1. [ GR No. 107967, Mar 01, 1994 ] OBSEQUIO v.

CA
On September 10, 1986, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners Consorcia Tenio and her husband,
Orlando Obsequio, and the heirs of Eduardo Deguro for recovery of possession and ownership alleging that sometime in
1964, they mortgaged the land to Eduardo Deguro for P10,000.00 and delivered the certificate title of the said land to the
latter as a guaranty to the loan. They continued to cultivate the same and, at the end of the harvest season, they gave two-
thirds (2/3) of the harvest to Eduardo Deguro. However, Deguro and his wife, without the knowledge and consent of private
respondents, prepared a document of sale, making it appear that private respondents sold the land to them as evidenced
by the annotation of the deed of sale and the cancellation of the original certificate of title in the the name of the
respondents and the issuance of a new certificate of title in favor of Deguro. After the death of Eduardo Deguro, his heirs
sold the land to Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio and in 1970, a TCT was issued in her name. It was allegedly only in 1982, when
Eufronio Alimpoos received a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold of his land from the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), that he learned that the land was already titled in the name of another.

The Heirs of Deguro claims the regularity of the transactions in the deed of absolute sale between their parents and the
private respondents while petitioner Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio maintains that she purchased the land from the heirs of
Deguro in good faith, for valuable consideration and without knowledge of any flaw or defect whatsoever. The trial court
ruled in favor of the petitioners while the CA reversed the decision of the former. Petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said decision which was denied by the Court of Appeals hence the instant recourse by petitioners.

Issue:
WON the reconveyance of the land to the original owner is in order

Ruling:
No, reconveyance of the land in question to the original owner is not in order.
Under Section 55 of the Land Registration Act, as amended by Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, an original owner,
of registered land may seek the annulment of a transfer thereof on the ground of fraud. However, such a remedy is without
prejudice to the rights of any innocent holder for value with a certificate of title.

A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other person
has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before
he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio is a purchaser in
good faith.
It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value
intervenes. A deed of sale executed by an impostor without the authority of the owner of the land sold is a nullity, and
registration will not validate what otherwise is an invalid document

The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions
relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the
need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it
was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. Consequently, petitioner cannot be faulted and, as a matter of
fact, she is vested with the right to rely on the title of Eduardo Deguro.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent court now under review are hereby REVERSED and the decision of
the court a quo is accordingly REINSTATED.
 2. Quimson v. Suarez, GR No. 21381, Apr. 5, 1924, 45 Phil., 901

This is an action of forcible entry and detainer, the plaintiff alleging that he is entitled to the possession of the land in
question under a lease from its owner and that the defendant is wrongfully withholding it from him. The defendant
maintains that he is lawfully in possession under another lease of an earlier date from the same owner.

In 1917, the deceased Pablo Tecson leased a large fishpond situated in the municipality of Orani, Province of Bataan, to one
David Luna for the term of ten years at an annual rent of P900. Two months later Luna, with the consent of Tecson, assigned
the lease to Pablo Suarez, the defendant herein. Shortly afterwards Tecson applied for the registration of the land under
the Land Registration Act, but died before the final disposal of the case and the final decree and corresponding certificate
of title were issued in the names of the administratrix of Tecson's estate, and Maximiana Tongco, his widow in equal shares,
the former later on was succeeded by the latter. Neither in the final decree nor in the certificate of title was any mention
made of the lease in favor of Suarez.
In 1920, Maximiana Tongco then granted a lease of the land to the plaintiff Quimson. for the term of six years from May
1921, the rent for the entire term being fixed at P6,250, payable at the time of the execution of the lease. This lease was at
once entered by memorandum upon the certificate of title for the land. At the time of the execution of the lease the plaintiff
knew that the defendant Suarez was in possession of the land as a tenant of Maximiana Tongco, by whom he had been told
that the term of Suarez' lease expired on March 1, 1921, and there is no evidence showing that he had knowledge of any
extension of term.
Suarez brought an action which was still pending in the Court of First Instance against Quimson and Maximiana Tongco to
have Quimson's lease set aside. Meanwhile, on May 1, 1921, Quimson made a formal demand upon Suarez for the
surrender of the possession and the demand not being complied with, the present action was brought in the court of the
justice of the peace of Orani which ruled in favor of the plaintiff ordering the defendant to vacate the land and to pay
damages. On appeal, defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied. The trial court thereupon rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiff for the possession of the land plus damages, with costs, and the case is now before us upon appeal by the
defendant from that judgment.
Issue: WON the right of possession of the defendant to the land was extinguished and that the contract of lease of the
defendant, is null and void for not having been noted on the corresponding certificate of title
Ruling:
Yes, the right of possession of the defendant to the land was extinguished and that the contract of lease of the defendant,
is null and void for not having been noted on the corresponding certificate of title.
One of the principal features of the Torrens System of registration is that all incumbrances on the land or special estates
therein shall be shown, or, at least, intimated upon the certificate of title and a person dealing with the owner of the
registered land is not bound to go behind the certificate and inquire into transactions, the existence of which is not there
intimated. There being in the present case no indication on the certificate of title of the existence of the defendant's lease,
and the certificate therefore showing a clear title and right of possession in favor of the lessor, the plaintiff had a perfect
right to rely on the lessor's statement that defendant's right of possession terminated on April 30, 1921, and was not bound
to make further inquiries. He can, therefore, not be charged with fraud, neither actual nor constructive.
The disadvantages of adopting the rule suggested by the appellant would far outweigh the advantages, would be out of
harmony with the underlying principles of the Torrens System of registration and would tend to impair the value of
registered titles.
The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.
 3. G.R. No. L-42897 July 27, 1937 WILLIAM H. ANDERSON & CO., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GREGORIO GARCIA

In Sept. 7, 1927, two parcels of land in Paniqui, Tarlac, identified as lots 4019 and 4043 belonging to the Cipriano
Obcena and registered in his name were levied upon and sold at public auction by the sheriff of the province and
awarded to the judgment creditor, William H. Anderson & Co. pursuant to an order of execution in a civil case. On the
following day, the sheriff of Tarlac issued a certificate of sale which was filed and recorded in the office of the register
of deeds. A final deed of sale covering the lots was executed in favor of William H. Anderson & Co. after Obcena
failed to exercise his right of redemption within the statutory period.

However, it appears that on March 23, 1927, a document of absolute sale bearing the same date, acknowledged
before a notary public, was executed by Obcena and his wife, conveying lot No. 4019 to Aurora Riquez for the sum
of P160. It appeared to be registered in the registry of deeds of the province on Nov. 3, 1930. On this same date,
Aurora Riquez obtained the cancellation of the original certificate of title and the issuance in her name of transfer
certificate of title covering lot 4019. The sale in favor of William H. Anderson & Co. was annotated on the back of
Rique' new certificate.

Also on March 23, 1927, Aurora Riquez sold with pacto de retracto the same lot 4019 to Gregorio Garcia, and the
sale was also registered in the registry of deed of the province on November 3, 1930.

Petitioner filed a petition praying, among other things, for the cancellation of transfer certificate issued to Gregorio
Garcia. Garcia alleged among other things, that he was the owner of lot No. 4019, having acquired the same from
Aurora Riquez by virtue of a contract of sale with pacto de retracto on March 23, 1927; that Aurora Riquez in turn
acquired lot 4019 from the virtue of a contract of absolute sale executed on March 23, 1927; that he was a purchaser
in good faith and that, when the contract of sale with pacto de retracto was had on March 23, 1927 between him and
Aurora Riquez, lot 4019 was free from all encumbrances; that the absolute sale effected by Cipriano Obcena and
Magdalena Labitoria in favor of Aurora Riquez on March 23, 1927, and the subsequent sale made by the latter in his
favor on the same date, took place before the issuance of the order of execution in civil case, and that at the time of
said execution Cipriano Obcena was no longer the owner of said lot 4019.

Issue: who has a superior right over the controverted lot No. 4019, William H. Anderson & Co. or Gregorio Garcia?

Ruling:

In the case of Worcester vs. Ocampo and Ocampo (34 Phil., 646), it was held that a pacto de retracto sale which was
not recorded, filed, or entered in the office of the register of deeds until after the purchaser at an execution sale had
secured his lien by attachment was subject to the rights of the latter and the same could not be enforced against the
land until after the rights of purchaser had been fully satisfied. Under the facts of that case, the rights of the judgment
creditor who was the purchaser at the auction sale were declared superior to those of a vendee or transferee of the
same property under a contract of sale with pacto de retracto entered into before the levy and unregistered at the time
of such levy.

Under the Torrens system registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the
land (secs. 50 and 51, Land Registration Act). A person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the
register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which
are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary
objects of the Torrens system. A bona fide purchaser for value of such property at an auction sale acquires good title
as against a prior transferee of the same property if such transfer was unrecorded at the time of the auction sale. The
existence or absence of good faith will, of course, must be determined upon the facts and the legal environment of
each particular case.

From what has been said it follows that judgment should be rendered in favor of the petitioner-appellant, William H.
Anderson & Co. The corresponding certificate of title covering lot No. 4019 should, therefore, be issued in its name.
Without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
 4. Revilla v. Galindez, GR L-9940, Mar. 30, 1960, 107 Phil. 480
This case involves a lot (lot No. 659-a) located in Rizal Nueva Ecija which used to be the southwestern portion of another
lot (Lot 659). This other lot was formerly registered in the name of Alipio Gasmeña who donated to Florencio Gasmeña said
southwestern portion of the lot, with an area of 1.8144 hectares. The donation was duly annotated on the certificates of
title. In 1938, Florencio Gasmeña mortgaged his unsegregated portion to defendant Godofredo Galindez, for the sum of
P350.00 and in the same year, sold it to the latter. The mortgage was registered but the subsequent sale was never
registered. However, from the date of the mortgage, defendant Galindez had been in possession of the property.

Several years after Florencio Gasmeña's death in 1941, the portion which he had conveyed to defendant was segregated
and designated as Lot No. 659-A. A TCT was also issued in the name of the already deceased Florencio' Gasmeña. This
certificate of title carried no annotation of the registered mortgage in favor of defendant.

Sometime later, the widow and heirs of Florencio Gasmeña executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale wherein
they declared that Florencio Gasmeña died intestate, without debts and possessed solely of Lot No. 659-A, which lot they
adjudicated to themselves and then sold for P2,000.00 to plaintiffs Avelino Revilla and Elena Fajardo. Hence, the deed of
extrajudicial partition with sale was registered, so T.C.T. in the name of Florencio Gasmeña was cancelled, and in lieu thereof
T.C.T. No. was issued to plaintiffs subject to the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 74, Rules of Court. Plaintiffs attempted
to take possession of the land, but defendant's overseer informed them that defendant had previously purchased it from
Florencio Gasmeña. Hence, the commencement of this action seeking to recover the possession of Lot No. 659-A.

The lower court rendered judgment declaring the deed of extrajudicial partition with sale null and void and ordering the
Register of Deeds to cancel T.C.T. in favor of defendant Galindez. Raising questions purely of law, plaintiffs have appealed
directly to SC.

Issue: Who are the rightful owners of the said lot

In cases of double sales of immovable property, Art. 1544 of NCC dictates that the property ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Deeds. Since the land in question was a registered
one, said rule is in perfect accord with the Land Registration Act, Section 50 of which provides that no deed, mortgage,
lease or other voluntary instrument except a will, purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land until its registration.

Since the first sale to the defendant was never registered, the sale operated only as a contract between him and the vendor,
Florencio Gasmeña, and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. Florencio Gasmeña and his
heirs were bound to respect the contract, but innocent third persons cannot be affected thereby.

One of the main features of the Torrens system of registration is that all encumbrances on the land or special estates therein
shall be shown, or at least intimated upon the certificate of title and a person dealing with the owner of the registered land
is not bound to go behind the certificate and inquire into transactions, the existence of which is not there intimated; but he
is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or on the certificate
of title.

Unquestionably, the sale in favor of plaintiffs was a registered one, and a certificate of title was issued to them. The question
is whether they are purchasers in good faith. However, plaintiffs did not buy the land from the registered owner, Florencio
Gasmeña but from his heirs. As decided by the court in numerous jurisprudences, good faith affords protection only to
purchasers for value from the registered owner.

Not being purchasers in good faith, plaintiffs are clearly not entitled to the rights of a registered owner. Thus they were
bound at their peril to investigate their transferors' right to sell the property. Ordinary prudence called for a scrutiny of the
deed of extrajudicial partition with sale as well as the transfer certificate in the name of Florencio Gasmeña.

Hence, under Art 1544 of NCC, ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession. The lot,
therefore, properly belongs to defendant.
 5. Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio, GR 169454, Dec. 27, 2007, 541 SCRA
479

Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered owners of a parcel of land covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 352 located at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan. The spouses had children
but the records fail to disclose their number. It is clear, however, that Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both
deceased, were among them and that the parties in this case are their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio,
while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio.

Both parties have been occupying the subject land for several decades although they have different theories regarding its
present ownership. According to petitioners, they are now the owners of the entire property in view of the private deed of
donation propter nuptias in favor of their predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico (said deed of donation was
never notarized). Respondents, on the other hand, claim that only half of the property was incorporated in the said deed
of donation because it stated that Fortunato Doronio is the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern side. Eager to
obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio filed a petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of
Donation". No respondents were named in the said petition neither did any one interpose an objection during the hearing.
Hence, petition was eventually granted and a new TCT was issued in favor of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico. The
respondents, upon learning this, appealed the decision but was dismissed on the ground that the decision was already final.

Determined to remain in their possessed property, respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (as plaintiffs) filed an action for
reconveyance and damages against petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio wherein RTC ruled in favor of the latter. It
concluded that the parties admitted the identity of the land which they all occupy;[17] that a title once registered under the
torrens system cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession or by prescription. CA reversed the RTC
decision taking note "that since the boundaries of the lot donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico differ from the
boundaries of the land owned by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. Thus, only half of the property was donated.

Issues: whether respondents had acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352 by acquisitive prescription
whether or not the transfer of the whole property covered by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the registration of the private
deed of donation is valid

Ruling:

1. No. A title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious
possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. It is notice to the whole world and as such all persons are
bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.The Torrens system is intended to guarantee the
integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, but it cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud
against the real owner of the registered land. The system merely confirms ownership and does not create it.
2. No. Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property
donated must be specifically described. Article 1328 of the Old Civil Code provides that gifts propter nuptias are
governed by the rules established in Title 2 of Book 3 of the same Code. Article 633 of that title provides that the
gift of real property, in order to be valid, must appear in a public document. It is settled that a donation of real
estate propter nuptias is void unless made by public instrument.
In the instant case, the donation propter nuptias did not become valid. Neither did it create any right because it
was not made in a public instrument. Hence, it conveyed no title to the land in question to petitioners'
predecessors.

However, the controversy between the parties is yet to be fully settled. The issues as to who truly are the present
owners of the property and what is the extent of their ownership remain unresolved. The same may be properly
threshed out in the settlement of the estates of the registered owners of the property, namely: spouses Simeon Doronio
and Cornelia Gante.
 6. Castillo v. Escutin, GR 171056, Mar. 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 258
Facts:
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel), married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search for
properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla,
co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters, situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas.

Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to secure an Order dated 4 March 1999 issued by Secretary
Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of the (DAR) approving the application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several
agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by "Perla K. Moratilla, et al." to residential, commercial, and recreational uses.

Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and the public auction sale of the same was scheduled on May
2002. Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point
Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation (Summit Realty). She met with its Vice
President, Orense and claimed that Orense did not show her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and
even threatened her that the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste family, was too powerful and influential for petitioner to tangle with.

The records of the Registry reveals that the source of the rights or interest of the adverse claimant is by virtue of a Levy on Execution
by the Regional Trial Court Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30, San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP-4489 (1996), [Dinah] C. Castillo vs.
Raquel Buenaventura. The registered owner, Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation nor its predecessor-in-interest are not
the judgment debtor or a party in the said case. Simply stated, there is no privity of contract between them. If ever her adverse claim is
against Raquel Buenaventura, the judgment debtor who holds no title over the property.

The LRA distinguished between two systems of land registration: one is the Torrens system for registered lands under the Property
Registration Decree, and the other is the system of registration for unregistered land under Act No. 3344 (now Section 113 of the
Property Registration Decree).

These systems are separate and distinct from each other. For documents involving registered lands, the same should be recorded under
the Property Registration Decree. The registration, therefore, of an instrument under the wrong system produces no legal effect.

Issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION OF PETITIONER
IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT

Ruling:

Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of ownership
of property, real or personal. Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or
which is the foundation of ownership of property. Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the
title to the land itself. Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true
copy of the decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title,issued subsequent to the original registration.

Petitioner's reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree is totally misplaced. It provides for the requirements for the
issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title. It cannot, in any way, be related to the cancellation of petitioner's tax declaration.

As between Catigbac's title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioner's title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is
evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to
Catigbac's ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac's certificate of title is binding upon the whole world, including respondent public officers and
even petitioner herself.
 Torbela v. Rasario, GR 140528, Dec. 7, 2011, 661 SCRA 633

This case involves two consolidated petitions of the Torbela siblings and the former wife of their nephew,
Lena Duque-Rosario. However, the court has delved more on the controversy as regards a parcel of land
located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan inherited by the Torbela siblings from their parents. The siblings had
consented their nephew, Dr. Rosario as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim to borrow the said land
for the latter to secure loans from several banks, including Banco Filipino to help in the construction of a
hospital on the same land. Unfortunately, then spouses Rosario failed to pay their loan from Banco Filipino
causing the latter to extrajudicially foreclose the real estate mortgage constituted on the lot in question. The
lot was bought by Banco Filipino who was the sole bidder in the public auction. Meanwhile, the Torbela
siblings tried to redeem Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino, but their efforts were unsuccessful . Hence, a new
certificate of title was issued in favor of the bank. The siblings then filed a petition for the annulment of the
certificate of final sale and the cancellation the TCT issued in favor of the bank. Their petition was denied by
the lower courts as well as their motion for reconsideration in the CA. Hence, this petition for review via Rule
45.

Issue: WON the Torbela siblings are the true owners of the lot in controversy

Ruling:
Dr. Rosario presented TCT, issued in his name, to prove his purported title to the lot and so the Court
made a clear distinction between title and the certificate of title:
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document. Petitioner
apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does
not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title.
The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of
any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership
with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other
parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.

Dr. Rosarios execution of the Deed of Absolute Quitclaim containing his express admission that he only
borrowed the lot from the Torbela siblings, eventually transformed the nature of the trust to an express one for
the benefit of the true owner (Art. 1451, NCC). Hence, he was only holding the property in trust for the real
owners, the Torbela siblings.

