Vda. De Haberer vs.
Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. L-42699 to L-42709; May 26, 1981
FACTS:
The lower court dismissed 11 complaints for recovery of
parcel of land. Plaintiff dies pending appeal. Counsel notifies the
court of appellant’s death, and prayed for suspension of the period
for filing an appellant’s brief pending appointment of an executor.
The Court of Appeals denies extension and dismisses the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of one of the parties in a pending
case is a proper recourse in dismissing the same.
RULING:
The Rules of Court requires appearance of the deceased
legal representatives instead of dismissing the case. Dismissal of
an appeal on the ground of failure to file appellant’s brief must be
in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play. The extension
should have been granted.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 97336 - February 19, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He was an Iranian
exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent was a former
waitress on a luncheonette, and was 22 years old. Petitioner was
allegedly the lover of the respondent, and was said to promise
marriage to the latter, which convinced her to live with him in his
apartment.
It was even alleged that the petitioner went to the house of the
respondent to inform her family about the marriage on the end of
the semester. However, the marriage did not materialize, with
several beatings and maltreatment experienced by the respondent
from the petitioner.
The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the
decision was held in favor of the respondent. However, the
petitioner claimed that the judgment of the RTC was an error, for
the claims of the respondent are not true, and that he did not know
about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were in accordance of his
custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the
damages incurred by the petitioner.
RULING:
Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law.
However, since the respondent was proved to have a good moral
character, and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by
the petitioner since the latter offered a promise of marriage, then
she could ask for payment for damages. Furthermore, since she let
her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since she believed that
his promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire,
then she could have her claims against the petitioner. Moreover,
the father of the respondent had already looked for pigs and
chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the
marriage, and then damages were caused by the petitioner against
the respondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent
against the petitioner.
University of the East vs. Jader
GR No. 132344 - February 17, 2000
FACTS:
Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the
East, failed to take his regular examination in Practice Court I in his
first semester of his last school year. However, he was able to
remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of his college
approved his application to take a removal examination.
In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list
of candidates for graduation for the
Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in the invitation for the 35th
Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies, the plaintiff’s name
appeared. Thus, he attended the investiture ceremonies and
graduated.
On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence
from his work and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far
Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a
deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take
the bar examinations.
He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and
exemplary damages arising from the latter’s negligence. The trial
court ruled in his favor and was granted for actual damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with
modification. The CA awarded moral damages. On account of
suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and ultimately
for not having to take the bar exam.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jader may validly claim for damages.
RULING:
In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court
emphatically enunciated that moral damages cannot be awarded to
Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he suffered shock, trauma, and
pain. Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It
opined that as a student, he should have been responsible enough
to ensure that all his affairs, especially those appertaining to his
academics, are in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his
failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not
verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements. While the Court
held the University of the East negligent and therefore liable for
actual damages in favor of Jader, the latter was also held liable for
negligence thereby no moral damages can be awarded in his favor.
The decision was affirmed with modification.
Noel Buenaventura vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 127358 - G.R. Nos. 127449; March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were
psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into
between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the
liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property;
ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the
amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity
arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his
mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was
pending, the CA, upon respondent’s motion issued a resolution
increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
RULING:
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a
bigamous marriage, the provisions of article 50 in relation to
articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of
gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule
applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the
property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a
quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to have been
acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of
one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said
distribution.
Jesus B. Ruiz vs. Encarnacion Ucol
G.R. No. L-45404, August 7, 1987
FACTS:
The laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Ruiz filed an
administrative charge
against defendant-appellee Ucol. Ucol, in her answer, alleged that
Tagaca was
merely used as a tool by Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucol's
because of a case filed by respondent’s husband against Ruiz. She
was also alleged to have made remarks that Ruiz instigated the
complaint and fabricated the charges.
When the administrative case was dismissed, the petitioner
filed his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol based on the
alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer.
The lower court acquitted Ucol on the ground that her guilt
was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court as to
the civil liability of the accused made no pronouncement. Instead of
appealing, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on
the same facts upon which the libel case was founded.
Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had
prescribed and that the cause of action was barred by the decision
in the criminal case for libel. The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss on the ground of res judicata. On appeal, the appellate
court certified the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil action for damages was already
barred by the criminal case of libel.

RULING:
The contentions of the petitioner have no merit. Art. 33 of the Civil
Code, independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil suit
for the recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by
the injured party. The civil liability arising from the crime charged
may still be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended
party does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not reserve his
right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant.
The Supreme Court did not find any defamatory imputation,
which causes dishonor, or discredit to the complainant. She was the
victim of an unprovoked, unjustified and libelous attack against her
honor, honesty, character and reputation; she has a right to self-
defense, which she did in her answer, to protect her honesty and
integrity and the very job upon which her family depend for
their livelihood.
Bellis vs. Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the
time of his death. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing
his Texas properties, the other disposing his Philippine properties.
