Professional Documents
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Bolante
Panganiban, J. 1.) Whether or not the respondent has the actual, physical,
exclusive and continuous possession of the land.
ISSUE:
EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos, 1.) Whether or not EDCA was unlawfully deprived of the
books because the check issued by the impostor in
G.R. No. 80298, April 26, 1990, 134 SCRA 614 payment therefor was dishonored.
Cruz, J. 2.) Whether or not EDCA had the right to cease the books
that were sold to Santos.
Facts On her acquisition of the said lot, Mrs. Arcilla demanded of the
defendant the re-opening of the fence in question as it was her plan
On March 11, 1954, the Court of First Instance of Davao, found that to construct her house in the said lot. When the defendant refused,
Antonio Legaspi acquired the lot in question with the knowledge that the Development Bank filed with the lower court a petition to hold
a "gravamen" or easement of right of way existed thereon, the said defendant in contempt. Mrs. Luz Arcilla later intervened in
promulgated a decision the dispositive portion of which reads (dili the case filed by DBP and was so allowed by the lower court.
ma basa kay spanish)
The Development Bank of the Philippines and Mrs. Luz Arcilla
In view of the March 11 order, the plaintiffs (Jabonete) immediately contended that the refusal of the defendant to cause or allow the
proceeded to the premises in question and opened in the fence of making of an opening in his fence was a defiance of the said court's
the defendant (Antonio Legaspi) a sufficient opening for the passage decision of March 11, 1954 and was, therefore, contemptuous. After
of men and vehicles. Even then, however, the defendant filed with due hearing, the lower court sustained the petitioners and found the
the court below on that very same day, May 21, 1954, a motion for defendant guilty of contempt with orders "to pay a fine of One
the reconsideration of the order granting discretionary execution. Hundred Pesos (P100.00) and to open the vereda or alley leading to
the lot owned by the Development Bank of the Philippines and
Thereafter, and upon the lower court's suggestion, the parties conveyed to Mrs. Luz S. Arcilla.
entered into an amicable AGREEMENT which was later embodied in
an order or "auto" dated May 24, 1954. (dili gihapon mabasa ang Issue
AGREEMENT)
Whether DBP and Mrs. Arcilla has the right to the easement granted
Both parties complied with terms of the AGREEMENT until the to Jabonete
plaintiffs, unable to continue with their repair shop, transferred to
another place in December 1959 whereupon the defendant Held
reconstructed his fence and its footing, closing thereby the opening
previously made by the plaintiffs. No.
Under the aforesaid order of May 24, 1954, the easement awarded Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals
or secured by the lower court to the plaintiffs was strictly a personal
G.R. No. 77628, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 74
one. The right of way granted was expressly limited to the latter and
their "family, friends, drivers, servants and jeeps." In the very Fernan, C.J.
language of the agreement the following appears:
El demandado Antonio Legaspi, permitira el uso y paso en la calle FACTS: Petitioner owns the dominant estate bounded on north by
the servient estate owned by respondents and an estate owned by
privada construida por el en su terreno a lo largo del terreno de los
Magsino, all of which are located in Talisay, Batangas. The servient
demandantes, a estos, su familia, sus amigos, chofers, servidumbre y estate is bound on the north by the national highway. To provide
de sus jeeps. access to the highway, a one meter road path was paved through in
which half of its width was taken from the estate of Magsino and the
other half from the estate of the respondent. Petitioner started a
The servitude established was clearly for the benefit alone of the
nursery plant type of business in which pushcarts were used to haul
plaintiffs and the persons above enumerated and it is clear that the the plants from his estate to and from his nursery and the highway,
lower court, as well as the parties addressed by the said order, did using the one meter road path. As his business grew, he bought a
not intend the same to pass on to the plaintiffs' successors-in- jeepney to enable him to transport more plants and soil catering to
interest. In other words, the right acquired by the original plaintiffs the now bigger demand. The problem however was that the jeepney
cannot pass through the road path since its width would not be
was a personal servitude under Article 614 of the Civil Code, and not accommodated by a one meter width. Petitioner made a request
a predial servitude that inures to the benefit of whoever owns the upon the respondent to sell to him 1 ½ meters of their property so
dominant estate. that the pathway may be widened to enable his jeepney to pass
through. The respondents refused. Petitioner went to court praying
that he would be granted the additional land to the right of way
Another evidence that the servitude in question was personal to the
already constituted but the trial court rendered a decision adverse
plaintiffs is the fact that the same was granted to the latter without to the petitioner because there was no such necessity as it was
any compensation to the respondent-appellant. shown that there was the presence of dried river bed only 80 meters
away from the property of the petitioner which he may use as an
alternative route. The CA affirmed said decision of the trial court.
Thus as a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands Art. 633 of the Civil Code from whence Art. 749 came Manresa
in the Philippines. The only instances when a foreigner can said: "If the acceptance does not appear in the same document,
acquire private lands in the Philippines are by hereditary it must be made in another. Solemn words are not necessary; it
succession and if he was formerly a natural-born Filipino citizen is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept x x x x it is
who lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner therefore contends necessary that formal notice thereof be given to the donor, and
that the acquisition of the parcels of land by David does not fall the fact that due notice has been given must be noted in both
under any of these exceptions. It asserts that David being an instruments. Then and only then is the donation perfected. "
American citizen could not validly acquire one-half (1/2) interest
in each of the subject parcels of land by way of the two (2) deeds Therefore, the provisions of the law not having been complied
of quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter vivos. with, there was no effective conveyance of the parcels of land
by way of donation inter vivos. There is no valid repudiation of
ISSUE: inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the
Whether or not the quitclaim executed by Helen tantamount to inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of
a donation in favor of her son David? -- NO Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29
December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two (2)
HELD: of them all the property in Simeon’s estate. By virtue of such
Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered in
present in the instant case. The language of the deed of her and her son’s name in undivided equal share and for eleven
quitclaim is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of (11) years they possessed the lands in the concept of owner.
her rights, title and interest over the lands in favor of David, and
not a donation. That a donation was far from Helen's mind is
further supported by her deposition which indicated that she
Balaqui v. Dongso, 53 Phil. 673 gift in question is a donation mortis causa, the donor meant
nothing else than that she reserved of herself the
Facts: A part of the deed of donation made by Plaintffs mother was possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her
stated as thus:
death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of
This gift to Placida Dongso resident of Candon, Ilocos them freely.
Sur, Philippine Islands, in recompense for her services to me, does not
pass title to her during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true
owner of the two aforementioned parcels, including my house and shed
thereon, and she shall be rightfully entitled to transmit them to her
children. I also bind myself to answer to said Placida and her heirs and
successors for this property, and that none shall question or disturb her
right.
The appellants dwelling on the words of the fourth paragraph of the deed
of gift just quoted, “ does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I
die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels,"
contend that the gift in question is a donation mortis causa, and, the
requisites and conditions indispensable for a will, according to article 620
of the Civil Code, being lacking is null and void. Held:
Taking the
deed above quoted as a whole, it is observed, in the first
place, that Hipolita Balaqui, wishing to reward Placida
Dongso for the latter's services since said Placida's
childhood, who lived with her and was treated by her as a
daughter, she donated to her two parcels of land with their
improvements; in the second place, it is noted that in the
same deed Hipolita Balaqui guaranteed to Placida Dongso
and her heirs and successors, the right to said property thus
conferred. From the moment Hipolita Balaqui guaranteed
the right granted by her to Placida Dongso to the two
parcels of land by virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered
such right; otherwise there would be no need to guarantee
said right. Therefore, when Hipolita Balaqui used the words
upon which the appellants base their contention that the