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Urban
Transport

A WorIdBank
Policy study

The World Bank

Washington, D. C., U.S.A.
Copyright 01986 by The International Bank
for Reconstruction and DevelopmentIThe World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.

All rights reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America
First printing April 1986

The judgments expressed in this study do not necessarily reflect the

vlews of the WorldBank's Board of Executive Directors or of the
governments that they represent.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Urban Transport
(A World Bank policy study, ISSN 0258-2120)
Bibliography: p.
1. Urban transportation. I. International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. II. Series.
HE305.U686 1986 388.4 86-4128
ISBN 0-8213-0755-X
 Foreword
Urban transport directly affects the economic ef-
ficiency of cities and the well-being of urban inhabi-
tants. Since almost everyone in urban areas makes
daily use of some form of transport, the operation of
the transport system is a major topic in most cities of
the world.
The primary objective of the World Bank's urban
program, initiated in 1972, was, and still is, to assist
member governments in developing approaches to
the efficient and equitable provision of urban services
and employment. In the case of urban transport,
initiai responses to the Bank's program revealed
widely differing views about the types of projects that
were best suited to the needs of developing countries.
Frequently, member countries proposed urban trans-
port projects that involved heavy capita1 outlays and
recurring expenditures, often with little benefit to a
majority of the inhabitants of urban communities. In
particular, the transport needs of low-income groups
received insufficient attention.
Because of this, the Bank articulated an approach
to urban transport that would be consistent with
broader sectoral and city-level objectives. This ap-
proach was set out in an Urban Transport Sector
Policy Paper published in May 1975. As more and
more urban transport projects have been undertaken,
some by countries themselves and others with the
help of international agencies, experience in dealing
with urban transport questions has added to our
~
knowledge and understanding. bf4ny of the prob-
lems and issues raised in the 1975 paper still exist
today, and the solutions proposed in 1975 remain
valid. However, the Bank has refineb its approach to
urban transport problems, and em hases have grad-
ually changed. pi
The Bank has increasingly stressed projects de-
I
signed to achieve sustained sector-w de benefits, such
as projects that improve transport system manage-
ment or demonstrate replicability, rlather than being
targeted to limited sections of the bommunity. The
Bank has also refined its views on kransport policy.
The 1975 paper stated that Bank support would
I
depend on whether borrowers init ated broad pro-
grams with a wide variety of reforms. But the imple-
P
mentation of a number of transp rt projects that
required major changes in policy- or example, the
introduction of road pricing in urbah areas-ran into
I
difficulties. This prompted the Ban+ to shift to selec-
tive and progressive reforms that bill lead, in the
long term, toward the wider use of
sound urban
transport policies. 1
Other developments have also influenced the
Bank's approach to urban transpop. In particular,
the unprecedented growth in
and steep increases in the
struction have
iii
ed, and city authorities are more willing than they
once were to adopt traffic management plans and
similar cost-effective measures.
The experience that has been gained and the
changes that have taken place aver the past decade
have prompted a fresh look at the urban transport
sector and the preparation of this new Bank study on
urban transport policy. The booklet sets out the
current views of the World Bank on urban transport
and the Bank's approach to future lending in this
sector.
In view of the range of urban transport problems
facing developing countries and the many technical
aspects involved, this study is supported by technical
papers by the Water Supply and Urban Development
Department of the Bank:
Institution Building for Trafic Management
Toward Better Urban Transport Planning in Devel-
oping Countries
Urban Transit Systems: Guidelines for the Exami-
nation of Options
Bus Companies: Performance Evaluation and Im-
provement (forthcoming)
Bus Services: Criteria for Profitability (forth-
coming)
Trafic Management Projects: Identification, Pre-
paration, and Appraisal (forthcoming)
Both this Urban Transport Policy Study and the
technical papers recognize the vital role that urban
transport plays in the urban development process and
are directed toward the World Bank's primary objec-
tive in urban transport: to improve city efficiency and
alleviate poverty.
Anthony A. Churchill
Director
Water Supply and Urban
Development Department
The World Bank

Urban Transport was prepared under the direction of Anthony A.

Churchill, director, Water SuppIy and Urban Development
Department. Alan Armstrong-Wright was the principal author.
Substantial contributions were made by Sir Alan Walters and the
regional project officers concerned with urban transport. Research
assistance was provided by Barry Yatman, Simon Lewis, Veronique
Summarg.
1. Urban '%Pansportand City Efficiency
Conceptual Framework 1
City Form and Efficiency 2
Growth in Demand for Urban Transport 4
Implications of Rapid Growth 7
2. Managing Demand for Woad Use
Road Pricing 8
Physical Restraints 10
Parking Restraints 11
User Taxes 11
Other Restraints on Vehicle Ownership 11
Land Use Control 12
3. Improving EBficiency by Traffic Management 14
Parking Restrictions 14
Priority for Public Transport 15
Traffic Movement and Traffic Control 16
Road Safety Measures 17
The Institutional Framework 18
National and Local Responsibilities 19
4. Public Transport: The Role of Bus Services
The Crisis in Public Transport 20
Public Transport Subsidies 22
Criteria for Viable Bus Services 22
The Role of Government 27
5. Investment Decisions
Investment in Road Networks 29
Capital-Intensive Investments 30
Urban Transit Systems: Examination of Options 32
Investments and Transport Planning 36
6. World Bank Involvement in Urban Transport:
Experience and Directions
Lending Program, 1972-85 39
Project Implementation Experience 40
Policy Issues and Directions 41
Conclusion 44

AppendixTables
A-1.Urban Transport Data: Selected Cities 46
A-2.Bus Services: City Comparisons, 1983 48
A-3.Bus Services: Key Indicators of Performance 49
A-4.Rail Services: City Comparisons, 1983 50
A-5.Rail Services: Capital Cost of Typical Rail Systems 52
A-6.Transit System Characteristics 53
A-7.World Bank Urban Transport Lending, 1972-85:
Breakdown of Investment Costs 54
A-8. World Bank Involvement in the Urban Transport Sector, 1972-85 58

Bibliography

Boxes
1. Area Licensing in Singapore 9
2. Electronic Road Pricing in Hong Kong 10
3. Korea and Egypt: Vehicle Ownership and Use 12
4. Restrictions on Parking and Street Trading 15
5. Bangkok Bus Lanes 16
6. Abidjan: A Comprehensive Approach to Transport Improvement 17
7. Calcutta: Private and Public Bus Operators 23
8. Bombay: Publicly Owned Bus Company 24
9. Hong Kong's Wide Range of Bus Services 26
10. Route Associations 27
11. Deregulation in Colombo 28
12. Cities in Brazil: Access to Low-Income Areas 30
13. Kingston, Jamaica: Road Maintenance 31
14. Caracas Metro 32
15. Bus Expressways in Porto Alegre 33
16. Hannover Light Rail Transit 34
17. Osaka's Surface R a p ~ dRailway 35
18. S2o Paulo Metro 36
19. Urban Transport Planning: A Two-Tiered Approach 37
During the past two decades the populations of many
cities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have dou-
bled. This huge population growth has been accom-
panied by a substantial expansion of city boundaries
and much higher levels of industrial and commercial
activity.
These changes have placed new and heavy de-
mands on urban transport systems, demands that
many cities in developing countries have been unable
to meet. Although there are fewer vehicles in these
cities, traffic congestion is usually much worse than
it is in the cities of the developed world. In Lagos or
Bangkok, for example, the average vehicle moves at
only about half the speed of the average vehicle in
London or Frankfurt.
Solving transport problems has thus become one
of the chief tasks confronting governments in the
developing countries, primarily because of the eco-
nomic importance of their burgeoning cities. The
urban sector in most developing countries accounts
for at least 50 percent of gross national product (GNP)
and in some countries for as much as 70 percent.
Clearly, an effective transport system helps to max-
imize the economic efficiency of any city, while an
inferior system retards economic progress. In addi-
tion, overburdened transport systems have made
traffic accidents a principal cause of death and injury
in the developing countries.
Today's transport problems hafe arisen despite
large annual
terns. Cities in developing
to 25 percent of their
transport systems, and
04
ermore, the overwhelming nature the urban trans-
port problem has sometimes tempteh governments to
try to sohe it by spending vast amohnts of money on
subways and complex highway infristructure. These
capital-intensive projects, however, have not always
been cost-effective. I
Pressure on urban transport systebs in the cities of
the developing world is likely to inc
ly in the future. The population
greater demand for urban transpoi shows no signs
of subsiding. In fact, some forecasters expect the
populations of certain Third worldcities to quadru-
ple between 1980 and 2000. withbut even greater
efforts to deal with the proble
and goods, many cities in the
will continue to have transport
achieve their goals and impair ci
Because sociaI, economic, and
ditions vary from city to city, ur
]ems will not be solved by the
made, universal policies. The
however, that three principle
financial viability, and effici
~
I
vii
guide the development of urban transport policies in
most cities.
When there is economic viability and benefits
outweigh the cost of transport, most people would be
willing to pay these costs. Urban authorities, howev-
er, often subsidize transport. But subsidies do not
necessarily augment the supply of transport facilities
and, in fact, ultimately inhibit expansion. Few cities
have sufficient resources to permit subsidies to go on
growing in pace with rapidly increasing demand.
Transport improvements should be seif-sustaining
and replicable so that they may be widely applied in
other cities and suburbs. To encourage self-sustaining
replicability, the users of urban transport facilities
should usually pay the costs incurred.
Achieving financial viability may necessitate a var-
iety of approaches. In the case of highways, for
example, widespread urban congestion indicates that
the "price" to road users does not reflect the value of
urban roads. Although the best approach may be
proper road pricing, this has proved difficult to
implement. An alternative is to levy suitable road
user taxes. In the case of public transport systems,
fares need to cover costs. This is more easily achieved
if systems are efficient so that costs are minimized.
Encouraging efficiency requires suitable incentives
that are more likely to exist when privately owned
systems operate under competitive conditions.
The public sector must, however, retain responsi-
bility for many formidable tasks that cannot be
assigned to the private firms. Only the public sector
can undertake, for example, traffic regulation and
management, the setting of safety standards, trans-
port planning, and the formulation of transport pol-
icy. Unfortunately, many of these exclusively gov-
ernmental tasks have been neglected in developing
countries.
Urban Transport and City Efficiency
The growth patterns of Third World cities are similar
to those that occurred in the West but are unfolding
faster and farther. Many cities formed around water
transport facilities and, later, along rail systems.
Motor vehicles altered the city shape once again.
Roads allowed commerce, industry, and urban resi-
dents the flexibility to take advantage of the lower
rents and greater space of the suburbs. But helter-
skelter expansion resulted in a new set of problems.
Business became critically dependent on adequate
communications and transport systems for the move-
viii
ment of goods and services throughout the city. At
present, the failure of these systems to function
smoothly in many places inhibits existing business
activity and stifles further growth and development.
Although circumstances dlffer considerably from
city to city in the developing countries, certain basic
trends determine transport demand: large increases
in urban population lead to a proportional increase
in transport trips; the spread of urban areas gives rise
to the expansion of road networks, longer journeys,
and the consumption of more fuel; the greater avail-
ability of motorized transport results in more moto-
rized trlps and increases in fuel consumption; increas-
es in household incomes create a greater propensity
for travel and a marked increase in car ownership,
with a consequent demand for more road capacity;
and increases in commercial and industrial activity
lead to increased volumes of service vehicles and
freight traffic. Taken together, these factors result in
a substantial increase in transport demand, which in
turn has significant implications for city efficiency.
The most notable eflects are widespread traffic
congestion, greatly increased costs-particularly in
fuel consumption-and a serious loss of productivity
in commerce and industry. The necessary basic ex-
pansion of road networks and transport systems to
meet these demands and the more complex and
costly solutions that prevail place a considerable
burden on city budgets. Furthermore, households in
urban communities are devoting increasingly large
proportions of their incomes to transport. The budg-
et bite is particularly significant among low-income
groups (for example, 1.5 percent of household income
for low-income groups in New Delhi; up to 20
percent in Kingston).
The speed with which demand and costs have
grown in developing countries has often over-
whelmed the institutions responsible for transport.
But despite the serious implications, demand for road
use has been allowed to grow virtually unrestrained.
Managing Demand for Road Use
Substantla1 expansion of road capacity may be una-
voidable when the demand for urban transport grows
rapidly. Even so, expansion of road capacity and
much road congestion can be reduced by suppress-
ing excessive demand for road use. An appreciable
amount of demand arises because users do not pay
the true costs of using the roads, in particular the
costs inflicted on other road users. Several methods
can be employed to reduce excessive demand:
Road pricing, whereby motorists are charged for
using congested roads (Hong Kong)'
Area licensing, whereby low-occupancy vehicles
pay to enter congested city centers during rush
hours (Singapore)
Physical restraints to discourage the movement of
private cars across city centers (Tunis and Go-
teborg)
Parking controls to prevent long-term downiown
parking by commuters but allow normal business
activities (Singapore)
User taxes on fuel to restrain the general use of
vehicles (Republic of Korea)
Financial restraints on vehicle ownership, such as
high import duties, sales taxes, or annual licensing
fees (Korea)
Land use controls to influence the magnitude and
type of transport demand (Curitiba and Bombay).
With rapidly growing demand for road space and
the high costs of expanding capacity, it is probably
only a matter of a short time before most developing
countries will need some form of motor vehicle
restraints to combat worsening transport conditions.
If these measmes are coupled with general improve-
ments in traffic flows and public transport that ben-
efit the majority of road users, they should win
acceptance more easily.
Improving EEciency b y Traffic Management
Much of the traffic congestion in the cities of devel-
oping countries is the result of inefficient use of
existing streets and highways. Several measures have
been used to speed up the movement of traffic with-
out spending large sums of money:
Restrictions on parking, stopping, and street trad-
ing (San Josk and Lima)
Priority measures for public transport vehicles,
such as bus-only lanes and segregated rights-of-
way (Bangkok)
Better control of traffic movements-through such
means as traffic signals and signs, intersection
improvements, and pedestrian walkways-backed
up by the enforcement of traffic regulations (Abid-
j an)
1. Examples and case studies noted in parentheses in this
summary are described in the boxes and in the main text.
* Road safety measures, inciudin
dent data, sale road design, in
vehicles, driver training and tes
education (Brazii, Chile, and
In addition, responsibilities for tra&ficmanagement
and enforcement of traffic rules land regulations
are often fragmented and unclear, &id the agencies
charged with such responsibilities including the
traffic police, need to be strengthened. In many cases,
1
a comprehensive approach to traffic anagement has
been able to achieve considerable sa ings in commu-
ter journey times and vehicle oper ting costs, and
especially in fuel consumption. In addition, it has
been possible to delete or defer expensive infrastruc-
ture projects.
Public Transport
In most developing countries,
mode of urban transport and
affordable to the poor.
vehicles in use, they are efficient ib moving large
numbers of people and in meeting
different quantities and qualities of
rience shows that the public
of transport and makes tradeoffs bdtween time and
discomfort and the amount they
But despite the clear need for gre
transport, there is a tendency to es
public undertakings that offer v
Such services usually are heavily suqsidized.
Subsidies generally arise because of a desire to
maintain certain levels of service dt fares that are
below costs. But the anticipated benkfits-for exam-
ple, better services, reduced car use and congestion,
and greater patronage leading to ilfiproved viabili-
ty-usually fall short of expectations. The main
reason for the failure of subsidies is that they remove
incentives to reduce costs and usually lead to inef-
I
ficiency, greater deficits, and yet mo e subsidies.
Clearly defined subsidies may be justified where
social and economic benefits have een accurately
assessed and outweigh ali the costs. But in general, it
will be extremely difficult for cities do rely on subsi-
k
dized public transport to meet fut re massive de-
mands, which are growing much fa ter than budget
1
revenues. As a result of this situati n, much more
emphasis is being placed on self-sup orting services,
which are now flourishing in many ci ies in the Third
World.
Examination of bus systems throubhout the world
reveals that bus services are more likely to be viable
and capable of meeting growing demands if certain
conditions are present:
Transport systems are owned by private operators
or, in some cases, by public corporations that
follow commercial practices (Calcutta and Bom-
bay).
There is competition between services, which
means that operators tend t o become more res-
ponsive to customers' needs and more innovative
in finding ways to cut costs (Accra and Monrovia).
* Operators are allowed to choose among different
sizes of buses and minibuses to meet different
levels of demand (Calcutta and Bogot6).
Different qualities of service are available, ranging
from basic but frequent and reliable low-cost
services for the urban poor to more comfortable
services at higher fares for higher income groups
(Hong Kong).
* Bus services are informally regulated by coopera-
tives and route associations formed by bus opera-
tors themselves (Daejeon and Buenos Aires).
* There is a minimum of government regulation of
bus services, particularly fares, t o encourage the
private sector (Colombo).
Governments can play a major role in raising the
level of public transport efficiency by improving and
extending the road network, by providing effective
traffic management, and by setting and enforcing
safety standards for the operation of buses.
Investment Decisions
Under pressure to effect urgent solutions to mounting
transport problems, city authorities often invest in
capital-intensive highways and rail transit systems.
Given the competing demands for resources, howev-
er, cities should carefully consider low-cost alterna-
tives. In the case of highways, investment can be
made cost-effective by addressing the needs of com-
mercial traffic and public transport rather than the
needs of private motorists and by adopting modest
but effective standards of road design. For example,
the paving and drainage of bus routes serving low-
income areas brings very high rates of return (Brazil).
Striking benefits are obtained simply by keeping
roads in good condition (Kingston).
When demand for road space outstrips capacity,
underground rail systems appear to offer particularly
attractive solutions to the problem, but the justifica-
tion and full implications of building such systems,
in particular the massive construction costs, are rare-
ly properly appraised (Caracas). Alternative trans-
port methods exist that are able to cope with very
high demand, some at comparatively low costs. Since
it is difficult and very costly to change a decision to
build substantial infrastructure, it is important for
c ~ t ygovernments to consider the various options
beflore becoming committed to any particular transit
system.
There are three main types of transit systems:
* Buses offer the cheapest and most flexible way of
meeting a wide range of demands throughout a
city. By operating in exclusive busways along
dense corridors, buses are generally able to cope
with the heaviest demands in most cities (Porto
Alegre).
* Llght rail transit ranges from low-cost trams op-
erating along public streets to high-cost semi-
metro rail systems on exclusive tracks. The capac-
ities of light rail transit systems are similar to those
of bus systems, but light rail is much less flexible
in meeting demands (Hannover).
* Rapid rail transit (metros, undergrounds) offers
the highest capacity at the highest speed. These
systems now involve extremely high construction
costs and sophisticated technology and are well
beyond the means of most cities (Osaka and Siio
Paulo).
In view of the importance of making appropriate
decisions, there is a need for careful transport plan-
ning and the examination of options. Transport plan-
ning in developing countries, with rapid growth,
uncertainties in future trends, and a dearth of data,
faces many difficulties. Nevertheless, it is possible to
take account of these difficulties and formulate
a long-term framework within which compatible
short-term plans for investments can be made.
World Bank Involvement in Urban Transport
After a slow start on urban transport projects in
1972, and a pause during 1974-75 to reconsider its
approach, the World Bank has steadily become more
involved. By 1985 the Bank's Board of Executive
Directors had approved some seventeen urban trans-
port projects, as well as thirty-two urban projects
with significant transport components. Urban trans-
port lending in these two forms has amounted to
more than $1,000 million." Most of this has been for
road construction, improvement, and maintenance
(49 percent), assistance to bus systems (17 percent),
and aid t o railways (16 percent). Although less has
been loaned to improve traffic management and road
safety (12 percent), such measures have a high rate of
return. Most of the balance of lending has been for
training and technical assistance.
Experience with urban transport projects has high-
lighted, in particular, the importance of sound in-
stitutional arrangements, improved enforcement of
traffic laws, and better training of the staffs of trans-
port agencies. Although some urban transport proj-
ects have been beset by serious problems, solutions
have been found, and to an increasing degree these
projects have brought satisfactory results. The con-
tribution that such projects make to the efficiency of
cities is evident in their very high economic rates of
return and the significant improvements in the move-
ment of people and goods.
2. Dollar amounts are U.S. dollars throughout.
The role of the World Bank is
develop appropriate transport po
ments. Investments in urban tr
lored not only to the needs of th
also to national economic strate
straints. Bank support is intende
countries find inexpensive ways of increasing trans-
port capacity and improving translport flows, with
!
particular attention to the transp rt needs of the
urban poor. The Bank will also emphasize road
safety measures, which have often been neglected.
Institution building and policy d
ularly to promote efficiency in p
continue to be central to most
tance. But the Bank will also b
expertise in reviewing proposed
scale projects, such as metros a
The World Bank's objective fo
improve efficiency and alleviate boverty in cities
by stimulating economic growth and productivity
through the cost-effective installatio/l, operation, and
management of transport systems. I
 Urban Transport
and City EKciency
Most of the cities in the developing countries face
severe transport problems. Road congestion is
spreading, the movement of people and goods is
slowing to a crawl, and transport costs are escalating.
The result has been a serious decline in productivity
and city efficiency, a drain on city and national
budgets, and a strain on urban institutions. The
transport crisis also takes a human toll. Statistics
indicate that traffic accidents are a primary cause of
death in the developing world.
This troublesome situation has occurred largely
because of the unprecedented rate of growth of the
developing cities. Urban populations have doubled in
size over the past ten to fifteen years, and even higher
rates of growth are likely in the future. Some cities,
in fact, expect to see their 1980 populations quadru-
ple by the year 2000. To accommodate larger popu-
lations, urban areas have spread outward. This en-
largement, combined with increased personal in-
comes, greater commercial and industrial activity,
and lack of proper pricing for the use of roads and
transport services, has caused demand for urban
transport to increase even more qbickly than the size
of urban populations. As a consequence, the perfor-
mance of most transport systems has fallen woefully
short of demand.
Because they are under considerable pressure to
effect improvements, some city authorities have been
~~
tempted to solve their mounting tr
by spending money on expensive
resorting to capital-intensive solut/ons is likely t o
mean the postponement or curtaildent of other im-
portant city services.
The appropriate policies for ibproving urban
transport will depend on the diffhrent social and
economic conditions of the cities cohcerned, and it is
t~
not possible t o provide ready-mad universal solu-
tions. But governments can use cer ain principles to
guide policy.
Conceptual Framewo
1 k
1
Three pr~nclplesconstitute the co ceptual frame-
work that has served as the basis of World Bank
policy on urban transport:
* Economic viability. Transport se vices and infra-
structures should be supplied id the benefits to
2
society outweigh the additional sts to society.
P
Financial viability. Investments should be under-
taken and services supplied if /he financing is
self-sustaining and enables the pbject to be repli-
cated. I
Eficiency. Cost should be kept
establishing suitable incentives
ity of services; similarly, the
services should be provided
 When a transport project is economically viable
and the benefits outweigh the full costs, most of the
people in new urban areas would be willing to pay
for simple improvements-paved and drained access
roads, for example-from which they would benefit,
but authorities are often reluctant to collect all of the
revenues needed for the changes. As a result, either
urban access and services are subsidized at the ex-
pense of the general taxpayer, or the quantity, qual-
ity, and variety of services are lacking. Well-inten-
tioned arguments maintain that subsidies augment
the supply of transport for the urban population,
particularly the poor, but that is not necessarily the
case. Paradoxically, subsidies often impose their own
limitations. The need for access to new urban areas
by way of buses and paved streets increases much
faster than budget revenues, and subsidies cannot
expand indefinitely. There is always a limit. The
supply of subsidized services then falls short of the
extent of services for which the public is willing to
Pay-
The principle of financial viability applies more
overtly to bus companies and rail lines than to roads.
The objective is to ensure that fares cover costs. If
public authorities do decide as a matter of policy
to subsidize bus or rail transportation, the subsidy
should not underwrite the company's costs, since this
promotes inefficiency and higher costs. The best kind
of subsidy is one targeted to particular passengers.
Achieving self-sustaining financial viability for
roadways can be more difficult since tradition ac-
cords them the status of free rights-of-way. Most
road users do not pay for their occupation of road
space, and widespread urban congestion shows that
the true road "rental price" would be very high
indeed. An obvious way to move toward financial
viability would be to institute road-pricing schemes,
but for institutional, technical, political, and admin-
istrative reasons, authorities have adopted this solu-
tion only rarely. In Hong Kong, where road pricing
has proved to be technically feasible, implementation
is facing strong opposition from influential pressure
groups. A simpler method is area licensing. Under
this approach, low-occupancy vehicles pay a charge
for traveling on any road in a congested urban area.
In Singapore, the only city in which area licensing has
actually been implemented, inner-city traffic prob-
lems were notably reduced.
Efficiency is achieved when costs are as low as
possible for a given service. The main institutional
encouragement for this is suitable incentives. These
incentives should not merely encourage a continual
search for less costly ways of doing things but also
spur innovation. There are many ways of ensuring
that incentives in publicly owned bus or rail corpor-
ations serve as spurs to efficiency rather than as
invitations to dissipate resources. But bureaucratic
inertia, political interference, and restrictions on
competitors may make it difficult for publicly owned
systems to achieve efficiency. In practice, private
ownership under competitive conditions usually pro-
vides a more appropriate and efficient form of insti-
tutional arrangement.
Nonetheless, the public sector has a crucial role to
play in urban transport, which in most circumstances
cannot be assigned to the private sector. Only the
public sector, for example, can plan, authorize, fund,
control, and police the road networks. Similarly,
traffic regulation and management, restraint mea-
sures, the licensing of drivers and vehicles, and the
setting of safety standards are clearly prerogatives of
the public sector. Furthermore, the public sector
plays a crucial role in designing and implementing
laws and regulations that promote transport ef-
ficiency.
These are formidable tasks. If they are neglected
by governments-and they often are-there is no
conceivable way for the private sector to fill the gap.
City Form and Efficiency
Many cities in the developing countries have grown
at an unprecedented rate in recent years, and this
growth is expected to continue in the foreseeable
future. In 1950 only three cities in developing coun-
tries had populations in excess of 4 million: Shanghai
(5.8 million), Buenos Aires (5.3 million), and Calcut-
ta (4.4 million). By 1980, however, there were more
than twenty cities in developing countries whose
populations topped 4 million, and by the end of the
century there are expected to be a t least sixty. Indeed,
more than twenty cities in developing countries are
forecast to have populations of more than 10 million
each by the year 2000 (see Figure 1 and Appen-
dix Table A-1, which provides comprehensive ur-
ban transport data on selected areas).
The rate of urban growth has been especially rapid
in countries that have traditionally been largely rural.
The urban populations in the least urbanized coun-
tries in Africa, for example, appear likely to quadru-
ple between 1980 and 2000. But in absolute terms the
largest growth in urban population is in Asia. A
particularly notable example is India where the ur- Figure 1. Total Urban Population
ban population is currently expanding by more than of Developing Countries
600,000 people every month.
Fast-growing cities in the developing countries Total
populatmn
have nurtured business and industry and have pro- (bllhons)
vided iobs and higher incomes to many migrants
from rural areas. It has been estimated that the urban
sector in most developing countries contributes at
least 50 percent of gross national product ( G N P ) and
often as much as 70 percent. Thus, it is important
thac cities function efficiently-that their resources
are used to maximize the cities' contribution to
national income. Urban transport is able to make a
major contribution to city efficiency when people and
goods are moved throughout the city at minimal
investment and operating costs. Industry and com-
merce now depend to a critical degree on ease of
access to any part of a city. The linchpin of economic
progress is a continually greater degree of specializa-
tion in plants, workshops, and offices, but such
progress requires more movement of goods and peo- Nornbcl.of clllei ullh
ple. Homes must be linked with places of employ- population ol rnlore
than 4 rnilllon- X 22
ment, while producers of goods and services must be
able to get them to market. Furthermore, an adequate
transport system enables cities to become catalysts
for social, cultural, and political development as well
as economic growth. technique of rail capitalized on transporting large
Conversely, poor transport systems stifle economic volumes of freight and large nu
growth and development, and the net effect may be from origin to destination. Inhere
a loss of competitiveness in both domestic and inter- rail is quite unsuitable for movin
national markets. Although they have smaller num- of goods or for transporting pas
bers of vehicles, cities in the Third World suffer worse w ~ d eareas. Since density is an e
congestion than cities in the industrialized countries. a rail system, there were no e
In Lagos and Bangkok, for example, the average circumferential railways. The
vehicle travels at only about half the speed of its dispersed and the freight too fr
counterpart in London or Frankfurt. This indicates The motor age introduced
both the amount of time and energy that are wasted ban transport and new patter
and the scale of opportunity for improvement. it appeared that the motor
Before the invention of the railway, cities were mented the trend started b
usually small in area but dense in population. Since urban populations. But road
transport on land was difficult and costly, cities were from rail transport and has
often founded at natural harbors or beside navigable form. Unlike railways, roa
waterways to take advantage of cheaper sea trans- operate very efficiently at 1
portation. densities. This greater flexi
The steam age brought about changes not only in to develop both circumfer
the form of cities but also in their size. Rail technology patterns. Only roads can
imposed a linear system and a rigid radial form. The of demands for freight tra
cities grew alongside the rail lines, all of which met at ~ t yrequired by the
the center of the city. Rail systems, thus, enabled larger The development of modern
numbers of people to work in central business districts larger work forces in central
while living in suburbs close to the rail lines. The as massive growth of
and outlying towns. This pattern of peripheral port policy is a critical element in a city's efficiency.
growth occurred in the United States, Europe, Aus- The savings achieved through cost-effective improve-
tralia, and Japan. Everywhere, trade and industry ments are therefore likely to be gratifyingly large
have migrated toward the cheaper land of the sub- indeed. This will be particularly so in the future since
urbs once roads provided access between suppliers few cities can expect to escape rapid growth in
and markets. Released from the arterial ties of the demand for transport facilities and services.
railways, businesses and people have been able to
take advantage of the lower rents and greater space Growth in Demand for Urban Transport
of the suburbs while enjoying the amenities of city
life. Developing countries are following the same The pattern of transport growth depends to a great
urban growth patterns but a t far faster rates than degree on the situation in each city, but certain basic
those experienced in the West. Even more than the factors have a considerable bearing on both the level
cities of the industrialized countries, the burgeoning and the rate of increase in demand. These are:
cities of the developing countries are products of the increases in population as a result of both high
motor vehicle, and that legacy has brought a unique natura! birth rates and migration from rural areas
set of problems. and smaller towns; geographical deconcentration;
The provision of transport in newly developed cities availability of motor~zed transport; increases in
is less constrained by the city's form than in long- household income; and increases in commercial and
established cities, but access may still be hampered by industrial activity.
political and financial difficulties. Providing access is
usually the responsibility of state or local authorities. Increases in Population
Although access is rarely owned, controlled, regulat-
ed, or charged for by private groups or individuals, The major cause of growth in urban transport de-
securing it is often beset by major political pressures mand in the developing world has been the dramatic
that make it impossible to balance competing needs. increase in urban populations. From 1970 to 1980 the
Indeed, in some cases the authorities are powerless to urban populations of the developing countries In-
control access. In squatter areas, for example, access creased by an average of 50 percent. Increases well in
can be gained only through labyrinths of alleys and excess of this average occurred in many urban areas,
passageways that, if not beyond the writ of the state, particularly where migration from rural areas was
are effectively beyond its reach.
Spending on transport is too often influenced not
by rational calculations of economic gain but by
notions of political prestige. Most countries spend Figure 2. Population and Total Daily Trips
too much on politically attractive but costly facilities,
such as elevated roadways and mass rail transit Tr~psper day
im~llrons)
systems, instead of making modest labor-intensive
road improvements, extending city streets, and cre-
ating low-cost bus operations. Since ra11subways can
cost as mhch as $100 million per kilometer, the
money spent building just a few meters of subway
could be used instead to construct or upgrade several
miles of streets.
It is not unusual for urban governments to spend
between 15 and 25 percent of their annual budgets
on transport-related investments and operations, and
sometimes a good deal more. In Calcutta, for exam-
ple, investment in urban transport during 1972-78
amounted to approximately $50 million a year, an
amount equivalent to 48 percent of the city's total
planned investment for all purposes. Clearly, with
such large sums at stake, an appropriate urban trans-
substantial. Striking examples of population growth Figure 3. The Growth of SPo Paulo
during that ten-year period are provided by a number 1930-80
of African cities, including Nairobi (90 percent),
Harare ($5 percent), Abidjan (102 percent), and Dar
es Salaam (105 percent). Other cities grew, but not as
rapidly, such as Jakarta (48 percent), Tunis (46 per-
cent), and Bogoti (47 percent).
Transport trips can be expected to grow at least in
proportion to increases in population. Figure 2 shows
that, in a representative selection of cities in develop-
ing countries, demand for transport is roughly pro-
portional to increases in population size. Other fac-
tors, such as greater participation of women in the
labor force (where this leads to more employment)
and those described below, may add to the growth in
demand for transport.

Sgread o f Uhan Areas I I I I I 1 I 1 I

Kilometers
Economic development and population growth result
in the enlargement of urban areas and the need to
extend the road network and transport services. This
involves major investment and a considerable burden the transport system. Between 1472 and 1978, for
on city resources.
S i o Paulo in Brazil (see Figure 3) provides a
dramatic example of the spread of urban areas in
b
example, the population of Bogo 6 increased from
2.85 million to 3.80 million, or 33 p rcent. During the
same period, the average commdting distance in-
developing countries. In 1930 the urban area of S i o creased by about 13 percent, with increases ranging
Paulo was approximately 150 square kilometers and from 5 to 23 percent. 1
the population was 1 million. By 1962 the city had
grown to 750 square kilometers with a population of
4 million. In 1980 the area was 1,400 square kilome-
Availability o f Motorized Transpo t
I
/
ters, and the population was more than 12 million. Although motorization is still in it infancy in many
The spread of an urban area is usually accompan- developing countries, the availabili y of motor trans-
ied by changes in employment and residential pat- port has increased sharply in recen years. In Indone-
terns. As land prices in the central city rise, for sia, for example, there were 3 ehicles per 1,000
example, manufacturing establishments may move population in 1970; by 1981 there dere 9. In the same
from the central city to the suburbs. Although this period, availability rose in Tuni
change may divert some trips away from transport Brazil from 37 to 83, in the Re
corridors leading to the city center, other kinds of 3.5 to 14, in Nigeria from 2 to 1
employment created in the city center may cause a 9 to 20. These substantial
net increase in trips and journey distances. If the congestion in places that wer
population and places of employment become more have reduced the efficiency of
widely distributed as a city grows, some pressure on public and private.
radial traffic corridors may be relieved, but there will Increased motorization, co
be increased demand for transport services and facil- migration from rural areas,
ities along the urban periphery. and increasing rates of road
Much also depends on the types of industry in the the causes of death in fifte
urban area, since certain industries lend themselves showed that road acciden
more easily to deconcentrated employment patterns enteritis, and that as ma
than others. In general, however, journeys tend to traffic accidents as died fr
lengthen as cities grow, thus adding to the burden on carried out by the Overseas
Road Research Laboratory (TRRL) has shown that
fatality rates (measured as annual deaths per 10,000
licensed vehicles) from road accidents in developing
countries are often twenty times greater than in
Western Europe or North America. Nigeria and
Ethiopia were the most extreme examples, with rates
exceeding 200. Kenya's rate was 65, while high rates
were also found in Pakistan (go), Turkey (SS), In-
donesia (40), and Colombia (35). By comparison,
there were 3.3 fatalities per 10,000 vehicles in the
United States and the United Kingdom.
Increases In Household Income
Data from the deveIoping countries on the relation-
ship between household earnings and amount of travel
are limited but are nevertheless sufficient to show that
income has a direct bearing on travel demand, partic-
ularly in urban areas. Studies in a number of cities
have found that high-income households make rough-
ly double the number of trips made by low-income
households. In Jaipur, for example, low-income
households were found to make four trips a day, while
high-income households made more than eight.
Where incomes have grown steadily there has also
been a marked increase in car ownership. This is
explained partly by an increased demand for quality
transportation (speed, comfort, privacy) and partly by
the failure of public transport systems to provide
satisfactory service (see Figure 4). Several studies indi-
cate an elasticity of roughly two in the relationship
between income and car ownership. In Jordan, where
household incomes increased 5.7 percent a year be-
tween 1970 and 1980, private car ownership increased
from 7 per 1,000 in 1970 to 22 per 1,000 in 1980, or
roughly 12 percent annually. In Brazil, where average
annual per capita income grew 5.1 percent, auto
ownership increased at an annual rate of about 10
percent. The same elasticities were found in Indonesia,
Thailand, and Tunisia. As car ownership increases,
however, the use of public transport tends to decline
(see Figure 5).
Increases in CommerciaI and Industrial Activity
Like increases in population and car ownership, in-
creases in industrial and commercial activity can cre-
ate or contribute to urban transport problems. The
larger volume of freight traffic and the attendant use
of larger and heavier vehicles can be particularly
troublesome. Roads in and around industrial areas,
Figure 4. Hncorne and Car Ownership
Cars per thousand
tnhabl~antr
Narlonal GNP per caplra (1980 L' S dollars)
railroad freight stations, and ports are often clogged
by commercial vehicles, and this congestion can spill
over into main corridors. Damage to road surfaces
then accelerates and reduces road speed and efficiency.
As a city grows, manufacturing activity in the
central area tends to decline and is often replaced by
commercial activity that makes even greater demands
on the transport system. In particular, the loading and
unloading of commercial trucks is a frequent cause of
congestion In central business districts. The high dens-
ity of buildings can make it difficult or impossible to
widen roads and increase their capacity. Congestion is
often exacerbated when the road network must cope
with a mixture of motorized vehicles, other modes of
transport (such as bicycles and pedal carts), and pe-
destrians.
Tunisia provides a good illustration of the effects
of greater industrial and commercial activity on
transport. During 1970-80 industry grew at an an-
nual average rate of 9 percent and led to a fourfold
increase (15 percent a year) in the number of com-
mercial vehicles, most of which spent much time
adding to the congestion on the roads of Tunis, the
country's largest city. Similarly, rapld growth in
manufacturing in Indonesia during the 1970s caused
a fivefold increase in the number of commercial
vehicles. That, in turn, placed considerable strain on
urban transport facil~tiesin Jakarta, where most of
the industrial development had occurred. This pat-
tern can be seen in many other cities of Africa, South consistently about 16 percent. (In
America, and Southeast Asia. households without cars spend ab
their incomes on urban transport.)
ImgIications of Rapid Growth The sheer speed with which de
grown in developing countries ha
Although it is sometimes difficult to specify how much the institutions responsible for
each of the factors described above contributes to which were pooriy equlpped to
transport demand, there is no doubt that collectively such magnitude. But despite t
they have a substantial effect. In many cases, demand demand has been allowed t
has outstripped road capacity. Greater congestion and strained. Transport infrastr
delays of both passenger and commercial traffic are many cities have become sev

widespread in developing countries and indicate the
seriousness of their transport problems. As a result,
costs-particularly fuel consumption costs-increase
substantially, and there is a serlous loss of productivity
in commerce and industry. A high level of pollution is
another undesirable feature of overloaded streets.
Transport dernand has ~ncreasedso rapidly in many
developing countries that complex and costly solu-
tions have often been adopted. Where at one time a
simple traffic circle might have sufficed, a grade-
separated intersection may become necessary, or traff-
ic direction by policemen may have to give way to
electrlc signals, sometimes controlled by computer.
Buildings may have to be demolished and valuable
land used to widen roads or construct elevated road-
ways. To increase the capacity of public transport
services, some city authorities have resorted to replac-
ing inexpensive bus services with heavily subsidized
mass transit railways. Higher prices for oil and labor
have further escalated urban transport spending. As a
result, urban transport often absorbs 15 to 25 percent
of city budgets today, considerably more than it did
ten or twenty years ago.
All income groups in urban communities are now
1
rarely used to best advant
networks, substantial capacity has een and continues
to be lost because of a lack of pro er traffic manage-
ment and uneconomic road use. The viability and
efficiency of public transport has been greatly im-
paired by a lack of incentives, a d investments in
inappropriate remedies have placed a heavy burden on
city budgets.
Nevertheless the situation is
there are many opportunities t
ciencies. Much can be done t
use, and substantlal increases
achieved with low-cost meas
ment. In most cities there is a1
improving the viability and
port services. Although mos
substantlal investment in urban t ansport, there are
low-cost opportunities to extend oad networks and
meet the heavy demands for public transport. I
Figure 5. Car Ownership and Publi Transport Use

Cars per thousand

c
inhabjtants
devoting larger proportions of their incomes to trans-
port. In developing countries it is not uncommon to
find that 5 to 10 percent of urban household income
is spent on transport. In some cities the figure is 15
percent or more. The high proportion of income spent
on transport by high-income groups sometimes re-
flects their demand for higher quality modes, especial-
ly private automobiles. For the urban poor, however,
spending a higher proportion of income on transport
may be a basic necessity that leaves less income
available for other purposes. In the Saket residential
area of New Delhi, for example, the average propor-
tion of household income spent on transport is 12
percent, while low-income groups spend as much as
15 percent. The range in Kingston, Jamaica, is be- I
Publ~ccranspocr share of mororlzed lttpr percent)

tween 15 and 20 percent, while in Calcutta it 1s

 Managing Demand
for Road Use
One answer to the urban transport crisis in the
developing world is to tackle the excess demand for
transport. The methods range from road pricing and
area licensing to fuel tax and land use control. The
advantage of these demand management measures is
that they require little initial capital outlay. The
disadvantage is the inevitable opposition of the pub-
lic to these measures, in particular the payment for
use of city streets. Nonetheless, with careful prepar-
ation and planning, transport demand management
can be one of the most cost-effective means of dealing
with urban transport problems.
Road Pricing
Because of the nature of roads, the usual market
forces that work with other commodities simply do
not apply and cannot correct for excessive or une-
conomic use. Relying on congestion alone to ration
road use places a high and inequitable cost on all
users of the congested road. It is therefore likely to
be in the public interest for the government to em-
ploy some form of road pricing.
Although the advantages of road pricing have long
been recognized, its introduction into urban areas
faces formidable technical, administrative, and polit-
ical obstacles. For a road-pricing system to be reason-
ably effective, the charges to individual users must be
related to how much they use congested streets and
the degree of congestion on those streets. But both
the calculation and collection of those charges can
prove difficult. In most urban areas it is impractical
to try to collect charges for road use at the time they
are incurred. The use of toll booths, for example,
might well aggravate congestion.
Enforcement is another major concern. Any system
has to be designed to make it possible to identify
vehicles whose drivers try to evade being charged.
Above all else, some means has to be found to
overcome the natural aversion of motorists to paying
for facilities traditionally perceived as being free.
One system of road pricing that has proved to be
effective in Singapore (see Box 1) is area licensing,
whereby low-occupancy vehicles pay a charge for
entering a congested area during rush hours. The
system encourages greater use of public transport
and shared private cars and discourages unnecessary
journeys.
If arrangements of this kind are to be successful,
the public transport system must be capable of trans-
porting the motorists and passengers diverted from
private cars. It is also necessary to arrange some
method of prepayment, since collection of charges at
entry points would be likely to increase congestion.
Quick identification of vehicles that have already
paid the charges is necessary, and enforcement must
be effective enough to prevent large-scale evasion.
Several other problems also have to be overcome.
Vehicles diverted from the congested area, for exam-
ple, have to be provided with alternate routes. The
layout of roads has to permit the isolation of the
restricted area without unduly impeding traffic flow.
If the hours of operation are too short, congestion is
likely to increase before and after the restricted
period, while excessively long hours of operation and
high charges may result in underutilization of road
space and may seriously affect business and other
activities in the restricted area.
Above all else, the government must have the
political will to come to grips with congestion in a
way that is unlikely to be popular with motorists. A
substantial effort to achieve public acceptance and
the flexibility to respond to cha
necessary concomitants of such
Despite the success of area li
efforts to introduce it elsewher
very far. Authorities in other
tant to try it, partly because o
the system will work and part
reaction. Nevertheless, the e
indicates that area licensin
effective and practical means
Schemes of this type may
avoid or at least defer enla
port infrastructure. Becaus
can be expected, the World
its support to well-designed area-licensing and other
road-pricing schemes.
In an attempt to develop and test solutions to the
many problems involved with more precise rationing
of road space, Hong Kong has embarked on an
innovative road-pricing scheme (see Box 2). Al-
though this scheme may eventually prove to be
adaptable for use elsewhere, it is likely to be some
time before it is sufficiently developed for general
application In urban areas. In the meantime, area
licensing and other less sophisticated demand man-
agement measures are well within the capabilities of
developing countries and will suffice to alleviate
congestion.
Physical Restraints
The traffic flow has been reduced in some cities
(Tunis and Goteborg in particular) by divlding the
central business district into "cells." Publ~ctransport
and emergency vehicles are allowed to cross the
borders between cells, but other traffic must use
entrances and exits onto circular routes that bypass
the central area. As a result of this arrangement,
traffic flows across Goteborg's central business dis-
trict between 1970 and 1982 decreased 45 percent,
while traffic accidents within the district decreased by
about 56 percent.
The completed first phase of a similar scheme in
Tunis has produced promising results that could well
be replicated in other cities where spare capacity is
available on routes bypassing the city centers. In
other cities, the cost of providing this additional
capacity, together with the cost of additional fuel
consumed in more circuitous journeys, may be con-
siderable and needs to be carefully weighed against
the benefits of reduced congestion and traffic acci-
dents in the city center.
A completely different approach to reduce peak
demand is provided by staggered working hours.
This measure has the dual benefits of spreading the
load on both roads and public transport systems.
More even loading during a reduced but longer peak
period utilizes road space and transport resources
more efficiently. Some success in staggering has been
achieved by various incentive and voluntary schemes
in a number of cities. But widely staggered working
hours, which would produce the greatest benefits,
have generally not gained acceptance, mainly be-
cause many business activities depend on interaction
among their workers or with clients and other bus-
inesses. Nonetheless, the promotion of staggered
working hours by city authorities is well worth the
small expense Involved.

Parking Restraints
Parking controls are usually employed to improve
traffic flow by reducing the number of parked vehi-
cles obstructing- the road (discussed further in Chap-
ter 3). But parklng controls may also d'iscourage
automobile use and ration road space. By imposing
special charges for parkin g in certain areas it is
possible to reduce the movement of cars into cong-
ested locations during peak periods without interfer-
ing with normal business and commercial activities.
If parking charges are set comparatively low for an
initial short period and then progressively raised for
longer periods, long-term parkers (commuters, for
example) will be discouraged from parking in the
area because they will have to pay a substantial daily
fee. People with business appointments and shoppers
desiring short-term parking will be encouraged, how-
ever, since they will benefit from both lower charges
and greater availability of parking places because of
more rapid turnover. This approach has been an
important contribution to the success of the area-
licensing scheme xsed in Singapore (Box l).
Parking restraints, however, tend to cause substan-
tial increases in illegal parking and must therefore be
accompanied by strict enforcement of parking regu-
lations. High charges for parking may also cause
additional trips during peak periods (as when people
are driven to work in the mornings by other family
members who then return home and repeat the
journey in the evenings). Parking controls may also
create many unproductive trips, for example, when
drivers circulate In traffic waiting for passengers or
looking for parkin g places. Furthermore, parking
controls do not deter through traffic, which is often
a primary cause of congestion in city centers. As a
result, parking control may be more effective as a
restraint when it forms part of a more comprehensive
demand management scheme, as in Singapore.
User Taxes
Vehicle use may also be restrained by excise taxes
customarily imposed on fuel, tires, spare parts, and
the like. These taxes increase the cost of automobile
travel as a function of use or distance and may
restrain toral use, but they do not affect where and
when an automobile is used. In particular, excise
taxes have no discernible effect during peak or off-
peak periods and in congested or noncongested
areas. Since vehicle use in most developing countries
II
is concentrated in urban areas, s ch taxes may at
least help to retard the spread of c ngestion.
Some excise taxes have undesi able side effects.
Although a Eax on tires or spare p rts, for example,
may restrain vehicle use, it may also give rise to
greater use of unsafe tires or poo maintenance, so
that breakdowns and accidents in rease rather than
reduce congestion.
But a tax on fuel is comparativel simple to admin-
ister and has a direct relationship to the amount of
vehicle use. It is therefore an attrac ive way of reduc-
ing private vehicle use. To make sure that public and
I
commercial transport is not unduly restrained as
well, however, some form of diffe entiai tax on fuel
for buses and trucks may be neces ary.
Only a few countries use a fuel lax specifically for
restraining vehicle use to control cbngestion. In oth-
ers the cost of fuel is kept below khe world market
price, a situation that encourages e greater vehicle
use (see Box 3). Reducing car use
pressure for heavy investments i
structure. An added advantage wo
in domestic fuel consumption; in o
tries this would allow more oil t
return for badly needed foreign e
Other Restraints om Vehicle b wnership
A more general method of inhibi
ship is to establish high import
and annual licensing fees on vehic
excise taxes, financial restraints 04 this kind do not
i
influence the location and time of c r use. Tn practice,
financial rest:aints on ownership ar likely to do little
more than slow down the growth i n the number of
vehicles. AS income levels rise, mbreover, financial
restraints of this type must periodfcally be adjusted
upward to remain effective.
Of the various financial resrrainks available, high
annual licensing fees are ~ r o b a b t(he
l ~ most effective,
0
since these charges cannot be rec vered when the
vehicle is resold. Although sales and( other acquisition
taxes on new cars are likely to be beflected in resale
prices and may be seen by some bdyers as an i ~ v e s t -
ment that could appreciate with a
sales taxes in most cases will
motorists to buy new cars. As a
owners will be encouraged to keep their cars longer.
A disadvantage of using the sales tax to discourage
t
car purchase is that older cars ay be less safe
and break down more frequently thereby adding
to congestion. To offset these tendencies, special
incentives to replace older cars can be implemented.
Similarly, high penalties for traffic obstruction may
reduce the number of trips by older and less reliable
vehicles traveling in congested areas.
Excise and ownership taxes are not likely to pro-
vide an optimum solution to congestion. Their chief
value is that they can usually be applied relatively
quickly within the framework of existing legislation
and thus can serve as stopgap measures until more
effective control measures are devised and imple-
mented.
Land Use Control
Effective land use planning and control can also
diminish the demand for transport services. Some
cities have been zoned so that employment opportu-
nities are located away from city centers and close to
residential areas, the aim being to reduce work trips,
particularly in congested central areas. Attempts
have also been made to control the density of land
occupation and thus to reduce the load on transport
systems generally. For example, in certain parts of
Curitiba, Brazil, the density of development has been
controlled so that demand for transport is limited to
the capacity of the public transport system. Similarly,
demand for transport can be reduced by locating
public service facilities close to intended consumers
and by locating major traffic generators away from
central areas. In Bombay, for example, the demand
placed on central city roads by heavy goods traffic is
being controlled by locating a major freight terminal
at Wadala on the outskirts of the city.
Land use control in developing countries generally
has proved to be ineffective, however, and its imple-
mentation is beset by many serious difficulties. These
include a lack of proper enforcement, wide and
blatant disregard for regulations, and public opposi-
tion. Where some measure of control has been exer-
cised, results often have been contrary to expecta-
tions. This is mainly because of the many complex
factors involved with land use planning and the
difficulties of adapting regulations to rapidly chang-
ing circumstances-a feature of developing coun-
tries.
It is only a matter of time before most cities in
developing countries will need to restrain the use of
motor vehicles as part of an overall plan to com-
bat worsening transport conditions. Given the wide
range of options, from road pricing and area licen-
sing to staggered working hours and user taxes,
authorities can select measures best suited to the
particular circumstances of their cities. Most of these
measures are likely to be unpopular with motorists,
but if demand management is coupled with general
improvements in traffic flow and public transport, it
should benefit the majority of road users and even-
tually gain acceptance.
Although it may become more and more necessary
to restrain excessive road use, demand management
cannot provide the total solution to congestion.
Many journeys, particularly those of public transport
vehicles and goods vehicles, make a vital contribu-
tion to the development of the ci
demand for road space must be
effective demand management
faced with large investments to
of their transport system. Aver
of accomplishing this is the
traffic management measures.
 I m p v1ng
Management
Rapidly increasing demands for transport in the
developing countries and the resulting traffic conges-
tion have led to political pressures to build new
transport infrastructures. But most developing coun-
tries can ill afford the expense of these solutions, and
thus there is a need to consider low-cost alternatives.
One such alternative is the use of traffic management
measures that are designed to reduce congestion and
increase road capacity by controlling the movement
of traffic.
In many road c a ~ a c i is
t ~seriousl~reduced
through wasteful use and neglect. Although circum-
stances vary 'onsiderab'~, most cities are Y"' be
faced with some, if not all, of the same problems:
On-street parking, both legal and illegal
On-street loading and unloading of delivery trucks
and passenger vehicles
Commercial trading conducted in the streets
A high proportion of uneconomic road users,
particularly private cars
Conflicting or poorly controlled traffic move-
ments, including pedestrian movements
Heavy through traffic in central areas
Slow-moving hand-drawn or animal-drawn vehi-
cles
Poor road surfaces and lack of street lighting
Traffic accidents and broken-down vehicles
I4
General lack of regard for and enforcement of
traffic regulations.
Where reduced capacity has made traffic conditions
unsatisfactory, it is likely that several or most of these
conditions exist. This wide range of traffic problems
calls for a comprehensive package of different mea-
sures.
Parking Restrictions
The most frequent and widespread causes of reduced
road capacity are lndiscrlminate curbside parking
and Stopping to load or unload passengers and
goods. These actions reduce the road space available
to moving vehicles and impede the flow of traffic.
The net effect, a substantial reduction of road capac-
ity, is particularly serious along maln roads during
peak periods. Street trading in congested areas has
similar effects and attracts additional pedestrians to
already crowded streets.
Many cities have dealt with these problems by
restricting on-street parking and stopping during
peak periods on busy streets and introducing controls
on street trading (see Box 4). These restrictions have
helped relieve congestion but require firm and con-
tlnued enforcement.
Although parking control schemes must be care-
fully planned, their implementation is comparatively
simple. They usually require only traffic signs and
markings, an enforcement staff, and possibly tow on traffic is taken into account. !
trucks. The greatest difficulty is likely to be obtaining regulations should permit the
public acceptance, particularly where on-street park- facilities at suitable locations, a
ing has become so firmly established that it is consid- should be permitted to charge
ered a "right." But the low costs of such schemes and
their substantial benefits to the community as a
whole are usually sufficient t o demonstrate ;heir
value. In many cities, particularly du
Ii
Priority for Public E a sport

If on-street parking is to be restricted or Sanned, the greatest proportion of road s

alternative parking places are likely to be essential. private cars, which handle only a s
When considering alternative parking locations and all personal trips. The great majo

