Table of Contents

C. JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS ..................................... 2

JOVEN DE GRANO vs GREGORIO LACABA ................................................... 2
VALENTIN CABRERA vs ELIZABETH GETARUELA, ET AL ............................... 6
RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVT. Vs FORMARAN ................. 10
SIAPNO vs MANALO .................................................................................. 20
MUÑOZ vs LLAMAS ................................................................................... 25
SERRANO vs DELICA .................................................................................. 26
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD. vs ASUNCION............................................ 29
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. vs BERNARDITA PEREZ ............... 34
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs COURT OF APPEALS .................. 37
HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG vs MELICOR ................................................. 40
RAMOS vs COURT OF APPEALS ................................................................. 46
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. vs EMMA MONDEJAR ...................................... 63
EDUARDO J. MARIÑO, JR. ET AL. vs GIL GAMILLA, ET AL. ......................... 66
GABRIEL ABAD, ET AL. vs RTC OF MANILA ................................................ 71
ANGELA DELA ROSA ET AL. vs ORFELINA D. ROLDAN ............................... 75
C. JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
JOVEN DE GRANO vs GREGORIO LACABA
G.R. No. 158877 June 16, 2009
JOVEN DE GRANO, represented by Venus P. de Grano, Ernesto H.
Malabanan, and Simplicia D. Malabanan,Petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO LACABA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 67852 dated October 16, 2002 and
Resolution dated June 18, 2003. This decision reversed the uniform decisions
of the municipal and regional trial courts dismissing a forcible entry case filed
by respondent Gregorio Lacaba. The antecedents of the petition are as
follows:
Respondent Gregorio Lacaba2 claims that he is the owner of two adjacent
parcels of land, located in Barangay Niugan, Laurel, Batangas and identified
as Cadastral Lot Nos. 6916 and 6917 in Survey No. REI-041011-001184. Lot
No. 6916 has an area of 5,743 square meters, while Lot No. 6917 has an area
of 804 square meters. Each parcel of land is covered by a separate tax
declaration in the name of respondent.
On May 30, 2000, respondent filed a complaint for forcible entry with prayer
for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction against
petitioner Joven de Grano. According to respondent, he has been in physical
possession of the two parcels of land for more than 30 years and has been
paying real property taxes thereon. In 1978, respondent purportedly
designated as caretakers the spouses Ely and Anita Mojica (spouses Mojica),
who occupied the property until the present, and allowed three other
spouses, including the spouses Silvestre and Amor Matilla (spouses Matilla),
to build their respective houses on the property and conduct fruit vending
and carinderia business.3
Respondent alleged that, sometime during the second week of May 2000,
petitioner, by means of force, intimidation, strategy and threats, and with the
help of his men, destroyed the perimeter fence built by respondent. The
fence was made of concrete posts and barbed wire. Respondent averred that
petitioner effectively disrupted respondent’s peaceful possession and
occupation of the property by clearing the land of plants, bushes and trees
and demolishing the house owned by the spouses Matilla. The continuous
intrusion of petitioner caused serious fear and anxiety to the occupants of the
properties.4
Respondent attached to the complaint Tax Declaration Nos. 016-00618 and
016-00619 and a copy of Official Receipt No. 5342125 dated May 30, 2000 of
the payment of real property tax from 1998 until 2000.5 In addition,
respondent later submitted a Certification issued by Barangay Captain
Marcelo Balba stating that respondent was the declared owner of Lot Nos.
6916 and 6917 based on Relocation Survey Plan No. REI-041011-001184, and
a Certification dated June 6, 1997 issued by the Municipal Assessor of Laurel,
Batangas stating that their records showed that respondent was the true and
lawful owner of the properties covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 016-006618
and 016-00619, and that real property tax had been paid from previous years
until 1997. Respondent’s counsels also executed a Joint Affidavit6 stating that
they prepared affidavits for the caretakers and neighbors to sign, but the
latter refused to sign for fear of their lives.
In his Answer, petitioner averred that the real owners and possessors of the
property were the family of Ernesto Malabanan, as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31929 of the Register of Deeds of Tanauan,
Batangas. He pointed out that Relocation Survey Plan No. REI-041011-001184
had already been cancelled by the Bureau of Lands on October 8, 1999; and
that, on April 13, 2000, the Bureau of Lands approved a Consolidation and
Subdivision Plan, which determined the metes and bounds of the properties
of the Malabanans. Petitioner alleged that the Office of the Building Official
approved the application of the Malabanans for the construction of a fence
on a portion of their property; and petitioner, acting in accordance with the
instructions of the Malabanans, caused the clearing of the
property.7 Petitioner submitted in evidence a copy of TCT No. T-
31929;8 Relocation Survey Plan No. REI-041011-001184 with a "cancelled"
marking;9 Order of cancellation of Relocation Survey Plan No. REI-041011-
001184;10 Consolidation and Subdivision Plan No. Pcs-04-
11 12
015296; Sinumpaang Salaysay of Nepumuceno Noveno, also a caretaker
of the Malabanan family; and uniformly worded affidavits13 of the occupants
of the property, stating that they were not connected with respondent, and
that they were occupying the property upon the permission of Ernesto
Malabanan.
On August 11, 2000, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action.14The court a quo found that
respondent’s claim, that he was in actual possession of the property through
the possession of his caretakers and the other spouses he allowed to occupy
the property, was belied by his own statement and that of Mr. Nepomuceno
Noveno, a resident of the barangay where the property is located, who
testified for petitioner.15
On November 13, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MCTC
Decision.16 Respondent’s counsel received a copy of the decision on
November 21, 2000. On December 14, 2000, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration.
In an Order dated March 28, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:
Finding no cogent reason to modify the decision of the Court dated
November 13, 2000, defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.17
Respondent’s counsel received a copy of the Resolution on April 18, 2001.
On October 23, 2001, upon manifestation of petitioner that it was not he who
filed the motion for reconsideration, the RTC modified the dispositive portion
of its March 28, 2001 Order, changing "defendant" to
"plaintiff."18 Respondent received a copy of this resolution on November 12,
2001.
Alleging that the October 23, 2001 RTC Resolution was the resolution denying
his motion for reconsideration, respondent filed a motion for extension of
time to file a petition for review with the CA on November 27, 2001. The CA
granted the motion subject to its timeliness. Finally on December 12, 2001,
respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CA.
On January 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss
Instant Petition and to Cite Petitioner (herein respondent) and Petitioner’s
Counsel for Contempt.19 Petitioner alleged therein that respondent
deliberately concealed the fact that the petition was filed out of time by not
attaching the March 28, 2001 RTC Order which denied respondent’s motion
for reconsideration.
On October 16, 2002, the CA rendered a Decision with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 13, 2000, as well as the Order
dated October 23, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration of said
decision, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent and all persons
acting under his authority and/or in his behalf is hereby ordered to vacate the
subject premises and to cease and desist from occupying the subject parcel
of land, as well as from exercising any and all acts of possession and dominion
over the same.
SO ORDERED.20
The CA dismissed the issue of the timeliness of the filing of respondent’s
motion for reconsideration before the RTC on the ground that such issue was
raised for the first time before the appellate court. It, likewise, ignored the
issue of the belated filing of the petition for review with the CA, ratiocinating
that petitioner was barred by estoppel from questioning the timeliness of the
petition, and that dismissing the case would not serve the ends of justice.21
On the merits, the CA concluded that respondent had been in prior, actual,
open, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the subject
properties for more than 40 years based on the fact that he was paying taxes
thereon. The CA did not give credence to the written manifestations of
petitioner’s witnesses whose statements were drafted in identical form.
Instead, the CA gave weight to the statement of respondent’s counsels that
they failed to secure affidavits from the caretakers and the neighbors because
the latter feared for their lives.221avvphi1
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, he filed a
Manifestation with Request for Judicial Notice of the verification survey
conducted by the DENR on February 15, 2002, which shows that the subject
property was part of the parcel of land registered in the name of the
Malabanan family.
On June 18, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. In the same Resolution, the CA noted that Verification Plan
No. VS-04-000534 was approved long after it had already rendered its
decision.23
Disgruntled, petitioner filed this petition for review, raising the following
issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE AND/OR GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW
FILED BEFORE IT BY RESPONDENT LACABA.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT LACABA IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF BEING
SOUGHT IN THE COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE THE MCTC.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT HEREIN PETITIONER DE GRANO IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST.24
The petition is meritorious.
The CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for review that was filed way
beyond the reglementary period. Rules of procedure may be relaxed in the
interest of substantial justice and in order to give a litigant the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint. However, concomitant
to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the
part of the party invoking liberality to explain its failure to comply with the
rules25 and prove the existence of exceptionally meritorious circumstances
warranting such liberality.26
Respondent proffered no explanation for the delay as, in fact, he did not
acknowledge that he filed his petition for review with the CA beyond the
prescriptive period. In his motion for extension of time to file the petition for
review with the CA, respondent alleged that it was the October 28, 2001 RTC
Order that denied his motion for reconsideration. As a stratagem or out of
plain ignorance, he counted the reglementary period from the date of his
receipt of the said order. But, as the CA was well aware, the reglementary
period should have been counted from the receipt of the March 28, 2001
Order.
Respondent might have been confused with the rule that, when a judgment
is amended, the date of the amendment should be considered the date of the
decision in the computation of the period for perfecting the appeal. For all
intents and purposes, the lower court rendered a new judgment from which
the time to appeal must be reckoned.27However, this rule presupposes that
the amendment consists of a material alteration of such substance and
proportion that would, in effect, give rise to an entirely new judgment.28 But
when the amendment merely consists of the correction of a clerical error, no
new judgment arises. In such case, the period for filing the appeal should still
be counted from the receipt of the original judgment.
In this case, there was no material alteration of the judgment. The
amendment merely consisted of changing the word "defendant" with
"plaintiff" in the dispositive portion, and it is obvious that it was "plaintiff"
(herein respondent) who filed the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
prescriptive period for filing the petition for review with the CA should be
counted from the date respondent received a copy of the first judgment
denying his motion for reconsideration, which was on April 18, 2001.
Respondent had until May 3, 2001 to file a petition for review, but he filed a
motion for extension to file the petition only on November 27, 2001, or
almost seven months later. In one case, the Court declared that a delay of
almost seven months is far from reasonable.29
Despite respondent’s failure to acknowledge his error, the CA, finding the
petition to be meritorious, chose to excuse the belated filing of the petition
to serve the ends of justice. This Court, however, finds otherwise, and holds
that the MCTC, as affirmed by the RTC, was correct in dismissing the
complaint.
For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the complainant must allege and prove
that he was in prior physical possession of the property and that he was
deprived of such possession by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth.30 A party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character
of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the
security that entitles him to remain in the property until a person with a
better right lawfully ejects him.31
A party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In doing so, he must rely on the strength of his
own evidence, not on the weakness of the defendant’s.32 To prove prior
possession, respondent presented his tax declarations, tax receipt and a
certification from the municipal assessor attesting that he has paid real
property tax from previous years. He, likewise, testified that he appointed the
spouses Mojica as his caretakers, and allowed three other spouses to build
their houses on the property. Respondent’s counsels also explained that they
were not able to secure the affidavits of the occupants of the property and
the neighbors because they feared for their lives.
Respondent’s evidence fails to make out a prima facie case of forcible entry
as it does not satisfactorily establish that respondent has been in physical
possession of the subject property prior to petitioner’s occupation thereof.
possession de jure.36 Only prior physical possession, not title, is the
issue.37 Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in
the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession.38
More importantly, no substantial injustice would be caused the respondent
if we uphold the finality of the RTC judgment, considering that he still has
another remedy to recover his alleged right to possess the property. Since
respondent anchors his right to possess the property on his alleged
ownership of the same, he may file the appropriate action to recover such
ownership.
With the foregoing disquisition, we find no necessity to discuss the issue of
whether petitioner is the real party in interest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals’ Decision dated October 16, 2002 and Resolution dated June 18,
2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

For one, we cannot tack respondent’s possession of the property on his

alleged tenants’ actual possession absent any proof that said tenants
acknowledge that respondent is the owner and that they have occupied the
property as respondent’s tenants. For all we know, these tenants could have
been in adverse possession of the property. We cannot simply rely on
respondent’s self-serving testimony that he designated the spouses Mojica
as his caretakers and allowed the other families to occupy the
property.lawphil

Tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proof of
possession.33 They are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner based on the presumption that no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession.34 It bears emphasizing that the word "possession," as used in
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, means nothing more than physical
possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil
law.35 When the law speaks of possession, the reference is to prior physical
possession or possession de facto, as contra-distinguished from
VALENTIN CABRERA vs ELIZABETH GETARUELA, ET AL
G.R. No. 164213 April 21, 2009
VALENTIN CABRERA, MANUEL CABRERA, and REBECCA LESLIE
CABRAS, Petitioners,
vs.
ELIZABETH GETARUELA, EULOGIO ABABON, LEONIDA LIGAN, MARIETTO
ABABON, GLORIA PANAL, LEONORA OCARIZA, SOTERO ABABON, JR., and
JOSEPH ABABON, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 22 January 2004
Decision2 and 3 May 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 80062.
The Antecedent Facts
Lot Nos. 3635-CC and 3635-Y, located in Inayawan, Pardo, Cebu City were
covered by Tax Declaration Nos. GR2K-12-078-02409 and GR2K-12-078-
02431 in the name of Arcadio Jaca (Arcadio). The heirs of Arcadio executed a
notarized document known as "Kasabutan nga Hinigala" dated 25 July 1951
which stipulated that all the inherited properties of Arcadio, including Lot No.
3635, would go to Peregrina Jaca Cabrera (Peregrina). However, in a
Repartition Project approved on 21 November 1956 by Judge Jose M.
Mendoza of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City, Branch 6 in Special
Proceedings No. 211-V, Lot Nos. 3635-CC and 3635-Y were given to Urbana
Jaca Ababon (Urbana), mother of Elizabeth Getaruela, Eulogio Ababon,
Leonida Ligan, Marietto Ababon, Gloria Panal, Leonora Ocariza, Sotero
Ababon, Jr., and Joseph Ababon (respondents). Upon Urbana’s death in 1997,
respondents inherited the lots.
Valentin Cabrera (Valentin), Manuel Cabrera (Manuel), and Rebecca Leslie
Cabras (Cabras), Peregrina’s adopted daughter, occupied the lots with the
knowledge and consent of respondents.
Respondents alleged that Valentin, Manuel, and Cabras (collectively,
petitioners) were occupying portions of the lots without paying any rentals,
but with an agreement that they would vacate the premises and demolish
their houses at their expense should respondents need the property. In 2001,
respondents personally notified petitioners that they would repossess the
property. Respondents asked petitioners to vacate the premises and remove
the houses they built on the lots. However, despite repeated demands,
petitioners refused to vacate the premises. The matter was referred to
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Inayawan, Cebu for possible
amicable settlement but petitioners still refused to vacate the premises.
Thus, respondents filed an action for ejectment against petitioners, docketed
as Civil Case No. R-45280.
Petitioners assailed the Project of Partition as incredible because its first page
was missing and it lacked the signatures of the parties who executed it.
Petitioners asserted the validity of the "Kasabutan nga Hinigala." Cabras
alleged that as owner of Lot No. 3635 upon Peregrina’s death, she could not
be ejected from the premises. Valentin and Manuel alleged that they could
not be ejected because they built their houses with Peregrina’s knowledge
and consent.
The Rulings of the MTCC and RTC
In its Decision4 dated 4 April 2002, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
7, Cebu City (MTCC) ruled in favor of respondents, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants, ordering the latter to vacate the premises in question
and to demolish whatever improvements introduced thereon and surrender
complete control and possession thereof to the plaintiffs, and to jointly and
severally pay the latter:
1) the amount of ₱15,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees;
2) litigation expenses in the sum of ₱5,000.00; and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.5
The MTCC ruled that the "Kasabutan nga Hinigala" was superseded by the
court-approved Repartition Project. The MTCC noted that in the Repartition
Project, Lot Nos. 3635-CC and 3635-Y were given to Urbana, respondents’
predecessor-in-interest. The MTCC ruled that while the lots were still in
Urbana’s name, respondents were not barred from judicially ejecting
petitioners from the premises.
Petitioners appealed from the MTCC’s Decision.
In its 19 May 2003 Decision,6 the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7
(RTC) reversed the MTCC’s Decision. The RTC ruled that the Project of
Partition showed that Lot No. 3635-Y was co-owned by Urbana (251 sq. m.),
Peregrina (863 sq. m.), and Andres Jaca (251 sq. m.). The RTC ruled that as
Peregrina’s heir, Cabras became a co-owner of Lot No. 3635-Y and she could
not be ejected from the property. The RTC ruled that Valentin and Manuel
could not likewise be ejected from the property as they were allowed by
Cabras to occupy the lot.
The RTC ruled that the Project of Partition also showed that Urbana’s total
share of 1,499 sq. m., covering 1,248 sq. m. of Lot No. 3635-CC and 251 sq.
m. of Lot No. 3635-Y, was sold to one Josefina Asas (Asas). As such,
respondents had no cause of action against petitioners.
The dispositive portion of the RTC’s Decision reads:
Wherefore, the judgment in the Decision dated April 4, 2002, of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. R-45280, is
REVERSED, and another one is entered DISMISSING the case against
defendants-appellants.
Plaintiffs-appellees are directed to compensate defendants-appellants
attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱15,000.00, and litigation expenses in the
amount of ₱5,000.00, as well as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 29 July 2003 Order, the
RTC partially granted respondents’ motion. The RTC ruled that it erred in
finding that Urbana sold her share to Asas. The RTC ruled that the Project of
Partition showed that it was Panfilo Jaca who sold his share to Asas. The RTC
modified its 19 May 2003 Decision as follows:
Wherefore, the judgment in the Decision dated April 4, 2002, of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. R-45280, is
MODIFIED, as follows:
1) Dismissing the complaint as regards Lot 3655-Y; and
2) Ordering defendants-appellants to vacate Lot No. 3655-CC, demolish
whatever improvements they may have introduced thereon and surrender
complete control and possession thereof to plaintiffs-appellees.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the RTC’s 29 July 2003 Order,
assailing the Project of Partition. In its 3 September 2003 Order,9 the RTC
denied petitioners’ motion. The RTC ruled that petitioners failed to present
any evidence supporting the purported falsity of the Project of Partition. The
RTC upheld the jurisdiction of the MTCC and further ruled that respondents’
action was an ejectment case.
Petitioners filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 22 January 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 29 July 2003
and 3 September 2003 Orders of the RTC.
The Court of Appeals held that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the allegations in the complaint. The Court of Appeals held that a complaint
for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of
possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful. The Court of Appeals ruled
that prior physical possession is indispensable only in actions for forcible
entry but not in unlawful detainer. The Court of Appeals further ruled that
occupation of the premises must be tolerated by the owners right from the
start of the possession of the property sought to be recovered.
The Court of Appeals found that in this case, petitioners were occupying the
lots without rentals upon agreement with respondents that they would
relinquish possession once respondents need the property. However,
petitioners refused to vacate the premises despite demands by respondents.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the allegations were sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the MTCC where the ejectment suit was instituted and tried.
The Court of Appeals noted that petitioners challenged respondents’ claim of
ownership of the property. The Court of Appeals ruled that the only issue
involved in an ejectment case is possession de facto. However, when the
issue of possession could not be resolved without resolving the issue of
ownership, the court may receive evidence upon the question of title to the
property but solely for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.
Hence, the MTCC acted correctly when it received evidence on the issue of
ownership. The Court of Appeals further noted that the RTC upheld the
MTCC’s finding that the Project of Partition superseded the "Kasabutan nga
Hinigala." The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC in refusing to admit
documents submitted by petitioners which they failed to present before the
MTCC. The Court of Appeals stressed that the MTCC’s finding on the issue of
ownership was merely provisional. Thus, petitioners were not legally barred
from filing the proper action to settle the question of title.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED
DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED. The assailed Orders dated July 29,
2003 and September 3, 2003 of the court a quo are hereby both AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 3 May 2004 Resolution,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that a complaint for unlawful detainer must be
filed within one year from demand and not from the start of possession as
claimed by petitioners. The Court of Appeals reiterated that in cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the issue is pure physical or de
facto possession and pronouncements made on the question of ownership
are provisional in nature. The Court of Appeals further ruled that all cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer shall be filed before the proper
Municipal Trial Court, there being no jurisdictional amount involved, even
with respect to damages or unpaid rentals sought.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues in their Memorandum:11
1. Whether the MTCC had jurisdiction to entertain the ejectment case
considering the absence of a contract, written or oral, entered into by
respondents and petitioners as lessors and lessees, respectively;
2. Whether tolerance as a ground for ejectment is tenable in this case; and
3. Whether the Project of Partition superseded the "Kasabutan nga Hinigala."
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners insist that the MTCC had no jurisdiction to entertain respondents’
complaint because there was no contract, oral or written, between the
parties. Petitioners allege that the proper action should have been one for
recovery of possession and not for unlawful detainer.
We do not agree.
It is settled that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.12
In this case, the complaint alleged that petitioners were occupying the
property, with agreement that should respondents need the property,
petitioners would relinquish possession of the lots and demolish their houses
at their expense. Respondents personally notified petitioners to vacate the
premises and to demolish their houses but petitioners refused to vacate the SO ORDERED.
lots. The complaint established that petitioners’ possession was by tolerance
of respondents, and their possession became illegal when they refused to
vacate the premises upon demand by respondents. Here, the possession
became illegal not from the time petitioners started occupying the property
but from the time demand was made for them to vacate the premises. In
short, the complaint sufficiently established a case for unlawful detainer.

Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the issue in this case is not the ownership
of the lots. It should be stressed that the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought determine the nature of the action and the
court with jurisdiction over it.13 The defenses set up in an answer are not
determinative of jurisdiction.14 The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made
to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the
parties.15 Thus:

In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or

material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties. However, where the issue of ownership is
raised, the courts may pass upon the issue of ownership in order to determine
who has the right to possess the property. We stress, however, that this
adjudication is only an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of
settling the issue of possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably
linked thereto. The lower court’s adjudication of ownership in the ejectment
case is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between
the same parties involving title to the property. It is, therefore, not conclusive
as to the issue of ownership x x x.16

The MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all held that the Repartition
Project superseded the "Kasabutan nga Hinigala." We sustain their factual
finding as this Court gives substantial weight to the factual finding of the trial
court, particularly if this factual finding is sustained by appellate courts.
However, we also reiterate that this resolution on the issue of ownership is
only provisional for the purpose of settling the issue of possession.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 22 January 2004

Decision and 3 May 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
80062.
RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVT. Vs FORMARAN indebtedness, and condoned the interests, penalties and surcharges accruing
thereon from 1 October 2004 to 31 December 2005 which amounted to
₱74,678,647.00. The Memorandum of Agreement required, in turn, that
G.R. No. 175914 February 10, 2009 petitioner execute simultaneously with the said Memorandum, "by way of
RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT dacion en pago," Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents Tan and
CORPORATION, Petitioner, Obiedo, covering the same parcels of land subject of the mortgages. The
vs. Deeds of Absolute Sale would be uniformly dated 2 January 2006, and state
HON. PABLO C. FORMARAN III, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court that petitioner sold to respondents Tan and Obiedo the parcels of land for the
Branch 21, Naga City, as Pairing Judge for Regional Trial Court Branch 22, following purchase prices:
Formerly Presided By HON. NOVELITA VILLEGAS-LLAGUNO (Retired 01 May
TCT No. Purchase Price
2006), ROMEO Y. TAN, ROBERTO L. OBIEDO and ATTY. TOMAS A.
REYES, Respondents.
38376 ₱ 9,340,000.00
DECISION
29918 ₱ 28,000,000.00
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 38374 ₱ 12,000,000.00
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated 22 November 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94800. The Court of Appeals, in its 39232 ₱ 1,600,000.00
assailed Decision, affirmed the Order2 dated 24 March 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City, in Civil Case No. RTC-2006-0030, 39225 ₱ 1,600,000.00
ordering petitioner Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development
Corporation to pay additional docket/filing fees, computed based on Section Petitioner could choose to pay off its indebtedness with individual or all five
7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. parcels of land; or it could redeem said properties by paying respondents Tan
and Obiedo the following prices for the same, inclusive of interest and
The present Petition arose from the following facts:
penalties:
Petitioner obtained a loan3 in the total amount of ₱95,700,620.00 from
respondents Romeo Y. Tan (Tan) and Roberto L. Obiedo (Obiedo), secured by TCT No. Redemption Price
real estate mortgages over five parcels of land, all located in Triangulo, Naga
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 38376,4 No. 38376 ₱ 25,328,939.00
29918,5 No. 38374,6 No. 39232,7 and No. 39225,8 issued by the Registry of
Deeds for Naga City, in the name of petitioner. When petitioner was unable 29918 ₱ 35,660,800.00
to pay the loan when it became due and demandable, respondents Tan and
Obiedo agreed to an extension of the same. 38374 ₱ 28,477,600.00

