The Current State of Military History

Author(s): Mark Moyar

Source: The Historical Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Mar., 2007), pp. 225-240
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4140172
Accessed: 11-08-2017 16:18 UTC

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The Historical Journal, 50, I (2007), pp. 225-240 ? 2007 Cambridge University Press
doi:Io.1or7/SooI8246Xo6oo598X Printed in the United Kingdom

THE CURRENT STATE OF MILITARY HISI'ORY

MARK MOYAR

US Marine Corps University

A B ST R A C T. Military history is often misconstrued as afield requiring little inte

historian provides little more than a chronology of generals and battles. Analys
twenty-first century's best military histories reveals that militar, history today goe

matter, incorporating social, cultural, and political history. Common areas o

historians include the impact of society, culture, and politics on a countg,'s ability to wage war; the social,
cultural, and political after-effects of war; the society and culture of military organizations; and the
relationship between military organizations and the communities from which they spring. While historians
continue to devote considerable attention to the conventional militaries ofEurope and the United States, many
also are studying small armies, irregular forces, non-state actors, civil wars, and non- Western armedforces.
Within the military realm, historians frequentyl tackle subjects of much greater complexity than the generals-
and battles stereotype would suggest, to include the relationship between technological and humanfactors, the

interdependency of land and naval warfare, and the influence of political direction on the militaY,.

Although the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have attracted great attention among
university faculty in the English-speaking world, the academe has not experienced the
surging interest in military history that the general public has experienced. In American
universities in particular, military history is not rebounding from the downward slide that
began several decades ago. As remaining military history professors retire, their jobs are
frequently converted to non-military fields or given to cultural or social historians who
have studied a cultural or social subject related in some way to war. The reason for military
history's ongoing difficulties in academia is the same one that caused the decline initially:
disdain of historians in other fields. Historians unfamiliar with military history are often
inclined to believe that military history is a simple business that does not require much
intellectual skill or creativity, a misperception derived from a vision of military history as
little more than a chronology of generals and battles. Lacking substantial contact with the
military, moreover, many academics do not understand that nations benefit from studying
war, just as they benefit from studying poverty or the environment, especially nations often
drawn into wars regardless of which party is in power and regardless of whether or not
military subjects are taught at their universities. Many are also unaware that humanitarian
and nation-building operations, which academics more readily support than combat
operations, must often be carried out entirely by military organizations because civilian
organizations typically refuse to work in areas where they might be abducted or killed.
A few key assets have prevented military history from fading into the same type of
obscurity as other unfashionable subjects. Military history is as popular among the general
public as it is unpopular among academicians, rendering it attractive for some academic

PO Box 82, Quantico, VA 22134, USA moyars@mindspring.com

225

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226 HIS TO RI(CA:.L J () U RN AI
presses and many commercial presses. In the United States, the decline in full-time pos-
itions in military history has been offset to a considerable degree by the growth of the US
military's educational institutions, which hire large numbers of military historians to teach
students ranging from eighteen-year-olds fresh out of high school to colonels in their forties.
The military's historical offices and research institutes also employ skilled military historians.
Professional historians occupy similar positions, although on a much smaller scale, in the
United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. In addition, some individuals who began their
careers in non-military fields have subsequently ventured into military history and produced
excellent work. They have succeeded not because military history can be quickly mastered
by newcomers; on the contrary, they have done it by devoting years of study to the subject.
As with most fields of historical inquiry, dilettantism in military history yields little or
nothing of value.
Jeremy Black's Rethinking military history, (2004) offers a useful basis for discussing twenty-
first century military history in the English-speaking world.1 Rethinking military histogy is the
most recent book-length analysis of the subject, and, despite some disjointedness and re-
peated straying from its main points, is thought provoking and valuable. Black levels some
of the accusations that have been invoked by those claiming that military history is not a
legitimate academic field. At the same time, he is a veteran military historian and therefore
also offers detailed criticisms of interest to historians in general. Black's critique consists of
eight main points. The balance of this essay tests the validity of these points against one
hundred of the best English-language military histories written in the twenty-first century,
covering subjects since 1500 in accordance with the mission of the Historical Journal. This
analysis reveals that many recent historians have, in fact, written the sorts of works that
Black and others have faulted historians for not producing.
All of the books cited herein analyse the essence of military history: the development or
use of armed force. I have not incorporated works that have only tangential ties to military
affairs, because this article is designed to show that historians are producing a large body
of vibrant history that fits into the traditional realm of military history, and that the
development and use of armed force remain vital to understanding the history of the world.
Thus, for example, I have included books that analyse how the culture of a military
organization or a nation's social structures affected a country's capacity for war making,
but I have not included books that analyse the self-perceived identity of a particular group
in the military or the social status of war veterans without tying those subjects to the
development or use of military power. In the absence of a connection to armed force, such
subjects should be characterized solely as cultural or social history, for nothing of substance
differentiates them from other works of cultural or social history. As Michael Howard, one
of the greatest historians of war, recently put it, 'At the centre of the history of war there
must lie the study of military history - that is, the study of the central activity of the armed
forces, that is, fighting. '2
As a result of this essay's principal topics, books that contained elements of history other
than military history tended to receive preference over those pertaining to purely military
affairs. Aside from a few books that skilfully synthesized the works of other historians, the
books were based on extensive research at military archives and other archives. In contrast

1 Jeremy Black, Rethinking military histon, (London, 2004).

2 Michael Howard, 'Military history and the history of war', in Williamson Murray and Richard
Hart Sinnreich, eds., 'The past as prologue: the importance of histon, to the militart profession (Carnbridge, 2oo006).
Emphasis in original.

