1) Lim V.

Queensland Tokyo Communication - The mock trading generated beneficial results which prompted Lim to invest in
By: Clyne $5000.00 which was paid through a manager’s check (This check was made in order
Petitioners: Jefferson Lim to answer for any trading account against which the deposit was made, for any loss
Respondents: Queensland Tokyo Communication of whatever nature, and for all obligations, which the investor would incur with the
Ponente: J. Quisumbing broker or in short POT MONEY)
- Lim was later on allowed to trade with Queensland and that Shia obligated himself
to furnish a regular market report and statement of transactions concerning the
RECIT-READY/SUMMARY: Queensland Tokyo Commodities, Inc. is a duly licensed broker
status of Lim’s investment
engaged in the trading of commodities futures with full membership at the Manila Futures
- The 1st day of trading yielded significant success since Lim was able to have a profit
Exchange, Inc. Upon suggestion of Benjamin Shia, a market analyst and trader of
of P6,845.57
Queensland, Jefferson Lim decided to invest with a marginal deposit of US$5,000 in
- Unfortunately on the 2nd day of trading, Lim loss around P44,465
manager's check on the foreign exchange market. Lim signed the Customer's Agreement.
- Shia later on returned the manager’s check since it would take 17 days to clear such
To accommodate Lim's request to trade right away, Queensland advanced P125,000 from
check which thereby made Lim replace the manger’s check with a traveller’s check
its own funds while waiting for the manager's check to clear since they dealt in pesos only.
- Such traveller’s check wasn’t indorsed and that out of ignorance of Shia, Shia still
He was then allowed to trade. During the first day of trading, Lim made a profit. However,
accepted it since Shia knew that Lim had a good credit rating
during the second day, they lost. Meanwhile, Queensland learned that it would take 17 days
- Citibank didn’t accept the check since it wasn’t indorsed and that despite the
to clear the manager's check. Upon management's request, Shia returned the manager's
numerous demand for Lim to sign such traveller’s check, Lim still chose not to and
check to Lim and it was replaced by an unindorsed traveler's check. The traveler's check was
that he even demanded a liquidation of his account for such will be able to cut his
deposited with Citibank but it was refused since it was not duly signed by Lim. Queensland
losses
returned the traveler's check to Lim for his signature but he did not return it to Queensland.
- RTC dismissed the petition of Queensland
Thereafter, Lim refused to settle his account with Queensland. Resultantly, Queensland
- CA reversed it on the basis that it was found that Lim really benefitted from the
filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Lim. The trial court dismissed the
agreement
complaint. But it was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Lim filed the instant recourse
alleging, among others, that the appellate court committed error in holding that petitioner
ISSUE
is estopped in questioning the validity of the Customer's Agreement.
Whether or not Mr. Lim is already estopped from assailing whether such agreement is invalid
The Court ruled that clearly, by his own acts, petitioner was estopped from impugning the
HELD
validity of the Customer's Agreement. For a party to a contract cannot deny the validity
Yes, Mr. Lim is estopped and the judgement of the Court of Appeal is hereby affirmed
thereof after enjoying its benefits without outrage to one's sense of justice and fairness. It
appeared that petitioner's reason for backing out of the agreement is that he began
RATIO
sustaining losses from the trade. However, this alone is insufficient to nullify the contract or
The Supreme Court held that since Lim was able to benefit from the agreement between him
disregard its legal effects. By its very nature it is already a perfected, if not a consummated
and Queensland, he is now estopped to claim the validity of the agreement. The essential
contract. Courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed,
elements of estoppel are:
simply because their contracts turned out to be disastrous or unwise investments. Thus, the
1) Conduct of a party amounting to false representation or concealment of material
instant petition was denied.
facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise
than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert
DOCTRINE: A party who has already benefitted from such agreement is estopped to question 2) Intent, or at least expectation, that this conduct shall be acted upon by, or at least
its validity influence, the other party;
3) Knowledge, actual or constructive of the real facts
FACTS It was uncontested that Lim really signed the Customer’s Agreement and that he fully knew the
- Benjamin Shia is a market analyst and trader of Queensland Tokyo Commodities Inc. nature of the contract he was entering to. Furthermore, the subsequent acts of Lim really
- Shia was later on introduced to Jefferson Lim by Marissa Bontia since Marissa’s wanted the Customer’s Agreement to be a valid contract thus making it valid and binding.