1
the amount of parking that needs to be provided, travel in pubIic transport, using c mparatively few
planners should Sear in mind that the availability of vehicles. The average bus or tr m carries about
erther on-street or off-street parking spaces attracts eighty passengers and takes up the space of no more
traffic in ways that may run cotlnter to other mea- than two private
sures designed t o improve traffic flow. Nevertheless, than two
it may be particularly important to provide parking
and stopping places for business activities in certain city traffic. There, private cars
areas. percent of all vehicles but
Provision of off-street parking and facilities for percent of all commuters.
handling goods should be left to the private sector, found in Mexico City.
with a minimum of regulation, provided their effect In many cities it is
ity to public transport and other high-occupancy
vehicles. Priority is most often provided by "bus
only" lanes but may also be in the form of exclusive
rights-of-way for buses and trams, and in some cases
whole streets are devoted only t o public transport
and pedestrians. Public transport has also been fa-
vored by special phases at traffic lights and exclusive
turning movements at intersections. Since these mea-
sures are flexible, they can be applied during peak
traffic periods on heavily used roads so as to cause
other road users to choose alternate routes or to
travel in the off peak. Another benefit is obtained by
permitting emergency and security vehicles to use
priority facilities and thus respond faster to urgent
calls.
Since priority arrangements for public transport
form part of more comprehensive traffic management
schemes, other traffic may not necessarily be worse
off. Obviously, however, private drivers caught in
congestion may be tempted to use the special facili-
ties provided for public transport. Hence, the success
of public transport priority measures depends to a
great extent on firm enforcement. Priority facilities
for public transport have been introduced successful-
ly in a large number of cities in developing countries.
A typical example is found in Bangkok (Box 5).
Traffic Movement and Traffic Control
Conflicting movements between vehicles and be-
tween vehicles and pedestrians intensify traffic
congestion. This problem occurs mainly at intersec-
tions, where vehicles and pedestrians make a variety
of maneuvers. Many of these maneuvers delay other
trafffc and are a h a potential cause of accidents. road links at crucial locations in the road network
Comparatively simple traffic regulation and minor and paving access roads and cycle tracks into squat-
road works can greatly reduce conflicting movements ter areas.
and help increase the effective capacity of the road More sophisticated efforss, su
network. The measures most commonly used include systems that use vehicle detect
installing traffic control signals at intersections, re- signals to computers to optimize
routing traffic, designating one-way streets, and ban- comparatively costly but still pr
ning the conflicting turns. Although these changes returns in the form of much r
involve extensive installation of traffic signs and and vehicle operating costs.
signals and road markings, the costs are very low in Although many kinds of tra
comparison with the costs of constructing additional sures can be effective when a
infrastructure. various locations, the greates
Minor road works can achieve additional improve- come from comprehensive
ments by altering the existing infrastructure-widen- areas or entire road networ
ing roads to provlde turning lanes and extra lanes for enforcement. One city in
through tra&c, installing traffic islands to channel had great success is Abi
traffic more efficiently, and building footbridges, (Box 6 ) .
flyovers, and pedestrian tunnels to separate pedestri-
ans and vehicles. The use of footbridges, fiyovers,
and tunnels is often the best technical solution, but
it is costly and may be impract~calbecause of lack of The rapid build-up in the number o f motor vehicles
space. Where there are many pedestrians, footpaths and pedestrians in most cities in debeloplng countries
may have to be wideced. Other valuable but inex- has brought with it an extremely igh rate of traffic
pensive improvements include constructing short accidents. In some developing tries the accident
rate (in relation to number of vehicles) is many times
that of developed countries. In addition to the suffer-
ing and distress that such accidents bring, their cost
to the economy is far from negligible. The measur-
able costs of such accidents have been calculated at
about 1 percent of GNP for developing countries.
Research by the Transport and Road Research
Laboratory in developing countries has demonstrat-
ed that accidents are caused by complex interactions
among vehicles, roads, weather conditions, and hu-
man actions and reactions. Most accidents are attri-
buted to unsafe driver or pedestrian behavior. In the
case of drivers, accidents are often the result of
negligence or of shortcomings in driver education
and the licensing system. Pedestrians often place
themselves at risk because they are unaware of dan-
ger or, in the case of migrants from rural areas, they
lack familiarity with urban traffic conditions. The
risks are often multiplied by poor road conditions
and the absence of pedestrian facilities, such as
sidewalks. In addition, vehicles in developing coun-
tries are often In unsafe condition because of poor
maintenance or difficulties in spare parts.
Most traffic accidents are avoidable, and accident
rates have been substantially reduced by concerted
efforts to do so through comprehensive road safety
programs. Programs of this type usually include such
measures as:
Collection and analysis of road accident data in
order to identify causes and likely accident spots
and to monitor the effectiveness of countermea-
sures
Specific consideration of road safety in road design
and traffic engineering
Changes in traffic laws
Better enforcement of traffic regulations
. Regular inspections and spot ,-hecks of the oper-
ating condition of motor vehicles
* Driver training and testing
Road user education and road safety publicity
Institutional reforms, including clear designation
of responsibilities for road safety.
Some developing countries have made extensive
efforts to improve road safety. A World Bank-fi-
nanced urban transport project in San Jost., Costa
Rica, has served as a catalyst for programs that place
special emphasis on educating children about road
safety. Chile has made road safety a compulsory part
of the curriculum in schools and has used the private
sector extensively to promote road safety. A National
Committee of Traffic Education has been set up
composed of representatives of insurance companies,
the press, TV and radio, car dealers, and tire manu-
facturers, as well as police departments.
Brazil has a strong road safety agency that has
implemented very effective education and enforce-
ment programs. During the first five years of the
campaign, the incidence of traffic accidents decreased
from 47 to 13 per million vehicle-kilometers. More
significantly, traffic accident deaths decreased from
4.5 to 1 per million vehicle-kilometers. Although it
may not be possible to determine precisely the part
played by the government's campaign in these spec-
tacular reductions, there can be little doubt that it
Was an essential factor.
The Institutional Framework
The rapid growth of traffic laces a considerable
burden on urban transport institutions. Rapid
growth brings with it the need more traffic
controls and regulations, effective police enforce-
ment, and the introduction of sophisticated technical
measures.
Unfortunately, urban transport institutions often
are ill-equipped to deal with the sheer increase in
traffic or to adopt advances in technology that would
help them overcome problems. It is rare to find single
agencies with the comprehensive authority needed to
deal with the large range of transport problems and
to coordinate overall solutions. Instead, authority is
usually divided among several agencies, each dealing
,ith different elements of the traffic problem. often,
too, the boundaries of these agencies' authority tend
to be indistinct; the result is a duplication of respon-
sibility, an undermining of accountability, and resist-
ance to change. In Calcutta, for instance, ten different
agencies are involved in the development of the road
network and are concerned with traffic management.
Recently, an important step toward consolidation
was taken when full responsibility for traffic engi-
neering was assigned to the Calcutta Metropolitan
Development Authority. Until then, the authority's
engineers had spent much of their time in coordina-
tion and liaison activities with the many other agen-
cies concerned with traffic management.
The ability of municipalities to cope with transport
problems has also been impaired by lack of sufficient
resources, particularly trained staff. When serious
transport problems arise, municipal agencies often
have little choice but to resort to stopgap solutions. At the local level, responsi
As a result, the overall transport situation deterior- the planning, design, implem
ates and the efficiency of the urban area suffers. Thus, nance of local traffic manag
considerable attention must be paid to institutional !ocal responsibilities should i
reorganization and training so that traffic manage- ic conditions, drafting and i
ment schemes can be properly planned, designed, regulations, and coordinati
implemented, and enforced. police. Because of the co
Because of the considerable differences between and the need to maintain
countries, there can be no hard and fast rules for ment, a local traffic m
what constitutes a sound institutional structure. located in an operatio
Nonetheless, it is necessary to define areas of respon- public works or engin
sibility for policy, executive functions, and enforce- forcement agency wou
ment and to provide the necessary resources to carry police department. Sin
out those responsibilities. Of particular importance agement measures de
is the need to distinguish between national and local effective enforcement,
responsibilities. ment agency-usually
drafting trafic regula
National and Local Responsibilities improvement schemes
a greater chance of bei
At the matiomal level, appropriate responsibilities in- the purview of the ci
clude the development and monitoring of urban trans- their work is properly
port policies, standards, specifications, and laws. Iden- urban development a
tifying and supervising research and training in the either be provided
urban transport sector are also national responsibili- ready access to funding.
ties. In addition, national agencies should provide
advice and assistance to local agencies on the plan-
ning, design, and implementation of traffic manage-
ment schemes. Eventually, the national agency should
develop the ability to identify, appraise, and supervise ments for establi
urban transport projects on a national scale. Probably
the best location for a national transport agency is
within an operational ministry, such as a ministry of
public works. Since the development of urban trans-
port policy at the national level is likely to involve
several other government ministries, coordination by
a high-level advisory group will be necessary. reduced.
 Public Transport:
The Role of Bus
Services
Public transport systems provide the most efficient
means of moving large numbers of people, especially
in dense urban areas. Bus services, in particular,
provide considerable flex~bilit~ in meeting demands
for transport at various levels of quality and quantity.
In many developing countries, buses are the choice of
a majority of the community and are the only means
of mobility that can be afforded by the urban poor.
An estimated 600 million trips a day were being made
in buses in Third World cities in 1980. By the year
2000 that figure will have at least doubled.
Yet despite its vital role, bus service in many places
falls far short of demand; systems are often severely
overstretched, uncomfortable, and unreliable. Po-
tential passengers increasingly turn to more costly
modes of transport or have to walk long distances.
This chapter discusses the reasons for this state of
affairs and considers the conditions that are needed
if bus services are to cope with the current and
forecast massive increases in demand.
The Crisis in Public Transport
Very few ~ u b l i ctransport systems in the developing
cities have been able to keep pace with the very rapid
and substantial increases in demand of the past few
decades. Bus services in particular have deteriorated,
and their efficiency and output have been further
reduced as passengers have turned to private cars and
20
thus added to traffic congestion.
Experience shows a need for a great variety of
modes of public transport. Given the opportunity,
people reveal widely divergent transport preferences,
but in many places city authorities favor a basic
standard of bus services provided by closely con-
trolled large corporations.
This approach is often justified by certain miscon-
ceptions. First, it is said that there are great econo-
mies of scale in the size of firms providing bus
services. This leads to the assumption that it is
possible to reduce costs by amalgamating all of a
city's transport firms into one comprehensive under-
taking. Providing such an undertaking with an exclu-
sive franchise is then rationalized as a means of
protecting it from "unfair competition" and thus of
increasing its viability. Second, it is often thought to
be inegalitarian to provide special services such as
premium or guaranteed seats or express buses in
return for higher fares. In other words, variety is
condemned.
The economies-of-scale argument, however, has
been discredited by both empirical evidence and
experience. The management and labor problems of
large bus undertakings that have often dominated the
agendas of cities in both the developing and the
industrial worlds have revealed the diseconomies of
large-scale operations. Small, competitive, and highly
variegated transport enterprises usually find it ef-
ficient to operate small vehicles rather than the large
costly buses characteristically chosen by large organ-
izations. Since the monopolies often produce only
low-quality service, people who are willing to pay for
something better are forced into using private cars or
taxis. This in turn increases congestion so that bus
services deteriorate, and the poor in particular are
disadvantaged.
The large, monopolistic public transport undertak-
ings are declining in many places. Typical is the
Transportes de Buenos Aires, a national enterprise set
up in 1951 to take over all public transport services
in Buenos Aires. Services deteriorated from the outset
and by 1959 the system was losing $120,000 a day.
By 1962 the financial situation was so serious and the
qualit y of services so poor that the enterprise was
dissolved and bus services turned over to private
companies.
Government regulation and control have exacer-
bated the poor operational and financial perfor-
mance of the monopolies. As costs rise, for example,
transport systems come under financial pressure to
increase fares, but politicians are under contrary
pressure to keep fares at existing levels. Unless the
system is subsidized, it will then have to eliminate
some of its less profitable services. Once again, how-
ever, politicians will be inclined to yield to pressure
from those whose services are threatened and to
insist on maintaining money-losing operations to
certain standards.
Public officials may also come under pressure to set
standards when sustained demand and revenues are
insufficient to support what are considered to be
socially or economically desirable services. These
include, for example, regular service to certain areas
deprived of transport and at times of thin demand;
special supplemental service at peak periods to re-
duce overcrowding or excessive waiting; and special
services to meet the needs of persons particularly
dependent on public transport, such as schoolchild-
ren or the aged and handicapped. Public officials
often attach considerable importance to meeting
these special needs, But probabl y the most frequent
reason for intervention is the desire of the public
officials to avoid public outcries over fare increases.
This desire is heightened where a uniform fare struc-
ture applies nationwide so that a fare increase would
become a national issue. But attempts to redress
dererioration in transport services by fixing fares and
levels of service inevitably lead to subsidies. These
usually begin with a write-off of debt but eventually
extend to direct operating subventions.
expectations, however, and as tra
1
Interventions of this type usu ily fall short of
come less able to provide adequate
able fares, the tendency is to appl
I
trols and subsidies. When succes ive interventions
fail to achieve the desired results, 't then becomes a
small step to full public ownersh Although public
ownership seems to make it poss e to avoid politi-
cally difficult choices, in most c s it merely post-
pones the day of reckoning.
With few exceptions, publicly owned transport
costs more to run (in many cases, very much more)
than comparable transport systems run by the private
sector. Without the profit motive 1 and the staff ac-
countability that exist in the e sector, publicly
owned systems have little to strive for
cost-effectiveness, to compete fod revenues, or to
sustain the high degree of effor
come the numerous day-to-day
more, government agencies and
porations often lack the flexibl
the ability to hire and fire st
discretion needed to adapt speedily to changing con-
ditions.
Several cities have found that (taking over bus
k
services was so fraught with diffic ltles and such a
burden on their resources that the have reverted to
encouraging private ownership. In ~ i n ~ s t oJamai-
n,
ca, for example, the Jamaica Omn
had operated successfully under
for twenty years, found it imposs
growing obligation to o
serve areas with thin t
Services deteriorated, and in 19
taken over by the governme
dropped and costs rose, to the
service was costing the gover
every month in deficit finan
government leased the assets of tbe service to the
private sector and introduced
the development of private
from being an isolated
cities with declining
1
that, when given the opportunity, mall private en-
terprises emerge as the major su pliers of public
rransport services.
In some clties, it is true, sell-ebtablished public
agencies do provlde notably w
effective bus services. It is lnde
publicly owned transport system
torily, but because of the
appropriate incentives and
 Public Transport Subsidies
Although many transit systems throughout develop-
ing countries are self-supporting, it is not uncommon
to find others that are heavily subsidized. (Urban rail
services, almost without exception, are subsidized.)
Authorities justify subsidies on a number of grounds.
The most common is that the government has a
responsibility to provide the public with satisfactory
services at affordable fares. In this case, often over-
looked are the opportunities to achieve the same
results by other means, for example, by encouraging
competition and more cost-effective practices.
Another argument put forward is that subsidies
induce motorists to use public transport instead of
their automobiles and thus reduce road congestion.
But the evidence suggests that it takes much more
than Iow fares or even free rides on buses to lure
motorists from the comfort and convenience of their
cars.
Frequently, economies of scale are put forth as an
argument for subsidizing h i g h - c a ~ a c i tsystemspin
~ on the financial resources of cities, the full implica-
articular rapid railways-in the hope that greater
patronage will lead to financial viability. But such
subsidies often divert patronage from more efficient
systems and build pressure to extend the subsidized
and less efficient system. Under these circumstances
the more efficient systems may have to be curtailed,
may lose viability, and eventually also may have to
be subsidized.
Because the anticipated benefits of subsidies usual-
ly fall far short of expectations, more subsidization
is then needed. One of the main causes of subsidies'
failing to achieve expected results is that the existence
of subsidies removes the incentive to reduce costs or
to increase revenues. This in turn usually leads to
further inefficiency, greater deficits, and a need for
additional subsidies. Such spiraling subsidies for pub-
lic transport can be found in a number of cities in
developing countries. The annual subsidy for pub-
licly owned bus services in Karachi has reached $5
million; in Calcutta, $10 million; in Cairo, $26 mil-
Iion; and in Bangkok, $30 million. In Sao Paulo, the
public bus service receives a massive annual subsidy
of $90 million, which is equivalent to more than
$0.15 for every passenger trip.
Many examples of heavily subsidized urban public
transport can also be found in the industrial coun-
tries. In most cases the goal of the subsidy has been
only partially achieved. A study undertaken by the
Transport and Road Research Laboratory showed:
* Where subsidies were introduced, patronage in-
creased because of more intensive use by existing
users rather than because of more users.
Subsidies to attract car drivers generally have had
very little effect because of the high value placed on
the convenience of private cars.
Subsidies designed to reduce fares and improve
services have had only limited success. Only about
half the subsidy was actually reflected in lower
fares, and there was little improvement in services.
" In most cases, increased subsidies have resulted in
lower productivity and in substantial "leakage" of
the subsidy into larger staffs, wages, and unit costs.
In most of the countries studied, subsidies once
introduced have grown substantially. As a propor-
tion of operating costs, subsidies are particularly
high in such countries as the Netherlands (70 per-
cent), Belgium (69 percent), France (56 percent),
United States (46 percent), and Australia and Swe-
den (45 percent).
Despite the very heavy burden that subsidies place
tlons and long-term consequences of subsidies are
rarely taken into account. A review of the transport
sector by the world ~~~k revealed that subsidies
seldom are properly planned or appraised and that
actual effects in some cases are quite d i from ~ ~
those intended. For example, a 70 percent subsidy to
the nationalized bus company in Istanbul (IETT) was
designed to keep fares down for the urban poor.
H ~ many of~ the poor
~ living~in squatter~ areas~ ,
were served primarily by unsubsidized private enter-
prise minibuses that charged the same fare as IETT.
~ h subsidy
, in overstaffing of IETT buses and
inefficient use of capital stock.
Although subsidies that meet appropriate and spe-
cific social and economic may be justified,
proposals for subsidies need to be carefully appraised
and their true effects understood. The same consid-
e ration applies to existing subsidies, which need to
be reappraised from time to time to ensure that their
original justification remains validv In many cases,
appraisal will show that there is little to be gained
from a proposed subsidy and that elimination of an
existing subsidy is likely to lead to a more
and cost-effective system.
Moreover, subsidies are Gnanced from taxes levied
on citizens at all income levels, but it is not at all clear
that a transfer of funds--for example, from the
tax-paying farmer to the tax-paying urban bus user-
is socially just.
Demand is growing much faster than budget re-
venues, and subsidies cannot go on expanding with as, if not better than
demand. As a result, for many cities it will be Studies undertaken by the
extremely difficult to rely on subsidized public trans- in cities such as Calcutta, Ba
port to meet future needs. both private and publicly o
private bus service were be
Criteria for Viable Bus Services of the costs of publicly o
employees of privately o
Despite the magnitude of the problems, many public less than their counterpa
transport systems-particularly bus and minibus op- panies, private bus com
erations-do provide good service. A comparison of cities were, in fact, earn
bus services in some thirty cities and the range of wages. Nonetheless, w
performance usually achieved by well-managed bus private ownership are
services are set out in Appendix Tables A-2 and A-3. costs in the public sec
Examination of these and other bus services through- labor contracts an
out the world suggests that they are more likely to be dancy.
viable and capable of meeting growing demand when The studies also
certain conditions are present. support the conventional alle
owned services are less safe
Ownership ones. In addition, th
"skim the cream" by
The evidence suggests that privately owned bus ser- routes does not seem
vices are more likely to cost less per unit of output publicly owned syste
than publicly owned services, although there are
some notable exceptions (see Box 8). But generally
the quality of private bus service seems t o be as good
I~
Bangkok the privately run minibuses serve the nar-
row and sometimes unpaved side oads where regu-
lar buses cannot operate.
 It is also argued that the quality of service deterior-
ates on routes taken over by private operators, but this
contention is not supported by the evidence. In Cal-
cutta (Box 7) buses on roures taken over by private
operators were more evenly scheduIed, marginally
more comfortable, less subject to breakdown, and
considered to have better general appearance and
performance. In Istanbul it was found that the private
minibuses had faster operating speeds than the public
buses. In general, private operators are more inclined
to adjust to changing demands than are publicly held
enterprises.
In many countries publicly owned bus services are
long established, and the political and social climate
for a rapid move toward privatization may not be
appropriate. Without losing any opportunities to
encourage greater private prarticipation, careful at-
tention to the viability and efficiency of the publicly
owned services is likely to reap worthwhile results.
Generally the performance of pubiicly owned bus
services can be improved if they operate with a
measure of independence and pursue commercial
practices, including:
Accountabiliry for performance at all levels of
management
Incentives to reduce costs and improve service
Cost controls covering operation, maintenance, ad-
ministration, and route costing systems
Rational policies on subsidies, routes, fares, and
staffing.
Several publicly owned bus companies that follow
this approach perform well and are cost-effective. In
particular, these successful systems are headed by
dynamic managements that are able to motivate their
staffs through incentives. Usually constituted as semi-
independent public corporations, they are able to
select and replace staff and to keep costs down by
following sound management techniques, such as
cost control and performance measurement. When
such cost-effective operations are not financially vi-
able, it is usually because they do not determine fare
levels. One notably successfui publicly owned bus pedal rickshaws, converted vans
system is found in Greater Bombay (Box 8). taxis, and minibuses) because
drivers) are needed to carry
passengers. Because of the co
certain slow-moving types of
A policy to encourage private participation in the barred from city centers.
provision of b ~ services
s should avoid the use of In developing ccuntries,
regulations or franchises that would create private are often both cost-effective
monopolies. These tend to be inefficient and result in Because less developed econo
services which suffer most of the drawbacks of pub- costs, a higher ratio of dri
licly owned bus services. Instead, giving private op- necessarily a significant
erators unrestricted opportunity t o enter the market that favor the use of
and compete for business has generally produced
better transport services at lower costs. Under com- i
In low-density areas small ve icles can remain
financially viable while providin frequent service,
petition, operators tend to become more responsive despite low levels of demand.
t o customers' needs and more innovative in finding Small buses are usually prod
ways to cut costs. In Accra and Monrovia, for and cost much less per seat tha
example, highly competitive operators provide a
are ordinarily custom-built.
wide variety of services and are able to charge fares
below the regulated maximum. Drivers of small buses ofte
The alleged disadvanrages of competition (unfair stringent requirements for a dr
competitors, erosion of viability, congestion at bus drivers of large buses and thu
stops, low safety standards, and neglect of unprofit-
able routes) seldom are found to be real problems vehicles are usually less costly. L
Maintenance and inspection req irements for small

