Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PEOPLE
on January 2, 1951, an information for malversation of public funds thru reckless negligence was
filed, with the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon, against petitioner Rodrigo Acosta for having
allegedly made, as Provincial Treasurer of Bukidnon, "irregular and excessive purchases of supplies,
materials, equipment and printed forms from private dealers for the use of the province". After the
information was amended twice, it was finally set for trial. However, the trial Judge, Hon. Jose P.
Veluz, retired from the service without having decided the case. Unable to decide the case due to
problems in accuracy with the notes made by stenographer Celestino Suarez, Judge Abad Santos
had resigned leaving the case undecided. He was succeeded in office by Hon. Abudio Arrieta,
Judge, who, on October 27, 1958, rendered a decision convicting the defendants as charged. On
appeal, Acosta alleged that he was deprived of the right to a speedy trial as the decision of the lower
court was rendered over six (6) years later. CA remanded the case to the trial court.
No general principle fixes the exact time within which a trial must be had to satisfy the requirement of
a speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative; it is consistent with delays, and
whether such a trial is afforded must be determined in the light of the circumstances of each
particular case as a matter of judicial discretion. One accused of crime is not entitled to a trial
immediately on his arrest or accusation, he must wait a regular term of the court until an indictment
is found and presented if the case is one wherein the trial is on indictment, and until the prosecution
has had reasonable time to prepare for the trial. Moreover, the delay in the rendition of the decision
of the court of first instance was due to circumstances beyond the control of the judges who presided
the same.
the case was not yet ready for trial. Rule 31, Section 1, of the Rules of
Court, provides:
It is well-settled that motions for continuance or deferment of hearings are granted only upon
meritorious grounds[3]and that the grant or denial thereof is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court[4]the exercise of which will not be disturbed except on a showing of a patent and grave
abuse of discretion.
Petitioner failed to show such patent and grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondent in denying its oral motion for postponement.
Under the circumstances, it cannot rightly be said that the OSG was not guilty of inexcusable
carelessness, presumptiousness, indifference to and neglect of duty in assuming that public respondent
would grant its oral motion for postponement, coming to court unprepared and without a
witness. Hence public respondent was well within its authority to deny the Republics oral motion for
postponement of the hearings set on 19 and 20 October 1995 and require it, instead, to just formally
offer its evidence within fifteen (15) days from notice. Petitioner is not guilty of abuse of discretion,
much less grave, nor can it be charged by petitioner with denial of due process.
YU VS. MAPAYO
appellant therein had filed suit to recover from defendant Emilio Mapayo the sum of P2,800,
representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of a Gray Marine Engine sold by the plaintiff
to the defendant, plus attorney's fees. The City Court, after trial, disallowed the defenses and
ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff P2,500.00 and costs. Court ordered the plaintiff to present his
evidence. Plaintiff's counsel refused to comply with said order. Instead of calling his witnesses, he
moved the Court to present them after the defendant had presented their evidence. The court asked
said counsel twice whether he would present his evidence for the plaintiff, but said counsel refused
to do so and sticked to his demand that he would introduce his witnesses only in rebuttal. Therefore
the court ruled against plaintiff, holding that such action was a dictation to the Court to disregard its
lawful command and a violation of the order of trial provided in the Rules of Court.
While this appeal is not a complaint against the presiding judge, We can not refrain from observing
that the trial judge's despotic and outrageous insistence that plaintiff should present proof in support
of allegations that were not denied but admitted by the adverse party was totally unwarranted, and
was made worse by the trial judge's continual interrupting of the explanations of counsel, in violation
of the rules of Judicial Ethics. Defendant not having supported his special defenses, the dismissal of
the case was manifestly untenable and contrary to law.