father was a former employee of Lim’s father Lastly, the Supreme Court also ratiocinated that they can’t save a person from a contract
- Shia was trying to persuade Lim to invest in the Foreign Exchange Market by trading especially when such contract is valid just because the person didn’t exercise the necessary
US dollars against Japanese yen, British pound, Deutsche Mark and Swiss Franc prudence in entering into such contract.
- However, before agreeing to such investment, Lim requested Shia to conduct a
simulated trade without any real money involved
 2. CONSTANTE AMOR DE CASTRO V CA
GR NO: 115838
JULY 18 2002
By: MJBB
Topic: ESTOPPEL
Plaintiff-Appellant (Petitioner): Constante Amor De Castro and Corazon Amor De Castro
Defendant-Appellees(Respondent) : Court of Appeals and Francisco Artigo
Ponente: Carpio,J
RECIT-READY: Petitioners Constante and Corazon Amor de Castro were co-owners of four lots
located in Cubao, Quezon City. In a letter dated January 24, 1984, they authorized respondent
Francisco Artigo to act as real estate broker in the sale of these properties for the amount of
P23,000,000.00 at a 5% commission. It was private respondent who first found Times Transit
Corporation as a prospective buyer of two lots. Sometime in May 1985, the sale was
consummated. Artigo received P48,893.76 as commission. However, he felt aggrieved because
according to him, his total commission should be P352,500.00 which is 5% of the agreed price of
P7,050,000. Thus, he sued the petitioners in order to collect the unpaid balance of his broker's
commission. Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that private respondent was selfishly asking
more than what he truly deserved as commission to the prejudice of other agents who were
more instrumental in the consummation of the sale. The trial court ruled in favor of private
respondent and it was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
The petition was bereft of merit. A contract of agency which is not contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals or good custom is a valid contract, and constitutes the law between the
parties. The contract of agency entered into by Constante with Artigo was the law between them
and both were bound to comply with its terms and conditions in good faith. The mere fact that
"other agents" intervened in the consummation of the sale and were paid their respective
commissions cannot vary the terms of the contract of agency. In any event, the Court found that
the 5% real estate broker's commission was reasonable and within the standard practice in the
real estate industry for transactions of this nature.
DOCTRINE:
• An action is not barred by estoppel by laches when it is filed within the time
allowed by law.
• The right of action accrues from the moment the breach of right or duty occurs
• Contract of Agency must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of
action accrues
FACTS:
• Private respondent Artigo was authorized by the petitioners to act as real estate
broker in the sale of the four parcel of lands owned by petitioners. The properties
amounting P23,000,000. 

• It was agreed upon that five percent of the sale price will be given to the Artigo as
commission. 

• Two lots were sold and Artigo received from petitioners the amount of P48,893.76
as commission. 

• Petitioner felt shortchanged because according to him, his total commission should
be P352,500 which is five percent of the agreed price of P7.05M for the two lots. 

• He sued for the balance of P303,606.24. 

• Petitioners argue that Artigo is selfishly asking for more than what he truly deserved

as commission to the prejudice of other agents who were more instrumental in the
consummation of the sale.
• Trial court held petitioners liable for P303,606.24 (plus other costs of course)
• CA affirmed. 

• The De Castros contend :
o That Artigo's inaction as well as failure to protest estops him from
recovering more than what was actually paid him. They also cite Art 1235
§ Art. 1235. When the obligee accepts the performance, knowing
its incompleteness and irregularity, and without expressing any
protest or objection, the obligation is deemed fully complied
with.
o That laches should apply because Artigo did not file his complaint in court
until May 29, 1989, or almost four years later.
ISSUE:
• W/N Artigo’s action is barred by estoppel and thus, cannot prosper—NO.