Banco Filipino cannot be deemed a mortgagee in good faith, much less a purchaser in good faith at the
foreclosure sale of the lot since it was apparent that there was an adverse claim as regards the property. Hence,
the right of the Torbela siblings over the lot is superior over that of Banco Filipino; and as the true owners of Lot
No. 356-A, the Torbela siblings are entitled to a reconveyance of said property even from Banco Filipino.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition of the Torbela siblings is GRANTED.
Legarda v. Saleeby, GR L-8936, Oct. 2, 1915, 31 Phil. 590

Plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of
Manila. The subject of the dispute is a stone wall between the said lots that existed for a number of years.

In 1906, plaintiffs presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. Said
registration and certificate issued to them included the wall.Later the predecessor of the defendant likewise
presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him and in
1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the
torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.

Several months later, plaintiffs, upon discovery of the predicament immediately petitioned the Court of Land
Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title
of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the plaintiffs, denied said petition upon the
theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make
any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

Issue: Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

Ruling:

The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality
of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner
may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court to avoid the possibility of losing his
land.

"Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails.In successive registrations,
where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming
under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the
holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof.

The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be
on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a
portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and
purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when
two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has
complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked.
Angeles v. Sania, GR 44493, Nov. 3, 1938, 66 Phil. 444

The case tackles the ownership of a parcel of land having an area of some 7 plus hectares, in the municipality of
Bacolor of the Province of Pampanga which was erroneously included in another lot described in a cadastral record
of the said municipality now covered by original certificate of title registered and issued in 1921, in the name of Macaria
Angeles, Petra Angeles, Felisberto Samia, and Elena Samia as their common undivided property.

The plaintiff claims to be the exclusive owner of the property in question, and the defendant alleges the same thing
saying: That said property was allotted to her when her co-owners made a partition of all the properties owned by
them in common, and that if the plaintiff ever had any right thereto prior to the issuance of said original certificate of
title, such right prescribed a longtime ago.

The lower court decided the question in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to execute the necessary deed
of conveyance to the plaintiff of the land described in the complaint. From this judgment the defendant appealed,
hence this petition.

Issue: WON lower court erred in not holding that the plaintiff's claim is contrary to the principal objective of the Torrens
System in quieting of titles in the country.l awphi 1.

Ruling:

No, the lower court was correct in deciding in favor of the plaintiffs. The appealed judgment in question is affirmed in
toto, and it is ordered that, upon the amendment of the plan of cadastral survey of Pampanga, the corresponding writ
for the execution of said judgment be issued by the lower court, with the costs to the appellant.

The appellants never claimed to be the owners of the land and did so only after the lapse of more than eleven years
from the issuance of the title in their favor which was because they were declared owners thereof through error. The
purpose of the Land Registration Act is not to create or vest title, but to confirm and register title already created
and already vested, and of course, said original certificate of issued to them could not have vested more title than
what was rightfully due her and her co-owners. It appearing that said certificate granted her much more than she
expected, naturally to the prejudice of another, it is but just that the error, which gave rise to said anomaly, be
corrected.
10. Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, GR 5246, Sept. 16, 1910, 17 Phil. 49

The subject property in this petition is a parcel of agricultural land located in municipality of Baliuag, Province
of Bulacan. It was inherited by the four petitioners from their deceased parents and as co-owners of the said lot,
they sought to register the same in their names. directing that the land described in the petition be registered in
the names of the four petitioners, as co-owners.

However, respondent de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration asking for a revision of the case,
including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two parcels of land which he
inherited from his father who obtained the same by virtue of a state grant and alleging that the decree was
obtained with malice and fraud by the petitioners. The Land Court reopened the case, and after hearing the
additional evidence presented by both,parties, decided in favor of de la Cruz finding that failure on the part of
the petitioners to include the name of de la Cruz in their petition for registration, as an occupant of these two
parcels of land, was a violation of, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of Land Registration Act.
The petitioners appealed.

Issue: WON the failure to include the name of de la Cruz in petition for registration of petitioners would render
the decree invalid

Ruling:

No. The judgment appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of
the petitioners.

Although de la Cruz, occupying the two small parcels of land in question, was not served with notice,
he was made a party defendant by publication; and the entering of a decree in 1908, must be held
to be conclusive against all persons, including him, whether his name is mentioned in the application, notice,
or citation.

A proceeding in rem such as registration of land dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to
judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside
of it. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res.

In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified by
advertisement to all persons interested. In this jurisdiction, by the "provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Act No. 190, a decree allowing or disallowing a will binds everybody, although the only notice of the proceedings
given is by general notice to all persons interested.
Manotok IV v. Barque, GR 162335 & 162605, Dec. 12, 2008, 477 SCRA 339

In 1988, a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall which destroyed numerous certificates of title on file
with Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The resulting effects of that blaze on specific property
registration controversies have been dealt with by the Court in a number of cases since then.

Respondents, the Barques filed a petition with the Land Registration Authority (LRA) for administrative
reconstitution of the original of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Homer Barque located in
the then Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal alleging that theirs was among the records destroyed by
the 1988 fire. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owners duplicate of
the Barque title, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan FLS 3168-D covering the property.
However, the petitioners filed opposition thereto, claiming that title formed part of the land covered by
their reconstituted title. Since then, the litigations between the parties concerning the lot continued and
included the intervention made by another party, Manahan who was also claiming ownership over the
land.

Issue: Who has the legal right over the property?

Ruling:
The court did not render a decision as regards ownership of the lot. The cases were REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings. Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence to warrant the
annulment of the Manotok title. All that the record indicates thus far is evidence not yet refuted by clear and
convincing proof that the Manotoks claim to title is flawed. However, the Court of Appeals is sufficiently able to
undertake such function

The perceived advantages of the Torrens system of registration of land titles have helped stabilize land
ownership in the Philippines. Its underlying principle is security with facility in dealing with land. Its fundamental
purpose is to quiet title to land, to perpetually enjoin any question in the legality of the title, hence, the titles
issued under the system are indefeasible. Yet the Torrens system is imperfect in that it remains susceptible to
fraud, either in the original registration proceedings or in subsequent transactions.
Reynes v. Barrera, GR 46724, Sept. 30, 1939, 68 Phil. 656

The spouses, Vidal Reynes and Lucia R. de Reynes, were owners of lot in Cebu. Lucia died leaving
the plaintiffs as her heirs. Later, Vidal contracted a debt of P1,000 with one Pedro Malacahan.
Unfortunately, by virtue of a condemnatory judgement by the creditor against Vidal, the lot was levied
for execution and was sold at a public auction. Vidal conveyed his right of redemption to his brother
Manuel who thereafter redeemed the property. The lot was then subdivided into two, the second lot
registered in the name of Manuel. The other half was not included in this case since it was already sold
by the Sps. Reynes to another.