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 HISTI()RIO(GRAPHICAL RE'VIEVS 227
to some other fields of history, where post-modernism and other currents
mentally changed the quest for historical understanding, military history re
to Rankean empiricism and confidence in objective truth. I also used ori
creativity as criteria, since in general military history is not a straightforward
facts but instead is the exploration and analysis of complex, non-linear, and i
forces. Finally, books were measured against the standard criteria of ana
organization, and clarity of expression.3
Black's first contention, central to both his overall appraisal of military hi
appraisals of many non-military historians, is that most historians of militar
centrate on military leaders and battles and ignore the social, cultural, and p
of war. It is and always has been true that some military historians still concer
with only generals and battles, which should be no surprise given the pe
interest in these topics. It is also true, as Black says, that such histories often
primary research or original thinking. Others, nevertheless, are meticulous
and insightful. Such histories offer valuable knowledge to future warriors a
cases, provide poignant depictions of the most dramatic of human endeavou
Some military histories could be strengthened through the incorporati
cultural, political, and other types of history, especially economic history an
of science. Whether because of educational background or personal intere
historians often do not possess adequate familiarity with these fields. W
others miss is that many other historians of the twenty-first century have publ
histories that go beyond purely military subjects. During the I96os, num
began studying the non-military aspects of war, creating what became k
military history', and many recent works are the fruits of that shift. Altho
been around for four decades, it is still called 'new military history', which
sense is apt because many historians in other fields remain unfamiliar with
'new' when they encounter it.5 In another sense, though, the term has alwa
leading, for one can find the integration of military history with social, cul
itical history as far back as the fifth century B:, in the works of Thucydides a

3 It should also be noted that I undoubtedly missed some books that met all of the se
simply because more books have been published in this large field over the past five
person can locate and read.

4 See, for example, Rick Atkinson, An armn at dawn: the ar in .\brth Africa, 1942--943 (New York,
2002); William H. Bartsch, Deceinber 8, 1941: .lacArthurs Pearl Harbor (College Station, TX, 2003);
David J. Bercuson and Holger H. Herwig, The destruction of the Bismarck (New York, 2001); Gary XV.

Gallagher, Lee and his army in Confederate history (Chapel Hill, NC, 2001); John F. lMarszalek, Commander of
all Lincoln's armies: a 7ife of General Hlenry Il: Halleck (Cambridge, MIA, 2oo4); David McCullough, 1776
(New York, 2005); Roy Muir, Salamanca 1812 (New Haven, 2001);Jonathan B. Parshall and Anthony
'Tully, Shattered sword: the untold story of the battle of IMiduwr (Washington, DC, 2oo05) Stephen WV. Sears,
Gettysburg (Boston, 2003); Dennis Showalter, Patton and Rommel: men of uwar in the the twentieth century (New
York, 2005).
5 For recent usage of the term 'new military histor' to describe a seemingly new type of history, see
IanJ. Kerr, review of The garrison state: the military, government and societ! in colonial Punjab, 1849--1947 by Tai
Yong Tan, in tHistory, 34 (2006), p. 59; Mary Elizabeth Berry, 'Presidential address - samurai trouble:
thoughts on war and loyalty', Journal ofAsian Studies, 64 (200oo5), pp. 831---47: Margaret Sankey, review of
The defense of the Napoleonic kingdom of Italy by George F. Nafziger and Ilarco Gioannini, in Canadian
Journal of History, 39 (2004), PP. 146-7; Caroline Cox, 'Back into the American woods', Reviews in
American History, 32 (2004), pp. 471 -7; Herman Hattaway, review of- A short history of the Civil IWar at sea by

Spencer C. Tucker, in Journal of Southern History, 69 (2003), p. 439.

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228 HISTORICAL JOURNAL

and others. It can also be found in the works of Edward Gibb

Leopold von Ranke and his pupils in the nineteenth cent
J. F. C. Fuller and others in the early twentieth century.
Nowadays military historians can, in fact, provide valuabl
cultural, and social themes that are neglected by other hist
prevalence of 'microhistories' and the emphasis on rac
Historians with expertise in military subjects can properly
elements of human life, which other cannot do. For instanc
military history can properly assess the effects of social di
defend itself, for only such a historian knows which aspect
strongly affected by internal divisiveness, and what mechan
have that might mitigate divisiveness.
One of the more common areas of inquiry among twenty-fir
is the impact of society, culture, and politics on a country's
of the 1940 German invasion of France, most recently Juli
extended debate over the influence of France's social, cultur
the defeat of the large French armed forces.6 In The south vs.
southerners shaped the course of the Civil War (200o), William W.
state whites in the American Civil War joined the Confedera
numbers than did the whites immediately to their south
Lincoln's political manoeuvring and early Northern milita
that this development was crucial to the war's outcome, for
have won militarily had it obtained the services of such a lar
of the Scots-Irish in the United States,James H. Webb make
immigrants transfused the military prowess, individualism
the British isles into the armed forces of the United States.8
Other works focus on the direct effects of society, culture
soldier. In an examination of German coalition warfar
Richard L. DiNardo argues that the Nazis failed to imbue
ideological dedication to eradicating the Soviet Union, pre
Germany from demonstrating the fanaticism that made th
midable adversaries as well as willing perpetrators of atrocit
a book on the momentous battles at Trenton and Princeton
independence, asserts that culture and political ideology p
between Americans, on the one side, and Englishmen, Scots
Fischer contends, for example, that the egalitarianism and d
leaders led them to pay more attention to the advice of sub
better military decisions than their opponents."0 Dale R. Her
chaplains with political officers and commissars in six ar
performed a similar and vital function in the motivation
though he adds that the commissars strongly undermined m

6 Julian Jackson, Thefall of France: the Nazi invasion of0194o (Oxford

7 William W. Freehling, The south vs. the south: how anti-Confederate sout
War (Oxford,
8 2001).
James Webb, Bornfighting: how the Scots-Irish shaped A
9 Richard L. DiNardo, Germany and the Axis pocwers:from coalition t
to David Hackett Fischer, WI ashington 's crossing (Oxford, 2004).

