WHAT DO RANDOMIZED EVALUATIONS TELL US ABOUT MDG-RELEVANT POLICY

INTERVENTIONS?

A REVIEW OF J-PAL EVALUATIONS OF GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

INTERVENTIONS

DRAFT
15 JUNE 2010
Andy Sumner

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Randomised Evaluations (REs) are a form of impact evaluation that allows research to isolate the impacts of a
specific intervention from other factors. A major source of such research is the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action
Lab also know as J-PAL. J-PAL is a network of researchers around the world united by their use of Randomized
Evaluations to answer questions related to interventions for poverty reduction. This paper reviews the 100+ J-PAL
REs relavant to the social and governance concerns of the MDGs.

The body of studies say three key things of particular note:

1. Not surprising – here are numerous social development interventions that are successful (ie de-worming
tablets increase school attendance for example);

2. Surprising - given heated policy debates - user fees for public goods and services, even very small user fees,
lead to very drastic and unequivocal falls in service usage amongst the poor;

3. New - an emerging area for REs is in accountability interventions particularly mechanisms around reaching
the poor with public services such as report cards for clinics and other accountability mechanisms.

It is worth noting that REs are not without critique:

1. The most important being that they’re generally expensive as a form of evaluation;

2. REs generally can tell you if but not exactly why an intervention worked;

3. REs can only answer limited amount of generally very micro questions (and thus there is a concern
methods start to dictate the policy/research questions).

Table 1. Summary of J-Pal Randomised Evaluations relevant to the MDGs by MDG

Table 2. Full list of MDG-relevant RCTs conducted by J-PAL

Table 3. J-PAL REs yet to report with relevance to MDGs listed on J-Pal website (May 2010).

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Table 1. Summary of J-Pal Randomised Evaluations relevant to the MDGs by MDG

MDG Evidence of successful interventions on poverty No evidence of success

reduction
1 Fertilizers for farmers (Kenya); Provision of Access to credit and training course for farmers
mechanisms to save harvest income for future (Kenya)
fertilizer purchase (Kenya); Community monitoring
to improve health worker performance (Uganda);
Community-level iron fortification program (India);
Improving the supply of infrastructure for
immunization, and improving supply and
simultaneously increasing demand through the use
of modest, non-cash incentives (India); Delivery of
iron and Vitamin A supplementation and de-
worming drugs to 2-6 year old children (India)
2 Merit-based scholarships for girls (Kenya); Cash Provision of additional official government
incentives for teachers (Kenya); Provision to textbooks (Kenya)
schools with funding to hire a local contract teacher
(Kenya); Primary School De-worming Project
(Kenya); Operational tools and training for district
administrators (Madagascar); Village Education
Committees (India); Monetary incentive attached to
teacher attendance (India); Remedial education
intervention (extra tutoring) (India); Computer
Assisted Learning (India); Delivery of iron and
Vitamin A supplementation and de-worming drugs
to 2-6 year old children (India); Teacher
performance pay program (India); PACES-
vouchers to enable children to enroll in school
(Colombia)
3 Merit-based scholarships for girls (Kenya); Cash Provision of additional official government
incentives for teachers (Kenya); Provision to textbooks (Kenya); Mandated representation of
schools with funding to hire a local contract teacher women in village councils (India); Multiple pre-
(Kenya); Operational tools and training for district election voter education campaigns (India);
administrators (Madagascar); Vouchers for Provision of sanitary products to girls (Nepal)
appointments with family planning nurse and
access to contraception (Zambia); Village
Education Committees (India); Randomized
selection of some village chiefs (pradhans)
positions to be reserved for women (India);
Remedial education intervention (extra tutoring)
(India); Computer Assisted Learning (India);
Delivery of iron and Vitamin A supplementation
and de-worming drugs to 2-6 year old children
(India); Teacher performance pay program (India);
Commitment savings product called a SEED
(Philippines); PACES- vouchers to enable children
to enroll in school (Colombia)
4 Free provision of ITNs (Kenya); Vouchers for long- Cost-sharing of ITNs; Subsidized interest-free loan
lasting ITNs (Kenya); Water chlorination supply to to install a water connection at home (Morocco);

2
 households (Kenya); Improve water quality at the Paying for Clorin (chlorine to ensure clean water)
source (springs) (Kenya); Community monitoring ( Zambia)
to improve health worker performance (Uganda);
Incentives program to improve Assistant Nurse
Midwife (ANM) attendance (India); Community-
level iron fortification program (India); Improving
the supply of infrastructure for immunization, and
improving supply and simultaneously increasing
demand through the use of modest, non-cash
incentives (India); Delivery of iron and Vitamin A
supplementation and de-worming drugs to 2-6 year
old children (India); Voluntary commitment
savings program to stop smoking (Philippines)
5 HIV infections in school (Kenya); Training Subsidized interest-free loan to install a water
teachers on how to teach the HIV curriculum connection at home (Morocco); Paying for Clorin
(Kenya); HIV testing and counseling (Malawi); (chlorine to ensure clean water) ( Zambia)
Vouchers for appointments with family planning
nurse and access to contraception (Zambia); Water
chlorination supply to households (Kenya);
Community monitoring to improve health worker
performance (Uganda); Incentives program to
improve Assistant Nurse Midwife (ANM)
attendance (India); Community-level iron
fortification program (India); Voluntary
commitment savings program to stop smoking
(Philippines)
6 Free provision of ITNs (Kenya); Vouchers for long- Cost-sharing of ITNs; fee for de-worming drugs
lasting ITNs (Kenya); information on HIV (Kenya); paying for long-lasting ITNs (Kenya):
infections in school (Kenya); Training teachers on Subsidized interest-free loan to install a water
how to teach the HIV curriculum (Kenya); HIV connection at home (Morocco); Paying for Clorin
testing and counseling (Malawi); Primary School (chlorine to ensure clean water) ( Zambia)
De-worming Project (Kenya); Community
monitoring to improve health worker performance
(Uganda); Vouchers for appointments with family
planning nurse and access to contraception
(Zambia); Water chlorination supply to households
(Kenya); Improve water quality at the source
(springs) (Kenya); Improving the supply of
infrastructure for immunization, and improving
supply and simultaneously increasing demand
through the use of modest, non-cash incentives
(India); Delivery of iron and Vitamin A
supplementation and de-worming drugs to 2-6 year
old children (India); Voluntary commitment
savings program to stop smoking (Philippines)
7 Water chlorination supply to households (Kenya); Subsidized interest-free loan to install a water
Improve water quality at the source (springs) connection at home (Morocco); Paying for Clorin
(Kenya) (chlorine to ensure clean water)( Zambia);
Provision of sanitary products to girls (Nepal)
Most Small consumer loans to households ot marginal Introduction of microcredit to a new market (India)

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MDGs applicants (South Africa); Police training and
increasing the duration of job postings (India);
Proxy means testing (Indonesia); Incentives to open
a formal savings account (Indonesia); Auditing of
funds for public projects (Indonesia); Deposit-
collecting program (Philippines); Loans to
marginally creditworthy applicants (Philippines);
Commitment savings product called a SEED
(Philippines); Offer of credit through village banks
(Peru); business training to a group lending
program (Peru)

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Table 2. Full list of MDG-relevant RCTs conducted by J-PAL

Full reference Relevant MDGs Policy intervention Findings

tested
Africa
Kenya Dupas & Cohen. MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, Cost-sharing (patients No evidence was
‘Free Distribution malaria, and other contributing to cost of found to suggest that
or Cost Sharing? diseases) drugs) v free cost-sharing
Evidence from a MDG4 (Infant mortality) Insecticide Treated (patients
Malaria Prevention Nets (effect on usage contributing to cost
Experiment in and demand of of drugs) increases
Kenya’. 2006 Insecticide Treated ITN usage; Cost-
Nets of cost-sharing v sharing does
free provision) considerably
dampen demand-
results suggest that
free distribution of
ITNs is both more
efficient and more
cost-effective than
cost-sharing. These
results imply that
demand for ITNs is
75% lower at the
cost-sharing price
prevailing in Kenya
at the time of the
study ($0.75) than it
is under a free
distribution scheme
Miguel & Kremer. MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, Sustainable provision The introduction of a
‘The Illusion of malaria, and other of de-worming drugs small fee for
Sustainability: diseases) (cost-sharing (patients deworming drugs led
Comparing Free MDG4 (Infant mortality) contributing to cost of to an 80% reduction
Provision of drugs); health in treatment rates,
Deworming Drugs education and verbal consistent with the
and "Sustainable" commitment; social hypothesis that
Approaches in learning) people have low
Kenya’. 1997-2001 private valuation for
de-worming.
Dupas, P. MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, Ensuring the adoption As a result of this
‘HIV/AIDS malaria, and other of safer sexual intervention, the
Prevention Through diseases) behavior among incidence of
Relative Risk MDG5 (Maternal youth: Information on childbearing was
Information for mortality) the distribution of reduced by 28%
Teenage Girls in HIV infections by age (from 5.4 percent of
Kenya’. 2004-2005 and gender-“Relative girls getting
Risk Information pregnant within a
Campaign” in 71 year, to 3.9 percent).
schools randomly This suggests that

