G.R. No.
L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director,
Bureau of Printing, respondents.
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential
issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37,
38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325,
326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368,
404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473,
486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566,
573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923,
935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061,
1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,
1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772,
1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-
1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49,
72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150,
153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192,
193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213,
215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248,
251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283,
285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309,
312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357,
358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-
397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486,
488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587,
594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612,
615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726,
837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60,
62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147,
1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558,
1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-
1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695,
1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-
1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762,
1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-
1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-
1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-
1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-
1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889,
1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028,
2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-
2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414,
427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-
507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536,
538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563,
567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604,
609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-
707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9,
10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81,
92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348,
352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have
this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected
or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are
without the requisite legal personality to institute this
mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved
parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When
any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately
or at some other specified time, to do the
act required to be done to Protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is
to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due
course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as
the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court
held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus
would be granted to a private individual only in those cases
where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected,
independent of that which he holds with the public at large,"
and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the
writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs.
Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question
is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that
he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope
Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor
General to call a special election for the position of municipal
president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking
for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the
weight of authority supports the proposition
that the relator is a proper party to
proceedings of this character when a
public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise,
we think that it would not be applicable to
the case at bar for the reason 'that it is
always dangerous to apply a general rule
to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if
under the particular circumstances the
reason for the rule does not exist, the rule
itself is not applicable and reliance upon
the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for
applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The
circumstances which surround this case
are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a
proper party to these proceedings no other
person could be, as we have seen that it is
not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the
people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private
citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to
be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized
by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners
were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed
be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the
same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government
officer generally empowered to represent the people, has
entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity
of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions
as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the
Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The
point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this
Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official
Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date
of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity,
which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only
insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily
reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the
Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of
the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or
abstracts of decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient
importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as
may be required so to be published by law;
and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the
Philippines shall determine from time to
time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be
published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine
Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed
upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the
legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the
legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-
making process of the President. Thus, without publication,
the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents
and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain
ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su
potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638
reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ."
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters
of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The
law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must
be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose
a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures,
fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders
and letters of instructions which all form
part of the law of the land, the requirement
of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the Official Gazette as the
official government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such decrees,
orders and instructions so that the people
may know where to obtain their official and
specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall
have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this
decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of
those presidential decrees which were published only during
the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to
whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s
which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations
in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic
course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the
theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not
a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no
rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S.
425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite
clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must
be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to
have finality and acted upon accordingly,
of public policy in the light of the nature
both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of
those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest
from numerous decisions that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs.
Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium
Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law
was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot
be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court,
it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278,
and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government.
In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the
said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by
respondent officials considering the manifestation in their
comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains
from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same
shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some
other publication, even though some criminal laws provide
that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 103144. April 4, 2001]
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and
CEDRIC LEYSON, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari from the Order dated
November 25, 1991 issued by public respondent Secretary of
Labor and Employment. The November 25, 1991 Order
affirmed en toto the August 29, 1988 Order of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (hereinafter the POEA)
which found petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal
exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one count
of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers
in POEA Case No. (L) 85-05-0370.
Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philsa) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for
overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985, private
respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment
in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the
amount of P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin
and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de
Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson[1].
After the execution of their respective work contracts,
private respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29,
1985. They then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E,
the foreign principal of petitioner.
While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were
allegedly made to sign a second contract on February 4, 1985
which changed some of the provisions of their original contract
resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and
privileges[2]. On April 1, 1985, their foreign employer allegedly
forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work
hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any
corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When
they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private
respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were
repatriated to the Philippines[3].
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents
demanded from petitioner Philsa the return of their placement
fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired
portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a
case before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its foreign
principal, Al-Hejailan., with the following causes of action:
1. Illegal dismissal;
2. Payment of salary differentials;
3. Illegal deduction/withholding of salaries;
4. Illegal exactions/refund of placement fees; and
5. Contract substitution.[4]
The case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 85-05-
0370.
Under the rules of the POEA dated May 21, 1985,
complaints involving employer-employee relations arising out
of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas employment, including money claims, are
adjudicated by the Workers Assistance and Adjudication
Office (hereinafter the WAAO) thru the POEA Hearing
Officers[5]. On the other hand, complaints involving
recruitment violations warranting suspension or cancellation
of the license of recruiting agencies are cognizable by the
POEA thru its Licensing and Recruitment Office (hereinafter
the LRO).[6] In cases where a complaint partakes of the nature
of both an employer-employee relationship case and a
recruitment regulation case, the POEA Hearing Officer shall
act as representative of both the WAAO and the LRO and both
cases shall be heard simultaneously. In such cases, the
Hearing Officer shall submit two separate recommendations
for the two aspects of the case.[7]
In the case at bench, the first two causes of action were
in the nature of money claims arising from the employer-
employee relations and were properly cognizable by the
WAAO. The last two causes of action were in the nature of
recruitment violations and may be investigated by the
LRO. The third cause of action, illegal deduction/withholding
of salary, is both a money claim and a violation of recruitment
regulations and is thus under the investigatory jurisdiction of
both the WAAO and the LRO.
Several hearings were conducted before the POEA
Hearing Officer on the two aspects of private respondents
complaint. During these hearings, private respondents
supported their complaint with the presentation of both
documentary and testimonial evidence. When it was its turn to
present its evidence, petitioner failed to do so and
consequently, private respondents filed a motion to decide the
case on the basis of the evidence on record.[8]
On the aspects of the case involving money claims
arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal
dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision dated August 31,
1988[9], the dispositive portion of which reads:
CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering respondent PHILSA INTERNATIONAL
PLACEMENT AND SERVICE CORPORATION to pay
complainants, jointly and severally with its principal Al-
Hejailan, the following amounts, to wit:
1. TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE
SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,225.00) to each complainant,
representing the refund of their unpaid separation pay;
2. ONE THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR1,000.00) for V.A.
de Mesa alone, representing the salary deduction from his
March salary;
3. TWO THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,000.00) each for
R.I. Mikin and C.A.P. Leyson only, representing their
differential pay for the months of February and March, 1985;
and
4. Five percent (5%) of the total awards as and by way of
attorneys fees.
All payments of the abovestated awards shall be made in
Philippine Currency equivalent to the prevailing exchange
rate according to the Central Bank at the time of payment.
All other claims of complainants as well as the counterclaims
of respondent are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Under the Rules and Regulations of the POEA, the
decision of the POEA-Adjudication Office on matters involving
money claims arising from the employer-employee
relationship of overseas Filipino workers may be appealed to
the National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter the
NLRC)[11]. Thus, as both felt aggrieved by the said POEA
Decision, petitioner and private respondents filed separate
appeals from the August 31, 1988 POEA Decision to the
NLRC.
In a decision dated July 26, 1989[12], the NLRC modified
the appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by
deleting the award of salary deductions and differentials.
These awards to private respondents were deleted by the
NLRC considering that these were not raised in the complaint
filed by private respondents. The NLRC likewise stated that
there was nothing in the text of the decision which would justify
the award.
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but the same was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated
October 25, 1989.
Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989
decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for
review for certiorari where it was docketed as G.R. No.
89089. However, in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989, the
petition was dismissed outright for insufficiency in form and
substance, having failed to comply with the Rules of Court and
Circular No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy
of the questioned resolution dated August 23, 1989. [13]
Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the
August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on private respondents
money claims, the POEA issued a separate Order dated
August 29, 1988[14] resolving the recruitment violations aspect
of private respondents complaint. In this Order, the POEA
found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution,
and unlawful deduction. The dispositive portion of this August
29, 1988 POEA Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds herein
respondent PHILSA International Placement and Services
Corporation liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two
(2) counts of contract substitution and one count of
withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to refund the
placement fees in the amount of P2,500.00 to Rodrigo L.
Mikin, P4,000.00, each, to Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric
A.P. Leyson plus restitution of the salaries withheld in the
amount of SR1,000.00 to Vivencio A. de Mesa.
Moreover, respondents license is hereby suspended for eight
(8) months to take effect immediately and to remain as such
until full refund and restitution of the above-stated amounts
have been effected or in lieu thereof, it is fined the amount of
SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00) PESOS plus restitution,
SO ORDERED.
In line with this August 29, 1988 Order, petitioner
deposited the check equivalent to the claims of private
respondents and paid the corresponding fine under
protest. From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order
dated October 10, 1989.
Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of
the POEA thru the LRO suspending or canceling a license or
authority to act as a recruitment agency may be appealed to
the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and
Employment.[15] Accordingly, after the denial of its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner appealed the August 21, 1988
Order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. However,
in an Order dated September 13, 1991[16], public respondent
Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed en toto the
assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but this was likewise denied in an Order dated November 25,
1991.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari where petitioner
raises the following grounds for the reversal of the questioned
Orders:
I.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING PETITIONER
GUILTY OF ILLEGAL EXACTIONS. THE FINDING IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. AND IN ANY
EVENT, THE LAW ON WHICH THE CONVICTION IS
BASED IS VOID.
II.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PENALIZING
PETITIONER WITH CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION. IN
THE PREMISES, THE CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION
IS VALID AS IT IMPROVED THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
EMPLOYMENT.
III.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING
PETITIONER LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL
DEDUCTIONS/WITHHOLDING OF SALARIES.FOR
THE SUPREME COURT ITSELF HAS ALREADY
ABSOLVED PETITIONER FROM THIS CHARGE.
With respect to the first ground, petitioner would want us
to overturn the findings of the POEA, subsequently affirmed
by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment,
that it is guilty of illegal exaction committed by collecting
placement fees in excess of the amounts allowed by law. This
issue, however, is a question of fact which cannot be raised in
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.[17] As we have
previously held:
It should be noted, in the first place, that the instant petition
is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. An extraordinary remedy, its use is
available only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases
wherein the action of an inferior court, board or officer
performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is challenged for
being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction. The sole office
of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not
include correction of public respondent NLRC's evaluation of
the evidence and factual findings based thereon, which are
generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. [18]
The question of whether or not petitioner charged private
respondents placement fees in excess of that allowed by law
is clearly a question of fact which is for public respondent
POEA, as a trier of facts, to determine. As stated above, the
settled rule is that the factual findings of quasi-judicial
agencies like the POEA, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only respect, but at times even finality
if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.[19]
 On this point, we have carefully examined the records of
the case and it is clear that the ruling of public respondent
POEA that petitioner is guilty of illegal exaction is supported
by substantial evidence. Aside from the testimonial evidence
offered by private respondents, they also presented
documentary evidence consisting of receipts issued by a duly
authorized representative of petitioner which show the
payment of amounts in excess of those allowed by the
POEA. In contrast, petitioner did not present any evidence
whatsoever to rebut the claims of private respondents despite
the many opportunities for them to do so.
Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable
for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. II,
Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which
may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of
publication.
There is merit in the argument.
In Taada vs. Tuvera[20], the Court held, as follows:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letter of instructions
issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules
or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as
having no force and effect the following administrative
issuances: a) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint
Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment
Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of
hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories [21]; b) Letter of
Instruction No. 416 ordering the suspension of payments due
and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the
national government[22]; c) Memorandum Circulars issued by
the POEA regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to
Hong Kong[23]; d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-
01 issued by the Philippine International Trading Corporation
regulating applications for importation from the Peoples
Republic of China[24]; and e) Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and
Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances
and fringe benefits to government officials and employees [25].
In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances
questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were
not published or filed with the National Administrative Register
as required by the Administrative Code of 1987[26].
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must
likewise be declared ineffective as the same was never
published or filed with the National Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983
provides for the applicable schedule of placement and
documentation fees for private employment agencies or
authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum amount
which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas
workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued
in compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of the Labor
Code which provides, as follows:
Article 32. Fees to be paid by workers. Any person applying
with a private fee-charging employment agency for
employment assistance shall not be charged any fee until he
has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually
commenced employment.Such fee shall be always covered
with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount
paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of
allowable fees. (italics supplied)
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under
consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation[27]. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular
No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed
with the National Administrative Register, the same is
ineffective and may not be enforced.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that
the imposition of administrative sanctions on petitioner was
based not on the questioned administrative circular but on
Article 32 and Article 34 (a)[28] of the Labor Code.
The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the
Labor Code were never cited, much less discussed, in the
body of the questioned Orders of the POEA and Secretary of
Labor and Employment. In fact, the said Orders were
consistent in mentioning that petitioners violation of
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the basis for
the imposition of administrative sanctions against
petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that petitioner was
held liable under the said provisions of the Labor Code,
Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code presupposes the
promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by the Department of
Labor and Employment. Considering that, as previously
discussed, Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
embodying such a schedule of fees never took effect, there is
thus no basis for the imposition of the administrative sanctions
against petitioner. Moreover, under Book VI, Chapter II,
Section 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987, (r)ules in force
on the date of the effectivity of this Code which are not filed
within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be
the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No.
2 was never filed with the National Administrative Register,
the same cannot be used as basis for the imposition of
administrative sanctions against petitioner.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that
the questioned administrative circular is not among those
requiring publication contemplated by Taada vs. Tuvera as it
is addressed only to a specific group of persons and not to the
general public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument.
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a
specified group, namely private employment agencies or
authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our
ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of
Service Exporters vs. Torres[29], the administrative circulars
questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group,
namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the
recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled
therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars
may not be enforced or implemented.
Our pronouncement in Taada vs. Tuvera is clear and
categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are
interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or
those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not
been shown to fall under any of these exceptions.
In this regard, the Solicitor Generals reliance on the case
of Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of Customs[30] is misplaced. In
the said case, the validity of certain Customs Memorandum
Orders were upheld despite their lack of publication as they
were addressed to a particular class of persons, the customs
collectors, who were also the subordinates of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. As such, the said
Memorandum Orders clearly fall under one of the exceptions
to the publication requirement, namely those dealing with
instructions from an administrative superior to a subordinate
regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance
which does not obtain in the case at bench.
With respect to the second ground, petitioner would want
us to review the findings of fact of the POEA regarding the two
counts of alleged contract substitution. Again, this is a
question of fact which may not be disturbed if the same is
supported by substantial evidence. A reading of the August
29, 1988 Order of the POEA shows that, indeed, the ruling
that petitioner is guilty of two (2) counts of prohibited contract
substitution is supported by substantial evidence. Thus:
2. As admitted by respondent, there was definitely a contract
of substitution in the first count. The first contract was duly
approved by the Administration and, therefore, the parties
are bound by the terms and condition thereof until its
expiration. The mere intention of respondents to increase the
number of hours of work, even if there was a corresponding
increase in wage is clear violation of the contract as
approved by the Administration, and notwithstanding the
same, the amendment is evidently contrary to law, morals,
good customs and public policy and hence, must be
shunned (Art. 1306, Civil Code of the Philippines, Book III,
Title I, Chapter 1, Article 83, Labor Code of the Philippines,
as amended). Moreover, it would appear that the proposed
salary increase corresponding to the increase in number of
work bonus may just have been a ploy as complainant were
(sic) thereafter not paid at the increased rate.
As to contract substitution in the second part, a third contract
was emphatically intended by respondent to be signed by
complainants which, however, was not consummated due to
the adamant refusal of complainants to sign thereon. Mere
intention of the respondent to commit contract substitution for
a second time should not be left unpunished. It is the duty of
this Office to repress such acts by teaching agencies a
lesson to avoid repetition of the same violation. [31]
With respect to the third ground, petitioner argues that
the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding of
salaries considering that the Supreme Court itself has already
absolved petitioner from this charge. Petitioner premises its
argument on the fact that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the
NLRC absolving it from private respondent de Mesas claim for
salary deduction has already attained finality by reason of the
dismissal of private respondents petition for certiorari of the
said NLRC decision by the Supreme Court.
Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989
Decision of the NLRC has attained finality by reason of the
dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing the
same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the
money claims of private respondents arising from employer-
employee relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only
for the payment of the said money claims that petitioner is
absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and
separate from the money claims of private respondents, may
still be properly imposed by the POEA. In fact, in the August
31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims
of private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office
precisely declared that respondents liability for said money
claims is without prejudice to and independent of its liabilities
for the recruitment violations aspect of the case which is the
subject of a separate Order.[32]
The NLRC Decision absolving petitioner from paying
private respondent de Mesas claim for salary deduction based
its ruling on a finding that the said money claim was not raised
in the complaint[33]. While there may be questions regarding
such finding of the NLRC, the finality of the said NLRC
Decision prevents us from modifying or reviewing the
same. But the fact that the claim for salary deduction was not
raised by private respondents in their complaint will not bar
the POEA from holding petitioner liable for illegal deduction or
withholding of salaries as a ground for the suspension or
cancellation of petitioners license.
Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on
its own initiative, may conduct the necessary proceeding for
the suspension or cancellation of the license of any private
placement agency on any of the grounds mentioned
therein.[34] As such, even without a written complaint from an
aggrieved party, the POEA can initiate proceedings against an
erring private placement agency and, if the result of its
investigation so warrants, impose the corresponding
administrative sanction thereof. Moreover, the POEA, in an
investigation of an employer-employee relationship case, may
still hold a respondent liable for administrative sanctions if, in
the course of its investigation, violations of recruitment
regulations are uncovered.[35] It is thus clear that even if
recruitment violations were not included in a complaint for
money claims initiated by a private complainant, the POEA,
under its rules, may still take cognizance of the same and
impose administrative sanctions if the evidence so warrants.
As such, the fact that petitioner has been absolved by
final judgment for the payment of the money claim to private
respondent de Mesa does not mean that it is likewise
absolved from the administrative sanctions which may be
imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or withholding
of private respondents salary. The POEA thus committed no
grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively
liable of one count of unlawful deduction/withholding of salary.
To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the
three (3) counts of illegal exaction as POEA Administrative
Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 could not be the basis of
administrative sanctions against petitioner for lack of
publication. However, we affirm the ruling of the POEA and
the Secretary of Labor and Employment that petitioner should
be held administratively liable for two (2) counts of contract
substitution and one (1) count of withholding or unlawful
deduction of salary.
Under the applicable schedule of penalties imposed by
the POEA, the penalty for each count of contract substitution
is suspension of license for two (2) months or a fine of
P10,000.00 while the penalty for withholding or unlawful
deduction of salaries is suspension of license for two (2)
months or fine equal to the salary withheld but not less than
P10,000.00 plus restitution of the amount in both
instances[36]. Applying the said schedule on the instant case,
the license of petitioner should be suspended for six (6)
months or, in lieu thereof, it should be ordered to pay fine in
the amount of P30,000.00. Petitioner should likewise pay the
amount of SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A. de
Mesa as restitution for the amount withheld from his salary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September
13, 1991 and November 25, 1991 Orders of public respondent
Secretary of Labor and Employment are hereby
MODIFIED. As modified, the license of private respondent
Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is
hereby suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it is
hereby ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as
fine. Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay the amount of
SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa. All
other monetary awards are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100335. April 7, 1993.
UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE, INC. (now UNCIANO
COLLEGES & GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC.); MIRANDO C.
UNCIANO, SR., DOMINADOR SANTOS AND EDITHA
MORA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Honorable LOURDES K.
TAYAO-JAGUROS, in her capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Manila; ELENA VILLEGAS
thru VICTORIA VILLEGAS; and TED MAGALLANES thru
JACINTA MAGALLANES, respondents.
Bernardo P. Fernandez for petitioners.
Free Legal Assistance Group for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RULE WHEN A
DOCTRINE OF THE SUPREME COURT IS OVERRULED
AND A DIFFERENT VIEW IS ADOPTED. — In the case of
People v. Jabinal, (G.R. No. 82499, 178 SCRA 493 [1989]),
it is a settled rule that when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES;
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; PURPOSE. — As to the
question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, the case of Capitol Medical
Center, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. discussed
exhaustively the purpose in issuing said writ: "The sole
object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of
the case can be heard. The status quo is the last actual
peaceable uncontested status which preceded the
controversy (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225). It may only
be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection
of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil.
445). It should only be granted if the party asking for it is
clearly entitled thereto (Climaco vs. Macaraeg, 4 SCRA 930;
Subido vs. Gopengco, 27 SCRA 455; Police Commission vs.
Bello, 37 SCRA 230). Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction
tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is
generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to the
final hearing (Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. vs. Del
Rosario, 22 Phil. 433). It may, however, issue 'in cases of
extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where
considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in
complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful
invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and
remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where
the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish
and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the
parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant,
than to establish a new relation. Indeed, the writ should not
be denied the complainant when he makes out a clear case,
free from doubt and dispute.' (Commissioner of Customs vs.
Cloribel, et al., 19 SCRA 235)."
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of
the decision 1 of public respondent Court of Appeals dated
February 7, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 21020; and its
resolution dated June 3, 1991.
The antecedent facts are, as follows:
On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena Villegas and
Ted Magallanes, thru their mothers, Victoria Villegas and
Jacinta Magallanes, respectively, filed before the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, a
petition for injunction and damages with prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners Unciano
Paramedical College, Inc. (now Unciano Colleges and
General Hospital, Inc.), Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dominador
Santos, Editha Mora, Dr. Evelyn Moral and Laureana Vitug,
docketed as Civil Case No. 90-52745. Among other things,
they alleged therein that:
"6.01. Around the latter part of July 1989, the above-named
students initiated a petition proposing to the school
authorities the organization of a student council in the
school. They solicited support of their petition from the
studentry by asking the students to endorse the same with
their signatures. They were able to get at least 180
signatures.
"6.02. On August 18, 1989, Elena Villegas and a certain
student named Solomon Barroa were summoned to the
Office of Dr. Moral and were admonished not to proceed with
the proposal because, according to her, the school does not
allow and had never allowed such an organization.
"6.03. On September 12, 1989, when news leaked out that
the above-named students would be barred from enrollment,
they sought confirmation with respondent Dr. Moral, Dean of
Discipline, who told them 'it's not true unless you violate the
rules and regulations of the school and if you still insist with
your student council.'
"6.04. On October 28, 1989, in compliance with an
announcement to see the Dean of Nursing, the above-
named students met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who
informed them that they would be barred from enrollment for
the second semester because they supposedly harassed a
female student, invited an outsider to the school to speak
before the students, and also because the school has an
arrangement with the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports not to allow their students to put up a student council.
Dr. Moral advised them to get their Honorable Dismissal, and
warned them that if she herself were to give it, it would be
marked `expelled.'
"6.05. On November 6, 1989, the students again approached
Dr. Moral who informed them that they were no longer
allowed to enroll because they are allegedly members of the
National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) and
the League of Filipino Students (LFS), officers of the student
organization they organized, and, moreover 'drug addicts.'
The students asked for proof of these accusations but were
not given any, and were told by Dr. Moral that the school has
people investigating for (sic) them but she did not disclose
their identities nor provide any proof to support her
allegations.
"6.06. On November 13, 1989, a few days after petitioners
retained the services of counsel FREE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE GROUP (FLAG), counsel sent a letter to Mr.
Mirando Unciano, President of the College, demanding that
the constitutional requirements of due process be complied
with prior to unilaterally dismissing the students, and
requesting that a conference be held prior to 17 November
1989, as the enrollment deadline was fast approaching . . .:
"6.07. On 17 November 1989, acceding to the demand, a
meeting was held, attended by Dr. Moral, Dean Vitug, Mr.
Rustico Lopez, the students, and their counsel. Due,
however, to the inability of Dr. Moral to resolve the problem
in the absence of the College President and their legal
counsel, the meeting was reset to November 22, 1989 upon
Dr. Moral's request. However, notice was sent to the
students' counsel from Unciano Paramedical College
resetting the meeting to November 27, 1989 stating that the
President will attend personally therein . . .
"6.08. On 27 November 1989, due to the absence of the
school's legal counsel and the President who allegedly just
arrived from the United States, Dr. Moral again requested
that the meeting be reset. A verbal altercation occurred
between the parties due to the delaying tactics of the school
officials and the failure to resolve the problem by their
continuous refusal to discuss the merits of the accusations
against the students. The meeting, attended by Dr. Moral,
Dean Vitug and Dean Dominador Santos, ended with the
school officials' request that it be reset for 29 November
19B9 and that the students bring their parents or guardian
with them at said meeting. The students agreed to this
request and their counsel prepared a written summary of the
matters discussed and agreed during the meeting. The
school officials refused to sign it, however . . .
"6.09. On 29 November 1989, the students were informed
that the President had unilaterally refused to allow them to
enroll and it was up to their parents to request or appeal to
the school officials to change their decision. Mrs. Victoria
Villegas and Mrs. Jacinta Magallanes wrote to the school
officials to request that their children be allowed to enroll . . .
Dr. Moral informed them that the Board of Trustees will have
to decide on these requests.
"6.10. On 11 December 1989, the students were informed
that the Board of Trustees had refused to grant the parents'
request." 2
On May 16, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order effective May 17, 1990, enjoining petitioner
school from not enrolling private respondents in its College of
Nursing and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction on June 4, 1990. 3
Petitioners filed an opposition to the prayer for a preliminary
mandatory injunction on the ground that private respondents
are not entitled thereto and have no clear legal right to the
relief demanded. On the same date, the trial court issued an
order, the pertinent parts of which, read:
"xxx xxx xxx
"It is the opinion of the Court that there will be irreparable
injury to the petitioners if they are not allowed to enroll. At
least they will miss another semester.
"On the other hand, the injuries mentioned by Dr. Unciano, in
particular the withdrawal of the other students and the school
will lose money if the petitioners are allowed to enroll is still a
speculation, and may not take place.
"In view thereof, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for
issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, ordering the
respondents to allow petitioners to enroll for the first
semester of school year 1990-1991, upon filing by petitioners
of a bond in the amount of P2,000.00 each.
"xxx xxx xxx
"SO ORDERED." 4
On June 11. 1990, the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction was issued. 5
On June 13, 1990, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of
the Order of June 4, 1990 was denied. 6
Elevating the matter to the Court of Appeals in a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the
same was dismissed on February 7, 1991 for lack of merit. 7
Said the court:
"The arguments advanced in support of the petition are
mainly anchored on the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of ALCUAZ, et al. vs. Philippine School of Business
Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al., L-76353,
May 2, 1988; 161 SCRA 7 where it was held that —
'It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the
school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided
in Paragraph 137 (of the) Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it
is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester.
Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the 'written
contracts' required for college teachers are for 'one
semester.' It is thus evident that after the close of the first
semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract
either with the students or with the intervening teachers . . .
"However, in the more recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs.
Hon. Sancho Dames II, et al., G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990
(185 SCRA 523), the Supreme Court, abandoned and
overruled its decision in Alcuaz and declared thus:
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the
'termination of contract' theory. But it must be repeatedly
emphasized that the contract between the school and the
student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions [See Art. XIV, Secs. 1-2, 4(1).]
'Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on
Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Private
School which provides that '(w)hen a student registers in a
school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
semester for collegiate courses,' which the Court in Alcuaz
construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a
student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of
one semester, has already expired.
'The 'termination of contract' theory does not even find
support in the Manual. Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that a
college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to
protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid
on an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the
downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before
examinations. Thus, even if a student does not complete the
semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for
more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition
fees for the whole semester before he is given his
credentials for transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137,
subsumed under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees,
which in its totality provides:
'137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood
that he is enrolling for the entire school year for elementary
and secondary courses, and for the entire semester for
collegiate courses. A student who transfers or otherwise
withdraws, in writing, within two weeks after the beginning of
classes and who has already paid the pertinent tuition and
other school fees in full or for any length of time longer than
one month may be charged ten per cent of the total amount
due for the term if he withdraws within the first week of
classes, or twenty per cent if within the second week of
classes, regardless of whether or not he has actually
attended classes. The student may be charged all the school
fees in full if he withdraws anytime after the second week of
classes. However, if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a
justifiable reason, the student shall be charged the pertinent
fees only up to and including the last month of attendance.'
'Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to
mean that the student shall be enrolled for only one
semester, and that after the semester is over his re-
enrollment is dependent solely on the sound discretion of the
school. On the contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of
the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period
he is expected to complete it. Thus, Paragraph 107 states:
'Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or
university upon meeting its specific requirement and
reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case of
academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation,
the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the
entire period he is expected to his (sic) complete his course
without prejudice to his right to transfer.'
'This 'presumption' has been translated into a right in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 232, the 'Education Act of 1982.' Section 9 of
this act provides:
'SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School. — In addition to other
rights, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law and
regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the
following rights:
xxx xxx xxx
12. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or
violation of disciplinary regulations.' " 8
On June 3, 1991, the motion for reconsideration was denied,
again, for lack of merit. 9 Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners raise this lone issue:
"WHETHER OR NOT THE NON DOCTRINE SHOULD BE
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO GOVERN AND
INVALIDATE THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF INCIDENTS THAT
TOOK PLACE PRIOR TO ITS ADOPTION AND WHICH
INCIDENTS WERE PROPER AND VALID UNDER THE
ALCUAZ DOCTRINE PREVAILING AT THE TIME SAID
INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE." 10
Petitioners argue that under the then prevailing Alcuaz
doctrine which was promulgated on May 2, 1988, the
contract between them and private respondents was validly
terminated upon the end of the first semester of school year
1989-1990. Although said doctrine was later abandoned in
Non, et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was
promulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990, when the
termination of the contract between them had long become
fait accompli. Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to
parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof, conformably with the case of People v. Jabinal, G.R.
No. L-30061, 55 SCRA 607 (1974). Thus, the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court
with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree with the arguments of petitioners.
The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive
effect to cases that arose before its promulgation on May 20,
1990, as in this case, which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it
were otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners
and other schools similarly situated who relied on the ruling
in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2, 1988, which
recognized the termination of contract theory. We had an
opportunity to resolve a similar issue in National Service
Corporation, et al. v. NLRC. 11 In this case, petitioner
claimed that as a government corporation (by virtue of its
being a subsidiary of the National Investment and
Development Corporation, a subsidiary wholly owned by the
Philippine National Bank, which in turn is a government
owned corporation), the terms and conditions of employment
of its employees are governed by the civil service law, rules
and regulations. In support thereof, petitioner cited the ruling
in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 12 that employees
of government owned or controlled corporations are
governed by the civil service law, rules and regulations, we
rejected this claim of petitioner and held that:
"It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in
said case should not be given retroactive effect, that is, to
cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January
1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and
other employees similarly situated, because under the same
1973 Constitution but prior to the ruling in National Housing
Corporation vs. Juco, this Court had recognized the
applicability of the Labor Code to, and the authority of the
NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over, disputes involving terms
and conditions of employment in government-owned or
controlled corporations, among them, the National Service
Corporation (NASECO)." 13
In addition, We reiterate Our earlier pronouncement in the
case of People v. Jabinal, supra, that it is a settled rule that
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different
view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied
on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Coming now to the question on the propriety of the issuance
of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the case of
Capitol Medical Center, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
14 discussed exhaustively the purpose in issuing said writ:
"The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case can be heard. The status quo is the
last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the
controversy (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225). It may only
be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection
of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil.
445). It should only be granted if the party asking for it is
clearly entitled thereto (Climaco vs. Macaraeg, 4 SCRA 930;
Subido vs. Gopengco, 27 SCRA 455; Police Commission vs.
Bello, 37 SCRA 230).
Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction tends to do more than
to maintain the status quo, it is generally improper to issue
such an injunction prior to the final hearing (Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co. vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. 433). It may,
however, issue 'in cases of extreme urgency; where the right
is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience
bear strongly in complainant's favor where there is a willful
and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest
and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one and
where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to re-
establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation
between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by
the defendant, than to establish a new relation. Indeed, the
writ should not be denied the complainant when he makes
out a clear case, free from doubt and dispute.'
(Commissioner of Customs vs. Cloribel, et al., 19 SCRA
235.)." 15

