Casibang vs Aquino

FACTS:R e s p o n d e n t R e m i g i o P . Y u w a s p r o c l a i m e d o n N o v e m b e r 9 , 1 9 7 1 a s t h e
e l e c t e d M a y o r o f Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections. Herein petitioner filed on
November 24, 1971 a protestagainst the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, on the grounds of As the proceedings continued, the 1973 Constitution was ratified. Yu
moved to dismiss the election protestof petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction
over the same in view of the effectivityof the 1973 Constitution by reason of which —Section 9
of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has
intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that "...the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative
to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973Constitution. Therefore, all local government
should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. Thisis clear in the New Constitution under its
Article XI." He further submitted that local elective officials haveno more four-year term of office. They
are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodiedin the New Constitution, and under
Section 9 of Article XVII. CFI ruled in favor of Yu.ISSUE:WON the protest case is a political
questionHELD:

No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there
a n y a c t o f t h e incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly
reviewed or interfered with if t herespondent Judge decides the election protest. The term
"political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
refers to those questions which under the Constitution,are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authorityhas been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issuesdependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" The only issue in the electoral protestcase dismissed by
respondent Judge on the ground of political question is who between protestant — herein petitioner —
and protestee — herein respondent Yu — was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan,and legally
entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge
thefunctions, duties and obligations of the position. If the protestee's election is upheld
by the respondentJudge, then he continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant,
herein petitioner. That is the onlyconsequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved — a
purely justiciable question or controversy asit implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable,
an act or ommission violative of said right,and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said
breach of right. Any judgment to be made on that issue will not in any way collide or interfere
with the mandate of Section 9 of Article XVII. Neither doesSection 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in
that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply,that section allocated unto the National
Assembly the power to enact a local government code.
Daza vs SingsonFacts:
Cong. Daza, a member of the Liberal Party, was one of the representatives who was
chosen torepresent the said party in the Commission of Appointments. When the party Laban ng
DemokratikongPilipino was reorganized, it resulted to the swelling of its members to 159
and thereby reducing the members of the LP to only 17. Because of this, the House of Representatives
revise its operation in theCOA withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving
this to the newly-formed LDP. Thechamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the
original members except the petitioner
andi n c l u d i n g t h e r e i n r e s p o n d e n t L u i s S i n g s o n . C o n g . D a z a c h a l l e n g e s h i s r e m
oval alleging that thereorganization of the House representation in the said b
o d y i s n o t b a s e d o n a p e r m a n e n t p o l i t i c a l realignment because LDP is not a duly registered
political party and has not yet attained political stability.Cong. Singson, on the other hand, contends that
the question raised was political in nature and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the issue raised is political in nature, thus beyond the jurisdiction of the Court
Held:
The issue at bar does not involve the discretionary act of the HR that may not be reviewed becauseit is
political in nature. The issue involved here is the legality and not the wisdom of the act of that chamber in
removing the petitioner from the COA. Consequently, the issued presented is justiciable
rather than political, for it involves the manner of filling the COA as prescribed in the Constitution (
legality
) and notthe discretion of the HR in the choice of its represent atives (
wisdom
). Moreover, even if the question is political in nature, it would still come in the powers of the Sc to
review under the expanded jurisdictionconferred upon it by Article 8, Section 1 of
the Constitution, which includes the authority to determinewhether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch on instrumentality of
the government.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC vs POEAFacts:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident
in Tokyo,Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
MemorandumCircular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that
the complaint wascognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been
filed against the StateInsurance Fund.The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering
the position papers of the parties ruledin favor of the complainant.The decision is challenged by the
petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not
an overseas worker.
Issue:
Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction
Held:
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No.
797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to
protecttheir rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor
Code in1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations
arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen."