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 HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEWS 229

secondary approval of military decisions and appointing

loyalty rather than merit.n
In Carnage and culture: landmark battles in the rise of Western p
provides case studies to prove an argument he made prev
Western culture in Greece 2,500 years ago led to the dev
way of war, which has enabled Western armies to outfigh
every occasion since. Hanson credits the liberalism of this W
of dissent, its granting of personal freedoms, its concep
science - with producing the superior cultural attributes
way', particularly innovation, individual initiative, and d
have disputed Hanson's thesis, the most prominent is John
shares Hanson's belief that culture profoundly influence
examples from many countries and time periods, Lynn
universal Western warrior and instead contends that the
produced a diverse array of warriors.13 Pradeep B. Baru
thesis, using 3,000 years of battle in South Asia to argue t
always the most effective way, although Barua struggles in d
and in confronting the fact that the West did win numer
Asia.14

Mark Moss's Manliness and militarism: educatingyoung boys in Ontario for war (2001) explores
how books, schools, outdoor activities, and cadet drill inculcated enthusiasm for war in
Canadian boys during the Victorian and Edwardian eras. This topic is highly relevant to
military history, for the socialization of boys has much influence on how they perform on
the battlefield, but unfortunately Moss does not examine the battlefield behaviour of
Canadian soldiers and thus does not shed light on this form of influence.5" One scholar
who has attempted to cover both pre-war conditioning and its influence in war is Peter
Schrijvers, author of a well-researched history of US troops in the Pacific theatre during
the Second World War. Schrijvers contends that American servicemen entered the war
with a set of ingrained impulses and preconceived notions about the Pacific as an extension
of the North American frontier, and he attributes the subsequent destructiveness of the war
to the Americans' frustration with their inability to tame the 'frontier'. In emphasizing the
importance of the frontier, however, Schrijvers gives inadequate attention to many other
factors that caused the American troops -- and troops of other nationalities and other
eras - to engage in gratuitous violence, such as privation, danger, and the death of com-
rades.16 A good example of history that avoids such oversimplification is Peter S.
Kindsvatter's American soldiers: ground combat in the Jl'orld Ii'ars, Korea, and Vietnam (2003),
which inspects the experiences of US soldiers and Marines throughout the military cycle,
starting with their entrance into the armed forces, moving into training, to combat, and
finally to departure from the armed forces. He addresses all of the questions pertinent to

" Dale R. Herspring, Soldiers, commissars, and chaplains: ciil -militar relations since Cronmwcell (Lanham,
MD, 2001).
12 Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and culture: landmark battles in the rise of IWestern power (New York,
2001). 13 John A. Lynn, Battle: a histonr of combat and culture (Boulder, CO, 2003).
14 Pradeep P. Barua, The state at war in .south Asia (Lincoln, NE, 200oo).
'5 Mark Moss, Manliness and militarism : educating roungbors in Ontario for war (Don Mlills, Ontario, 2001).
16 Peter Schrijvers, The GI war against Japan: American soldiers in Asia and the Iacfic during I orld WlIar II
(New York, 2002).

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 230 HISTORICAL JO( RNAL

the key issue of motivation, such as why men joined th

enemy, why many persisted in the face of serious r
buckled, and answers them effectively on the basis o
Historians who have investigated the social, cultura
the fighting stopped include Richard Schweitzer, wh
First World War on the religiosity of British and
persuasively that faith in God, if not organized relig
been recognized.18 Analysing the military experience
First World War, Jennifer D. Keene argues that the
army after the war, with profound implications f
through the GI Bill, a landmark social welfare progr
the political radicalism of a minority to an entire g
take among historians of soldier radicalism."9 After
jects into a compelling Civil War battle history,
Fredericksburg! (2002) thoroughly assesses the after-ef
not only on the war at the operational and strategic
and South, morale in the two armies, and the lives of
battle and the people who attempted to alleviate thei
Hanson's Ripples of battle (2003) focuses on the long-
his interpretation of the Battle of Shiloh in the Ame
contends that the death of Confederate General Alb
Southerners that chance, rather than the enemy, ha
contributed to a post-war South that was fixated on
future.21

Several studies chronicling the defeat of Nazi Germany show how the violence and the
policies of both the Allied forces and the Nazis affected the lives of German citizens and
permanently changed their society and culture. Unsurprisingly, considerable disagreement
has arisen over issues such as whether the massive bombing of German cities was justified,
and whether the resultant devastation made the Germans more or less inclined to support
the post-war occupation forces.22 In the latest of several superb books on the Korean War,
William Stueck assesses the war's lasting impact on South Korea and America's relation-
ship with South Korea. After the war, he shows, America's military power enabled the
Americans to influence South Korean politics as they thought best, which was often quite
different from what South Korea's leaders deemed best. The United States did not always
compel South Korean leaders to follow American prescriptions, but it did cause them
to restrain their desire to attack North Korea and it made them undertake a degree of'

17 Peter S. Kindsvatter, American soldiers: ground combal in the world wars. Korea, and Vietnam (Lawrence
KS, 2003).
18 Richard Schweitzer, The cross and the trenches: religious faith and doubt amiong British and American Great
War soldiers (X'Vestport, 2003).
19 Jennifer I). Keene, Doughboss, the Great liar, and the remaking ofAm.nerica (Baltimore, NID, 2001).
20 George C. Rable, Frederickshbug! Frederickshbug! (Chapel Hill, NC, 2002).
21 Victor Davis Hanson, Ripples of battle: how wars of the past still detennine how wej ight, how we live, and
how we think (New York, 2003).
22 Stephen G. Fritz, Endkampf: soldiers, civilians, and the death of the Third Reich (Lexington, KY, 2004);

Max Hastings, Annageddon: the battleJbr Germanya. 1944-- 194i (New York, 2004); Herman Knell, To destroy,
a city: strategic bombing and its human consequences in 1 lWorld War II (Cambridge, MA, 2003); Frederick
Taylor, Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945 (New York, 2004).