In the present case, the contract between the parties was

validly terminated upon the end of the first semester of
school year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is the
status quo. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which
ordered petitioners to allow private respondents "to enroll for
the first semester of school year 1990-1190." 16 Guided by
the Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore the status
quo but will go a step backward, then restore the condition
preceding the status quo. Private respondents do not
possess any clear legal right to re-enroll, corollarily,
petitioners are not obliged legally to re-admit them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 7, 1991 and
its resolution dated June 3, 1991 are SET ASIDE. The orders
of the trial court dated June 4, 1990 and June 13, 1990 and
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction are likewise SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961
EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, absolving defendant Arellano
University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the
plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for
insufficiency of proof thereon.
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and
undisputed. As established by the agreement of
facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and
documentary evidence introduced by the parties, it
appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school
year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in
the defendant University. After finishing his
preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the
College of Law of the defendant from the school
year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in
the defendant university up to and including the first
semester of the fourth year. During all the school
years in which plaintiff was studying law in
defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano,
brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of
the College of Law and legal counsel of the
defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last
semester of his law studies in the defendant
university but failed to pay his tuition fees because
his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having
severed his connection with defendant and having
accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the
College of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff
left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the
last semester of his fourth year law in the college of
law of the Abad Santos University graduating from
the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff,
during all the time he was studying law in defendant
university was awarded scholarship grants, for
scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees
were returned to him after the ends of semester and
when his scholarship grants were awarded to him.
The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to
defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the
first semester up to and including the first semester
of his last year in the college of law or the fourth
year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law
from Abad Santos University he applied to take the
bar examination. To secure permission to take the
bar he needed the transcripts of his records in
defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned
the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The
defendant refused until after he had paid back the
P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as
above stated. As he could not take the bar
examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid
to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the
sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant
in this case.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the
scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to
sign the following contract covenant and
agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me
by the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer
to another school without having refunded to the
University (defendant) the equivalent of my
scholarship cash.
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".
It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private
Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the
subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private
schools, colleges and universities," reading:
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to
this, Bureau show that some schools offer full or
partial scholarships to deserving students — for
excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-
curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but
gifted students should be encouraged. But to
stipulate the condition that such scholarships are
good only if the students concerned continue in the
same school nullifies the principle of merit in the
award of these scholarships.
2. When students are given full or partial
scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships
are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and
other fees corresponding to these scholarships
should not be subsequently charged to the recipient
students when they decide to quit school or to
transfer to another institution. Scholarships should
not be offered merely to attract and keep students
in a school.
3. Several complaints have actually been received
from students who have enjoyed scholarships, full
or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to
other schools since their credentials would not be
released unless they would pay the fees
corresponding to the period of the scholarships.
Where the Bureau believes that the right of the
student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it
reserves the right to authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum;
that plaintiff asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass
upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript of his
record in defendant University, without being required to
refund the sum of P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private
Schools upheld the position taken by the plaintiff and so
advised the defendant; and that, this notwithstanding, the
latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said
refund were made, and even recommended to said Bureau
that it issue a written order directing the defendant to release
said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented
to the court for judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff was,
accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest,
said sum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar
examination in 1953. Subsequently, he brought this action
for the recovery of said amount, aside from P2,000 as moral
damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as
attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of litigation.
In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-
vis the Bureau of Private Schools, namely, that the
provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and binding
and that the memorandum above-referred to is null and void.
It, likewise, set up a counterclaim for P10,000.00 as find that the contract as to consideration or the thing
damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees. to be done, contravenes some established interest
of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision good moralsor tends clearly to undermine the
of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in
the former waived his right to transfer to another school Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound
without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of
scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The lower court resolved merit not to keep outstanding students in school to
this question in the affirmative, upon the ground that the bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that
aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private university scholarships award is a business
Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, scheme designed to increase the business potential
not mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not
provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for only inconsistent with sound policy but also good
plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant without good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this
reasons and simply because he wanted to follow the definition. It is good customs; those generally
example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its accepted principles of morality which have received
brief that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of some kind of social and practical confirmation. The
Private Schools is null and void because said officer had no practice of awarding scholarships to attract students
authority to issue it, and because it had been neither and keep them in school is not good customs nor
approved by the corresponding department head nor has it received some kind of social and practical
published in the official gazette. confirmation except in some private institutions as
in Arellano University. The University of the
Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving
lower court did, the question whether plaintiff had sufficient of free scholarships to gifted children, does not
reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to the require scholars to reimburse the corresponding
Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, value of the scholarships if they transfer to other
and its far reaching effects, transcend personal equations schools. So also with the leading colleges and
and demand a determination of the case from a high universities of the United States after which our
impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential to pass educational practices or policies are patterned. In
upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless these institutions scholarships are granted not to
of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in attract and to keep brilliant students in school for
question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help
void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a gifted students in whom society has an established
sound principle of public policy. As the Director of Private interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)
Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the
defendant,
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the
There is one more point that merits refutation and defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with
that is whether or not the contract entered into interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954,
between Cui and Arellano University on September date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and
10, 1951 was void as against public policy. In the dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.
case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank,
245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In
determining a public policy of the state, courts are
limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the
judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of
government officers.' It might take more than a
government bureau or office to lay down or
establish a public policy, as alleged in your
communication, but courts consider the practices of
government officials as one of the four factors in
determining a public policy of the state. It has been
consistently held in America that under the
principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as
applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will
not recognize or uphold a transaction which its
object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be
prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or
to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169
U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811;
Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano
University understood clearly the real essence of
scholarships and the motives which prompted this
office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it
should have not entered into a contract of waiver
with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct
violation of our Memorandum and an open
challenge to the authority of the Director of Private
Schools because the contract was repugnant to
sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in
Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp.
Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a
contract void as against public policy, a court must
G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961
EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, absolving defendant Arellano
University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the
plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for
insufficiency of proof thereon.
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and
undisputed. As established by the agreement of
facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and
documentary evidence introduced by the parties, it
appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school
year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in
the defendant University. After finishing his
preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the
College of Law of the defendant from the school
year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in
the defendant university up to and including the first
semester of the fourth year. During all the school
years in which plaintiff was studying law in
defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano,
brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of
the College of Law and legal counsel of the
defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last
semester of his law studies in the defendant
university but failed to pay his tuition fees because
his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having
severed his connection with defendant and having
accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the
College of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff
left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the
last semester of his fourth year law in the college of
law of the Abad Santos University graduating from
the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff,
during all the time he was studying law in defendant
university was awarded scholarship grants, for
scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees
were returned to him after the ends of semester and
when his scholarship grants were awarded to him.
The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to
defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the
first semester up to and including the first semester
of his last year in the college of law or the fourth
year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law
from Abad Santos University he applied to take the
bar examination. To secure permission to take the
bar he needed the transcripts of his records in
defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned
the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The
defendant refused until after he had paid back the
P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as
above stated. As he could not take the bar
examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid
to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the
sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant
in this case.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the
scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to
sign the following contract covenant and
agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me
by the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer
to another school without having refunded to the
University (defendant) the equivalent of my
scholarship cash.
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".
It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private
Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the
subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private
schools, colleges and universities," reading:
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to
this, Bureau show that some schools offer full or
partial scholarships to deserving students — for
excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-
curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but
gifted students should be encouraged. But to
stipulate the condition that such scholarships are
good only if the students concerned continue in the
same school nullifies the principle of merit in the
award of these scholarships.
2. When students are given full or partial
scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships
are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and
other fees corresponding to these scholarships
should not be subsequently charged to the recipient
students when they decide to quit school or to
transfer to another institution. Scholarships should
not be offered merely to attract and keep students
in a school.
3. Several complaints have actually been received
from students who have enjoyed scholarships, full
or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to
other schools since their credentials would not be
released unless they would pay the fees
corresponding to the period of the scholarships.
Where the Bureau believes that the right of the
student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it
reserves the right to authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum;
that plaintiff asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass
upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript of his
record in defendant University, without being required to
refund the sum of P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private
Schools upheld the position taken by the plaintiff and so
advised the defendant; and that, this notwithstanding, the
latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said
refund were made, and even recommended to said Bureau
that it issue a written order directing the defendant to release
said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented
to the court for judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff was,
accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest,
said sum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar
examination in 1953. Subsequently, he brought this action
for the recovery of said amount, aside from P2,000 as moral
damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as
attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of litigation.
In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-
vis the Bureau of Private Schools, namely, that the
provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and binding
and that the memorandum above-referred to is null and void.
It, likewise, set up a counterclaim for P10,000.00 as find that the contract as to consideration or the thing
damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees. to be done, contravenes some established interest
of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision good moralsor tends clearly to undermine the
of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in
the former waived his right to transfer to another school Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound
without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of
scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The lower court resolved merit not to keep outstanding students in school to
this question in the affirmative, upon the ground that the bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that
aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private university scholarships award is a business
Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, scheme designed to increase the business potential
not mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not
provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for only inconsistent with sound policy but also good
plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant without good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this
reasons and simply because he wanted to follow the definition. It is good customs; those generally
example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its accepted principles of morality which have received
brief that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of some kind of social and practical confirmation. The
Private Schools is null and void because said officer had no practice of awarding scholarships to attract students
authority to issue it, and because it had been neither and keep them in school is not good customs nor
approved by the corresponding department head nor has it received some kind of social and practical
published in the official gazette. confirmation except in some private institutions as
in Arellano University. The University of the
Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving
lower court did, the question whether plaintiff had sufficient of free scholarships to gifted children, does not
reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to the require scholars to reimburse the corresponding
Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, value of the scholarships if they transfer to other
and its far reaching effects, transcend personal equations schools. So also with the leading colleges and
and demand a determination of the case from a high universities of the United States after which our
impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential to pass educational practices or policies are patterned. In
upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless these institutions scholarships are granted not to
of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in attract and to keep brilliant students in school for
question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help
void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a gifted students in whom society has an established
sound principle of public policy. As the Director of Private interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)
Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the
defendant,
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the
There is one more point that merits refutation and defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with
that is whether or not the contract entered into interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954,
between Cui and Arellano University on September date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and
10, 1951 was void as against public policy. In the dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.
case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank,
245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In
determining a public policy of the state, courts are
limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the
judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of
government officers.' It might take more than a
government bureau or office to lay down or
establish a public policy, as alleged in your
communication, but courts consider the practices of
government officials as one of the four factors in
determining a public policy of the state. It has been
consistently held in America that under the
principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as
applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will
not recognize or uphold a transaction which its
object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be
prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or
to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169
U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811;
Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano
University understood clearly the real essence of
scholarships and the motives which prompted this
office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it
should have not entered into a contract of waiver
with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct
violation of our Memorandum and an open
challenge to the authority of the Director of Private
Schools because the contract was repugnant to
sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in
Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp.
Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a
contract void as against public policy, a court must
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice
Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No.
1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her
Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of
the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established their residence in
the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4,
1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against
petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that
private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and
petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this
certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is
interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety
of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a
grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the
lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it
devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to
exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be
useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case
within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the
parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying
claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before
the American Court that they had no community of property;
that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree
issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to
determine whether the property relations between petitioner
and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had
obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person
before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained
jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address
as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt
Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility
in the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in
the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of
KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to
represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept
service of Summons, to file an Answer,
appear on my behalf and do an things
necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the
ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property
to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations
to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree
is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme
Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:
 The purpose and effect of a decree of
divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie
when thus severed as to one party, ceases
to bind either. A husband without a wife, or
a wife without a husband, is unknown to
the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty. that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no

longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our

laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent

Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998]
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
BLANDINA DANDAN,* respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J .:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not
however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way
their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in
the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950
evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other
and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954
she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks
thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in
the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31
August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan
(also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan,
named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan,
opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead
of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the
latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty.
Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April
1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children)
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private
writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner
and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole
surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate
declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his
estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private
respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto
failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial
court required the submission of the records of birth of the
Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for
resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required
documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1] which held
that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep.
Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction,"[2]disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their
marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither
did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal
properties due to lack of judicial approval. [3] On the other
hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage
existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less
was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been
acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As
regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On
27 November 1987[4] only petitioner and Ruperto were
declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor
of the two intestate heirs.[5]
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan
children were allowed to present proofs that the recognition of
the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except
Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been
made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February
1988[6] partial reconsideration was granted declaring the
Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-
half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
petitioner to the other half.[7]Private respondent was not
declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned
records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April
1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated
during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her
children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed by
the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided
without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules
of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone
sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995
it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and
15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the
remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.[8] On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need
because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution
either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to their
respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and,
second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private
respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law
which can be resolved in the present petition based on
established facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon
by respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as
to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the
decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes
them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;[10] nor as to their respective
hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the
legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the
parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for
immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate,
simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records
of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue
on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion
private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to
whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and
in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner replied that
Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to
her in spite of the divorce they obtained.[12] Reading between
the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to
establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence
documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the of forum shopping.
arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of
claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case
v. Escao. to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null
and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order
reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by
citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the
in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.[13] that aliens may obtain divorces Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed
they are valid according to their national law. She prayed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise
therefore that the case be set for hearing. [14] Petitioner AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the
opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the
on her citizenship.[15] The trial court did not grant private hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo
respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve Padlan.
her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were
"Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." [16] It The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in
maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine shopping is DENIED.
jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their SO ORDERED.
citizenship pertained solely to the time
of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a
basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still
a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial
court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen
at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to
inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on
petitioner's citizenship;[17] it did not merit enlightenment
however from petitioner.[18] In the present proceeding,
petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private
respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript
of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing
for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer
certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's
duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked
whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that
she was since 1954.[19] Significantly, the decree of divorce of
petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same
year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at
the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to
be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent
appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the
trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be
determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right
of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving
spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already
resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22
April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo
was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage
considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of
the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse
that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship.[20]
As regards the motion of private respondent for
petitioner and her counsel to be declared in contempt of court
and that the present petition be dismissed for forum
shopping,[21] the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to
exist the actions must involve the same transactions and
same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be
identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. [22] The
present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the
subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts
concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles
of certain properties belonging to the estate of
G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN
and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated August 6, 2004,
which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-
10636, declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando
B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of
bigamy, as well as the Resolution3 dated January 27, 2005,
which denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent
Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. 4 Thereafter,
they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly
became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of
marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. 5
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando
married respondent Merope in Calasiao,
Pangasinan.6Contending that said marriage was bigamous
since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio
Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City7 against
Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack
of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real
party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the merits
ensued.
On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff
Felicitas Amor Catalan and against defendants Orlando B.
Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:
1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza
with Orlando B. Catalan is declared null and void ab
initio;
2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally
to pay plaintiff by way of moral damages the
amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the
amount of P50,000.00, including costs of this suit;
and
3) The donation in consideration of marriage is
ordered revoked and the property donated is
ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza.
Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas,
Jr. and Atty. Nolan Evangelista.
SO ORDERED.10
Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals,
which reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the
appeal and consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No. D-
10636, RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.11
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner
filed the instant petition for review raising the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING
IN COURT TO QUESTION THE NULLITY OF THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;
II.
WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
TO DECLARE THE QUESTIONED MARRIAGE VOID
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.12
Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the
respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and her
children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy
to address her grievances and to protect her family from
further embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the
Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring
the marriage void despite overwhelming evidence and the
state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.13
The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the
personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.
However, this issue may not be resolved without first
determining the corollary factual issues of whether the
petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become
naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually
been judicially granted a divorce decree.
While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts
and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial
of the case,14 there are, however, exceptions to this rule, like
when the findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals are conflicting, or when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based.15
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner
and respondent Orlando were naturalized American citizens
and that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988.
However, after a careful review of the records, we note that
other than the allegations in the complaint and the testimony
during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence
to prove their naturalization and divorce.
The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:
In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the
documentary and testimonial evidence she presented, we
deem it undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are American
citizens and had this citizenship status when they secured
their divorce decree in April 1988. We are not therefore
dealing in this case with Filipino citizens whose marital status
is governed by the Family Code and our Civil Code, but with
American citizens who secured their divorce in the U.S. and
who are considered by their national law to be free to
contract another marriage. x x x16
Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the
failure of the petitioner to refute or contest the allegation in
respondents’ brief, that she and respondent Orlando were
American citizens at the time they secured their divorce in
April 1988, as sufficient to establish the fact of naturalization
and divorce.17 We note that it was the petitioner who alleged
in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and
that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce
decree.18 It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 19
Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003,
now specifically provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife.

Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a xxxx

cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.20 A
divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to
the national law of the foreigner.21 However, before it can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering
that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 22
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the
evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner
has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the
petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict
remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes
absolute.23 In such case, the RTC would be correct to
declare the marriage of the respondents void for being
bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21,
1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent
Merope,24 and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated
June 16, 1988 between the respondents.25
In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare
the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing
it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception
of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and
whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or
restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not allow respondent
Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but
reduce the amount of moral damages from ₱300,000.00 to
₱50,000.00 and exemplary damages from ₱200,000.00 to
₱25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to
remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition
to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner
Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be
REMANDED to the trial court for its proper disposition. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and

which, following the national law of Orlando, does not restrict
remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling
that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, thus:

Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former

spouses no longer has any interest nor should each have the
personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might
subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another
perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s
subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect
or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the
divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x26

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at
the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family
Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a
party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any
other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest27 and must be based on a cause
of action.28 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog,29 the Court held that
the children have the personality to file the petition to declare
the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their
stepmother as it affects their successional rights.1awphi1.net

Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the
February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the
September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP.
Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry
Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad
San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death on December
18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708
which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that,
at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100
San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as
legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son
by his second marriage; that the decedent left real
properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at
₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and
joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10of the
petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent
filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She
submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in
Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus,
she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry
her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code
and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San
Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the
Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage
with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from
his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding
Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid.
Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot
and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge
Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan
pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion
for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and
law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an
Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-
raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to
submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of
venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition.
On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and
Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June
20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition
for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in
the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino
citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and
January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person
as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor
in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus,
the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal
capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the
marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly
dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued
by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2,
Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is
no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view —
sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26,
par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of
our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed,
courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts
should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate
of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the
Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee,
"shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws".
For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and
petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the
petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant
petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which
was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo
insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38"residence" is
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile
at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his
domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to
Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee.
They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights
and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent
cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence,
she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly
laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in
which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of
Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished
from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence"
as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in
Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there
is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election
laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of
actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the
Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have
his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese
General Hospital for the period August to December 1992
indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented
proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-
envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s
calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100
San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition
for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional
Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17,
1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the
branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme
Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject
petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to
file the petition for letters of administration, we must first
resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo
was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue,
we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is
sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage
between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage
was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no
interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after
the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond
of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and
to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband
without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to
the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty,
that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court
ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the
alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform
her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still marriedto
private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that
the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery
suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of
one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated
that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided
on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of
limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be
denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing
marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains
a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical
background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into
law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin
to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in
the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis
added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a
situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the
law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties
and productive of no possible good to the community, relief
in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a
mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one
is considered released from the marital bond while the other
remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the
alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the
Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in
stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as
Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s
rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable
part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but
in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws
that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied
in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our
nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be
done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots
to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to
the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes
again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as
the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his
due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law
in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce
decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In
Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific
guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and
due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies
of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the
Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that
their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained
by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters
of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of
the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also
provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would
be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has
a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest
must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of
which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity
of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails
to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as
a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between parties who
live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless
the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the
divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be
Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
property relations of couples living together as husband and
wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the
property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the
union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry
each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband
and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions.
Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent
proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on
the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo
or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or
Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28,
1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
 Certificate[6] identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, G.R. No. 155635
Petitioner, American citizen[7] born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar
Present:
Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn
- versus -
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
Makapugay, American.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARPIO MORALES,
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, TINGA,
Respondents. VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ. On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California,
x-------------------------------------------x
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix.
Petitioner,
G.R. No.From
163979
then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital relationship
- versus - seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996,

VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.

Promulgated:
Respondent. November 7, 2008
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------x Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente

DECISION was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the

VELASCO, JR., J.: Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,[8] ordering

the dissolution of the couples marriage and leaving them to

The Case
remarry after completing the legal requirements, but giving

them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year

Before us are these two petitions interposed by
petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No.
certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in 406/97,[9] settling the couples property relations pursuant to
CA-G.R. SP No. 68187. an Agreement[10] they executed on December 14, 1996.Said

agreement specifically stated that the conjugal property which

In the first, a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65
they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real
and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and
seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution [2] of the CA, as property and all the improvements and personal properties
reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
2002,[3] granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Muntinlupa.[11]
private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial
courts grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month

The second, a petition for review under Rule from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed
45,[4] docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 with the Makati City RTC a petition[12] dated January 26, 1996,
Decision[5] of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a with attachments, for declaration of nullity of
suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with
marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,
application for support commenced by Rebecca against
however, later moved[13] and secured approval[14] of the
Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa
City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution motion to withdraw the petition.
issued by the RTC in the said case.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court
Acknowledgment[15] stating under oath that she is an
ordered the consolidation of both cases.
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been

The Facts living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of

Vicente.
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20,

1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of
 SO ORDERED.[19]
absolute nullity of marriage[16] on the ground of Vicentes

alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No.

01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v.

Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to

The RTC declared, among other things, that the
Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought
divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca
defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of
also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent
support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere
monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP
allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to
220,000.
preclude her from receiving legal support.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to

Following the denial[20] of his motion for
Dismiss[17] on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action
reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order,
and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of
Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer
divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.
writ of preliminary injunction.[21] His petition was docketed as

CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an

opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is

no valid divorce to speak of.

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired

TRO.[22] On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim
Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the
contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced
decretal portion of which reads:
several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically,

Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, pending final resolution of
Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction be ISSUED in this case,
bigamy and concubinage. enjoining the respondent court from
implementing the assailed Omnibus Order
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite November 20, 2001, and from conducting
further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-
094, upon the posting of an injunction bond
in the amount of P250,000.00.
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an
SO ORDERED.[23]
Order[18] denying Vicentes motion to dismiss Civil Case No.