HELD/RATIO:
DUN SA SECOND CONTENTION: LACHES SHOULD APPLY
• Artigo did not neglect to assert his right:
o He was appointed as agent on January 24, 1984 – Lots were sold
in June 1985
o He demanded in April and July 1985 payment of commission
o When the demand for payment was not paid. Artigo decided to
sue on May 29,1989
• Laches does not apply because only four years had lapsed from the time of
the sale in June 1985 it is within the ten-year prescriptive period.
• This does not constitute an unreasonable delay in asserting one's right. The
Court has ruled, "a delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law
and is not considered to be a delay that would bar relief.”
RULING: Petition denied. Artigo ( Respondent ) won
 3. Far East Bank and Trust Company v Querimit • Upon appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court with modification that
G.R. No. 148582 FEBTC was solely liable for the amounts
January 16, 2002 • FEBTC failed to prove certificates of deposit had been paid out of its funds
By: Danielle Casipit
____________________________________________________________________ Issue: W/N the subject certificates of deposit have already been paid - NO
Topic: Natural Obligations; Estoppel; Laches W/N she is guilty of laches - NO
Petitioner: Far East Bank and Trust Company
Respondent: Estrella O. Querimit Held:
____________________________________________________________________ • First, as a rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it
• The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has
RECIT-READY: been discharged by the payment
• In this case, certificates of deposit were clearly marked payable to bearer which
Doctrine: Courts will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the means to the person in possession of an instrument
doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result • The bank should not have paid the husband without requiring the surrender of the
certificates
Facts • Bank’s defense was because he was one of the bank’s senior managers
• Estrella O. Queremit worked as an internal auditor for Philippine Savings Bank from • However, despite that fact, FEBTC never required him to deliver the certificates,
1962-1982 violating the banks policies and procedures
• On Nov 24, 1986, she opened a dollar savings account in Far East Bank and Trust • The bank therefore failed to exercise diligence required by nature of its business
Company • Second, laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time, to do
• 4 Certificates of Deposit were issued each in the amount of $15k totaling $60k that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier
• There certificates were to mature in 60 days on Jan 23, 1987 and were payable to • There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each
bearer at 4.5% interest per annum case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances
• Certificates bore the word “accrued”, which meant if they were not presented for • In this case, it would be unjust to allow the doctrine of laches to defeat the right of
encashment or pre-terminated prior to maturity, the money with accrued interest respondent to recover her savings which she deposited with the petitioner
would be rolled over by the bank and annual interest would accumulate • She did not withdraw her deposit even after the maturity date of the certificates of
automatically deposit precisely because she wanted to set it aside for her retirement
• In 1989, respondent’s spouse required medical treatment in the United States
• Respondent used her savings from BPI
• In January of 1993, her husband died and she returned to the Philippines
• She went to FEBTC to withdraw her deposit but she was told her husband had
withdrawn the money
• FEBTC refused to give her the money claiming it had given respondent’s late
husband tan accommodation to allow him to withdraw her deposit
• They presented evidence showing payment to wit:
o 4 FEBTC Dollar demand drafts in $15,100.96 each issued to husband
Dominador Querimit
o Debit ticket dated Jan 23, 1987 show debit of $60,443.84
o Interbatch transaction ticket register or credit ticket dated Jan 23, 1987
showing that the amount was credited to petitioners International
Operation Division
• They also claim that she is guilty of laches because the certificates of deposit were
issued in 1986, and she only tried to withdraw them in 1996
• Trial court rendered judgement in favor of Estrella ordering the bank to pay her the
amount of $60k, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney fees
 4. BIALA v CA or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that
GR NO. L-43503 the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
OCTOBER 31, 1990 • The four basic elements of laches are:
By: CHESKA DOMINGUEZ 1. Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
Topic: NATURAL OBLIGATIONS; ESTOPPEL; LACHES rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the
Petitioners: LEONOR J. BIALA complainant seeks a remedy;
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS (Fourth Division) and MARIA P. LEE • The only element present in this case. (wasn't elaborated)
Ponente: MEDIALDEA, J. 2. Delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute suit;
RECIT-READY/SUMMARY: Petitioner Biala is the debtor and respondent Lee is her creditor.