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 HIST'(O)RI()GRAPHICAL REVIEWS 23I

political liberalization that they did not want to undertake.23 Fre

Cayton argue in their history of North American civilization that
defined by war for the past five hundred years. In their view, wa
imperialism, a phenomenon that they contend differs little from t
countries, contrary to the common view that the global role of the
Both experienced and renowned historians, they score many point
among American society, war, and foreign policy, though they ca
claiming that the nine individuals examined in the book are rep
Americans in the past five centuries, and for ascribing too little infl
list of nine does not include the two most influential American th
empire - Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson - and larg
idealism, a set of principles that has, for better or worse, profoun
foreign policy and military strategy for the past century.24
Good histories of military organizations frequently involve exte
military society and military culture. The methodologies applie
historians to other groups can be applied effectively to the milita
historian has made the effort to understand the military's idi
Coffman's The regulars (2004), an account of the transformation of t
end of the nineteenth century and the outbreak of the Second W
that factors such as social support for the military and the transit
lectual culture to one that prized education helped turn a small,
into a much larger and more competent force.25 Isabel Hull's h
German armed forces ably scrutinizes the development of German
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, contending that or
rather than ideology, led the German army to annihilate civilians w
war. Hull, however, at times is guilty of attributing excessive influen
research, particularly to what she describes as the worst aspects o
ture. This problem results in insufficient regard for nationalism a
rents in Germany, and in an unduly negative assessment of Germ
during the First World War.26 Dennis Showalter analyses German
effectively in a book on the wars of German unification, because he i
showing the great importance of military culture, but rather cons
important factors that shaped the armed forces and the course
studies of military society and culture includeJeffrey Grey's history
and Elizabeth Lutes Hillman's much more narrowly focused histor
justice in the Cold War.28
Black's second main contention is that Western military historia
ance of military organizations in influencing domestic politics, wh
lack of military meddling in Western domestic politics. Yet some e

23 William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean IlWar: a new diplomatic antd strategic h

24 Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, The dominion of 'war: empire and lib
1500 2000 (New York, 2005).
25 Edward M. Coffman, The regulars: the American amr, 1898 1941 (Camb
26 Isabel V. Hull, Absolute destruction: military culture and the practices of war i
NY, 2005). 27 Dennis Showalter, The wars of German unification (London, 2004).
28 Jeffrey Grey, The Australian arnmy (Oxfbrd, 2001); Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, Defending America:
militagy culture and the Cold 'ar court-martial (Princeton, N J, 2oo00).

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232 H IS1TO R ICA L J () tRNA LI

examine the domestic political activities of the military in grea

tensive research in Brazilian archives, Frank D. McCann expertly
army's involvement in political plots, its role in suppressing Br
ments, and the participation of its officers in civil government. In
how the army's expanding recruitment made the Brazilian nation
relevant to many households for the first time and enabled the Brazi
the grip of the centre over the periphery, which no other inst
military history of the British monarchy, Charles Carlton argues
monarchy's creation and development. The political powers of th
have been heavily dependent on its military powers, whether real,
symbolic, as in the most recent two centuries.30
The reciprocal relationship, the impact of domestic politics on th
equally rigorous treatment. Thomas J. Goss argues that Presid
appointment of militarily inexperienced politicians to generalsh
War was more sensible than previous scholars have contended, f
these generals in raising troops and maintaining support for the w
damage caused by their military ineptitude. Like most militar
careful attention to Clausewitz's observation that war is but one m
itical ends and hence overall political effectiveness ultimately i
military effectiveness.31 In a study of Winston Churchill, Abr
Clemenceau, and David Ben Gurion, Eliot A. Cohen makes the
primacy of politics, in addition to showing how political leaders
most effectively.32 Elsewhere, Stanley Weintraub ably covers the rol
British strategic decisions during the American war for independe
American historians, who generally attribute the outcome of th
actions of American soldiers and politicians, Weintraub conten
lusionment with war taxes among Britons constrained British act
contributed heavily to the ultimate British capitulation.33
Thirdly, Black alleges that military histories generally ignore ar
of Western Europe and the United States and treat non-Wester
Certainly English-speaking scholars do accord non-WVestern subje
portion of attention than they would merit if attention were dis
territory or population. Reasons for this distortion include the W
disproportionate share of large wars and military innovations, th
archives in non-Western countries, and a special curiosity abou
Current military historians, nonetheless, are generally well attune
usually to a greater degree than historians of the United State
not experts in military or diplomatic history, and they are not
non-Western peoples are primitive. Kenneth Chase, for instance,
firearms up to 1700, devotes one chapter to Europe and five ch

29 Frank D. McCann, Soldiers of the patria: a hislon' oflthe Brazilian arnm

2004). 30 Charles Carlton, Roal warriors: a miliarn, hisror, qf the British monarchy (Harlow, 20oo03).
31 Thomas J. Goss, The war within the nion high command: politics and generalship during the Civil Il'ar
(Lawrence, KS, 2003).
32 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme commiand: soldier . . satesmien. and leadership ill U' arlime (New York, 200oo).
33 Stanley Weintraub, Iron tears: Amenricals battle fir fireedom. Britainii quagmire, 177 178- (New York,
2005).

