This is a petition for indirect contempt in connection with respondents alleged defiance

FIRST DIVISION of the December 16, 2004 Decision[1] rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 159962,
ZENAIDA M. LIMBONA, G.R. No. 173290 entitled Balindong v. Limbona, as well as the Resolutions[2] dated June 6, August 15,

Petitioner, and December 12, 2005.

Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ.
The facts as stated in G.R. No. 159962 are as follows:
HON. JUDGE RALPH S. LEE of

Regional Trial Court-Quezon City,

Br. 83, MAYOR ANWAR BERUA Investigating prosecutor Ringcar Pinote conducted the
preliminary investigation and found probable cause to indict the
BALINDONG, LT. COL. JALANDONI private [respondents] for the offense of Double Murder with Multiple
Frustrated Murder. As a result, an Information was filed in the
COTA, MAYOR AMER ODEN Promulgated: Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12,
charging [them] with the crime of Double Murder with Multiple
BALINDONG & ALI BALINDONG,
Frustrated Murder.
Respondents. November 20, 2006
The herein [private respondents] filed an urgent motion for
reinvestigation. In an Order dated 23 July 1998, Acting Presiding
Judge Rasad Balindong granted the petition and ordered the records
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x returned to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Marawi City.

The said office issued a Resolution dated 28 August

DECISION 1998 modifying the offense charged against Anwar Balindong, Lt.
Col. Jalandoni D. Cota, and PO1 Kennedy Balindong to double
homicide with multiple frustrated homicide, and dropping the charges
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: against Amer Oden Balindong and Ali Balindong. In the meantime,
the Supreme Court transferred the venue from Lanao del Sur
to Cotabato City x x x.
The [petitioner] filed a petition for review of the Provincial
Prosecutors Resolution before the Department of Justice (DOJ) under
then Secretary Serafin Cuevas. In a Resolution dated 04 August 1999,
the latter modified the said Resolution and directed the filing of two
1|Page Rule 71 Contempt
 informations for murder with attempted murder, two informations for
frustrated murder and an information for attempted murder against all
the private [respondents]. The [latter] filed a motion for
reconsideration on 01 September 1999. Meanwhile, five amended
informations were filed on 04 October 1999 for the aforementioned
offenses before the RTC of Maguindanao, Cotabato City, docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 2503, No. 2573, No. 2574, No. 2575, and No.
2576. On 01 December 1999, the DOJ denied the petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
Subsequently, the venue was again transferred
from Cotabato City to Cagayan de Oro City. x x x
On 01 January 2000, the [private respondents] filed a second
motion for reconsideration of Secretary Cuevass Resolution dated 01
December 1999. This was denied with finality in a Resolution
dated 16 March 2000 by then Acting DOJ Sec. Artemio Tuquero, with
a warning that no further pleadings would be entertained. Seven
months later, on 10 October 2000, the [private respondents] filed a
third Motion for Reconsideration before the DOJ.
In the meantime, x x x the venue of the above cases [was]
transferred from Cagayan de Oro to a Special Criminal Court
in Quezon City.
x x x Criminal Cases No. 2503 and No. 2573 were re-raffled to the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 219 and re-docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-01-99892 and Q-01-99893. Criminal Cases Nos. 2574 to 76
were re-raffled to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 227, and re-
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-100542 to 44.
On 12 March 2001, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez
resolved to grant the [private respondents] third motion for
reconsideration x x x
xxxx
Seeking to have Secretary Perezs 12 March 2001 Resolution
annulled, [petitioner] filed her own motion for reconsideration with
2|Page Rule 71 Contempt
the DOJ. Upon denial of said motion, [she] filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 22 May 2003, the latter granted the petition for certiorari,
reversed the DOJ Resolution dated 12 March 2001 and reinstated the
DOJ Resolutions dated 04 August 1999, 01 December 1999 and 16
March 2000.
xxxx
The petitioners thereupon filed the present petition [G.R. No.
159462] for certiorari under Rule 45 before this Court. x x x
[O]n 03 December 2003, Pairing Judge Jose Paneda of the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 219, caused the issuance of warrants of arrest
against herein petitioners for the above-mentioned cases. The latter
moved for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in this Court,
which was granted on 18 February 2004 x x x.[3]
On December 16, 2004, the Court thru Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario
rendered a decision in G.R. No. 159962 affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals
and sustaining the Resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ) dated August 4, 1999
directing the filing of two Informations for Murder with Attempted Murder, two
Informations for Frustrated Murder and an Information for Attempted Murder against
all the private respondents; as well as the December 1, 1999 and March 16, 2000
Resolutions of the DOJ denying private respondents motions for reconsideration. The
Court also directed the implementation of the warrants of arrest issued against them. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 22 May 2003 which annulled the DOJ
Resolution dated 12 March 2001 and reinstated its Resolutions issued
 on 04 August 1999, 01 December 1999 and 16 March 2000 is noted in our Resolution dated 02 March 2005, there is no longer any
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 obstacle to the implementation of the existing warrants of arrest.
February 2004 by this Court is hereby LIFTED, and the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 219, is ORDERED to implement its
Resolution dated 03 December 2003 relative to the issuance of
warrants of arrest against all the accused. The said Court is directed to Unfazed, respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification.[6]
submit a report thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of In a Resolution[7] dated August 15, 2005, the Court expunged said motion from
Justice for its information and appropriate action.
the records and resolved to:

SO ORDERED.[4]
Private respondents motion for reconsideration of said Decision was denied
x x x (b) ADMONISH [private respondents] and their counsel to pay
heed to the directives of this Court and against misrepresenting the
import of its rulings and to desist from any further unauthorized
pleadings UNDER PAIN OF CONTEMPT.

with finality in a Resolution[5] dated June 6, 2005, thus:

Meanwhile, an Entry of Judgment[8] was issued by the Court certifying that the
The Court notes that [private respondents] have adduced no aforesaid Decision rendered on December 16, 2004 had become final and executory
substantial or cogent arguments to warrant a modification of our
Decision. They merely rehashed the arguments in their petition, which on July 5, 2005.
we have already passed upon. Wherefore, the Motion for
Reconsideration and its supplement thereto are DENIED with
FINALITY. NO FURTHER PLEADINGS WILL BE
ENTERTAINED. Due to the voluntary inhibition of Judge Paneda of RTC-QC Branch 219,
Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-99892 and Q-01-99893 were re-raffled to RTC-QC Branch
100 presided by Judge Marie Christine A. Jacob (Judge Jacob). On September 1, 2005,
In view of the denial with finality of the Motion for
Reconsideration and acting on the clarificatory letter of Branch Clerk private respondents filed before said trial court a Motion for Determination of Probable
of Court Edwin Paredes of Quezon City RTC, Branch 219, which we
3|Page Rule 71 Contempt
Cause and/or Motion to Dismiss the Case and Quash Warrant of Arrest. [9] Pending the
trial courts action on said motion, this Court issued another Resolution[10] on December
12, 2005 ordering Judge Jacob to enforce the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Paneda
on December 3, 2003 with utmost dispatch and to submit a report thereon.
Pursuant thereto, Judge Jacob issued an Order dated January 4, 2006, denying
private respondents motion for determination of probable cause/to dismiss/quash and
ordered the enforcement of the arrest warrants against them. [11] Thereafter, Judge Jacob
inhibited[12] herself from the aforesaid cases and the same were re-raffled to Branch 83
of the trial court presided by respondent Judge Ralph S. Lee.
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration[13] of the January 4,
2006 Order of Judge Jacob and a Motion to Re-Determine the Existence or Non-
Existence of Probable Cause which May Even Warrant Dismissal-Even of the
Appropriate Charges of Homicides, Frustrated and Attempted Homicides. [14]
In the meantime, petitioner secured copies of the arrest warrants in order to
facilitate respondents long overdue arrests and was dismayed to discover copies of such
warrants stamped EXPIRED.[15] Thus on March 31, 2006, the prosecution filed a Motion
for the Issuance of Alias Warrants of Arrest before Branch 83. When the trial court failed
to act immediately on said motion, the prosecution filed a Motion for Inhibition of Judge
4|Page Rule 71 Contempt
Lee on May 23, 2006 not knowing that on May 12, 2006, respondent judge had issued
an Order[16] granting respondents motion for re-determination of probable cause and
ordered the down-grading of the subject offenses to Double Homicide with Attempted
Homicide, Double Frustrated Homicide and Attempted Homicide, before eventually
inhibiting[17] himself from the aforesaid cases on July 14, 2006.
Hence, the present recourse contending that private respondents are guilty of
indirect contempt for stubbornly filing motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases
and/or the re-determination of probable cause notwithstanding the Decision and
Resolution of the Court as to the proper charge against them.
Petitioner also avers that respondent judge set aside this Courts final Decision
in G.R. No. 159962 by down-grading the offenses charged against respondents. His
seeming indifference to look into the highly suspicious act of stamping the warrants
EXPIRED as well as his failure to act on the prosecutions Manifestation with Motion
for the Issuance of the Alias Warrants of Arrest as well as its subsequent Motion for
Inhibition is an affront to this Court as an institution. [18]
In their Comment, private respondents contend that while there is no dispute that this
Courts Decision in G.R. No. 159962 was final and executory, it was not a decision on
the merits but upon a mere technicality from which not even the principle of res
judicata has set in.[19] They insist that the phrase with which to charge the accused found
in the Decision clearly indicates that the issue of the appropriate crimes with which to
charge the accused was left unresolved by this Court. They argue that resolving said
issue is a task which lies with the trial court (Branch 83 in this case), as it involves
evidentiary matters.[20] Respondents likewise maintain that the instant petition should be
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds because indirect contempt proceedings involve a
full-blown trial which can only be had before the trial courts. [21]
The sole issue for resolution is whether respondents are guilty of indirect contempt.
We rule in the affirmative.
Pertinent portions of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, read:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may
be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
xxxx
5|Page Rule 71 Contempt
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order or judgment of a court, x x x.
xxxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
xxxx
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority
of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede
the due administration of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice
or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration
of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party litigants or their
witnesses during litigation. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts
and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the
due administration of justice.[22]

The charge must be filed before the court against which the indirect contempt
was committed.[23] Respondents contention that the petition should be dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds because indirect contempt proceedings involve a full-blown trial
which can only be had before the trial court lacks merit. It is a well-established rule that
the power to determine the existence of contempt of court rests exclusively with the
court contemned.[24]
Section 5, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that:
Sec. 5. Where charge to be filed. Where the charge for
indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court
or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed
by it, the charge may be filed with such court. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the present case, private respondents are guilty of indirect contempt for filing the
following:
(1) Urgent Motion for Clarification of the dispositive portion of
the December 16, 2004 Decision in G.R. No. 159962;
6|Page Rule 71 Contempt
(2) Motion for Determination of Probable Cause and/or Motion to
Dismiss the Case and to Quash Warrant of Arrest (with
prayer for suspension of the enforcement of warrant of arrest
pending hearing) filed on September 1, 2005 before Branch
100 of the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Christine
Jacob;
(3) Motion for Reconsideration of Judge Jacobs January 4, 2006
Order denying their motion dated September 1, 2005 filed on
January 24, 2006;
(4) Motion to Re-Determine the Existence or Non-Existence of
Probable Cause Which May Even Warrant Dismissal- Even
of the Appropriate Charges of Homicide, Frustrated and
Attempted Homicide filed before Branch 83 on February 21,
2006.
The December 16, 2004 Decision of the Court in G.R. No. 159962 clearly
sustained the filing of two Informations for Murder with Attempted Murder, two
Informations for Frustrated Murder and an Information for Attempted Murder against
private respondents. The Court even directed the implementation of the arrest warrants
against them. This, notwithstanding, private respondents filed a motion for
determination of probable cause and/or the dismissal of the case against them. Worse,
this was done after being admonished by the Court to pay heed to its directives under
pain of contempt.
With the finality of this Courts Decision, all issues relative to the determination of the
proper offenses with which to charge private respondents had been laid to rest. In
continuing to file pleadings and motions purportedly seeking for the clarification of the
proper charges against them, respondents merely rehashed their tired arguments and
unavailing assertions. They did not only succeed in delaying the conduct of the trial of
the aforesaid cases but also willfully and deliberately flouted this Courts directives with
their stubborn refusal to abide by our pronouncement and their incessant nit-picking of
issues already resolved with finality.
In granting respondents motions for reconsideration and re-determination of
probable cause, and consequently down-grading the charges against respondents in his
Order dated May 12, 1006, Judge Lee contravened this Courts directive in G.R. No.
159962 and in the subject Resolutions. He impudently substituted his own judgment for
that of this Court. Had he thoroughly reviewed the records of the case, it would have
been impossible for him to misread the import of said Decision and Resolutions.
7|Page Rule 71 Contempt
In sum, we find that private respondents persistent attempts to raise issues long
since laid to rest by a final and executory judgment constitute contumacious defiance of
the authority of this Court and impede the speedy administration of justice.[25]
Under Section 7 of Rule 71, if the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher
rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment not
exceeding six months, or both.
In Alcantara v. Ponce,[26] this Court found the incessant filing by the
respondents and their counsels of pleadings and motions with the ultimate purpose of
convincing the Court to give due course to their petition despite its categorical and final
resolve to deny the same as constituting indirect contempt and ordered them to pay a
fine of P2,000.00 each.
In Heirs of Trinidad De Leon v. Court of Appeals,[27] we held that respondent
corporations insistent filing of an action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages
involving the same parcels of land which this Court already decided with finality as
constituting indirect contempt and fined it in the amount of P10,000.00.
 We are well aware of the legal precept that the power of the court to punish
contemptuous acts should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. However, where there is clear and contumacious defiance of, or refusal to
obey this Court's Decision, as in the instant case, we will not hesitate to exercise our
inherent power if only to maintain respect to this Court, for without which the
administration of justice may falter or fail.[28] Under the circumstances attendant in the WE CONCUR:

instant case, we find the fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to be meted upon each
respondent to be in order.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
WHEREFORE, private respondents Mayor Anwar Berua Balindong, Lt. Col.
Chief Justice
Jalandoni Cota, Mayor Amer Oden Balindong and Ali Balindong and public respondent
Judge Ralph S. Lee of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83 are found Chairperson

guilty of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and ordered to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND

PESOS (P5,000.00) each payable in full within five days from receipt of this Decision.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

8|Page Rule 71 Contempt

 [1]
Penned by Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario and concurred in by Associate
Justices Reynato S. Puno, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, and Dante O. Tinga; 447 SCRA
201.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 36-37; 44 and 58.
[3]
Supra note 1 at 202-207.
[4]
CERTIFICATION Id. at 213.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[6]
Id. at 38-43.
[7]
Id. at 44.
[8]
Id. at 46-47.
[9]
Id. at 48-57.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the [10]
Id. at 58-59.
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was [11]
Id. at 60-62.
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. [12]
Id. at 63-64.
[13]
Id. at 65-79.
[14]
Id. at 80-106.
[15]
Id. at 107-110.
[16]
Id. at 117-125.
[17]
Id. at 438-439.
[18]
Id. at 10.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN [19]
Id. at 298.
[20]
Id. at 299.
Chief Justice [21]
Id. at 287.
[22]
Lu Ym v. Mahinay, G.R. No. 169476, June 16, 2006, SC E-library.
[23]
Igot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150794, August 17, 2004, 436 SCRA 668, 674.
[24]
Id. at 675, citing San Luis v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 598, 606-607 (2001).
[25]
Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, 200 Phil. 516, 523 (1982).
[26]
G.R. No. 131547, December 15, 2005, 478 SCRA 27, 48 & 60.
[27]
G.R. No. 138660, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 101, 114 & 121.
[28]
Province of Camarines Norte v. Province of Quezon, 419 Phil. 372, 389 (2001).

9|Page Rule 71 Contempt

EN BANC SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, Promulgated:

Respondent.

February 16, 2006

JOSE TEOFILO T. MERCADO and MA. G.R. No. 160445 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

AGNES R. MERCADO,

Petitioners,
Present: RESOLUTION

PANGANBIBAN, CJ.,

PUNO,
QUISUMBING, SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J.:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
*
CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,
*
CALLEJO, SR.,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO, and

GARCIA, JJ.

10 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
 The dignity of the Court can never be protected where infraction of ethics

meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given

cause to break faith that a magistrate is the epitome of honor amongst men. To

preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. [1]

Incidental to the present petition for review on certiorari is the contempt

proceedings against petitioner Jose Teofilo T. Mercado arising from his letter dated

October 18, 2004, insinuating that: (1) the ponente succumbed to the tremendous

pressure of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in denying his petition; (2) the

Security Bank Corporation, respondent, financed the ponentes travel to the United

States; and (3) the ponente gave respondent a go signal to sell his property.

The facts are as follows:

On December 12, 2003, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Ma. Agnes R.

Mercado, petitioners, filed with this Court a Petition for Review

on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (a) Decision[2]dated May 27, 2003 in

CA-G.R. SP No. 71570 dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment;

and (b) its Resolution[3] dated October 23, 2003 denying their motion for

reconsideration.

11 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
 On January 12, 2004, we denied the petition because of petitioners failure

to show that a reversible error had been committed by the Appellate Court. [4]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the Court of

Appeals, in dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment, merely relied on

technical rules of procedure, thereby sacrificing the greater interest of justice and

equity; and that their former counsels gross negligence constitutes extrinsic fraud,

a ground for annulling the trial courts judgment.

On March 24, 2004, we issued a Resolution granting petitioners motion for

reconsideration and reinstating their petition. We likewise required Security Bank

Corporation, respondent, to comment on the petition.

12 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt

In its comment, respondent averred that the issues raised in the present
petition are mere rehash of the issues petitioners raised before the Appellate
Court. As to the alleged negligence of their counsel, respondent pointed out that
the same cannot be considered an extrinsic fraud since through the same counsel,
The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that before a
petition for annulment of judgment can prosper, petitioners must first
file an appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief as required
by the Revised Rules of Court. Having failed to do so, they cannot
avail of an action for annulment of judgment, otherwise, they would
benefit from their inaction or negligence.

they actively pursued and recovered moral damages and attorneys

It bears emphasis at this point that an action for annulment
fees.Furthermore, assuming that petitioners counsel refused to file a motion for of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal.
reconsideration with the trial court, still, they had the option to terminate his

services and hire another; and that they should not have waited for four (4) years
before filing the petition for annulment of judgment.
On June 7, 2004, we issued a Resolution denying the petition on the ground
that petitioners indeed failed to show that a reversible error had been committed
by the Appellate Court.
Petitioners contention that their failure to appeal from the
trial courts Decision was due to the negligence of their former counsel
lacks merit. Records show that they participated actively, through
their counsel, in the proceedings before the trial court. As party
litigants, they were expected to be vigilant of their interests and,
therefore, should monitor the progress of the case. Thus, they should
have constantly communicated with their counsel to be advised of the
status of their case. This way, they would not have lost their
opportunity to appeal.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but we dismissed the same
in our Resolution dated September 15, 2004, thus:
We find no compelling reason to grant petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Granting that petitioners petition for annulment of judgment
is in order, still the same is dismissible. For the remedy of annulment
of judgment to prosper, either one of the following grounds must be
present: (1) extrinsic fraud or (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process. Petitioner argues that their counsels negligence constitutes
extrinsic fraud. We are not convinced. Extrinsic fraud can be
committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is prevented
from presenting his case to the court. This situation is not present in
this case.