1
and, if they do arise, can usually be overcome Small vehicles can be operated at higher speeds,
by minimal intervention. If bus movements cause especially on congested or narr w streets, which
congestion, for example, it can be dealt with by allow for ~ u i c k e r~urnaround.

I
strengthening police enforcement of traffic rules.
Users of small vehicks may b nefit from more
Similarly, inspection of buses and driving tests for
frequent service and, in some c ses, door-to-door
bus drivers can be introduced to improve safety.
In the case of unprofitable routes shunned by the service, in return for higher fare .
private sector (the number of these is actually likely Large buses are generally mo
to be small where there is free competition), public where demand is high enough
authorities can offer private operators the opportuni- service and where the full
ty to bid for operation of the routes at set standards, use of road space and energy
capacities, and fares. Operators bid on the amount realized. Although a city's nee
of money to be paid or received by them, depending particular circumstances, some
on the extent to which they expect the routes to be medium, and small vehicles w
profitable or unprofitable. Competitive bidding ar- best bus service. A. mixe
rangements give private operators an incentive to convenient and frequent and
keep costs down, and when this approach has been throughout the day on both
adopted for providing transport services previously routes and is more adaptabl
subsidized by the government, the amount of the stances than a fleet of buses
subsidy has invariably been substantially reduced. where operators are free to c
use, as in Calcutta, Bogot
Choke of Vehicle uncommon to find a varie
buses, minibuses, and para
Small vehicles are generally less economic than larger chosen by operators with
ones in their use of road space and energy per road conditions, levels of
passenger kilometer. This is particularly so in the costs are more likely to be
case of paratransit vehicles (for example, motor and priate than vehicles specifie
Variety ofServices
Calculating the demand for transportation in urban
areas is not simply a matter of determining the
number of people or the m ~ o u n tof goods t o be
carried from point A to point urban Inhabitants
manifest their transport preferences in terms of their
willingness to pay for being transported from place
to place. Payment, however, is made not only in coin
and currency but also in time, trouble, and discom-
fort. People reveal their preferences when they make
tradeoffs between time and discomfort, on the one
hand, and the amount of money they are willing to
pay for transport, on the other hand. Tradeoffs vary
enormously between different people, depending on
their circumstances. Indeed, the tradeoffs of any
individual may vary greatly from one day to the
The supply problem is to ensure that modes of
transport are deployed to meet the users' willingness
to pay. The essential aspect of supply is that it should
give people the opportunity to trade up or down in
comfort, reliability, frequency, and price.
As incomes rise in the developing countries and
more people are able to buy cars, public transport
systems will have to become more attractive if the
road network is not to be saturated. Comfortable and
reliable services, albeit at fares set at cost, will have
to be established to attract more affluent riders. At
the same time, however, public transport systems will
have to include frequent, reliable, and low-cost bus
services for those (likely to be a majority) who are
willing to sacrifice comfort for reliability and lower
fares.
Demands for various levels of service that fall
between these two extremes are likely to arise, and
demand for each type af service can be expected to
change from time to time. It will therefore be impor-
tant to develop public transport systems that will
allow flexibility in providing services, and this can
best be achieved by variety in bus services (see Box 9).
Coopeaation among Operators
In a number of cities, cooperation among bus oper-
ators has resulted in the provision of better services.
Operators have formed route associations that exer-
cise informal supervision to mitigate the dangerous
and disruptive practices often attributed to free mar-
ket conditions wnthout reducing health y competition.
Route associations, or "empresas," provide microbus
service in Buenos Aires, for example. Each empresa
is composed of the owner-oper
route, and its members must a
tion's rules. The operators be
scheduling and a standard far
f
public benefits from the greater f quency and reli-
ability of services and higher st ndards. There is
considerable competition among
since passengers have a choice
associations of ~ a r i o u kinds
s are
in Latin America, Africa, and
United States (see Box 10).
The Role of ~overnr/lent
I
Generally, public transport servi
ficiently with a minimum of gov
particular, the freedom to set f
market factors is more likely to
demand will balance each ot
absence of financial controls b
a favorable climate for invest
port. Similarly, the freedom to determine the routes,
size of vehicles, and frequency of services, particular-
ly where competition exists, enhances the likelihood
of economic viability and public satisfaction (see
Box 11).
In some cases, of course, a transport system may
contain certain routes that for a variety of reasons are
not profitable and therefore not attractive to com-
mercjal operators. If these are deemed to be socially
o r economically desirable, the government may then
decide to subsidize such services. When subsidies are
provided to users in a form that enables them to
choose between services, however, competition is
retained and operators still have an incentive to run
cost-effective services at acceptable standards. But
subsidies to users or to service providers that result
in artific~allylow fares may lead to excessive demand
and consequent pressure to provide greater capacity
than would otherwise be required.
Although there are strong arguments for keeping
government control of public transport to a mini-
mum, certain responsibilities must be assumed by
governments. The greatest of these is the mammoth
task of improving and extending the road network.
As already noted, road pricing to compensate for
imperfections in the market will require considerable
government effort. Traffic regulation and manage-
ment-particularly the adoption of measures that
give priority to public transport vehicles-also must
be the responsibility of the public sector, as are the
licensing of public transport drivers and vehicles and
the setting of safety and environmental standards.
Many cities need to strengthen and refine the institu-
tions responsible for these functions and to provide
adequate training for their staff. Much of the discus-
sion on the institutional framework for traffic man-
agement in Chapter 3 applies equally to the gov-
ernment authorities with public transport responsi-
bilities.
In view of forecasts of rapid growth in urban
populations and a consequent spread of urban areas,
the need for bus services can be expected to intensify
greatly in the years to come. If the private and the
public sectors play their appropriate roles, most
developing countries will have the opportunity to
develop vigorous and viable public transport sys-
tems. The magnitude of expected future demands
makes it imperative to grasp this opportunity and not
fritter it away.
 Decisions
Faced with what appear to be insurmountable trans-
port problems, cities in developing countries are
frequently tempted to turn to expensive infrastruc-
ture projects in the hope that a substantial invest-
ment will provide an effective and complete solution.
These investments generally take the form of expen-
sive highway infrastructure or rapid rail transit sys-
tems designed to provide a massive amount of new
transport capacity to relieve crowded radial roads.
But in view of all the other demands on their re-
sources, cities should carefully consider low-cost
transport alternatives.
Investment in Road Networks
Considerable increases in both the population and
the area of a city often mean that road networks must
be substantially improved and lengthened. In Pusan,
Korea, for example, the metropolitan area grew from
370 to 430 square kilometers between 1968 and 1982,
while total road length increased from 550 to 1,600
kilometers. Such extensive road improvement and
construction can place a heavy burden on city fi-
nances. The choice of routes and the designs for new
or improved roads should therefore avoid excessive
standards and be economically justified.
The greatest benefits are achieved when urban
highway investment is directed toward the needs of
commercial traffic and public transport rather than
the needs of motor cars. Experie
an approach-for example, the
drainage of bus routes serving
offers very high rates of return.
benefit a relatively high proporti
mainly through faster journey
/0
sumption and maintenance, and fe er delays because
of breakdowns (see Box 12).
Striking net benefits are obtain d simply by keep-
ing roads in good condition. But he urban roads in
many developing countries tend to be rough and
riddled with potholes. The poor c ndition is due to
b
a combination of factors: unexpe tedly large traffic
volumes, underdesign and faulty c nstruction, over-
I
loaded trucks, and, in particula lack of proper
maintenance.
Experience shows that proper aintenance of city
streets produces large savings in c'ty budgets in the
long run. Maintenance prolongs the life of roads,
postpones the day when expensiv rehabilitation or
reconstruction is required, and thu can substantially
reduce overall city expenditures n roads. Routine
and periodic maintenance of paved roads costs about
4
$2,000 to $4,000 per kilometer er year and can
extend the life of a roadway by fifteen to twenty
b
years. Full rehabilitation of a two- ane road is likely
to cost between $150,000 and $250, 00 per kilometer.
I"
Regular maintenance benefits h ndreds of thou-
sands of road users and reduces vehicle operating
costs anywhere from 15 percent to 40 percent. Faster
journeys and smoother rides also provide consider-
able benefits to passengers and goods (see Box 13).
Proper road maintenance also reduces the risk of
traffic accidents.
More and more cities are recognizing the value of
keeping roads in a good state of repair and are giving
road maintenance higher priority than previously in
their budgets. But if a city is to reap the full bene-
fits of increased spending on road maintenance, the
agency responsible must be efficient and effective.
Road maintenance is frequently the responsibility of
work units within city departments, but in recent
times there has been a strong movement toward
greater use of private contractors. Studies in Brazil,
Kenya, and Argentina have shown that maintenance
can be done more effectively under contract and a t
considerable cost savings. For example, in Ponta
Grossa, Brazil, road maintenance was 59 percent
more costly when done by municipal workers than
when done by a private contractor.
The construction of major roads and other expen-
sive highway infrastructure, such as grade-separated
intersections and bridges, is likely to be unavoidable
as cities grow. But an emphasis on low-cost roads
and timely maintenance will mean that a greater
proportion of the population, particularly the urban
poor, can be better served.
Capital-Intensive Investments
Underground railways capable of moving up to
60,000 passengers an hour in each direction at high
speeds appear to offer a particularly attractive solu-
tlon to chaotic road conditions. Politically speaking,
a metro is easily sold to the public as a symbol of
progress and a sign that the community has achieved
the status of a major world city. In addition, foreign
suppliers of subway technology are often ready to
make financing for construction and equipment read-
ily available; because of unemployed resources in
their own economies, they are able to get export
subsidies.
Although rapid rail systems may provide a viable
solution to traffic ~ r o b l e m sunder certain circum- the Hong Kong metr
stances, the full implications of decisions to build time and within budge
such systems are rarely understood. Such decisions assistance to pay capital costs.
have on occasion been based on faulty reasoning and With an expensive
insufficient examination of alternatives. Construc- system, city authorities
tion of the Caracas metro, for example, was justified competition by other fo
on the basis of a number of expectations which did buses, in order to boost the pa
not, in that case, materialize (see Box 14). of the rail system. City authori
The greatest drawback of rapid rail systems, par- measures with the argument
ticularly underground systems, is their massive con- provide an integrated system t
struction costs that, in combination with high op- approach, however, tends to
erating costs, may well prove to be excessively bur- competing systems in jeopar
densome on city budgets (see Appendix Tables A-4 a marginal increase in reven
and A-5). Estimates of the number of people that will Forced suppression of prefe
use these large-scale projects are often overly optim- that the public will be serv
istic, and revenues rarely are sufiicient to cover op- Energy savings may also
erating costs, let alone depreciation and financing tions. The saving of corn
costs. Rapid rail projects have often shown them- given as a justification fo
selves particularly susceptible to cost overruns as tric transport systems,
well. Even highly efficient underground systems op- disappointingly low. For
erating under favorable demand conditions, such as tive transport to conser
I
that an investment of $1.5 billion in electric-powered
mass transport systems would result in annual sav-
ings equivalent to only 1.2 days of consumption of
petroleum-based products by the country as a whole.
~ j t h in ~ some
~ ~ hcases heavy Investment in a
metro may be a technically feasible solution to a
city's transport problems, the system's high costs
might mean the postponement of other important
projects. Therefore government authorities should
carefully consider the alternatives before deciding to
invest in rapid rail systems.
Urban Transit Systems: Examination of Options
A wide variety of technically feasible ways exist to
meet the growing transport demands of a city. Al-
though all of them may be worth some consideration,
most should be screened out at an early stage.
To do this, it will usually be sufficient to identify
the main traffic corridors and estimate the range of
future demand. After forecasts of demand and esti-
mates of the costs of each option are obtained, it will
be possible to decide which options are worth more
 i
detailed examination. Other factors to be considered using larger buses with a capacity f 120 or more and
in evaluating options are their flexibility, the ease or operating in the same condition can carry up to
difficulty of ~ntegratingthem into the city's existing 15,000 passengers an hour. If pri rity measures are
system, the degree to which they will disrupt city put into place, these volumes ca be increased to
ac~ivitiesand affect the environment during and 15,000 passengers an hour for s dard buses and in
after implementation, and the costs of operation and the region of 20,000 for the lar buses; peak-hour
maintenance. volumes of 23,000 passengers hour have been
Once certain options have been identified as ap- achieved by buses operat~ngin r lanes. Vol-
propriate, detailed feasibility studies can be under- umes in excess of 30,000
taken. Of particular importance will be economic reached in express
analysis and financial planning to determine whether and off-line
the new system is within the city's financial means. way (Box 15), even with few intersections, is
In addition, the most suitable institutional arrange- still able to carry 28,000
ments should be identified for efficient implementa- of providing priority
tion, operation, and maintenance of the system. Usually, little more is
The characteristics of the main types of available road markings and
transit systems are discussed below and summarized Exclusive busways
in Appendix Table A-6. from $2 million to
of large buses
Buses Passenger costs per kilometer ra ge from $0.02 to
$0.08 (1985).
Buses and minibuses provide the cheapest and most Electric trolley buses provide &pacity similar to
flexible way of meeting heavy demand. Systems using
standard-size transit buses, each with a capacity of
about 80 passengers, are able to carry up to 10,000
passengers an hour per lane in mixed traffic. Systems
are high, particularly for the 6
system. In line with the
I
that of conventional buses and ar environmentally
attractive because they cause less p Ilution. But costs
transmission
transport systems, the high investment in trolley
buses is unlikely to be justified on the basis of
combustible fuel savings. In a developing city, public
transport services often need rerouting because of
changes in demand, road works, and traffic manage-
ment. Trolley buses, tied to their power transmission
systems, cannot easily be rerouted and thus lack the
considerable flexibility of buses. Nevertheless, trolley
buses may be attractive under certain conditions-in
hilly terrain, for example.
Where buses are the major means of meeting
demands for public transport, very large numbers of
buses are likely to be involved. To reduce the danger
of accidents and pollution, there is a strong need to
institute and enforce adequate safety and environ-
mental standards for the operation of buses.
Light Rail Transit
The term "light rail transit" refers to a wide range of
electrically powered rail systems. At one extreme are
trams or streetcars, which operate on tracks and
share the roadwa y with other users. At the other
extreme are "pre-metro" systems operated on exclu-
sive rights-of-way and often designed for conversion
to rapid rail systems when conversion is warranted
by demand. The distinguishing features of light rail
systems are that passengers usually board from the
road surface or from low platforms, and the vehicles
operate in single units or in short trains at moderate
speeds. Trackways may be shared with other traffic
and may have sections of exclusive rights-of-way.
Some systems, like the one in Hannover (Box 161,
combine several types of light rail transit to meet
different circumstances and levels of demand.
Light rail systems using single trams, each with a
capacity of 100 passengers, are comparatively slow
and carry up to 6,000 passengers an hour in mixed
traffic. If double trams are used, capacity can be
increased to 12,000 passengers an hour. Where the
trams operate on an exclusive street track and inter-
sections are located at grade, capacity can be boosted
to 15,000 passengers. Light rail systems with exclu-
sive right-of-way, grade-separated intersections, and
five- or six- car trains can achieve peak-hour volumes
of around 36,000 passengers an hour. When con-
structed at ground level, a light rail infrastructure
composed of trackway, signals, and power system
will cost between $6 million and $10 million per
kilometer. Elevated systems can be expected to cost
between $25 million and $40 million per kilometer,
while underground sections may cost between $65
mill~onand $118 million per kilometer. The cost
of light rail vehicles in 1985 was approximately
$800,000 each. Costs for surface light rail systems
with exclusive r~ghtsof way are in the region of
$0.10-$0.15 per passenger kilometer.
If a light raii system can be established on an
existing and exclusive right-of-way, or if such a
ground-level right-of-way can be provided easily, the
cost and capacity of a light rail system, together w ~ t h
a low level of air pollution, may make it an attractive
option. But a completely different picture emerges if
the system must be elevated or placed underground.
To achieve maximum capacities, high-frequency
service is imperative. But high-frequency service is
likely to impair the flow of crossing traffic if intersec-
tions are not grade-separated.
Generally light rail systems are confined to main
traffic corridors and are not suitable for distributing
passengers throughout secondary and tertiary road
networks. The consequent need for many passengers
to change modes during their journeys is a distinct
disadvantage of light rail systems. Bus services, by
comparison, serve the entire road network and can
to change between services.
n
be routed to greatly reduce the eed for passengers
Rapid Rail Transit 1
h
Rapid rail transit systems (often termed "the sub-
way," "the underground," or "t e metro") invari-
ably operate on completely exclusive rights-of-way at
10
high speeds and provide the high st transit capacity
currently available. Peak hour c pacities of about
60,080 passengers an hour in e ch direction have
been achieved (for example, in Sa Paulo and Hong
Kong).
To achieve such high passenger lolurnes, rapid rail
/
systems usually have sophisticated signaiing and con-
trol devices that allow the operato s to maintain high
I
speeds and frequencies. Rapid r il systems usually
have high-level platforms that faci itate rapid loading
and unloading. Because they cre te little noise and
air pollution, underground r
particular, are attractive envir
The costs of rapid rail syst
rail systems, differ greatly,
exclusive right-of-way was o
t
cities, rapid rail systems were intr duced at an early
stage and surface rights-of-way w re obtained with
!
comparative ease and at low cost.
In some cases, private develope s have built rapid
rail systems and have reaped the fi ancial benefits of
development opportunities that the existence of the
system created on land adjacent to the lines. A
number of systems in Japan were developed this way.
Operated at competitive fares, they have been able to
show a profit. Although some rely heavily or, profits
from property development, most of them earn prof-
its because they are operated very efficiently (see Box
17). Similar situations arise when urban sections of
an intercity rail line or suburban railway can be
upgraded to provide commuter services. Once again,
the cost of providing an exclusive right-of-way is
likely to be comparatively small. The World Bank is
assisting with the upgrading of a number of suburban
rail systems (for example, in Porto Alegre, Tunis, and
Abidjan).
The creation of an exclusive right-of-way for a
surface rapid rail system in many cities in develop-
ing countries would require the acqaisition of large
amounts of land, the demolition of buildings, and
damage to the city environment. It is thus important
to establish surface rights-of-way a t an early stage in
a city's development.
The costs of underground or elevated rail struc-
tures are likely to be well beyond the means of most
cities. An elevated system is likely to cost in the
region of $30 million to $45 million per kilometer,
with stations costing an additional $2 million to $5
million each. An underground system constructed by
the "'cut and cover" method is likely to cost between
$65 million and $100 million per kilometer, plus $8
million to $20 million for each station. To these must
be added the costs of depots and rolling stock. Rapid
rail vehicles cost about $1 million each. Thus, it is
not surprising to find that new rapid rail systems cost
several bilIions of dollars. For example, the Sao Paulo
metro (Box 18), which is 70 percent underground,
cost $2,338 million (at 1983 prices); the Caracas
metro (Box 14), which is mainly underground, is
estimated to cost $1,440 million for twelve kilome-
ters, or more than $117 million per kilometer.
Investments and Transport Planning
Motor vehicles provide considerable flexibility of
movement and greater freedom in the location of
industrial, commercial, and residential development.
As a result, greater weight is given to factors such as
income levels and employment and residential oppor-
tunities in the shaping of development. These factors
and the flexibility provided by motor vehicles need to
be taken into account when making transport invest-
ment decisions. Nowadays, for example, car owner-
ship is likely to have more influence on the residential
cholces of high-income groups than the provision of
normal public transport. Public transport services
would have to be highly convenient and comfortable
and coupled with car use restraints to persuade
motorists to give up firmly established use of their
cars. In the case of low-income groups, the provision
of cheap land close to employment opportunities (or
vice versa) may be more important in their choice of
residence than the provision of transport facilities.
Nevertheless, authorities sometimes justify costly
transport investments on the assumption that certain
development objectives can be achieved, and they
may overlook the influence of other factors. Further-
more, the impact of transport systems on land use is
often not properly appraised, with the result that
!and use problems are exacerbated. For example, a
major highway in Indonesia was constructed to con-
nect suburban Kebayoran with the capital of Jakar-
ta. Although not intended to influence development
along its route, the highway has been the principal
force in shaping a large part of the area and has
presented serious problems. It has given people living
in suburban high-rise, high-value buildngs ready
access to the city, but the intensity of linear develop-
ment has led to congestion and overloaded services
in a very narrow band along the roadway.
Although idealized models may show that plan-
ning will enable governments to maximize the net
benefits of transport investments, plailning
in reality has proved to be difficult
in the developing countries. Emu1
oped countries is rarely the ans+er. Conventional
planning methods have largely d or enjoyed only
fleeting success in the aad have
been even more disappointing in developing coun-
tries, where rapid growth in demand, uncertainties
1
about future income and land u e patterns, and a
dearth of data add to planners' dlfficulties. Yn most
48
developing cumtries transport pl nning should em-
phasize short-term needs within broad long-term
planning framework. This will he1 avoid premature
investments that may preclude fficient long-term
solutions or set unfavorable pattdrns for long-term
development, I
I
A possible planning method for ities in developing
countries is being studied by the W rid Bank (see Box
19). Although the method is unlikely to find uniform
acceptance or to be suitable for al
it takes account of the many unc
vides a Bong-term framework wtt
ble short-term plans can be set.
of a two-tiered approach, with
for the long term and design p
term.
a
Authorities faced with high dem nd for transport
 W d d Bank In
in Urban Ttansport: ~
Experience and D i m