In a Memorandum of Agreement9 dated 17 March 2005, respondents Tan

39232 ₱ 6,233,381.00
and Obiedo granted petitioner until 31 December 2005 to settle its
 39225 ₱ 6,233,381.00
In the event that petitioner is able to redeem any of the afore-mentioned
parcels of land, the Deed of Absolute Sale covering the said property shall be
nullified and have no force and effect; and respondents Tan and Obiedo shall
then return the owner’s duplicate of the corresponding TCT to petitioner and
also execute a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage. However, if petitioner is
unable to redeem the parcels of land within the period agreed upon,
respondents Tan and Obiedo could already present the Deeds of Absolute
Sale covering the same to the Office of the Register of Deeds for Naga City so
respondents Tan and Obiedo could acquire TCTs to the said properties in their
names.
The Memorandum of Agreement further provided that should petitioner
contest, judicially or otherwise, any act, transaction, or event related to or
necessarily connected with the said Memorandum and the Deeds of Absolute
Sale involving the five parcels of land, it would pay respondents Tan and
Obiedo ₱10,000,000.00 as liquidated damages inclusive of costs and
attorney’s fees. Petitioner would likewise pay respondents Tan and Obiedo
the condoned interests, surcharges and penalties.10 Finally, should a contest
arise from the Memorandum of Agreement, Mr. Ruben Sia (Sia), President of
petitioner corporation, personally assumes, jointly and severally with
petitioner, the latter’s monetary obligation to respondent Tan and Obiedo.
Respondent Atty. Tomas A. Reyes (Reyes) was the Notary Public who
notarized the Memorandum of Agreement dated 17 March 2005 between
respondent Tan and Obiedo, on one hand, and petitioner, on the other.
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, petitioner, represented by Mr.
Sia, executed separate Deeds of Absolute Sale,11 over the five parcels of land,
in favor of respondents Tan and Obiedo. On the blank spaces provided for in
the said Deeds, somebody wrote the 3rd of January 2006 as the date of their
execution. The Deeds were again notarized by respondent Atty. Reyes also on
3 January 2006.
Without payment having been made by petitioner on 31 December 2005,
respondents Tan and Obiedo presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated 3
January 2006 before the Register of Deeds of Naga City on 8 March 2006, as
a result of which, they were able to secure TCTs over the five parcels of land
in their names.
On 16 March 2006, petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint12 against
respondents Tan, Obiedo, and Atty. Reyes, for declaration of nullity of deeds
of sales and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO). The Complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
On the basis of the facts already recounted above, petitioner raised two
causes of action in its Complaint.
As for the first cause of action, petitioner alleged that as early as 27 December
2005, its President already wrote a letter informing respondents Tan and
Obiedo of the intention of petitioner to pay its loan and requesting a meeting
to compute the final amount due. The parties held meetings on 3 and 4
January 2006 but they failed to arrive at a mutually acceptable computation
of the final amount of loan payable. Respondents Tan and Obiedo then
refused the request of petitioner for further dialogues. Unbeknownst to
petitioner, despite the ongoing meetings, respondents Tan and Obiedo, in
evident bad faith, already had the pre-executed Deeds of Absolute Sale
notarized on 3 January 2006 by respondent Atty. Reyes. Atty. Reyes, in
connivance with respondents Tan and Obiedo, falsely made it appear in the
Deeds of Absolute Sale that Mr. Sia had personally acknowledged/ratified the
said Deeds before Atty. Reyes.
Asserting that the Deeds of Absolute Sale over the five parcels of land were
executed merely as security for the payment of its loan to respondents Tan
and Obiedo; that the Deeds of Absolute Sale, executed in accordance with
the Memorandum of Agreement, constituted pactum commisorium and as
such, were null and void; and that the acknowledgment in the Deeds of
Absolute Sale were falsified, petitioner averred:
13. That by reason of the fraudulent actions by the [herein respondents],
[herein petitioner] is prejudiced and is now in danger of being deprived,
physically and legally, of the mortgaged properties without benefit of legal
processes such as the remedy of foreclosure and its attendant procedures,
solemnities and remedies available to a mortgagor, while [petitioner] is
desirous and willing to pay its obligation and have the mortgaged properties
released.13
In support of its second cause of action, petitioner narrated in its Complaint
that on 18 January 2006, respondents Tan and Obiedo forcibly took over, with
the use of armed men, possession of the five parcels of land subject of the
falsified Deeds of Absolute Sale and fenced the said properties with barbed
wire. Beginning 3 March 2006, respondents Tan and Obiedo started
demolishing some of the commercial spaces standing on the parcels of land
in question which were being rented out by petitioner. Respondents Tan and
Obiedo were also about to tear down a principal improvement on the
properties consisting of a steel-and-concrete structure housing a motor
vehicle terminal operated by petitioner. The actions of respondents Tan and
Obiedo were to the damage and prejudice of petitioner and its
tenants/lessees. Petitioner, alone, claimed to have suffered at least
₱300,000.00 in actual damages by reason of the physical invasion by
respondents Tan and Obiedo and their armed goons of the five parcels of
land.
Ultimately, petitioner’s prayer in its Complaint reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that upon the filing of this complaint, a 72-hour temporary
restraining order be forthwith issued ex parte:
(a) Restraining [herein respondents] Tan and Obiedo, their agents, privies or
representatives, from committing act/s tending to alienate the mortgaged
properties from the [herein petitioner] pending the resolution of the case,
including but not limited to the acts complained of in paragraph "14", above;
(b) Restraining the Register of Deeds of Naga City from entertaining moves by
the [respondents] to have [petitioner’s] certificates of title to the mortgaged
properties cancelled and changed/registered in [respondents] Tan’s and
Obiedo’s names, and/or released to them;
(c) After notice and hearing, that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
imposing the same restraints indicated in the next preceding two paragraphs
of this prayer; and
(d) After trial, judgment be rendered:
1. Making the injunction permanent;
2. Declaring the provision in the Memorandum of Agreement requiring the
[petitioner] to execute deed of sales (sic) in favor of the [respondents Tan and
Obiedo] as dacion en pago in the event of non-payment of the debt as pactum
commissorium;
3. Annulling the Deed[s] of Sale for TCT Nos. 29918, 38374, 38376, 39225 and
39232, all dated January 3, 2006, the same being in contravention of law;
4. Ordering the [respondents] jointly and solidarily to pay the [petitioner]
actual damages of at least ₱300,000.00; attorney’s fees in the amount of
₱100,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court attendance of counsel as appearance
fee; litigation expenses in the amount of at least ₱10,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱300,000.00, plus the costs.
[Petitioner] further prays for such other reliefs as may be proper, just and
equitable under the premises.14
Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC on 16 March 2006, petitioner paid the
sum of ₱13,644.25 for docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the Office
of the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court initially considered Civil Case No.
2006-0030 as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and computed the
docket and other legal fees due thereon according to Section 7(b)(1), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court.
Only respondent Tan filed an Answer15 to the Complaint of petitioner.
Respondent Tan did admit that meetings were held with Mr. Sia, as the
representative of petitioner, to thresh out Mr. Sia’s charge that the
computation by respondents Tan and Obiedo of the interests, surcharges and
penalties accruing on the loan of petitioner was replete with errors and
uncertainties. However, Mr. Sia failed to back up his accusation of errors and
uncertainties and to present his own final computation of the amount due.
Disappointed and exasperated, respondents Tan and Obiedo informed Mr.
Sia that they had already asked respondent Atty. Reyes to come over to
notarize the Deeds of Absolute Sale. Respondent Atty. Reyes asked Mr. Sia
whether it was his signature appearing above his printed name on the Deeds
of Absolute Sale, to which Mr. Sia replied yes. On 4 January 2006, Mr. Sia still
failed to establish his claim of errors and uncertainties in the computation of
the total amount which petitioner must pay respondent Tan and Obiedo. Mr.
Sia, instead, sought a nine-month extension for paying the loan obligation of
petitioner and the reduction of the interest rate thereon to only one percent
(1%) per month. Respondents Tan and Obiedo rejected both demands.
Respondent Tan maintained that the Deeds of Absolute Sale were not
executed merely as securities for the loan of petitioner. The Deeds of
Absolute Sale over the five parcels of land were the consideration for the
payment of the total indebtedness of petitioner to respondents Tan and
Obiedo, and the condonation of the 15-month interest which already accrued
on the loan, while providing petitioner with the golden opportunity to still
redeem all or even portions of the properties covered by said Deeds.
Unfortunately, petitioner failed to exercise its right to redeem any of the said
properties.
Belying that they forcibly took possession of the five parcels of land,
respondent Tan alleged that it was Mr. Sia who, with the aid of armed men,
on board a Sports Utility Vehicle and a truck, rammed into the personnel of
respondents Tan and Obiedo causing melee and disturbance. Moreover, by
the execution of the Deeds of Absolute Sale, the properties subject thereof
were, ipso jure, delivered to respondents Tan and Obiedo. The demolition of
the existing structures on the properties was nothing but an exercise of
dominion by respondents Tan and Obiedo.
Respondent Tan, thus, sought not just the dismissal of the Complaint of
petitioner, but also the grant of his counterclaim. The prayer in his Answer is
faithfully reproduced below:
Wherefore, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that, after due
hearing, judgment be rendered dismissing the complaint, and on the
counterclaim, [herein petitioner] and Ruben Sia, be ordered to indemnify,
jointly and severally [herein respondents Tan and Obiedo] the amounts of not
less than ₱10,000,000.00 as liquidated damages and the further sum of not
less than ₱500,000.00 as attorney’s fees. In the alternative, and should it
become necessary, it is hereby prayed that [petitioner] be ordered to pay
herein [respondents Tan and Obiedo] the entire principal loan of
₱95,700,620.00, plus interests, surcharges and penalties computed from
March 17, 2005 until the entire sum is fully paid, including the amount of
₱74,678,647.00 foregone interest covering the period from October 1, 2004
to December 31, 2005 or for a total of fifteen (15) months, plus incidental
expenses as may be proved in court, in the event that Annexes "G" to "L" be
nullified. Other relief and remedies as are just and equitable under the
premises are hereby prayed for.16
Thereafter, respondent Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in which
he contended that Civil Case No. 2006-0030 involved real properties, the
docket fees for which should be computed in accordance with Section 7(a),
not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 04-2-04-SC which took effect on 16 August 2004. Since petitioner did not
pay the appropriate docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030, the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, respondent Tan asked the RTC
to issue an order requiring petitioner to pay the correct and accurate docket
fees pursuant to Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended;
and should petitioner fail to do so, to deny and dismiss the prayer of
petitioner for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale for having been
executed in contravention of the law or of the Memorandum of Agreement
as pactum commisorium.
As required by the RTC, the parties submitted their Position Papers on the
matter. On 24 March 2006, the RTC issued an Order17 granting respondent
Tan’s Omnibus Motion. In holding that both petitioner and respondent Tan
must pay docket fees in accordance with Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, the RTC reasoned:
It must be noted that under paragraph (b) 2. of the said Section 7, it is
provided that QUIETING OF TITLE which is an action classified as beyond
pecuniary estimation "shall be governed by paragraph (a)". Hence, the filing
fee in an action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed which is also classified as
beyond pecuniary estimation, must be computed based on the provision of
Section 7(A) herein-above, in part, quoted.
Since [herein respondent], Romeo Tan in his Answer has a counterclaim
against the plaintiff, the former must likewise pay the necessary filling (sic)
fees as provided for under Section 7 (A) of Amended Administrative Circular
No. 35-2004 issued by the Supreme Court.18
Consequently, the RTC decreed on the matter of docket/filing fees:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [herein petitioner] is hereby ordered
to pay additional filing fee and the [herein respondent], Romeo Tan is also
ordered to pay docket and filing fees on his counterclaim, both computed
based on Section 7(a) of the Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular
No. 35-2004 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order to the Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court, Naga City and for the latter to compute and to
collect the said fees accordingly.19
Petitioner moved20 for the partial reconsideration of the 24 March 2006
Order of the RTC, arguing that Civil Case No. 2006-0030 was principally for
the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and, as such, incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Petitioner submitted that the RTC erred in applying
Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to petitioner’s first
cause of action in its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
In its Order21 dated 29 March 2006, the RTC refused to reconsider its 24
March 2006 Order, based on the following ratiocination:
Analyzing, the action herein pertains to real property, for as admitted by the
[herein petitioner], "the deeds of sale in question pertain to real property" x
x x. The Deeds of Sale subject of the instant case have already been
transferred in the name of the [herein respondents Tan and Obiedo].
Compared with Quieting of Title, the latter action is brought when there is
cloud on the title to real property or any interest therein or to prevent a cloud
from being cast upon title to the real property (Art. 476, Civil Code of the
Philippines) and the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to or interest
in the real property which is the subject matter of the action (Art. 447, ibid.),
and yet plaintiff in QUIETING OF TITLE is required to pay the fees in
accordance with paragraph (a) of Section 7 of the said Amended
Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, hence, with more reason that the
[petitioner] who no longer has title to the real properties subject of the
instant case must be required to pay the required fees in accordance with
Section 7(a) of the Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 afore-
mentioned.
Furthermore, while [petitioner] claims that the action for declaration of
nullity of deed of sale and memorandum of agreement is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, however, as argued by the [respondent Tan], the issue
as to how much filing and docket fees should be paid was never raised as an
issue in the case of Russell vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.22
In a letter dated 19 April 2006, the RTC Clerk of Court computed, upon the
request of counsel for the petitioner, the additional docket fees petitioner
must pay for in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 as directed in the afore-mentioned
RTC Orders. Per the computation of the RTC Clerk of Court, after excluding
the amount petitioner previously paid on 16 March 2006, petitioner must still
pay the amount of ₱720,392.60 as docket fees.23
Petitioner, however, had not yet conceded, and it filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals; the petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 94800. According to petitioner, the RTC24 acted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it issued its
Orders dated 24 March 2006 and 29 March 2006 mandating that the
docket/filing fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030, an action for annulment of
deeds of sale, be assessed under Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
as amended. If the Orders would not be revoked, corrected, or rectified,
petitioner would suffer grave injustice and irreparable damage.
On 22 November 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
wherein it held that:
Clearly, the petitioner’s complaint involves not only the annulment of the
deeds of sale, but also the recovery of the real properties identified in the
said documents. In other words, the objectives of the petitioner in filing the
complaint were to cancel the deeds of sale and ultimately, to recover
possession of the same. It is therefore a real action.
Consequently, the additional docket fees that must be paid cannot be
assessed in accordance with Section 7(b). As a real action, Section 7(a) must
be applied in the assessment and payment of the proper docket fee.
Resultantly, there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo. By grave abuse of discretion is
meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough – it must be grave.
The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion
was exercised arbitrarily and despotically.1avvphi1
Such a situation does not exist in this particular case. The evidence is
insufficient to prove that the court a quo acted despotically in rendering the
assailed orders. It acted properly and in accordance with law. Hence, error
cannot be attributed to it.25
Hence, the fallo of the Decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Orders of the
court a quo are AFFIRMED.26
Without seeking reconsideration of the foregoing Decision with the Court of
Appeals, petitioner filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court,
with a lone assignment of error, to wit:
18. The herein petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave and serious reversible error in affirming the assailed
Orders of the Regional Trial Court which are clearly contrary to the
pronouncement of this Honorable Court in the case of Spouses De Leon v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104796, March 6, 1998, not to mention the fact
that if the said judgment is allowed to stand and not rectified, the same would
result in grave injustice and irreparable damage to herein petitioner in view
of the prohibitive amount assessed as a consequence of said Orders.27
In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court
explicitly pronounced that "[t]he court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee." Hence, the payment of
docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,29 the Court laid down
guidelines for the implementation of its previous pronouncement in
Manchester under particular circumstances, to wit:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing
fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or
if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
In the Petition at bar, the RTC found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that
petitioner did not pay the correct amount of docket fees for Civil Case No.
2006-0030. According to both the trial and appellate courts, petitioner should
pay docket fees in accordance with Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, as amended. Consistent with the liberal tenor of Sun Insurance, the
RTC, instead of dismissing outright petitioner’s Complaint in Civil Case No.
2006-0030, granted petitioner time to pay the additional docket fees. Despite
the seeming munificence of the RTC, petitioner refused to pay the additional
docket fees assessed against it, believing that it had already paid the correct
amount before, pursuant to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
as amended.
Relevant to the present controversy are the following provisions under Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC30 and Supreme
Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-200431 :
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. –
(a) For filing an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counterclaim, CROSS-
CLAIM, or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing
a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, if
the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES,
DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND ATTORNEY’S FEES, LITIGATIO
NEXPENSES AND COSTS and/or in cases involving property, the FAIR MARKET
value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX
DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE
STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE CLAIMANT, is:
[Table of fees omitted.]
If the action involves both a money claim and relief pertaining to property,
then THE fees will be charged on both the amounts claimed and value of
property based on the formula prescribed in this paragraph a.
(b) For filing:
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated
2. Special civil actions, except judicial foreclosure of mortgage,
EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS, PARTITION AND QUIETING OF TITLE which
will
3. All other actions not involving property
[Table of fees omitted.]
The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases involving real property
depend on the fair market value of the same: the higher the value of the real
property, the higher the docket fees due. In contrast, Section 7(b)(1), Rule
141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
In order to resolve the issue of whether petitioner paid the correct amount
of docket fees, it is necessary to determine the true nature of its Complaint.
The dictum adhered to in this jurisdiction is that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or Complaint itself,
rather than by its title or heading.32However, the Court finds it necessary, in
ascertaining the true nature of Civil Case No. 2006-0030, to take into account
significant facts and circumstances beyond the Complaint of petitioner, facts
and circumstances which petitioner failed to state in its Complaint but were
disclosed in the preliminary proceedings before the court a quo.
Petitioner persistently avers that its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 is
primarily for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale. Based on the
allegations and reliefs in the Complaint alone, one would get the impression
that the titles to the subject real properties still rest with petitioner; and that
the interest of respondents Tan and Obiedo in the same lies only in the Deeds
of Absolute Sale sought to be annulled.
What petitioner failed to mention in its Complaint was that respondents Tan
and Obiedo already had the Memorandum of Agreement, which clearly
provided for the execution of the Deeds of Absolute Sale, registered on the
TCTs over the five parcels of land, then still in the name of petitioner. After
respondents Tan and Obiedo had the Deeds of Absolute Sale notarized on 3
January 2006 and presented the same to Register of Deeds for Naga City on
8 March 2006, they were already issued TCTs over the real properties in
question, in their own names. Respondents Tan and Obiedo have also
acquired possession of the said properties, enabling them, by petitioner’s
own admission, to demolish the improvements thereon.
It is, thus, suspect that petitioner kept mum about the afore-mentioned facts
and circumstances when they had already taken place before it filed its
Complaint before the RTC on 16 March 2006. Petitioner never expressed
surprise when such facts and circumstances were established before the RTC,
nor moved to amend its Complaint accordingly.1avvphi1.zw+ Even though
the Memorandum of Agreement was supposed to have long been registered
on its TCTs over the five parcels of land, petitioner did not pray for the
removal of the same as a cloud on its title. In the same vein, although
petitioner alleged that respondents Tan and Obiedo forcibly took physical
possession of the subject real properties, petitioner did not seek the
restoration of such possession to itself. And despite learning that
respondents Tan and Obiedo already secured TCTs over the subject
properties in their names, petitioner did not ask for the cancellation of said
titles. The only logical and reasonable explanation is that petitioner is
reluctant to bring to the attention of the Court certain facts and
circumstances, keeping its Complaint safely worded, so as to institute only an
action for annulment of Deeds of Absolute Sale. Petitioner deliberately
avoided raising issues on the title and possession of the real properties that
may lead the Court to classify its case as a real action.
No matter how fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them, the
allegations and reliefs it sought in its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030
appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they do the recovery by
petitioner of its title to and possession of the five parcels of land from
respondents Tan and Obiedo.
A real action is one in which the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property;
or, as indicated in what is now Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real
action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
property.33
Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, prior to its amendment by A.M. No.
04-2-04-SC, had a specific paragraph governing the assessment of the docket
fees for real action, to wit:
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis
in computing the fees.
It was in accordance with the afore-quoted provision that the Court, in
Gochan v. Gochan,34 held that although the caption of the complaint filed by
therein respondents Mercedes Gochan, et al. with the RTC was denominated
as one for "specific performance and damages," the relief sought was the
conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds
of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the
provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the
case before the RTC was actually a real action, affecting as it did title to or
possession of real property. Consequently, the basis for determining the
correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the
estimated value thereof as alleged in the complaint. But since Mercedes
Gochan failed to allege in their complaint the value of the real properties, the
Court found that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the same for non-
payment of the correct docket fees.
Likewise, in Siapno v. Manalo,35 the Court disregarded the title/denomination
of therein plaintiff Manalo’s amended petition as one for Mandamus with
Revocation of Title and Damages; and adjudged the same to be a real action,
the filing fees for which should have been computed based on the assessed
value of the subject property or, if there was none, the estimated value
thereof. The Court expounded in Siapno that:
In his amended petition, respondent Manalo prayed that NTA’s sale of the
property in dispute to Standford East Realty Corporation and the title issued
to the latter on the basis thereof, be declared null and void. In a very real
sense, albeit the amended petition is styled as one for "Mandamus with
Revocation of Title and Damages," it is, at bottom, a suit to recover from
Standford the realty in question and to vest in respondent the ownership and
possession thereof. In short, the amended petition is in reality an action in
res or a real action. Our pronouncement in Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals is instructive. There, we said:
A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface
the true objectives and nature of the action which is to recover real property.
(Inton, et al., v. Quintan, 81 Phil. 97, 1948)
An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real
action. Its prime objective is to recover said real property. (Gavieres v.
Sanchez, 94 Phil. 760, 1954)
An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from
an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Muñoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil.
737, 1950).
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or
possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and
his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of
the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the
recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is
that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does
not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the
case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.
Unfortunately, and evidently to evade payment of the correct amount of
filing fee, respondent Manalo never alleged in the body of his amended
petition, much less in the prayer portion thereof, the assessed value of the
subject res, or, if there is none, the estimated value thereof, to serve as basis
for the receiving clerk in computing and arriving at the proper amount of filing
fee due thereon, as required under Section 7 of this Court’s en banc
resolution of 04 September 1990 (Re: Proposed Amendments to Rule 141 on
Legal Fees).
Even the amended petition, therefore, should have been expunged from the
records.
In fine, we rule and so hold that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over its Civil Case No. Q-95-24791.36
It was in Serrano v. Delica,37 however, that the Court dealt with a complaint
that bore the most similarity to the one at bar. Therein respondent Delica
averred that undue influence, coercion, and intimidation were exerted upon
him by therein petitioners Serrano, et al. to effect transfer of his properties.
Thus, Delica filed a complaint before the RTC against Serrano, et al., praying
that the special power of attorney, the affidavit, the new titles issued in the
names of Serrano, et al., and the contracts of sale of the disputed properties
be cancelled; that Serrano, et al. be ordered to pay Delica, jointly and
severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of
₱200,000.00, as well as attorney’s fee of ₱200,000.00 and costs of litigation;
that a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ordering Serrano, et
al. to immediately restore him to his possession of the parcels of land in
question; and that after trial, the writ of injunction be made permanent. The
Court dismissed Delica’s complaint for the following reasons:
A careful examination of respondent’s complaint is that it is a real action. In
Paderanga vs. Buissan, we held that "in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the
recovery of real property, or, as stated in Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court, a real action is one ‘affecting title to real property or for the
recovery of possession of, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure
of a mortgage on a real property.’"
Obviously, respondent’s complaint is a real action involving not only the
recovery of real properties, but likewise the cancellation of the titles thereto.
Considering that respondent’s complaint is a real action, the Rule requires
that "the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees."
We note, however, that neither the "assessed value" nor the "estimated
value" of the questioned parcels of land were alleged by respondent in both
his original and amended complaint. What he stated in his amended
complaint is that the disputed realties have a "BIR zonal valuation" of
₱1,200.00 per square meter. However, the alleged "BIR zonal valuation" is
not the kind of valuation required by the Rule. It is the assessed value of the
realty. Having utterly failed to comply with the requirement of the Rule that
he shall allege in his complaint the assessed value of his real properties in
controversy, the correct docket fee cannot be computed. As such, his
complaint should not have been accepted by the trial court. We thus rule that
it has not acquired jurisdiction over the present case for failure of herein
respondent to pay the required docket fee. On this ground alone,
respondent’s complaint is vulnerable to dismissal.38
Brushing aside the significance of Serrano, petitioner argues that said
decision, rendered by the Third Division of the Court, and not by the Court en
banc, cannot modify or reverse the doctrine laid down in Spouses De Leon v.
Court of Appeals.39 Petitioner relies heavily on the declaration of this Court in
Spouses De Leon that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of
sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Court, however, does not perceive a contradiction between Serrano and
the Spouses De Leon. The Court calls attention to the following statement in
Spouses De Leon: "A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that
in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought."
Necessarily, the determination must be done on a case-to-case basis,
depending on the facts and circumstances of each. What petitioner
conveniently ignores is that in Spouses De Leon, the action therein that
private respondents instituted before the RTC was "solely for annulment or
rescission" of the contract of sale over a real property.40 There appeared to
be no transfer of title or possession to the adverse party. Their complaint
simply prayed for:
1. Ordering the nullification or rescission of the Contract of Conditional Sale
(Supplementary Agreement) for having violated the rights of plaintiffs
(private respondents) guaranteed to them under Article 886 of the Civil Code
and/or violation of the terms and conditions of the said contract.
2. Declaring void ab initio the Deed of Absolute Sale for being absolutely
simulated; and
3. Ordering defendants (petitioners) to pay plaintiffs (private respondents)
attorney's fees in the amount of ₱100,000.00.41
As this Court has previously discussed herein, the nature of Civil Case No.
2006-0030 instituted by petitioner before the RTC is closer to that of Serrano,
rather than of Spouses De Leon, hence, calling for the application of the ruling
of the Court in the former, rather than in the latter.
It is also important to note that, with the amendments introduced by A.M.
No. 04-2-04-SC, which became effective on 16 August 2004, the paragraph in
Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, pertaining specifically to the basis
for computation of docket fees for real actions was deleted. Instead, Section
7(1) of Rule 141, as amended, provides that "in cases involving real property,
the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE
CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICH IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE,
THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION x x x" shall be the basis
for the computation of the docket fees. Would such an amendment have an
impact on Gochan, Siapno, and Serrano? The Court rules in the negative.
A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real
action would still be determined in accordance with the value of the real
property involved therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the
acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real
properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value,
would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in
the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same.
In sum, the Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by
petitioner against respondents is the recovery of title to and possession of
real property. It is a real action necessarily involving real property, the docket
fees for which must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not
commit any error in affirming the RTC Orders requiring petitioner to pay
additional docket fees for its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
The Court does not give much credence to the allegation of petitioner that if
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is allowed to stand and not rectified, it
would result in grave injustice and irreparable injury to petitioner in view of
the prohibitive amount assessed against it. It is a sweeping assertion which
lacks evidentiary support. Undeniably, before the Court can conclude that the
amount of docket fees is indeed prohibitive for a party, it would have to look
into the financial capacity of said party. It baffles this Court that herein
petitioner, having the capacity to enter into multi-million transactions, now
stalls at paying ₱720,392.60 additional docket fees so it could champion
before the courts its rights over the disputed real properties. Moreover, even
though the Court exempts individuals, as indigent or pauper litigants, from
paying docket fees, it has never extended such an exemption to a corporate
entity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby
DENIED. The Decision, dated 22 November 2006, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 94800, which affirmed the Orders dated 24 March 2006 and
29 March 2006 of the RTC, Branch 22, of Naga City, in Civil Case No. RTC-2006-
0030, ordering petitioner Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development
Corporation to pay additional docket/filing fees, computed based on Section
7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SIAPNO vs MANALO
G.R. No. 132260 August 30, 2005
AMANTE SIAPNO, CRISTINA LOPEZ and MINDA GAPUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL V. MANALO, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
As far back as 1987, in Manchester Development Corporation, et al. vs. Court
of Appeals,1 this Court has made it clear that any complaint, petition, answer
and other similar pleading that does not specify in its body and prayer the
amount of damages claimed should not be accepted or admitted or otherwise
expunged from the records. It is unfortunate that to this date, there are still
those who failed to hearken to our teaching in Manchester. The present case
exemplifies one.
Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside
the decision dated 13 January 19982of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R.
SP No. 45434, dismissing, for lack of merit, the earlier petition for certiorari
and prohibition thereat filed by the petitioners against the Hon. Eudarlio B.
Valencia, Presiding Judge, RTC, Quezon City, Branch 222, and the herein
respondent, Manuel V. Manalo.
The underlying facts are not disputed:
As then Administrator of the National Tobacco Administration (NTA),
petitioner Amando Siapno, thru a special order dated 12 April 1995, created
a negotiating panel with the responsibility of undertaking the disposal of
NTA’s 31,159 square-meter real property at Barrio Prinza, Las Piñas City, and
accepting offers relative to the purchase thereof by interested party/parties.
As constituted, the panel was composed of Ricardo Briones, as chairman, and
petitioners Cristina Lopez and Minda Gapuz, as members.
Thru a letter dated 02 June 1995, respondent Manuel Manalo offered to buy
the real property in question, which offer was accepted and approved by the
NTA Board of Directors in its Resolution No. 336-95 bearing date 15 June
1995, of which respondent Manalo was duly informed by the NTA Corporate
Secretary.
In yet another Resolution dated 19 June 1995, the NTA Board of Directors
directed the Corporate Secretary to assist the negotiating panel in the
preparation of the necessary document for the final disposition and transfer
of ownership of the subject real asset in favor of Manalo.
Accordingly, there was prepared a format of a Deed of Sale to be entered into
by and between NTA and Manalo, which format was duly approved by the
NTA Board of Directors in its Resolution No. 341-95 dated 23 June 1995.
On 27 June 1995, Manalo signed the prepared Deed of Sale, with one NTA
Board member acting as a witness. However, the chairman of the negotiating
panel Ricardo Briones, deferred affixing his signature thereon unless and until
Manalo shall have paid twenty percent (20%) of the agreed purchase price,
as downpayment.
The next day - 28 June 1995 - Manalo paid NTA the sum of ₱4,424,598.00 by
way of downpayment, and, on 24 July 1995, he sent a letter to NTA attaching
thereto the original of the domestic letter of credit he established in NTA’s
favor for the balance.
However, despite the above, petitioners refused to implement NTA Board
Resolutions No. 336-95 and 431-95, hence the sale to Manalo of the subject
real property was never consummated.
Such was the state of things when, on 20 August 1995, in the Regional Trial
Court at Quezon City, Manalo filed against petitioners a petition
for Mandamus with Damages, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-
24792 which was raffled to Branch 222 of the court. In it, Manalo prayed for
the following reliefs, to wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Immediately upon filing of this petition, an order be issued requiring
Corporate Secretary Lino Eugenio, Jr. or anyone acting in his behalf, to turn
over to the Court all the minutes --- and other documents/vouchers including
the partially signed Deed of Sale allied thereto --- of the meetings of the NTA
Board of Directors wherein Resolutions Nos. 336-95- 339-95 and 341-95 were
adopted, in order to insure preservation of their integrity;
2. After hearing, to compel respondents [now petitioners] to honor, respect
[and] implement NTA Board Resolutions Nos. 336-95, 339-95 and 341-95 by
signing in behalf of NTA the prepared Deed of Sale covering the Prinza, Las
Piñas property.
Petitioner further prays for such other reliefs as may be deemed, just and
equitable in the premises.3
On 25 August 1998, or before the petitioners could have submitted their
responsive pleading, Manalo filed directly with the Branch Clerk of Branch
222 instead of with the Clerk of Court an Amended Petition for Mandamus
with Revocation of Title and Damages,4 thereunder impleading Stanford East
Realty Corporation (Stanford), as additional respondent, it being alleged in
the same amended petition that herein petitioner Amante Siapno as NTA
Administrator, unlawfully executed a deed of sale over the same NTA
property in favor of Stanford, on the basis of which the Register of Deeds of
Las Piñas issued in Stanford’s favor TCT No. T-4948 for said property. Manalo
thus prayed in his amended petition for a judgment declaring the sale to
Stanford and the latter’s title as null and void and adjudging the petitioners
liable to pay him ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages; ₱1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages; ₱2,000,000.00 by way of actual damages; and
₱500,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees. We quote Manalo’s prayer in his
amended petition:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Hon. Court that
IMMEDIATELY UPON FILING OF THIS PETITION
1. A temporary restraining order be issued to all the respondents to stop and
desist from making any transaction involving the subject property;
2. An order be issued requiring Corporate Secretary Lino Eugenio Jr. or
anyone acting or substituting in his behalf to turn over [to] the court all the
minutes --- and other documents/vouchers including the partially signed
Deed of Sale allied thereto -- of meetings of the NTA Board of Directors
wherein Resolutions Nos. 336-95, 339-95 and 341-95 were adopted, in order
to ensure preservation of their integrity;
AFTER NOTICE AND HEARING
3. A writ of preliminary injunction of the same tenor as in first prayer be
issued;
4. A decision rendered:
4.1 Compelling the respondent NTA officials to honor, respect and implement
NTA Board Resolutions Nos. 336-95, 339-95 and 341-95 by signing in behalf
of NTA the prepared Deed of Sale covering the Prinza, Las Piñas property;
4.2 Declaring as null and void the Deed of Sale executed by the NTA in favor
of respondent Stanford and TCT No. 49418 issued in the latter’s name on the
basis thereof;
4.3 Ordering the respondents to jointly and severally pay the petitioner: P1
million as moral damages; P1 million as exemplary damages; P2 million as
actual damages and P500,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Petitioner further prays for such other reliefs as may be deemed just
equitable in the premises.5
On 29 November 1995, petitioners filed their Answer With Counter-claim and
Crossclaim, thereunder raising the defense, inter alia, that the suit filed by
Manalo involves a conveyance of real property, hence the docket fee therefor
should be based on the value of the real asset involved in the suit but which
is not stated in Manalo’s amended petition. And since Manalo has not paid
the proper amount of docket fee for his amended petition, the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
On 24 April 1996, petitioners filed a third-party complaint, which the trial
court admitted in open court on 23 May 1996. Manalo, however, moved to
strike out petitioners’ third-party complaint, arguing that the docket fees
therefor were not paid.
To Manalo’s motion to strike, petitioners interposed an opposition with an
accompanying motion for preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense of
lack of jurisdiction based on Manalo’s deficient filing fee for his amended
petition.
On 08 June 1996, Manalo paid the sum of ₱15,150.00 as additional docket
fee, followed by his manifestation to that effect.
In an order dated 08 August 1996, the trial court deemed the question of
inadequate filing fee as having become moot and academic by reason of
Manalo’s subsequent payment of the additional filing fee.
In yet another order dated 09 August 1996, the trial court denied petitioners’
prayer for a preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense of lack of
jurisdiction, explaining that Manalo has already paid the additional docketing
fee. In the same order, the trial court set the case for pre-trial.
In time, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s two (2)
aforementioned orders, which motion was likewise denied by the court in its
subsequent order of 08 August 1997.
Therefrom, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
45434, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in issuing its three (3)
aforementioned orders of 08 August 1996, 09 August 1996 and 08 August
1997.
As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in its assailed decision of
13 January 1998, denied petitioner’s recourse "for lack of merit".
Hence, petitioners’ present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, it being their submission that the appellate court erred:
I.
IN HOLDING, PER THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED 13 JANUARY 1998,
THAT RESPONDENT’S PETITION IN THE COURT OF ORIGIN IS A PERSONAL
ACTION, NOT A REAL ACTION, THEREBY SANCTIONING THE COGNIZANCE BY
THE COURT A QUO OF WHAT IS IN ESSENCE A REAL ACTION WITHOUT THE
PAYMENT OF THE PRESCRIBED AND CORRECT DOCKET FEES THEREFOR,
WHICH IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON TO THE COURT’S ACQUISITION AND
EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION.
II.
IN SANCTIONING AND APPROVING, IN CONTRAVENTION OF APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE AND IN CLEAR DEPARTURE FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, THE DELIBERATE PLOY OF
RESPONDENT IN STATING THE DAMAGES HE CLAIMS ONLY IN THE BODY BUT
NOT IN THE PETITORY (PRAYER) PORTION OF THE PETITION TO EVADE
PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET/FILING FEES THEREFOR.
Simply put, the issue is: whether or not the trial court acted with or without
jurisdiction in its Civil Case No. Q-95-24791. Upon the resolution of this issue
rests the corollary question of whether or not the appellate court acted with
grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in coming out with its
challenged decision of 13 January 1998, sustaining the trial court’s three (3)
orders in the basic case for Mandamus With Revocation of Title and Damages
in Civil Case No. Q-95-24791.
We rule for the petitioners.
Consistent with our ruling in Manchester, supra, that the amount of damages
claimed must be alleged not only in the body of the complaint, petition or
answer but also in the prayer portion thereof, the lower court should have
outrightly dismissed respondent’s original petition for mandamus with
revocation of title and damages in its Civil Case No. Q-95-24791, or, if already
admitted, should have expunged the same from the records.
We note that while paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 of Manalo’s original petition
somehow alleged the amount of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees, all in the aggregate amount of ₱4,500,000.00, which he
claimed to have sustained by reason of petitioners’ inaction/refusal to
implement the NTA Board Resolutions relative to the sale of the questioned
property to him, the prayer, supra, embodied in the same original petition
made no mention whatsoever of the same damages. In fact, there was not
even a prayer for the payment thereof.
The requirement that the amount of damages claimed has to be specified not
only in the body of the pleading but also in its prayer portion came about to
put an end to the then prevailing practice by counsels of reciting the damages
prayed for only in the body of the complaint to evade payment of the correct
filing fees. To quote from Manchester:
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it
frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case
of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer
although the amount of over ₱78 million is alleged in the body of the
complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the
assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when,
even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an
investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended
complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in
the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this
Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of
damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel
wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of ₱10,000,000.00
in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid
payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of
this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions,
answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer,
and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in
any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not
be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
(Emphasis supplied)
The irrelevant circumstance that respondent Manalo subsequently paid
additional filing fees in connection with his amended petition is of no
moment. For, with the reality that his original petition suffered from the
defect in its prayer vis a vis the amount of damages claimed, and, therefore,
should not have been admitted, or, if already accepted, should have been
ordered expunged from the records, the amended petition could have served
no valid purpose because in law, there is, in the first place, no existing petition
to be amended. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to have
entertained and assumed jurisdiction over the same by issuing the orders
assailed in CA-G.R. SP No. 45434.
There is more.
In his amended petition, respondent Manalo prayed that NTA’s sale of the
property in dispute to Standford East Realty Corporation and the title issued
to the latter on the basis thereof, be declared null and void. In a very real
sense, albeit the amended petition is styled as one for "Mandamus with
Revocation of Title and Damages", it is, at bottom, a suit to recover from
Standford the realty in question and to vest in respondent the ownership and
possession thereof. In short, the amended petition is in reality an action in
res or a real action. Our pronouncement in Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals6 is instructive. There, we said:
A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface
the true objectives and nature of the action which is to recover real
property. (Inton, et al., v. Quintan, 81 Phil. 97, 1948)
An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real
action. Its prime objective is to recover said real property. (Gavieres v.
Sanchez, 94 Phil. 760, 1954)
An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from
an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Muñoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil.
737, 1950).
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or
possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and
his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership
of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the
recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine
is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property
does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature
of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.
Unfortunately, and evidently to evade payment of the correct amount of
filing fee, respondent Manalo never alleged in the body of his amended
petition, much less in the prayer portion thereof, the assessed value of the
subject res, or, if there is none, the estimated value thereof, to serve as basis
for the receiving clerk in computing and arriving at the proper amount of filing
fee due thereon, as required under Section 7 of this Court’s en
banc resolution of 04 September 1990 (Re: Proposed Amendments to Rule
141 on Legal Fees).7