5
 selected among 328 the intervention
primary schools reduced the
involved in another likelihood that girls
HIV intervention engage in unsafe
evaluation sex.
Miguel et al. MDG2 (Primary The Girls’ The program raised
‘Incentives to education) Scholarship Program test scores by 0.19
Learn: A Merit- MDG3 (Gender equality) (GSP)- Out of a set ofstandard deviations
Based Girls' 127 schools, 64 were for girls enrolled in
Scholarship randomly invited to schools eligible for
Program in Kenya’. participate in a the scholarship.
2001-2002 program which gave While the program
merit-based impact on school
scholarships to 6th participation is
grade girls nearly zero among
girls in some areas,
the impact in Busia
is positive at 3.2
percentage points;
greater teaching
effort was directed
to the class as a
whole; Anecdotal
evidence from
teacher interviews
suggests greater
parental monitoring
occurred in Busia as
a result of the
program
Miguel et al. MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, Water chlorination: Most households
‘Source Dispensers malaria, and other examine the impact of have a low
and Home Delivery diseases) factors including willingness to pay
of Chlorine in MDG2 (Primary price, persuasion, for chlorine, despite
Kenya’. 2004-2008 education) promotion and the its well known
MDG3 (Gender equality) chlorination products benefits. After
MDG7 (Water and themselves with a receiving a free 7-
sanitation) two-phase study month supply,
chlorine was
detected in 58% of
households, much
more than the 2%
starting level;
Investments in
marketing
campaigns and
coupon schemes
proved to be
ineffective strategies
to encourage point-
of-use chlorination.
6
 Chlorine was
detected in 40% of
households visited
by a promoter,
compared to only
4% in those who
weren’t visited
Dupas, P. ‘The MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, Vouchers for long- The demand for
Role of Exposure, malaria, and other lasting ITN (LLIN) malaria-preventing
Social Networks diseases) bed nets in Western
and Marketing MDG4 (Infant mortality) Kenya is relatively
Messages in price sensitive; an
Households' increase in price
Willingness to Pay from $0 to $1 leads
for Malaria to a drop of 35
Prevention in percentage points in
Kenya’. 2007-2008 take up, and an
increase from $1 to
$2 leads to a further
drop of 25
percentage points.
Gaining access to a
free or highly
subsidized LLIN in
the first year
increased
households’
reported, as well as
observed,
willingness to pay
for a second LLIN;
Neither of the two
framing options
(health or financial)
had any impact at all
on LLIN take up
Miguel et al. MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, Improve water quality The simple
‘Cleaning Springs malaria, and other at the source infrastructure
in Kenya’. 2005- diseases) (springs). Identified investment of
2006 MDG4 (Infant mortality) 200 springs in the “spring cleaning”
MDG7 (Water and Busia district of significantly reduced
sanitation) Kenya, and persuaded both water
each local community contamination and
to contribute 10% of the incidence of
the costs of the diarrhea. There was
improvement project, 66% less E-coli
usually in labor. contamination in
treated springs than
in untreated ones,
and an average of
24% less
7
 contamination in
users’ home water
supplies among
households who
collected water from
multiple springs and
those who only used
protected springs.
Diarrheal incidence
in children under 3
years old fell by 4.7
percentage points, or
25%, though there
was no significant
effect on children
ages 5 to 12.
Duflo et al. MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, Teachers from 164 Increased chances of
‘Teacher Training malaria, and other randomly selected teachers teaching
for HIV/AIDS diseases) schools were trained about HIV in the
Prevention MDG5 (Maternal on HIV/AIDS and on classroom; students
Education in mortality) how to teach the HIV had greater
Primary School curriculum. The knowledge about the
Classrooms in curriculum covers disease and also
Kenya’. 2003-2006 facts about the reported more
disease, and tolerant attitudes
encourages abstinence toward those with
until marriage and AIDS; intervention
faithfulness did not reduce
afterwards childbearing rates
among girls,
suggesting that it did
not decrease the
likelihood that girls
engage in unsafe
sex.
Kremer et al. MDG2 (Primary Effects of a teacher Student test scores
‘Teacher Incentives education) incentives program increased
Based on Students' MDG3 (Gender equality) (e.g. cash incentives) significantly in
Test Scores in on both teacher treatment schools.
Kenya’. 1996-2000 behavior and student However, evidence
test scores in Kenya suggests that this
improvement did not
necessarily occur
through the intended
channel of regular
classroom teaching;
Test score
improvements
dropped off after the
program was
completed. Prior to
8
 the program,
incentive schools
were slightly less
likely to offer test
preparations, but
after the introduction
of the program,
treatment schools
were 4.2 percentage
points more likely to
conduct prep
sessions in the first
year and 7.4
percentage points
more likely in the
second
Kremer et al. MDG2 (Primary Provision of After one school
‘Textbooks and education) additional official year there was no
Test Scores in MDG3 (Gender equality) government textbooks evidence that the
Kenya’. 1995-2000 textbook provision
increased average
test scores, or that it
reduced either grade
repetition or dropout
rates. Textbooks
increased
progression to
secondary school for
eighth graders but
did not reduce grade
repetition or raise
attendance in lower
grades
Duflo et al. ‘Rates MDG1 (Nutrition) Researchers set out to All fertilizer
of Return to experimentally treatments led to
Fertilizer: Evidence measure the returns to increases in yield,
from Field fertilizer among area though in different
Experiments in farmers amounts.
Kenya’. 2000-2005 Interventions A, B,
and C led to yield
increases of 28%,
48% and 63%
respectively, relative
to comparison plots.
Intervention D, the
Ministry of
Agriculture
recommended
package, led to an
average 91%
increase in yield
9
 relative to
comparison plots.
This evidence
demonstrates that
fertilizer use can
have substantial
returns, even in the
absence of any
changes in other
farming practices on
real-world farms
Duflo et al. MDG1 (Nutrition) Savings and Fertilizer The SAFI program
‘Nudging Farmers Initiative (SAFI): was very popular.
to Use Fertilizer: researchers designed The basic SAFI was
Experimental an intervention to test offered in two
Evidence from if providing seasons. In the first
Kenya’. 2000-2005 mechanisms to save season, the program
harvest income for increased usage by
future fertilizer 14 percentage
purchase could be points, on a base of
effective in increasing 23 percentage
usage points. In the second
season, the increase
was even bigger,
increasing usage by
18 percentage
points. Overall, the
results suggest that
offering farmers
small, time-limited
discounts on
fertilizer may
substantially
increase usage
without inducing
overuse among
farmers who are
already using
fertilizer, at
relatively low cost.
Karlan et al. MDG1 (Nutrition) Access to credit and One year after the
‘Finding Missing training course- program began,
Markets: An Researchers treatment individuals
Agricultural conducted a were 19.2
Brokerage randomized study percentage points
Intervention in with DrumNet, a more likely to be
Kenya’. 2003-2005 Kenyan NGO, to growing an export
evaluate whether a crop, but there were
package of services no significant gains
could help small in income. While
farmers overcome credit might have
10
 barriers to adopting, made exporting
financing and easier to some
marketing export clients, access to
crops. credit had no effect
on income gains
compared to no-
credit groups
Robinson, J. MDG1 (Nutrition) Intra-household risk- Overall, the study
‘Limited Insurance sharing (i.e. sharing suggests significant
Within the risk among couples) barriers to efficient
Household in arrangements such as risk sharing among
Kenya’. 2006 loans and gifts these couples. Since
this study evaluated
relatively small
shocks, the failure of
intra-household risk
sharing is likely to
be even more
pronounced for
bigger shocks such
as a poor harvest or
major illness. In
weeks in which they
receive the shock,
men increase their
expenditures on
privately consumed
items by 21%
Kremer et al. MDG2 (Primary Provision of flipcharts The comparison
‘Flipcharts, School education) to each of 89 between
Inputs & MDG3 (Gender equality) randomly selected retrospective and
Retrospective vs. Kenyan primary prospective
Prospective schools estimates of the
Analyses in effect of flipcharts in
Kenya’. 1996-1998 Kenyan primary
schools finds that
randomized
prospective
estimates are much
smaller than
retrospective
estimates; policy
should reflect
prospective study
findings as
retrospective studies
may produce
misleading results.
Duflo et al. ‘Peer MDG2 (Primary Provision to 140 Providing school
Effects, Pupil- education) schools with funding committees with

11
 Teacher Ratios, and MDG3 (Gender equality) to hire a local contractfunds to hire an extra
Teacher Incentives teacher to address teacher on a short-
in Kenya’. 2005- classroom term contract had a
2007 overcrowding generally positive
effect on learning, as
measured by test
scores. Contract
teachers were
present in school
more than their civil-
service counterparts,
and their students
scored higher on
exams.
Miguel & Kremer. MDG2 (Primary Primary School De- De-worming
‘Primary School education) worming Project reduced serious
Deworming in MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, (PSDP). Schools with worm infections by
Kenya’. 1997-2001 malaria, and other worm prevalence over half amongst
diseases) 50% were mass children in the
treated with de- treatment groups;
worming drugs every De-worming
six months. In increased school
addition to medicine, participation by at
treatment schools least 7 percentage
received regular points, which
public health lectures, equates to a one-
wall charts on worm quarter reduction in
prevention, and school absenteeism;
training for one The entire
designated teacher. community and
those living up to 6
kilometers away
from treatment
schools benefited
from “spillovers” of
the de-worming
treatment.
Madagascar Duflo et al. MDG2 (Primary District administrators Top-down approach:
‘Primary Education education) in treatment districts The interventions
Management in MDG3 (Gender equality) received operational targeted at the
Madagascar’. 2005- tools and training that district and sub-
2007 included forms for district level had
supervision visits to minimal effects on
schools, and the administrator’s
procurement sheets behaviors, and the
for school supplies schools and students
and grants (district- under their
level intervention). responsibility;
Bottom-up: The
interventions at the
school level led to
12
 significantly
improved teacher
behavior: Test scores
were 0.1 standard
deviations higher
than those in the
comparison group
two years after the
implementation of
the program.
Additionally, student
attendance increased
by 4.3 percentage
points compared to
the comparison
group average of
87%, though teacher
attendance and
communication with
parents did not
improve.
Malawi Thornton, R. ‘The MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, Uptake of HIV testing On average,
Demand for and malaria, and other and counseling respondents who
Impact of Learning diseases) (impact of monetary received any cash-
HIV Status in MDG5 (Maternal incentives and value voucher were
Malawi’. 1998- mortality) distance and impact twice as likely to go
2004 on sexual behaviour) to the VCT center to
obtain their HIV test
results as those who
received no cash
incentive; Receiving
an HIV positive
diagnosis
significantly
increased the
likelihood of
purchasing condoms
among those who
were sexually active.
While only 34% of
those who received
no monetary
incentive attended
clinics to learn their
results, monetary
incentives were
highly effective at
increasing result-
seeking behavior
Morocco Duflo et al. MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, Subsidized interest- Since the
‘Household Water malaria, and other free loan to install a participating
13
 Connections in diseases) water connection at households already
Tangier, Morocco’. MDG4 (Infant mortality) home had access to the
2007-2008 MDG5 (Maternal water grid through
mortality) free public taps, no
MDG7 (Water and improvements in the
sanitation) quality of water
consumed by
households have
been found. Despite
significant
improvement in
water quantity, no
change in the
incidence of
waterborne illnesses
was found. Time
saving was found to
occur, as well as
bypassing a source
of tension between
households.
South Africa Karlan et al. ‘Small Most MDGs (indirect) Small consumer loans Expanding access to
Individual Loans to households credit is found to
and Mental Health (Marginal applicants- significantly
in South Africa’. those who may have increase well-being
2004-2006 been turned down for of borrowers.
credit beforehand) Economic self-
sufficiency
(employment and
income) was higher
for treated applicants
than for those in the
comparison group 6-
12 months after
treatment. Twenty-
six percent of treated
households report an
improvement in food
consumption.
Uganda Svensson & MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, Community In the intervention
Bjorkman. malaria, and other monitoring to group, utilization of
‘Community-Based diseases) improve health general outpatient
Monitoring of MDG4 (Infant mortality) worker performance services was higher
Primary Healthcare MDG5 (Maternal (and the impact this (20%), more people
Providers in mortality) might have on health came for child birth
Uganda’. 2004 utilization and deliveries (58%) and
outcomes) more patients sought
prenatal care (19%).
More people sought
family planning
services (22%) and
14
 immunizations
increased for all age
groups, especially
newborns. Better
health facilities at
centres, reduced
waiting times,
improved health
outcomes (e.g.
increase in infant
weight): the overall
effect of this
intervention was
significantly
positive, bringing
great hope to the
possibility of
community led and
sustained monitoring
efforts
Zambia Field et al. MDG3 (Gender equality) Vouchers for Take up of the
‘Contraceptive MDG6 (HIV/AIDS) appointments with voucher was high at
Adoption, Fertility, family planning nurse 47%, indicating that
and the Family in and access to women valued the
Zambia’. 2006 contraception substantial reduction
(vouchers given in in the time cost of an
presence of husbands) appointment
associated with the
voucher. However,
male knowledge of
the voucher led to a
substantial reduction
in use of these
services, suggesting
that policies or
technologies that
shift relative control
of contraceptive
methods from men
to women may
significantly
increase
contraceptive use
and reduce average
fertility in some
contexts
Ashraf et al. ‘Can MDG7 (Water and Door-to-door sale of Researchers found
Higher Prices sanitation) Clorin (chlorine to that fewer people
Stimulate Product MDG4 (Infant mortality) ensure clean water) at bought Clorin
Use? Evidence MDG5 (Maternal a randomly chosen, (chlorine to ensure
from a Randomized mortality) below-market “offer clean water) as the
15
 Experiment in price” to about 1,260 price rose; for every
Zambia’. 2006 households with poor 1% increase in price
access to piped water there was a 0.67%
or chlorine home- decrease in quantity
delivery (Researchers demanded. However
sought to find higher prices did
whether higher prices appear to screen out
can help target those those who would not
who would most use have used the
the product) product in any event,
and a higher
willingness to pay
was associated with
greater propensity to
use. Overall, the use
of chlorine does
decrease with higher
prices due to
dampened demand,
but this decline is
partially offset by
better targeting of
the product to
families who are
likely to use it.
South Asia
India Duflo et al. ‘The MDG3 (Gender equality) Researchers studied There was no
Impact of Women the policy evidence that the
Policy Makers on consequences of policy impact of the
Public Goods in mandated reservations is
India’. 2000-2002 representation by driven by features
determining whether other than the gender
there was any of the president. It is
difference in the because women’s
provision of social own preferences are
services between more aligned to the
male and female led general preferences
village councils of women that they
end up serving them
better.
Banerjee et al. MDG1 (Nutrition) Introduction of No evidence was
‘Measuring the MDG2 (Primary microcredit to a new found to suggest that
Impact of education) market microcredit
Microfinance in MDG3 (Gender equality) empowers women or
Hyderabad, India’. MDG4 (Infant mortality) improves health or
2005-2008 MDG5 (Maternal educational
mortality) outcomes.
(related) Additionally, 30% of
loans were
reportedly used to