• The lapse of nine years within which Lee had not instituted her suit
Lee filed an action for the collection of Biala's debt. Biala invoked the defense of
cannot be considered as unreasonable delay to warrant the application
prescription. The TC dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. CA reversed the
of laches. In the first place, the action filed by respondent has not yet
decision so Biala appealed to the SC arguing that the action filed by Lee is barred by laches,
prescribed, since it was instituted well within the period of 10 years
having been filed nine years after. The SC ruled in favor of Lee. Only one of the elements of
from the time the cause of action accrued as provided by law.
laches is present in this case.
3. Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit;
DOCTRINE:
• Biala has not sufficiently shown that she has no knowledge that Lee
(1) For an action to be barred by laches, all the elements of laches must be present.
would assert her right for the collection of the obligations which the
(2) The doctrine of laches, being an equitable principle, should not be applied to supplant what
former owes the latter. She even admitted the existence of the REM
is clearly stated in the law, especially if it would defeat and not promote justice.
and the PNs.
(3) The doctrine of laches cannot be taken against respondent where petitioner is shown to have
4. Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
promised from time to time the relief sought for.
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
(4) Laches, being an equitable defense, he who invokes it must come to court with clean hands.
• There is no showing that the Biala would be the party injured or
FACTS: prejudiced if the suit is not held to be barred. If the suit is allowed to
prosper against her and the latter adjudged liable, her liability would
• Respondent Lee filed an action for collection of sum of money against petitioner
be confined merely to the settlement of her due and demandable
Biala, in the amount of P31,338.76, based on several causes of action, evidenced by
obligations and the payment of proper interest to Lee for the default
documents of three real estate mortgages (REM) and 12 promissory notes (PN)
incurred.
executed by Biala in favor of Lee.
• Biala denied all the allegations and contended that (1) although she signed for the
amount of P12,000 as stated in the first document of REM, the real amount she
actually received from Lee was only P2,000, (2) the other claims of Lee had already
been settled, and even if not settled, the action has already prescribed; and (3) the
amounts stated under the other causes of action were never received by her.
• The TC dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription of all claims.
• Lee appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the TC.
• Hence, this petition. Biala argued that the action brought by Lee is barred by laches
on the ground of unreasonable delay of nine years before the filing of the action.

ISSUE:
(1) WON the action brought by respondent Lee is barred by laches

HELD/RATIO:
(1) NO. Only one element of laches is present in this case.
• Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which,
by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
 5. Z. E. Lotho v Ice and Cold Storage • CA: Denied Lotho’s claim based on the grounds of laches and consent.
GR NO. L-16563
December 28, 1961 ISSUE:
By: Gayares W/N Lotho’s complaint is barred by laches (unreasonable delay)?
Topic: Natural Obligations; Estoppel; Laches
Petitioners: Z. E. Lotho, Inc HELD/RATIO:
Respondents: Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc. (ICS) YES
Ponente: Reyes, JBL.
Essential elements of the defense of laches:
1. Conduct of the defendant giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for
RECIT-READY/SUMMARY: Lotho took a long time to institute an action against ICS for
which the complaint seeks a remedy;
violation of unfair competition. Therefore, he is barred by laches.
2. Delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge
or notice of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
DOCTRINE:
institute a suit
Inaction within a reasonable time to enforce a right underlies a valid defense of laches and
3. Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
reveals implied consent to the violation of a right.
would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
4. Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
FACTS:
complainant or the suit is not held to be barred.
• Lotho was established in 1947 with a capital stock of P100k for the purpose of
operating an ice plant and selling the ice at wholesale or retail. It served the towns In this case, the elements are illustrated in the following manner: (1) Conceded by Lotho when
of San Pedro, Binan, Sta. Rosa, Cabuyao, and Calamba, which are all in the province it claimed that there was an invasion by the ICS of its rights under the certificate of public
of Laguna. convenience; (2) Evidence shows that Lotho already knew for nine years that ICS was selling ice
• Lotho was operating a 10-ton ice-producing unit. It obtained gross revenue of to its co-defendants and he tried to win them back but ultimately failed, which means that such
P13.5k, while it suffered P200 loss from operating expenses. delay is unreasonable; (3) Lotho was aware that IICS was selling ice to its co-defendants, yet it
• It also suffered another loss in the following year worth P4.7k. Three years after, made no genuine effort to stop that practice, which is also evidenced by their
Lotho suffered the heaviest loss amounting to 17k and it discontinued its operations. “unconsummated” agreement since it still allowed ICS to sell in Lotho’s area; (4) Inequity is
• Due to its discontinuance, Lotho’s certificate of public convenience was cancelled. apparent in this case since it is admitted that some of Lotho’s records were lost because of the
It was revived eventually when it resumed operation and only a 5-ton ice-producing long delay in bringing this case, and therefore, could not be produced when ICS asked to have
unit was used since the old 10-ton unit was sold to Sps. Gomez to meet company recourse to said records – in other words, Lotho has a stale claim since he cannot verify the
obligations. damages he is claiming. It would be unjust to allow Lotho to reap benefit from having slept on
• From February to June of that year, until it closed business, Lotho would buy ice its rights.
from the Farola Ice Plant of the ICS whenever its machine broke down for resale to
its customers. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against Lotho.
• Lotho’s certificate of public convenience was then definitely cancelled by the Public
Service Commission.
• ICS is also a corporation engaged in the same manner of business and it operates in
Manila, Pasay, Quezon, Cavite, and Bulacan. The other defendants in this case are
also ice dealers of the municipalities of Laguna, which are covered by Lotho’s
franchise.
• These franchises depended on Lotho before. However, they eventually shifted to
buy ice from ICS since it was way more profitable.
• Lotho tried to win the franchises back but was unsuccessful.
• Lotho alleged that ICS constituted to indirect sales within the former’s territory,
hence, an agreement was reached. However, the agreement was never signed so
each party blamed each other for non-consummation.
• TC: Dismissed Lotho’s action to impute ICS of unfair competition and payment for
damages.
 #6 GOLLOY v CA
GR NO. L-47491
MAY 4, 1989
By: GUZMAN
Topic: LACHES
Petitioners: GALICANO GOLLOY
Respondents: HON. JOSE VALDEZ, JR., CONSOLACION VALDEZ, LOURDES VALDEZ, SOLEDAD
VALDEZ, AND BENNY MADRIAGA
Ponente: PARAS, J.
RECIT-READY: Case is a petition from the decision of CA on the disputed land of the petitioner which
ruled against it. Petitioner here, is the owner of a land for more than 20 years. While the Southwest
portion of the land, was bounded by the land of the private respondent. The priv. respondent decided to
subdivide the land, however, in the course of subdivision, the PR placed 2 monuments inside the
southwest portion of petitioner’s land. Thus, petitioner filed an action to quiet title. The PR, alleged that
they never encroached the said land. In the pre-trial, they agreed that the disputed land will be resolved
through surveying the respective lots. However, on the surveyors’ report, it was said that the PR’s land
prevails over petitioner’s land. CFI, ruled in favor of the PR in accordance to the surveyors’ report. CA
affirmed it. SC reversed the decision. The Court said, if ever, they have any right on the disputed land,
they will be guilty of laches.
DOCTRINE: Failure to assert claims and ownership for 32 years, by virtue of the equitable
principle of laches will apply.
FACTS
• The case is a petition for review on certiorari on the decision of CA affirming the
judgment of CFI.
• Petitioner for more than 20 yrs, has been registered owner and in possession of a
41,545 sqm parcel of land. (Covered by TCT No. 45764)
• Southwest portion of the above land, is bounded by the land of the private
respondent.
o Priv. respondent subdivided their land.
o In the course of the subdivision, private respondents caused to be placed
2 monuments inside the Southwest portion of petitioner’s land.
• Petitioner now filed with the CFI, an action to quiet title.
