Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PRIVATISATION OF THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY IN AFRICA
PAPER PRESENTED
AT THE
8th INTERNATIONAL ARAB IRON AND STEEL CONFERENCE
HELD AT
DOHA, QATAR
17TH‐ 19TH MARCH 2008
BY
DR. SANUSI A. MOHAMMED (FNMS)
THE SECRETARY – GENERAL
OF
AFRICAN IRON AND STEEL ASSOCIATION (AISA)
ABUJA‐NIGERIA
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Privatization as a strategy for economic management was given momentum after
Chile’s successful return of public assets to the private sector operators in the
early 1970s. Consequently, the new economic paradigm aimed at shifting
functions and responsibilities in whole or in part from government to private
sector became the order of the day. The objective was for more efficient
management of the economy devoid of government interference. This idea seems
to be the driving force that made many governments to imbibe the idea in every
field of economic activity, including iron and steel industry.
In the developed countries however, where the economy is privately driven, the
governments institute regulatory frame work and control mechanisms for each
private sector operations. More‐so that the strategic sector economic activity in
such countries is initially wholly government driven. It is only after attaining
satisfactory level of proficiency and performance that the private sector is invited
to participate, in developing specific sectors in the economy, having been given
due encouragement and incentives.
Experience has now shown that privatization, when hurriedly applied without
following the laid down guidelines, can bring about negative results leading to
asset stripping, cannibalization, unemployment, low employee morale and capital
flight culminating in re‐nationalization of the enterprise.
This paper is an attempt to identify successful and unsuccessful privatization
exercises in the iron and steel industries in Africa. The paper dwells more on
Nigeria because of the clear demonstration of how a beautifully designed
privatization policy is so poorly implemented which results in typical un‐successful
privatization exercise.
2.0 IRON AND STEEL COMPANIES PRIVATISATION IN AFRICA
2.1 South Africa
The south African Government drew up methodology and guidelines in which
they identify communication as one of the most important attributes in a period
of privatization. If workers are uncertain about their future, they will probably be
less productive than they ought to be. Personnel should be kept informed
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throughout the transitional period, and should be reassured of their importance
in achieving the desired objective in order to keep morale at high level.
Funds obtained from the selling of state assets will be used to reduce debts and
to support the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). The government
will invest the income from privatization in such a way that the physical results of
these investments will be seen, for example implementing its RDP.
The first parastatal to be privatized was ISCOR. This was not a difficult task
because this entity was already being managed like a private company. This
privatization was approved after three separate investigations by ISCOR itself,
Senbank and the Finance Bank. ISCOR did an internal investigation in April 1988.
It appointed Senbank as its private consultant and the State appointed the
Finance Bank. Together these two financial institutions were asked to make
acceptable price estimates. In February 1989, the State declared that it was going
to privatize its shareholdings in ISCOR (Saayman 1989:34 Cf Office for Public
Enterprises 1995).
Initial reaction from the employees and the management were rather skeptical.
Employees feared job losses. The management realized that privatization would
not have any influence on the business philosophy of the entity, because the
enterprise was structured according to the Companies Act of 1973 and was
managed like a private entity. It was also decided that the shareholder’s structure
should be spread as widely as possible to prevent any single company or person
taking control of South Africa’s Iron and Steel production (Saayan 1989:36‐49).
An extensive marketing campaign was launched to change the perceptions of
both the public and employees. The task of the management was to provide
information to all interest groups and also to create awareness that shares would
be available to the general public. Management also tried to keep the more than
58,000 workers informed of all developments. A shareholding scheme for
workers was developed and information and training sessions in shareholding
were initiated. Management personnel were also trained in privatization at
special seminars. Publications, intensive press campaigns and interviews with
financial analysts and the top management were used for marketing purposes. A
visit of 20 overseas bankers and company clients was arranged to inform them of
the developments and implications of privatization. In the end ISCOR was
successfully sold for R3.7 billion (Saayan 1989:53‐59. Cf Coetzee 1994:43).
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The South African government is cautious when it comes to replacing public
monopolies with private ones, because this could lead to a possible alienation of
civil servants and a potential increase in unemployment.
To win civil servants over to the idea of privatization, government must offer
them assurances that staff reductions will be achieved through voluntary
retirement or attrition.
Employees who retired were not replaced; some resigned voluntarily: and
different duties were combined to eliminate the need to hire additional staff.
2.2 Zimbabwe
The Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) was rehabilitated by the
Government, against the usual negative advice of the World Bank, having been
seriously vandalized by the rapacious, then out‐going colonial masters who
established the company in the 1950s.
ZISCO resumed production and had reached 80% capacity utilization (of the 1
million tonne annual capacity) before the government put the company back on
the privatization table ready to divest to the tune of 75%. This was disrupted and
frustrated by political intrigues.
2.3 Egypt
The Egyptian Iron and Steel Company (EISCO) has been in existence for over 50
years now and is wholly owned and operated by the Egyptian Government as a
public concern. The recent idea of privatizing the company was brought up with
the same stereo‐type World Bank/IMF findings that the Company has been
declaring losses annually. The Government noted the findings but counter it that
profitability is not only measured in terms of the accountant’s balance sheet.