With respect to the lot under Manuel’s name, he conveyed the same, under pacto de retro, to the defendant,
Rosalina Barrera who, acquired full ownership thereof and since then had been in continuous
possession of the property until the commencement of the present action. Plaintiffs now seek to declare
null and void the sale at public auction of one-half of the property in question, which by virtue of heirship,
belonged to them, as well as all subsequent transfer thereof. The lower court rendered judgment for
the plaintiffs, from which defendant, Rosalina Barrera, took the present appeal.

Issue: Who has the better right over the lot?

Ruling:

The defendant has a better right over the lot. There defendant is a purchaser in good faith and for a valuable
consideration. There was nothing in the certificate of title of Manuel Reynes, from whom she acquired
the property, to indicate any cloud or vice in his ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon.

Where the subject of a judicial sale is a registered property, the purchaser thereof is not required to
explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates in quest for any hidden defect or
inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were, otherwise, the efficacy
and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure, would entirely
be futile and nugatory. "Every applicant receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser or registered land who takes a certificate of title for value
in good faith, shall hold the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate.
Capitol Subdivision v. Province of Negros Occidental, GR L-16257, Jan. 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 60

Lot 378 in controversy is part of Hacienda Madalagan, registered under the Amenabars. In 1920, the Amenabars
sold the Hacienda to Jose Benares. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of the Amenabars
was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Benares obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title under his name.

Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot 378 to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Later in
1926, he again mortgaged the properties to PNB, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling
Co. These were duly recorded in the office of the RD of Negros Occidental. The mortgage in favor of the Bank was
subsequently foreclosed and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure
sale. Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares was cancelled and another TCT was issued in the name of the
Bank.

In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son of Jose Benares, Carlos, subject to the condition that the
title will remain with the Bank until full payment. Thereafter, Carlos transferred his rights, under his contract with
the Bank, to plaintiff Capitol Subdivision which completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank in
1949. Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff and a transfer certificate
of title covering Lot 378 was issued.

When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale 1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda
and it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental.
Immediately plaintiff made representations with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation. Not
being satisfied with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.

Defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in the year 1924-1925 through expropriation proceedings and
that it took possession and began the construction of the provincial hospital thereon. They further claimed that
for some reason beyond their comprehension, title was never transferred in its name and it was placed in its
name only for assessment purposes.

ISSUE: Whether defendant herein had acquired the lot in question in an expropriation proceedings.

Ruling:

The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate
transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title
and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry.

In the case at bar plaintiff had no such actual knowledge, it being an established fact that he was not aware until
1949 that the land on which the provincial hospital stood was Lot 378. Considering that sugar centrals as well as
banks are known to have an array of experienced and competent lawyers, it cannot be said that plaintiff was not
justified in assuming that said institutions had scrutinized the background of Lot 378 and were satisfied that the
same belonged to the mortgagor when said mortgages were constituted, In short, we find that plaintiff herein is
a purchaser in good faith and for value.
State Investment House, Inc. v. CA, GR 115548, Mar. 05, 1996, 254 SCRA 368

In 1969, a contract to sell was executed by the Sps. Oreta, and the Solid Homes, Inc. involving a parcel of land
in Capitol Park Homes Subdivision, Quezon City for a consideration of P39,347.00. Upon signing of the
contract, the spouses Oreta made payment amounting to P7,869.40, with the agreement that the balance shall be
payable in monthly installments plus annual interests. Sometime later, Solid executed several real estate
mortgage contracts in favor of State Investment Homes, Inc. over its subdivided parcels of land, including the
subject lot of the contract to sell between the Sps. Oreta and Solid.

SOLID failed to comply with its mortgage obligations contract. Hence, STATE extra-judicially foreclosed the
mortgaged properties with the corresponding certificate of sale annotated at the back of the titles covering the
said properties. SOLID negotiated to redeem the properties from STATE.

In 1899, the spouses filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, HLRB, against the
developer SOLID and STATE for failure on the part of SOLID to execute the necessary absolute deed of sale as
well as to deliver title to said property.

Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) rendered a decision ordering State to execute a
Deed of Conveyance of the lot as well as deliver the certificate of title in favor of complainants and Solid to pay
State that portion of its loan which corresponds to the value of the lot as collateral.

Hence, this petition for review questioning the non-application of the settled rule that that persons dealing
with property covered by Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on the
face of the title.

Issue: WON State, mortgagee is not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title of the
mortgagor Solid

Ruling:

No. ACCORDINGLY, the court finds no reversible error in the assailed judgment and the same is
AFFIRMED.

As a general rule, where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of
the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens
Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his
right thereto. The exception is that where the purchaser or mortgagee, has knowledge of a defect or lack of title
in his vendor, or that he was aware of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the
status of the title of the property in litigation.

In this case, petitioner was well aware that it was dealing with SOLID, a business entity engaged in the business
of selling subdivision lots. In fact, the OAALA found that at the time the lot was mortgaged, respondent State had
been aware of the lots location and that said lot formed part of Capital Park/Homes Subdivision.
Ching v. CA, 1990, 181 SCRA 9

The land in question is located in then Municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal. In 1960, 5/6 portion of the
property was reconveyed to the Nofuentes and a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued accordingly. By virtue of
a sale to Ching Leng , TCT under the name of the Nofuentes was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in favor of
Cheng.

In 1965, Ching Leng died in the US. Thus, legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(now RTC) Branch III, Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate. Regular process of publication was
made and no oppositors appeared at the hearing, consequently Alfredo Ching was appointed administrator of his
father’s estate. The land in controversy was among those included in the inventory submitted to the court.

13 years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him which was later amended as against his estate was
commenced by private respondent Pedro Asedillo for reconveyance of the abovesaid property and cancellation
of T.C.T. in his favor based on possession. Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed
by the trial court and naturally, no answer was made. Hence, a judgement by default was rendered, declaring
respondent Asedillo as true owner of the lot.

Petitioner filed for the annulment of the decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE
PARTIES

Ruling:

No. Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in
question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.