16
 repay an existing
loan, 15% to buy a
durable good for
household use, and
15% to smooth
household
consumption.
Banerjee et al. MDG4 (Infant mortality) Incentives program to These results show
‘Incentives for MDG5 (Maternal improve Assistant that, like other
Nurses in the Public mortality) Nurse Midwife public service
Health Care System (ANM) attendance at providers, nurses are
in Udaipur, India’. rural subcenters responsive to
2005-2007 serving 135 villages properly
in Udaipur District administered
incentives; Even
when the incentive
was effective at
increasing presence,
it did not increase
the rate at which
patients came to the
sub-centers, which
in any case is very
low. At any given
time between 0.46
and 0.9 clients were
being seen in the
center, fewer even
than the 2-3 clients
observed two years
earlier.
Banerjee et al. MDG3 (Gender equality) Multiple pre-election The likelihood that
‘Campaigns to voter education an individual would
Influence Voting campaigns (PEVACs) vote for the party
Behavior in Uttar which represented
Pradesh, India’. their caste decreased
2007 from 57% to 52% in
villages which
received this
campaign. Voting
patterns made it
clear that the poor do
have distinct
preferences for
representatives who
focus on issues that
are important for
them
Banerjee et al. MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, Community-level iron A midline survey
‘Reducing Anemia malaria, and other fortification program shows a significant

17
Through Iron diseases) (an option for iron difference in anemia
Fortification of MDG1 (Nutrition) supplementation for rate between
Grain in Udaipur, MDG4 (Infant mortality) families who do not treatment and
India’. 2002-2009 MDG5 (Maternal buy commercially comparison villages,
mortality) processed grain) of about 7
percentage points,
but by end-line,
when the uptake had
fallen, there was no
difference in anemia
between treatment
and comparison
groups. The program
was effective in
reducing anemia as
long as take up was
high enough, but
ineffective when
take up was low;
Monthly health
monitoring reveals a
similar pattern for
weakness and
fatigue: symptoms
were reduced when
take up was
sufficiently high, but
by end-line the
program had no
effect on health.
Banerjee et al. ‘Can MDG2 (Primary 3 interventions to Those who could
Informational education) determine if more read only letters at
Campaigns Raise information and baseline were 3.5%
Awareness and encouragement to use more likely to read
Local Participation the channels available at least paragraphs
in Primary to them would cause or words, and 3.3%
Education in VECs (Village more likely to read
India?’ 2005-2006 Education stories if they were
Committees) and in an Intervention 3
community members village. These
to demand and changes in average
receive better services literacy across the
village came despite
the fact that only 8%
of children,
including 13% of
those who could not
recognize letters
prior to the
intervention,
attended the classes.
18
 If we assume that all
the improvement in
the villages came
from the reading
classes then children
who attended the
classes must have
seen very big
improvements in
reading
Banerjee et al. MDG1 (Nutrition) Improving the supply Study results
‘Improving MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, of infrastructure for indicate that offering
Immunization Rates malaria, and other immunization, and families in resource-
Through Regular diseases) improving supply and poor settings small,
Camps and MDG4 (Infant mortality) simultaneously non-financial
Incentives in India’. increasing demand incentives in
2004-2007 through the use of addition to reliable
modest, non-cash services and
incentives education is more
effective than
providing services
and education alone.
It is also more cost-
effective—more
children utilize the
same immunization
facilities, lowering
the cost per child
immunized, even
considering the cost
of the incentives.
Duflo et al. MDG3 (Gender equality) Randomized selection Mandated Exposure
‘Perceptions of of some village chiefs to a female leader
Female Leaders in (pradhans) positions does not affect
India’. 2006-2007 to be reserved for villagers’ stated taste
women for male leaders.
Men rated male
leaders 1.44 points
higher than female
leaders. Women
exhibited a smaller,
though significant,
bias in favor of male
leaders, ranking
them 0.56 points
above female
leaders. Political
reservation led to
significant electoral
gains for women.

19
Duflo et al. MDG2 (Primary Monetary incentive Over the 30 months
‘Encouraging education) attached to teacher of the study, teachers
Teacher Attendance MDG3 (Gender equality) attendance at program schools
through Monitoring had an absence rate
with Cameras in of 21%, compared to
Rural Udaipur, 44% at baseline and
India’. 2003-2006 42% in the
comparison schools.
Two and a half years
into the program,
children from the
treatment schools
were also 62% more
likely to transfer to a
formal primary
school, which
requires passing a
competency test.
The program
resulted in an
immediate and long
lasting improvement
in teacher attendance
rates in treatment
schools; Increasing
teacher attendance
improves
educational
outcomes (test
scores)
Banerjee et al. MDG2 (Primary Balsakhi Program, a The number of
‘Balsakhi Remedial education) remedial education students in the
Tutoring in MDG3 (Gender equality) intervention (extra bottom third of
Vadodara and tutoring) program classes who
Mumbai, India’. passed basic
2001-2004 competency tests
increased by nearly
8%, while those in
the top third who
passed increased by
4%. The program
had substantial
positive impacts on
children’s academic
achievement. Scores
on tests administered
after the program
showed that in both
cities in both years,
the program
improved overall test
20
 scores
Banerjee et al. MDG2 (Primary Pratham, an Considerable unmet
‘Computer-Assisted education) education-oriented demand for loans.
Learning Project MDG3 (Gender equality) NGO, designed a The CAL program
with Pratham in program that was shown to be
India’. 2001-2004 supplemented highly effective in
classroom instruction raising students' skill
with Computer levels in math
Assisted Learning (though not in
(CAL) languages), but was
less cost-effective
than the tutor-based
Balsakhi program. n
the first year, math
scores increased
approximately 0.36
standard deviations,
a substantial
achievement when
compared to other
education
interventions.
Miguel et al. MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, Pratham’s preschool Large gains in child
‘Balwadi malaria, and other nutrition and health weight—roughly 0.5
Deworming in diseases) project in the slums of kg on average—
India’. 2001-2003 MDG4 (Infant mortality) Delhi, India. The were found in the
MDG1 (Nutrition) program delivered a treatment schools
MDG2 (Primary package consisting of relative to
education) iron and Vitamin A comparison schools
MDG3 (Gender equality) supplementation and over the two-year
de-worming drugs to study period;
2-6 year old children Average preschool
through an existing participation rates
preschool network. increased sharply by
5.8 percentage
points among treated
children, reducing
preschool
absenteeism by
roughly one fifth.
Muralidharan & MDG2 (Primary Teacher performance Teacher pay based
Sundararaman. education) pay program on student
‘Teacher MDG3 (Gender equality) implemented in the performance is
Performance Pay in Indian state of Andhra found to be highly
Andhra Pradesh, Pradesh (AP). Two effective at
India’. 2004-2007 types of teacher improving student
performance pay learning. After two
(group bonuses based years of the
on school program, students in
performance, and incentive schools