13 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt

We reiterate that in G.R. No. 151816, we ruled that the Court
of Appeals did not commit reversible error in dismissing petitioners
petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the trial courts order of
execution of its Decision in favor of respondent bank.
In fine, this Resolution should now write finis to the instant
case.[5]
Petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration but was denied for
being prohibited.
On October 18, 2004, petitioner Mercado wrote Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. stating that:
On March 24, 2004, the Third Division, in its Resolution,
granted our Motion for Reconsideration and even gave due course and
reinstated our petition.
But when I received the Resolution dated June 7,
2004 denying my Petition for Review on July 12, 2004, I immediately
called my counsel, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, on the phone. I asked him
why on earth the ponente denied again my petition on the same
ground for failure of petitioners to show that a reversible error had
been committed by the appellate court? My counsel said,
14 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
the ponente informed him that she has to deny our petition on the
same ground because of the tremendous pressure from the Chief
Justice to favor Security Bank Corporation (SBC). By the way, my
counsel and the ponente are very close and long time friends to each
other. When I heard the bad news, I was so shocked in disbelief. It is
true, what you did is unthinkable, ungodly, and malicious. It is
also very suspicious that after a few days after my conversation
with Atty. Villanueva, he and his family left for London, leaving
my case to the care of one of his Associates. Later on,
the ponente herself left for the U.S.A. to visit her children. Is this
a coincidence? As the saying goes, when there is smoke, there is
fire. Another coincidence, before the receipt of the Resolution dated
June 7, 2004, denying our petition on the basis of SBCs
unsubstantiated Comment, SBC sold our property to M. Miranda
Development Corporation and succeeded in getting a permit to
demolish the four (4) building erected in our property from the Forbes
Park Association, even if the case is still pending and we have not
even filed our Motion for Reconsideration with the Supreme Court,
not to mention the Lis Pendens annotated on the title of the property
in the name of SBC. The person who bought our property from SBC
for P120,000,000.00 is known to my nephew and us. While the buyer
is drinking with my nephew and others, not knowing that one of them
is my nephew, he bragged to them that he just bought the property of
the Mercados in Forbes Park. The buyer said I paid already the
property because SBC told me that they already have the go-signal
from the ponente to sell the property. Few days thereafter, all the
improvements in our property were totally demolished by a
construction company owned by my provincemate in Pampanga by
the name of Mr. Bana, whom I personally met at the site while the
demolition was being carried out.
Have you no conscience at all? Are you not bothered of
the final judgment after life? Is this the legacy you want to impart
to your children and all the Filipino people? What you did to my
 family and I is unforgivable not only to God and to humanity. You
have deprived us of our precious possession without due process.
This is also the abode of my wife, my children, their respective
spouses, and my 10 grandchildren, not to mention the several
household members and their families.
I would like to believe that the Supreme Court is the last
bulwark of true justice. If you, the Chief Justice, himself, are the
first person to make a mockery of our laws, no wonder why
foreign investors do not want to invest in our country because they
said, there is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in
particular. This is in the highest degree of injustice. You have
deprived us of our basic fundamental rights in the protection of
our property without due process. There is no justice in our
courts, the Supreme Court in particular. Do you think I will bring
my case to the Supreme Court by mere question of facts?From our
petition for Annulment of Judgment filed before the Court of Appeals
and now the Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme
Court, my wife and I as petitioners-movants have clearly invoked
LACK OF JURISDICTION on the part of the trial court to adjudicate
respondent SBCs counterclaim for the payment of the loan. As I
understand, when the ground invoked as basis for Annulment of
Judgment is LACK OF JURISDICTION, the Petition may be filed at
any time before it is barred by estoppel or laches, neither of which is
obtaining in our case. Even in laymans legal point of view, this
Petition of ours clearly and undoubtedly raises a question of law.
Please I beg of you, have a last hard look on our Petition and
the two (2) Motions for Reconsideration and let us focus and not
evade on the real issue on LACK OF JURISDICTION on the part
of the trial court and not concentrate on negligence of counsel and
other trivial reasons, etc. Or better yet, please refrain from
15 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
influencing the members of the Third Division. Let them
deliberate regularly on our case or inhibit themselves on the
case. Please let the Institution serve justice, and not individual
pecuniary interests. SBCs counsels are experts in fabrication of facts
and in misleading the courts. I have a feeling that they might as well
have led you to believe something, which is not true. Please dont be
an instrument of their wicked schemes, lest the Supreme Court
itself becomes their means to perpetrate injustice. This is the only
Bank which is not interested in amicable settlement in spite of my
several sincere offers of amicable settlement since the case was filed
in 1995 up to 2003, and these are all in writing and duly received by
SBC.Unfortunately, all my offers were rejected by them.
I wrote you this letter as a last resort because my family and
I looked up at you before as the most honest and upright Chief
Justice. As we would like to know if you really had intervened and
put pressure, as the Ponente said to Atty. Villanueva, (my counsel) to
favor SBC because if you did, then we rest our case. Please enlighten
us before we seek another forum to seek redress the injustices,
sleepless nights, humiliation and embarrassment we suffered. If
we are wrong about you, and I hope we really are wrong, please accept
our appeal for forgiveness and apologies. GOD is my witness, that
what I have told you is the truth.
Mr. Chief Justice, the Filipino people know how religious
you are. Please do what a religious man ought to do in serving
justice. Please live up to our, as well as HIS expectations. (Emphasis
supplied)
 On November 2, 2004, Chief Justice Davide required Mercados lawyer, Atty.
Jose P. Villanueva, to comment on the letter and show cause why he should not be held
[6]
in contempt of court.
On November 17, 2004, the Courts Third Division ordered Mercado to
personally appear on November 22, 2004 and show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court.[7]
On the scheduled date, Mercado, together with Atty. Pablo G. Macapagal, his
new counsel, appeared before the Third Division and swore to the truth of the letter he
wrote.[8] He manifested that he only stated therein what Atty. Villanueva told him that
his petition was denied for the second time because of the tremendous pressure from the
Chief Justice. He further manifested that during the wake of Atty. Villanuevas mother,
he (Atty. Villanueva) pointed to Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, bragging that she
is a very very good, close and long time friend of his. [9] However, while stating this,
Mercado referred to Justice Conchita Carpio Morales as Justice Gutierrez.[10]
Forthwith, the Third Division issued in open court a Resolution[11] directing
Atty. Macapagal to submit a written explanation why Mercado should not be held in
contempt of Court.
For his part, Atty. Villanueva submitted a comment,[12] strongly denying
Mercados allegations in his letter. He denied having told petitioners that their petition
had to be denied again because there was a tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice
in favor of Security Bank Corporation. He also stressed that there was no correlation
between the ponentes trip to the United States and his trip to London. He explained that
he and his family went to London to attend the graduation of his daughter, Cherriemaya
Veloso Villanueva. To substantiate this, he submitted a photocopy of LondonSchool of
16 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
Economics (LSE) and Political Science Presentation Ceremonies where the name of his
daughter, Cherriemaya Veloso Villanueva, is listed as one of the successful
graduates. He likewise submitted a photocopy of his passport indicating his departure
for London on July 14, 2004 and his arrival in the Philippines on July 27, 2004. In
addition, he said he never met anyone from respondent bank, including its lawyers, and
that there is no truth to Mercados statement regarding his nephews alleged encounter
with the new owners of the subject property.
On December 13, 2004, Mercado submitted his explanation[13] why he should
not be punished for contempt of court. He claimed that the contemptuous statements in
his letter merely reiterate the tenor of Atty. Villanuevas statements. He offered an
apology, explaining that he wrote the letter while he was under the impulse of personal
stress as he was losing his residential house.
On January 26, 2005, the Third Division ordered both Mercado and Atty.
Villanueva to appear on February 21, 2005 to elucidate their respective positions.
Mercado testified that it was Atty. Villanueva who informed him that
the ponente is Justice Gutierrez. Atty. Villanueva even bragged that she is his very, very
close friend.
For his part, Atty. Villanueva testified that it was Mercado who informed him
that Justice Gutierrez is the ponente. He also confirmed that she attended the wake of
his mother. But he denied Mercados claim that he pointed to Justice Gutierrez and said
that she is his close friend.[14]
 Thereafter, the Third Division designated Court of Appeals Justice Renato C.
Dacudao as Commissioner to receive evidence on the factual issues involved in the
[15]
contempt incident.
On May 18, 2005, Justice Dacudao submitted his Investigation, Report and
Recommendation. He found Mercado guilty of improper conduct tending to bring
the authority and the administration of justice by the Court into disrespect when
he openly belittled, degraded, and embarrassed the Highest Court of the land,
particularly the Chief Justice x x x. However, he held that there was no showing that
he acted with malice and/or in bad faith or that he was properly motivated. Thus,
he recommended that Mercado be fined in the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
We cannot sustain Justice Dacudaos finding that Mercado did not act with
malice or bad faith in imputing those derogatory and disrespectful remarks against Chief