Even the amended petition, therefore, should have been expunged from the
records.

In fine, we rule and so hold that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over its Civil Case No. Q-95-24791. It follows that the appellate court itself
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, when it sustained the unlawful
orders of the trial court, subject of petitioners’ petition for certiorari and
prohibition in CA-G.R. SP No. 45434.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of

the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-95-24791 of
the trial court is accordingly DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
MUÑOZ vs LLAMAS others, that venue is improperly laid. As the action herein should have been
commenced in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the lower court correctly
ordered the dismissal prayed for by defendant Palanca.
G.R. No. L-2832 December 21, 1950
The contention of appellant that the order of dismissal fails to state the legal
JOSE MUÑOZ, plaintiff-appellant, grounds therefor, is without merit, because the order expressly states that
vs. the motion to dismiss was well taken, with the result that the grounds alleged
ROSENDO R. LLAMAS and DIONISIA PALANCA, defendants-appellees. in said motion have impliedly been adopted by the lower court.lawphil.net
Jose S. Sarte for appellant. Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Cabral and Crisostomo for appellee Dionisia Palanca. So ordered.

PARAS, J.:

On September 24, 1948, the plaintiff filed in the court of First Instance of
Manila a complaint against the defendants Rosendo R. Llamas and Dionisia
Palanca, praying (1) that the sale executed by the plaintiff in favor of
defendant Llamas, and the sale executed by the latter in favor of the
defendant Palanca, both covering two lots with improvements situated in
Pasay, Rizal, be declared null and void, and (2) that the plaintiff be declared
the owner of said properties. On October 4, 1948, the defendant Dionisia
Palanca filed a motion for dismissal on the grounds that venue was
improperly laid and that the complaint stated no cause of action, to which
motion for dismissal the plaintiff filed an opposition on November 12, 1948.
On November 13, 1948, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order
finding the motion for dismissal to be well taken and ordering the dismissal
of the case against defendant Palanca, without special pronouncement as to
costs. From this order the plaintiff has appealed.

It is obvious that the motion to dismiss is well founded, at least because venue
was improperly laid. The complaint seeks to annul two deeds of sale covering
real property situated in Pasay, Rizal, and to obtain a judicial declaration that
the plaintiff is the owner thereof. Hence said action affects title to real
property. Under section 3, Rule 5, of the Rules of Court, actions affecting title
to real property must be commenced and tried in the province where the
property or any part thereof lies. Upon the other hand, under section 1, Rule
8, of the Rules of Court, an action may be dismissed on the ground, among
SERRANO vs DELICA
G.R. No. 136325. July 29, 2005
MANUEL M. SERRANO, Petitioners,
vs.
EUGENIO C. DELICA, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated
September 30, 1998 and Resolution dated November 13, 1998 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46632, entitled "Manuel M. Serrano, petitioner,
vs. Hon. Alberto L. Lerma, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 256,
Muntinlupa City, and Eugenio C. Delica, respondents.
The petition stemmed from the following facts:
On June 30, 1997, Eugenio C. Delica, respondent, filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, presided by Judge Alberto L. Lerma, a
complaint for cancellation of Deeds of Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title, Joint
Venture Agreement, and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil
Case No. 97-120. Impleaded as defendants were Manuel M. Serrano, now
petitioner, Manuel P. Blanco, MBJ Land, Inc., and MARILAQUE Land, Inc.
The complaint alleges inter alia that respondent is the registered owner of
ten parcels of land situated in Bagbagan, Muntinlupa City, with a total area of
2,062,475 square meters, more or less, covered by ten Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCT) Nos. S-12619 to S-12628 of the Registry of Deeds, same city. On
August 10, 1995, after having been "promised with financial bonanza" by
petitioner and Manuel Blanco, respondent executed in favor of the latter a
special power of attorney. Blanco then sold to MBJ Land, Inc. respondent’s
three parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. S-12625, S-12626 and S-12628.
Thus, these titles were cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. 207282, 207283
and 207284 were issued in the name of MBJ Land, Inc.
On December 4, 1996, MBJ Land, Inc. entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
with MARILAQUE Land, Inc. involving the three parcels of land.
On December 23, 1996, petitioner Serrano again "unduly influenced, coerced
and intimidated" respondent into executing an affidavit wherein he
confirmed that he sold his remaining seven parcels of land, covered by TCT
Nos. S-12619 to S-126124 and S-12627, to petitioners. Later, respondent
found that these seven titles were cancelled and new titles (TCT Nos. 209636
to 209642) were issued in petitioner’s name based on a spurious Deed of
Absolute Sale.
Respondent thus prayed in his complaint that the special power of attorney,
affidavit, the new titles issued in the names of petitioner and MBJ Land, Inc.,
and contracts of sale be cancelled; and that petitioner and his co-defendants
be ordered to pay respondent, jointly and severally, actual, moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00, as well as attorney’s fee
of ₱200,000.00 and costs of litigation. Respondent likewise prayed that,
pending trial on the merits, a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued ordering the defendants to immediately
restore him to his possession of the parcels of land in question; and that after
trial, the writ of injunction be made permanent.
Petitioner then filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim, denying the
material allegations of the complaint.
Respondent later amended his complaint.
On August 5, 1997, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and
on September 8, 1997, a preliminary injunction directing petitioner and his
co-defendants to immediately restore respondent to his possession.
Petitioner then filed consolidated motions for reconsideration praying that
the complaint be dismissed for respondent’s failure to pay the required
docket fee; and that Judge Lerma be directed to inhibit himself from hearing
the case.
The trial court, in its Order dated January 7, 1998, denied petitioner’s
consolidated motions.
Petitioner seasonably filed with the Court of Appeals a petition Thus, the rule is that "upon the filing of the pleading or other application
for certiorari and prohibition with application for a preliminary injunction and which initiates an action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be
temporary restraining order assailing the trial court’s twin Orders dated paid in full."4 However, a litigant who is a pauper is exempt from the payment
September 8, 1997 ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; of the docket fees. But the fees shall be a lien on the judgment rendered in
and denying his consolidated motions dated January 7, 1998. Petitioner favor of said pauper litigant, unless the court otherwise provides.5
raised three issues: (a) whether respondent paid the correct docket fee; (b)
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
whether the trial court’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is in
but the payment of the prescribed docket fees that vests a trial court with
order; and (c) whether Judge Lerma should inhibit himself from hearing the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.6
case.
In the case at bar, petitioner impugns the Court of Appeals’ ruling that
On September 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision partially
respondent’s complaint in Civil Case No. 97-120 is not capable of pecuniary
granting the petition by: (1) affirmingthe trial court’s ruling that the docket
estimation and that, therefore, the docket fee is fixed at ₱600.00 pursuant to
fee was correctly paid; (2) setting aside the trial court’s Order directing the
Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court.
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; and (3) leaving the matter of
inhibition to the discretion of Judge Lerma. We agree with petitioner that the Court of Appeals erred in issuing such
ruling. It should have considered the allegations of the complaint and
Petitioner then filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Court of
the character of the reliefs sought, the criteria in determining the nature of
Appeals’ ruling that respondent correctly paid the docket fee and that the
an action.7
motion for inhibition should be addressed to Judge Lerma’s sound discretion.
A careful examination of respondent’s complaint is that it is a real action.
In a Resolution dated November 13, 1998, the Appellate Court denied the
In Paderanga vs. Buissan,8 we held that "in a real action, the plaintiff seeks
motion.
the recovery of real property, or, as stated in Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the
Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari. Revised Rules of Court,9 a real action is one ‘affecting title to real property or
for the recovery of possession of, or for partition or condemnation of, or
The core issues for our resolution are:
foreclosure of a mortgage on a real property.’"
1. Whether respondent paid the correct docket fee when he filed his
Obviously, respondent’s complaint is a real action involving not only the
complaint in Civil Case No. 97-120; and
recovery of real properties, but likewise the cancellation of the titles thereto.
2. Whether the matter of inhibition should be addressed to Judge Lerma’s
Considering that respondent’s complaint is a real action, the Rule requires
discretion.
that "the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
On the first issue, we cannot overemphasized the importance of paying the value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
correct docket fees. Such fees are intended to take care of court expenses in computing the fees."10
the handling of cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of equipment, salaries
We note, however, that neither the "assessed value" nor the "estimated
and fringe benefits of personnel, etc., computed as to man-hours used in the
value" of the questioned parcels of land were alleged by respondent in both
handling of each case. The payment of said fees, therefore, cannot be made
his original and amended complaint. What he stated in his amended
dependent on the result of the action taken, without entailing tremendous
complaint is that the disputed realties have a "BIR zonal valuation" of
losses to the government and to the judiciary in particular.3
₱1,200.00 per square meter. However, the alleged "BIR zonal valuation" is
not the kind of valuation required by the Rule. It is the assessed value of the
realty.11 Having utterly failed to comply with the requirement of the Rule that
he shall allege in his complaint the assessed value of his real properties in
controversy, the correct docket fee cannot be computed. As such, his
complaint should not have been accepted by the trial court. We thus rule that
it has not acquired jurisdiction over the present case for failure of herein
respondent to pay the required docket fee. On this ground alone,
respondent’s complaint is vulnerable to dismissal.