An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action
against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam,
so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given
an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against
specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status
of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of
land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns
the right to a tangible thing.

A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to. A strong presumption
exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any
"information possessoria" or title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title.
J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. CA, GR L-23480, Sept. 11, 1979, 93 SCRA 146

The case originated as an ejectment suit instituted by the plaintiff corporation against the private respondent
Guillermo Reñosa; that in the trial court, Reñosa admitted that the corporation is the owner of the disputed parcel
of land in Quezon City on which respondent constructed his residence in 1967 as a lessee for P12 a month.
Respondent defended that he bought the disputed portion of land from a certain Capt. Faustino C. Cruz, for the
sum of P3,600.00 who acquired the said same by virtue of a compromise agreement and that all in all Faustino
C. Cruz sold to respondent 360 square meters of land.
The trial court ruled in favor of the corporation in the ejectment case on the grounds that it is the registered
owner of the questioned land and is entitled to possession as an attribute of ownership; that respondent's claim
of the right to possess the disputed land based on purchase of the same from Capt. Faustino C. Cruz who is the
supposed owner of the land by virtue of a compromise agreement is without any legal basis.

Respondent CA in reversed the decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON private respondent Reñosa's predecessor in-interest in the disputed property namely, Capt. Cruz,
acquired a valid right to own and possess said land - a right that he could have legally transmitted to private
respondent Reñosa to entitle the latter to a better right of possession against the admitted registered owner of
the land.

Ruling:

No. It has been shown that a condition precedent has not been complied with which in turn made the SC rescind
the compromise agreement and release the corporation from its obligation thereof. Hence, no right was acquired
by respondent.

The court stressed the fundamental principle in law applicable to the circumstances of the case, that mere
possession of whatever length cannot defeat the imprescriptible title to the holder of registered Torrens Title to
real property, and that registered real property under the Torrens system cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription. The petitioner who is the registered owner of the disputed land has a right to possess and recover
the same, as against private respondent Reñosa who merely claims a right to possess from his predecessor-in-
interest Capt. Cruz who likewise never acquired any right to possess the disputed property.
Ybañez v. IAC, GR 68291, Mar. 6, 1991, 194 SCRA 743

Private respondent Valentin Ouano, a claimant-occupant of the lot situated in Davao del Norte with an area of 3
plus hectares which was surveyed in 1958, filed in 1959, a homestead application with the Bureau of Lands. It
was approved on the same year and issued by the District Land Officer, Land District No. 20, for and by authority
of the Director of Lands.

In 1963, an order for the issuance of patent was issued by the Bureau of Lands and thereafter, an OCT was issued
to Valentin Ouano over the Homestead Patent. However, in 1975, after 19 years of possession, cultivation and
income derived from coconuts planted on the lot, Ouano was interrupted in his peaceful occupation thereof
when a certain Arcadio Ybanez and his sons forcibly and unlawfully entered the land armed with spears, canes
and bolos. Oano filed a case against Ybanez to recover the possession of the land.

Petitioners alleged that it was declared by the Director of Lands that the homestead patent issued to Ouano was
improperly and erroneously issued, since on the basis of their investigation and relocation survey, the actual
occupation and cultivation was made by petitioner Ybañez and his children.

The trial court ruled in favor of Oano. On appeal, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court with
modifications.

Issue: WON Ibanez’ petition is meritorious.

Ruling:

No.

The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. After the expiration of the one (1) year period from the issuance of the decree of
registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible. The settled rule is that a decree of registration
and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the ground of actual fraud within one (1)
year from the date of its entry and such an attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. The validity
of the certificate of title in this regard can be threshed out only in an action expressly filed for the purpose.

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a
homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial
registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the
contemplation of the Public Land Law.

Although petitioners may still have the remedy of reconveyance, if they are the "owners" and actual occupants
of the lot as claimed by them before the trial court, this remedy, however, can no longer be availed of by
petitioners due to prescription. The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real
property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title.
Rufloe v. Burgos, GR 143573, Jan. 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 264

Petitioner Adoracion Rufloe is the wife of Angel Rufloe, now deceased, while co-petitioners are their children.
During the marriage the spouses Rufloe acquired a 371-square meter parcel of land located in, Muntinlupa
covered by a TCT, the subject of the controversy. In 1978, respondent Elvira Delos Reyes forged the signatures of
the spouses Rufloe in a Deed of Sale to make it appear that the disputed property was sold to her by the latter
and was able to obtain a TCT on the said lot issued in her name.

Thus, in 1979, the Rufloes filed a complaint for damages against Delos Reyes with the RTC alleging the falsity of
the deed of sale since Angel Rufloe couldn’t have signed it as he was already deceased in 1974. They also filed a
notice of adverse claim. In 1984, during the pendency of of the case, Delos Reyes sold the subject property to
respondent siblings Burgos and a new TCT was then issued in their names. In 1985, the Burgos siblings, in turn,
sold the same property to their aunt, Leonarda Burgos but the sale was not registered. The subject property
remained in the name of the Burgos siblings who also continued paying the real estate taxes thereon. In 1989,
the RTC ruled in favor of the Rufloes. Said decision had become final and executory.

In 1990, the Rufloes filed their complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contract and Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Titles against respondents Leonarda and the Burgos siblings, and Delos Reyes alleging that no valid
title was ever conveyed to the Burgos siblings. Respondents maintained that they bought the property in good
faith and for value after they were shown a genuine copy of the title of the disputed property. The trial court
ruled in favor of the Rufloes.

Respondents appealled to the CA, which held them purchasers in good faith and for value.

Issue: Whether the sales were valid and binding, making the respondents innocent purchasers in good faith and
for value despite the forged deed of sale of their transferor Delos Reyes

Ruling:

No. Due to the forged deed of sale, Delos Reyes acquired no right over the subject property which she could
convey to the Burgos siblings. All the transactions subsequent to the falsified sale between the spouses Rufloe
and Delos Reyes are likewise void, including the sale made by the Burgos siblings to their aunt, Leonarda.

There was absolute lack of good faith on the part of respondents. The evidence shows that the Rufloes caused a
notice of adverse claim to be annotated on the title of Delos Reyes as early as 1979. Despite the notice of adverse
claim, the Burgos siblings still purchased the property in question.