World Bank lending for urban transport is compara- shows the proportion of cost attrib red to the various
r
tively recent. Although the Bank has been in exist-
ence since 1945, it was not until 1972 that it became
involved in urban transport projects. Rapid urban
types of urban transport funded b the World Bank
and the number of components in each category.
I
r
b
:1
growth in a11 regions of the developing world was Table 1. Urban Transport Gornpo ents Financed by
placing enormous demands on public institutions, the World Bank
% ~ Z % : ~ ~ ~ M ? m : ~ % % ~ m a w < ~ - ~ m : % ? ~ ~ e
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ " ~ ~

which lacked the technical expertise, institutional P rcentage Number

capacity, and financial resources to cope with these of of
Urban transport components cost components
demands. The Bank's involvement in transport arose , ~ : ~ ~ ~ % * * ~ w ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ % M ~ ~ ~ z ~ ? . w~ a ~~ -Z ~ ~. * W3 ~* . ~* - ?m ~
z * S? < ~ L ~ ~ ~ ~

in response to requests for assistance from develop-
ing countries as part of an urban lending program
initiated to address urban problems generally.
Lending Program, 1972-85
From 1972 to 1985, seventeen urban transport proj-
ects were approved by the Executive Directors of the
Bank; another thirty-two urban projects had signifi-
cant transport components. The total costs of the
seventeen transport projects amounted to $1,900 mil-
lion, of which the Bank financed $800 million. In
addition, the transport components of urban projects
cost $520 million, of which the Bank financed $240
million. In all, iirban transport Iending in these
two forms has amounted to $1,040 million. Loan
amounts have ranged from $159 million for the
second Brazil urban transport project in Porto Alegre
to $0.3 million for transport components of the
second urban development project in Kenya. Table 1
Road construction, improvement, 48.6 34
maintenance
Bus acqu~sltion,facilities, priority
bus lanes
Rail systems
Traffic management, including road
safety
Training and technical assistance
(road and rad)
Pedestrian facihties
Miscellaneous (mainly veh~clesand
equipment)
Total
Much of the road infrastructurd investment was
designed to benefit public tramp rt vehicles and
low-income areas. The smafl pro ordon of funds
devoted to trzffic management reflkcts the low cost
1
of these measures, which nonetheless have a high
impact. More than half the transbort components
(traffic management,
tance) were devoted to better
The table also illustrates the
included infrastructure components, including grade-
separated intersections, as well as traffic management
components. As the authorities in Bombay became
aware of the benefit of low-cost traffic management,
they replaced some of the planned grade-separated
intersections with traffic signals.
Lending for public transport operations, which has
concentrated on improving the efficiency and viabil-
ity of bus services, has generally been successful. The
most notable successes have been in Bombay and
Madras and in several cities in Brazil. In Bombay the
ratio of revenues to costs has improved significantly,
as have bus operations and services. The results in
Madras have been similar.
In Brazil, considerable improvements in bus oper-
ations have been achieved in five metropol'?tan areas
(Salvador do Bahia, Gritiba, Recife, Belo Morizonte,
and Porto Alegre). Physical aeasures inciuded the
introduction of exclusive bus lanes, the construction
of bus terminais, and the paving of bus routes
in low-income areas. These improvements have
achieved significant cost savings, which in Curitiba
and Recife have been passed on to passengers in the
form of fare reductions. By contrast, progress in
imp~ovingpublic transport in Calcutta has been very
disappointing because of staff management prob-
lems.
Significant delays and cost overruns have often
been experienced in projects involving road constrrrc-
tion and road improvements. In some cities, such as
Calcutta and Madras, these problems arose because
land had to be found lor the relocation of families
displaced by the projects. Furthermore, some road
improvement schemes have been iound to Re too
ambitious. The urban transport project in Bangkok
called for the rapid construction of up to seven
flyovers to improve congested intersections and to
provide additional capacity on roads outside a pro-
posed traffic restraint area. Feasibility studies subse-
quently showed that it would be difficult to construct
and operate these flyovers, and most of them were
dropped.
Nevertheless, road construction and road improve-
ments are a major part of most urban transport
projects and components and have made significant
contributions to the improvement of transport con-
ditions. Particularly noteworthy were the consider-
able benefits derived from paving bus routes in low-
income areas in several cities in Brazil and removing
severe bottienecks on 10 kilometers of federal high-
way in Kuala 1,umpur. In Abidjan, investment in
'Fable 2. Average Economic Rate dl Return for Urban
Transport Projects, 1973-81
s~***~;~~.?m~~~a~%?~~*?~~~w~~2*~<~<~;~?~?~a?.~w,~
Fiscal
year
1tf
a. Rate of return estimated at appraisal; in the case of completed
projects, the savings have generally equ led and in some cases
exceeded predictions confirming high rates return.
infrastructure has been reduced, and the road con-
struction that has been underta
with considerable success on
more accessible. I
That urban transport plays a major role in the
economic efficiency of cities is evident from the
4
very high economic rates of ret rn that have been
achieved, mainly from the consiberable savings in
?
time and the reduction in vehic e operating costs.
Estimated rates of return have be high for all types
of urban projects but particularly r urban transport
projects, as is evident from Table 2.
Policy Issues and Dir cdoeas
Over the next two decades the
d
many developing coilntries will
Africa, these populations are e
One effect of this growth
already severe congestion se
cities in developing countrie
is serious, it is not hopeles
alleviate, if not to cure, the
cities. Measures of
and tried in both the
ing countries.
Because of its experience in app 'aking and finznc-
4
ing projects, the World Bank is in a position to help
countries that want to prevent a vvprsening of urban
transport conditions. Its asslstanke is expected to
expand in cities where congestiod and other trans-
i
port problems are growing. As in he past, the Bank
C
will assist countries in making crucial investment
decisions, formulating transport p licy, and develop-
ing institutions. The Bank's experience is particularly
important in making an independent appraisal of
proposed transport investment programs. Proposed
investments are usually large in relation to the total
available funds, and mistakes can be very costly.
History shows that attempts to solve urban transport
problems by means of large construction programs
are often wasteful and frustrating. But in view of the
substantial investment needed to provide even basic
transport facilities in expanding cities, the size and
sequencing of the investment program must be eval-
uated in the context of the government's overall
strategy. This involves placing the urban transport
investment firmly in the hierarchy of the city's and
the country's other Investment priorities. Through its
country economic and sector work, the Bank can
assist member countries in determining the most
efficient means of providing high-priority urban
transport services, given the constraints on resources.
Bank assistance is most likely to be in the form of
a package of recommended measures and associated
institutional components, with emphasis on inexpen-
sive solutions, such as traffic management and the
improvement and extension of roads and existing
public transport operations. Measures l ~ k these
e ben-
efit a large section of the community, in particular
the urban poor; since they help to increase capacity
and reduce congestion at a relatively low cost, they
have a very high payoff, In considering proposals for
transport improvements, the Bank's focus will be
~rimarilyon inexpensive ways of increasing the ca-
pacity of the road network, such as by building or
improving peripheral roads as well as radial routes
to remove bottlenecks. Priority will be given to
providing better road access for commercial and
public transport vehicles. In addition, the Bank is
likely to emphasize certain aspects of urban transport
policy that are too often neglected, for example, road
safety measures.
If developing countries are to reap the benefits of
such packages, policy and institutional changes will
normally be necessary. In light of its previous expe-
rience, the Bank recognizes that sweeping changes
often are not possible. The most efficient use of
resources is likely to occur when a country under-
takes gradual but progressive reform of its policies.
Bank assistance to urban transport projects must
take into account the wide cultural, political, social,
and economic differences among countries, regions,
and sometimes even neighboring cities. Despite these
wide differences and the need for flexibil~t~, a num-
ber of the same overriding needs apply to urban
transport in most cities in developing countries.
Strengt~en~ngo~~nstitUu'OnS
There is a pressing need to strengthen institutions in
the transport sector. The institutions responsible for
urban transport generally lack the executive, finan-
cial, and technical skills to cope with existing situa-
tions, let alone emerging transport problems. Projects
must therefore be designed to improve system man-
agement and to induce replication; that is, projects
should help institutions become able to undertake
similar projects elsewhere with diminishing outside
assistance. Particular emphasis needs to be placed on
training and technical assistance to enable transport
agencies to prepare and implement sound policies
and programs.
DemandManagement
The value of demand management measures, such as
road pricing and restraints on parking, has long been
recognized. Except for imposing parking controls,
however, few cities in developing countries have
made significant progress in managing demand.
Careful attention needs to be given to the political
as well as the physical aspects of methods proposed
for managing demand. Policy measures that involve
restraining the use of private cars are likely to be
unpopular with car users, a wealthy and influential
group. In some cities, private motorists often disre-
gard even the most basic regulations, such as parking
controls. Under these circumstances, the first step is
to create greater public respect for traffic regulations
by increasing the effectiveness of enforcement. But
attempts to introduce radical ~ o l i c ychanges are
unlikely to achieve any results and may simply soli-
dify public opposition. A gradualist approach of
progressively introducing restraints on road use,
while at the same time improving ~ u b l i transport,
c is
more likely to lead to greater acceptance. Whenever
the opportunity arises, however, the Bank is re pared
to assist in the development of such strong measures
as area licensing. Assistance would also be given t o
the institutional strengthening necessary for effective
implementation of such measures.
Although effective demand management is a valu-
able too1 in combating congestion, it cannot provide
the total solution. Considerable investment in in-
creasing the capacity of transport systems will be
necessary to cater to the growing demands, especially
since commercial and public transport makes a vital
contribution to city development.
Trafic Management, Road Bwprovements,
andMai~abenance
Traffic management schemes, extensions and im-
provements of basic road networks, and better road
maintenance will continue to receive much emphasis
in future projects financed by the World Bank be-
cause of their substantial benefits, low costs, and high
rates of return.
Initially, a number of the Bank's borrowers were
reluctant to accept traffic management measures and
basic road improvements as an alternative to costly
infrastructure solutions. But now that the value and
high rates of return of such measures have been
clearly demonstrated, these Iow-cost solutions have
been accepted and replicated in subsequent pro-
grams. mow eve^, successful t r a 6 c management de-
pends heavily on road users' compliance with traffic
regulations and controls. Compliance, in turn, de-
pends on effective enforcement. In many cities, re-
sponsibility for traffic management is divided among
several agencies, and each agency's responsibilities
are often ill-defined. Traffic management projects are
thus expected to focus on bolstering institutional
frameworks and on training and technical assis-
tance for planning, implementation, and enforce-
men: agencies.
Road Safehyl Measures
Governments rarely have a clear understanding of
the extent and causes of traffic accidents or of their
costs to the community. Because of this, the Bank
intends to encourage governments to explore the root
causes of accidents and devise countermeasures.
4Jlbblic Transport
The great majority of motorized trips in most cities
in developing countries are made in public transport
vehicles. Because of rapid growth in demand, consid-
erable expansion of public transport systems in most
cities will be an absolute necessity. Improved public
transport and more efficient management of demand
can help to combat the trend away from public
transport vehicles toward greater use of private cars.
Bus and minibus services are likely to continue to
be the main form of public transp rt in most cities in
developing countries and the of motorized
conveyance that the urban
Bank lending for urban development is therefore
P
expected to give considerable ern hasis to maximiz-
ing the use of public transport, par, icularly buses and
minibuses. I
Experience has shown that public transport sys-
fi
tems can be both efficient and nancially viable.
Efficiency and viability are strongly influenced by the
type of ownership and managebent, freedom of
choice of vehicles, the degree of co
extent of government control.
vi
Experience also shows that pri ately owned bus
companies are much more Iikely to be financially
viable. Many countries with publi ly owned systems
1
might gain much from reducing r eliminating res-
trictions on the operation of privat buses and giving
incentives for private ownership. But in countries
where the political and social may not
be auspicious for privatization,
age operational independence
of public ownership. Lending
rected toward increasing operat
proving management, and rati
routes, fares, and staffing policies.
of incentives for cost reductions a
ments will always be a priority,
n
reduce unnecessary government i tervention in the
provision of services. Similar goals will be empha-
sized when the Bank makes loans bo improve trans-
port systems operated by the pivake sector.
I
s~1
Capital-In'nrensiveProjects
Confronted with the need to find lrrtions to urban
transport problems, both official s urces of finance
and private sector consultants ten
capital-intensive projects. These
attractive to the suppliers of equi
and tempting to developing coun
the experience to appreciate the
6
such projects. Whether or not Ba k lending is in-
volved, the Bank is in a position t provide a broad
i
perspective on the value of capital- ntensive proiects
in the context of the priorities of the country's overall
public Investment program.
In many cases, the Bank's assess ents have clearly
"g.
shown that Instead of building unde ground railways
or elevated highways, governments
better to have increased the capaci
services through bus priority measures, such as ex-
clusive busways and better road access. In some
cities, of course, capital-intensive investments, such
as elevated highways or rapid rail systems, may be
the best approach. But when loans are sought for
projects of this kind, borrowers will be encouraged
by the Bank to compare these projects with other and
less expensive options and to carefully appraise the
implications of the investments under consideration.
Conclusion
There is an urgent need to give greater emphasis to
urban transport problems in developing countries in
view of:
The high proportion of economic growth attribut-
ed to urban development
The considerable contribution that efficient urban
transport makes to urban development and pro-
ductivity throu g h efficient movement of people
and goods
* Predicted high rates of urban growth that will lead
t o rapid and considerable increases in demand for
transport
The substantial proportions of city budgets al-
ready expended for urban transport.
In view of the urgent need, the Bank is prepared to
expand its urban transport lending program, giving
particular attention to:
44
The strengthening of urban transport institutions,
including technical assistance and training
Low-cost solutions, including demand manage-
ment, traffic management, road improvements,
. safety, and maintenance
~ h provision
, of access to public transport and
priority measures such as bus-only lanes
The improvement of public transport, in particular
the rationalization and upgrading of existing ser-
vices
The improvement of facilities for commercial
traffic
* Capital-intensive investments, such as major im-
provements in existing toad networks and trans-
port systems that are likely to produce high rates
of return
Advice and assistance to developing countries in
making crucial decisions about transport invest-
ments.
The World Bank recognizes the need to accommo-
date the considerable differences that exist between
cities and to adapt its to changes in trends
and emphasis. But while adogting a flexible ap-
proach, the World Bank will continue to support the
main objective for urban transport: to improve city
efficiency and alleviate poverty by promoting eco-
nomic growth and productivity through efficient and
cost-effective construction, operation, and manage-
rnent of transport systems.
Appendix Tables
Table A-1. Urban Transport Data: Selected Cities
- & % = . ~ . - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ E ~ s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~--&---<a<<*<&
- ~ ~ ~ c ~ ~
<< ~~ ~
~ -& ~ ~~ ~- e- ~- ~~ - ~s -< ~ < ~ e - ~ h s ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ - - . ~ - ~ c ~ ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ - ~ . ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ - ~ - ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ & - ~ ~ - ~ - ~ ~ - - ~ ~ > - ~ ~ ~ . - . - . ~ . - ~ - d ~ - . . . ~ & .

