, MD, was affiliated with the defendant
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF MEDICINE ROCKFORD,
ILLINOIS as a resident student.
3 At all times relevant to the allegations contained in this complaint defendant,
<<DEFENDANT MEDICAL PROFESSOR>>, MD, was affiliated with the
defendant UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF MEDICINE
ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS as a doctor supervising resident students in the family
medicine program.
<<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, MD, and <<DEFENDANT MEDICAL
PROFESSOR>>, MD were employees and/or agents under the direction, control
and/or supervision of UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF MEDICINE
ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS.
<<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, MD, was under the direct supervision and
direction of the defendant <<DEFENDANT MEDICAL PROFESSOR>>, MD as a
resident student.
6 At all relevant times herein, the Defendant, <<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, MD,
held herself out to the public as a competent and skilled physician for the diagnosis
and treatment of human ailments, diseases and injuries.
7 At all relevant times herein, the Defendant, <<DEFENDANT MEDICAL
PROFESSOR>>, MD, held himself out to the public as a competent and skilled
physician for the diagnosis and treatment of human ailments, diseases and injuries.
8 At all relevant times herein, the UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF
MEDICINE ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS, held itself out to the public as a competent
and skilled medical institution for the diagnosis and treatment of human ailments,
diseases and injuries.
9 That on or about the 2nd day of June 2005, the defendants <<DEFENDANT
STUDENT>>, MD, and <<DEFENDANT MEDICAL PROFESSOR>>, MD,
inserted a Mirena IUD into the plaintiff <<PLAINTIFF>>.
10 At all relevant times after June 1, 2005, the UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
COLLEGE OF MEDICINE ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS, held out its employees to
the public as nurses, hospital administrators, Doctors and surgeons competent and
skilled in the diagnosis and treatment of human ailments, diseases and injuries.
11 On or about June 2, 2005 the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, was 22 years and 9
months old and then and there had a prospect of having and living a normal and
rewarding life.
12 On June 2, 2005, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, came to the UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF MEDICINE ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS d/b/a
University Family Health Center, 1221 East State Street, Rockford, Illinois 61104.
13 On June 2, 2005, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, came to the aforesaid medical
facility seeking treatment from said facility and its employees for the insertion of a
contraceptive device and other medical treatment.
14 On June 2, 2005, a medical procedure was performed on the plaintiff,
<<PLAINTIFF>>, by the defendant while at the aforesaid clinic.
15 In the course of insertion of the aforementioned IUD the individual defendants
created a false passageway.
16 It is a breech of the standard of care for a reasonably well qualified physician to
create a false passageway while inserting a Mirena IUD.
17 That by creating the aforementioned false passageway in the course of the insertion of
the aforementioned IUD the defendants perforated the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>’s,
uterus.
18 In the course of the medical procedure of inserting the aforementioned IUD the
individual defendants improperly deployed the IUD.
improperly deploy a Mirena IUD.
20 The IUD was not deployed at ≤ 6cm (fundus not felt) and “the insertion was short of
this mark.”
deploy a Mirena IUD where the insertion is short of the desired mark.
22 That as a direct and proximate result of perforating the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>’s,
uterus the plaintiff suffered damages and losses as stated elsewhere herein.
23 As a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s aforementioned conduct the IUD
was placed intraperitoneally and required an operation for its removal.
24 The defendant <<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, MD, was negligent in one (1) or
more of the following respects:
a. The defendants created a false passageway;
b. The defendants did not diagnose that they had created a false passageway; and
c. The defendants improperly deployed the IUD without adequately determining that
it was properly positioned within the plaintiff’s uterus; and
d. She failed to follow the manufactures instructions with respect to the insertion of
the Mirena IUD.
26 As a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s aforementioned negligent conduct
the plaintiff’s uterus was damaged irreversible causing her to suffer from sever,
permanent and disabling procreative injuries and damages. As a result the plaintiff
has suffered a loss of the ability to bring forth children in a normal manner all of
which could have been minimized or cured by proper diagnosis and treatment, By
reason of the injuries sustained the plaintiff has suffered unnecessary pain and mental
anguish, she requires future medical care and attention; she is disabled; she will in the
future lose incur further physical pain and suffering. She has suffered and will
continue in the future to suffer the loss of enjoyment of life for the remainder of her
life. She will continue to remain permanently disabled for the remainder of his life
and will be required to expend sums of money on medical and nursing care for the
remainder of her life seeking to alleviate or cure the created by the treatment of the
defendants.
WHEREFORE, the minor plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, prays that this court enter a
judgment against the defendant, <<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, MD, in an amount in
excess of $50,000.00, plus costs of this action.
COUNT 2
NOW COMES, the plaintiff <<PLAINTIFF>>, and for her first cause of action