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 HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEWS 233

regions, and he examines warfare in each region to dete

European regions attained the same quality of firearm desi
of Alfred W. Crosby's overly concise history of projectiles c
the formation of 'the West', and much of the remainde
Japanese, the Indians, the Mongols, and the Ottomans. Cros
century are focused on the United States and Western Europ
fault him for insufficient inclusiveness on that score, for t
advances in projectile technology occurred in those places.3
the First World War gave short shrift to non-European t
groundbreaking first volume of his three-volume history o
Strachan devotes nearly 400 out of a total of i,ioo pages to
The Chinese Civil War, which previously did not receiv
Western scholars, is the subject of a strong general history
to explain how and why the winners won, variously draw
political, social, and cultural history to develop that explan
Chinese Communist land reform, Chinese Nationalist rela
and Communist political subversion against the Nationali
points, alongside the major battles."3 Adding to the litera
topic, Gerald Horne contends that Japan succeeded brillia
Asian resentment of white supremacy in its assault on Br
and 1942, though he overstates the pro-Japanese and anti-w
and does not adequately cover the presence of anti Japanese
the brutal and dictatorial character of Japanese 'liberati
of the Vietnam War have been giving greater attention t
conflict, particularly during the years before and after m
Through the use of numerous Vietnamese sources, Philip
that Western observers have been wrong to view the Sou
Dinh Diem, as a hopeless reactionary, and that such misund
contributed to the deterioration in US-South Vietnamese re
Diem's downfall and the termination of his counterinsur
however, errs in accepting the standard view that D)iem w
war effectively.39 James H. Willbanks sheds new light on
ment's political and military troubles during the last years o
1975, he argues, resulted not merely from the withdrawal o
have contended, nor simply from the inadequacy of Americ
Vietnamese armed forces, as others have maintained,
Vietnamese leadership, as still others have maintained, but
the three.40

34 Kenneth Chase, Firearms: a global history to 1700oo (Cambridge, 20

35 Alfred W. Crosby, Throwing fire: projectile technology through his/to
36 Hew Strachan, The First World l 'ar, i: To arms (Oxford, 2001).
37 Odd Arne Westad, Decisive encounters: the Chinese civil war, 1946-
38 Gerald Home, Race war! I 7Iite supremnac and the Japanese attack on t

39 Philip E. Catton, Diem 'sjinal failure: prelude to America s war in l

40 James H. Willbanks, Abandoning I ietnam: how America left and So
KS, 2004).

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234 H I STO R I CA L J L) U R N A I.

Despite the relative paucity of source materials, Africa is also a po

for today's military historians. Ron Lock and Peter Quantrill have assemb
history of the Zulu victory over the British at Isandlwana, in which th
British and Zulus with equal interest and objectivity.41 Robert B. Edgerto
history of African armies, which runs from the late eighteenth century
emphasizes the importance of these armies in fighting for and against colo
in waging the calamitous civil wars that have plagued post-colonial Africa.4
Algeria are the central figures in Matthew Connelly's thorough history of
for independence, which deftly weaves military and diplomatic history togeth
cultural, and political history to show how the Algerian rebels overcame nu
failures by influencing international popular opinion and foreign governm
Fourthly, according to Black, military historians concentrate too much
and military systems, ignoring small states, small and irregular armies
actors. The works of McCann, Edgerton, and Lock and Ouantrill mentio
tradict this statement, as do several others. Robert R. Mackey's history of irr
during the US Civil War, for example, covers anti-Union forces in the Up
were not part of a large military system. Mackey notes that irregulars ha
impact on the war as a whole - albeit sometimes under the guidance
Confederate leadership- and that the Union forces only thwarted them
considerable thought and manpower to the task.44 John Connor has wr
history of Britain's frontier wars against the Aborigines of Australia, in w
'forces' often consisted of unorganized settlers or ex-convicts and the A
consisted of small groups that did not co-ordinate or collaborate with one a
Historians have been giving considerable attention to warfare on the Am
from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, where Indian tribes fought aga
and European frontiersmen who often had little or no connection to a sta
system. In his bold book, The frst wa)y of war: American war making on the fron
Grenier challenges the famous 'American Way of\War' thesis of Russell We
to Weigley's thesis, the United States developed a peculiar way of war in the m
century, which was centred around the brute annihilation of the enemy's
Grenier argues that American frontiersmen began shaping an American wa
earlier, a way marked by extensive killing of enemy non-combatants and
enemy agricultural production.46 Consistent with Grenier's book are the find
R. Nester's The frontier war for American independence (2004), which details fr
volving these same methods of warfare, as well as advancing the controversial
these battles were critical to the victory of the American colonists in 1781.47
Some of the most sophisticated recent histories have shown how milit
facilitated the extension of a government's influence into its outer territorial
fringes of another country. Max Boot, for example, adroitly reveals in Th

4' Ron Lock and Peter Q.uantrill, .ulu victorr: the epic of Isandlwana and the cover-up
42 Robert B. Edgerton, Ajfrica anrnies:fJomi honor to infanr) (Boulder, CO,() 2002).
4a Matthew Connelly, A diplomatic revolution: Algeria s figh for independence and the origins
world (Oxford, 2002).
44 Robert R. Mackey, The uncivil war: inrregular walfare in the upper south, 1861-186
2004). 45 John Connor, 77e 1Au.stralian fJontier wars, 1788 18%8 (Sydney, 2002).
46 John Grenier, The jirsl way of war: American war making on the fontier, 1607-1814 (Cambridge, 2005).
47 William R. Nester, The fiontier warfor. American independence (NMechanicsburg, PA, 2004).