Population Cars Buses

Metro GArP
Annual area Per Total Per Annual Per Commerc~al
growthrate 1980 capzta" number 1,000 growthrate Total 1,000 vehicles
1980 1970-80 (square 1980 1980 pop. 1970-80 number pap 1980
Czty (1,000) (percent) km) (US$) (1,000) 1980 (petcent) 1980 1980 (number)
-.

Abidjan 1,715 11.0 261 1,150 85 50 10.0 2,410 1.41 -

Accra 1,447 6.7 1,390 420 27 19 - 709 0.49 7,411
Amman 1,125 4.1 36 1,420 81 72 - 433 0.38 32,000
Ankara 1,900 4.4 237 1,470 65 34 14.2 781 0.41 -
Bangkok 5,154 9.1 1,569 670 367 71 7.9 6,300 1.22 34,155
BogotA 4,254 7.1 - 1,180 180 42 7.8 9,081 2.13 -
Bombay 8,500 3.7 438 240 180 21 6.1 3,066 0.36 38,447
Buenos Aires 10,100 1.7 210 2,390 537 53 10.0 12,089 1.20 97,245
Cairo 7,464 3.1 233 580 239 32 17.0 8,177 1.10 42,000
Calcutta 9,500 3.0 1,414 240 95 30 5.6 3,160 0.33 28,500
Harare 670 5.2 - 630 107 160 3 .O 504 0.75 5,300
Hong Kong 5,067 2.5 1,060 4,240 200 39 7.4 9,278 1.83 58,801
Jakarta 6,700 4.0 650 430 222 33 9.8 4,798 0.72 77,781
Karachi 5,200 5.2 1,346 300 184 35 8.4 12,064 2.32 17,628
Kuala Lumpur 977 3.5 244 1,620 37 38 - 1,148 1.18 7,923
Lagos 1,321 3.1 665 1,010 62 47 - - - 58,857
Lima 4,415 4.2 - 930 333 75 7.2 8,853 2.01 1,060
Manila 5,925 5.1 636 690 266 45 8.0 31,403 5.30 100,725
Medellin 2,078 3.2 1,152 1,180 91 44 - 4,800 2.31 10,800
Mexico City 15,056 5.0 1,479 2,090 1,577 105 - 18,500 1.23 155,500
Nairobi 1,275 8.8 690 420 60 47 - 1,100 0.86 -
Rio de Janeiro 9,200 2.4 6,464 2,050 957 104 12.1 11,000 1.20 95,945
San Josk, C.R. 637 3.5 180 1,730 - - - 500 0.78 -
SHo Paulo 12,800 4.5 1,493 2,050 1,935 151 7.8 16,400 1.28 240,000
Seoul 8,366 5.0 627 1,520 127 15 11.7 13,000 1.55 63,222
Singapore 2,413 1.5 618 4,430 164 68 6.8 6,512 2.70 78,038
Tunis 1,230 6.4 115 1,310 38 31 - 642 0.52 -
London 6,851 -0.9 1,579 7,920 1,932 282 2.6 11,479 1.68 78,723
New York 7,086 -1.0 759 11,360 1,545 218 10,481 1.48 90,692
Paris 8,800 0.6 454 11,730 3,240 368 12.3 7,100 0.81 255,000
Stockholm 1,528 3.0 6,489 13,520 391 256 3.0 1,850 1.21 34,036
Stuttgart 581 -0.8 207 13,590 199 343 2.5 332 0.57 -
Tokyo 8,352 -5.6 592 9,890 2,219 266 2.5 6,393 0.77 130,427
Wellington
- Not available.
135
~ r _ l w ~ w l " " . ~ % ~ i / z ~ - ~ ~ ~ - ~ & & l ~ ~ _ l l ~ J ~ ~ ~ ~ s =~._-a
- ~ s , . --_I%-a~
-0.7
w_ c ~ ___ 266
. . I
7,090
J ~ E . ~ G ~
61
~ ~ ~ -.
% ~I ~~
452
~~ ~ * ~ ~~ -~ -~ -- ~
~
-
~~ - ~ ~ ~~ ~
256 1.90
~ ~~~ s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ - ~ ~ _ ~ , <, -& -- - ~ ~~ ~
24,432
- " ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ ~ E ~ ~ ~ . ~

a. Nat~onaldata.
b. Some c~tieshave a substantial proportion of pedestrian trlps not reflected In the motorized data
Source: World Bank surveys, studies, and appraisals.

-"-'-------,*---
>, *
 Market price ( 1 983 US$)
- - - - -
Lzter
Modal share of motorized tr1psh(percent!
of
regular 5-km Para- Razl or
Economy car gas bus t r ~ p Auto Tax2 Bus transit subway Other

6,560 0.80 0.26 33 12 50 -

6,000 0.45 0.18 - - - - Accra
10,850 0.54 0.48 44 11 19 26 0 0 Amman
7,097 0.50 0.14 23 10 53 9 2 Ankara
10,870 0.48 0.09 25 10 55 10 Bangkok
6,075 0.23 - 14 1 80 0 0 5
7,327 0.61 0.05 8 10 34 13 34 - Bombay
4,500 0.40 0.11 - - 45 27 - 28 Buenos Axes
10,002 0.20 0.07 15 15 70 - - - Cairo
7,922 0.69 0.04 - 2 67 14 10 4 Calcutta
- - 0.15 - - - - - - Harare
5,833 0.56 0.13 8 13 60 - 19 - Hong Kong
18,697 0.34 0.16 27 - 51 - 1 21 Jakarta
10,741 0.46 0.04 3 7 52 18 6 Karachi
8,616 0.49 0.15 37 - 33 17 0 13 Kuala Lumpur
- - 0.45 - - - - - Lagos
8,000 0.30 - - - 45 27 -
9,187 0.49 0.07 16 2 16 59 - 8 Manila
6,975 0.23 0.07 6 4 85 5 0 Medellin
7,000 0.26 0.09 19 - 51 13 15 Mexico City
- - 0.15 45 - 31 15 0 9 Nairobi
4,506 0.77 0.21 24 2 62 2 11 - RIOde Janeiro
- - 0.07 21 2 75 0 0 2 SanJos6, C.R.
5,469 0.65 0.26 32 3 54 - 10 1 S2o Paulo
5,574 0.85 0.16 9 15 68 0 7 0 Seoul
16,563 0.70 0.24 47 - - - - 53 Singapore
8,106 0.47 0.27 24 4 61 - 10
8,354 0.70 0.61 61 1 23 0 12
9,000 0.33 0.75 12 2 14 0 72 0
4,592 0.54 0.30 56 - 8 0 21 15 Paris
8,569 0.53 - 48 - 53 - - - Stockholm
7,833 0.55 0.82 44 6 33 6 - 11 Stuttgart
3,516 0.59 0.59 32 - 6 0 61 0 Tokyo
9,279
.= .- . z - . - 0.59
. - a . .
0.67 56
% 9 . .-.c
-
r--rrrr rrx--
26
.i>.__
-
-ar--enrr;-nxrr %--a<> ---1 -
5
-r...iir_.
10
n-rr.rur%"
rrrr.r---r-_r < --.
Wellington
i.> - - -* -% ..rr
 1

,j if; Table A-2. Bus Services:

' - ' ' *-
"9 ,
City Comparisons, 1983
7" irrr r i 7 - --r i %-r.u.u.W,-."*"""' rr r -i r
i---- 2 iV.""lW" rr r -- r - r t r *. r.rruuu..o."in 3 " e l r """ " ",, r".r-.?--r*....~u - *.~*vm~-c.rn.l-"""r "" ^ nr--- . *r -- ", - v.w-uw w, ,*>*+

Total
Annual cost per Annuul Operail wg
Number Avatl- Per oprratzng bus
- operating passenger operating hare tevenue/
Owner of abtlzty Km Pasbrngers cost h kzlom~ter' teuenued for 5 km totnl
City shtp buses ' (prvcent) per day Staff per day (US%mill~on) (US$) ( U S $ millton) (US$) COAtL
- - -
. -- - -- - .
. . - -

Ab~dlan Mixed 1,044 85 183 7.1 829 91.29 0.07 69.40 0.26 0.67
Accra l'ubltc 44 24 292 28.1 2,092 1.03 0.03 0.63 0.13 0.51
Accra Private 665 73 223 5.5 676 10.43 0.04 17.72 0.18 1.37
Addis Ababa Public 164 58 205 13.1 2,467 7.96 0.02 6.59 0.07 0.67
f
Ankara Public 899 67 210 5.8 1,273 25.62 0.01 15.31 0.14 0.48
Bon~bay Publlc 2,325 92 216 14.0 2,093 81.95 0.01 72.97 0.05 0.77
; Cairo Publrc 2,454 69 24 6 14.6 2,417 60.41 0.01 36.19 0.07 0.50
Calcutta Public 981 64 133 18.0 1,641 23.05 0.01 13.09 0.04 0.45
Dakar Mixed 439 70 287 9.6 1,193 22.97 0.04 20.41 0.26 0.76
; Guatemala City Private 1,600 95 304 - 1,037 29.00 0.02 54.60 0.10 1.55
Hong Kong Private 2,392 X5 243 4.7 1,610 117.96 0.03 136. LO 0.13 1.OO
Karach~ Public 646 65 267 9.9 1,135 11.73 0.01 6.73 0.04 0.43
I Kuala Lunlpur Private 358 80 250 4.3 7.53 12.03 0.02 32.38 0.17 1 .OO
Mornbasa Mixed 89 90 315 7.5 1,640 3.93 0.03 4.48 0.11 0.96
.j
Na~robi Mixed 295 84 330 9.7 1,762 16.31 0.03 17.98 0.3 5 1.08
Porto Alegrc Private 1,492 95 218 4.3 669 46.68 0.05 65.35 0.23 1.17
j Sarl Jose, C.K. M~xed 621 80 128 - 2,013 19.39 0.02 24.24 0.07 1.04
Siio Paulo Public 2,631 83 284 7.4 795 159.51 0.03 75.64 0.26 0.41
S5o Paulo Private 6,590 83 280 5.1 765 - - - 0.26 1 .0Oe
Seoul Private 8,310 95 340 3.9 1,326 398.18 0.03 443.43 0.16 1.04
Singapore Prrvate 2,859 91 269 3.9 374 1 10.23 0.10 147.75 0.24 1.32
4 Athens Publlc 1,768 87 245 6.6 91 0 100.36 0.05 37.39 0.23 0.34
Berlin Publlc 1,505 85 199 5.8 992 234.99 0.16 130.08 0.78 0.51
Chicago Public 2,275 93 125 3.1 750 339.28 0.08 194.54 0.90 0.52
j London Public 4,901 88 202 6.8 842 605.90 0.17 319.21 0.61 0.48
Paris Public 4,005 87 142 4.5 419 512.00 0.25 191.45 0.30 0.37
777 92 128
Senda~
" "m ."%* " z-m-- *.,*9.u a. .-- - 7
Publlc
" 7 7 ,- -- ,%- -%.> --- , -"" " - - -"= " =* ,-."* *7--" W"
2.5
m-7r." Z""." 7-
495
---.-..."- ~ <*<-mw",v "
57.76
"" , .. 7 - "%", v, -
0.11
- **.-2*-.3.v w-."vT
59.44
" . " """ - ..>
0.58
"" %.".%"%-
0.96
, vs"~<%w

- Not available.
Note: The data cover theprtnc~palcorporatlon or group o f prlvate operators rn each city; they do not rnclude paratransit.
a. The nurnber of buses beloriglng to thc principal corporatlon or group of private operators covered hy the survey. The total number of buses operated In rhe crty as a whole 1s gtven in
Table A-1.
i:
b. Operating coat excludes dcpreaatlon and interest chargea.
c. Total cost includes operattng cost, depreciation, and interest charges. For Lonlpardttvc purposes a un~formmcthod of determtnlng deprectatlotl and interest charges was uscd to oht,ltn
> er are lnlputed by using an average trtp length of 5 k~lonlcters.
total cost. P a ~ s e n ~k~lomcters
d. Operating revenue includes fare box and advertistng revenue but excludes suhsldtes.
r Cost and revenue data for SHo Paulo private operators are not available, bur prlvatc operators rccclve no subsldy from the government anct are known to at Icast break even.
Sourcp: World Bank survey of bus operators; studles arid apprarsalz.
*i

t4
i
."
<
Table A-3. Bus Services: Key Indicators of Performance
a--< -*. * &-.? -*

1.
-.
a-Ee-z-sz *%s-s =-=
,- --m2a"ek.emGec>.sz

Passengers carried per bus per day

Single-deck
-<-L~-.<~- -s.%+.<-a-*- -<-*..%-=ewe->- b-<.sa-<.=sah-em%kE*sh-><<-&- -a&"bt.%,=

IA qk<* <
&
. -.-.,.

Double-deck
2.
3.
Kilometers per bus per day
Staff employed per bus
Administrative
230-26

0.3-0.4 0~
~~
Maintenance 0.5-1.5
Total 3-8
4. Light or dead mileage as a percentage of total mileage 0.6-1.0
5. Accidents per 100,000 bus kilometers 1.5-3
6. Breakdowns as a percentage of buses in operation 8-10
7. Availability: buses in service as a percentage of total fleet 80-90
8. Fuel consumption: liters per bus per 100 kilometers 30-50
9. Pits, ramps, and lifts per 100 buses 8-10
10. Spares consumption per bus per year: percentage of vehicle cost
. ll.-l.iy..e
_.-*l-iill I-<de
11.
-. - I
Operating ratio: revenue to operating cost (including depreciation)
-I-..El~I.-~*.s%~
I

Notes: T h e Indicators of performance have been chosen

a,*----~,~

because they help assess the efficiency of bus servlces and are based
~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ E ~ ~ - ~ - ~ - ~ - * ~ ~ , ~ - - ~ c . ~ ~ ~ ~ < s & ~ ~ ~ - -- m
~ =- ~
- ~ -~ - ~* -< =~ -. ~- z

maintenance but will be greatly Influenced

1.05:l-1.0 :1

1~ ~ ~ -s-. ~ ~
- .~ h~ ~- w~ ~- -z . ~~ c ~ ~ o < - ~ mccss

7-12by raffic cond~tions,an

part~cularthe volume of pedestr~ans.A com arison should there-
---<ss-
5-$%

1
on data that should be readily available. The range of values are fore be made wlth the general traffic accident ate for the city.
for reasonably well-managed bus companies In developing coun- 6. This lnd~catorIS based on breakdown that require assls-
tries and take Into account varying condlt~onsthat may prevall. tance from a mobile repair unit or repair at th depot.
The following notes are numbered t o correspond t o the ind~ca- 7. To calculate fleet availabil~tythe total n mber of buses ran-
tors listed above: ning during the morning or evening peak peri d is divided by total
1. The figures are based on smgle-deck buses w ~ t ha total crush fleet slze, excludlng buses scrapped or cannlba ized.
capaclqof 80 passengers and double-deck buses with a capacity of 8. Fuel consumption will depend on size of ehicle. englne type,
120, and assume the exclus*on of buses not tn service. and grad~entsand traffic encountered en route
2. The figures assume the exclusion of buses not in service. 9. Sufficient pits, ramps, or lifts will be r quired t o cover all
3. Where labor costs are low, the higher end of the range can be scheduled maintenance, unscheduled repairs, nd overhauls.
expected, and vice versa. 10. The figures glven assume that s~mllarcondiaons apply t o
4. Light or dead m~leage(mileage that is not revenue earnmg) the procurement of buses and spares. Where s ecial tar~ffsapply t o
will depend on the locat~onof n ~ g h tparking and maintenance In one or the other, these need to be taken into ac ount.
relation t o routes. 11. The operatmg ratlo is talculated by
5. The accident rate will indicate the standard of drlvlng and by operating costs (including deprec~atlon).
_- <l_l _
-,-. .*__*
j_i__*,i_G
--I__--_--_ 91.-.i.i1116 L...
ILi.-.-I-*s~< - I -.
.I.l^..li-l..L-..- -1" s-.XiXL.<<-~L-CCZ-i--- i-lTem-c.ls.^<.< >,.-ICCIm%--I_ 2 I I -li-SEI .X --..-.-i---X-. *-
i=- -.I. -" - -. .-%-,^--__ I

Total cor t
Total Annual Total Annual Operatrng Per
annual operatzng annual Fare for revenue/ passenger
passengers Passenger cost C costd
operating
~evenue~ Skm total ktlometerd '
(nttllzon) flow b (US$ mzllzon) (US$ mtll10n) (US$ mzlllon) (US$) costd (US%, Crty
-- -- --
80.6 28,760 33.34 120.28 42.16 0.47 0.35 0.332 Caracas
109.0 14,295 15.32 76.89 20.31 0.18 0.26 0.136 Santiago
347.0 58,000 67.15 210.54 40.68 0.07 0.19 0.081 SHo Paulo
24.0 8,000 7.55 11.41 4.05 0.20 0.36 0.044 Tunis
12.9 3,600 31.70 51.88 4.29 0.54 0.08 0.538 Adela~de
7.8 - 99.20 147.33 48.10 0.75 0.33 2.51 8 Balt~more
346.2 40,000 126.44 498.15 104.05 0.78 0.21 0.228 Berl~n
11.9 4,650 5.44 15.43 - 0.81 - 0.146 Calgary
149.7 12,395 101.50 388.79 61.30 0.90 0.16 0.221 Chicago
412.0 60,000 60.96 152.06 132.27 0.06 0.87 0.049 Hong Kong
563.0 23,000 440.08 1,094.58 440.99 0.51 0.40 0.259 London
199.9 20,000 92.53 180.38 31.68 0.69 0.18 0.141 Montreal
379.8 37,000 189.34 224.78 261.43 - 1.16 0.032 Nagoya
330.0 43,697 127.09 326.43 158.73 0.72 0.49 0.432 Nagoya City
952.6 68,600 1,100.00 4,750.99 955.34 0.90 0.20 0.480 New York
856.6 62,696 414.37 780.32 416.49 0.72 0.53 0.182 Osaka
4.7 1,267 5.30 14.86 4.34 0.50 0.29 0.524 San Diego
..
55.5
*-.---
*s-i_=ll- *
15,086
ssr- r=w-- sli -_ ---e=---- -
128.20
----ll-~~c.-v-=~ss~--vs-
401.66
-..-lel**
-.I.,
.-..- -
69.80
._ -. _ - ., ---
-ss<X=2- -
z~I*aa..-=-.=<c<.