• Priv. respondent, filed motion to dismiss with counterclaim.
o They alleged that they never encroached upon the landholding of
petitioner.
o Nothing has been placed on his land which could create any cloud.
o The truth of the matter was that they merely subdivided their own land
according to their title.
o Therefore, there was nothing for petitioner to quiet or remove cloud on
his title.
• In the pre-trial, the parties had an agreement, that the disputed land will be resolved
through surveying the respective lots and, hence, to relocate the disputed area with
the end in view of determining the true and correct boundaries of their parcels.
• Then, CFI ordered the Director of Lands to appoint an impartial public surveyor.
o In the submitted report, it was stated that there were overlappings on
the boundaries of the two lands.
o And that overlappings are due to the defect in the survey on petitioner’s
land since it did not duly conform with the previously approved survey.
o Hence, the private respondents’ land, prevails over petitioner’s land,
since the former was surveyed and titled ahead.
• CFI: the court renders judgment in accordance with the surveyor’s report, thus,
favoring to the private respondent.
o CA: affirmed the decision of the CFI.
ISSUE
• Who between the two title holders is entitled to the land in dispute?
HELD/RATIO
• The petitioner is entitled to the disputed land. The Court reversed and set aside the
decision of CA. Private respondents to cause the segregation of the disputed portion
presently oocupied by the petitioner and reconvey the same to the latter and after
segregation to order the RoD to issue a new certificate of title covering said portion
in favor of the petitioner.
• The said lands, having been surveyed and thereafter registered, it follows that
monuments were placed therein to indicate their respective boundaries. It is hardly
persuasive that private respondents' predecessor, Dominga Balanga, believing that
she has a rightful claim to the overlapped portions, did not make any move to
question the placement of the monuments.
o She could have easily objected to the placement and pointed out that
the placement of the monuments excluded the overlapped portions
from her property. However, no such objection was made.
o These facts could only be construed to mean that private respondents'
predecessor, Dominga Balanga, never believed that she has a right and
legal claim to the overlapped portion. There appears to be no evidence
to support claims of repeated demands against petitioner to refrain from
cultivating the contested portion, much less an action filed in court to
enforce such demands.
• Besides, considering that petitioner and his predecessor or predecessors have been
in continuous possession in the concept of an owner, for almost fifty (50) years (from
August 15, 1919, when the property was registered, up to February, 1966, when the
private respondents caused the placement of two (2) monuments inside his land),
the latter if they have any right at all to the overlapped portion, are guilty of laches.
• In the case of Caragay-Layno v CA: "Of significance is the fact, as disclosed by the
evidence, that for twenty (20) years from the date of registration of title in 1947 up
to 1967 when this suit for recovery of possession was instituted, neither the
deceased DE VERA up to the time of his death in 1951, nor his successors-in-interest,
had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to the disputed portion. They may,
therefore be said to be guilty of laches as would effectively derail their cause of
action. Administrator ESTRADA took interest in recovering the said portion only
when he noticed the discrepancy in areas in the Inventory of Property and in the
title."
7. VICTORIANO v. CA
GR 87550; FEB. 11, 1991
By: Madrid
____________________________________________________________________
Topic:
Petitioner: Divina Victoriano
Respondent: CA & Heirs of Crispin Arcilla (Represented by Masigla)
____________________________________________________________________
Summary:
Doctrine: An original registered owner may lose his right to recover back the title and
possession of property by reason of LACHES.

Facts:
- Private Respondent Masigla was in possession of a parcel of land (Lot 897).
- In 1987, her son, Domingo, entered the adjoining property (Lot 898) owned by Petitioner
Victoriano.
- Domingo prohibited Petitioner and her tenants from cultivating the land.
- Petitioner filed a criminal case for theft, malicious mischief, usurpation, and squatting against
Domingo.
- During the case, Petitioner discovered that Lot 897 was registered in the name of her
grandfather (Cirilo Tamio).
- Petitioner then secured a title of Lot 897.
- Masigla then filed for reconveyance of Lot 897 claiming that her father, Crispin, bought the
land from Cirilo and that they have been in possession of the said land since 1927.