21
 individual bonuses performed on
based on teacher average 0.28 and
performance) 0.16 standard
deviations higher
than those in
comparison schools
in math and
language tests
respectively. At the
end of two years, the
average treatment
effect was a 0.27
standard deviation
increase in test
scores in the
individual incentive
schools compared to
0.16 standard
deviations in the
group incentive
schools.
Bertrand et al. Governance (related to International Finance Close to 71% of
‘Obtaining a most MDGs) Corporation (IFC) license getters in the
Driver's Licence in followed 822 driver’s comparison group
India: An license candidates, did not take the
Experimental collecting data on licensing exam, and
Approach to whether they obtained 62% were
Studying licenses, as well as unqualified to drive
Corruption’. 2004- detailed micro data on (according to the
2006 the specific independent test).
procedures, time, and Overall, these results
expenditures involved support the view that
corruption does not
merely reflect
transfers from
citizens to
bureaucrats but
distorts allocation of
resources.
Banerjee et al. Governance (related to Rajasthan Police Evidence from
‘Police most MDGs) initiated an public opinion
Performance and intervention with J- surveys revealed
Public Perception in PAL researchers implementing police
Rajasthan, India’. which aimed to training and
2006-2008 enhance police increasing the
performance, improve duration of job
public opinion, and postings can
gather objective significantly
information about improve the public’s
crime rates and opinion of the
performance police. Increasing
22
 the number of
trained officers from
0% to 100% raises
the probability that
crime victims were
satisfied with police
investigation by 31
percentage points
Duflo et al. MDG2 (Primary Survey of all almost The provision of
‘Efficiency and education) all village councils in irrigation and
Rent Seeking in MDG3 (Gender equality) Birbhum, totaling 161 education services
Local Government’. MDG7 (Water and councils and resource was lower in lower-
2000-2003 sanitation) map caste areas relative
(indirect) to higher-caste ones,
drinking water and
informal education
centers were
provided equally
among groups, and
lower-caste
communities saw a
larger allocation of
sanitation services.
Village heads from
the Scheduled Castes
built on average
10% more
infrastructure
projects in lower-
caste areas relative
to the amount built
in lower-caste areas
of communities
which did not have a
reserved village head
Banerjee et al. MDG1 (Nutrition) SKS Microfinance's The data suggest that
‘Providing Health MDG4 (Infant mortality) pilot health insurance SKS households,
Insurance through MDG5 (Maternal program despite being
Microfinance mortality) members of a
Networks in Rural MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, microcredit
Karnataka, India’. malaria, and other organization, face
2007 diseases) considerable
MDG7 (Water and financial risk from
sanitation) health shocks. Less
than 1% of
households have
accident or health
insurance, but they
face frequent and
serious health
shocks.
23
Nepal Thornton & Oster. MDG3 (Gender quality) Effect of provision of Girls not allocated
‘Menstruation and MDG7 (Water and sanitary products on menstrual cups in
Education in sanitation) school attendance, the initial
Nepal’. 2006-2008 attainment, self- randomization were
esteem and health 2.6 percentage
among adolescent points less likely to
girls be in school on days
they were
menstruating. This
falls well below the
10-20% estimates
made by policy
makers. Similarly,
the allocation of a
menstrual cup has no
effect on test scores,
and this is not due to
low adoption of the
cup: 60% of
treatment girls report
using the cup six
months into the
study.
South east Asia
Indonesia Banerjee et al. Most MDGs (indirect) Proxy means testing The PMT method
‘Effectively (PMT) (approach that outperformed both
Targeting Anti- focuses on the the community and
Poverty Programs household level, hybrid treatment in
in Indonesia’. 2008- identifies potential terms of the overall
2009 beneficiaries by a mis-target rates
single or set of
indicators that are
highly correlated with
(low) expenditures)
and community-based
methods of targeting
Cole et al. Most MDGs (indirect) The Access to Results show a
‘Financial Literacy, Finance survey was strong relationship
Access to Finance followed by a between financial
and the Effect of financial literacy literacy and banking
Being Banked in experiment, which behaviour.
Indonesia’. 2007 was only undertaken Specifically, an
in Java, Indonesia, increase in the
designed to directly incentive from US$3
test the role and to $14 increases the
relative importance of share of households
financial literacy and that open a formal
prices in determining savings account
demand for banking from 3.5% to 12.7%,
services an almost three-fold

24
 increase.
Olken, B. Most MDGs (indirect) A randomized The evidence
‘Combating evaluation in 608 suggests that
Corruption in Indonesian villages in increasing the
Community East Java and Central probability of
Development in Java: auditing of external audits
Indonesia’. 2003- funds for public substantially reduced
2004 projects missing funds in the
project; The
invitations increased
the number of
people participating
in the accountability
meetings by about
40%
Olken, B. ‘Direct MDG3 (Gender equality) Randomized Direct elections on
Democracy and evaluation in 48 women’s projects,
Local Public Goods villages, all of which on the other hand,
in Indonesia’. 2005- were preparing to did result in projects
2006 apply for that were located in
infrastructure projects poorer areas of the
(assessing villages. Villagers in
participation and treatment locations
governance) were 22 percentage
points more likely to
correctly identify the
type and location of
the general village
project, and 29
percentage points
more likely to know
these things about
the woman’s project.
Philippines Ashraf, N. ‘Spousal Most MDGs (indirect) A field study in which Evidence shows that
Control and Intra- couples attempted to the setting of intra-
Household make decisions with household decision-
Decision Making in varying degrees of making has
the Philippines’. privacy and ability to significant impact on
2005-2006 bargain final outcomes;
These results suggest
that spouses with
different information
about household
income may create
incentives for hiding
funds. In the private
setting, 51% of men
preferred to directly
deposit money into
their own account