against the defendant <<DEFENDANT MEDICAL PROFESSOR>>, MD states the
following to-wit:
1 The defendant, <<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, MD, at all times alleged herein was
and is a medical resident student of UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF
MEDICINE ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS.
<<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, MD, was affiliated with the UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF MEDICINE ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS as a resident
student.
3 At all times relevant to the allegations contained in this complaint defendant,
<<DEFENDANT MEDICAL PROFESSOR>>, MD, was affiliated with the
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF MEDICINE ROCKFORD,
ILLINOIS as a doctor supervising resident students in the family medicine program.
PROFESSOR>>, MD were employees and/or agents under the direction, control
and/or supervision of UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF MEDICINE
ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS.
<<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, MD, as a resident student was under the direct
supervision and direction of the defendant <<DEFENDANT MEDICAL
PROFESSOR>>, MD.
6 At all relevant times herein, the Defendant, <<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, MD,
held herself out to the public as a competent and skilled physician for the diagnosis
and treatment of human ailments, diseases and injuries.
7 At all relevant times herein, the Defendant, <<DEFENDANT MEDICAL
PROFESSOR>>, MD, held himself out to the public as a competent and skilled
physician for the diagnosis and treatment of human ailments, diseases and injuries.
8 At all relevant times herein, the UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF
MEDICINE ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS, held itself out to the public as a competent
and skilled medical institution for the diagnosis and treatment of human ailments,
diseases and injuries.
9 That on or about the 2nd day of June 2005, the individual defendants
PROFESSOR>>, MD, inserted a Mirena IUD into the plaintiff <<PLAINTIFF>>.
10 At all relevant times after June 1, 2005, the UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
COLLEGE OF MEDICINE ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS, held out its employees to
the public as nurses, hospital administrators, Doctors and surgeons competent and
skilled in the diagnosis and treatment of human ailments, diseases and injuries.
11 On or about June 2, 2005 the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, was 22 years and 9
months old and then and there had a prospect of having and living a normal and
rewarding life.
12 On June 2, 2005, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, came to the UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF MEDICINE ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS d/b/a
University Family Health Center, 1221 East State Street, Rockford, Illinois 61104.
13 On June 2, 2005, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, came to the aforesaid medical
facility seeking treatment from said facility and its employees for the insertion of a
contraceptive device and other medical treatment.
14 On June 2, 2005, a medical procedure was performed on the plaintiff,
<<PLAINTIFF>>, while at the aforesaid clinic.
15 In the course of insertion of the aforementioned IUD the individual defendants
created a false passageway.
create a false passageway while inserting a Mirena IUD.
17 That by creating the aforementioned false passageway in the course of the insertion of
the aforementioned IUD the defendants perforated the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>’s,
uterus.
18 In the course of the medical procedure of inserting the aforementioned IUD the
individual defendants improperly deployed the IUD.
improperly deploy a Mirena IUD.
20 The IUD was not deployed at ≤ 6cm (fundus not felt) and “the insertion was short of
this mark.”
deploy a Mirena IUD where the insertion is short of the desired mark.
22 That as a direct and proximate result of perforating the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>’s,
uterus the plaintiff suffered damages and losses as stated elsewhere herein.
23 As a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s aforementioned conduct the IUD
was placed intraperitoneally and required an operation for its removal.
24 The defendant <<DEFENDANT MEDICAL PROFESSOR>>, MD, was negligent
in one (1) or more of the following respects:
a. The defendants created a false passageway;
b. The defendants did not diagnose that they had created a false passageway; and
c. The defendants improperly deployed the IUD without adequately determining that
it was properly positioned within the plaintiff’s uterus;
d. He failed to properly and sufficiently supervise and control the conduct of the
defendant student <<DEFENDANT STUDENT>> who was acting under his
supervision at the time of the events complained of herein.
27 As a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s aforementioned negligent conduct
the plaintiff’s uterus was damaged irreversible causing her to suffer from sever,
permanent and disabling procreative injuries and damages. As a result the plaintiff
has suffered a loss of the ability to bring forth children in a normal manner all of
which could have been minimized or cured by proper diagnosis and treatment, By
reason of the injuries sustained the plaintiff has suffered unnecessary pain and mental
anguish, she requires future medical care and attention; she is disabled; she will in the
future lose incur further physical pain and suffering. She has suffered and will
continue in the future to suffer the loss of enjoyment of life for the remainder of her
life. She will continue to remain permanently disabled for the remainder of his life
and will be required to expend sums of money on medical and nursing care for the
remainder of her life seeking to alleviate or cure the created by the treatment of the
defendants.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, prays that this court enter a