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 HISTO R RI()GRRAPHICAL RIE'VIE\WS 235
peace: small wars and the rise of American power (200oo2) how the United States expand
global power over the past two centuries by fighting small wars that enabled it to p
sea lanes, establish far-flung naval and air bases, promote free trade, and thwart po
threats to the homeland.48 In examining British soldiers on the American fron
Michael McConnell explains how Britain tried, and failed, to use military outpo
protect the British colonies from American Indian attacks, although the book s
from an excessive concern with the minutiae of outpost life.49 Of far wider s
Ian Beckett's history of Britain's Victorian army, which shows, among other thing
the health of the British empire depended upon military logistics, and that the ne
deploy the army to extend and guard the empire spawned technological changes su
the laying of new rail track and the proliferation of telegraph lines.50 Building
earlier work, Geoffrey Parker argues persuasively that European imperial expansion
1480 to 1750 owed its success to Europe's ability to overwhelm enemy coastal for
and to build superior fortresses on the coasts of Africa, Asia, and South America,
vening earlier historians who attributed the success to Europe's superior comm
practices.5
A corollary to the allegation that military historians are obsessed with state-t
conflict is the charge that military historians neglect armed conflict within states
histories by Catton, Westad, and Edgerton cited earlier analyse armed conflict w
states. In Thailand's secret war: OSS, SOE, and the free Thai underground during World
(2005), E. Bruce Reynolds illuminates the efforts of the Serai Thai forces and the B
and American secret services to oust the government of Phibun Songkhram, wh
allied Thailand withJapan after Pearl Harbour. The British Special Operations Ex
sought to use Thai forces to replace Phibun's government with one that would p
British forces to take permanent control of the Kra isthmus, but were ultimate
muscled by the American Office of Strategic Services, which succeeded in its objec
bringing to power an independent Thai government friendly to the United States.5
criticism of inattention to internal conflict could be applied accurately to earlier histor
the Korean War, which largely ignored the low-intensity conflict within South Kor
claimed tens of thousands of lives in the two years prior to the North Korean in
of June 1950. Allan R. Millett, however, has produced an incisive history of the
preceding the invasion, in which he shows that the Korean War actually began
with guerrilla and terrorist attacks.53
With Western forces now heavily engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Ir
Afghanistan and elsewhere, historians are paying greater attention to insurgencies,
they never forgot about the subject entirely, in contrast to political scientists and m
analysts, who almost entirely neglected insurgencies in the late 199os on the presum
that geopolitically significant insurgencies were a thing of the past.John P. Cann's ex

48 Max Boot, The savage wars of peace: small wars and the rise of American power (New York, 2002
49 Michael M. McConnell, Army and empire: British soldiers on the .American frontier, 1758-1775 (
NE, 2004).
50 Ian Beckett, The Victorians at war (London, 2003). For more on the British empire, see Klaus
Dodds, Pink ice: Britain and the South Atlantic empire (London, 2002), which covers the role of the British
armed forces in the development of Britain's South Atlantic empire.

5 Geoffrey Parker, Success is neverfinal: empire, war, and faith in earl)' modem Europe (New York, 2002).
52 E. Bruce Reynolds, Thailand's secret war: OSS, SOE, and the free Thai underground during World IWar II
(Cambridge, 2005).
5 Allan R. Millett, The warjbr Korea, 1945--1950o: a house hurning (Lawrence, KS, 2005).

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 236 HISTORICAL JOURNAL
study of counterinsurgency in Portugal's African colonies show
overcame severe resource constraints by recruiting native Africa
insurgent armed forces, training the recruits effectively, and impleme
non-military areas such as health, education, commerce, and infr
J. Wilensky describes American administration of medical care dur
and assesses its utility in accomplishing the objective of winning over
people. He contends that the health care programmes actually dishe
by showing that their own government lacked the ability or desire
though if it did have such effect it was of little consequence, for ot
that the South Vietnamese people generally had a positive view of th
this period.55 In two massive volumes, David W. P. Elliott studie
Vietnamese province over a forty-five-year period, with the bulk of
one group of Vietnamese fighting another. Employing a multitude o
Elliott analyses the internecine struggles in much greater depth
insurgency histories.56 At the broad end of the spectrum is Ian Becket
and counter-insurgencies: guerrillas and their opponents since 175o (2001), w
view of a great number of insurgencies.57
Present-day insurgencies have spawned dozens of interview-b
which possess lasting historical value. While archival sources for re
are typically non-existent, much can be obtained from interviewing
the events. Oral histories, of course, are usually most fruitful whe
proximity to an event since the participants are easier to locate, more
and events are fresher in their memories. Often no written record i
that informs the planning and execution of military strategies and
interaction between Western military personnel and their indigeno
may provide the only way for that type of information to enter m
many recent books are valuable mainly as sources of information, a
analysis. Sean Naylor's .Not a good day to die: the untold story of Operati
fully interprets a complicated attempt by US forces and their Afgha
and Al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan's Shahikot valley. Naylor sho
level political guidance, ineffective employment of allied fighters, a
among military organizations led to a fiasco.58 Bing West ably chronicl
US Marines in Iraq to secure the insurgent stronghold of Fallujah, u
tions from Washington. While lauding the performance of the Mar
faults senior US civilian and military leaders for disorganizat
Iraqi politics and culture."59 Steve Coll uses countless interviews as w
evidence to deliver an outstanding account of the wars in Afghan
invasion in December 1979 to the terrorist attacks of ii September

54 John P. Cann, Counterinsurgency in .Africa: the Portuguese wa'r of war (St Petersburg, FL, 2005).
55 Robert J. Wilensky, Military medicine to win hearts and minds: aid to civilians in the Vietnam war
(Lubbock, 'TX, 2004).
56 David W. P. Elliott, The Vietnamese IWEar: revolution and social change in the Mekong Delta, i93yo -.97
(2 vols., Armonk, NY, 2003).
57 Ian Beckett, Modern insurgencies and counter-insurgencies: guerrilla and their opponents since 175o (London,
2001).
58 Sean Naylor, Not a good day to die: the untold story of Operation Anaconda (New York, Berkley, 2005).
59 Bing West, No true glory: a frontline account of the battle for Fallujah (New York, 2005).