25
 rather than putting it
into their spouse’s
account (23%) or
committing it to
consumption (25%).
However, when
information about
the outcomes was
made public, 60% of
men chose to
commit their money
to consumption
rather than putting
the money into their
own account (21%)
or into their spouse’s
account (19%).
Karlan et al. Most MDGs (indirect) Deposit-collecting The gender
‘Deposit Collectors program offered by difference suggests
in the Philippines’. the Green Bank of that intra-household
2001-2004 Caraga decision making
factors play a strong
role in the take-up of
deposit-collection
services; The
deposit-collection
service resulted in a
substantial increase
in savings for those
offered the service.
he deposit-collection
service increased
savings by about
25% after 10
months. The average
person made 3.85
deposits over the 10
month period, and
the average deposit
amounted to 497
pesos
Karlan et al. Most MDGs (indirect) Loans to marginally Additionally,
‘Measuring the creditworthy borrowing
Impact of applicants (those who households
Microcredit and may have been substituted away
Interest Rate refused credit from labor for their
Sensitivity in the beforehand) businesses and into
Philippines’. 2007- education for their
2009 children, choosing to
invest in their
family’s human
26
 capital, rather than in
capital specific to
their businesses
Karlan et al. MDG4 (Infant mortality) Committed Action to Results suggest that
‘CARES MDG5 (Maternal Reduce and End those who signed a
Commitment mortality) Smoking (“CARES”) CARES
Savings for MDG6 (HIV/AIDS, is a voluntary commitment
Smoking Cessation malaria, and other commitment savings increase their
in the Philippines’. diseases) program. probability of test
2006-2007 passage and a lasting
quit spell by several
fold. These results
were far above the
reductions in
smoking associated
with the cue card
treatment. ndividuals
who were offered a
CARES contract
were 3 to 6
percentage points
more likely to pass a
urine test for
nicotine after six
months than those in
the comparison
group, a substantial
effect considering
that only 8 to 12
percent of
comparison
individuals passed
the test.
Karlan et al. MDG 3 (Gender equality) Commitment savings The SEED product
‘Commitment Most MDGs (indirect) product called a leads to more
Savings Products in SEED (Save, Earn, decision making
the Philippines’. Enjoy Deposits) power for women in
2000-2003 account. The SEED the household, and
account provides likewise an increase
individuals with a in purchases of
commitment to female-oriented
restrict access to their durable goods.
savings, thus Findings suggest that
potentially helping the 81% increase in
with either self- savings after one
control or family- year did not crowd
control issues out savings held
outside of the
participating bank,
but that the longer-
term impact over
27
 two and a half years
was only a 33%
increase, which is no
longer statistically
significant.
Latin America
Colombia Kremer et al. MDG2 (Primary Programa de Preliminary results
‘Vouchers for education) Ampliación de showed no
Private Schooling MDG3 (Gender equality) Cobertura de la significant
in Colombia’. Educación Secundaria differences in school
1998-2004 (PACES), one of the enrollment between
largest voucher lottery winners and
programs to date losers three years
(vouchers to enable after application. But
children to enroll in lottery winners were
school) 15 percentage points
more likely to have
attended private
school and to attend
university; While
test scores suggest
vouchers had more
positive effects than
simply reducing
grade repetition, no
strong conclusions
were able to be
drawn about the
long-term effects of
private schooling on
test scores. Lottery
winners were more
likely to take the
university entrance
exam, a good
predictor of high
school graduation,
since 90% of all high
school graduates
take the exam.
Within the sample of
voucher applicants,
about 28 percent of
students took the
ICFES exam, and
vouchers raised the
exam registration
rates about 7
percentage points.
Peru Karlan et al. Most MDGs (indirect) In collaboration with These findings

28
 ‘Valuing Trust in PRISMA, a Peruvian underscore the
Shantytowns in NGO offering credit prediction on which
Peru’. 2005 through village banks, the program was
researchers designed founded, namely that
and implemented a borrowers with close
new loan product and social relationships
administered surveys to their sponsors
to 9,000 shantytown allow the bank to be
households more certain that this
new client will repay
their loan
Karlan & Valdivia. Most MDGs (indirect) Impact of adding The impact on
‘Business business training to a business outcomes
Education for group lending was significantly
Microcredit Clients program positive though the
in Peru’. 2002-2005 impact on
institutional
outcomes was less
impressive. For
clients in the
treatment group,
sales in the month
prior to the follow
up surveys were
15% higher than in
the comparison
group, and returns
were an average
26% higher in "bad
months" when they
would have expected
downward
fluctuations in their
sales
Source: J-PAL Summaries at: http://www.povertyactionlab.org/search/apachesolr_search?
view=grid&filters=type:evaluation