Since the complaint is dismissible, the second issue on whether Judge Lerma
should inhibit himself from hearing the case has become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46632 are hereby REVERSED. The
complaint in Civil Case No. 97-120 is ordered DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD. vs ASUNCION
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J.
WARBY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for
petitioners. Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law Offices
for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court
acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has
not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity)
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for
the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer
for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy
Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the
required answer within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B.
Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought,
among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and
liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the
suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of
damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint
to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee
which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection
was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding
over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together
with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City which were under investigation for under-
assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court
thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive that
they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge
Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was
then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative
Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the
docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The
Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-
assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in
their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No.
Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk of Court
instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by
private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said
certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by
petitioners. On August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private
respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter
assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a
Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk
of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the
Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by
private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered.
On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-
Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00
as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said
second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and
compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about
P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the
second amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted
proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof
should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket
fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's
claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages"
amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private
respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
questioning the said order of Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging
an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as d.qmages so the total claim amounts
to about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after
filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional
docket fee of P80,396.00.1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among
others, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it
seeks annulment of the order
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the
portion thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and
requiring the Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to
be paid by private respondent on the basis of the amount of
P25,401,707.00. 2
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment
of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding
that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177
on the ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper docket fee.
Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid
the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and
considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended
and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be
paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the
same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all
incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory,
petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester Development
Corporation vs. CA, 4 as follows:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading
will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling
in the Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling
in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the
time said civil case was filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as
yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of
this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5 wherein this Court held that the trial
court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was
insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is
untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 6
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the payment of the
full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an
appeal. In a forcible entry and detainer case before the justice of the peace
court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the case,
the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited only
P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within the
reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of
judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the amount of
the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this
court held that the Court of First Instance did notacquire jurisdiction to hear
and determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.
In Lee vs. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to
become a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office
of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in
1956, barely 5V2 months prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This
Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal
requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year before the
filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that
the filing of petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23, 1953
produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23,
1956.
9
In Malimit vs. Degamo, the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee
were applied. It was an original petition for quo warranto contesting the right
to office of proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk
of the Court of First Instance, within the one-week period after the
proclamation as provided therefor by law.10However, the required docket
fees were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this
Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to be the real date
of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed.
Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule that the docket
fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However,
we also held that said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate
of several wills of the same decedent as he is not required to file a separate
action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the same
special proceeding then pending before the same court.
Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a
case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the
actual date of its filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket fee and
P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-
11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of
Title issued in the name of the defendant be declared as null and void. It was
also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper
title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of
P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to
plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount of
P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount
of P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct
amount of the docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff
alleging that the action was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the docket
fee must be based on its assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 was
the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay
P3,104.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include
the Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the
exemplary damages earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayer
merely sought moral damages as the court may determine, attorney's fees of
P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to
the amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the amended
complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order
for the payment of the additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then
challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket
fee in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it
must be based on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be
considered to have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not
sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed
only upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket fee regardless
of the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest
difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that
as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee
of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one, for damages, We
upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages
alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial court
which was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint.
However, as aforecited, this Court
overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts
and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action
against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid
by the plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of such property
of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be
rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants
to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul
defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that
the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally, actual,
compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may
be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked the trial
court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid
and sufficient for purposes of payment, and to make the injunction
permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer
although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78
Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff.
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00
for the docket fee based on the nature of the action for specific performance
where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation. However,
it was obvious from the allegations of the complaint as well as its designation
that the action was one for damages and specific performance. Thus, this
court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct docket fee computed
against the amount of damages of about P78 Million, although the same was
not spelled out in the prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an
amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-
plaintiff and eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body
of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee
in the said case and other cases that were investigated. On November 12,
1985, the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint
by stating the amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff did as
instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged was
reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in
the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this
Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by
payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of
the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes
there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declared
null and void.13
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-
assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Court together
with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case are similar
to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of
damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount
of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund of the
premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with
damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On
January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in
the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as
actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount
of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended
complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the
additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than
P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging
an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is
approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent Thus, the Court rules as follows:
paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing
during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total
amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and
to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing
a docket fee of P257,810.49. fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case.
or reglementary period.
The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due
it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
of the second amended complaint. appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee
if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
until] the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus,
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the
original complaint was null and void. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court
of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the
considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his
total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the
required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that
prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any,
sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket
without pronouncement as to costs.
fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by
manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be SO ORDERED.
ordered.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still
insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which
the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk
or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found
due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. vs BERNARDITA PEREZ
G.R. No. 181842 February 5, 2010
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. and SOLIDBANK
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
BERNARDITA H. PEREZ, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact PATRIA H.
PEREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On September 17, 1997, petitioner Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank) forged
a lease contract with Bernardita H. Perez (respondent), represented by her
attorney-in-fact Patria H. Perez1, over two parcels of land located in Sta.
Maria, Bulacan for a period of 15 years commencing on January 1, 1998.
Solidbank was to, as it did, construct a one-storey building specifically suited
for bank premises.
Solidbank was later acquired by its co-petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (Metrobank), the latter as the surviving entity.
On September 24, 2002, Metrobank sent a notice of termination of the lease
contract effective September 30, 2002.2 Respondent, objecting to the
termination, filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages against
herein petitioners Solidbank and Metrobank before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan praying that, inter alia, herein petitioners be
ordered to pay her "the would be unrealized income for the ensuing idle
months of the said building."3
Metrobank asserted in its Answer with Counterclaim, however, that the lease
contract did not prohibit pre-termination by the parties.
After respondent rested her case, Metrobank was, by Order of January 12,
2006, declared to have waived its right to present evidence after its counsel
incurred several unexcused absences.
By Decision of April 5, 2006, Branch 22 of the Malolos RTC ruled in favor of
respondent, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter, jointly
and severally:
1. To pay the plaintiff the amount of ₱212,322.60 as unrealized income before
the filing of the case (Sept. 2002 to Feb. 2003);
2. To pay the plaintiff the amount of ₱2,013,753.03 as unrealized (income)
after the filing of the case up to present (March 2003 to March 2006);
3. To pay the plaintiff the would be unrealized income for the ensuing idle
months of said building amounting to P7,126,494.30 (covering April 2006
until expiration of the contract of lease);
4. To pay plaintiff the amount of ₱200,000.00 as moral damages;
5. To pay plaintiff the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
6. To pay plaintiff the amount of ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
7. To pay plaintiff as litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.4 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On appeal, Metrobank challenged, in the main, the trial court’s award of
"unrealized income for the ensuing idle months" despite respondent’s failure
to pay docket fees thereon to thus render the complaint dismissible for lack
of jurisdiction.
By Decision5 of November 23, 2007, the appellate court affirmed that of the
trial court6 and denied, by Resolution of February 21, 2008, a reconsideration
thereof. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
In her Comment, respondent admitted that the filing fees she paid did not
cover her prayer for unrealized income for the ensuing idle months, for "at
the time of filing and payment[,] the period that the building would be idle
could not yet be determined."7
In sustaining respondent’s justification for nonpayment of additional docket
fees, the appellate court held:
For one, plaintiff-appellee Perez could not have been certain at the time she
filed the Complaint that defendant-appellant Metrobank would no longer
return to the Leased Property. It would have been speculative therefore on
the part of plaintiff-appellee Perez to allege in her Complaint any unrealized
income for the remaining period of the Lease Contract considering that the
possibility of defendant-appellant Metrobank reconsidering its decision to
terminate the said Lease Contract and returning to the Leased Property at
some future time was not definitively foreclosed when the Complaint was
filed. In light of her predicament, plaintiff-appellee Perez was thus justified in
just making a general prayer for the court a quo to award unrealized income
for the "ensuing idle months" of the Leased Property.8 (italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
The petition is partly meritorious.
In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,9 the Court held
that a pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount sought shall
not be admitted or shall be expunged, and that a court acquires jurisdiction
only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. This rule was relaxed in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion10which was echoed in the 2005 case of Heirs
of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melico, the pertinent portion of the decision in the latter
case reads:
Plainly, while the payment of prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional
requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party
involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such
payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs
and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule
does not apply.11 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Metrobank takes exception to the application of Sun Insurance Office to the
present case because, by its claim, respondent deliberately concealed the
insufficient payment of docket fees.
Metrobank’s position fails. The ensuing months in which the leased premises
would be rendered vacant could not be determined at the time of the filing
of the complaint. It bears recalling that the building constructed on
respondent’s leased premises was specifically constructed to house a bank,
hence, the idle period before another occupant with like business may opt to
lease would be difficult to project.
On Metrobank’s raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the complaint for
respondent’s failure to pay the correct docket fees, apropos is the ruling
in National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals: 12
Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional
requirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the
same within a reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails to comply with this
requirement, the defendant should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or
else he would be considered in estoppel. In the latter case, the balance
between the appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by the
plaintiff will be considered a lien on any award he may obtain in his
favor.13 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvph!1
Metrobank raised the issue of jurisdiction only before the appellate court
after it and its co-petitioner participated in the proceedings before the trial
court. While lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, a party may be
held in estoppel if, as in the present case, it has actively taken part in the
proceedings being questioned.
The foregoing disposition notwithstanding, respondent is liable for the
balance between the actual fees paid and the correct payable filing fees to
include an assessment on the award of unrealized income, following Section
2 of Rule 141 which provides:
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. – Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not
alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading,
the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien
on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and
collect the corresponding fee (underscoring supplied),
and jurisprudence, viz:
The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although
specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to
any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor
speculate as to the amount thereof.14 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A word on the grant of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

The Court notes that respondent’s witness-attorney-in-fact testified only on

the existence of the lease agreement and unrealized income due to pre-
termination. Since an award of moral damages is predicated on a categorical
showing from the claimant that emotional and mental sufferings were
actually experienced, absent any evidence thereon in the present case,15 the
award must be disallowed. And so too must the award of attorney’s fees,
absent an indication in the trial court’s Decision of the factual basis thereof,
the award having been merely stated in the dispositive
portion.16 Parenthetically, while respondent prayed in her complaint for the
award of attorney’s fees and testified during the trial that:

Q: Now, in connection with the filing of this case and hiring your lawyer, do
you have agreement with your counsel with respect to attorney’s fees?

A: ₱100,000.00 acceptance fees.

Q: What about appearance fees?

A: I forgot already, sir.,17

there is no showing that she submitted any documentary evidence in support

thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is in part GRANTED. The November 23, 2007

Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. The Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan is ordered to reassess, determine and
collect additional fees that should be paid by respondent within fifteen (15)
days, in accordance with the foregoing discussion of the Court, provided the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not

yet expired, which additional fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment in
satisfaction of said lien. The award of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees is DELETED.