Justice Davide and the ponente.
Bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong.[16] It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.[17] Malice is of the
same genre. It connotes a sinister motive.
Mercados addressing such letter to Chief Justice Davide is a perfect illustration
of bad faith and malice tending directly to degrade the administration of justice. It
transgresses the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticisms bringing into
disrepute, not only the authority and integrity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente,
but also of the entire Judiciary. While feigning to be searching for truth on whether Chief
Justice Davide indeed exerted tremendous pressure to the ponente, he repeatedly
humiliated him and the Judiciary in the most loutish and insolent manner. He accused
17 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
him of doing an unthinkable, ungodly, and malicious act and of depriving his
(Mercados) family of their basic fundamental rights in the protection of (their) property
without due process. He concluded that what Chief Justice Davide did to his family is
unforgivable not only to God and to humanity. In an insulting and insolent tenor, he
stated that if the Chief Justice, himself, is the first person to make a mockery of our laws,
then there is no wonder why foreign investors do not want to invest in our country.
Furthermore, he alleged that an irregularity or bribery attended the denial of his
petition for review. He insinuated that the travels of Atty. Villanueva and
the ponente abroad were financed by respondent bank, stating that when there is smoke,
there is fire. He also recklessly accused the ponente of giving respondent bank a go-
signal to sell his property. In this backdrop, he asked Chief Justice Davide to refrain
from influencing the members of the Third Division; let them deliberate regularly on the
case or inhibit themselves on the case; and let the Institution serve justice, and not
individual pecuniary interests.
Finally, he condemned the entire Judiciary by saying there is no justice in our
courts, the Supreme Court in particular. And with impudence, he threatened Chief
Justice Davide to enlighten him before he seeks another forum to seek redress for the
injustices, sleepless nights, humiliation and embarrassment his family suffered.
Without doubt, Mercados letter is marked with malice, bad faith, and gross
disrespect. He committed a remarkable feat of character assassination and honor
vilification. Contrary to his claim that he is just verifying the truth of Atty. Villanuevas
statements, the words in his letter are more accusatory than inquisitorial. What is
disconcerting is that his accusations have no basis in fact and in law.Obviously, they
caused intense pain and humiliation on the part of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.
 The Resolution of the Third Division of this Court dated September 15,
2004 denying Mercados motion for reconsideration is well explained. A principle
almost repeated to satiety is that an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is
not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. A party must have first availed of
appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief before an action for annulment can
prosper. Its obvious rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or
negligence. Also, the action for annulment of judgment must be based either
on (a)extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.[18] Having failed
to avail of the remedies and there being a clear showing that neither of the grounds was
present, the petition must be dismissed. Only a disgruntled litigant would find such
legal disposition unacceptable.
Mercado bewails the denial by the Third Division of his petition through a mere Minute
Resolution and after reinstating the petition. Apparently, he finds the Courts manner
of denial and change of heart unusual and casts sinister undertone to them.
In In Re Laureta,[19] we ruled that the Court is not duty-bound to render
signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or
minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given depending on its evaluation of a
case. In the same case, we held that the recall of a due course Order after a review of
the records of the case is a common occurrence in the Court.Like the respondents in
the said case, Mercado should not think that it is only his petition which has been
subjected to such recall.
The Third Division initially denied Mercados petition because it is apparent on
its face that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing his petition
for annulment of judgment. Considering his motion for reconsideration alleging that the
Appellate Court merely relied on technical rules of procedure and that his former counsel
18 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
committed gross negligence, the Third Division took the most prudent course by
reinstating the petition. Now, after considering the petition and the comment thereon,
the Third Division was convinced that, indeed, the Appellate Court did not commit any
reversible error. Is this irregular? The answer is a resounding no. The reinstatement of
a petition does not guarantee that it will be subsequently granted. Otherwise, the
filing of comment and subsequent pleadings would be an exercise in futility.
Now, in a bid to escape liability for contempt, Mercado invokes freedom of
speech and privacy of communication.
We are not persuaded.
A person charged with contempt of court for his utterances which clearly
constitute contempt may not ordinarily escape liability by merely invoking the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. Liberty of speech must not be confused
with abuse of such liberty. When he attributed those contemptuous remarks to Chief
Justice Davide and the ponente, Mercado abused such liberty. His statements cast
aspersions to their reputation and integrity and create a distrust to the Judiciary.
The fact that Mercados letter was addressed only to the Chief Justice does not
rinse it of its contemptuous character. In In Re Laureta,[20] we ruled that letters
addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial
functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
court.
Accordingly, we hold Mercado guilty of indirect contempt of court.
 Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may
be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
xxxxxx
d. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
xxxxxx
As for Atty. Villanueva, while Justice Dacudao did not categorically state that
he (Atty. Villanueva) told Mercado that Chief Justice Davide exerted tremendous
pressure on the ponente, the reason why the petition was dismissed for the second time,
however, we are inclined to believe that Atty. Villanueva gave such information to
Mercado. Not only that, Atty. Villanueva also revealed the name of the ponente; that he
and the ponente have known each other since 1964; and that the ponente would be at
the wake of his mother, thus:
19 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
After a careful and conscientious examination of the
evidence adduced in the instant case, the undersigned investigator is
fully convinced that it was only through Atty. Villanueva that
petitioner could have learned or known the name of the ponente in the
case.
As between petitioner and Atty. Villanueva, the undersigned
investigator in inclined to give more credence to the testimony of
petitioner. Not only was petitioner consistent, firm, and candid and
detailed in his testimony, but he was also able to corroborate his
claims, by submitting his diary which contained vital entries and by
presenting the testimony of his nephew. x x x
Moreover, it was admitted by Atty. Villanueva that he
and Justice Gutierrez have known each other since 1964 and that
Justice Gutierrez was in the wake of his mother. These admissions
tend to strengthen the allegations of petitioner that Atty.
Villanueva was the one who told him the name of the ponente;
that Atty. Villanueva told him that he and the ponente are very
close; and that when petitioner attended the wake of Atty.
Villanuevas mother, he was told by Atty. Villanueva that Justice
Gutierrez, the ponente, was coming.
Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a
lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body.Further, Rule 15.07 provides that a lawyer must
impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness. Atty. Villanueva took the forbidden course. In informing Mercado that he
was a very very good, close and long time friend of the ponente, Atty. Villanueva
impressed upon the former that he can obtain a favorable disposition of his
case. However, when his petition was dismissed twice, Mercados expectation
crumbled. This prompted him to hurl unfounded, malicious, and disrespectful
accusations against Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.
We have repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold assurances to their
clients. A lawyer who guarantees the successful outcome of a litigation will exert heavy
pressure and employ any means to win the case at all costs. But when the case is lost, he
will blame the courts, placing them under a cloud of suspicion. As what happened in
this case, Atty. Villanuevas statements led Mercado, not only to suspect but also to
believe, that the entire Court, together with Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, could
be pressured or influenced,
Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to
courts and the judicial officers.[21] Atty. Villanuevas conduct, no doubt, degraded the
integrity and dignity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente and this Court as well.
Thus, we find Atty. Villanueva also guilty of indirect contempt of court.
On the appropriate penalty, the general rule is that courts have inherent power
to impose a penalty for contempt reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the
offense. And that the degree of punishment for contempt is said to lie within the sound
discretion of the court.[22] Considering the circumstances obtaining herein, we believe
20 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
that Mercado and Atty. Villanueva should be fined P50,000.00 each and warned that a
repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty.
One last word. The reason for the inherent power of courts to punish for
contempt is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial
institution. Without such guarantee, the institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.[23] Thus, we must act to preserve its honor and integrity from assaults of
disrespect. One reason why respect of the public for the Judiciary has diminished is
because of unscrupulous lawyers who imply that judges and justices can be influenced
or bribed. Such conduct has no place in the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Atty. Jose P. Villanueva are
declared GUILTY of indirect contempt of court. They are FINED P50,000.00 each
and WARNED that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Villanuevas personal record
in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
 WE CONCUR:

