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NTPC Limited

REPORT OF NTPC DADRI STATION BLACKOUT

MULTI-UNIT TRIPPING EVENT

AT NTPC-DADRI ON 10/11/2016

PREAMBLE:

On 10/11/2016 at 10:49 hrs, 400 kV Bus#1 & 2 of NTPC DADRI tripped on


Busbar differential protection operation of both Bus#1 & 2. Subsequently Unit#3,
Unit#5, Unit#6 of Dadri Thermal & GT#1, GT#2, STG#1 & Rihand-Dadri HVDC Pole-1
tripped. 400kV main breakers of all outgoing feeders also tripped causing station black-
out.
Following are the observations recorded during NTPC-Dadri site visit:

Observations:

Station load before the incidence:

Status of Units and Lines of NTPC-Dadri at around 10:45 hrs on 10/11 /2016

Unit U#1 U#2 U#3 U#4 U#5 U#6 GT#1 GT#2 STG HVDC Station
Pole#1

MW 0 0 214 0 379 488 130 130 145 681 2187

400KV Lines at Dadri:

1. Maharanibagh: 370 MW
2. Malerkotla: 198 MW
3. Greater Noida: 645 MW
4. Panipat-1: 210 MW
5. Panipat-2: 206 MW
6. Mandaula-1: 83 MW
7. Mandaula-2: 87 MW
8. Muradnagar: 111 MW

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Description of Events:

Rihand-Dadri HVDC pole#2 isolation was planned on 10/11/2016. HVDC pole#1


was carrying approx. 700 MW. 400 kV Dadri Switchyard is having one & half breaker
scheme. HVDC Pole#1 & 2 are in same diameter. 400 kV Breakers of HVDC Pole#1, 2 &
complete set of Tie bay equipments are located at HVDC building. Only 400 kV Bus
isolators of HVDC Pole#1 & 2 are located within NTPC Dadri Switchyard boundary. All
control of HVDC Poles bay equiments are from HVDC control room only. Remote
operation of Isolators are defunct for long time and the prevailing practices are to operate
the Bus isolators of HVDC Poles bays from local.

HVDC Pole#1 is connected to 400 kV Bus#12 & HVDC Pole#2 is connected to 400 kV
Bus#1.

Switchyard Shift Operator was instructed to open the HVDC Pole#2 Bus isolator, to issue
permit to PGCIL. The Operator inadvertently operated the HVDC Pole#1 Bus isolator,
from local, bypassing all interlocks (circuit breaker ON) at Isolator MB. With partial
opening of all three phases of the isolator, heavy arcing started across the isolator
contacts. The Operator ran away from the site and Bus-bar protection of Bus#2 along-
with check zone operated due to Earth fault created because of Isolator arcing at
10:49:42:138 hrs. All breakers connected to Bus#2 tripped. Bus#1 was healthy till that
time, bus after 551 msec, Bus-bar protection of Bus#1 also operated, tripping all breakers
connected to Bus#1, thus making Bus dead.

Analysis of Unit Tripping:

Unit#5 & 6 tripped due to tripping of their 400 kV Breakers due to Bus-bar protection
operation of both Buses.

Dadri Gas GT#1, 2 & STG tripped on loss of evacuation, due to tripping of ICT#3 & 4.
Other evacuation option available for DGPS is through 220 kV Dari-Railway line#1 was
under shutdown & 220 kV Dadri Line#2 was carrying approx. 20 MW. Hence, due to
mismatch of Generation & load all running units of Dadri Gas tripped on over-frequency
protection, setting at 51.5 Hz.

Dadri Unit#3 tripped due to loss of evacuation from 400 kV side, as there is no
evacuation line on 220 kV voltage level at Dadri.

Safe Shutdown of Units:

Safe shutdown of Unit#3, Unit#5 & Unit#6 units took place. All DC drives, DG sets & DC
lights of Stage-1 Units came in to service on auto. DG switchgear charged with closing
and synchronizing of DG breakers. Emergency switchgears of all Stage#1 units
charged from DG switchgear.

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Recommendations:

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