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 HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEWS 237

mujahedeen rebels induced the Soviets to withdraw in 1989

lost interest in Afghanistan, allowing Pakistan and Saudi Ar
Al-Qaeda within Afghanistan, and even after the hunt for
late I99os, the US effort was hampered by interagency sq
direction."0

Within the realm of purely military affairs, historians frequ

greater complexity than the 'generals-and-battles' stereoty
is the use of technology in warfare. Black, in his fifth point, c
overemphasize technology in explaining military capabilit
portance to human factors, but, again, numerous recent hi
When appraising military power and military innovation, s
viously rank technology below society, culture, organization
tactics.61 The many thoughtful historians who have produc
innovation almost always emphasize that technology alone d
but that such changes require modifications in these oth
historians of technology who write on military topics. In a
warfare, for example, Edmund Russell reveals how the deve
and agricultural pesticides by the US government and privat
the weapons available to combatants, but also the comb
weapons.63
Historians of communications technology and communications decryption technology
are careful to note the limitations of such technology and the importance of human factors
in its use. In a history of intelligence that puts heavy stress on the decryption of the enemy's
wireless communications, John Keegan cautions that even the best intelligence can be
misused by fallible humans and that physical power is often more important than any
intelligence. Even during the Battle of Crete in May 1941, Keegan notes, when decryption
of German messages gave the British commander extremely detailed foreknowledge of
the German plans to invade Crete, elite German paratroop units were still able to fight
their way on to the well-defended island and vanquish its defenders.64 In a history of
US intelligence in the Pacific during the Second World War, Jeffrey M. Moore asserts
that while intelligence was valuable, American success should be credited primarily to
the combat forces that did the fighting. Like most intelligence historians, moreover,
Moore notes that the use of technology to collect information is only one of several stages in
the 'intelligence cycle' -in addition to collection of information, intelligence always re-
quires the non-technological activities of tasking intelligence agencies, processing and

60 Steve Coll, Ghost wars: the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to
September 1o, 2001 (New York, 2004).
61 Chase, Firearms; Fischer, Washington's crossing; Hanson, Carnage and culture; Lynn, Battle; Jackson,
The fall of France.
62 See, for example, MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, The dynamics of military revolution
(Cambridge, 2001); Coffman, The regulars; Geoff Mortimer, ed., Early modern military history, 1450-1815
(Houndmills, 2004); Eric Dorn Brose, The kaiser's anrny: the politics ofmilitary technology in Germany during the
machine age, 1870--198 (Oxford, 2001); Ronald H. Spector, At war at sea: sailors and naval combat in the
twentieth century (New York, 2001).
63 Edmund Russell, War and nature:fighting humans and insects with chemicals from I'World War I to Silent
Spring (Cambridge, 2001).
64 John Keegan, Intelligence in war: knowledge of the enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda (London, 2003).

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 238 HISITOl )RICAL J ()UKRNAL
analysing information, disseminating the analysed intelligence, and acting on the intelli-
gence.65
Similarly, campaign histories almost invariably emphasize the role of human factors and
assign them higher priority than technology. To cite a couple of examples, Terry Copp's
history of Canadian forces in the Normandy campaign examines the adjustments in tactics
and operational art that enabled the Canadians to overcome German forces that possessed
superior armour and artillery.66 In a history of the Virginia Campaign of May and June
1864, Mark Grimsley explains how the Confederate generals, with fewer men and inferior
armaments, used their superiority in tactics and operational art to inflict enormous cas-
ualties on the Union forces and hold them at bay, while the Union commander General
Ulysses S. Grant used his own operational skills to keep the Confederates from moving
over to the offensive.67

Sixthly, Black claims that the worst obsessions with technology involve air power and
armour. Yet most of the scholarly books on air power and armour give great weight to non-
technological factors. In recent years, historians of air power have become increasingly
sophisticated in analysing the conceptual and organizational facets of aerial warfare. Tami
Davis Biddle, author of a pioneering history of British and American strategic bombing
from 1914 to 1945, asserts that the neglect of air power within the British and American
military establishments prevented the development of viable air power doctrine and strong
strategic air arms in the interwar period. Those in Britain and America who did attempt to
develop doctrine, she adds, relied more on imaginative speculation about the vulnerability
of societies and industries to massive bombing than on solid evidence. As a result, Britain
and the United States entered the Second World War woefully ill-prepared to wage war in
the air, a problem that would take considerable time to ameliorate.68 Stephen Budiansky
takes a similar analytical approach in a history spanning the period from Kitty Hawk to the
recent Iraq War, although, unlike Biddle, he draws on little primary research. Budiansky
emphasizes that strategists have repeatedly come to the false conclusion that strategic
bombing can win wars easily, but he acknowledges that the development of precision-
guided munitions near the end of the twentieth century has begun to enable strategic
bombing to live up to expectations.69 Elsewhere, James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson
have written a terrific broad history of the use of air power in small wars, identifying
original and useful lessons from thirty conflicts.70
Analytical sophistication can likewise be found in recent histories of armoured warfare.
Some of the best history of armour appears in Robert M. Citino's two brilliant volumes on
operational warfare in the twentieth century. In the attainment of decisive victory through
armoured warfare, Citino stresses, technological superiority has often proved less import-
ant than operational art, organization, and logistics. This reality explains, for example,

65 Jeffrey M. Moore, Spies for Nimintz:joint military intelligence in the Pacfic War (Annapolis, MD, 200oo4).
See also Roland H. Worth,Jr., Secret allies in the Pacific: covert intelligence and code-breaking prior to the attack on
Pearl Harbor (Jefferson, NC, 2001).
66 Terry Copp, Fields offire: the Canadians in .ornandr (Toronto, 2003)-
67 Mark Grimsley, And keep moving on: the I rginia campaign, Malq June 1864 (Lincoln, NE, 2002).
68 Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and reality in air wuarfire: the evolution of British and Amenrican ideas about
strategic bombing, g914-1945 (Princeton, NJ, 2002).
69 Stephen Budiansky, Air power: the men, machines, and ideas that revolutionized war, from KItty Hawk to Gulf
War II (New York, 2004).
70 James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in small wars: fighting insurgents and terrorists
(Lawrence, KS, 2003).