(On leave)

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Associate Justice Associate Justice

Chief Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA CANCIO C. GARCIA

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

21 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
 [13]
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby Compliance and Explanation dated November 30, 2004, id. pp. 403-409.
certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation [14]
TSN, February 21, 2005, p. 12.
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
[15]
See Resolution, rollo, p. 679.
[16]
Spiegel v. Beacon Participation, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007.
[17]
Air France v. Carrascoso, L-21438, September 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
[18]
Salonga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111478, March 13, 1997, 269 SCRA 534.
Chief Justice [19]
G.R. No. 68635, March 12, 1987, 148 SCRA 382, 417.
[20]
Supra.
[21]
Fernandez v. Verzola, A. M. No. CA-04-40, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 369.
[22]
17 Am Jur 2d 105, citing United Marine Div. of I.L.A. v. Commonwealth, 193 Va
773, 71 SE2d 159, cert den 344 US 893, 97 L Ed 690, 73 S Ct 212.
*
On leave. [23]
See Salcedo v. Hernandez, supra.
[1]
See Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 (1935).
[2]
Rollo, pp. 48-60. Penned by Justice Sergio L. Pestao (deceased) and concurred in by
Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and Justice Noel G. Tijam.
[3]
Id., pp. 80-83.
[4]
See Resolution, id. p. 151.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 320-327.
[6]
Letter dated November 2, 2004, id., p. 393.
[7]
Resolution dated January 26, 2005, id., pp. 413-415.
[8]
TSN, November 22, 2004, p. 27.
[9]
TSN, November 22, 2005, p. 36.
[10]
Id. pp. 37-41.
[11]
Rollo, p. 65.
[12]
Letter dated November 22, 2004, id., pp. 366-369.