d. Total cost includes operating costs, depreciation, and merest charges. For comparative purposes a untform method of determmmg
0.60
.<*C C *.I--
0.17
li .,I --.. c- <
.
z
.z.
0.341 San Franc~sco
-^..IUlr.i*-l _- .-.T..

depreclatlon and lnterest charges was used to obtain total cost.

e. Operating revenue includer fare box and advertlslng revenue but excludes subsldles
f Paqsenger kilometers where not specxhed in the survey response are imputed bv uslng an average trlp length of 7 5 kdometers.
Source World Bdnk survey of rail operators, supplemented by World Bank anallses and studles.
Tabge A-6. Transit System Characteristics
: ~ z ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ z : : : ~ = ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ ~ : : ! : ~
SS-Z ~
Gs#w--. ~ <ssw*-:%am
~ ~ zz>% .-.--:-
- -: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Buses and trolley buses" Trams LRT

Prfvate Para- Mzxed Bus-only Segregated (mzxed (surface Under-
Characterzstzc cars transrt traffic lanes busways trafftc) excluszve)

Vehicle capacity 4 to 5 4 80 80 100 200 300

(occupancy to to to 120 to to to
1 to 2) 20 120 120 200 300 375
Vehicles per 1 3 4
traln n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. to to to
2 6 10
Lane/ track capacity 500 1,000 10,000 15,000 6,000 20,000
(passengers to to to to 30,000 to to 50,000
per hour)b 800 4,000 15,000 20,000 12,000 36,000
Journey speed 15 12 10 15 15 10 15 30
with stops to to to to to to to to
(km per hour)c 25 20 12 18 30 12 25 35
Capital cost 5 2 50 50 50 300
(USS1,OOO to to to to to to 800 1,000
per veh~cle) 10 25 100 100 130 600
Cost of complete 2 3 6 20
system minus n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. to to to to
vehicles (US$ 7 5 10 25
million per km)
Total cow Including 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.10
interest (US$ per to to to to to to to to
passenger km) 0-24 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.15
Cost recovery: 0.60 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.25 0.15 0.50 0.50
fare for 5 km to to to to to to to to
(US$) 1.20 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.40 0.50 0.75 0.75
=-> =-*a=<s-esz* --d- - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~a - ~ ~~ ~ - - ~~ ~ ~~ - ~ ~~ > ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ = ~~ ~-=---
z ~ c ~~ - ~ ~- - w ~ - c ~e = ~ zs-9>s7s-bsss < e~ . ~ -~ e . s- ~ , z -=-.--*-*?---.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

n.a. Not appilcable.

Note. Cost and performance figures assume h ~ g hlevels of ut~lizationand patronage and efficient operatlon,
a. For trolley buses add approximately 20 percent to the bus costs.
b. LaneJtrack capaclty IS the maximum number of passengers that can be carried on a single lane or track past a pc during one hour.
c. Journey speed IS the average overall speed, with loading and unloading time at stops and starions taken Into acc ~ t journey
; speed in
mixed traffic may be substantially less in congested conditions.
Source World Bank studies.
 Traffic Bus rehab. Bus
management and acquzsttton facilities
Cost Percent Cost Percent Cost Percent Country and project name 1
Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport
Turkey: Istanbul Urban Program
Iran: Teheran Urban Transport
Tunisia: Tunis Urban Transport
India: Calcutta Urban Dev.
Korea: Secondary Cities
Malaysia: Second Kuala Lumpur Urban Transpc
Phil~ppines:Manila Urban Dev.
India: Bombay Urban Transport
Ivory Coast: Urban Dev.
India: Madras Urban Dev.
Costa Rica: San Jose Urban Transport
India: Second Calcutta Urban Dev.
Kenya: Second Urban
Brazil: Urban Transport
Thailand: Bangkok Urban Transport
Tun~sia:Second Urban Dev.
Korea: Second Cwangju
Philippines: Urban Dev.
Brazil: Second Urban Transport (Porto Alegre)
India: Calcutta Urban Transporr
Mauritius: Urban Rehab. and Dev.
India: Second Madras Urban Dev.
Brazil: Third Urban Transport
Ivory Coast: Second Urban
India: Kanpur Urban Dev.
Ph~lippines:Urban Engineer~ng
Brazil: Recife Metro Region Dev.
Egypt: Greater Cairo Urban Dev.
Mex~co:Mexico City Deconcenttation
Ethiopia: Urban Dev.
Tun~sia:Third Urban
Cameroon: Urban Dev.
Philippines: Regional Dev.
Brazil: Parani Market Towns
India: Third Calcutta Urban Dev.
Dominican Republic: Technical Assistance
Jordan: Amman Urban Transport
India: Madhya Pradesh Urban Dev.
Korea: Jeonju Regional Dev.
Jama~ca:Kingston Urban Transport
Zimbabwe: Urban Dev.
Tunisia: Urban Transport I1
Peru: Lima Urban Transport
Madagascar: Urban Dev,
Senegal: Technical Assistance
Thailand: Regional Cities
Paraguay: Asunci6n Municipal Dev.
Korea: Seoul Urban Transport
Total
(Table conttnues on he following page.)
 Table A-7 (continued)
........................................L
.
, .
. . ............. .................................................... -=-- ....... s
.lI*rliw
. m. ...............
Bus and NOVA Rat1 Pedestrtan
prtoritres systems facrlitres
--
Country and project name Cost Percent Cost Percent Cost Percent
--- -.

Malaysia: Kuala Lurnpur Urban Transport ... ... ... ... ... ...
Turkey: Istanbul Urban Program ... ... ... ... ... ...
Iran: Teheran Urban Transport ... ... , .. ... ... ...
Tunisia: Tunis Urban Transport ... ... 9.3 32.5 ... ...
India: Calcutta Urban Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Korea: Secondary C~ties ... ... ... ... ... ...
Malaysia: Second Kuala Lurnpur Urban Transport 4.4 7.1 ... ... ... ...
Philippines: Manila Urban Dev. 0.1 0.4 ... ... 1.8 6.6
Ind~a:Bombay Urban Transport ... ... ... ... 3.1 6.1
Ivory Coast: Urban Dev. 1.0 1.9 ... ... ... ...
India: Madras Urban Dev. ... ... ... ... 3.0 16.7
Costa Rica: San Jose Urban Transport ... ... ... ... 0.3 1.0
India: Second Calcutta Urban Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Kenya: Second Urban ... ... ... ... ... ...
Braz~l:Urban Transport 66.1 26.6 ... ... ... ...
Thailand: Bangkok Urban Transport 1.5 4.4 ... ... ... ...
Tunisla: Second Urban Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Korea: Second Gwangju ... ... ... ... ... ...
Philippines: Urban Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Brazil: Second Urban Transport (Porto Alegre) ... ... 308.9 98.8 ... ...
India: Calcutta Urban Transport ... ... 47.6 39.4 ... ...
Mauritius: Urban Rehab. and Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
India: Second Madras Urban Dev. ... ... .~. ... ... ...
Brazil: Third Urban Transport 7.6 3.0 .., ... 2.2 0.9
Ivory Coast: Second Urban 25.8 30.0 ... ... 2.1 2.4
India: Kanpur Urban Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Philippines: Urban Engineering ... ... ... ... ... ...
Brazd: Recife Metro Region Dev. 9.2 33.8 .., ... ... ...
Egypt: Greater Cairo Urban Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Mexico: Mexico City Deconcentration ... ... ... ... ... .,,
Ethiopia: Urban Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Tunisia: Third Urban ... ... ... ... ... ...
Cameroon: Urban Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Philipp~nes:Regional Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Brazil: Parani Market Towns ... ... ... ... 0.8 1.3
India: Third Calcutta Urban Dev. ... ... ... ... 0.5 1.2
Dominican Republic: Technical Assistance ... ... ... ... ... ...
Jordan: Amman Urban Transport ... ... ... ... 10.0 17.8
India: Madhya Pradesh Urban Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Korea: Jeonju Regional Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Jama~ca:Kingston Urban Transport ... ... ... ... ... ...
Zimbabwe: Urban Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Tunisia: Urban Transport I1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Peru: Lima Urban Transport ... ... ... ... ... ...
Madagascar: Urban Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Senegal: Technical Assistance ... ... ... ... ... ...
Thailand: Reg~onalC~ties ... ... ... ... ... ...
Paraguay: Asuncibn Municipal Dev. ... ... ... ... ... ...
Korea: Seoul Urban Transport ... ... ... ... ... ...
Total 115.7 5.0 365.8 15.8 23.8 1.0
..................... ..............................................................
&- ___B-_I= ............................. .*.z+*..z-. ......a..a.........%>~.~---~a~e..~&~L.~.~a.~-.s..-
.
... Not included In the project.
a. HOV refers to high-occupancy vehicles.
b. Includes vehicles and equlprnent.
c. Includes $0.3 rnlll~onfor area road pnclng.
d. Includes $2 rnill~onworking cap~tal.
e. lncludes trainmg.
f. M~scellaneousveh~clesand equipment
g. Truck term~nals.
h. Bridge construction.
1. Equipment.

56

.......................................................................................................................................................
2- --+* .l.lplsl+l-J.. .-.......,.1...... i_i_ - .-
*....... >> >> 3>-1 ... IT-TlVii-
 Technical
assistance Traznzng Othei
Cost Percent Cost Percent Cost Percent Cotlntry and project name 1
Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur Urban Transport
Turkey: Istanbul Urban Program
Iran: Teheran Urban Transport
Turiisia: Tunis Urban Transport
Indla: Calcutta Urban Dev.
Korea: Secondary Cities
Malaysia: Second Kuala Lumpur Urban Tra sport
Philippines: Manila Urban Dev.
India: Bombay Urban Transport
Ivory Coast: Urban Dev.
India: Madras Urban Dev.
Costa Rica: San JosC Urban Transport
India: Second Calcutta Urban Dev.
Kenya: Second Urban
Brazil: Urban Transport
Thailand: Bangkok Urban Transport
Tunisia: Second Urban Dev.
Korea: Second Gwangju
Philippines: Urban Dev.
Brazil: Second Urban Transport (Porto Aleg
India: Calcutta Urban Transport
Mauritius: Urban Rehab. and Dev.
India: Second Madras Urban Dev.
Brazil: Third Urban Transport
Ivory Coast: Second Urban
India: Kanpur Urban Dev.
Philippines: Urban Engineering
Brazil: Recife hletro Region Dev.
Egypt: Greater Cairo Urban Dev.
Mexico: Mexico C ~ t yDeconcentration
Ethiopia: Urban Dev.
Tunisia: Third Urban
Cameroon: Urban Dev.
Philippines: Regional Dev.
Brazil: Paran6 Market Towns
India: Third Calcutta Urban Dev.
Dominican Republic: Technical Assistance
Jordan: Amman Urban Transport
India: Madhya Pradesh Urban Dev.
Korea: Jeonju Reglonal Dev.
Jamaica: Kingston Urban Transport
Zimbabwe: Urban Dev.
Tunisia: Urban Transport I1
Peru: Lima Urban Transport
Madagascar: Urban Dev.
Senegal: Technical Assistance
Tha~land:Regional Cities
Paraguay: Asuncion Municipal Dev.
Korea: Seoul Urban Transport
Total
...%-%.-.e..==-LzL=.<EeG*b ...
cG-sG~mz--*a-,-m" ........
Table A-8. World Bank Involvement in the Urban Transport Sector, 1972-85
(cost and amount In CSS mrllzon)
-
--
li
--
--
--
l_
wa
=-
--
w-
--
--
--
- m--Pc-Ks----B

Total Urban transport Total

sector loan Urban transport sector lend~ng
Appra2sal proyct
Country and prolect name date cost Cost Percent amount Amount Percent IBRDa IDA b
Urban transport projects
Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur 1972 31.6 31.6 100.0 16.0 16.0 100.0 16.0 0
Iran: Teheran 1973 65.9 65.9 100.0 42.0 42.0 100.0 42.0 0
Tunisia: Tunls 1973 28.6 28.6 100.0 18.0 18.0 100.0 11.0 7.0
Malaysia: Second Kuala Lumpur 1976 72.0 61.9 86.0 26.0 20.4 78.5 20.4 0
Indla: Bombay 1976 50.5 50.5 100.0 25.0 25.0 100.0 25.0 0
Costa Rica: San Jose 1977 31.5 31.5 100.0 16.5 16.5 100.0 16.5 0
Brazll 1978 248.9 248.9 100.0 88.0 88.0 100.0 88.0 0
Thailand: Bangkok 1978 34.0 34.0 100.0 16.0 16.0 100.0 16.0 0
Brazil: Second (Porto Alegre) 1980 312.8 312.8 100.0 159.0 159.0 100.0 159.0 0
India: Calcutta 1980 121.7 120.8 99.3 56.0 56.0 100.0 0 56.0
Brazll: Third 1981 257.0 257.0 100.0 90.0 90.0 100.0 90.0 0
Egypt: Greater Cairo 1982 116.2 90.3 77.7 60.0 56.6 94.3 56.6 0
Jordan: Amman 1983 65.6 56.3 85.8 30.0 26.0 86.7 26.0 0
Jamaica: Kingston 1984 29.8 29.8 100.0 16.0 16.0 100.0 16.0 0
Tunisia: I1 1984 82.5 82.5 100.0 33.0 33.0 100.0 33.0 0
Peru: Llma 1984 135.9 78.6 57.8 82.5 43.3 52.5 43.3 0
Korea: Seoul 1985 219.4 219.4 100.0 69.0 69.0 100.0 69.0 0
Subtotal 1,903.9 1,800.4 94.6 843.0 790.8 93.8 727.8 63.0
Urban projects
Turkey: Istanbul Urban Program 1972 3.3 0.6 18.2 2.3 0.5 21.7 0 0.5
India: Calcutta Urb Dev. 1973 96.9 27.0 27.9 35.0 7.5 21.4 0 7.5
Korea: Secondary Citres 1974 25.0 2.8 11.2 15.0 1.4 9.3 1.4 0
Phil~ppines:Manrla Urban Dev. 1976 65.0 27.2 41.8 32.0 14.8 46.3 14.8 0
Ivory Coast: Urban Deb. 1976 122.3 51.8 42.4 44.0 20.9 47.5 20.9 0
India: Madras Urban Dev. 1977 52.0 18.0 34.6 24.0 8.7 36.3 0 8.7
India: Second Calcutta Urban 1977 180.2 38.4 21.3 87.0 20.0 23.0 0 20
Kenya: Second Urban 1978 69.4 0.3 0.4 50.0 0.3 0.6 0.2 0
Tunisia: Second Urban Dev. 1979 45.1 1.0 2.2 19.0 0.5 2.6 0.5 0
Korea: Second Gwangju 1979 154.8 19.2 12.4 65.0 10.0 15.4 10 0
Philippines: Third Urban Dev. 1980 120.0 9.4 7.8 72.0 5.6 7.8 5.6 0
Mauritius: Urban Rehab. and Dev. 1980 24.5 2.4 9.8 15.0 1.8 12.0 1.8 0
India: Second Madras Urban 1980 87.9 21.4 24.3 42.0 13.0 31.0 0 13
Ivory Coast: Second Urban Dev. 1981 104.0 86.1 82.8 51.0 41.5 81.4 41.5 0
India: Kanpur Urban Dev. 1981 51.7 2.7 5.2 25.0 1.9 7.6 0 1.9
Phillpplnes: Urban Engineerrng 1981 11.5 0.7 6.1 8.0 0.7 8.8 0.7 0
Brazil: Recife Metro Region Dev. 1982 347.8 27.2 7.8 123.9 9.5 7.7 9.5 0
Mexico: Mexlco City
Deconcentration 1982 15.0 2.0 13.3 9.2 1.3 14.1 1.3 0
Ethiopia: Urban Dev. 1982 27.7 2.1 7.6 20.0 1.4 7.0 0 1.4
Tunisia: Third Urban 1983 60.1 1.8 3.0 25.0 1.4 5.6 1.4 0
Cameroon: Urban Dev. 1983 54.7 0.8 1.5 20.0 0.4 2.0 0.4 0
Philippines: Reglonal Dev. 1983 114.6 30.2 26.4 67.0 12.6 18.8 12.6 0
Brazil: ParanB Market Towns 1983 150.2 58.9 39.2 52.7 20.6 39.1 20.6 0
India: Third Calcutta Urban Dev. 1983 303.1 44.8 14.8 147.0 20.5 13.9 20.5 0
Dom~nicanRepublic: Technical
Assistance 1983 17.4 0.9 5.2 7.1 0.8 11.3 0.8 0
Indla: Madhya Pradesh Urban Det . 1983 50.1 1.8 3.6 24.1 1.5 6.2 1.5 0
Korea: Jeonju Regional Dev. 1984 143.3 26.7 18.6 45.0 12.9 28.7 12.9 0
Senegal: Technical Assistance 1984 6.5 1.5 23.1 6.0 1.5 25.0 0 1.5
Zimbabwe: Urban Dev. 1984 112.6 1.5 1.3 43.0 2.7 6.3 2.7 0
Madagascar: Urban Dev. 1984 18.0 0.7 3.9 12.8 0.6 4.7 0.6 0
Thailand: Regonal Clues 1985 50.0 2.0 4.0 27.5 1.2 4.4 1.2 0
Paraguay: Asunc~onMun~clpalDev. 1985 31.0 9.2 29.7 20.0 4.6 23.0 4.6 0
Subtotal 2,715.7 521.1 19.2 1,236.6 242.6 19.6 188 54.5
T
local 4,619.6 2,321.5 50.3 2,079.6 1,033.4 49.7 915.8 117.5
---*-----. sEcsFE--*- -sEwmb.----sE- ----z

a. Internatlonal Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank).

b. Internatlonal Development Associat~on,an affiliate of the World Bank.
Source: World Bank appraisal reports.

58
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D.C. 20433, U.S.A.