01-094 and granting Rebeccas application for

support pendente lite, disposing as follows: Rebecca moved[24] but was denied reconsideration

of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the

Wherefore, premises considered,
the Motion to Dismiss filed by the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive
respondent is DENIED. Petitioners
Application in Support of the Motion for writ[25] was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of
Support Pendente Lite is hereby
GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2,
to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED 2002, denied her motion.
AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php
220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as
support for the duration of the proceedings
relative to the instant Petition.
 The adverted CA resolutions of April 30,
2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in
Rebeccas petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No.
155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a
Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil
Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC
issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently
assailed CA Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus
Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order
dated November 20, 2001
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case
No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of
action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicentes
motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in
determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of
action.[27] Applying said rule in the light of the essential
elements of a cause of action,[28] Rebecca had no cause of
action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this
jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void,
the union having previously been dissolved on February 22,
1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as
an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicentes
capacity to contract another marriage.
(3) Rebeccas contention about the nullity of a
divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign
divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as
to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was
not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a
Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by
the Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality
of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her
American citizenship, having professed to have that
nationality status and having made representations to that
effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during
her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when
she applied for and eventually secured an American passport
on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated
the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage
(Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being
born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which
follows the jus soli principle, Rebeccas representation and
assertion about being an American citizen when she secured
her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship
and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was
denied in the equally assailed June 4,
2004 Resolution.[29] Hence, Rebeccas Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4)
assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her
petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA
erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTCs orders
which would have entitled her to support pending final
resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the
assailed CA decision submitting as follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE
FACT OF PETITIONERS FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY
 STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER
PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO. The Courts Ruling

II
The petition is bereft of merit.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES
TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE
MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT. Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This

Case
III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY

ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM
CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente,
PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof
DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following
ACTS.
are compelling circumstances indicative of her American
IV
citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory
ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS
ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A
GRAVE ABUSE.[30] and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American

passport.[33]
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No.

163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had
failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as

an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the
shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of
outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to
Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines,
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of
provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the
Acknowledgment[34] in which she stated being an American
national law of the foreigner.[31] Second, the reckoning point is
citizen.
not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time

of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the
obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a
Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID)
Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept
Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its
of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this
face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she
jurisdiction.[32]
has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be

over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative
only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of
issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the
Justice of Rebeccas recognition pursuant to the Order of
granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court,
Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner
resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner
Edgar L. Mendoza.
Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce

judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID
February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of
Certificate No. RC 9778:
divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal
To Whom It May Concern:
effects?
 This is to certify that *MARIA
REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose
photograph and thumbprints are affixed
hereto and partially covered by the seal of
this Office, and whose other particulars are
as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date
of Birth: March 5, 1953
Sex: female Civil
Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of
Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on
face: none
was r e c o g n i z e d as a citizen of the
Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV,
Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935
Constitution per order of Recognition JBL
95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner
Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and
duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement
dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes
only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.
Given under my hand and seal
this 11th day of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988
issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the
following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1)
Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the
Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the
1stIndorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero
affirming Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen was
issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of
the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778
was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the
payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR
No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above
certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October
11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required
affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given
for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the
date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was
the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January
22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that
the certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for
recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the
DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under
Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987
Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec.
3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to provide immigration and
naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws
governing citizenship and the admission and stay of
aliens. Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of
Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is
required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-
002[35] on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration]
through its Records Section shall
automatically furnish the Department of
Justice an official copy of its Order of
Recognition within 72 days from its date of
approval by the way of indorsement for
confirmation of the Order by the Secretary
of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No.
292. No Identification Certificate shall be
issued before the date of confirmation
by the Secretary of Justice and any
Identification Certificate issued by the
Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition
shall prominently indicate thereon the date
of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca
of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days
after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the
1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be
too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of
close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said
affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized
as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that
ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in
1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates
that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date
of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically,
therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of
Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen through the
1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of

Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the

Rebeccas passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration

be exact. of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together

with Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition to

motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

Validity of Divorce Decree

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca

is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree
is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at
Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.
least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she

secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated,
the Dominican Republic.
Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument

that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point
represented herself in public documents as an American
out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for
citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and
declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City
shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern
RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her
her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said
alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that
divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the
petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996,
Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:
it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than

a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which
the parties expressly submit to the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the
existing incompatibility of temperaments x x
no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M.
BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42
only documents appended as annexes to said original petition
years of age, married, domiciled and
were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex A) and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang,
Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x,
Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex B). If indeed ID Certificate No. who personally appeared before this
court, accompanied by DR. JUAN
RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of
1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document
Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age,
be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her married and domiciled and residing at 502
Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa,
citizenship being crucial to her case? Filipino, appeared before this court
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO
TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of special power of attorney given the 19th of
February of 1996, signed before the Notary
absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of
Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him
the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate to subscribe all the acts concerning this
case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)
from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached

consisted of the following material documents: Marriage

Contract (Annex A) and Divorce Decree. It was only through

her Opposition (To Respondents Motion to Dismiss dated 31 Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was

May 2001)[36] did Rebecca attach as Annex C ID Certificate bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a

No. RC 9778. country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of

Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement[38] executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil
Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and
duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4,
1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was
valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding
in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized
here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as
valid under the national law of the alien spouse. [39] Be this as
successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment
may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be
an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to
actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as
such, is subject to proof to the contrary.[41]

it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel,
when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized
personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly
and allowed in any of the States of the Union,[40] the
represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens,
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as
decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican
here, sufficient.
Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both

Rebecca and Vicente.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce

decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly
parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the
recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000
divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on
affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6,
the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law,
1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone,
albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The
work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their
Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as
conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v.
we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a
Rodriguez:
divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the
Before our courts can give the effect of res countrys policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point
judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x
x x, it must be shown that the parties is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds obtained.[42]
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit: Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign
judgments.The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by
country, having jurisdiction to
Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this
pronounce the judgment is as
follows: jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree
obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente
(a) In case of a judgment
upon a specific thing, the is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of
judgment is conclusive upon the
matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no
title to the thing;
longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court
(b) In case of a judgment
against a person, the judgment is formally pronounced: [T]hat the marriage between MARIA
presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is
hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after
completing the legal requirements.[43]
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage,
Vicente could no longer be subject to a husbands obligation
under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to
live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
Rebecca.[44]
The divorce decree in question also brings into play
the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing
as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin
elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art.
26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements
for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.[45]
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need
not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and
Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed
citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil
Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed
on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as
regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that
the ex-couples conjugal property consisted only their family
home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that
the conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage
consists only of the real property and all
the improvements and personal properties
therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by
TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued
by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro
Manila registered in the name of Vicente M.
Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x
x.[46] (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement
was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second
divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997,
ordered that, THIRD: That the agreement entered into
between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in
Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of
divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are
hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every
provision of said agreement.[47]
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement
contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her
representation before the divorce court from asserting that her
and Vicentes conjugal property was not limited to their family
home in Ayala Alabang.[48]
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly
clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises,
cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v.
Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action,
thus:
A cause of action is an act or
omission of one party in violation of the
legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss
based on lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. The
allegations in a complaint are sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against the
defendants if, hypothetically admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance
 with the prayer therein. A cause of action
exists if the following elements are Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no
present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the
longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No.
plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an 155635, that is, Rebeccas right to support pendente lite. As it
obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part
of such defendant violative of the right of the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage
recovery of damages.[49]
for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebeccas WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No.
underlying petition before the RTC, Vicentes motion to dismiss 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness,
and Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the documentary while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25,
evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of
2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-
action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
presupposes the existence of a marriage. petitioner.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of SO ORDERED.

action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does not

exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is

ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.[50]With the valid foreign

divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie

binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be

dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal

obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of

their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he

had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the

support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note

that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached

the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before

her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She

would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support,

which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is

best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In

this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved

as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and

Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente

owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until

the child concerned shall have finished her education.