judgment against the defendant, <<DEFENDANT MEDICAL PROFESSOR>>, MD,
in an amount in excess of $50,000.00, plus costs of this action.
<<PLAINTIFF>>
By:
Mark A. Rouleau
Mark A. Rouleau
(815) 229-7246
Affidavit of Merit
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO
<<PLAINTIFF>>,
Plaintiff, At Law
vs. CASE NO.
<<DEFENDANT STUDENT>>, and

<<DEFENDANT MEDICAL
PROFESSOR>>.,
Defendant.
AFFIDAVIT OF MERITS
State of Illinois
County of Winnebago } Ss
I, Mark Rouleau, under the penalties of perjury as provided for in 735 ILCS 5/1-
109 of the Code of Civil Procedure do depose and state that the information contained in
this motion is to correct the best my knowledge.
1. I am over the age of twenty-one.
2. I am not under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of swearing to this
affidavit.
3. I am not treating for any condition that would impair my judgment or am I

suffering from any such condition.
4. This cause of action arises for treatment on or about June 4, 2005 predating P.A.
94-677, § 330, eff. Aug. 25, 2005; the amendments in said act specifically
providing “(j) The changes to this Section made by this amendatory Act of the
94th General Assembly apply to causes of action accruing on or after its effective
date.”
5. That I have consulted and reviewed the facts of the case with a health professional
who I reasonably believe:
a) Is knowledgeable in the relevant issues involved in the particular action;
b) Practices or has practiced within the last 6 years or teaches or has taught
within the last 6 years in the same area of health care or medicine that is at
issue in the particular action; and
c) Is qualified by experience or demonstrated competence in the subject of

the case;
6. The reviewing health professional has determined in a written report, after a

review of the medical record and other relevant material involved in the particular
action that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of such
action; and that the I have concluded on the basis of the reviewing health
professional's review and consultation that there is a reasonable and meritorious
cause for filing of such action.
7. The defendants are physicians licensed under the Medical Practice Act to practice
medicine in all of its branches and the reviewing professional who prepared the
written is a health professional licensed in the same profession, with the same
class of license, as the defendants.
8. A copy of the written report, clearly identifying the plaintiff and the reasons for
the reviewing health professional's determination that a reasonable and
meritorious cause for the filing of the action exists, is attached to this affidavit,
but the information which would identify the reviewing health professional has
been deleted from the copy so attached.
9. The affiant further sayeth not.
Mark Rouleau
Forcible Entry & Detainer – Breech of Contract
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO
ABIDON INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMERICAN CLASSIFIEDS OF ROCKFORD, CASE NO.