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by
the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This
circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies
in the hiringof Filipino seamen for overseas employment.But the petitioner questions the validity of
Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principleof non-delegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with
such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the
principle, is not subject to delegation.Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The
model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge
by the employer. The power of thePOEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring
the model contract is not unlimited as thereis a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of
the said authority. That standard isdiscoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the
Philippine Overseas EmploymentAdministration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino
workers to "fair and equitableemployment practices."The petition is dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner.
KURODA vs JALANDONIFacts :
Shigenori Kuroda, a formerly a Lietenant-General of the japanese imperial army and commandinggeneral
of the japanese imperial forces in the philippines during a period covering 1943 and 1944 who isnow
charge before a military commission convened by the chief of staff of the armed forces of the philippines
with having unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them
to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the
imperial japanese forces in the violations of the laws and customer of war.Petitioner argues that
respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for its actscommitted in violation of
Hague Convention and the Geneva convention because the Philippines is notsignatory to Hague
Convention and signed the Geneva only in 1947. He also challenges the participation of the two
American attorneys in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorneys are not qualifiedto
practice law in the Philippines.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the executive order no. 68 is a ground for the violations of our provision of
constitutionslaw and to our local law.2. Whether or not Atty. Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port is
allowed to practice the law professions in the philippines.
Ruling :
The court holds that the Executive Order is valid and Constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3 that ” The Philippines renounces war as
aninstruments of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of
thelaw of nation.”In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present
day, including theHague and Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by theU.N, all the persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing,
or waging a war of aggression and commission of the crimes and offenses consequential and incidental
thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war of humanity and civilization, are held accountable
therefore. Consequently, inthe promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order no. 68, the President of
the Philippines has acted inconformity with the generally accepted principles and policies of international
law which are part our Constitution.On the second issue, the court ruled that the appointment of the two
American attorneys is not violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that the U.S
which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of
our nation should be allowed representationin the trial of those very crimes. The lest that we could do in
the spirit of comity is to allow thisrepresentation in said trial.The petition was denied.
AGUSTIN vs EDU
Facts: A presidential letter of instruction (LOI) prescribing the use of triangular reflectorized early
warningdevice to prevent vehicular accidents was assailed for the lack of legislative enactment that would
authorizethe issuance of said LOI. The petition quoted two whereas clauses of the assailed LOI.
[Whereas], thehazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies
concerned withtraffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United
nations Organization;[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine
Government under PD 207,recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road
and safety signs and devices.Issue: Whether or not a legislative enactment is necessary in order to
authorize the issuance of said LOIHeld: No. The petition must be dismissed for lack of merit. It cannot
be disputed that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance. “The
Philippines *** adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land,
***.” The 1968 Vienna Convention on RoadSigns and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not
for this country to repudiate a commitment towhich it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt
servanda stands in the way of such an attitude,which is, moreover, at war with the principle of
international morality.*Pacta sunt servanda – every agreement enforce is binding upon the parties
and must be performed by themin good faith.
In Re: ManzanoFacts:
RTC Judge Manzano was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee onJustice
pursuant to EO 856 as amended by EO 326 by then Governor. Rodolfo Farinas. He sent a letter tothe SC
stating that before he accepts the appointment, he would like to request for the issuance
of aResolution (1) authorizing him to accept his appointment and assume and discharge the powers and
dutiesattached to it (2) that his membership to the said Committee is not violative of the
Independence of the
Judiciary or may be considered as an abandonment of his position in the RTC (3) to
consider that hismembership in the committee is a part of the primary function of an
Executive Judge. However, on e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e E O ’ s ,
it was revealed that among the functions
o f t h e C o m m i t t e e i s t o r e v i e w complaints against any apprehending officer xx who
may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper
authority for the appropriate action. Another function ist o r e c o m m e n d t h e r e v i s i o n o f a n y
l a w o r r e g u l a t i o n w h i c h i s b e l i e v e d p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e p r o p e r administration of
criminal justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the acceptance of Judge Manzano of his appointment in the Committee will violatethe
doctrine of separation of powers
Held:
It is evident from the stated functions of the Committee that it performs
functions that areadministrative in nature
which are defined as those involving the regulation and control over the conductand affairs of
individuals fore their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the legislature xxx. Under Art.8, Sec12 of the Constitution, the members of
the xxxcourts xxx shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi -judicial or
administrative functions.
While the doctrine of separation of powers is xxx not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, xxx it
cannot justify a member of the jud iciary being required to assume position xxx which
are non judiciary incharacter xx if he is expected to be confined to the task of adjudication. Xxx He
is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official.
This does not mean that the RTS judges sh ould adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility.
An RTC judge should render assistance to said Committees xxx but only when itmay be reasonably
incidental to the fulfilment of their judicial duties. Hence, the request was denied.
Separation of PowersTAÑADA vs.CUENCO
FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo Tañada and Diosdado Macapagal sought to oust respondent
senators MarianoJ. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal,
alleging that theCommittee on Rules for the Senate, and the Senate itself, in nominating then choosing the
respondents,respectively, had acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation
of Article VI,Section 11 of the Constitution (1935):
Section 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
bethe sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respectiveMembers. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of theSenate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each
House, threeupon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest numbers of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.
Respondents allege that: (a) the Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the

action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states
nocause of action, because "petitioner Tañada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated
himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators."ISSUE:1 . A r e t h e a l l e g a t i o n s b y t h e
r e s p o n d e n t s c o r r e c t ? 2 . I s t h i s c a s e a m e r e p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n ? RULING:We cannot
agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. This case is not anaction
against the Senate and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow
the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides
that theSenate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is
partneither of Congress nor of the Senate.Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution,
the exclusive power to choose the Senators whoshall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the
fundamental law has prescribed the manner in whichthe authority shall be exercised. Under the
Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in theCongress of the Philippines. Yet, it does
not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon theconstitutionality of acts of Congress. And,
since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into thelegality of statutes enacted by the two
Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be noreason why the validity of an act of
one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government,may not be determined in
the proper actions.The Court is also called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco
and Delgado, by theSenate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator
Primicias – a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate –
on behalf of its Committeeon Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest
number of votes" in the Senate, andhence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is
not clothed with "full discretionaryauthority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
The exercise of its power thereon issubject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be
mandatory in nature. It is clearly within thelegitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the
validity the proceedings in connectiontherewith.Whether an election of public officers has been in
accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover,where the legislative department has by statute
prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular
election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been
applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights."The court does not
only have jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issueraised by the
parties herein.