Moreover, the defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with notice
of a flaw in the title of his transferor. To be effective, the inscription in the registry must have been made in good
faith. A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law cannot
be used as a shield for fraud.
Peralta v. Abalon, GR 183448, June 30, 2014, 727 SCRA 477

The civil case before the RTC of Legaspi City involved a parcel of land registered under the name of Bernardina
Abalon and fraudulently transferred to Restituto Rellama and who, in turn, subdivided the subject property and
sold it separately to the other parties to this case – Spouses Peralta; and the Andals. Thereafter, Spouses Peralta
and the Andals individually registered the respective portions of the land they had bought under their names.
The heirs of Bernardina were claiming back the land, alleging that since it was sold under fraudulent
circumstances, no valid title passed to the buyers. On the other hand, the buyers, who were now title holders of
the subject parcel of land, averred that they were buyers in good faith and sought the protection accorded to
them under the law.

Issue: Whether a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value, even if the true owner thereof has been in possession of the genuine title, which is valid and has not
been cancelled.

Ruling:

As for Spouses Peralta, court ruled that they are indeed buyers in bad faith. It is well-established in our laws and
jurisprudence that a person who is dealing with a registered parcel of land need not go beyond the face of the
title. A person is only charged with notice of the burdens and claims that are annotated on the title except when
the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient
facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The
presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within
the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and
hence does not merit the protection of the law.

However, in the case of the Andals, there is no evidence that the chain of registered titles was broken. Neither
were they proven to have knowledge of anything that would make them suspicious of the nature of Rellama’s
ownership over the subject parcel of land. Hence, we sustain the CA’s ruling that the Andals were buyers in good
faith. Consequently, the validity of their title to the parcel of the land bought from Rellama must be upheld.
Republic v. CA, GR L-46626-27, Dec. 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 865

These two cases are about the cancellation and annulment of reconstituted Torrens titles whose originals are
existing and whose reconstitution was, therefore, uncalled for.

Lots of the Tala Estate, with areas of more than 25 and 24 hectares, respectively, located at Novaliches, Caloocan,
now Quezon City, are registered in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The originals of the titles
are on file in the registry of deeds in Pasig, Rizal and were not destroyed during the war.

The reconstitution proceeding started when Laborada, a widow residing in Manila, filed in Caloocan City a petition
for the reconstitution of the title in 1967 covering the above-mentioned lots alleging that she was the owner of
the same and that the title covering it, the number of which she could not specify, was not available. Her petition
was granted based on convincing evidence presented. Acting on the court's directive, the register of deeds issued
to Laborada in 1968 TCT which was later subdivided into seven lots under Laborada’s name.

In another and later case, one Francisco S. Bombast, single Manila filed in the lower court a petition dated
November 16, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title of the same lot, with the same circumstances as Laborada’s.
It was likewise granted and the alleged missing TCT was reconstituted. 5 months prior to the issuance of the
reconstituted title, Bombast sold the lot to Deo and a TCT was issued to him. He then sold the lot to A & A Torrijos
Engineering Corporation and a TCT was issued to the corporation.

In 1970, the State filed two petitions for the cancellation and annulment of the reconstituted titles. The cases
were decided in favor of the respondents and CA affirmed as well. Hence, this appeal by the State.

Issue: WON the reconstituted titles were valid.

Ruling:

No. We hold that the appeal is justified.

The theory of A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation that it was a purchaser in good faith and for value is
indefensible because the title of the lot which it purchased unmistakably shows that such title was reconstituted.
That circumstance should have alerted its officers to make the necessary investigation in the registry of deeds of
Caloocan City and Rizal where they could have found that Lot 918 is owned by the State.

The existence of the two titles of the Government for the lots ipso facto nullified the reconstitution proceedings
and signified that the evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and Bombast
cannot be given any credence. The two proceedings were sham and deceitful and were filed in bad faith. Such
humbuggery or imposture cannot be countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.
Sandoval v. CA, GR 106657, Aug. 1, 1996, 260 SCRA 283

The property subject of the controversy is a parcel of land on which a five-door apartment building stands,
covered by a TCT in the name of Lorenzo L. Tan, Jr. and located in Quezon City.
In 1984, Tan, Jr. was notified of the need to present his owners copy of the TCT to the Registry of Deeds, Quezon
City in connection with an adverse claim where he discovered that an adverse claim by one Godofredo Valmeo
had been annotated on his title. An impostor, had mortgaged the property to Valmeo in1984 to secure a P70k
obligation.

Tan filed a complaint for cancellation of the annotation of mortgage and damages against Almeda and Valmeo
before the RTC. In 1985, Tan met petitioner Sandoval who claimed to be the new owner at the site of the
property. Upon further investigation, Tan discovered that as early as 1984, someone purporting to be him sold
the property to Almeda in a Deed of Sale of Registered Land with Pacto de Retro, causing the cancellation of his
TCT and a new TCT in favor of Alameda to be issued.

Almeda sold the subject property to Sandoval who then acquired a TCT under his name. In the amended
complaint impleading Sandoval, Tan alleged that petitioner had prior knowledge of legal flaws which tainted
Almedas title. Petitioner countered that he was a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. He
bought the property through real estate brokers whom he contacted after seeing the property advertised. Both
the trial court and CA ruled in favor of Tan, Jr. Hence this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not Juan Sandoval, herein petitioner, is a purchaser in good faith or an innocent purchaser for
value.

Ruling:

No. Clear and convincing evidence showed that Sandoval was not a purchaser in good faith.
It is settled doctrine that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond
the same, but only has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are
annotated on the title except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel
a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of
title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title
of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the
vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said
certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor
a purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law.
Gonzalez v. Rojas, GR L-5449, Mar. 22, 1910, 16 Phil. 51

The subject land of fishery belonged to the sisters Juliana Samonte and Atanasia Samonte, during their
lifetime, who are said to have inherited it from their grandfather, Jose Samonte. These sisters leased the property
to Mamerto Siaoson under a contract for 12 years. The first sale was made by the Juliana Samonte to Alejandro
Rojas, on February 2, 1900. Juliana Samonte died on March 10 of the same year. From March 21, 1895, to the
same date of 1907, Mamerto Siaoson was entitled to the possession and lease of the fishery. For this reason,
Juliana Samonte, on February 24, 1900, said that the lease still had six years to run. Juliana Samonte and Alejandro
Rojas expressly stipulated, in the document of contract, Exhibit No. 1, that as soon as the said six years of the
lease should have expired "and this land is returned to us — Juliana’s words-immediately and without delay we
will deliver the same to this married couple. On November 14, 1907, the delivery of this land had not yet been
made to Alejandro Rojas; hence, by means of a notarial proceeding, the latter demanded of two sons of Juliana
Samonte, Brigido and Matias Villanueva, the said delivery.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale made by Juliana Samonte to Alejandro Rojas in 1900 remained in a state of
dependency on the completion of the contract and was not consummated.