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN,
Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-
appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in
Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September
14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the
executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy
Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen
Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without
issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie
Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of
the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the
following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about
twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living
ascendants, and no descendants except my above
named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor
has she been at any time adopted by me, and who,
from all information I have now resides in Egpit,
Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00),
Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in
trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and
paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the
principal thereof as well as any interest which may
have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my
well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney),
now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the
income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the
executor in his final account and project of partition ratified
the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed
by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her
(Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she
having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary
thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two
acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was
alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the
deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several
foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the
Philippines and even if the case were decided in California,
Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that
the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen
having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the
decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the
time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a
citizen of the United States and of the State of California at
the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic
validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the
law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the
right to dispose of his property in the way he desires,
because the right of absolute dominion over his property is
sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl.
2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49
Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various
motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence,
this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD
OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY,
IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE
INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING
AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY
UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE
GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE
ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a
citizen of the United States and of the State of California at
the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the
time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as
witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself
in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to
probate, the facts of record show that the deceased
Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29,
1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival
in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher,
was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army
Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as
the City of San Francisco, in the State of California,
U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the
United States and stayed there for the following
nine years until 1913, during which time he resided
in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was
in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again
departed the Philippines for the United States and
came back here the following year, 1929. Some
nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his
own country, and came back to the Philippines the
following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their
case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was
interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in
April 1945, he left for the United States but returned
to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622,
as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs.
"MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July
21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned
once more to California shortly after the making of
his last will and testament (now in question herein)
which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila
on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's
Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp.
2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the
deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact
that he was born in New York, migrated to California and
resided there for nine years, and since he came to the
Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and
only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering
that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or
properties in that state, which would indicate that he would
State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many
shades of meaning from mere temporary presence
to the most permanent abode. Generally, however,
it is used to denote something more than mere
physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p.
29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship
that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by
his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the
United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased
appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California
by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in
accordance with the following principle expounded by
Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be
taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been
shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one
may be domiciled in a place where he has never
been. And he may reside in a place where he has
no domicile. The man with two homes, between
which he divides his time, certainly resides in each
one, while living in it. But if he went on business
which would require his presence for several weeks
or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a
resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
settlement as continuing only for the particular
business in hand, not giving up his former "home,"
he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition
of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of
intention as well as physical presence. "Residence
simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with
many shades of meaning, from the merest
temporary presence to the most permanent abode,
and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the
only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
 However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
determination of the meaning of the term "national law"is
used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of
the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens
only and in force only within the state. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can
not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general
American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law
of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing
the disposition of personal property? The decision of the
court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee
that under the California Probate Code, a testator may
dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl.
2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions
of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law
of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's
opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to
by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It
is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the
internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited
case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being
in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a
citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the
validity of the testamentary provision in question should be
referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is
the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various
authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When
the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference
to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus
its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The
Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is,
applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which
referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once
having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle
is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the
reference back should not have been to Michigan
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the
"endless chain of references" which has so often
been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of
the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal
law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the
reference back. Yet there seems no compelling
logical reason why the original reference should be
the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws
rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a
merry-go-round, but those who have accepted
the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by
getting off at the second reference and at that point
applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look
always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the
objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity
will result from adoption of their respective views.
And still more strange is the fact that the only way
to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem
is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form
the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to
whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both
reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the
case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected
the renvoi, judgment would have been against the
woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois
courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment
would be for the woman. The same result would
happen, though the courts would switch with
respect to which would hold liability, if both courts
accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two
instances: where the title to land is in question, and
where the validity of a decree of divorce is
challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule
of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties
in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any
further reference goes only to the internal law.
Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the
situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be
valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec.
7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate,
domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question
arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a
Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict
of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls
for an application of the law of the deceased's last
domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was
France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts
court to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in
French law, and decree a distribution accordingly.
An examination of French law, however, would
show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it
would refer the distribution to the national law of the
deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute
of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative
course of action: (a) either to apply the French law
 is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into
a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute
of distributions, on the assumption that this is what
a French court would do. If it accepts the so-
called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course,
thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is
presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws
rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to
the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower
sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31,
pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign
law is to be resorted to as governing a particular
case, the further question may arise: Are the rules
as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign
law also to be resorted to? This is a question which,
while it has been considered by the courts in but a
few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the
doctrine involved has been descriptively designated
by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung",
since an affirmative answer to the question
postulated and the operation of the adoption of the
foreign law in toto would in many cases result in
returning the main controversy to be decided
according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S.
872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi",
has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine
of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in
determining the question before it, must take into
account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but
also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply
the law to the actual question which the rules of the
other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of
the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally
been repudiated by the American authorities. (2
Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and
the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof.
Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-
1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are
quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the
rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of
the foreign state or country, but its rules of the
conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the
law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the
Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900,
in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country
as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the
contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which
disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute,
and desires that said personal statute shall
be determined by the law of the domicile,
or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign
systems of law, provided it be certain that
one of them is necessarily competent,
which agree in attributing the
determination of a question to the same
system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to
distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who
has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with
the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether
the law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of
domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would
make the distribution in accordance with the law of
nationality — that is the English law — he must
accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its
conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession
and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced
jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in
the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens
as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions.
The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in
the determination of matters with foreign element involved is
in accord with the general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which
follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one
or more states, and leaves a will directing the
manner of distribution of the property, the law of the
state where he was domiciled at the time of his
death will be looked to in deciding legal questions
about the will, almost as completely as the law of
situs is consulted in questions about the devise of
land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules
control devolution of the personal estate in case of
intestate succession, the same rules should
determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that
the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws
rules at the situs property, and the reason for the
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is
the general convenience of the doctrine. The New
York court has said on the point: 'The general
principle that a dispostiton of a personal property,
valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere,
is one of the universal application. It had its origin in
that international comity which was one of the first
fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business
intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more
apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law
of California. But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the
California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens
domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as
in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of
our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein,
and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no

law to the contrary in the place where the property is
situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law
to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said
Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should
govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained
in the various authorities cited above the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict
of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law
of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the
law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case
back to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will then be like
a football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and
the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply
its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state
of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially
as the application of the internal law of California provides no
legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and
894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156;

Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130;
and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees
to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at
bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case
does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United
States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not
appear in each case that there exists in the state of which
the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art.
946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased

Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law
of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby

reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law
on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs
against appellees.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA
BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors
appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees
E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law,
from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated
April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the
executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of
Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma
Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two
items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis
and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a
resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted
to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the
will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen
and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their
respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it
released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed
by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of
their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration,
the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition"
wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of
Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock
amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the
project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth"
clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided
the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit
of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and
second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to
him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964,
issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
executor's final account, report and administration and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it
applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is
Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been
denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which
law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor
even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court
in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963.
Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law
rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the
domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer
to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17
in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights;
(e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d)
the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
 However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may
he the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the

law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph

three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or

property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code

afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the
new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code
as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to
make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in
itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the
national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good

customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen
to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail
over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed

two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court
ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now
Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a

citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws
of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied
to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby

affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
 [G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the
Court of Appeals[1] modifying that of the Regional Trial Court,
Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City[2] declaring respondent
Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-
owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo
N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may have
acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived
together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted
serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to
September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula
Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married before
a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines
Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo
departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the
conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. [5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United
States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No.
5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District
Court, Southern District of New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American
Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the
U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.[7] He
discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in
and having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy
registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo
Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was not
legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank. [9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In
fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances
allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary
and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and
support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their
marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they
would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo
would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she
voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from
Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both
Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and
stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public
Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November
16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State
of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated
in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior
Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego
found all factual allegations to be true and issued an
interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became
final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente
in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who
did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as
husband and wife.[15] Their twenty-five (25) year union
produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed
Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and
Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador
M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano.In the
will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their
three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO
exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San
Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL
the personal properties and other movables or belongings
that may be found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R.
Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente
and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real
properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically
my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and
Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife
Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz
F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real
properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in
Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of
Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned
properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons,
but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by
and among themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole
executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her
default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in
the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her
lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or
testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or
published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of
mine in any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother
and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R.
Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or
personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to
each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament.[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and
allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo
moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his
estate.[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion
for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly
executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate. [20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be
terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court
a petition[22] for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate
in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos
surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired
during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his
property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her
legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate
proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance
of letters testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate
proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition
in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was
published in the newspaper Bicol Star.[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint
decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the
divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void
and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at
Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F.
Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is
denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share
from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of
paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula
Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13,
1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner
and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as
primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to
one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the
illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic)
Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also
entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of
the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the
corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor
upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00
conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three
(3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods,
chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any
time come to her possession or to the possession of any
other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and
discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or
such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by
this court; to render a true and just account of her
administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court and to perform all
orders of this court by her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for
want of evidence could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias
motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision,
stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate
or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted
by him.[29] Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial
court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of
Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-
third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the
Court of Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial
court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared
as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased
may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, [34] denied the
motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through
the various arguments raised,[36] the issue is simple. Who are
entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of
Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on
the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an
American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce
from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and
(4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
 Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are
necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the
Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of
Appeals and the trial court called to the fore
the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the
law of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of
New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it
made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that
American law follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine
law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will. [38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot
possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to
its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore
refer to no other than the law of the State of which the
decedent was a resident.[39] Second, there is no showing that
the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required
by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid
since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial
courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the
will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with
nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It
declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property
she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying
Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete
disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is
fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided
they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v.
Court of Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was no
longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from
petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable
and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce
obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the
Court of Appeals must be reversed.[43] We hold that the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter
of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left
to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic
or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring
ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to
his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the
will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since
he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit
from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed
in accordance with the formalities required is answered by
referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that
whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the
decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon
the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
 In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree
of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and
for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of
origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N.
Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional
rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the
trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle
the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules
of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.