29
30
Table 3. J-PAL REs yet to report with relevance to MDGs listed on J-Pal website (May 2010).
Africa
Benin
Karlan, D. ‘Microfinance and Health Protection
Initiative, Including Malaria Education, in
Benin’
Ethiopia
Karlan & Goldberg. ‘Targeting the Ultra-Poor in
Ethiopia’
Ghana
Duflo et al. ‘Return to Secondary Schooling in
Ghana’
Fischer et al. ‘Willingness and Ability to Pay for
the Kosim Clean Water Filter in Ghana’
Karlan, D. ‘Returns to Medium and Small
Enterprise Management Consulting in Ghana’
Kenya
Kremer et al. ‘The Impact of Distributing School
Uniforms on Children's Education in Kenya’.
2001-2004
Kremer et al. ‘Decentralization: A Cautionary
Tale - Public Finance in Kenya’. 1995-2000
Kremer & Gugerty. ‘The Rockefeller Effect:
Looking at Organizations of the Disadvantaged
in Kenya’. 2002-2003
Kremer & Vermeersch. ‘School Meals,
Educational Achievement and School Finance in
Kenya’
Robinson & Dupas. ‘Savings Accounts for
Village Micro-Entrepreneurs in Kenya’. 2006-
2007
Morocco
Crépon et al. ‘Impact of Rural Microcredit in
Morocco’. 2006-2009
Duflo et al. ‘Conditional Cash Transfers for
Education in Morocco’
Niger
Asia
Afghanistan
Linden & Burde. ‘Village Based Schools in
Afghanistan’. 2007-2008
Bangladesh
Field & Glennerster. ‘Empowering Girls in
Rural Bangladesh’. 2007
Rasul et al. ‘Targeting the Ultra-Poor in
Bangladesh’
India
Banerjee et al. ‘Helping the Ultra-Poor Use
Microcredit in Murshidabad, India’. 2006
Banerjee et al. ‘Read India: Helping Primary
School Students in India Acquire Basic Reading
and Math Skills’. 2008-2010
Bertrand & Mullainathan. ‘Misclassification in
the Targeted Public Distribution System in
India’. 2007
Chattopadhyay et al. ‘Rainfall Insurance in
Gujarat, India’
Chattopadhyay et al. ‘Futures Prices and Risk
Hedging in Gujarat, India’
Duflo et al. ‘Cooking Stoves, Indoor Air
Pollution, and Respiratory Health in India’. 2006
Field et al. ‘Business Training for Women in
Ahmedabad, India’
Field & Pande. ‘Microfinance Repayment
Schedules in West Bengal, India’. 2006
Hanna et al. ‘Teacher and Student Motivation,
Family Participation, and Student Achievement
in Rural Udaipur, India’. 2003
Karlan et al. ‘Debt Traps for Micro-
Entrepreneurs in Chennai, India’. 2007-2008
Linden, L. ‘Computer-Assisted Learning Project
with Gyan Shala in India’. 2004-2006
Linden et al. ‘How to Teach English in India:
31
Latin America
Bolivia
Karlan et al. ‘Text Message Reminders for
Savings and Loan Repayment, in Bolivia and
Philippines’
Karlan, D. ‘Hope versus Fear in Health Credit
Marketing in Bolivia’
Karlan, D. ‘Lock Boxes and a Bridge to Formal
Banking in Bolivia’
Karlan & Gine. ‘Peeling Back the Layers of
Group Liability in Bolivia’
Colombia
Linden et al. ‘Designing Conditional Cash
Transfers in Education: Colombia's Subsidios
Program’
Linden & Barrera-Osorio. ‘Spanish Computer-
Assisted Learning Program in Colombia’. 2006-
2008
Dominican Republic
Schoar & Fischer. ‘Small and Medium
Enterprise Financing and Mentoring Services in
Emerging Markets in the Dominican Republic’
El Salvador
Martínez et al. ‘Responses to Degree of Control
over Remittances in El Salvador’. 2007-2008
Mexico
Karlan et al. ‘Interest Rate Sensitivity Among
Village Banking Clients in Mexico’. 2006-2008
Karlan et al. ‘Psychological Responses to
Microfinance Loan Recovery in Peru’. 2006-
2008
No author. ‘Inviting Husbands to Female
Solidarity Groups in Mexico’.
No author. ‘Emergency Savings Accounts for
Remittance Receivers in Mexico’
Nicaragua
Huillery et al. Decentralizing Education
Expenditures: Primary School Community
Grants in Niger’. 2008-2009
Sierra Leone
Miguel & Glennerster. ‘The Role of Information
and Radios on Political Knowledge and
Participation in Sierra Leone’
Miguel et al. ‘Community Driven Development
in Sierra Leone’
South Africa
Karlan et al. ‘Marketing Effects in a Consumer
Credit Market in South Africa (Pricing the
Effect of Psychological "Features")’. 2003-2006
Karlan & Zinman. ‘Interest Rates, Loan
Maturity and Demand for Microfinance Loans in
South Africa’. 2003
Karlan & Zinman. ‘Estimating the Impact on the
Lender's Bottom Line and Borrowers'
Household Welfare of Expanding the Supply of
Consumer Credit to the Working Poor in South
Africa’
Uganda
Karlan & Linden. ‘Micro-Savings in Primary
Schools as a Means to Decrease Student Drop-
Out Rates in Uganda’
Svensson & Bjorkman. ‘Promoting Community
Health in Uganda’
Uganda & Tanzania
Rasul et al. ‘Human Capital, Financial Capital,
and the Economic Empowerment of Female
Adolescents in Uganda and Tanzania’
Zambia
Ashraf et al. ‘The Role of Incentives in the
Distribution of Public Goods in Zambia’
Testing the Relative Productivity of Pratham Field & Thornton. ‘Extending Health Insurance
Instruction Methods’. 2005-2007 to the Informal Sector Through Microfinance in
Linden et al. ‘Teaching Pre-Schoolers to Read: Nicaragua’. 2007-2009
A Randomized Evaluation of the Pratham Peru
Shishuvachan Program in India’. 2005-2007 Karlan, D. ‘Barriers to the Demand for Condoms
Nepal in Peru’
Linden & Edmonds. ‘Interventions Aimed at Karlan, D. ‘Interest Rates and Client Incentives
Child Laborers in the Nepalese Carpet Industry’ for Repayment in Puno and San Martin, Peru’
Pakistan Karlan & Thuysbaert. ‘Targeting the Ultra-Poor
Karlan & Pariente. ‘Graduating the Poorest Into in Peru’. 2009
Microfinance: Linking with Financial Services Karlan & Zinman. ‘Using Encouragement to
on the Model of BRAC’s TUP in Pakistan’. Overcome Psychological Barriers to Saving in
2008 Peru’. 2005
Linden et al. ‘Private School Incentive Program No author. ‘Impact of Rural Credit in Peru
in Pakistan’
Indonesia
Olken et al. ‘Project Generasi: Conditional
Community Block Grants in Indonesia’. 2007
Philippines
Karlan et al. ‘Health Insurance and Asymmetric
Information in the Philippines’
Karlan et al. ‘Impact of Health Insurance in the
Philippines’. 2007
Karlan et al. ‘Psychology of Savings: Evaluation
of Commitment Savings Program - FICO Bank,
Philippines’
Karlan & Gine. ‘Group versus Individual
Liability in the Philippines’. 2004-2009
Karlan & Mullainathan. ‘Debt Trap, Financial
Literacy, and Savings in Philippines’
No author. ‘Determinants of Delinquency in the
Philippines’
32
33