22 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128686. May 28, 2004]
HONORATO ESPINOSA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
PRESIDING JUDGE, Branch 23, RTC Iloilo City and Sps. RODOLFO
and VIOLETA ALCANTARA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] dated October 11, 1996 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39206, dismissing the petition for the annulment of
the Decision[2] dated May 15, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (RTC) in
Civil Case No. 18622.
The antecedents are recited below.
After finding through a relocation survey that a portion of their Lot 933-A-1-A,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-69242 (Iloilo), was occupied by the
petitioner Honorato Espinosas (Espinosa) restaurant, known as Tatoys Manokan and
Seafoods Restaurant, the private respondents Rodolfo and Violeta Alcantara
(Alcantaras) filed an action for ejectment against Espinosa before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Iloilo City (MTC), on November 4, 1985. [3]
Espinosa denied the encroachment. Also through his counsel then, Atty. Rex
Castillon, Espinosa succeeded in having the case tried as in a regular case, instead of a
hearing under the Rules on Summary Procedure. [4]
23 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
After trial, the MTC rendered judgment on February 6, 1989 in favor of Espinosa,
dismissing the complaint and ordering the Alcantara spouses to pay moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit. It found that
Espinosa did not encroach on the lot of the Alcantaras as his restaurant was situated
on Lot 933-A-18 which he owns.[5]
The Alcantaras appealed the decision to the RTC.[6] Its Presiding Judge, Hon. Tito
G. Gustilo, noted that the lot of the Alcantaras and the adjoining lots, including those of
Espinosa and the city street, are all titled properties. On that basis and with the
concurrence of the parties and their respective lawyers, the Judge issued
an Order on October 2, 1989, commissioning the Bureau of Lands to conduct a
relocation survey for the purpose of determining whether Espinosas restaurant has
indeed encroached on the Alcantaras lot.[7]
Judge Gustilo presided over the ocular inspection and relocation survey on October
2, 1989. Present were the parties and their lawyers.[8]
In due time, the Bureau of Lands through its authorized representative submitted
to the RTC the result of the relocation survey with the corresponding sketch plan. [9] The
sketch plan indicates that Espinosas restaurant encroaches on eighty-nine (89) square
meters of the Alcantaras Lot 933-A-1-A and also on a portion of the city street known
as Melo Boulevard and designated as Lot 933-A-1-B.[10] Said street lot used to be a part
of the bigger property owned by the Alcantaras predecessor-in-interest from whom the
City of Iloilo purchased the street lot.[11]
During the relocation survey, Judge Gustilo proposed a compromise settlement to
the parties and their lawyers whereby should the relocation survey attest to the
encroachment on the Alcantaras lot Espinosa would buy the encroached area at P250.00
per square meter from the Alcantaras. Espinosa agreed to the proposal at the
time. However, when the Judge invited the parties and their counsels to his chambers to
explore or pursue the proposed compromise agreement on three (3) occasions, namely:
on December 27, 1989, April 2, 1990 and April 5, 1990, Espinosa rejected the proffered
settlement.[12]
On May 15, 1990, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the Alcantaras,
reversing the MTC decision and ordering Espinosa to vacate the lot in question and to
pay the Alcantaras moral damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs of
suit.[13]
 Espinosa elevated the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals through a Petition For
Review which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 22398.[14]
On September 6, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in the case,
denying Espinosas Petition For Review.[15]
Unfazed, Espinosa elevated the CA Decision to this Court and his Petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 111752. This Court denied the Petition in
a Resolution dated February 27, 1995 for which the corresponding Entry of
Judgment was made on August 18, 1995.[16]
Less than three (3) months later, on December 6, 1995, Espinosa, this time through
his present counsel, Atty. Honorio S. Laguilles, Jr., filed a petition for annulment of
judgment with the Court of Appeals. He alleged that the promulgation of the RTC
decision was attended with extrinsic fraud and denial of due process. [17] In his
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, however, Espinosa was silent on
the petitions he earlier filed with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 22398) and this
Court (G.R. No. 111752) and the decision or resolution on the petitions. [18]
In the challenged Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
annulment of judgment.[19] It also declared Espinosa and his present counsel in contempt
of court and fined each of them One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) for forum-shopping.
Consequently, the issues before this Court are (a) whether the RTC Decision may
be annulled on the ground of extrinsic fraud and denial of due process, and (b) whether
Espinosa and his present counsel are guilty of forum-shopping.
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. [20] Extrinsic
fraud, the ground upon which Espinosa relies upon, is one of the recognized grounds for
annulment of judgment.[21] However, the mere allegation of extrinsic fraud does not
instantly warrant the annulment of a final judgment, as the same has to be definitively
established by the claimant. Espinosa has failed to prove extrinsic fraud.
Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act of prevailing party committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from exhibiting
fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing
party.[22] The extrinsic fraud complained off by Espinosa refers to the act of conducting
the relocation survey while the case was on appeal to the RTC. Espinosa suggests that
it was highly questionable on the part of the RTC to have ordered such a survey since
24 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
the case was being heard on appeal, and given the nature of an ejectment action, only
the submission of memoranda by the parties are required. [23]
Clearly, the conduct of the relocation survey was not occasioned at the instigation
of the prevailing party (the Alcantaras), but upon lawful order by the RTC. Moreover,
the procedure was consented to by all of the parties and their lawyers. The relocation
survey was ordered for the purpose of conclusively ascertaining a factual issue, i.e., the
exact location of the structure belonging to Espinosa in relation to the lot of the
Alcantaras. This is a proper question for the RTC to have inquired into, and well within
its competence as it is a trier of facts. Every court has the inherent power to do all things
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction.[24]
Even assuming that the order for the relocation survey is irregular on the premise
that RTC may decide the appealed case based only on the records and pleadings before
it, such lapse is procedural in character only. The findings would not be ipso
facto binding on the parties who consented to the survey, but would only form part of
the proofs on which the trial court would base its decision upon. Despite such relocation
survey, Espinosa was not prevented from challenging the findings before the RTC. Nor
was Espinosa prevented from arguing against the adoption of such findings before the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, considering that he had availed of the proper
appellate processes before these higher courts.
Indeed, Espinosa raised the same issue concerning the alleged impropriety of the
relocation survey ordered by the RTC before the CA in CA G.R. SP No. 22398. It was
rejected by the appellate court in its decision in the said case. The same issue was raised
again in G.R. No. 111752 before this Court, albeit unsuccessfully. A claim of extrinsic
fraud would presuppose that the claimant was prevented exhibiting fully his side of the
case. On the contrary, Espinosa has had multiple opportunities to raise the same issue
on the impropriety of the relocation survey before the courts. His claim has acquired the
veneer of a scratchy vinyl record that repeats its hoary tune ad nauseum to the general
effect of irritation.
Espinosa claims that he was deprived of due process and blames his former
counsel, Atty. Castillon, for having consented to the relocation survey, implicitly
suggesting that the lawyer too had an active hand in denying him due
process. Indubitably, Espinosa and his former counsel agreed to the relocation survey,
were present during the survey and are thus estopped from questioning its very conduct
in the first place. When a party retains the services of a lawyer, he is bound by his
counsel's decisions regarding the conduct of the case. The general rule is that the client
is bound by the mistakes of his counsel, save when the negligence of counsel is so gross,
reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. [25]
Citing the cases of Legarda v. Court of Appeals[26] and Alabanzas v. IAC[27],
Espinosa invokes the exception to the general rule that a client need not be bound by the
actions of counsel who is grossly and palpably negligent. These very cases cited
demonstrate why Atty. Castillons acts hardly constitute gross or palpable
negligence. Legarda provides a textbook example of gross negligence on the part of the
counsel. The Court therein noted the following negligent acts of lawyer Antonio
Coronel:
Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to
be expected that he would extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the
petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner.
