JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, et al.

, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, et al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014

FACTS:

Republic Act 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (cyber crime law), aims to regulate access to and
use of the cyberspace. Cyberspace is a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing
individual accesses to and uses of the internet. However, the wicked can also use the cyberspace to conduct their illegal
activities. For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish
wrongdoings. But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts
as crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would enable the government to track down
and penalize violators. These provisions are:

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.
(v) Others also assailed the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the above listed provisions of the cybercrime law are unconstitutional.

HELD:

a. Section 4(a)(1) - Constitutional

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the
fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.

The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, useful in
determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. In the cases before it, the Court
finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom,
like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another
without right. It is a universally condemned conduct. However, this should not cover ethical hackers. Since the ethical
hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section
4(a)(1).

b. Section 4(a)(3)- Constitutional

(3) Data Interference. – The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it
intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed
freedoms.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may
not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.7
But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,8
the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to
destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents.

c. Section 4(a)(6)- Constitutional

(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the
reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate government agency at
the time of the domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.

d. Section 4(b)(3)- Constitutional

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion
of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has
yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.

Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to
privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.

Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the over-breadth doctrine will not hold water since the
specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are
specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental
right to acquire another’s personal data.

e. Section 4(c)(1)- Constitutional

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(1) Cybersex.– The will-ful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.
 Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution. They express fear
that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded
as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace.

The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only
to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition
of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.

f. Section 4(c)(2)- Constitutional

(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-
Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be
(1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.

It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (ACPA) to cover
identical activities in cyberspace. The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in
cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is
rational basis for such higher penalty.

g. Section 4(c)(3)- Unconstitutional

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. – The transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of
computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the sender to its
existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt
of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the
message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same
level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection.36 The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

h. Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code

Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law - Constitutional

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyber-libel is actually not a new crime
since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely
affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.

But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous
statement or article.

i. Section 5 in relation to Section 4(c)(4), 4(c)(3), 4(c)(2)- Unconstitutional

Sec. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of
any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses
enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or aids in
the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cyber-crimes. It suffers from over-breadth,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of
internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or
abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal
crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of
netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section
4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply
to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section
4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1)
on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity
Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.

j. Section 6- Constitutional

Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed by,
through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of
this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.

Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. There
exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology
and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades
identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for
higher penalties for cybercrimes.

k. Section 7- Constitutional (except as to online liberal, and child pornography)

Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.

The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts may
be prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code. When two
different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses
arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. With
the exception of the crimes of online libel and online child pornography, for such would be tantamount to a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

l. Section 8. Penalties- Constitutional

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the
legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cyber-crimes. They appear
proportionate to the evil sought to be punished.

m. Section 12- Unconstitutional

Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to
collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications
transmitted by means of a computer system.

The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says
that traffic data collection should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing
can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or
receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to
extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.

n. Section 13-Constitutional

Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating to
communication services provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from
the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order
from law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.

The contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or recipients and are to be
considered private communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy
of the same as they pass its system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service
providers to keep traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication services for at least six months from
the date of the transaction and those relating to content data for at least six months from receipt of the order for their
preservation.

Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. The
service provider has never assumed responsibility for their loss or deletion while in its keep. The process of preserving
data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.

o. Section 14- Constitutional

Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an order
requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscriber’s information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its
possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint officially
docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation.

What Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in
the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure
would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence.
Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.

p. Section 15- Constitutional

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where a search and seizure warrant is properly issued,
the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and communications
network.

Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and seizure
procedures. On its face, however, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would
ensure the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court
warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken.
Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.

q. Section 17- Constitutional

Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service
providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer
data subject of a preservation and examination.
 Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or examination violates
the user’s right against deprivation of property without due process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the user
has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage
system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he generated the data or received
it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.

r. Section 19- Unconstitutional

Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.— When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation
of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.

Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Computer data may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as files
that contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings. It is indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their
writers or authors may constitute personal property. Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and
seizures, whether while stored in their personal computers or in the service provider’s systems.

The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the constitutional guarantees to
freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches and seizures.

s. Section 20- Constitutional

Sec. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from law
enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision
correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every
noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities.

Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the mere failure to
comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or
valid.

The act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or will-fully.” There must still be
a judicial determination of guilt, during which defense and justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section
20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.

t and u. Sections 24 and 26(a)- Constitutional

Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.– There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC),
under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies and
for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.

Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime
offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x.

Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation
and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or
parameters for it to follow.

In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests:
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
 Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national
cybersecurity plan. ###