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 HISTORIOGRAPHICAL RE\VIE\WS 239
why the Germans defeated the French in 1940 and why Israel trounced Egypt in t
campaign of I956.7' Mary Habeck's extraordinarily thorough history of Germ
Soviet armour doctrine between the world wars shows how the two countries dev
innovative methods for employing armour when the rest of the world failed to d
explains that perceptions of the small conflicts of the 1930s both led Hitler to
the new armoured doctrine and led Stalin to reject it, enabling the German Wehr
to rout the Soviet Red Army in 1941 and come breathtakingly close to destro
Soviet Union.72 In their tactically focused history of Australian armour in the V
War, Gary McKay and Graeme Nicholas put far greater emphasis on tactical meth
co-operation among crew members than on the technological features of the t
armoured personnel carriers.73
Seventhly, Black faults military historians for separating sea conflict from land co
For many wars, naval operations are consigned to a separate chapter and, as Black
historians often do not draw connections between naval and ground operation
large proportion of cases, though, few important connections exist. Where such
important, historians have tended to take note of them. John W. Gordon, for in
shows how Britain used its naval resources to support land operations in the hotly
state of South Carolina during the American war of independence. Domina
Atlantic coast, Britain's navy swiftly and invisibly transported troops to unexpect
most favourable to British ambitions. British ships also resupplied the troops
and prevented the importation of supplies to the rebels." Ronald H. Spector re
demonstrates the interdependency of land and naval forces in his outstanding
of twentieth-century naval warfare. One of Spector's main points is that the sec
of the century saw the world's navies devoting fewer resources to warfare betwe
and more resources to naval support of land operations.75 Historians cont
give substantial attention to amphibious warfare in the Pacific during the Second
War."76 In a history of British amphibious warfare after the Second World War, Ia
reveals that Britain's ineffective integration of ground and naval elements res
missed opportunities and operational failures, reaching the apex of futility at
I956."7 Lawrence Freedman's official history of the Falklands campaign tho
investigates the interrelationships among the land, naval, and air component
campaign.78
Black's eighth and final point is that military historians disregard the role of political
direction in the determination of force structure, doctrine, military objectives, and
measures of effectiveness. While some of these areas may be deserving of more attention,
in general they receive ample coverage. Many of the books mentioned previously address

71 Robert M. Citino, Questfor decisive victory :from stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899-194o (Lawrence,
KS, 2002); Robert M. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: the evolution of operational warfare (Lawrence, KS,
2004).
72 Mary Habeck, Storm of steel: the development of armor doctrine in Germany) and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939
(Ithaca, NY, 2003).
73 Gary McKay and Graeme Nicholas, Jungle tracks: Australian armour in Viet Nam (Crows Nest, 2001).
"7 John W. Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution: a battlefield history (Columbia, SC, 2003).
75 Spector, At war at sea.

78 Bruce F. Meyers, Swift, silent, and deadly: Marine amphibious reconnaissance in the Pacfc, 1942-1945
(Annapolis, MD, 2004).
77 Ian Speller, The role of amphibious warfare in British defence policy, 1945-1956 (Houndmills, 2001).
7s Lawrence Freedman, The oficial history of the Falklands Campaign (2 vols., London, 2005).

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240 HISTORICAL O URNAL
these subjects."79 Elsewhere, Eric Dorn Brose's study of the imperial Ger
that Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had an amateurish fascination with military
at times with decisions on force structure and doctrine, while at other
provide guidance in these areas when needed, inhibiting consistency a
across the armed forces."8 In a fine general history of the First Wo
S. Neiberg attributes the massive bloodletting on the Western front to po
insisted that the armed forces remain on the offensive, not to obtuse m
many others have."8 Alexander B. Rossino examines the influence of poli
ideology on the German invasion of Poland, arguing that Nazi hatred
led the German war planners to remove the customary restrictions on th
against non-military targets, which resulted in horrific civilian casua
makes a strong argument that Nazi ideology pervaded both the German
shedding new light on the debate over the prevalence of racism and f
armed forces of the Third Reich.82
The importance of political direction is very visible in recent histories
War, which emphasize that President Lyndon Johnson's domestic and in
itical concerns caused him to eschew the call up of reservnes and prohibit th
US ground forces in North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.83James P. C
US Marine Corps firebase near the demilitarized zone between North Vie
Vietnam highlights the military consequences of the Johnson administr
enemy body count to measure success.84 On the subject of the Balkan w
assessments of the constraints and metrics imposed by US policymakers on
have begun to emerge.85
In the final analysis, it is not true, as Black and others would have it, tha
is in a decline brought on by its own obsession with generals-and-battles
of intellectual vitality. Large numbers of historians, including many wh
other than military history, have developed the requisite expertise to wr
subjects directly related to the development or use of armed force, the e
history. They have studied military history broadly, identifying the nu
tural, and political factors that are tied to or intertwined with military
ception that military history has brought itself down through narro
however, has harmed the field by turning other historians against it. If
of military history in the twenty-first century has helped to remove this m
it has accomplished its primary objective.

79 See, for example, Cohen, Supreme command; Freedman, The official history; Goss
Union high command; Naylor, Not a good day to die; Weintraub, Iron tears; W est, No true
80 Brose, The kaiser's army.
81 Michael S. Neiberg, Fighting the Great 'War: a global history (Cambridge, MA, 20
82 Alexander B. Rossino, Hitler strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, ideology, and atrocity (Law
83 C. Dale Walton, The myth of inevitable U.S. defeat in Vietnam (London, 2002); Ga
dominance: imbalance ofpower and the road to war in Vietnam (Berkeley, CA, 2005).
84 James P. Coan, The hill of angels (Tuscaloosa, AL, 2004).
85 R. Craig Nation, Il4ar in the Balkans, 1991-2002 (Carlisle, PA, 2003).

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