In both wills, the recognized illegitimate children were not given
any share. Texas has no conflict rule (Rule of Private International
Law) governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas law,
there are no compulsory heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such illegitimate children of Bellis be
entitled to successional rights.
RULING:
The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their
legitimes. Under Texas law, there are no legitimes. Even if the
other will was executed in the Philippines, his national law, still, will
govern the properties for succession even if it is stated in his
testate that it shall be governed by the Philippine law.
US vs. Bull
15 PHIL 7
FACTS:
H.N Bull, who was the master of a vessel transporting cattle,
carabao and other animals from Formosa to Manila, failed to
provide suitable means for securing the animals while they are in
transit. Such neglect was a violation of Act. No. 275 of the
Philippine Commission, which reads:
“The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels,
carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other
animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another,
or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine
Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying
such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide
for the suitable sustenance of such animals during the
ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the
port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause
such animals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh
water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time
that the animals are embarked to the time of their final
debarkation.”
Bull contends that the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction
over his offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippines has jurisdiction over this
case.
RULING:
When a vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines
which embrace the entrance of Manila Bay, the vessel is within the
territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply. A
crime committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to
the Philippines is within the jurisdiction of the courts of the
Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the time the ship
was within the territorial waters – regardless of the fact that the
same conditions existed when the ship sailed from the foreign port
and while it was on the high seas.
In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found
guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
People vs. Bayotas
G.R. No. 102007 (236 SCRA 239)
FACTS:
 Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually
convicted on June 19, 1991. While the appeal was pending, Bayotas
died. The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal; however, it required the Solicitor-General to comment with
regard to Bayotas’ civil liability arising from his commission of the
offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor-General expressed his view
that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil
liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. This
comment was opposed by the counsel of accused-appellant,
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of the
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both criminal and civil
penalties, he cited in support and invoked the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in People v. Castillo, which was held that the civil
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal responsibility
and therefore civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before final judgment is rendered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his civil liability.
RULING:
Yes, the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his civil liability because tire liability is
based solely on the criminal act committed. Corollarily, the claim
for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused,
if the same may also be predicated from another source of
obligation other than delict, such as law, contract, quasi-contract or
quasi-delict.
Where civil liability survives, an action for recovery may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject
to Section 1. Rule 11 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused depending
on the source of obligation upon which the same is based.
Donato vs. Hon. Luna
G.R. No. L-54598; April 15, 1988
FACTS:
On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru
Assistant City Fiscal Amado Cantor, filed information for bigamy
against Leonila Donato with the Court of First Instance. The private
respondent filed a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with petitioner. Respondent had no previous knowledge of
petitioner’s existing marriage to Rosalinda Maluping.
Donato interposed in her answer the defense that his
second marriage was void and since it was solemnized without a
marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue
influence were employed by respondent.
Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the
criminal case contending that the civil case seeking the annulment
of the second marriage raise a prejudicial question which must be
determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the issue raised in the civil case is a
prejudicial question which must be determined before the criminal
case can proceed; and whether or not the petitioner lacked the
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
RULING:
Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial question
because a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered
as a prejudicial question on the condition that it must be proven
that the petitioner’s consent to the marriage was obtained through
intimidation, violence and undue influence in order to establish that
his act in the subsequent marriage was done involuntarily. In the
petitioner’s argument that the second marriage should have been
declared null and void on
the ground of force, intimidation and violence allegedly employed
against him by respondent only sometime later cannot be
considered relevant.
Eugenio Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127540 - October 17, 2001
FACTS:
Paulina Rigonan owned three parcels of land including the
house and warehouse on one parcel. She allegedly sold them to
private respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan,
who claim to be her relatives amounting to P850.00. The
petitioners Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel
Capalungan, who claim to be her closest surviving relatives,
allegedly took possession of the properties by means of stealth,
force and intimidation, and
refused to vacate the same. The respondent filed a complaint for
reinvindicacion against petitioners. The petitioners stated that the
sale was spurious and they are the legitimate owner of the land
being the nearest kin of Paulina. The respondents shown a carbon
copy of the deed of sale not bearing the signature of Paulina only
allege thumb mark of the latter and the deed was tainted with
alterations, defects and irregularities. The trial court found the
deed “fake” and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. The
appellate court, however, reversed the decision and declared the
respondents the owner of the properties. On appeal, the petitioners
asserted that there was abundant evidence at the time of the
execution of the sale, the deceased was already senile. She could
have not consented to the sale by merely imprinting her
thumbmark on the deed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the vendor has the capacity to act on the
alleged sale of her property.

RULING:
The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the trial court.
There is a serious doubt that the seller consented to the sale of and
the price for her parcels of land. The time of the execution of the
alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and
senile. She died an octogenarian barely over a year when the deed
was allegedly executed but before copies of the deed were entered
in the registry. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent
to contract
merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical
infirmities. However, when such age or infirmities have impaired
the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly,
intelligently, and firmly protecting her property rights then she is
undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima
Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the
deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally.
She narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in
bed.