- TC ruled in favor of Petitioner. CA reversed.

Issue:
WON Petitioner’s action to recover Lot 897 is barred by Laches?

Held:
YES.
- The principle of laches, is defined as "such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse
party, as will operate as a bar in equity."
- The Court of Appeals had correctly observed:
Defendant-appellee disregards the fact that plaintiffs-appellants have been in
continuous possession of the land Since 1927 and they were not ousted therefrom by the
grandfather of defendant-appellee who sold the property to them, nor by the immediate
successors of the seller. Defendant-appellee's inaction for more than 50 years now bars her
from acquiring possession of the land on the ground of laches.
 #8 Marcelino vs. CA
GR # 94422
DATE: June 26, 1992
By: Julpha Policina
Petitioners: Guillermo Marcelino, Conrado Antonio, Jr and Connie Antonio (both minors)
represented by their grandfather (Guillermo)
Respondents: CA, Severina Lactaoen, Conchita Marcelino, Sps Simon Mariaga and Crispina
Marcelino, Guding Marcelino, Peping Cansino
Ponente:
DOCTRINE: Long inaction in asserting a right also bars from recovery of the same.
FACTS:
• Silvestre Marcelino and Genoveva Patricia (spouses) is the registered owner of 3
parcels of land in Tarlac.
• Guillermo and late Luciana Marcelino are the only heirs.
• Even before WWII, private respondents has the possession of these parcels of land
• Guillermo and Luciana (when still alive), demanded restitution of physical
possession and torrens titles but the respondents refused.
• Respondents contention:
o that they are the lawful occupants
o action of petitioners already prescribed
o they inherited it from their parents who bought them from Pedro
Marcelino and had purchased it from Genoveva Patricio (all evidenced
by absolute sale and notarized documents)
• RTC dismissed, ground of laches
• CA upheld
• Hence, this petition
o CA erred in finding them guilty of laches for failure to assert their rights
to the property for over 50 years
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners be allowed to recover the land
HELD/RATIO: NO
• Laches – the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier.
o Negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it
• In case at bar, petitioners admitted that private respondents had been occupying in
said land even before WWII
• For almost 50 years, no action had been taken by the petitioners to recover
possession of the land.
• Long inaction in asserting their right to the lots bars them from recovering the same.
• “The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when
the law requires them to act”
• Petition DENIED, CA decision AFFIRMED.
 9. SIERRA vs PAIC SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK
G.R. No. 197857
DATE: September 10, 2014
By: Enzo
Topic: Estoppel/Laches
Petitioners: SPOUSES FRANCISCO SIERRA et al
Respondent: PAIC SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, INC.,
Ponente:
SUMARRY: Yung Goldstar Conglomerates, Inc (GCI), represented by Zaldaga, obtained a
loan from Summa Bank for an amount of 1.5M. Si Summa Bank later on became resp “Paic
Savings and Mortgage Bank” (PSMB). To secure the loan , nag issue ng PNs si GCI and to
further secure the loan, nag execute ng REM sila pet spouses (madami silang spouses dito)
over their respective parcels of land in Antipolo. After signing the REM with resp bank,
binigyan ni Zaldaga ng 200,000 worth of checks sila pet Sps which were later on successfully
encashed. Later on, hindi na nakabayad ng loan si GCI, so nag send ng letter of foreclosure
si resp bank nung 1984 kanila pet sps, pero no response. So napunta na kanial resp bank
yung properties. In 1991 (7 years after the foreclosure) nag file ngayon sila pet sps ng
annulment nung foreclosure saying na (1) there was a mistake daw on getting their consent
kasi akala nila “Principal Mortgagors” daw sila, peo yun pala “Accommodation Mortgagors”
lang sila’ nila GCI and (2) di daw sila informed sa foreclosure. Nag rule yun RTC in favor kanila
pet Sps saying na there was indeed a mistake, pero nireverse ni CA saying na barred by
laches na sila pet Sps kasi since the ground of annulment was mistake, 4 years lang yung
prescriptive period. Hence the issue of WON PET SPS ARE ALREADY BARRED BY LACHES. Sabi
ng SC YES kasi Laches operates to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a
clearly inequitable situation. In the case, since prescribed na yung action nila pet Sps, to
allow their action to prosper would be unfair kanila resp bank since prescribed na nga yung
period. So talo sila pet Sps.