In all other respects, the appellate court’s Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN
ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE
MAISIP, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second
Division of January 28,1987 and another motion to refer the case to and to
be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the
motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the motion to set
the case for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed
on the basis of the amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs.
Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in that the filing
fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages sought in the
original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that —
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession
of a parcel of land with damages.2While the present case is an action for torts
and damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary restraining
order, etc.3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the
annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the declaration of
ownership and delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for
the payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees arising
therefrom in the amounts specified therein. 4However, in the present case,
the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
during the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced
forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in
question, to attach such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to
satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order
defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property
and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering
defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and
exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during
the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the
purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment and to
make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not
specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total
amount of over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff.5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion
as to the nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was
considered as primarily an action for recovery of ownership and possession
of a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as merely to the main
cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the
sheriff's fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As
maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well as the
designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific
performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only
of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary
estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages
sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the
body of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which
should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to
the attention of this Court together with similar other cases an investigation
was immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another
counsel with leave of court filed an amended complaint on September 12,
1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff
and by emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the
complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this
Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering the re- assessment of the
docket fee in the present case and other cases that were investigated, on
November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended
complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then
that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint
in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of damages were
specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs
to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in
the original complaint as it did not consider the damages to be merely an or
incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and possession of real
property. 8 An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to
include the government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the
amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said
amended complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of
ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should
be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of
P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the
payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over
the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and
regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the original
complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be
the basis of the computation of the filing fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the
allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that
it is an action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee
should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the
original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the present case the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket
fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction
upon the Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no such original complaint
that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order
admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and
actions taken by the trial court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis
of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in
the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it
frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case
of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer
although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the
complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the
assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when,
even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an
investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended
complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in
the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this
Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of
damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel
wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00
in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid
payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of
this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers
and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted
nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading
will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling
in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement
is overturned and reversed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG vs MELICOR
G.R. No. 140954. April 12, 2005
HEIRS OF BERTULDO1 HINOG: Bertuldo Hinog II, Bertuldo Hinog III, Bertuldo
Hinog, Jr., Jocelyn Hinog, Bertoldo Hinog IV, Bertoldo Hinog V, Edgardo
Hinog, Milagros H. Pabatao, Lilian H. King, Victoria H. Engracia, Terisita C.
Hinog, Paz H. Besana, Roberto C. Hinog, Vicente C. Hinog, Roel C. Hinog,
Marilyn C. Hinog, Bebot C. Hinog, lordes C. Hinog, Pablo Chiong, Arlene
Lanasang (All respresented by Bertuldo Hinog III), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ACHILLES MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 4,
7th Judicial Region, Tagbiliran City, Bohol, and CUSTODIO BALANE, RUFO
BALANE, HONORIO BALANE, and TOMAS BALANE,Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court which assails the Orders dated March 22, 1999, August 13, 1999 and
October 15, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, of Tagbilaran City,
Bohol in Civil Case No. 4923.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 21, 1991, private respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas and Honorio,
all surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership and
Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages" against Bertuldo Hinog
(Bertuldo for brevity). They alleged that: they own a 1,399- square meter
parcel of land situated in Malayo Norte, Cortes, Bohol, designated as Lot No.
1714; sometime in March 1980, they allowed Bertuldo to use a portion of the
said property for a period of ten years and construct thereon a small house
of light materials at a nominal annual rental of ₱100.00 only, considering the
close relations of the parties; after the expiration of the ten-year period, they
demanded the return of the occupied portion and removal of the house
constructed thereon but Bertuldo refused and instead claimed ownership of
the entire property.
Accordingly, private respondents sought to oust Bertuldo from the premises
of the subject property and restore upon themselves the ownership and
possession thereof, as well as the payment of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses "in amounts justified by the
evidence." 2
On July 2, 1991, Bertuldo filed his Answer. He alleged ownership of the
disputed property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 2, 1980,
executed by one Tomas Pahac with the knowledge and conformity of private
respondents.3
After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. On November 18, 1997, private
respondents rested their case. Thereupon, Bertuldo started his direct
examination. However, on June 24, 1998, Bertuldo died without completing
his evidence.
On August 4, 1998, Atty. Sulpicio A. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for
Bertuldo as his services were terminated by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III.
Atty. Veronico G. Petalcorin then entered his appearance as new counsel for
Bertuldo.4
On September 22, 1998, Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the
complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground
that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the amount of
damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and that
under Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,5 non-
payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional.6
In an amended motion, filed on October 2, 1998, Atty. Petalcorin further
alleged that the private respondents failed to pay the correct docket fee since
the main subject matter of the case cannot be estimated as it is for recovery
of ownership, possession and removal of construction.7
Private respondents opposed the motion to expunge on the following
grounds: (a) said motion was filed more than seven years from the institution
of the case; (b) Atty. Petalcorin has not complied with Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court which provides that the death of the original defendant
requires a substitution of parties before a lawyer can have legal personality
to represent a litigant and the motion to expunge does not mention of any
specific party whom he is representing; (c) collectible fees due the court can
be charged as lien on the judgment; and (d) considering the lapse of time, the
motion is merely a dilatory scheme employed by petitioners.8
In their Rejoinder, petitioners manifested that the lapse of time does not vest
the court with jurisdiction over the case due to failure to pay the correct
docket fees. As to the contention that deficiency in payment of docket fees
can be made as a lien on the judgment, petitioners argued that the payment
of filing fees cannot be made dependent on the result of the action taken.9
On January 21, 1999, the trial court, while ordering the complaint to be
expunged from the records and the nullification of all court proceedings
taken for failure to pay the correct docket fees, nonetheless, held:
The Court can acquire jurisdiction over this case only upon the payment of
the exact prescribed docket/filing fees for the main cause of action, plus
additional docket fee for the amount of damages being prayed for in the
complaint, which amount should be specified so that the same can be
considered in assessing the amount of the filing fees. Upon the complete
payment of such fees, the Court may take appropriate action in the light of
the ruling in the case of Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, supra.10
Accordingly, on January 28, 1999, upon payment of deficiency docket fee,
private respondents filed a manifestation with prayer to reinstate the
case.11 Petitioners opposed the reinstatement12 but on March 22, 1999, the
trial court issued the first assailed Order reinstating the case.13
On May 24, 1999, petitioners, upon prior leave of court,14 filed their
supplemental pleading, appending therein a Deed of Sale dated November
15, 1982.15 Following the submission of private respondents’ opposition
thereto,16 the trial court, in its Order dated July 7, 1999, denied the
supplemental pleading on the ground that the Deed of Absolute Sale is a new
matter which was never mentioned in the original answer dated July 2, 1991,
prepared by Bertuldo’s original counsel and which Bertuldo verified; and that
such new document is deemed waived in the light of Section 1, Rule 917 of the
Rules of Court. The trial court also noted that no formal substitution of the
parties was made because of the failure of defendant’s counsel to give the
names and addresses of the legal representatives of Bertuldo, so much so
that the supposed heirs of Bertuldo are not specified in any pleading in the
case. 18
On July 14, 1999, petitioners manifested that the trial court having expunged
the complaint and nullified all court proceedings, there is no valid case and
the complaint should not be admitted for failure to pay the correct docket
fees; that there should be no case to be reinstated and no case to proceed as
there is no complaint filed.19
After the submission of private respondents’ opposition20 and petitioners’
rejoinder,21 the trial court issued the second assailed Order on August 13,
1999, essentially denying petitioners’ manifestation/rejoinder. The trial court
held that the issues raised in such manifestation/rejoinder are practically the
same as those raised in the amended motion to expunge which had already
been passed upon in the Order dated January 21, 1999. Moreover, the trial
court observed that the Order dated March 22, 1999 which reinstated the
case was not objected to by petitioners within the reglementary period or
even thereafter via a motion for reconsideration despite receipt thereof on
March 26, 1999.22
On August 25, 1999, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration23 but the
same was denied by the trial court in its third assailed Order dated October
15, 1999. The trial court held that the Manchester rule was relaxed in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion.24 Noting that there has been no
substitution of parties following the death of Bertuldo, the trial court directed
Atty. Petalcorin to comply with the provisions of Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. The trial court also reiterated that the Order dated March 22,
1999 reinstating the case was not assailed by petitioners within the
reglementary period, despite receipt thereof on March 26, 1999.25
On November 19, 1999, Atty. Petalcorin complied with the directive of the
trial court to submit the names and addresses of the heirs of Bertuldo.26
On November 24, 1999, petitioners filed before us the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition.27 They allege that the public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be reinstated
after private respondents paid the docket fee deficiency since the trial court
had earlier expunged the complaint from the record and nullified all
proceedings of the case and such ruling was not contested by the private
respondents. Moreover, they argue that the public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be filed and denying the
manifestation with motion to dismiss, despite the defect in the complaint
which prayed for damages without specifying the amounts, in violation of SC
Circular No. 7, dated March 24, 1988.
In their Comment, private respondents aver that no grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the trial court in reinstating the complaint upon the
payment of deficiency docket fees because petitioners did not object thereto
within the reglementary period. Besides, Atty. Petalcorin possessed no legal
personality to appear as counsel for the heirs of Bertuldo until he complies
with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.28
At the outset, we note the procedural error committed by petitioners in
directly filing the instant petition before this Court for it violates the
established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum.29 As we stated in People vs. Cuaresma:30
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It
is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of
Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-
crowding of the Court’s docket.31
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the
precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some
instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.32
Thus, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ
of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Exceptional
and compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases:
(a) Chavez vs. Romulo33 on citizens’ right to bear arms; (b) Government of the
United States of America vs. Purganan34 on bail in extradition proceedings;
(c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla35 on government contract
involving modernization and computerization of voters’ registration list;
(d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora36 on status and existence of a public
office; and (e) Fortich vs. Corona37 on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of
the Office of the President which modified the approval of the conversion to
agro-industrial area.
In this case, no special and important reason or exceptional and compelling
circumstance analogous to any of the above cases has been adduced by the
petitioners so as to justify direct recourse to this Court. The present petition
should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of
the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for
the dismissal of the petition at bar.
In any event, even if the Court disregards such procedural flaw, the
petitioners’ contentions on the substantive aspect of the case fail to invite
judgment in their favor.
The unavailability of the writ of certiorari and prohibition in this case is borne
out of the fact that petitioners principally assail the Order dated March 22,
1999 which they never sought reconsideration of, in due time, despite receipt
thereof on March 26, 1999. Instead, petitioners went through the motion of
filing a supplemental pleading and only when the latter was denied, or after
more than three months have passed, did they raise the issue that the
complaint should not have been reinstated in the first place because the trial
court had no jurisdiction to do so, having already ruled that the complaint
shall be expunged.
After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief
in their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents,
petitioners are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial
court’s jurisdiction.38 If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot
thereafter challenge the court’s jurisdiction in the same case.39 To rule
otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is
against the policy of the Court.40
Nevertheless, there is a need to correct the erroneous impression of the trial
court as well as the private respondents that petitioners are barred from
assailing the Order dated March 22, 1999 which reinstated the case because
it was not objected to within the reglementary period or even thereafter via
a motion for reconsideration despite receipt thereof on March 26, 1999.
It must be clarified that the said order is but a resolution on an incidental
matter which does not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the
proceedings.41 It is an interlocutory order since there leaves something else
to be done by the trial court with respect to the merits of the case.42 As such,
it is not subject to a reglementary period. Reglementary period refers to the
period set by the rules for appeal or further review of a final judgment or
order, i.e., one that ends the litigation in the trial court.
Moreover, the remedy against an interlocutory order is generally not to
resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and,
when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner
authorized by law.43 Only when the court issued such order without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed
interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an
appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order.44Such special
circumstances are absolutely wanting in the present case.
Time and again, the Court has held that the Manchester rule has been
modified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) vs. Asuncion45 which defined the
following guidelines involving the payment of docket fees:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fees within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing
fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or
if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional
requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party
involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such
payment.46 Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the
plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government,
the Manchester rule does not apply.47
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the reinstatement of the
complaint was just and proper considering that the cause of action of private
respondents, being a real action, prescribes in thirty years,48 and private
respondents did not really intend to evade the payment of the prescribed
docket fee but simply contend that they could not be faulted for inadequate
assessment because the clerk of court made no notice of demand or Moreover, no formal substitution of the parties was effected within thirty
reassessment.49 They were in good faith and simply relied on the assessment days from date of death of Bertuldo, as required by Section 16, Rule 353 of the
of the clerk of court. Rules of Court. Needless to stress, the purpose behind the rule on
substitution is the protection of the right of every party to due process. It is
Furthermore, the fact that private respondents prayed for payment of
to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented
damages "in amounts justified by the evidence" does not call for the dismissal
in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his
of the complaint for violation of SC Circular No. 7, dated March 24, 1988
estate.54 Non-compliance with the rule on substitution would render the
which required that all complaints must specify the amount of damages
proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquires
sought not only in the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer in order to
no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on
be accepted and admitted for filing. Sun Insurance effectively modified SC
whom the trial and the judgment would be binding.55 Thus, proper
Circular No. 7 by providing that filing fees for damages and awards that
substitution of heirs must be effected for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction
cannot be estimated constitute liens on the awards finally granted by the trial
over their persons and to obviate any future claim by any heir that he was not
court.50
apprised of the litigation against Bertuldo or that he did not authorize Atty.
Thus, while the docket fees were based only on the real property valuation, Petalcorin to represent him.
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the action, and judgment awards
The list of names and addresses of the heirs was submitted sixteen months
which were left for determination by the court or as may be proven during
after the death of Bertuldo and only when the trial court directed Atty.
trial would still be subject to additional filing fees which shall constitute a lien
Petalcorin to comply with the provisions of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
on the judgment. It would then be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court of
Court. Strictly speaking therefore, before said compliance, Atty. Petalcorin
the trial court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
had no standing in the court a quo when he filed his pleadings. Be that as it
and collect the additional fees.51
may, the matter has been duly corrected by the Order of the trial court dated
It is worth noting that when Bertuldo filed his Answer on July 2, 1991, he did October 15, 1999.
not raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of correct docket
To be sure, certiorari under Rule 6556 is a remedy narrow in scope and
fees. Instead, he based his defense on a claim of ownership and participated
inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop.57 It
in the proceedings before the trial court. It was only in September 22, 1998
offers only a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior
or more than seven years after filing the answer, and under the auspices of a
tribunal within its jurisdiction.58 It can be invoked only for an error of
new counsel, that the issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in the
jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was issued by the court,
motion to expunge by Bertuldo’s heirs.
officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
After Bertuldo vigorously participated in all stages of the case before the trial grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
court and even invoked the trial court’s authority in order to ask for jurisdiction,59 not to be used for any other purpose,60 such as to cure errors in
affirmative relief, petitioners, considering that they merely stepped into the proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact.61 A contrary
shoes of their predecessor, are effectively barred by estoppel from rule would lead to confusion, and seriously hamper the administration of
challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction. Although the issue of jurisdiction may justice.
be raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it
Petitioners utterly failed to show that the trial court gravely abused its
is nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on ground of
discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. On the contrary, it acted
laches or estoppel.52
prudently, in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
RAMOS vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural
guardians of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS and
RON RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO
HOSAKA and DRA. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration
to the health and welfare of their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this
precept, he is made accountable for his acts. A mistake, through gross
negligence or incompetence or plain human error, may spell the difference
between life and death. In this sense, the doctor plays God on his patient's
fate. 1
In the case at bar, the Court is called upon to rule whether a surgeon, an
anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate
comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. 2
Petitioners seek the reversal of the decision 3 of the Court of Appeals, dated
29 May 1995, which overturned the decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court,
dated 30 January 1992, finding private respondents liable for damages arising
from negligence in the performance of their professional duties towards
petitioner Erlinda Ramos resulting in her comatose condition.
The antecedent facts as summarized by the trial court are reproduced
hereunder:
Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon of June 17, 1985, a 47-year
old (Exh. "A") robust woman (TSN, October 19, 1989, p. 10). Except for
occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the
presence of a stone in her gall bladder (TSN, January 13, 1988, pp. 4-5), she
was as normal as any other woman. Married to Rogelio E. Ramos, an
executive of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, she has three
children whose names are Rommel Ramos, Roy Roderick Ramos and Ron
Raymond Ramos (TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 5-6).
Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways, she
sought professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation for the
removal of a stone in her gall bladder (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 5). She
underwent a series of examinations which included blood and urine tests
(Exhs. "A" and "C") which indicated she was fit for surgery.
Through the intercession of a mutual friend, Dr. Buenviaje (TSN, January 13,
1988, p. 7), she and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Orlino
Hozaka (should be Hosaka; see TSN, February 20, 1990, p. 3), one of the
defendants in this case, on June 10, 1985. They agreed that their date at the
operating table at the DLSMC (another defendant), would be on June 17,
1985 at 9:00 A.M.. Dr. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a
"cholecystectomy" operation after examining the documents (findings from
the Capitol Medical Center, FEU Hospital and DLSMC) presented to him.
Rogelio E. Ramos, however, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good
anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn, assured Rogelio that he will get a good
anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00, which was to
include the anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after the
operation (TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 14-15, 22-23, 31-33; TSN, February 27,
1990, p. 13; and TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 3-4, 10, 17).
A day before the scheduled date of operation, she was admitted at one of the
rooms of the DLSMC, located along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City (TSN,
October 19,1989, p. 11).
At around 7:30 A.M. of June 17, 1985 and while still in her room, she was
prepared for the operation by the hospital staff. Her sister-in-law, Herminda
Cruz, who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical
Center, was also there for moral support. She reiterated her previous request
for Herminda to be with her even during the operation. After praying, she
was given injections. Her hands were held by Herminda as they went down
from her room to the operating room (TSN, January 13, 1988, pp. 9-11). Her
husband, Rogelio, was also with her (TSN, October 19, 1989, p. 18). At the
operating room, Herminda saw about two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta
Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to administer anesthesia. Although
not a member of the hospital staff, Herminda introduced herself as Dean of
the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center who was to provide
moral support to the patient, to them. Herminda was allowed to stay inside
the operating room.
At around 9:30 A.M., Dr. Gutierrez reached a nearby phone to look for Dr.
Hosaka who was not yet in (TSN, January 13, 1988, pp. 11-12). Dr. Gutierrez
thereafter informed Herminda Cruz about the prospect of a delay in the
arrival of Dr. Hosaka. Herminda then went back to the patient who asked,
"Mindy, wala pa ba ang Doctor"? The former replied, "Huwag kang mag-
alaala, darating na iyon" (Ibid.).
Thereafter, Herminda went out of the operating room and informed the
patient's husband, Rogelio, that the doctor was not yet around (id., p. 13).
When she returned to the operating room, the patient told her, "Mindy, inip
na inip na ako, ikuha mo ako ng ibang Doctor." So, she went out again and
told Rogelio about what the patient said (id., p. 15). Thereafter, she returned
to the operating room.
At around 10:00 A.M., Rogelio E. Ramos was "already dying [and] waiting for
the arrival of the doctor" even as he did his best to find somebody who will
allow him to pull out his wife from the operating room (TSN, October 19,
1989, pp. 19-20). He also thought of the feeling of his wife, who was inside
the operating room waiting for the doctor to arrive (ibid.). At almost 12:00
noon, he met Dr. Garcia who remarked that he (Dr. Garcia) was also tired of
waiting for Dr. Hosaka to arrive (id., p. 21). While talking to Dr. Garcia at
around 12:10 P.M., he came to know that Dr. Hosaka arrived as a nurse
remarked, "Nandiyan na si Dr. Hosaka, dumating na raw." Upon hearing those
words, he went down to the lobby and waited for the operation to be
completed (id., pp. 16, 29-30).
At about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who was inside the operating room with
the patient, heard somebody say that "Dr. Hosaka is already here." She then
saw people inside the operating room "moving, doing this and that, [and]
preparing the patient for the operation" (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 16). As she
held the hand of Erlinda Ramos, she then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the
hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, "ang hirap ma-
intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan" (id., p. 17).
Because of the remarks of Dra. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what
Dr. Gutierrez was doing. She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the
nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka
approached her. She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to
call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist (id., p. 19). After Dr. Calderon
arrived at the operating room, she saw this anesthesiologist trying to intubate
the patient. The patient's nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed
in a trendelenburg position — a position where the head of the patient is
placed in a position lower than her feet which is an indication that there is a
decrease of blood supply to the patient's brain (Id., pp. 19-20). Immediately
thereafter, she went out of the operating room, and she told Rogelio E.
Ramos "that something wrong was . . . happening" (Ibid.). Dr. Calderon was
then able to intubate the patient (TSN, July 25, 1991, p. 9).
Meanwhile, Rogelio, who was outside the operating room, saw a respiratory
machine being rushed towards the door of the operating room. He also saw
several doctors rushing towards the operating room. When informed by
Herminda Cruz that something wrong was happening, he told her (Herminda)
to be back with the patient inside the operating room (TSN, October 19, 1989,
pp. 25-28).
Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw that the patient was still in
trendelenburg position (TSN, January 13, 1988, p. 20). At almost 3:00 P.M. of
that fateful day, she saw the patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
About two days thereafter, Rogelio E. Ramos was able to talk to Dr. Hosaka.
The latter informed the former that something went wrong during the
intubation. Reacting to what was told to him, Rogelio reminded the doctor
that the condition of his wife would not have happened, had he (Dr. Hosaka)
looked for a good anesthesiologist (TSN, October 19, 1989, p. 31).
Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by the hospital to explain what
happened to the patient. The doctors explained that the patient had
bronchospasm (TSN, November 15, 1990, pp. 26-27).
Erlinda Ramos stayed at the ICU for a month. About four months thereafter
or on November 15, 1985, the patient was released from the hospital.
During the whole period of her confinement, she incurred hospital bills
amounting to P93,542.25 which is the subject of a promissory note and
affidavit of undertaking executed by Rogelio E. Ramos in favor of DLSMC.
Since that fateful afternoon of June 17, 1985, she has been in a comatose
condition. She cannot do anything. She cannot move any part of her body.
She cannot see or hear. She is living on mechanical means. She suffered brain
damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five
minutes (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 21-22). After being discharged from the
hospital, she has been staying in their residence, still needing constant
medical attention, with her husband Rogelio incurring a monthly expense
ranging from P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 (TSN, October 19, 1989, pp. 32-34). She
was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal
damage" (Exh. "G"; see also TSN, December 21, 1989,
p. 6). 5
Thus, on 8 January 1986, petitioners filed a civil case 6 for damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein private respondents
alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos.
During the trial, both parties presented evidence as to the possible cause of
Erlinda's injury. Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz
and Dr. Mariano Gavino to prove that the sustained by Erlinda was due to lack
of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by
private respondents during the anesthesia phase. On the other hand, private
respondents primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Eduardo Jamora,
a pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda's
allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).
After considering the evidence from both sides, the Regional Trial Court
rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, to wit:
After evaluating the evidence as shown in the finding of facts set forth earlier,
and applying the aforecited provisions of law and jurisprudence to the case
at bar, this Court finds and so holds that defendants are liable to plaintiffs for
damages. The defendants were guilty of, at the very least, negligence in the
performance of their duty to plaintiff-patient Erlinda Ramos.
On the part of Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, this Court finds that she omitted to
exercise reasonable care in not only intubating the patient, but also in not
repeating the administration of atropine (TSN, August 20, 1991, pp. 5-10),
without due regard to the fact that the patient was inside the operating room
for almost three (3) hours. For after she committed a mistake in intubating
[the] patient, the patient's nailbed became bluish and the patient, thereafter,
was placed in trendelenburg position, because of the decrease of blood
supply to the patient's brain. The evidence further shows that the hapless
patient suffered brain damage because of the absence of oxygen in her
(patient's) brain for approximately four to five minutes which, in turn, caused
the patient to become comatose.
On the part of Dr. Orlino Hosaka, this Court finds that he is liable for the acts
of Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez whom he had chosen to administer anesthesia on
the patient as part of his obligation to provide the patient a good
anesthesiologist', and for arriving for the scheduled operation almost three
(3) hours late.
On the part of DLSMC (the hospital), this Court finds that it is liable for the
acts of negligence of the doctors in their "practice of medicine" in the
operating room. Moreover, the hospital is liable for failing through its
responsible officials, to cancel the scheduled operation after Dr. Hosaka
inexcusably failed to arrive on time.
In having held thus, this Court rejects the defense raised by defendants that
they have acted with due care and prudence in rendering medical services to
plaintiff-patient. For if the patient was properly intubated as claimed by
them, the patient would not have become comatose. And, the fact that
another anesthesiologist was called to try to intubate the patient after her
(the patient's) nailbed turned bluish, belie their claim. Furthermore, the
defendants should have rescheduled the operation to a later date. This, they
should have done, if defendants acted with due care and prudence as the
patient's case was an elective, not an emergency case.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants. Accordingly, the latter are ordered
to pay, jointly and severally, the former the following sums of money, to wit:
1) the sum of P8,000.00 as actual monthly expenses for the plaintiff Erlinda
Ramos reckoned from November 15, 1985 or in the total sum of P632,000.00
as of April 15, 1992, subject to its being updated;
2) the sum of P100,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees;
3) the sum of P800,000.00 by way of moral damages and the further sum of
P200,000,00 by way of exemplary damages; and,
4) the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 7
Private respondents seasonably interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court rendered a Decision, dated 29 May 1995, reversing the
findings of the trial court. The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate
court reads:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing premises the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED, and the complaint below against the appellants is hereby ordered
DISMISSED. The counterclaim of appellant De Los Santos Medical Center is
GRANTED but only insofar as appellees are hereby ordered to pay the unpaid
hospital bills amounting to P93,542.25, plus legal interest for justice must be
tempered with mercy.
SO ORDERED. 8
The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on 9 June 1995 by
petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was mistakenly addressed as "Atty. Rogelio
Ramos." No copy of the decision, however, was sent nor received by the
Coronel Law Office, then counsel on record of petitioners. Rogelio referred
the decision of the appellate court to a new lawyer, Atty. Ligsay, only on 20
June 1995, or four (4) days before the expiration of the reglementary period
for filing a motion for reconsideration. On the same day, Atty. Ligsay, filed
with the appellate court a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration was submitted on 4 July
1995. However, the appellate court denied the motion for extension of time
in its Resolution dated 25 July 1995. 9Meanwhile, petitioners engaged the
services of another counsel, Atty. Sillano, to replace Atty. Ligsay. Atty. Sillano
filed on 7 August 1995 a motion to admit the motion for reconsideration
contending that the period to file the appropriate pleading on the assailed
decision had not yet commenced to run as the Division Clerk of Court of the
Court of Appeals had not yet served a copy thereof to the counsel on record.
Despite this explanation, the appellate court still denied the motion to admit
the motion for reconsideration of petitioners in its Resolution, dated 29
March 1996, primarily on the ground that the fifteen-day (15) period for filing
a motion for reconsideration had already expired, to wit:
We said in our Resolution on July 25, 1995, that the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration cannot be extended; precisely, the Motion for Extension
(Rollo, p. 12) was denied. It is, on the other hand, admitted in the latter
Motion that plaintiffs/appellees received a copy of the decision as early as
June 9, 1995. Computation wise, the period to file a Motion for
Reconsideration expired on June 24. The Motion for Reconsideration, in turn,
was received by the Court of Appeals already on July 4, necessarily, the 15-
day period already passed. For that alone, the latter should be denied.
Even assuming admissibility of the Motion for the Reconsideration, but after
considering the Comment/Opposition, the former, for lack of merit, is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 10
A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty. Sillano on 11 April 1996.
The next day, or on 12 April 1996, Atty. Sillano filed before this Court a motion
for extension of time to file the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
The Court granted the motion for extension of time and gave petitioners
additional thirty (30) days after the expiration of the fifteen-day (15) period
counted from the receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals within
which to submit the petition. The due date fell on 27 May 1996. The petition
was filed on 9 May 1996, well within the extended period given by the Court.
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the following
grounds:
I
IN PUTTING MUCH RELIANCE ON THE TESTIMONIES OF RESPONDENTS DRA.
GUTIERREZ, DRA. CALDERON AND DR. JAMORA;
II
IN FINDING THAT THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS DID NOT CAUSE
THE UNFORTUNATE COMATOSE CONDITION OF PETITIONER ERLINDA
RAMOS;
III
IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 11
Before we discuss the merits of the case, we shall first dispose of the
procedural issue on the timeliness of the petition in relation to the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners with the Court of Appeals. In their
Comment, 12 private respondents contend that the petition should not be
given due course since the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners on
the decision of the Court of Appeals was validly dismissed by the appellate
court for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. We do not agree.
A careful review of the records reveals that the reason behind the delay in
filing the motion for reconsideration is attributable to the fact that the
decision of the Court of Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of
petitioners, the Coronel Law Office. In fact, a copy of the decision of the
appellate court was instead sent to and received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos
on 9 June 1995 wherein he was mistakenly addressed as Atty. Rogelio Ramos.
Based on the other communications received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos,
the appellate court apparently mistook him for the counsel on record. Thus,
no copy of the decision of the counsel on record. Petitioner, not being a
lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period for filing a motion for
reconsideration, referred the same to a legal counsel only on 20 June 1995.
It is elementary that when a party is represented by counsel, all notices
should be sent to the party's lawyer at his given address. With a few
exceptions, notice to a litigant without notice to his counsel on record is no
notice at all. In the present case, since a copy of the decision of the appellate
court was not sent to the counsel on record of petitioner, there can be no
sufficient notice to speak of. Hence, the delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration cannot be taken against petitioner. Moreover, since the
Court of Appeals already issued a second Resolution, dated 29 March 1996,
which superseded the earlier resolution issued on 25 July 1995, and denied
the motion for reconsideration of petitioner, we believed that the receipt of
the former should be considered in determining the timeliness of the filing of
the present petition. Based on this, the petition before us was submitted on
time.
After resolving the foregoing procedural issue, we shall now look into the
merits of the case. For a more logical presentation of the discussion we shall
first consider the issue on the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquiturto the instant case. Thereafter, the first two assigned errors shall be
tackled in relation to the res ipsa loquiturdoctrine.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the
rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence,
or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation. 13 Where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of
care. 14
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that,
as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain
types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of
some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. 15 It is
grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis
of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from
the mere occurrence of the accident itself. 16 Hence, res ipsa loquitur is
applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive
law and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate
ground of liability. 17 Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the
nature of a procedural rule. 18 It is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere
procedural of convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a
plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. 19 In other
words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense
with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process
of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the
accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine,
creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on
the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. 20 Still, before
resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be
satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated. 21
In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the "control of
instrumentality" which caused the damage. 22Such element of control must
be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. In order to have the
benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage, must
show a situation where it is applicable, and must establish that the essential
elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident. 23
Medical malpractice 24 cases do not escape the application of this doctrine.
Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant
upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference
of negligence as the cause of that harm. 25 The application of res ipsa
loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a
judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does,
as a matter of law, permit a given inference. 26
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice
suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated
from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is
dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of
negligence. 27 The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert
testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical
science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of
mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the
facts. 28 Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are
competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated
upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the
statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and
manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-
expert witnesses. 29 Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable,
the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of
injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court
from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of
care. 30 Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting
injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised,
an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily
required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. 31 When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is
prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the
injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant
without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard
of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way,
under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress
for injury suffered by him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following
situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an
operation, 32 injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not
under, or in the area, of treatment, 33 removal of the wrong part of the body
when another part was intended, 34 knocking out a tooth while a patient's jaw
was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, 35 and loss of an eye while
the patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following
an operation for appendicitis, 36 among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been
measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical
negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to
show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not
a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously
applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally
restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as
a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of
professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due
care had been
exercised. 37 A distinction must be made between the failure to secure
results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily
found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of
those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or
surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific
treatment. 38 The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain
why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific
treatment did not produce the desired result. 39 Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not
available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of
an operation or treatment was not accomplished. 40The real question,
therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary
incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which
is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such
operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the
average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward
consequence. 41 If there was such extraneous interventions, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain
the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could. 42
We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. As will
hereinafter be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior
to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application
of res ipsa loquitur.
A case strikingly similar to the one before us is Voss vs. Bridwell, 43 where the
Kansas Supreme Court in applying the res ipsa loquitur stated:
The plaintiff herein submitted himself for a mastoid operation and delivered
his person over to the care, custody and control of his physician who had
complete and exclusive control over him, but the operation was never
performed. At the time of submission he was neurologically sound and
physically fit in mind and body, but he suffered irreparable damage and injury
rendering him decerebrate and totally incapacitated. The injury was one
which does not ordinarily occur in the process of a mastoid operation or in
the absence of negligence in the administration of an anesthetic, and in the
use and employment of an endoctracheal tube. Ordinarily a person being put
under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a consequence of
administering such anesthesia in the absence of negligence. Upon these facts
and under these circumstances a layman would be able to say, as a matter of
common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional
treatment were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had
been exercised.
Here the plaintiff could not have been guilty of contributory negligence
because he was under the influence of anesthetics and unconscious, and the
circumstances are such that the true explanation of event is more accessible
to the defendants than to the plaintiff for they had the exclusive control of
the instrumentalities of anesthesia.
Upon all the facts, conditions and circumstances alleged in Count II it is held
that a cause of action is stated under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 44
Indeed, the principles enunciated in the aforequoted case apply with equal
force here. In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy
and expected a routine general surgery to be performed on her gall bladder.
On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and
control of private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control
over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and,
except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and
body. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the
performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her
brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room
already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage,
which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the
process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not in
the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia
and in the use of endotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under
anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering
such anesthesia if the proper procedure was followed. Furthermore, the
instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the
endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private
respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda
could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under
the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.
Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is
injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the
immediate and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a practical
administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. Upon
these facts and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say, as
a matter of common knowledge and observation, if negligence attended the
management and care of the patient. Moreover, the liability of the physicians
and the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to
secure the desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the
diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever
performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon all these initial determination a case is
made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Nonetheless, in holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case
we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where
injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to any and all anesthesia
cases. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to
be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage.
Having in mind the applicability of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and the
presumption of negligence allowed therein, the Court now comes to the issue
of whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that private respondents
were not negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the
operation and, if in the affirmative, whether the alleged negligence was the
proximate cause of Erlinda's comatose condition. Corollary thereto, we shall
also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the testimonies of
the witnesses for the private respondents.
In sustaining the position of private respondents, the Court of Appeals relied
on the testimonies of Dra. Gutierrez, Dra. Calderon and Dr. Jamora. In giving
weight to the testimony of Dra. Gutierrez, the Court of Appeals rationalized
that she was candid enough to admit that she experienced some difficulty in
the endotracheal intubation 45 of the patient and thus, cannot be said to be
covering her negligence with falsehood. The appellate court likewise opined
that private respondents were able to show that the brain damage sustained
by Erlinda was not caused by the alleged faulty intubation but was due to the
allergic reaction of the patient to the drug Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal), a
short-acting barbiturate, as testified on by their expert witness, Dr. Jamora.
On the other hand, the appellate court rejected the testimony of Dean
Herminda Cruz offered in favor of petitioners that the cause of the brain
injury was traceable to the wrongful insertion of the tube since the latter,
being a nurse, was allegedly not knowledgeable in the process of intubation.
In so holding, the appellate court returned a verdict in favor of respondents
physicians and hospital and absolved them of any liability towards Erlinda and
her family.
We disagree with the findings of the Court of Appeals. We hold that private
respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their
part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of
her piteous condition.
In the instant case, the records are helpful in furnishing not only the logical
scientific evidence of the pathogenesis of the injury but also in providing the
Court the legal nexus upon which liability is based. As will be shown
hereinafter, private respondents' own testimonies which are reflected in the
transcript of stenographic notes are replete of signposts indicative of their
negligence in the care and management of Erlinda.
With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, we find her negligent in the care of Erlinda
during the anesthesia phase. As borne by the records, respondent Dra.
Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. This fact was attested to by
Prof. Herminda Cruz, Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing
and petitioner's sister-in-law, who was in the operating room right beside the
patient when the tragic event occurred. Witness Cruz testified to this effect:
ATTY. PAJARES:
Q: In particular, what did Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez do, if any on the patient?
A: In particular, I could see that she was intubating the patient.
Q: Do you know what happened to that intubation process administered by
Dra. Gutierrez?
ATTY. ALCERA:
She will be incompetent Your Honor.
COURT: A: When Dr. Calderon try (sic) to intubate the patient, after a while the
patient's nailbed became bluish and I saw the patient was placed in
Witness may answer if she knows.
trendelenburg position.
A: As have said, I was with the patient, I was beside the stretcher holding the
xxx xxx xxx
left hand of the patient and all of a sudden heard some remarks coming from
Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez herself. She was saying "Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, Q: Do you know the reason why the patient was placed in that trendelenburg
mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan. position?