INC.,
Defendant.
COMPLAINT FORCIBLE DETAINER
NOW COMES the Plaintiff, ABIDON, INC., and complains that the said
Plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the following described premises in the Township
of Rockford, Winnebago County, Illinois, to-wit:
An office suit 3105 located at 5301 E. State St., Rockford, Illinois
and that the Defendant, AMERICAN CLASSIFIEDS OF ROCKFORD, INC.,

unlawfully withhold possession thereof from the said Plaintiff and in support of its
complaint alleges the following:
COUNT I
1. The plaintiff leased the subject premises to the defendant upon the terms of the lease
attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “A”.
2. Exhibit “A” paragraph 18 provides for attorney fees as follows:
“D. Surrender of Posession. Tenant agrees that upon termination of this Lease
in any manner or for any cause, to surrender possession to the Landlord as when
Tennant took possession, ordinary wear and tear excepted. * * *”
“F. Attorney’s Fees and Costs. In the event of default by Tenant of any of the
provisions of this Lease, Tennant shall be responsible for reasonable attorney’s
fees, expenses and costs incurred by the Landlord as a result of such default.”
3. That on October 13, 2006 the lessor ABIDON, INC. (lessor) gave the defendant
AMERICAN CLASSIFIEDS OF ROCKFORD, INC. written notice that the lease
would not be extended further. A copy of the written notice is attached hereto and
marked as Exhibit “B”.
4. Pursuant to the terms of the written notice dated October 13, 2006 the one (1) year
lease agreement dated September 19, 2005 (Exhibit “A”), and that letter of the lessor
(Exhibit “B”), the lease is terminated on December 31, 2006 and would not be
extended further.
5. On December 22, 2006 the plaintiff Abidon Inc. by and through its Secretary Stanley
Miller hand delivered the attached Exhibit “C” to the President of the defendant
JAMES SEARLE further notifying the defendant that they must vacate the property.
Said letter further stated in part:
You are further advised that if you or your company remain in the premises after December 31,
2006 you will be deemed to be holdover tenants and an action will be commenced under the
Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute (735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq.). In addition to eviction the
statutes provide in part:
5/9-202. Wilfully holding over
§ 9-202. Wilfully holding over. If any tenant or any person who is in or comes
into possession of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, by, from or under, or by
collusion with the tenant, wilfully holds over any lands, tenements or hereditaments, after
the expiration of his or her term or terms, and after demand made in writing, for the
possession thereof, by his or her landlord, or the person to whom the remainder or
reversion of such lands, tenements or hereditaments belongs, the person so holding over,
shall, for the time the landlord or rightful owner is so kept out of possession, pay to the
person so kept out of possession, or his or her legal representatives, at the rate of double
the yearly value of the lands, tenements or hereditaments so detained to be recovered by
a civil action. (735 ILCS 5/9-202)
6. On December 22, 2006 at the defendant’s place of business the plaintiff Abidon Inc.
by and through its Secretary Stanley Miller orally informed the defendant by and
through its President JAMES SEARLE, that any and all offers to create a new lease to
said premises were withdrawn and that the tenant was to vacate the premises as of
December 31, 2006 as indicated in the prior letter (Exhibit “A”) dated October 13,
2006 .
7. That after the aforesaid communications both oral and written of December 22, 2006
the defendant American Classifieds of Rockford, Inc. attempted to accept the
aforementioned withdrawn offer to lease the premises under new terms and
conditions, thereby constituting a new offer from the defendant which has not been
and will not be accepted by the plaintiff.
8. On December 28, 2006 the plaintiff Abidon Inc. by and through its Secretary Stanley
Miller hand delivered the attached Exhibit “D” to the place of business for the
defendant further notifying the defendant that they must vacate the property. Said
letter stated:
On December 22, 2006 you were informed in writing that the terms of the one (1) year lease
agreement dated September 19, 2005, and that letter of the lessor, the lease is terminated on
December 31, 2006 and would not be extended further. You were further advised that if you or
your company remain in the premises after December 31, 2006 you will be deemed to be holdover
tenants and an action will be commenced under the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute
(735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq.). You were further informed in person by Mr. Stanley Miller of
Abidon, Inc. when he delivered that letter of December 22, 2006 that all offers from Abidon to
your company to create a new lease relationship between your company and Abidon Inc. were
withdrawn and void. Your attempt to create a new lease relationship between Abidon and
American Classifieds of Rockford, Inc. by executing and delivering the withdrawn offer after the
time of its withdrawal is void. See for example Rothenbuecher v. Tockstein, (Ill.App. 5 Dist.
1980) 411 N.E.2d 92, 88 Ill.App.3d 968. Your offer to enter into a contract on the terms of the
withdrawn offer is rejected.
You are once again advised that that if you or your company remain in the premises after
December 31, 2006 you will be deemed to be holdover tenants and an action will be
commenced under the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute (735 ILCS 5/9-101 et
seq.).
9. The defendant is still in possession of the subject premises.
Wherefore, Plaintiff prays that a Summons be issued in pursuance of the Statute,