DOCTRINE: Laches operates not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but rather
to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.
FACTS
1. Goldstar Conglomerates, Inc. (GCI), represented by Zaldaga, obtained from First
Summa Savings and Mortgage Bank (Summa Bank), now respondent Paic Savings
and Mortgage Bank, Inc. (PSMB), a loan in the amount of PhP1,500,000.00
2. As security therefor, GCI executed in favor of PSMB six (6) promissory notes as well
as a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land
3. As additional security, petitioners Francisco Sierra and 3 other Sps (co-petitioners in
this case) mortgaged four (4) parcels of land in Antipolo City respectively registered
in their names (subject properties).
4. Records show that after the signing of the mortgage deed, Zaldaga gave petitioner
Francisco Sierra four (4) manager's checks with an aggregate amount of
PhP200,000.00, which were later successfully encashed
5. Eventually, GCI defaulted in the payment of its loan to resp PSMB, thereby
prompting the latter (PSMB) to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties
with due notice to petitioners.
6. On 1984, Since petitioners failed to redeem the subject properties within the
redemption period, their certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were
issued in PSMB's name.
7. On 1991, or 7 years after the foreclosure, Petitioners filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the real estate mortgage and its extrajudicial foreclosure,
and damages against PSMB and Summa Bank before the RTC. Petitioners averred:
a. that under pressing need of money, with very limited education and
lacking proper instructions, they fell prey to a group who misrepresented
to have connections with Summa Bank and, thus, could help them secure
a loan.
b. Despite lack of special authority from them, foreclosure proceedings
over the subject properties were initiated by PSMB and not Summa Bank
in whose favor the mortgage was executed;
c. They further claimed that they were not furnished a copy of the petition
for foreclosure prior to the precipitate extrajudicial foreclosure and
auction sale which failed to comply with the posting and notice
requirements.
8. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: PSMB prayed for the dismissal of the complaint,
claiming that petitioners have no cause of action against it because it never
extended any loan to them. PSMB maintained that:
a. PSMB and Summa Bank are one and the same entity.
b. the subject properties were mortgaged to secure an obligation covered
by the loan agreement with GCI;
c. the mortgage was valid, having been duly signed by petitioners before a
notary public;
d. the foreclosure proceedings were regular, having complied with the
formalities required by law; and
e. petitioners allowed time to pass without pursuing their purported right
against Summa Bank and/or PSMB.
9. RTC: Ruled in favor of the petitioners.
a. It held that petitioners cannot be faulted for failing to heed the notice of
extrajudicial foreclosure sale by PSMB considering their lack of notice
that Summa Bank had changed its name to PSMB.
10. Aggrieved, PSMB filed an appeal
11. The CA reversed the RTC and further held that petitioners were barred by laches
from asserting any claim on the subject properties considering that despite receipt
of the letter dated June 11, 1984 informing them of the scheduled auction sale, they
failed to attend the sale or file an adverse claim, or to thereafter redeem the subject
properties.
ISSUE: WON PETITIONER’S ARE ALREADY BARRED BY LACHES? YES!
HELD/RATIO
12. Laches operates not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but rather
to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation.
 13. In the case, Since the complaint for annulment was anchored on a claim of mistake,
i.e., that petitioners are the borrowers under the loan secured by the mortgage, the
action should have been brought within four (4) years from its discovery.as the
records disclose, despite notice on June 19, 1984 of the scheduled foreclosure sale,
petitioners, for unexplained reasons, failed to impugn the real estate mortgage and
oppose the public auction sale for a period of more than seven (7) years from said
notice.
14. Verily, to allow petitioners to assert their right to the subject properties now after
their unjustified failure to act within a reasonable time would be grossly unfair to
PSMB, and perforce should not be sanctioned.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 27, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 91999 is hereby AFFIRMED.