xxx xxx xxx A: As far as I know, when a patient is in that position, there is a decrease of
blood supply to the brain. 46
ATTY. PAJARES:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: From whom did you hear those words "lumalaki ang tiyan"?
The appellate court, however, disbelieved Dean Cruz's testimony in the trial
A: From Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez.
court by declaring that:
xxx xxx xxx
A perusal of the standard nursing curriculum in our country will show that
Q: After hearing the phrase "lumalaki ang tiyan," what did you notice on the intubation is not taught as part of nursing procedures and techniques.
person of the patient? Indeed, we take judicial notice of the fact that nurses do not, and cannot,
intubate. Even on the assumption that she is fully capable of determining
A: I notice (sic) some bluish discoloration on the nailbeds of the left hand whether or not a patient is properly intubated, witness Herminda Cruz,
where I was at. admittedly, did not peep into the throat of the patient. (TSN, July 25, 1991, p.
Q: Where was Dr. Orlino Ho[s]aka then at that particular time? 13). More importantly, there is no evidence that she ever auscultated the
patient or that she conducted any type of examination to check if the
A: I saw him approaching the patient during that time. endotracheal tube was in its proper place, and to determine the condition of
Q: When he approached the patient, what did he do, if any? the heart, lungs, and other organs. Thus, witness Cruz's categorical
statements that appellant Dra. Gutierrez failed to intubate the appellee
A: He made an order to call on the anesthesiologist in the person of Dr. Erlinda Ramos and that it was Dra. Calderon who succeeded in doing so
Calderon. clearly suffer from lack of sufficient factual bases. 47
Q: Did Dr. Calderon, upon being called, arrive inside the operating room? In other words, what the Court of Appeals is trying to impress is that being a
nurse, and considered a layman in the process of intubation, witness Cruz is
A: Yes sir.
not competent to testify on whether or not the intubation was a success.
Q: What did [s]he do, if any?
We do not agree with the above reasoning of the appellate court. Although
A: [S]he tried to intubate the patient. witness Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can very well testify upon matters
on which she is capable of observing such as, the statements and acts of the
Q: What happened to the patient?
physician and surgeon, external appearances, and manifest conditions which
are observable by any one. 48 This is precisely allowed under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur where the testimony of expert witnesses is not required.
It is the accepted rule that expert testimony is not necessary for the proof of
negligence in non-technical matters or those of which an ordinary person may
be expected to have knowledge, or where the lack of skill or want of care is
so obvious as to render expert testimony unnecessary. 49 We take judicial
notice of the fact that anesthesia procedures have become so common, that
even an ordinary person can tell if it was administered properly. As such, it
would not be too difficult to tell if the tube was properly inserted. This kind
of observation, we believe, does not require a medical degree to be
acceptable.
At any rate, without doubt, petitioner's witness, an experienced clinical nurse
whose long experience and scholarship led to her appointment as Dean of
the Capitol Medical Center School at Nursing, was fully capable of
determining whether or not the intubation was a success. She had extensive
clinical experience starting as a staff nurse in Chicago, Illinois; staff nurse and
clinical instructor in a teaching hospital, the FEU-NRMF; Dean of the Laguna
College of Nursing in San Pablo City; and then Dean of the Capitol Medical
Center School of Nursing. 50Reviewing witness Cruz' statements, we find that
the same were delivered in a straightforward manner, with the kind of detail,
clarity, consistency and spontaneity which would have been difficult to
fabricate. With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied that
she was able to demonstrate through her testimony what truly transpired on
that fateful day.
Most of all, her testimony was affirmed by no less than respondent Dra.
Gutierrez who admitted that she experienced difficulty in inserting the tube
into Erlinda's trachea, to wit:
ATTY. LIGSAY:
Q: In this particular case, Doctora, while you were intubating at your first
attempt (sic), you did not immediately see the trachea?
DRA. GUTIERREZ:
A: Yes sir.
Q: Did you pull away the tube immediately?
A: You do not pull the . . .
Q: Did you or did you not?
A: I did not pull the tube.
Q: When you said "mahirap yata ito," what were you referring to?
A: "Mahirap yata itong i-intubate," that was the patient.
Q: So, you found some difficulty in inserting the tube?
A: Yes, because of (sic) my first attempt, I did not see right away. 51
Curiously in the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez made the haphazard
defense that she encountered hardship in the insertion of the tube in the
trachea of Erlinda because it was positioned more anteriorly (slightly deviated
from the normal anatomy of a person) 52 making it harder to locate and, since
Erlinda is obese and has a short neck and protruding teeth, it made intubation
even more difficult.
The argument does not convince us. If this was indeed observed, private
respondents adduced no evidence demonstrating that they proceeded to
make a thorough assessment of Erlinda's airway, prior to the induction of
anesthesia, even if this would mean postponing the procedure. From their
testimonies, it appears that the observation was made only as an
afterthought, as a means of defense.
The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of
anesthesia is universally observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic
accidents. Pre-operative evaluation and preparation for anesthesia begins
when the anesthesiologist reviews the patient's medical records and visits
with the patient, traditionally, the day before elective surgery. 53 It includes
taking the patient's medical history, review of current drug therapy, physical
examination and interpretation of laboratory data. 54 The physical
examination performed by the anesthesiologist is directed primarily toward
the central nervous system, cardiovascular system, lungs and upper
airway. 55 A thorough analysis of the patient's airway normally involves
investigating the following: cervical spine mobility, temporomandibular
mobility, prominent central incisors, diseased or artificial teeth, ability to
visualize uvula and the thyromental distance. 56Thus, physical characteristics
of the patient's upper airway that could make tracheal intubation difficult
should be studied. 57 Where the need arises, as when initial assessment
indicates possible problems (such as the alleged short neck and protruding
teeth of Erlinda) a thorough examination of the patient's airway would go a
long way towards decreasing patient morbidity and mortality.
In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda
for the first time on the day of the operation itself, on 17 June 1985. Before
this date, no prior consultations with, or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda
was done by her. Until the day of the operation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez
was unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. She was
likewise not properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face
during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent Dra.
Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the
scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional
negligence and professional irresponsibility. The measures cautioning
prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the
physician's centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to follow this medical
procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence.
Respondent Dra. Gutierrez, however, attempts to gloss over this omission by
playing around with the trial court's ignorance of clinical procedure, hoping
that she could get away with it. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez tried to muddle
the difference between an elective surgery and an emergency surgery just so
her failure to perform the required pre-operative evaluation would escape
unnoticed. In her testimony she asserted:
ATTY. LIGSAY:
Q: Would you agree, Doctor, that it is good medical practice to see the patient
a day before so you can introduce yourself to establish good doctor-patient
relationship and gain the trust and confidence of the patient?
DRA. GUTIERREZ:
A: As I said in my previous statement, it depends on the operative procedure
of the anesthesiologist and in my case, with elective cases and normal cardio-
pulmonary clearance like that, I usually don't do it except on emergency and
on cases that have an abnormalities (sic). 58
However, the exact opposite is true. In an emergency procedure, there is
hardly enough time available for the fastidious demands of pre-operative
procedure so that an anesthesiologist is able to see the patient only a few
minutes before surgery, if at all. Elective procedures, on the other hand, are
operative procedures that can wait for days, weeks or even months. Hence,
in these cases, the anesthesiologist possesses the luxury of time to be at the
patient's beside to do a proper interview and clinical evaluation. There is
ample time to explain the method of anesthesia, the drugs to be used, and
their possible hazards for purposes of informed consent. Usually, the pre-
operative assessment is conducted at least one day before the intended
surgery, when the patient is relaxed and cooperative.
Erlinda's case was elective and this was known to respondent Dra. Gutierrez.
Thus, she had all the time to make a thorough evaluation of Erlinda's case
prior to the operation and prepare her for anesthesia. However, she never
saw the patient at the bedside. She herself admitted that she had seen
petitioner only in the operating room, and only on the actual date of the
cholecystectomy. She negligently failed to take advantage of this important
opportunity. As such, her attempt to exculpate herself must fail.
Having established that respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to perform pre-
operative evaluation of the patient which, in turn, resulted to a wrongful
intubation, we now determine if the faulty intubation is truly the proximate
cause of Erlinda's comatose condition.
Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia
which led to Erlinda's coma was due to bronchospasm 59 mediated by her
allergic response to the drug, Thiopental Sodium, introduced into her system.
Towards this end, they presented Dr. Jamora, a Fellow of the Philippine
College of Physicians and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty Board of
Internal Medicine, who advanced private respondents' theory that the
oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy, 60 was due to an
unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate. We find the
theory of private respondents unacceptable.
First of all, Dr. Jamora cannot be considered an authority in the field of
anesthesiology simply because he is not an anesthesiologist. Since Dr. Jamora
is a pulmonologist, he could not have been capable of properly enlightening
the court about anesthesia practice and procedure and their complications.
Dr. Jamora is likewise not an allergologist and could not therefore properly
advance expert opinion on allergic-mediated processes. Moreover, he is not
a pharmacologist and, as such, could not have been capable, as an expert
would, of explaining to the court the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the
supposed culprit, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).
The inappropriateness and absurdity of accepting Dr. Jamora's testimony as
an expert witness in the anesthetic practice of Pentothal administration is
further supported by his own admission that he formulated his opinions on
the drug not from the practical experience gained by a specialist or expert in
the administration and use of Sodium Pentothal on patients, but only from
reading certain references, to wit:
ATTY. LIGSAY:
Q: In your line of expertise on pulmonology, did you have any occasion to use
pentothal as a method of management?
DR. JAMORA:
A: We do it in conjunction with the anesthesiologist when they have to
intubate our patient.
Q: But not in particular when you practice pulmonology?
A: No.
Q: In other words, your knowledge about pentothal is based only on what you
have read from books and not by your own personal application of the
medicine pentothal?
A: Based on my personal experience also on pentothal.
Q: How many times have you used pentothal?
A: They used it on me. I went into bronchospasm during my appendectomy.
Q: And because they have used it on you and on account of your own personal
experience you feel that you can testify on pentothal here with medical
authority?
A: No. That is why I used references to support my claims. 61
An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm
properly falls within the fields of anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and
clinical pharmacology. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the
field of neurology. While admittedly, many bronchospastic-mediated
pulmonary diseases are within the expertise of pulmonary medicine, Dr.
Jamora's field, the anesthetic drug-induced, allergic mediated bronchospasm
alleged in this case is within the disciplines of anesthesiology, allergology and
pharmacology. On the basis of the foregoing transcript, in which the
pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with
medical authority, it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to
Dr. Jamora's testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental
Sodium.
The provision in the rules of evidence 62 regarding expert witnesses states:
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown
to possess, may be received in evidence.
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special
knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by
the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical
experience. 63Clearly, Dr. Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based
on the above standard since he lacks the necessary knowledge, skill, and
training in the field of anesthesiology. Oddly, apart from submitting
testimony from a specialist in the wrong field, private respondents'
intentionally avoided providing testimony by competent and independent
experts in the proper areas.
Moreover, private respondents' theory, that Thiopental Sodium may have
produced Erlinda's coma by triggering an allergic mediated response, has no
support in evidence. No evidence of stridor, skin reactions, or wheezing —
some of the more common accompanying signs of an allergic reaction —
appears on record. No laboratory data were ever presented to the court.
In any case, private respondents themselves admit that Thiopental induced,
allergic-mediated bronchospasm happens only very rarely. If courts were to
accept private respondents' hypothesis without supporting medical proof,
and against the weight of available evidence, then every anesthetic accident
would be an act of God. Evidently, the Thiopental-allergy theory vigorously
asserted by private respondents was a mere afterthought. Such an
explanation was advanced in order to advanced in order to absolve them of
any and all responsibility for the patient's condition.
In view of the evidence at hand, we are inclined to believe petitioners' stand
that it was the faulty intubation which was the proximate cause of Erlinda's
comatose condition.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. 64 An injury or damage is
proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in
bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury
or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence
of the act or omission. 65 It is the dominant, moving or producing cause.
Applying the above definition in relation to the evidence at hand, faulty
intubation is undeniably the proximate cause which triggered the chain of
events leading to Erlinda's brain damage and, ultimately, her comatosed
condition.
Private respondents themselves admitted in their testimony that the first
intubation was a failure. This fact was likewise observed by witness Cruz when
she heard respondent Dra. Gutierrez remarked, "Ang hirap ma-intubate nito,
mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan." Thereafter, witness Cruz
noticed abdominal distention on the body of Erlinda. The development of
abdominal distention, together with respiratory embarrassment indicates
that the endotracheal tube entered the esophagus instead of the respiratory
tree. In other words, instead of the intended endotracheal intubation what
actually took place was an esophageal intubation. During intubation, such
distention indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through the
esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus
would certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube
which carries oxygen is in the wrong place. That abdominal distention had
been observed during the first intubation suggests that the length of time
utilized in inserting the endotracheal tube (up to the time the tube was
withdrawn for the second attempt) was fairly significant. Due to the delay in
the delivery of oxygen in her lungs Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis. 66 As
stated in the testimony of Dr. Hosaka, the lack of oxygen became apparent
only after he noticed that the nailbeds of Erlinda were already
blue. 67 However, private respondents contend that a second intubation was
executed on Erlinda and this one was successfully done. We do not think so.
No evidence exists on record, beyond private respondents' bare claims, which
supports the contention that the second intubation was successful. Assuming
that the endotracheal tube finally found its way into the proper orifice of the
trachea, the same gave no guarantee of oxygen delivery, the hallmark of a
successful intubation. In fact, cyanosis was again observed immediately after
the second intubation. Proceeding from this event (cyanosis), it could not be
claimed, as private respondents insist, that the second intubation was
accomplished. Even granting that the tube was successfully inserted during
the second attempt, it was obviously too late. As aptly explained by the trial
court, Erlinda already suffered brain damage as a result of the inadequate
oxygenation of her brain for about four to five minutes. 68
The above conclusion is not without basis. Scientific studies point out that
intubation problems are responsible for one-third (1/3) of deaths and serious
injuries associated with anesthesia. 69 Nevertheless, ninety-eight percent
(98%) or the vast majority of difficult intubations may be anticipated by
performing a thorough evaluation of the patient's airway prior to the
operation. 70 As stated beforehand, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to
observe the proper pre-operative protocol which could have prevented this
unfortunate incident. Had appropriate diligence and reasonable care been
used in the pre-operative evaluation, respondent physician could have been
much more prepared to meet the contingency brought about by the
perceived anatomic variations in the patient's neck and oral area, defects
which would have been easily overcome by a prior knowledge of those
variations together with a change in technique. 71 In other words, an
experienced anesthesiologist, adequately alerted by a thorough pre-
operative evaluation, would have had little difficulty going around the short
neck and protruding teeth. 72 Having failed to observe common medical
standards in pre-operative management and intubation, respondent Dra.
Gutierrez' negligence resulted in cerebral anoxia and eventual coma of
Erlinda.
We now determine the responsibility of respondent Dr. Orlino Hosaka as the
head of the surgical team. As the so-called "captain of the ship," 73 it is the
surgeon's responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task
in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in
his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the "captain" of the operative
team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia
protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr.
Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient.
Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had
scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as
Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the
latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was
remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal
responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.
We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in this particular incident.
The unique practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with
attending and visiting "consultants," 74 who are allegedly not hospital
employees, presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence
in medical malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is only more apparent
than real.
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing
of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises.
Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots, visiting or attending, are required
to submit proof of completion of residency, their educational qualifications;
generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate),
evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references. These requirements are
carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review
committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the
application. 75 This is particularly true with respondent hospital.
After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending consultant, he
is normally required to attend clinico-pathological conferences, conduct
bedside rounds for clerks, interns and residents, moderate grand rounds and
patient audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the privilege
of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or for the privilege of
admitting patients into the hospital. In addition to these, the physician's
performance as a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee
on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients,
nurses, interns and residents. A consultant remiss in his duties, or a
consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to
the hospital or its peer review committee, is normally politely terminated.
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their
attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not,
technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying
all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test
is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the
purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending
and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now arises as to
whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent
doctors for petitioner's condition. 76
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of
its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a
person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others
based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria
potestas. 77 Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned
prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent damage. 78 In other words, while the burden of proving negligence
rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the
respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that
they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and
supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the
degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to
offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby
failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having
failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible
with its physicians for Erlinda's condition.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in accepting
and relying on the testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents.
Indeed, as shown by the above discussions, private respondents were unable
to rebut the presumption of negligence. Upon these disquisitions we hold
that private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article
2176 79 of the Civil Code.
We now come to the amount of damages due petitioners. The trial court
awarded a total of P632,000.00 pesos (should be P616,000.00) in
compensatory damages to the plaintiff, "subject to its being updated"
covering the period from 15 November 1985 up to 15 April 1992, based on
monthly expenses for the care of the patient estimated at P8,000.00.
At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount established by the trial court at
the time of its decision would be grossly inadequate to cover the actual costs
of home-based care for a comatose individual. The calculated amount was
not even arrived at by looking at the actual cost of proper hospice care for
the patient. What it reflected were the actual expenses incurred and proved
by the petitioners after they were forced to bring home the patient to avoid
mounting hospital bills.
And yet ideally, a comatose patient should remain in a hospital or be
transferred to a hospice specializing in the care of the chronically ill for the
purpose of providing a proper milieu adequate to meet minimum standards
of care. In the instant case for instance, Erlinda has to be constantly turned
from side to side to prevent bedsores and hypostatic pneumonia. Feeding is
done by nasogastric tube. Food preparation should be normally made by a
dietitian to provide her with the correct daily caloric requirements and
vitamin supplements. Furthermore, she has to be seen on a regular basis by
a physical therapist to avoid muscle atrophy, and by a pulmonary therapist to
prevent the accumulation of secretions which can lead to respiratory
complications.
Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages recoverable in
suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost
of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to
undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. However, the provisions of the Civil
Code on actual or compensatory damages present us with some difficulties.
Well-settled is the rule that actual damages which may be claimed by the
plaintiff are those suffered by him as he has duly proved. The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2199. — Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he
has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.
Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the
time of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence
has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these
provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where
the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications
directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict.
In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are
to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one
which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of
trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but
which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty. 80 In
other words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual
or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided
for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
As it would not be equitable — and certainly not in the best interests of the
administration of justice — for the victim in such cases to constantly come
before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the
compensatory damages previously awarded — temperate damages are
appropriate. The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain
extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care.
In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing
care for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a
decade. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the
amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now
much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for
temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their
loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should
not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home
without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly
inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in
temperate damages would therefore be reasonable. 81
In Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 82 this Court was confronted with a
situation where the injury suffered by the plaintiff would have led to
expenses which were difficult to estimate because while they would have
been a direct result of the injury (amputation), and were certain to be
incurred by the plaintiff, they were likely to arise only in the future. We
awarded P1,000,000.00 in moral damages in that case.
Describing the nature of the injury, the Court therein stated:
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent a traumatic
amputation of her left lower extremity at the distal left thigh just above the
knee. Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the full
ambulatory functions of her left extremity, even with the use of state of the
art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the period of hospitalization (which
was paid for by Li), she will be required to undergo adjustments in her
prosthetic devise due to the shrinkage of the stump from the process of
healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and months of
physical and occupational rehabilitation and therapy. During the lifetime, the
prosthetic devise will have to be replaced and readjusted to changes in the
size of her lower limb effected by the biological changes of middle-age,
menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches menopause, for example, the
prosthetic will have to be adjusted to respond to the changes in bone
resulting from a precipitate decrease in calcium levels observed in the bones
of all post-menopausal women. In other words, the damage done to her
would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently
changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would
normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and
adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational
therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
xxx xxx xxx
A prosthetic devise, however technologically advanced, will only allow a
reasonable amount of functional restoration of the motor functions of the
lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The resultant anxiety,
sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and physical pain are
inestimable. 83
The injury suffered by Erlinda as a consequence of private respondents'
negligence is certainly much more serious than the amputation in the
Valenzuela case.
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred.
She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now. The burden of
care has so far been heroically shouldered by her husband and children, who,
in the intervening years have been deprived of the love of a wife and a
mother.
Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of
petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify. Even the temperate
damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner's condition
remains unchanged for the next ten years.
We recognized, in Valenzuela that a discussion of the victim's actual injury
would not even scratch the surface of the resulting moral damage because it
would be highly speculative to estimate the amount of emotional and moral
pain, psychological damage and injury suffered by the victim or those actually
affected by the victim's condition. 84 The husband and the children, all
petitioners in this case, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the
patient's illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have
fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their
long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. They,
not the respondents, are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of
the victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real
one. For the foregoing reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages
would be appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00
are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we
are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise
proper.

Our courts face unique difficulty in adjudicating medical negligence cases

because physicians are not insurers of life and, they rarely set out to
intentionally cause injury or death to their patients. However, intent is
immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence exists and is
proven, the same automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the
damage caused.

Established medical procedures and practices, though in constant flux are

devised for the purpose of preventing complications. A physician's experience
with his patients would sometimes tempt him to deviate from established
community practices, and he may end a distinguished career using
unorthodox methods without incident. However, when failure to follow
established procedure results in the evil precisely sought to be averted by
observance of the procedure and a nexus is made between the deviation and
the injury or damage, the physician would necessarily be called to account for
it. In the case at bar, the failure to observe pre-operative assessment protocol
which would have influenced the intubation in a salutary way was fatal to
private respondents' case.

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed

from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily
against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual
damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a
monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos
expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3)
P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary
damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. vs EMMA MONDEJAR
G.R. No. 200804 January 22, 2014
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN
MONDEJAR, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse1 to the Court from the Decision2 dated November 23,
2011and Order3 dated February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City, Branch 45 (RTC) in RTC Case No. 11-13833 which dismissed, on
the ground of improper remedy, petitioner A.L. Ang Network, Inc.'s
(petitioner) petition for certiorari from the Decision4 dated June 10, 2011 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City, Branch 4 (MTCC) in Civil
Case No. SCC-1436, a small claims case for sum of money against respondent
Emma Mondejar (respondent).
The Facts
On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint5 for sum of money under the
Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases6 before the MTCC, seeking to collect
from respondent the amount of ₱23,111.71 which represented her unpaid
water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.7
Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect
payment therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of
whom is respondent who owns and occupies Lot 8, Block 3 of said subdivision.
From June 1, 2002 until September 30, 2005, respondent and her family
consumed a total of 1,150 cubic meters (cu. m.) of water, which upon
application of the agreed rate of ₱113.00 for every 10 cu. m. of water, plus
an additional charge of ₱11.60 for every additional cu. m. of water, amounted
to ₱28,580.09.8 However, respondent only paid the amount of ₱5,468.38,
thus, leaving a balance of ₱23,111.71 which was left unpaid despite
petitioner’s repeated demands.9
In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003,
she religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of ₱75.00 for her
water consumption. Notwithstanding their agreement that the same would
be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner unilaterally
charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments (at the average of 40
cu. m. of water per month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the average
daily water consumption for a household of only 3 persons. She also
questioned the propriety and/or basis of the aforesaid ₱23,111.71 claim.10
In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for not paying
the adjusted water charges since March 2003 up to August 2005.11
The MTCC Ruling
On June 10, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision12 holding that since
petitioner was issued a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC)13 by the
National Water Resources Board (NWRB) only on August 7, 2003, then, it can
only charge respondent the agreed flat rate of ₱75.00 per month prior
thereto or the sum of ₱1,050.00 for the period June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003.
Thus, given that respondent had made total payments equivalent to
₱1,685.99 for the same period, she should be considered to have fully paid
petitioner.14
The MTCC disregarded petitioner’s reliance on the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board’s (HLURB) Decision15dated August 17, 2000 in HLURB Case
No. REM C6-00-001 entitled Nollie B. Apura, et al. v. Dona Carmen I
Subdivision, et al., as source of its authority to impose new water
consumption rates for water consumed from June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003
in the absence of proof (a) that petitioner complied with the directive to
inform the HLURB of the result of its consultation with the concerned
homeowners as regards the rates to be charged, and (b) that the HLURB
approved of the same.16
Moreover, the MTCC noted that petitioner failed to submit evidence showing
(a) the exact date when it actually began imposing the NWRB approved rates;
and (b) that the parties had a formal agreement containing the terms and
conditions thereof, without which it cannot establish with certainty
respondent’s obligation.17 Accordingly, it ruled that the earlier agreed rate of
₱75.00 per month should still be the basis for respondent’s water
consumption charges for the period August 8, 2003 to September 30,
2005.18 Based on petitioner’s computation, respondent had only paid
₱300.00 of her ₱1,500.00 obligation for said period. Thus, it ordered
respondent to pay petitioner the balance thereof, equivalent to ₱1,200.00
with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of receipt of the
extrajudicial demand on October 14, 2010 until fully paid.19
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari20 under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the MTCC in finding that it (petitioner) failed to establish with certainty
respondent’s obligation, and in not ordering the latter to pay the full amount
sought to be collected.
The RTC Ruling
On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision21 dismissing the petition
for certiorari, finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the
non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided under Section 2322of
the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that
it cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision directing
respondent to pay petitioner a bigger sum than that which has been awarded.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration23 but was denied in an Order24 dated
February 16, 2012, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing
petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on
the same day, based on the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC).
The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court
docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-
stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party
may, thus, immediately move for its execution.25 Nevertheless, the
proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings
where appeal is not an available remedy,26 does not preclude the aggrieved
party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
This general rule has been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific
Assurance Corporation,27 wherein it was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary
writ of certiorari is always available where there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Jaca v.
Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:
x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special
civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law," this rule is not
without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not
constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy
or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the
mere absence – of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice
without the writ that usually determines the propriety of certiorari.
This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:
Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies
under the Rules is an absence of an appeal nor any "plain, speedy and
adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of law, one which has been so
defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and
sufficient not merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring
about a revival of the judgment x x x complained of in the certiorari
proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or
tribunal" concerned. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTC’s apprehension that
respondent’s recourse before it (was only filed to circumvent the non-
appealable nature of [small claims cases], because it asks [the court] to WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 23,
supplant the decision of the lower [c]ourt with another decision directing the 2011 and Resolution dated February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
private respondent to pay the petitioner a bigger sum than what has been Bacolod City, Branch 45 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC Case No. 11-13833
awarded."28 Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original is hereby REINSTATED and the court a quo is ordered to resolve the same with
action29 designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. dispatch.
Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish
SO ORDERED.
that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could
either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not
the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or
arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy.30

In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed
of the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the
subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling.

Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the
proper forum (i.e., the RTC).1âwphi1 To be sure, the Court, the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari.31Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a
party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul
of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial
hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against
first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before
the Court.32 This procedure is also in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.33

Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,34 certiorari
petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding
Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its
petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has
jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said
petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC
Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper
disposition.
EDUARDO J. MARIÑO, JR. ET AL. vs GIL GAMILLA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 132400 January 31, 2005
EDUARDO J. MARIÑO, JR., MA. MELVYN P. ALAMIS and UST FACULTY
UNION, petitioners,
vs.
GIL GAMILLA, DUPONT ASERON and JUSTINO CARDENAS, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43701,2 setting aside the order and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the lower court.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in May 1986, the UST Faculty Union (USTFU) entered into an initial
collective bargaining agreement with the University of Santo Tomas (UST)
wherein UST undertook to provide USTFU with a free office space at Room
302 of its Health Center Building.3
On 21 September 1996, the officers and directors of USTFU scheduled a
general membership meeting on 5 October 1996 for the election of the union
officers. However, respondent Gamilla and some faculty members filed
a Petition4 with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) seeking to stop the holding of the USTFU election.5
Meanwhile, on 2 October 1996, Rev. Fr. Rodel Aligan, O.P., Secretary General
of the UST, issued a Memorandum to the Deans, Regents, Principals and
Heads of Departments regarding the holding of a faculty convocation on 4
October 1996.6
On 4 October 1996, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001, enjoining the
holding of the election of the USTFU officers and directors. However, denying
the TRO they themselves sought, Gamilla and some of the faculty members
present in the 4 October 1996 faculty convocation proceeded with the
election of the USTFU officers. On the other hand, the scheduled election for
5 October 1996 did not push through by virtue of the TRO.7
In the succeeding week, on 11 October 1996, petitioners filed with the DOLE
a petition for prohibition, injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order,8 seeking to invalidate the election held on
4 October 1996.
Two months later, on 4 December 1996, UST and USTFU, represented by
Gamilla and his co-officers, entered into a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) for a period of five (5) years from 1 June 1996 up to 31 May 2001. The
CBA was ratified on 12 December 1996.9
In another front, the Med-Arbiter issued a TRO dated 11 December 1996,
enjoining Gamilla and his fellow officers to "cease and desist from performing
any and all acts pertaining to the duties and functions of the officers and
directors" of USTFU.10
On 27 January 1997, at around eleven in the morning (11:00 a.m.),
respondents Gamilla, Cardenas and Aseron, with some other persons, served
a letter of even date on petitioners Mariño and Alamis, demanding that the
latter vacate the premises located at Room 302, Health Center Building,
UST—the Office of USTFU. However, only the office messenger was in the
office at the time. After coercing the office messenger to step out of the
office, Gamilla and company padlocked the door leading to the union’s
office.11
On 5 February 1997, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila a Complaint12 for injunction and damages with a prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order over the use of the
USTFU office.
At the 11 February 1997 hearing on the application for TRO before the trial
court, respondents through a consolidated motion to dismiss sought the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of forum-shopping and prayed that
the trial court suspend the application for injunctive relief until it shall have
resolved the motion to dismiss.13l^vvphi1.net
On the same date, Med-Arbiter Falconitin rendered a decision,14 declaring
the 4 October 1996 election and its results null and void ab initio. The decision
was appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations which affirmed the
same.15 Respondents brought the matter to this Court via a special civil action
for certiorari.16 The Court promulgated its decision,17 dismissing the petition
on 16 November 1999.
On 3 March 1997, the RTC issued the assailed order,18 to wit:
WHEREFORE, upon plaintiff’s filing a bond in the amount of ₱50,000.00, let a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issue requiring defendants their
representatives and agents or other persons acting in their behalf to remove
the padlocks on the door of the UST Faculty Union office located at Room
302, Health Center Bldg., UST, España, Manila and to refrain from
preventing/disturbing in any manner whatsoever the plaintiffs in entering the
said premises.
In the meantime, defendants are hereby ordered to submit their answer to
the complaint within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof.
On 5 March 1997, after petitioners as plaintiffs therein had posted the
requisite bond, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.19
On 19 March 1997, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari20 before the
Court of Appeals, claiming that the orders dated 3 and 5 March 1997 were
void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction and on the ground that they were issued
in violation of due process of law.21 The Court of Appeals stated that the basic
issue of the case was whether the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Civil Case No. 97-81928.22 It agreed with respondents’
disquisition that petitioners’ cause of action in the complaint before the trial
court is inextricably linked and intertwined with the issue of who are the
legitimate officers of the USTFU, which issue was then being litigated before
the DOLE. The appellate court held that Civil Case No. 97-81928 and Case No.
NCR-OD-M-9610-016 appear to be the same, with the observation that the
civil case merely "grew out" from the labor case. It also cited the prohibition
against the issuance of injunction in any case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute, unless otherwise provided by law.23 It added that it would have
been more appropriate for the RTC to determine whether it had jurisdiction
over the subject case before issuing the assailed orders.24 The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED—and
the assailed order (dated March 3, 1997) and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction (dated March 5, 1997) SET ASIDE—and the respondent
judge ordered to DISMISS Civil Case No. 97-81928.
SO ORDERED.25 (Emphasis in the original.)
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration26 was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assert that the RTC has jurisdiction to decide Civil Case No. 97-
81928, as the determination of the legality and propriety of padlocking the
doors of the USTFU office and preventing the free and unhampered ingress
to and egress from the said premises, as alleged in the complaint, are matters
incapable of pecuniary estimation.27Moreover, they claim that the civil case
was premised on causes of action belonging to the USTFU which are to be
resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statutes.
They stress that the causes of action involve a tortious act and the
corresponding claim for damages that are both governed by the civil law and
fall under the jurisdiction of regular courts.28
Petitioners add that not all controversies involving members of the same
union are to be decided by the labor tribunal. They add that in the instant
case, the pendency of the labor case should not militate against the civil case
they filed since the criminal and civil aspects of a violation of Article 241 of
the Labor Code29 can be litigated separately and independently from the
administrative aspect of a breach of the rights and conditions of
membership.30
Anent the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the writ of injunction issued by
the trial court, petitioners state that Art. 254 of the Labor Code31 on
prohibition against injunctions is not applicable to the instant case since the
controversy cannot be categorized as a labor dispute. They argue that the
injunction was called for considering that they "have rights to be protected
and preserved," which however, "were violated, invaded and trampled upon"
by respondents through the acts complained of.32
Petitioners claim that respondents were not denied their day in court when
the trial court did not resolve the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding with
the hearing on the application for injunctive order. According to them,
respondents were given the chance to present their evidence in support of
their opposition to the injunction and TRO, but respondents chose not to avail
of this opportunity.33
Lastly, they add that respondents Gamilla, Cardenas and Aseron had no right
to act for and in behalf of the USTFU for the following reasons, to wit:
Gamilla’s claim to the USTFU presidency was declared non-existent by the
labor tribunals; Cardenas was the chief of the security force in the university
and not a faculty member; and, Aseron was a Barangay Chairman and not a
member of the UST faculty.34 Thus, petitioners claim that USTFU was
improperly included as petitioner in the petition35 before the Court of
Appeals.
Accordingly, petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred and gravely
abused its discretion when:
I. It ruled that the regional trial court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
97-81928;
II. It ruled that Civil Case No. 97-81928 is a labor dispute cognizable by the
DOLE;
III. It granted the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 43701, set aside the
orders issued by the trial court, and ordered the dismissal of the civil case;
IV. It ruled that Art. 254 of the Labor Code is applicable to the matters
involved in Civil Case No. 97-81928;
V. It ruled that respondents were denied their day in court; and
VI. It ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 43701
was pro-forma.36
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the regional trial court had no
jurisdiction over the issue as to who has the right to use the union office
because the same is inextricably linked and intertwined with the issue as to
who are the legitimate and duly elected officers of the USTFU, which was then
the subject of another case before the DOLE.37 Furthermore, respondents
insist that the trial court violated their right to due process when it refused to
determine the issue of jurisdiction before issuing its assailed
orders.38 Respondents submit that the only issue in the instant petition is
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 97-81928.39
There is merit in the petition but only in part.
Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint40 and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein.41
Central to the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is its adoption of
respondents’ argument that the issue in Civil Case No. 97-81928 is
"inextricably linked and intertwined with the issue as to who are the lawful
officers of the USTFU," which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Labor; and that "the use of the union office is a mere incident of
the labor dispute." 42 Specifically, the Court of Appeals held:
. . . .The two cases (Civil Case No. 97-81928 and Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-
016) appear the same. While ostensibly, the complaint filed with the trial
court was branded ‘injunction and damages’, the action challenged the
legitimacy of petitioners’ election as officers of the UST Faculty Union, with
the plaintiff therein (respondent herein) seeking to enjoin them (petitioners
herein) from claiming and acting as such (elected officers of the union) and
to have the election proceedings of October 4, 1996 invalidated and declared
null and void. Taking note of plaintiffs’ (private respondents’) previous moves
before the Department of Labor, Civil Case No. 97-81928 appear (sic) to have
grown out therefrom—hence, said case clearly falls outside of the
competence of the trial court.43
Another reason that militates against the trial court’s assumption of
jurisdiction over the case is Article 254 of the Labor Code that states:
Art. 254. Injunction prohibited.—No temporary or permanent injunction or
restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall
be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise provided in
Articles 218 and 264 of this Code.441awphi1.nét
As pointed out by petitioners, the Court of Appeals erroneously categorized
the instant matter as a labor dispute. Such labor dispute includes any
controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee.45 Jurisdiction over labor disputes, including claims for actual, complaint a quo, and ultimately precluding the union from serving its
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer- members.
employee relations is vested in Labor Arbiters and the National Labor
Fundamentally, the civil case a quo seeks two reliefs¾one is for the removal
Relations Commission (NLRC).46
of the padlocks on the office door and restraining respondents from blocking
On the other hand, an intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and petitioners’ access to the premises, while the other is for the recovery of
among union members. It encompasses all disputes or grievances arising moral and exemplary damages.
from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution
Prior to the institution of the civil case, petitioners filed before the Med-
and by-laws of a union, not excepting cases arising from chartering or
Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR a petition for prohibition, injunction with a
affiliation of labor organizations or from any violation of the rights and
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against
conditions of union membership provided for in the Labor Code.47 In contrast,
herein respondents for the latter’s assumption of office as elected USTFU
an inter-union dispute refers to any conflict between and among legitimate
officers. Specifically, they prayed that respondents be enjoined from claiming
labor organizations involving questions of representation for purposes of
to be the duly elected officers of the union and from performing acts for and
collective bargaining; it includes all other conflicts which legitimate labor
in behalf of the union.
organizations may have against each other based on any violations of their
rights as labor organizations.48 Like labor disputes, jurisdiction over intra- The propriety of padlocking the union’s office, the relief sought by the
union and inter-union disputes does not pertain to the regular courts. It is petitioner in the civil case, is interwoven with the issue of legitimacy of the
vested in the Bureau of Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the assumption of office by the respondents in light of the violation of the union’s
Department of Labor. constitution and by-laws, which was then pending before the Med-Arbiter.
Necessarily, therefore, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case insofar
Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-016 entitled "Eduardo J. Mariño, Jr., et al. v. Gil
as the prayer for the removal of the padlocks and the issuance of an injunctive
Gamilla, et al." before the BLR is neither a labor nor an inter-union dispute. It
writ is concerned.
is clearly an intra-union dispute.
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction, once acquired, continues until the case is
The case before the trial court, Civil Case No. 97-81928 entitled Eduardo J.
finally terminated.50 The petition with the Med-Arbiter was filed ahead of the
Mariño, Jr. et al. v. Gil Gamilla, et al.,49on the other hand, is a simple case for
complaint in the civil case before the RTC. As such, when the petitioners filed
damages, with an accompanying application for injunction. The complaint
their complaint a quo, jurisdiction over the injunction and restraining order
essentially bears the following allegations: that despite an outstanding
prayed for had already been lodged with the Med-Arbiter. The removal of
temporary restraining order prohibiting the holding of an election of officers,
padlocks and the access to the office premises is necessarily included in
respondent Gamilla and others proceeded to hold a purported election; that
petitioners’ prayer to enjoin respondents from performing acts pertaining to
there was a case pending before the DOLE questioning the validity of the
union officers and on behalf of the union. In observance of the principle of
supposed election; and, that respondent Gamilla with two other persons
adherence of jurisdiction, it is clear that the RTC should not have exercised
(later learned to be respondents Aseron and Cardenas) compelled the office
jurisdiction over the provisional reliefs prayed for in the complaint. A review
messenger to vacate the premises of the USTFU office, and thereafter
of the complaint shows that petitioners disclosed the existence of the petition
padlocked the room. Petitioners alleged respondents’ act of padlocking the
pending before the Med-Arbiter and even attached a copy thereof.51 The trial
office was without lawful basis, and had prevented them from entering the
court was also aware of the decision of the Med-Arbiter dated 11 February
office premises, thereby denying them access to personal effects, documents
1997, declaring the supposed union officers’ election void ab initio and
and records needed in the on-going cases both in the DOLE and in the
ordering respondents to cease and desist from discharging the duties and
functions of the legitimate officers of the USTFU. The trial court even
obtained a copy of the said decision two (2) days after its promulgation.52 Still,
it continued the hearing on the application for injunction and eventually
issued the assailed orders.
At this juncture, the Court notes that a key question in this case has already
been settled by the Court in its decision in UST Faculty Union, et al. v. Bitonio,
Jr., et al.53 In that case, it was ruled that the 04 October 1996 election was
void for having been conducted in violation of the union’s constitution and
by-laws. Nevertheless, the complaint a quo could not have validly proceeded
at the time of its filing of the said case due to petitioners’ lack of cause of
action.
As to the alleged inclusion of the USTFU as petitioner in the petition before
the Court of Appeals, suffice it to say that the right to use the union’s name
as well as to represent it has been settled by our decision in UST Faculty
Union, et al. v. Bitonio, Jr., et al. Petitioners, as the rightful officers of the
USTFU, and not respondents, have the right to represent USTFU in the
proceedings.
Let us go back to the claim for damages before the lower court. Art. 226 of
the Labor Code provides, thus:
The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the
regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive
authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both
parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes,
grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations
in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those
arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or
voluntary arbitration.
membership. The Court has consistently held that where no employer-
employee exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or any
collective bargaining agreement, it is the regional trial court that has
jurisdiction.551awphi1.nét
Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such, can
exercise only those powers which are specifically granted to them by their
enabling statutes. Consequently, matters over which they are not granted
authority are beyond their competence.56 While the trend is towards vesting
administrative bodies with the power to adjudicate matters coming under
their particular specialization, to ensure a more knowledgeable solution of
the problems submitted to them, this should not deprive the courts of justice
their power to decide ordinary cases in accordance with the general laws that
do not require any particular expertise or training to interpret and apply.57 In
their complaint in the civil case, petitioners do not seek any relief under the
Labor Code but the payment of a sum of money as damages on account of
respondents’ alleged tortuous conduct. The action is within the realm of civil
law and, hence, jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts.58
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals setting aside the Order dated 3 March 1997 and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction dated 5 March 1997 is hereby AFFIRMED.
The case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, unlike the NLRC which is explicitly vested with the jurisdiction over
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages,54 the BLR is
not specifically empowered to adjudicate claims of such nature arising from
intra-union or inter-union disputes. In fact, Art. 241 of the Labor Code ordains
the separate institution before the regular courts of criminal and civil
liabilities arising from violations of the rights and conditions of union
GABRIEL ABAD, ET AL. vs RTC OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-65505 October 12, 1987
GABRIEL ABAD, PIO AGANON, MARIO ALARCIO, JOSE AQUINO, CESAR
AURELIO, SOTERO BERNARDO, AURELIO CABRAL, JESUS CARREON,
ABELARDO CARILLO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH LII-HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN
and THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC., respondents.
PARAS, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari originated from a complaint by the
petitioners filed on August 18, 1978 against respondent Philippine American
General Insurance Company, Inc. (PHILAMGEN, for brevity) for the
enforcement of contract and recovery of loss of money basically praying for,
among other things, payment of the money value of the respective
accumulated sick leave with pay of the separated employees of respondent
company either thru retirement, retrenchment or resignation. Instead of
filing an answer thereto, PHILAMGEN moved to dismiss the complaint, which
the trial court granted in its order 1 dated February 16, 1979. After a denial
oil their motion to reconsider the aforesaid order by the trial court on May 2,
1979, petitioners filed before Us a petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 50563. A decision 2 was rendered by this Court promulgated on October
30, 1981, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent court, dated February 16, 1979
and May 2, 1979, are hereby set aside, the dismissed complaint is reinstated;
and said court is directed to conduct further proceedings for the disposition
of Civil Case No. 117708. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Unfortunately fire destroyed the sala wherein the entire records of Civil case
No. 117708 were kept. However, the records of the case were reconstituted
on January 21, 1982 and the case was renumbered as Civil Case No. 82-1324.
Thereafter, respondent Philamgen filed its Answer to the complaint. On
January, 1983, judicial reorganization took place by the passage of Executive
Order No. 864 and the case at bar was re-raffled to respondent Regional Trial
Court of Manila, which was presided over by Judge David G. Nitafan.
Respondent court motu proprio, dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 82-
1324. declaring that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject made being money
claims arising from employer-employee relations. Motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners was denied by respondent judge. Hence, this petition for
certiorari with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Respondent Court erred in reversing motu proprio this Honorable Supreme
Court's decision in G.R. No. L-50563 by dismissing once again petitioners'
action on the erroneous ground of lack of jurisdiction.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Respondent Court erred in holding itself a totally different court from the
Court of First Instance whose cases were merely taken over by Respondent
Court. (p. 25, Rollo)
By way of reference the entire record and decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-
50563 (108 SCRA 717) were incorporated by petitioners in their petition.
The pertinent portion of the assailed decision of the lower court reads as
follows:
Even before receiving the views of the parties, however, this Court has
decided to proceed with and resolve the issue of jurisdiction motu proprio,
for the same is so basic as to affect the validity and propriety of any and all
proceedings in this case.
1. It is the perception of this Court that the jurisdictional issue decided and
settled in G.R. No. 50563 cannot be considered as the law of the case insofar
as this proceeding now pends before this Court. What was there put to rest
was the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 864 provides that the Courts of First Instance
shall be deemed automatically abolished upon the constitution and
organization of the courts provided in Batasan Pambansa Big, 129 as of 12:00
o'clock midnight of January 17, 1983, which re-raffled a sentence in Section
44 of said Act.
With the abolition of the Court of First Instance-which was held in G.R. No.
50563 as having jurisdiction over the case, the jurisdiction of said court was
abolished with it. This is supported by the replied of Rep. Act No. 296 (defining
the jurisdiction of, among others, the Courts of First Instance) by Section 47
of BETA Blg. 129, and which law (Batas Blg. 129) in turn defining the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in its Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22.
2. The postulate that once jurisdiction is acquired by a court, the same lasts
until the termination of the case, notwithstanding changes in the law on
jurisdiction, does not apply to this case because it was the court itself which
acquired initial jurisdiction that was abolished so that there is no more court
to continue exercising such initially acquired jurisdiction.
3. Jurisdiction of this Court (the reorganized Regional Trial Court) must be
tested by the laws in force at the time the reorganization took place, and
when this case was re-raffled not at the time of the commencement of the
action because the courts then existing were all abolished upon the
reorganization.
What were the relevant laws on jurisdiction in force at the time of declaration
of judicial reorganization?
Of course, insofar as the reorganized courts vested with general jurisdiction,
Batasan Pambansa Blg. 129 was and still is the controlling law. When it comes
to labor-related actions, however, such as the one at bar, initial jurisdiction is
vested on "administrative machiner(ies)" provided "for the expeditious
settlement of labor or industrial disputes." (See Art. 211, P.D. 442), which are
the National Labor Relations Commissions and the Labor Arbiters, the
jurisdiction of the latter of which are defined as follows:
Art 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission — (a) The Labor
Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide within thirty (30) working days after subrogated of the case by the
parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:"
l. Unfair labor practice cases.
2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms
and conditions of employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or
underscored of wages, purchases compensation, separation pay and other
benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement. Except claims for
employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits;
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. Cases arising from any violation of article 265 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts.
(This article of the Labor Code was originally Article 216, of PD 442, but
subsequently reorganization to Art. 217, amended by PD 1691 which took
effect 1 May 1978, further amended by PD 1948. which took effect 1 May
1980, then further amended by BP Blg. 130 which took effect on 21 August
1981 and finally amended by BP Blg. 227 which took effect on 1 June 1982;
emphasis supplied.)
As last amended by BP Blg. 130 and 23,1981, the above provision was in force
on 17 January 1983 when the judicial reorganization took place.
"Note that BP Blg. 130, was considered by the Batasan Pambansa in the same
session when it enacted BP Blg. 129, the judicial reorganization act, so that
there could have been no doubt in the legislative mind at the time that
jurisdiction over labor-related claims was being initially vested, not to the
courts but to administrative machineries. Besides the underscored portions
of the above-quoted provisions of the Labor Code are clear and
comprehensive enough to include the claims embodied in the complaint in
this action. And what is most important is that the administrative jurisdiction
vested by the law upon the Labor Arbiters is "original and exclusive."
That it was the evident intention of the legislature to divest the courts of
general jurisdiction initial jurisdiction over cases such as that involved in this
action is further corroborated by Arts. 292, 293 and 294 of the Labor Code
which outline the procedure of "prosecuting all money claims accuring" both
during or prior to the effectivity of the Code.
More particularly, the second paragraph of Art. 293 of the Labor Code
provides —
"Pending the final determination of the merit of money claim filed with the
appropriate entrance/exit no civil action arising from the same cause of
action shall be filed with any court. ..."
We are not unmindful of the fact that G.R. No. 50563 was decided by the
highest Court on the basis of the provisions of Article 217 of the Labor Code,
as amended by BP 1367, which took effect on 1 May 1978, but as heretofore
indicated, subsequent amendments of the same provision took place. In said
decision in G.R. No. 50563, mention was made of the amendment brought
about by PD 1367 having been given retroactive application. Following this
rule of retrospective application, we can not see any reason why the
subsequent amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code, brought about by
PD 169 (1 May 1980), BP Blg. 130 (21 August 1981) and BP Blg. 227 (1 June
1982) may not also be applied to this action which was filed on 28 August
1978.
Neither is this Court unaware of the 10 February 1983 resolution of the Hon.
Supreme Court providing for administrative guidelines in the distribution of
cases relative to the implementation of BP Blg. 129, but said administrative
regulation cannot be interpreted to have the effect of modifying or
abrogating substantive provisions of laws on jurisdiction because by express
mandate of the Constitution rule making power of the Supreme Court is
limited to procedural rules mg which may not diminish, increase or modify
substantive laws. (Sec. 5[5], Art. X, Constitution).
This Court is not also unaware of that portion of Section 44 of BP Blg. 129
providing that cases pending in the abolished courts shall be transferred to
the appropriate courts created in the Act, but it is evident that the phrase
"appropriate courts" must have reference to those courts whose jurisdiction
are clearly defined in other parts of the law, otherwise a mere transitory
provision win serve to negate the primary and avowed purpose of the
judiciary reorganization act. But be that as it may, this provision has hardly
any application here because this case is being referred to an administrative
machinery ,which has better facilities of adjudicating the claim (MOLE is
furnishing with copies of CBA's) more expended as they are not hamstrung
by the strict rules of procedure and evidence.
In any event, even if limitations of actions are also provided in the Labor Code
(Art. 292 thereof), the pendency of this action before the then Court of Flight
Instance of Manila may be deemed to have suspended the period of
limitations if only to give meaning to the social justice spirit and orientation
of the Labor Code. (pp. 40-44, Rollo).
Based on such findings, the respondent court issued the following dispositive
portions:
WHEREFORE, without prejudice to plaintiff's pursuing their claims before the
appropriate administrative machineries in the Ministry of Labor &
Employment, the complaint in this case is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED. (p. 45, Rollo, emphasis supplied).
Petitioners' allegations do not deserve merit. One of the important features
in the Judiciary Reorganization effected through B.P. 129 is the addition of
paragraph (6), (P155,828.60). Sec. 19, in defining the jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts (which took the place of the abolished Courts of First Instance),
which reading as follows:
In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. (emphasis supplied).
A provision not found in Sec. 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. It was the
intention of the legislative body to uncluttered the courts of cases which may
be adjudicated, in the first instance, by officials or bodies exercising quasi-
judicial adjudicatory powers like the Labor Arbiters or the National Labor
Relations Commission a specialized body or bodies on labor related
provisions and are not restricted by the technical rules of pleading and
evidence.
The Regional Trial Courts of today are actually the same courts that
functioned as Courts of First Instance before the Judiciary Reorganization Act
(Batas Pambansa Bilang 129). There might have been a change in the name
and in some incidental features but essentially, they are the same.
However, whereas before jurisdiction over money claims of laborers and
employees appertained to Courts of First Instance, the same are now to be
taken cognizance of by proper entities in the Department of Labor and
Employment.

The rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is finally resolved or

adjudicated does not apply when the change in jurisdiction is curative in
character. Thus in the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that
Courts of First Instance /Regional Trial Courts no longer have jurisdiction over
aforesaid monetary claims of labor.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and the

ruling of the respondent court is hereby AFFIRMED. Let the parties file the
appropriate action before the proper administrative bodies in the
Department of Labor and Employment.