After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by private
respondent, said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an
extension of time to file the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence,
petitioner was declared in default on motion of private respondent's counsel. After the
evidence of private respondent was received ex-parte, a judgment, was rendered by the
trial court.
Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the
same set aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory.[28]
Gross negligence on the part of the counsel in Legarda is clearly established,
characterized by a series of negligent omissions that led to a final executory judgment
against the client, who never once got her side aired before the court of law before
finality of judgment set in. The actions of Atty. Castillon hardly measure up to this
standard of gross negligence exhibited in the Legarda case.
On the other hand, in Alabanzas counsel failed to file an appellants brief, thereby
causing the dismissal of the appeal before the Court of Appeals. [29] Despite such
inexcusable and fatal lapse, the Court ruled that it was not sufficient to establish such
gross or palpable negligence that justified a deviation from the rule that clients should
be bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel. [30] It strikes as odd that Espinosa
should cite Alabanzas in the first place, considering that the lapse of the counsel therein
25 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
was far worse than that imputed to Atty. Castillon, yet the Court anyway still refused to
apply the exception to the general rule.
Besides, there is nothing in the record that would tend to establish that Atty.
Castillon performed less than ably in representing Espinosa. On the contrary, as noted
by the Alcantaras in their Comment, Atty. Castillon is a law professor on Property and
a distinguished practitioner in the City of Iloilo.[31] Moreover, Atty. Castillon served as
Espinosas counsel for more than ten years.[32] Espinosas defeat is attributable not to the
purported incompetence of his former lawyer but to the untenability of his legal position.
And even if Atty. Castillon committed a tactical error in consenting to the relocation
survey, this was done out of the honest belief that the survey would benefit his clients
cause. Just because it did not, Espinosa and his new counsel could not just turn about
and pin the blame on the patsy of their convenient choice.
Another matter cited by the Court of Appeals is also worth noting. The Petition for
Annulment of Judgment is silent as to when Espinosa received a copy of the impugned
decision, or when he discovered the alleged extrinsic fraud. [33] An action based on
extrinsic fraud must be filed within four (4) years from its discovery. [34] Since the
timeliness of the Petition could not be ascertained, it could have very well been
dismissed on that ground alone.
Anent the issue of forum-shopping, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
finding that Espinosa and his present counsel, Atty. Laguilles, Jr., violated the rules on
non-forum shopping. Revised Circular No. 28-91 (as amended) was already in force
when the petition in CA G.R. SP No. 39206 was filed on October 11, 1996. Under the
Circular, which has since been incorporated into the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,[35] the petitioner has to attest that he has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other tribunal or agency. If such an action or proceeding has been instituted, the
petitioner is obliged to state the status of the same.[36]
In his Verification, Certification and Affidavit of Merit, which contains the
certificate of non-forum shopping in the petition in CA G.R. SP No. 39206, Espinosa
and his new counsel did not mention the petitions in CA G.R. SP No. 22398 and G.R.
No. 111752 and the decisions or resolutions thereon. In his present petition before this
Court, Espinosa does mention the existence of the previous cases in his Verification With
Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping, though with the disclaimer that those cases involved
different issues than those addressed in the current petition. The belated compliance,
however, is of no moment, as his failure to assert the same before the Court of Appeals Espinosa and Atty. Honorio S. Laguilles, Jr. Instead, the Court of Appeals is
is sufficient to warrant liability. DIRECTED to initiate indirect contempt proceedings against Espinosa and Atty.
Laguilles, Jr., and RESOLVE the same in conformity with Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of
Espinosa argues against this finding by noting that the issues of denial of due Civil Procedure.
process and fraud were raised for the first time in the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment. Yet, the proof of such fraud is the alleged improper allowance of the SO ORDERED.
relocation survey. As the Court of Appeals noted, that same question of impropriety was
already passed upon by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in two previous Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
petitions filed by Espinosa. The Court of Appeals noted that: A reading of the petition Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.
filed [in CA-G.R. SP No. 22398] vis-a-vis the one filed in this case would readily reveal
that not much difference exists between the two except that the first is a petition for
review while the present is one for annulment of judgment. [37] In the pithy words of the
Court of Appeals, same dog, but with a different collar. [38]
[1]
However, this Court is unable to sustain the Court of Appeals declaration that Penned by Justice, now Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia, concurred in by Justices
Espinosa and his counsel are in contempt of court and the corresponding fine of One Eugenio S. Labitoria and Artemio G. Tuquero.
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) imposed upon them. Under Revised Circular No. 28-91, [2]
Rendered by Hon. Tito G. Gustilo.
the submission of a false certification constitutes indirect contempt of court, without
[3]
prejudice to the filing of criminal action against the guilty party and the institution of Rollo, p. 10. Docketed as Civil Case No. 15288.
disciplinary proceedings against the counsel. Unlike in cases of direct contempt, which [4]
Id. at 11.
can be summarily adjudged and punished by a fine[39], a finding of guilt for indirect
contempt must be preceded by a charge in writing, an opportunity given to the [5]
Id. at 27.
respondent to comment thereon and to be heard by himself or by counsel in a
[6]
hearing.[40] The Court of Appeals erred in summarily punishing Espinosa and his Id. at 28.
counsel, considering that the charge against them only constitutes indirect contempt. In [7]
Id. at 30.
cases of indirect contempt, no matter how palpable the errants bad faith might appear to
[8]
the court, due process as laid down in the rules of procedure must be observed before Id. at 29.
the penalty is imposed. [9]
Ibid.
Finally, the ejectment case against Espinosa was filed way back in 1985, and the [10]
judgment therein attained finality in 1995. If the pendency of this case has prevented the Ibid.
Alcantaras from enforcing the long-final judgment in their favor, then such delay is [11]
Rollo, p. 84.
understandably egregious. The immediate execution of this judgment is declared exigent
[12]
to enable the Alcantaras deservedly to rest secure in the vindication of their rights and Id. at. 30.
the enjoyment of their property. [13]
Ibid.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The [14]
Id. at 31.
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals Sixteenth Division is AFFIRMED, EXCEPT
insofar as it imposes a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) on petitioner Honorato [15]
Id. at 31-32.
26 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt
[16] [33]
Id. at 32. Rollo, p. 42.
[17] [34]
Id. at 31. See Section 3, Rule 47, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
[18] [35]
Id. at 32. F. Regalado, I REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 147 (1997). See also Section 5,
[19]
Rule 7, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Id. at 26-35.
[36]
[20]
Par. 1, Revised Circular No. 28-91.
Barco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120587, 20 January 2004.
[37]
[21]
Rollo, p. 34.
See Section 2, Rule 47, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
[38]
[22]
Ibid.
Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 222, 242 (2000), citing Cosmic Lumber
[39]
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 168, 179 (1996). Section 1, Rule 71, REVISED RULES OF COURT.
[23] [40]
Rollo, p. 16. See Section 3, Rule 71, REVISED RULES OF COURT. [T]here must be a hearing
[24]
of the indirect contempt charge after notice thereof is validly served on the
Shioji v. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333, 344 (1922). Moreover, the Rules of Court recognize person charged with indirect contempt. Balasabas v. Hon. Aquilisan, 193 Phil.
that every court has the power to amend and control its process and orders so 639, 650 (1981).
as to make them conformable to law and justice. Section 5(g), Rule 135,
Revised Rules of Court.
[25]
Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 678, 688-689 (2000), citing Tenebro v. Court
of Appeals
, 275 SCRA 81 (1997) and Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 642 (1997).
[26]
G.R. No. 94457, 18 March 1991, 195 SCRA 418.
[27]
G.R. No. 74697, 29 November 1991, 204 SCRA 304.
[28]
Legarda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94457, 18 March 1991, 195 SCRA 418, 424-
425.
[29]
Alabanzas v. IAC, G.R. No. 74697, 29 November 1991, 204 SCRA 304, 306.
[30]
Id. at 309.
[31]
Rollo, p. 100. Espinosa does not refute Atty. Castillons apparent credentials, merely
noting without effect that even the high and mighty commit
mistakes. See Rollo, p. 126.
[32]
Ibid.

27 | P a g e Rule 71 Contempt