Understand the role of language and discourse in shaping conflict between groups of people

The ways we think and talk about a subject influences and reflects the ways we act in
relation to that subject. This is the basic premise of discourse theory. Linguistic
representations determine the way in which we think about particular objects, events,
situations and function as a principle of action influencing actual social practice (Shapiro,
1988), there will be competition among groups over what is to be taken as the correct,
appropriate, or preferred representation (Holquist, 1983).

A myth is used within a place e.g. nation or a country, to tell a particular story which may
help us make sense of the world. Three key attributes distinguish a political myth from a
simple narrative: First, a mythical narrative provides significance. Second, it is shared by a
group and (re)produced at various levels. Third, it can come to affect the political conditions
of the group (Bottici, 2007). Myths have been used in the past to try and understand what
Britain is. For example, in the case of Brexit, both sides were making very different
arguments and drawing upon different stories about what Britain is with one story saying
that ‘Britain is an Island nation’. It can be argued that mythical discourse affects political
practice by imbuing language with power, shaping what people consider to be legitimate
and driving the determination to act. Political myths help us come to terms with our political
circumstances and they also drive our determination to act

Language can accomplish things. We can see language as a behaviour, as something that
can justify things/ courses of action and undermine others. In some cases that course of
action may be one which leads to conflict or more so towards war. Using language, war can
be constructed as a good thing, something that should be done, something which is morally
right. It can be sold to the public as morally justifiable, something they can get behind and
support. A major example is Tony Blair legitimating the war against Iraq. This used the well-
known political myth which is the “war on terror”. Following 9/11, rhetorical emphasis on
national grievance was largely achieved through repetition of words such as “tragedy”,
“suffering”, “loss”, “horror” and “calamity”. Despite Bush’s and Powell’s acknowledgement
that citizens of many countries died in the attacks, official rhetoric overwhelmingly depicted
Americans as a special, united people suffering a uniquely obscene tragedy which called
upon the myth of “American Exceptionalism”.

Despite Bush’s acknowledgement that citizens of many countries died in the attacks, official
rhetoric overwhelmingly depicted Americans as a special, united people suffering a uniquely
obscene tragedy. Alternatively, the rhetoric could have framed the events as an attack on
humanity or expressed solidarity with victims of political violence in other countries
(Jackson, 2005). However, through continual emphasis of American ownership of the
tragedy, the official rhetoric succeeded in bestowing upon America the politically valuable
status of primary victim (Jackson, 2005). As Bowman (1994) has pointed out, creating or
sustaining a sense of national victimhood and grievance promotes a discourse of violence
that rallies support for war. So, while the sense of victimhood and grievance that was
emphasized and reemphasized in hundreds of texts was in no way invented or falsely
manufactured, it did serve the political purpose of justifying American military action in the
subsequent “War on Terror’.
Official rhetoric has repeatedly conflated various targets and threats in the “War on Terror”
into a single enemy: “the terrorists.” They have often been referred to even more broadly as
“the enemies of freedom” or the “evildoers”. Bush divided the world into those who are
“with us” and those who are “with the terrorists” (20 Sept. 2001), and he grouped three
countries with vastly divergent interests and agendas (Iran, Iraq, and North Korea) into a
unitary “axis of evil”. By neglecting to disaggregate rival groups, and instead clumping them
into a category of “terrorists” or “Islamist terrorists,” official rhetoric embraced the
apocalyptic outlook that characterizes the myth of American Exceptionalism.

Official rhetoric has also portrayed the “War on Terror” as a cosmic battle between good
and evil. Bush also used a biblical term when he referred to Osama Bin Laden as “the evil
one” (11 Oct. 2001) and al-Qaeda as “the evil ones” (29 Nov. 2001). Language that appeals
to the religious moorings of hundreds of millions of Americans has obvious persuasive
advantages and is a powerful way to elicit intuitive support for both a speaker and his
policies. This supports the fact that politicians use rhetoric, carefully chosen words which
have effect on justifying courses of action, demonising other people, printing them in a
negative way.

Another myth revived after 9/11, which shapes conflict between people is the present
‘civilization vs barbarism’ myth which links America’s struggle against terrorism with a
larger, on-going clash between civilization (us) and barbarism (the terrorists). American
newspapers framed world affairs in terms of civilization-based conflict. For example, the
New York Times published the following headlines in a section called “A Nation Challenged”
in the months following 9/11: “Yes, this is about Islam,” “This is a religious war,” “Diffusing
the holy bomb,” “Barbarians at the gate,” “Faith and the secular state,” “A head-on collision
of alien cultures,” amongst many others. These headlines which relied on the myth
“civilization vs barbarism’ portrayed Islam in a very negative way and thus caused conflict.

Lexical triggers such as “civilization, innocent’’, ‘cruelty’, and ‘hatred’, “freedom’s enemies,”
“savages,” and “barbarians”, recall the larger body of work on civilization vs barbarism in a
number of texts. A sharp linguistic boundary has been drawn between “Us” and “the
terrorists,” who epitomize savagery. In contrast, America is made to embody enlightened
civilization in the discourse and is defined in opposition to the terrorist Other. Bush further
constructed the “righteous We” when he expressed astonishment that anyone could hate
the United States. The idea that “they hate us because of what we love” has been repeated
in numerous texts

Language that construes a battle of divine significance between “the civil and the savage”
plays a central role in legitimizing and mobilizing support for a long, violent, and vaguely
defined counterterrorism campaign.

Overall, rhetoric evoking the myth of Civilization v. Barbarism has accomplished several
things. It has depicted a less-than-human enemy whose savage ideology threatens all that
civilization holds dear. It has extended the discourse of Exceptional Grievance and
victimhood by emphasizing American innocence and virtue. Further, it has employed
absolute dichotomies in a way that has imbued “who we are” with a sense of duty, which
has helped legitimize America’s use of force in the “War on Terror.” The “War on Terror”
rhetoric has constructed powerful categories of identity in order to satisfy political
objectives and has breathed new life into the long- standing myth of Civilization v.
Barbarism. Thus, historically grounded and intuitively appealing political myths can be
valuable rhetorical tools for policy legitimization.

Bush has been using rhetoric and myths to make a case for the argument for the Iraq war.
He is using overt case of language to construct the argument for war and to knock down tge
argument against.