SO ORDERED.
ANGELA DELA ROSA ET AL. vs ORFELINA D. ROLDAN
G.R. No. 133882 September 5, 2006
ANGELA DELA ROSA and CORAZON MEDINA, petitioners,
vs.
ORFELINA D. ROLDAN, LORNA SAN DIEGO, FLORDELIZA D. CATACUTAN,
NORMA Y. LACUESTA, and ARSENIO DULAY, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 45560 affirming, on a petition for review, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac in Civil Case No. 8396,
which in turn reversed on appeal the decision of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac in Civil Case No. 6089 for unlawful detainer.
The Antecedents
The spouses Adriano Rivera and Aurora Mercado were the owners of two (2)
parcels of land located in Tarlac, Tarlac, both covered by respective titles; the
261-square-meter lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
7225, while the 772 sq. m. was covered by TCT No. 7226.
Sometime in 1957, the spouses Rivera executed a deed of sale2 over the
properties in favor of the spouses Arsenio Dulay and Asuncion dela Rosa.
Gideon dela Rosa, one of Asuncion's brothers, was one of the instrumental
witnesses in the deed. To pay for the property, the spouses Dulay, who were
members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), secured
a P9,500.00 loan and executed a real estate mortgage over the two lots as
security therefor. On September 16, 1957, the Register of Deeds issued TCT
Nos. 29040 and 29041 in the names of the spouses Dulay.
The spouses Dulay forthwith took possession of the lots, except a 500-square-
meter portion which was then occupied by Gideon dela Rosa and his wife
Angela and the portion where the house of Corazon Medina stood. The
spouses Dulay declared the property for taxation purposes in their names and
paid the realty taxes therefor.
Sometime in 1982, the spouses Dulay made demands on Gideon, Angela and
Corazon to vacate the premises, as their three daughters would be
constructing their respective houses thereon. Gideon, Angela and Corazon
refused to do so, prompting the spouses to file a complaint for recovery of
possession (accion publiciana) against them with the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. The spouses Dulay alleged, inter alia, that they
bought the lots from the spouses Rivera in 1957; defendants occupied a 370-
square-meter portion on the western side, and were claiming ownership over
one-half of the property, as shown by their letter to plaintiffs appended to
their complaint; and they needed the property so that their daughters, who
already had their respective families, could build houses thereon. The
spouses Dulay prayed that defendants be evicted from the property and be
required to pay reasonable compensation for their use of the premises.3 The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6261.
In their answer to the complaint, defendants alleged the following by way of
special and affirmative defenses: Gideon and his sister Asuncion contributed
equally to the purchase price of the property; plaintiffs secured a GSIS loan
of P9,500.00, out of which P6,500.00 was paid to the vendors; Gideon and
Asuncion verbally agreed that plaintiffs would be indicated as the sole
vendees in the deed of sale as they were the GSIS members; defendants had
already paid their share of the purchase price of the property as of 1978,
except for the amount of P332.00; and, insofar as the one-half portion on the
western side of the property was concerned, plaintiffs were trustees for
defendants, who likewise owned the same. Defendants interposed
counterclaims for damages and prayed that the said one-half portion be
reconveyed to them.4
During the trial, the spouses Dulay adduced in evidence the following: the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 16, 1957, with Gideon as an
instrumental witness;5 the tax declarations in their names covering the
property; and receipts of realty tax payments made over the property.6
Defendants spouses Dela Rosa adduced in evidence a small notebook
containing therein an alleged list of payments to the spouses Dulay of their
share in the purchase price of the property.7 They presented an NBI
Questioned Documents Expert to prove the authenticity of the signature of
Asuncion Dulay on one of the receipts.8However, Asuncion denied that she
bought the property with her brother Gideon, and that she received any
amount from him and his wife as part of the purchase price of the property.
She likewise denied that it was her signature that appeared on the purported
receipt.
On July 17, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 6261 in
favor of the spouses Dulay and ordered the spouses Dela Rosa and Corazon
Medina to vacate the property and turn over possession to plaintiffs.9The trial
court declared:
ANALYZING THE EVIDENCE, there is no doubt that the registered owners of
the lots in question are the plaintiffs-spouses Arsenio Dulay and Asuncion
dela Rosa (Exhibits "A" and "B"). They bought these lots from the spouses
Adriano Rivera and Aurora Mercado (Exhibits "D" and "D-1").
Defendants' claim that they bought from the plaintiffs one-half (1/2) portion
of the lots in question is untenable. Firstly, if it is true as claimed by them that
there was such an agreement to purchase from the plaintiffs a portion of the
lots in question, why did they not reduce [the] same in writing? In fact, it's
the defendants, particularly Gideon dela Rosa, who induced and
accompanied the plaintiffs to go to a Notary Public for the execution of
Exhibit "D." The amounts mentioned in Exhibit "5" does (sic) not clearly
indicate whether they were payments made for the purchase price in
installment or for monthly rentals for their occupation of Lot 3-B-2. The
defendants were the only ones who made entries; and a perusal of such
entries were not recorded in sequence of alleged monthly payment but
merely entries dictated and/or written at will.
Regarding Exhibit 6 and the alleged signature of plaintiff Asuncion dela Rosa,
the report (Exhibit "7," "7-A" and "7-B") and the testimony of the Chief NBI
handwriting expert when presented by the defendants themselves is very
emphatic. Thus:
"However, the question signature was signed over a typewritten carbon or
duplicate…."
What we mean by that, Sir, is that there is here a purported receipt with the
body typewritten underlining below the supposed signature Asuncion R.
Dulay, it is a little surprising because if a document is prepared in one
occasion, then the body should be in ribbon impression and the underlining
should be in ribbon. The supposed typewritten body above the signature is
an original ribbon impression, that is, it is direct from the typewritten with
the ribbon striking the sheet of paper, the underlining, however, on which
the signature is signed is a carbon impression, that means it is a duplicate
impression. (pp. 8-9, tsn., Oct. 30/85).10
The spouses Dela Rosa and Corazon Medina appealed to the CA. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 15455. On June 29, 1990, the appellate court
rendered judgment granting the appeal and reversed the trial court's ruling.
According to the appellate court, the complaint was premature on account of
plaintiffs' failure to allege, in their complaint, that there had been earnest
efforts to have the case amicably settled as mandated under Article 222 of
the New Civil Code.11
The spouses Dulay filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court which was granted. The motion was
recorded as UDK-10069. However, the spouses Dulay failed to file their
petition. Thus, on November 19, 1990, the Court resolved to declare final and
executory the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 15455 for failure of
plaintiffs-appellees to file their petition for review.12 The resolution of the
Court became final and executory.13
In the meantime, Gideon died. His wife Angela and Corazon Medina
continued residing in the property without paying any rentals therefor.
Asuncion Dulay passed away on June 26, 1995, survived by her husband
Arsenio and their children: Orfelina Roldan, Lorna San Diego, Flordeliza
Catacutan, and Norma Lacuesta.
In a letter dated October 2, 1995, Arsenio and his children, through counsel,
made demands on Corazon and Angela to vacate the property within 30 days
from receipt thereof, with a warning that failure to do so would impel them
to file the necessary legal action.14 Nevertheless, they suggested a conference
to discuss the amicable settlement of the matter. Corazon and Angela ignored
the letter. This prompted Arsenio and his children to file a complaint for
eviction against Angela and Corazon in the Office of the Barangay Captain.
The parties did not arrive at a settlement, and on December 1, 1995,
the Pangkat Secretary issued a certification to file action.15
On January 29, 1996, Arsenio and his children, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer against Corazon and Angela, as defendants, in the MTC
of Tarlac, Tarlac. Plaintiffs alleged the following:
3. Plaintiffs are the co-owners of two adjoining parcels of residential land
located at Tarlac, Tarlac, and more particularly described as follows:
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29040
"A parcel of land (Lot "B" of the subdivision plan Psd-2284, being a portion of
the land described on the original plan II-5215, G.L.R.O. Record No. 7962),
situated in the Barrio of San Roque, Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac.
Bounded on the N.E., by Lot "C" of the subdivision plan; on the S.E., by Lot
No. "3-B-2" of the subdivision plan and property of Concepcion Cider; on the
W., by property of Timotea Mercado; and on the N.W., by Lot "A" of the
subdivision plan, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-ONE (261)
SQUARE METERS, more or less."
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29041
"A parcel of land (Lot No. "3-B-2" of the subdivision plan Psd-2284, being a
portion of Lot No. "3-B," plan II-2977-Amd., G.L.R.O. Record No. 1955),
situated in the Barrio of San Roque, Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac.
Bounded on the N.E., by Lot 87-C of the subdivision plan; on the S.E., by Lot
No. 3-B-1 of the subdivision plan; on the S.W., by property of Concepcion
Cider; and on the N.W., by Lot B of the subdivision plan, containing an area
of SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO (772) SQUARE METERS, more or less."
Copies of the transfer certificates of title are attached as Annexes "A" and
"B," respectively. The total assessed value of said lands does not exceed
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
4. Said parcels of land were formerly owned by the spouses Asuncion dela
Rosa and Arsenio Dulay. Plaintiffs Orfelina Roldan, Lorna San Diego, Flordeliza
Catacutan, and Norma Lacuesta are the children of the spouses Asuncion dela
Rosa and plaintiff Arsenio Dulay. Upon the death of Asuncion dela Rosa on 26
June 1995, said parcels of land became jointly owned by herein plaintiffs. A
copy of Asuncion dela Rosa's certificate of death is attached as Annex "C."
5. The spouses Dulay bought said parcels of land sometime in 1957.
Defendants and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and are
continuously occupying about five hundred (500) square meters, more or
less, of said parcels of land. Defendants and their predecessors-in-interest
have occupied said parcels of land since 1957 without paying any rent.
6. The occupation by defendants of said parcels of land were at the mere
tolerance of the spouses Dulay and, thereafter, of the plaintiffs. Defendants
have promised to vacate the premises if and when needed by the spouses
Dulay and plaintiffs.
7. Demands were made on defendants to vacate the premises, which
demands, however, were ignored and not heeded. Defendants refused and
continues to refuse to vacate the premises. A copy of the final demand letters
sent to Angela dela Rosa and Corazon Medina are attached as Annexes "D"
and "E," respectively.
8. In an attempt to arrive at an amicable settlement and in recognition of their
being blood relatives, plaintiffs exerted earnest efforts towards a
compromise with defendants. Defendants were invited to discuss and settle
the matter amicably. Defendants, however, refused to meet and discuss any
settlement and ignored the invitation extended by plaintiffs.
9. In compliance with Section 412 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No.
7160) and as a further attempt to settle the dispute amicably, plaintiffs
brought the matter to the lupong tagapamayapa of their barangay.
Defendants, however, refused to discuss an amicable settlement. The
certification to file action issued by the lupon chairman is attached and made
an integral part hereof as Annex "F."
10. Defendants have been occupying and using the premises without paying
any rent therefor. The present reasonable rental value of the premises is Fifty
Pesos (P50.00) per month, which amount defendants should be made to pay
from September 1957 until possession is restored to plaintiffs.
11. By reason of the unjustifiable refusal to vacate and the unlawful detainer
of the subject property by defendants and all persons claiming rights under
them, plaintiffs were constrained to seek redress in court to protect their own
rights and interests, thereby causing them to incur litigation expenses in the
amount of not less than Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), for which amount
the defendant should be made liable to plaintiffs.16
Plaintiffs therein prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered
in their favor as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs most respectfully pray that,
after trial, judgment be rendered by this Honorable Court in favor of plaintiffs
and ordering as follows:
1. Defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to immediately
vacate the premises;
2. Defendants to pay all rental arrears at the monthly rate of P50.00 from
September 1957 until possession is restored or a total of P23,000.00;
3. Defendants to pay litigation expenses in the amount of P50,000.00; and
4. Defendants to pay the costs of this suit.
Plaintiffs pray for such other and further reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.17
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6089.
In their answer, defendants reiterated their allegations in their answer to the
complaint in Civil Case No. 6261 in the CFI of Tarlac.
On April 30, 1996, Angela filed a complaint against Arsenio and his children in
the MTC of Tarlac, Tarlac for recovery of ownership, reconveyance,
cancellation of title, and damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
6154. Angela, as plaintiff, reiterated her allegations in her answer and
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 6261 as allegations comprising her causes of
action. She prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their
favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Hon. Court that judgment
shall issue:
1. Ordering that an immediate temporary restraining order restraining the
defendants from disturbing the possession of the Plaintiff over the property
in question until the case is finally dissolved;
2. Declaring the Plaintiff as owner of the one-half (1/2) property in question,
thereby reconveying the ownership thereof and cancelling the title;
3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount
of P30,000.00 as attorney's fee, plus P1,000.00 per hearing;
4. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount
of P10,000.00 as acceptance fee, plus P20,000.00 as litigation expenses;
5. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount
of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
6. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount
of P10,000.00 as moral damages;
7. And granting such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the
premises.18
On July 17, 1996, the MTC issued a pre-trial order in Civil Case No.
6089 defining the issue, thus:
Whether or not Unlawful Detainer is proper in the premises considering the
claim of ownership by defendants from the beginning of these litigations
sometime in 1982 followed by this case at bench. Otherwise stated, is the
occupation of the land in dispute by the defendants by tolerance of
plaintiffs.19
On September 25, 1996, the MTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 6089 in
favor of Corazon and Angela and ordered the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.20 The court held that the issue between the
parties was one of ownership and not merely possession de facto. Thus, the
possession of the property by defendants was not by mere tolerance, but by
virtue of a claim of ownership; in fact, defendants never recognized the
plaintiffs' claim of ownership over the property. In ruling against Arsenio and
his children, the trial court relied on their pleadings, the decision of the CFI in
Civil Case No. 6261, the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 15455, and the
resolution of this Court in UDK-10069.21 It declared that, although the CA
reversed the decision of the CFI in Tarlac, the facts show that the dispute
between the parties constitutes possession de jure; the action of the spouses
Dulay in Civil Case No. 6261 which was an accion publiciana cannot be
converted into one for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 6089.
Arsenio and his children appealed to the RTC. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 8396. On June 25, 1997, it reversed the decision of the MTC and
ordered the eviction of defendants, holding that the issue was the
entitlement to the physical possession de facto of the property, an issue
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC;22 in contrast, the issue between
the parties in Civil Case No. 6261 was possession de jure and not
possession de facto. The RTC further declared that the spouses Dulay had a
torrens title over the property which was conclusive against the whole world;
as such, they were entitled to the possession of the property as owners
thereof. Citing the ruling of this Court in Peran v. Espera,23 the RTC ruled that
Corazon and Angela possessed the property for a considerable length of time
only through mere tolerance of plaintiffs.
Corazon and Angela moved to reconsider the decision, which the RTC denied
in an Order24 dated September 22, 1997. They filed a petition for review in
the CA, praying that the RTC decision be reversed and the decision of the MTC
be affirmed. Angela claimed that she owned one-half of the property as co-
owner of the spouses Dulay. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45560.
On March 16, 1998, the CA rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 45560
affirming the decision of the RTC and dismissing the petition. The CA ruled
that, contrary to the claim of Angela, there was no trust created over one-
half of the property in her favor. Since the complaint against Angela and
Corazon in the MTC was one for unlawful detainer, the MTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, they had been in possession of the
property by tolerance. In any case, their action was barred by prescription
and laches.
Angela and Corazon filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Angela and Corazon, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari, claiming that the CA erred as follows:
I was a verbal agreement between Gideon and his sister Asuncion that the
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN CONSIDERING
THAT THE CASE AT BAR IS ONE OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER, WHEN IT IS ONE OF
RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION.
II
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN CONSIDERING
THAT THERE WAS NO TRUST CREATED BY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES.
III
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN CONSIDERING
THAT THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM HAS BEEN BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION OR
LACHES.
IV
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR RESPONDENTS.25
According to petitioners, during the pre-trial in the MTC, the parties
stipulated on the following issues to be resolved by the court: whether or not
the action for unlawful detainer of respondents was proper considering that
petitioners claimed ownership over the property in their answer to the
complaint; and whether petitioners possessed the property by mere
tolerance of respondents. Petitioners insist that during the pre-trial
conference, respondents admitted that they had filed a complaint for
recovery of possession of property against petitioners in the CFI of Tarlac,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6261.
Petitioners maintain that the principal issue is one of ownership over the
property and not merely whether or not respondents, as plaintiffs, were
entitled to possession de facto as the registered owners thereof; hence, the
MTC had no jurisdiction over the action of respondents.
Petitioners are of the view that the trial court and the CA erred in declaring
that there was no trust created over the property. They maintain that there
property would be purchased by them; that the purchase price thereof would
be advanced by Asuncion; that Asuncion would be indicated as the vendee in
the deed of absolute sale to enable her to secure a GSIS loan to pay for the
property, with the concomitant agreement that Gideon would pay one-half
of the purchase price for the property; and that the property will be titled in
their name as trustees for the spouses Gideon and Angela dela Rosa over one-
half portion of the lots. They insist that they are not barred from assailing the
deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the spouses Dulay by the spouses
Rivera. There is likewise no factual and legal basis for the award of attorney's
fees.
In their comment on the petition, respondents aver that the stay of
petitioners in the property after 1982 was by mere tolerance. The MTC had
exclusive jurisdiction over their action because it was filed within one year
from petitioners' last demand to vacate the property. The CA correctly ruled
that no trust was created over the property, with petitioners as trustors and
respondents as trustees; whether a trust agreement was created is a question
of fact which cannot be raised in this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari.
In any event, petitioners' claim of a constructive trust was barred by
prescription since more than ten years had elapsed from the time the titles
over the properties in favor of respondents were issued on September 16,
1957.
Respondents further point out that the MTC of Tarlac rendered judgment in
Civil Case No. 6154 dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription or
laches; on April 6, 2000, the RTC affirmed the decision on appeal; the CA
affirmed the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 58857 on February 14, 2002; and on
January 22, 2003, this Court denied petitioners' petition for review of the
decision of the CA in G.R. No. 155599.26 Thus, the fact that no constructive
trust existed in favor of petitioners has been laid to rest by the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The threshold issues are: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the action
of respondents (plaintiffs therein); (2) whether the CA erred in declaring that
there was no trust relationship between petitioners as trustors and
respondents as trustees; (3) whether the appellate court erred in ruling that
the action of petitioners to enforce the trust against respondents had
prescribed; and (4) whether respondents are entitled to attorney's fees.
On the first issue, we agree with the decision of the CA that the action of
respondents against petitioners was one for unlawful detainer, and that the
MTC had jurisdiction over the same. Indeed, petitioners claimed ownership
over one-half of the property in their answer to the complaint and alleged
that respondents were merely trustees thereof for their benefit as trustors;
and, during the pre-trial, respondents admitted having filed their complaint
for recovery of possession of real property (accion publiciana) against
petitioners before the CFI of Tarlac, docketed as Civil Case No. 6261.
However, these did not divest the MTC of its inceptial jurisdiction over the
complaint for unlawful detainer of respondents.
It is settled jurisprudence that what determines the nature of an action as
well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, whether or not plaintiff is
entitled to any and all of the reliefs prayed for.27 The jurisdiction of the court
or tribunal over the nature of the action cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on defendant. Once
jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.28
Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the
parties; it cannot be acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by
their act or omission. Neither is it conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
It is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this
matter being legislative in character. Thus, the jurisdiction over the nature of
an action and the subject matter thereof is not affected by the theories set
up by defendant in an answer or motion to dismiss.29
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691, amending Section 33(2) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, which was the law in effect when respondents filed their
complaint against petitioners, provides that "Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer;
provided that, when, in such cases, defendant raises the questions of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issues of possession."
As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, respondents, as plaintiffs without deciding the issue of ownership, the court may proceed and resolve
below, alleged that they were the owners of parcels of land covered by TCT the issue of ownership but only for the purpose of determining the issue of
Nos. 29040 and 29041, hence, entitled to the possession of the property; possession. However, the disposition of the issue of ownership is not final, as
petitioners (defendants therein) and their predecessors-in-interest had it may be the subject of separate proceeding specifically brought to settle the
occupied the said parcels of land since 1957 without paying any rent; their issue. Hence, the bare fact that petitioners, in their answer to the complaint,
possession over the property continued even after the spouses Dulay raised the issue of whether they owned the property as trustors of a
purchased the property; and that their occupation of the property was by constructive trust (with the spouses Dulay as the trustees), did not divest the
mere tolerance of the spouses Dulay and, after Asuncion died on June 26, MTC of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and decide the same on
1995, by respondents; petitioners promised to vacate the premises when its merits.30
respondents needed the property; demands were made by respondents on
Petitioners were well aware that the issue of ownership over the property
October 2, 1995 for petitioners to vacate the property but the latter refused,
had to be resolved in a proper action for the purpose, separate from and
prompting an action to be filed in the Office of the Pangkat; and, on
independent of Civil Case No. 6089 in the MTC of Tarlac. It is for this reason
December 1, 1995, the PangkatSecretary issued a certification to file action.
that petitioner Angela filed a complaint for recovery of ownership,
As gleaned from the petitory portion of the complaint, respondents likewise
reconveyance, cancellation of title and damages against respondents,
prayed for the eviction of petitioners from the property with a plea for
docketed as Civil Case No. 6154, wherein she prayed that respondents, as
judgment for reasonable compensation for petitioners' occupation of the
defendants, be ordered to convey to her one-half portion of the property.
premises. Respondents filed their complaint on January 29, 1996 in the MTC,
However, her claim was rejected by the trial court, which ordered the
within the period of one year from the final demand made against petitioners
complaint dismissed; the RTC likewise dismissed the case on appeal. In
to vacate the property.
affirming this dismissal in CA-G.R. SP No. 58857 promulgated on February 14,
It is true that during the pre-trial, the MTC issued an order defining the issue 2002, the CA ratiocinated as follows:
to be litigated by the parties – whether or not unlawful detainer is proper in
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the foregoing, this Court finds that
the premises considering defendants' claim of ownership from 1982;
petitioner's complaint should be dismissed. This is so because petitioner
otherwise stated, whether petitioners' occupation of the land in dispute was
miserably failed to establish her claim to the property. It must be stressed
by mere tolerance of respondents. As framed by the MTC, the issue before it
that while an implied trust may be established by parol evidence, such
was basically one of physical or material possession of the property, although
evidence must be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust
petitioners raised ownership as an issue. Thus, the MTC erred when it
obligation are proven by an authentic document. (Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v.
declared that, since defendants claimed ownership over the property, it was
Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 603 [1999], at page 609). An implied trust cannot
divested of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the case on its
be made to rest on vague and inconclusive proof. (Ibid.)
merits.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the evidence she presented in her attempt to
It bears stressing that in unlawful detainer cases, the only issue for resolution,
establish their so-called trust agreement is not sufficient or convincing. The
independent of any claim of ownership by any party litigant, is: who is entitled
list of dates and amounts written by her purportedly showing payments made
to the physical and material possession of the property involved? The mere
to the late Asuncion dela Rosa Dulay cannot even be given credence as
fact that defendant raises the defense of ownership of the property in the
appreciation of such list can be equivocal (see Exhibit "H," page 152, Original
pleadings does not deprive the MTC of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Records). The list was made in petitioner's handwriting and there was no
and decide the case. In cases where defendant raises the question of
counter-signature made by Dulay showing acknowledgment of such listing.
ownership in the pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
At best, the list can merely be appreciated as it is, a list, but definitely, it does
not prove payments made on the purchase price of the ½ portion of the
property.
Also, the Court notes the NBI's Questioned Documents Report No. 316-884
(dated Nov. 14, 1984) finding that the signature of Asuncion Dulay in the
receipt allegedly acknowledging partial payment in the amount of P500.00
was signed over a typewritten carbon or duplicate impression which is not
part of the main entries in the receipt (see Exhibit "7," page 154, Original
Records). Such conclusion shows that the entries made on the receipt were
not written on a single occasion but rather separately executed. Thus, the
Court cannot give any evidentiary value on said receipt considering that its
credibility is suspect.
Meanwhile, private respondents have in their favor TCT Nos. 29040 and
29041 in the name of the spouses Arsenio Dulay and Asuncion dela Rosa (see
Exhibits "1" and "2," pages 181-182, Original Records); the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed in 1957 by the spouses Adriano Rivera and Aurora Mercado
(petitioner's paternal grandparents) conveying the entire property to the
spouses Dulay for the price of P7,000 (see Exhibit "3," page 148, Original
Records); the tax declaration receipts showing tax payments made by private
respondents on the property (see Exhibits "3" to "3-b," pages 183-185,
Original Records); and the tax declaration of real property for the year 1974
in the name of the spouses Dulay (see Exhibit "C" to "C-1," pages 150-151,
Original Records).
All told, petitioner failed to discharge that onus incumbent upon her to prove
her claim over the property.31
Angela assailed the decision of the CA in this Court in G.R. No. 155599, and
this Court resolved to deny the petition as follows:
G.R. No. 155599 (Angela dela Rosa v. Orfelina Roldan, et al.). – Considering
the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the petition for review on
certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
February 14, 2002 and October 14, 2002, respectively, the Court Resolves to
DENY the petition for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the
Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decision
and resolution as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction in this case.32
The resolution of the Court became final and executory on May 20,
2003.33 Thus, the issue of whether or not respondents were trustees of one-
half of the property had been finally resolved by this Court in favor of
respondents; in fine, the validity of TCT Nos. 29040 and 29041 in the names
of the spouses Dulay had been affirmed by the trial court, the MTC, the CA
and this Court. The claim of co-ownership of petitioner Angela and possession
over the western portion of the property thus have no factual and legal basis.
We agree with petitioners that the complaint of the spouses Dulay filed in
1982 docketed as Civil Case No. 6261 was one for recovery of possession of
the property (accion publiciana) and that they likewise later filed a complaint
with the MTC, on January 29, 1996, for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No.
6089 instead of an accion publiciana. However, respondents were not
proscribed from filing a complaint for unlawful detainer five (5) or six (6) years
from the dismissal of their complaint for recovery of possession of real
property. The dismissal of respondents' complaint in Civil Case No. 6261 by
the CA was not based on the merits of the case, but solely because it was
premature on account of the failure to allege that earnest efforts were made
for the amicable settlement of the cases as required by Article 222 of the New
Civil Code. The dismissal of the complaint was thus without prejudice.34
It bears stressing that, after the Court declared in UDK-10069 on November
19, 1990 that the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 15455 was final and
executory, respondents did not immediately file their complaint for unlawful
detainer against petitioners for their eviction. Respondents filed their
complaint only on January 29, 1996, or after the lapse of almost six (6) years,
but barely four (4) months after respondents' final demand to vacate the
property on October 2, 1995 and the issuance of the certification of
the Pangkat Secretary on December 1, 1995.
We agree with the contention of petitioners that for an action for unlawful
detainer based on possession by mere tolerance to prosper, the possession
of the property by defendant must be legal from the very beginning.35 In this
case, petitioners' possession of the property was tolerated by the former
owners, the spouses Rivera, and by the spouses Dulay after they purchased
the property. After all, Angela was the granddaughter of Consolacion Rivera,
the sister of Adriano Rivera, and Gideon was the brother of Asuncion.
However, when the spouses Dulay needed the property for their children's
use and requested petitioners to vacate the property, the latter refused.
From then on, petitioners' possession of the property became deforciant. A
person who occupies the land of another on the latter's tolerance, without
any contract between them, is necessarily barred by an implied provision that
he will vacate the same upon demand.36 Respondents thus had the option to
file a complaint for unlawful detainer within one year therefrom, or an accion
publiciana beyond the one-year period from the demand of respondents as
plaintiffs for petitioners to vacate the property.
The Court notes that the property was sold to respondents, and that it was
titled in their names (TCT Nos. 29040 and 29041). The said deed and titles
support the right of respondents to the material possession of the
property.37Under all the circumstances and facts in this case, petitioners'
claim, that they had the right to the material possession of the property, has
no factual and legal basis. We quote with approval the decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 45560:
Private respondents are entitled to its possession from the time title was
issued in their favor as registered owners. "An action for unlawful detainer
may be filed when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of their right to hold possession, by virtue
of a contract, express or implied."
Second. "The age-old rule is that 'the person who has a torrens title over a
land is entitled to possession thereof'." Except for the claim that the title of
private respondents is not conclusive proof of ownership, petitioners have
shown no right to justify their continued possession of the subject premises.38
On the issue of whether the RTC acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction in
awarding P50,000.00 as attorney's fees in favor of respondents, petitioners
aver that under the Rules on Summary Procedure, respondents are entitled
to a maximum amount of only P20,000.00; hence, the RTC acted in excess of
its jurisdiction when it awarded P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, as it is in excess
of the maximum amount under the said Rules. Besides, petitioners aver, the
amount of P50,000.00 is unjust and inequitable. Moreover, the RTC ordered
petitioners to pay attorney's fees of P50,000.00 without even supporting the
award with its finding and citing legal provisions or case law.
For its part, the CA ruled that the award of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees
under the Rules on Summary Procedure does not apply in a case where the
decision of the MTC is appealed to the RTC. The latter court may award an
amount beyond the maximum amount of P20,000.00 under the Rules on
Summary Procedure as attorney's fees for the reason that, on appeal in the
RTC, the regular rules of civil procedure apply. According to the CA, there was
factual and legal basis for the award of P50,000.00 as respondents' attorney's
fees:
Second. Decisional law states –
"There is no question that a court may, whenever it deems just and equitable,
allow the recovery by the prevailing party of attorney's fees. In determining
the reasonableness of such fees, this Court in a number of cases has provided
various criteria which, for convenient guidance, we might collate, thusly: a)
the quantity and character of the services rendered; b) the labor, time and
trouble involved; c) the nature and importance of the litigation; d) the
amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy;
e) the novelty and difficulty of questions involved; f) the responsibility
imposed on counsel; g) the skill and experience called for in the performance
of the service; h) the professional character and social standing of the lawyer;
i) the customary charges of the bar for similar services; j) the character of
employment, whether casual or for established client; k) whether the fee is
absolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney may properly charge
a higher fee when it is contingent than when it is absolute; and l) the results
secured."
In view thereof, the award of attorney's fees is justified. That is, in addition
to the provisions of Article 2208 of the New Civil Code which reads –
"In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
xxxx
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;"
xxxx

considering that petitioners refused to vacate the subject premises despite

demands by the private respondents.

Finally, the Supreme Court has explained –

"The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial Courts pursuant to Section 36 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. x x x Hence, when the respondents appealed the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the
applicable rules are those of the latter court."

Thus, the award of the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as

attorney's fees is justified considering that the jurisdictional amount of
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) under Section 1, paragraph (A),
subparagraph (1) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure applies only to
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.39

We agree with the ruling of the CA. The ceiling of P20,000.00 applies only in
the MTC where the Rules on Summary Procedure are applied. On appeal to
the RTC, the RTC may affirm, modify or even reverse the decision of the MTC;
as such, the RTC may increase the award for attorney's fees in excess
of P20,000.00 if there is factual basis therefor.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.