returnable on , 2007 at o’clock __. m. and that
this court enter an order granting the plaintiff immediate possession of the aforesaid
premises, along with its costs and attorney fees, and for such other and further relief as
this court deems reasonable and necessary.
COUNT II
NOW COMES, the plaintiff and for its further and alternative cause of action
states as follows:
1-9. The plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 9 of
count I of this complaint as paragraphs 1-9 of COUNT II.
10. The Illinois Statutes 735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq.). In addition to eviction the statutes
provide in part:
5/9-202. Wilfully holding over

§ 9-202. Wilfully holding over. If any tenant or any person who is in or comes into
possession of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, by, from or under, or by collusion with
the tenant, wilfully holds over any lands, tenements or hereditaments, after the expiration of
his or her term or terms, and after demand made in writing, for the possession thereof, by his
or her landlord, or the person to whom the remainder or reversion of such lands, tenements or
hereditaments belongs, the person so holding over, shall, for the time the landlord or rightful
owner is so kept out of possession, pay to the person so kept out of possession, or his or her
legal representatives, at the rate of double the yearly value of the lands, tenements or
hereditaments so detained to be recovered by a civil action. (735 ILCS 5/9-202)
11. That the act of remaining in the subject premises after having received the above
referred to notices constitutes willfully holding over.
Wherefore, Plaintiff prays if this court grant the plaintiff damages as provided for in
735 ILCS 5/9-101 and enter an order granting the plaintiff immediate possession of the
aforesaid premises, along with its costs and attorney fees, and for such other and further
relief as this court deems reasonable and necessary.
Dated
MARK A. ROULEAU (291) ABIDON, INC
5301 East State Street, Suite 215D
Rockford, Illinois 61108 BY:
(815) 229-7246 Stanley Miller (Secretary)
AFFIDAVIT
The undersigned, on oath, states that the allegations in the above complaint are true.
Signed and sworn to before me

this day of , 2007
Notary Public
Promissory Estoppel & Detrimental Reliance
STATE OF ILLINOIS
COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO
,
Plaintiff, At Law
vs. CASE NO.
,
Defendant.
COMPLAINT PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL-DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE
NOW COMES, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, by and through <<his/her/its>>

attorney and complains of the defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, as follows:
1. On or about _______________, 2001, at Rockford, Winnebago County, Illinois the

defendant, <<DEFENDANT>>, [allege what the defendant did or said, or omitted to
do or say, on which the estoppel is based].
2. As the defendant then knew or in the exercise of reasonable judgment should have
known, <<his/her>> conduct [or representations, or omissions to act (or speak)]
amounted to a false representation [or, fraudulent concealment] of the material fact
[or, of material facts] that _________ [state facts misrepresented or concealed].
3. Defendant intended that the plaintiff should rely and act upon <his/her>> conduct [or,
representations or omissions to act or speak].
4. Plaintiff relied upon the good faith [or truth] of defendant’s conduct [or
representations, omissions to act or speak].
5. In reliance, plaintiff [state in what respect plaintiff changed <<his/her>> position in

reliance upon defendant’s conduct, representations or omissions].
6. By reason of the above, plaintiff has suffered prejudice [and/or damage] in that {state
how plaintiff has been prejudiced or damaged] and defendant is estopped to assert or
claim that [state what the defendant is estopped to assert or claim].
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays that this court enter a judgment in <<his/her/its>>
favor against the defendant in the amount of $________________ plus costs of suit.
<<PLAINTIFF>>
By:

(815) 229-7246

Pleading Basics For Plaintiffs

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Pleading Basics For Plaintiffs

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Pleading From A Plaintiff’s View

Basic Form 735 ILCS 5/2-603

2. Each separate cause of action shall be stated in a separate count or counterclaim,

3. Each count, counterclaim, defense or reply, shall be separately pleaded, designated

Prayer for relief. 735 ILCS 5/2-604

3. Relief may be requested in the alternative.

Punitive Damages 735 ILCS 5/2-604.1

Verification of pleadings 735 ILCS 5/2-605

4. Verified allegations do not constitute evidence except by way of admission.

Exhibits 735 ILCS 5/2-606

1. If a claim or defense is founded upon a written instrument a copy must be attached

Bills of particulars 735 ILCS 5/2-607

Counterclaims 735 ILCS 5/2-608

2. The counterclaim shall be a part of the answer, and shall be designated as a

4. An answer to a counterclaim and pleadings subsequent thereto shall be filed as in the

Pleadings to be specific 735 ILCS 5/2-610

2. Every allegation, except allegations of damages, not explicitly denied is admitted,

Insufficient pleadings 735 ILCS 5/2-612

2. No pleading is bad in substance which contains such information as reasonably informs

Separate counts and defenses 735 ILCS 5/2-613

2. Pleading in the alternative is permitted without prejudice.

Joinder of causes of action and use of counterclaims 735 ILCS 5/2-614

Illinois recognizes permissive joinder of causes of action.

Motions with respect to pleadings 735 ILCS 5/2-615

1. All objections to pleadings shall be raised by motion.

2. If a pleading or a division thereof is objected to by a motion to dismiss or for judgment or

Amendments 735 ILCS 5/2-616

c. the land trustee of record is named as a defendant; and

d. the plaintiff proceeds with reasonable diligence subsequent to the

Seeking wrong remedy not fatal 735 ILCS 5/2-617.

(4) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment.

Combined motions 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1

Product liability actions 735 ILCS 5/2-621

Healing art malpractice 735 ILCS 5/2-622

7. Information regarding the preparation of a written report by the reviewing health

8. Filing Report is excused where

DRAFTING YOUR COMPLAINT

Fact Pleading versus Notice Pleading

The rule applies to all pleadings including affirmative defenses:

“'There is no clear distinction between statements of 'evidentiary facts,' 'ultimate facts,'

Examples of Conclusions of Law

In a case alleging improper influence on plaintiff's mother in having plaintiff committed to a

Solvency or Insolvency: Allegation in complaint that business or person was insolvent is

Opponents Knowledge: Allegations of a defendant's knowledge, especially the defendant's

Transfer of Title or Ownership: The allegation as to the passage of title is unmistakably a

Nature of Interest – Contingent Remainder: Phrase in pleading in a partition action alleging

Conspiracy: A general allegation that a party participated in conspiracy is deficient as being

Constitutionality: Broad allegation that provisions of a statute were unconstitutional is a mere

Witness ___________________, 2007

vs. CASE NO.

NOW COMES, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, by and through her attorney

2) At the time of the occurrence complained of herein the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>,

6) That the defendant, <<PROPERTY OWNER>>, had actual knowledge of condition

7) That the defendant, <<PROPERTY OWNER>>, frequently undertook to inspect the

8) On __________, 2002 at approximately ___________ while the plaintiff was

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant,

NOW COMES, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, by and through her attorney

2) At the time of the occurrence complained of herein the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>,

3) <<PROPERTY OWNER>>, made certain repairs in the rooms and premises,

4) The defendant, <<PROPERTY OWNER>>, negligently painted the window frames

5) On __________, 2002 at approximately ___________ while the plaintiff was

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant,

NOW COMES, the plaintiff, <<PLAINTIFF>>, by and through her attorney

8) On , 2002 at approximately _ while the plaintiff was

5) On , 2002 at approximately _ while the plaintiff was

6) On , 2002 at approximately _ while the plaintiff was