DOMINGO NEYPES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
It ruled that
FACTS:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, et.al filed an action for annulment
of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau
of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del
Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
Trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action
had already prescribed: February 12, 1998
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal: March 3,
1998
Filed a motion for reconsideration: March 18, 1998 (15th day
after receipt)
MFR dismissed by RTC: July 1, 1998
Petitioners received dismissal of MFR: July 22, 1998
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal: July 27, 1998 (5 days after
receipt of dismissal of MFR)
Appeal fees paid: August 3, 1998
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal,
holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners
on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this
too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.
Petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of
appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received
the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration.
When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days
had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for
appeal.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition.
the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3,
1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing
their complaint.
ISSUE:
What should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which
triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal: the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998
order dismissing the MR?
The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural
rules. Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from the notice of judgment or final order.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15
days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the
merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may
be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1,
1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the
"final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their
complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July
27, 1998.
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc, we
reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion
for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised
there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of
Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where we again considered the order denying
petitioner Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which
finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal
within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it
within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-
day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the
decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’

view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the
15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their
notice of appeal on time?

According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running

of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR
on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only
one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of
denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled
under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the "final
order" or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to

afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of
the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period

uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of

appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998
(the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration).