Paderanga v CA

KEY TAKE-AWAY: Right to bail is accorded to persons constructively arrested even though they havenot
been physically arrestedDATE/GR NO/SCRA: G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995PONENTE: REGALADO,
J.PETITIONER: MIGUEL P. PADERANGARESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

FACTS:Petition: Petition for certiorari on the CA’s decision denying the motion for reconsideration on
his petitionfor bail.Factual Antecedents: Miguel P. Paderanga was included in an amended information
for the crime of multiple murder asthe mastermind. Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion for
Admission of Bail before a Warrant of Arrestcould be issued by the lower court. Paderanga was unable
to appear for the hearing due to an ailment that needed medical attention.His counsel manifested that
they were submitting custody over the person of their client to thelocal chapter president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of saidhearing, he considered being in the
custody of the law. The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on his right
to bailStatute Involved: Art. 3, Sec. 12 Sec. 1 of Rule 114o Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security
given for the release of a person incustody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his
appearance beforeany court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in
theform of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. (1a)Position of
Respondent/s: The Court of Appeals reasoned that Paderanga was granted bail when was not in the
custody ofthe law, thus not eligible for the grant of the petition.

ISSUE: W/N it is proper to admit bail even though petitioner is not yet in custody of law

HELD/RATIO:NO Right to bail is only extended only to those persons who have been
arrested, detained, orotherwise deprived of their freedom A person is considered to be in the
custody of the law:o when he is arrested either by virtue of warrant of arrest or by warrantless arresto
when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrenderingto the proper
authorities In the foregoing facts, petitioner can be considered as being constructively and legally
undercustodyo Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control
over hisperson: firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trial court secondly, by furnishing
true information of his actual whereabouts; thirdly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of
the said court.o for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily
submittedhis person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court an
arrest is made either by: o actual restraint of the arrestee or o merely by his submission to the custody
of the person making the arrest (house arrest)Final Ruling Decision of CA is reversed. Petitioner is
granted bail

8 Maguddatu vs. Court of Appeals [GR 139599, 23 February 2000] First Division, Kapunan (J): 4 concur
Facts: Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu, Atty. Teodoro Rubino, Antonio
Sabbun Maguddatu and several other "John Does" were charged with murder before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 64, for the killing of Jose S. Pascual. On 23 October 1985, Maguddatu, et. al.
filed a motion to be admitted to bail on the ground that the prosecution's evidence is not strong. After
partial trial on the merits, the trial court issued an order, dated 20 December 1985, granting Maguddatu,
et. al.'s motion for bail and fixing the amount at P30,000.00 each. On the same day, Maguddatu, et. al.
posted bail through AFISCO Insurance Corporation. On 6 January 1987, AFISCO Insurance filed a motion
before the trial court praying for the cancellation of Maguddatu, et. al.'s bail bond because of the
latter's failure to renew the same upon its expiration on 20 December 1986. There is no showing,
however, of any action by the court on said motion. On 2 January 1998, the trial court convicted Aniceto
Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu, together with Atty. Teodoro Rubino, of the crime
of Homicide and sentenced them to suffer an indeterminate prison term of 8 years of Prision Mayor
medium, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The
judgment of conviction was promulgated in absentia. Accordingly, on 19 February 1998, the trial court
issued an order for the immediate arrest of Maguddatu, et. al. and their commitment to the custody of
proper authorities. While remaining at large, Maguddatu, et. al., on 27 February 1998, filed a Notice of
Appeal from the order of conviction for homicide with a motion to be granted provisional liberty under
the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court does nor appear to have resolved the motion for bail
pending appeal. Instead, it forwarded the records to the Court of Appeals. On 8 January 1999, the Court
of Appeals issued a Resolution, ordering the appellants to show cause within 10 days from notice why
their appeal should not be deemed abandoned and accordingly dismissed for their failure to submit
themselves to the proper authorities and to the jurisdiction of the court from which they seek relief in
the meantime that no bail has yet been approved for their temporary liberty and, further considering
that the approval of the same is discretionary and not to be presumed; and in the meanwhile, the
Station Commanders of the Manila Police Station, Manila and the Makati Police Station, Makati City to
file a return of the Order of Arrest issued by the Regional trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City on 19
February 1998 in Criminal Case 12010. A Compliance and Motion, dated 8 February 1999, filed by
Maguddatu, et. al. explained their failure to submit to the proper authorities. Despite the compliance
and motion filed by Maguddatu, et. al., they remained at large. on 23 June 1999, the Court of Appeals
issued the resolution under question denying Maguddatu, et. al.' application for bail and ordering their
arrest. Aggrieved by the foregoing resolution, Maguddatu, et. al. brought the petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court on 30 August 1999. Pending resolution of the petition, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution, dated 8 September 1999, declaring that the appeal filed is deemed abandoned and
dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124, New Rules on Criminal Procedure, and thus ordered the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City to issue warrants of arrest for the immediate apprehension
and service of sentence of Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu. Issue:
Whether Maguddatu, et. al. are entitled to bail during the whole duration their case is on appeal. Held:
The Constitution guarantees the right to bail of all the accused except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. Herein, despite an order of arrest
from the trial court and two warnings from the Court of Appeals, Maguddatu, et. al. had remained at
large. It is axiomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or
otherwise deprived of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous
to grant bail to one who is free. Maguddatu, et. al.'s Compliance and Motion dated 8 February 1999,
came short of an unconditional submission to the court's lawful order and to its jurisdiction. Further, the
trial court correctly denied Maguddatu, et. al.' motion that they be allowed provisional liberty after their
conviction, under their respective bail bonds. Apart from the fact that they were at large, Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-94, provides that
"the Court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same
bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman." The bail bond that the
accused previously posted can only be used during the 15-day period to appeal (Rule 122) and not
during the entire period of appeal. This is consistent with Section 2(a) of Rule 114 which provides that
the bail" shall be effective upon approval and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner
canceled, until the promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the
case was originally filed in or appealed to it." This amendment, introduced by SC Administrative Circular
12-94 is a departure from the old rules which then provided that bail shall be effective and remain in
force at all stages of the case until its full determination, and thus even during the period of appeal.
Moreover, under the present rule, for the accused to continue his provisional liberty on the same bail
bond during the period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is necessary. From the record, it appears
that the bondsman, AFISCO Insurance Corporation, filed a motion in the trial court on 6 January 1987 for
the cancellation of petitioners' bail bond for the latter's failure to renew the same upon its expiration.
Obtaining the consent of the bondsman was, thus, foreclosed. Furthermore, pursuant to the same
Section 5 of Rule 114, the accused may be admitted to bail upon the court's discretion after conviction
by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. However,
such bail shall be denied or bail previously granted shall be canceled if the penalty imposed is
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years if any one of the circumstances
enumerated in the third paragraph of Section5 is present. Herein, Maguddatu, et. al. are not entitled to
bail. Firstly, Maguddatu, et. al. violated the conditions of their bail. Maguddatu, et. al.'s non-appearance
during the promulgation of the trial court's decision despite due notice and without justifiable reason,
and their continued non-submission to the proper authorities as ordered by the Court of Appeals,
constitutes violations of the conditions of their bail. Moreover, it appears that Maguddatu, et. al. failed
to renew their expired bail bond, as shown by a Motion, dated 6 January 1987, filed by AFISCO Insurance
Corporation, praying for the cancellation of petitioners' bail bond because of the latter's failure to renew
the same upon its expiration. Lastly, Maguddatu, et. al. had no cause to expect that their application for
bail would be granted as a matter of course precisely because it is a matter of discretion. In fact, the
filing of a notice of appeal effectively deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain the motion for
bail pending appeal because appeal is perfected by the mere filing of such notice. It has been held that
trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the
capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion.
G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo

G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto

March 2, 2001

FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged
that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known
as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy
across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case
against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment
complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed,
with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA,
bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan
and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations
joined in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew
their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing
that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election.

OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being
an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition
for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,
and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only
in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner
Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD:

The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand
of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely,
the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987
constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question
of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial
review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that
struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the
Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued
regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its
legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that
petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner
is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987
Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-
sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed
while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the
immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the
incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).

Consti II case digest: MAPA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

STATUTORY IMMUNITY

FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices.However he was granted
an immunity from suit by the PCGG related to the previous charges against him, provided that he will
testify as witness against the Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the United States Vs Ferdinand Marcos,
during the RICO, where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos were being tried for charges of
corruption. All the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when they flew to New York to testify
against the Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the American prosecutor
dispensed the testimony of Mapa and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa, was not able to
testify, it was contended that the immunity from suit of Mapa took without force and effect. However,
the record shows that the petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the prosecution of
the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.

HELD:
 Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to any person from
being prosecuted provided they will meet the conditions provided by the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution or criminal case where he is being
tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa when they flew to New York to testify
implying that Mapa was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the information given by
him (MAPA) to testify against the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of the petitioner to testify on
the RICO can not nullify the immunity given to him by the PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy
the requirements both of the law and the parties’ implementing agreements. Though the petitioners
were not able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it can be said that it not their own fault.

Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity granted by the PCGG, which
under the law has the power to grant immunity.
TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE GRANTED:
1. Transactional Immunity - is broader aint he scope of its protection. By its grant the witness can no longer
be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence
derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.

Abadia v CA
FACTS:
Private respondent was arrested in connection with a coup attempt and was detained for months without charges.
After a charge sheet was filed against him for violations of the Articles of War, he filed a petition for habeas corpus
which was dismissed on the ground that a pre-trial investigation was already ongoing. Despite finding no evidence of
his direct participation in the coup, the Pre-Trial Investigative Panel recommended that he be charged with conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection. He remained in detention despite all existing charges against him
were later dismissed.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or no private respondent, a military officer, is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

RULING:
YES. The constitutional rights of the accused are clearly available to all citizens even in the absence of statutory
enactment. They cannot be denied to certain individuals because of gaps in the alw for which they are not
responsible. They cannot be taken away from certain individuals because of the nature of their vocation. Members of
the military establishment do not waive individual rights on taking up military uniform. That they become subject to
uniquely military rules and procedures does not imply that they agree to exclusively fall under the jurisdiction of only
those rules and regulations and opt to stand apart from those rules which govern all of the country’s citizens.

Petition is DENIED.

People v Tranca

FACTS:
Appellant was charge with the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. After he was arrested in a buy-bust operation,
he was made to undergo ultraviolet radiation to determine the presence of fluorescent powder dusted on the money
used.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not appellant’s right against self-incrimination was violated.
RULING:
NO. What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be
material. 18 Stated otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against his will, an admission of guilt.

Challenged decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

PEOPLE V NITAFAN
FACTS:
Respondent judge granted a motion to quash an information for estafa on the ground that the penal clause of
Presidential Decree No. 115 on the Trust Receipts Law is inoperative because it does not actually punish an offense
mala prohibita.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not P.D. 115 is unconstitutional as it violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for non-
payment of debt.

RULING:
NO. The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to
the prejudice of another regardless of whether the latter is the owner or not. The law does not seek to enforce
payment of the loan. Thus, there can be no violation of a right against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt.

Petition is GRANTED.