It is evident that the sale made by Juliana Samonte to Alejandro Rojas in 1900 remained in a state of dependency
on the completion of the contract and was not consummated; for the consummation, as is known, consists in the
delivery of the thing sold. Article 1462 of the Civil Code provides that —"A thing sold shall be considered as
delivered when it is placed in the hands of the vendee. When the sale is made by means of a public instrument,
the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if in said
instrument the contrary does not appear or may be clearly inferred.

No actual delivery was made of the possession of the reality in question. There was no public instrument, the
execution of which could have constituted a form of delivery of the thing sold. On the contrary, from the
instrument executed, which is only a private one, it clearly appears that the delivery of the fishery was postponed
to a fixed date, to wit, that of the termination of the contract of lease then pending, which was to be six years
from the date thereof.

"Ownership and other property rights are acquired and transmitted by law, by gift, by testate or intestate
succession, and, in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition."
Cariño v. Insular Government, GR 72, Feb. 23, 1909, 41 Phil. 935; 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594

Land Titles and Deeds – Native Title)

Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners
for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the
land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the
state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles.
Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.

Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.

Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land.

The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:

“It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has
been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same
way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”

There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a
claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an
exception to the theory of jura regalia.
 212 U.S. 449 (41 Phil. 935) – Civil Law – Land Titles and Deeds – Ancestral Domain – Ancestral Land Claim
Political Law – Regalian Doctrine – Due Process – Property Rights
In 1903, Mateo Cariño filed a petition for him to be granted a certificate of title over a 40 hectare land in Baguio,
Benguet. He claimed that he and his predecessors in interest had been in possession over said parcel of land since
time immemorial; that the Igorot community where the said land was located had always considered Mateo
Cariño and his predecssors/ancestors as the owner of said land; that said parcel of land had been transferred to
his predecessors and unto him in accordance with the Igorot custom.
The land registration court granted his petition but the government through the Solicitor General opposed said
grant on the ground that Mateo Cariño and ancestors failed to register said land during the Spanish Era. It was
argued that in 1880, the Spanish government decreed that all privately held land must be registered or else they
will be reverted back to the public domain (pursuant to the regalian doctrine).
The case reached the Philippine Supreme Court. The latter ruled against Mateo Cariño hence Cariño further
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo Cariño’s should be granted.
HELD: Yes, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision held by the Philippine Supreme Court. Mateo Cariño
cannot be deprived of his land simply because he failed to comply with the formalities required by the Spanish
law (or by a Philippine law). Cariño’s title, which he acquired from his ancestors predates, by more than 50 years,
the establishment of the American government in the Philippines (in fact, even before the establishment of the
Spanish government in the Philippines).
The US Supreme Court also noted that even the Solicitor General admitted that the Igorots were hardly ruled by
the Spanish government. That being, it is unlikely that the Spanish government would grant land titles to the
Igorots even if they will register their land under the old Spanish Law. The US Supreme Court also ruled that to
follow the stand of the Solicitor General is to deprive the land titles of the natives (not only Igorots but all native
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands). Under the Constitution: “no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal
protection of the laws.” The term “any person” includes the natives (in this case, the Igorots). All lands held under
private ownership during the Spanish era shall therefore be presumed to be such. Failure to register under
Spanish Law did not revert said lands to the public domain.
Kapunan, J., Sep. Op.: Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, GR 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, 347
SCRA 128

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA),
and its IRR on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law
that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs
of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, GR 179987, Apr. 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172).

Facts:

In 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for original registration of title covering a parcel of land
in Silang, Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his predecessors in
interest had been in open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the said land for more
than 30 years.

Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his great-grandfather which passed
down to his four sons. By 1966, one of the sons became the administrator of the properties which the
son of the latter succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was the one sold by the Velazco.
They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be alienable and disposable by the
DENR in 1982.

The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of Republic v Hebierto.

Issue: Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed

Held:

No. The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) of the PROPERTY
REGISTRATION DECREE. is Naguit, not Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case.
The requirement of bona fide ownership since 1945 is satisfied when at the time of the application, the
land is already classified as alienable and disposable. A contrary ruling will result to absurdity rendering
the presumption of the right nugatory and the provision inoperative, aggravated by the fact that at the
time the Philippine is still not an independent state.

The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership
in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. If the reverse is true,
then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.It is clear that only when there is a positive act, regardless if the land was classified as alienable
and disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be acquired through prescription.

While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that
is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with
Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Petition Denied.
Republic v. Lao, GR 150413, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 291

Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of land. She allegedly acquired
the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria Valenzuela who inherited it from
Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same
from Edilberto Perido by transfer. She prayed that the land be registered in her name under Commonwealth Act
141 (Public Land Act) based on her and her predecessor-in-interests’ open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive,
notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30)
years. She presented witnesses and evidence constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the technical description
of property and tax declarations in her and her predecessors’ names. The court approved the application. The
petitioner represented by the Solicitor General appealed the decision before the CA which re-affirmed the lower
court decision, hence this petition for review before the SC. The petitioner contends that there is no sufficient
evidence to warrant the issuance of the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required periods
and acts of possession mandated by law and her failure to prove that the land is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.

Issue: Whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application was disposable and
alienable land of the public domain?
Ruling:
Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our Constitution,[14] all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.[15] All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[16] Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.[17] To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.[18]
The court held that Commonwealth Act 141 requires that before one can register his title over a parcel of land,
the applicant must show that he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; in adverse possession over the land for at least 30 years and the land
subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Petitioner was right to contend
that the respondent did not prove by incontrovertible evidence that she possessed the property in the manner
and time required by law. She did not provide the exact period when her predecessors-in-interest started
occupying the property. In the absence of these evidences, her application shall fail. Hence the petition was
granted and her application was denied.
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (GR 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA),
and its IRR on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

Issue:

Ruling:

The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.3 This was the foundation
for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia
is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas:

"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore
ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony,
it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong
to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem
necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into
consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now
have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to
dispose of as we may wish.

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands became the
exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of distributing
the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian.5 Private land titles could
only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown.6