Multiplier effect, technological, security, social, and socio‐economic potentials of
an enterprise are greater indices in measuring profitability. Nearly 10 years on,
EISCO still remains a public enterprise.
The second integrated steel company, the Alexandria Iron and Steel Company
(ANSDK), using the Direct Reduction technology, has been privatized already.
ANSDK’s main shareholders include a number of Egyptian public sector companies
(64%), its Employees (14%), a Japanese Consortium (JC‐10%) composed of all
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Nippon Kokan, Kobe Steel and Toyo Menka Kaisha (renamed Tormen) and IFC
(5%). In November 1997, the Company decided to increase its capital in two
tranches in order to partly finance the proposed flat steel project. A number of
public sector shareholders refrained from participating in the first tranche, which
was implemented in December 1997, thereby diluting their combined
shareholding from 64% to about 56%. Public sector shareholding further
decreased to less than 50% after the second tranche of the capital increase was
mobilized. New private shareholders include Schloemann – Siemag AG (SMS) of
Germany, a major steel equipment supplier, which own about 1.5% of ANSDK’s
capital. The JC maintained its shareholding at 10%, while the Employees
increased their share to about 16%.
The project Cost about US$625 million (including an IFC ‘A’ loan of US$60 million,
a ‘B’ loan of about US$100 million and an equity investment of about US$11
million equivalent thereby maintaining IFC’s shareholding of 5%).
2.4 Lakshmi Nivas Mittal (LNM) in Africa
In 2001 the LNM Group took a 70 per cent stake in Algerian company Ispat
Annaba. Similarly, it has a 47 per cent stake in ISCOR, a South African Steel
Company, and plans to invest a total of around US$500 million. It has equally
signed mining Rights agreement for the iron ore deposit in Liberia while it has
bought up two steel mills in Mozambique with plan to further get involved in coal
and iron ore mining in the country. It is gratifying to note that the investment
expansion plan in to sub Saharan Africa forms a fundamental expansion strategy
of the real Mittal.
Other opportunities exist in Africa in terms of iron ore and other relevant mineral
deposits and the steel industry. We hope Mr Lakshmi Mittal will extend his wings
to these areas, including Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo Brazzaville, Libya,
Republic of Guinea, Mauritania and Nigeria. Already the Chinese and Qatar have
shown interest in the Mauritanian iron ore in which the Qatar Government has
invested US$360 million in realization of such venture.
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2.5 Nigeria
Nigeria made a second attempt at privatization by inaugurating the National
Council on Privatization (NCP) in 1999. During the inauguration ceremony, the
President of Nigeria presented an inaugural speech, part of which is hereby
reproduced:
“Up till recently, there have been many years of exhaustive deliberations by
stakeholders on how to put the Nigerian economy on the path of sustainable
growth and development. Right now, a consensus has emerged on the
imperative of privatization and commercialization of State‐owned enterprises”.
Mr. President considered the inauguration of the NCP to be very significant:
“Firstly, it is a critical step in our Administration’s socio‐economic agenda.
Secondly, it is a demonstration of our commitment to institutional reforms.
Thirdly, the response of stakeholders in the months ahead will enable us
determine, with a great measure of accuracy, the extent to which we have
regained international faith and confidence in our country in general and in our
economy in particular”.
He conceded that the problems associated with State‐owned enterprises and
monopolies were universal and not peculiar to Nigeria. He then proceeded to
enumerate them:
“State enterprises suffer from fundamental problems of defective capital
structure, excessive bureaucratic control or intervention, inappropriate
technology, gross incompetence and mismanagement, blantant corruption and
crippling complacency which monopoly engenders. Inevitably, these
shortcomings take a heavy toll on the national economy”
The President then prescribed a cure:
“It is true, however, that many developing countries have overcome the
problems through a well designed and single‐minded pursuit of privatization
program. The rationale is that privatization permits governments to concentrate
resources on their core functions and responsibilities, while enforcing the “rules
of the game” so that the markets can work efficiently, with provision of
adequate security and basic infrastructure, as well as assuring access to key
services like education, health and environmental protection.”
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He also gave some assurances.
(i) “We are privatizing for the benefit of our economic recovery and our
social life. We are not embarking on this exercise to please the World
Bank or the IMF”
(ii) “It is not designed to share our national assets to a few rich people.
We are not about to replace public monopoly with private monopoly”.
(iii) “… we want to remove the financial burden which these enterprises
constitute on the public and release resources for the essential
functions of government”.
(iv) “We want to ensure that many more service providers are brought in
to compete and thereby regulate the market for fairer pricing. We
want to ensure that these utilities work and deliver quality services.”
(v) “The process will avoid any possibility of further hardship to the public.
A vigorous public enlightenment programme will ensure that as many
Nigerians as possible do participate in the programme”.
(vi) “The process will be transparent and guided throughout by the best
interest of the country and the Nigerian public…. As part of the efforts
to ensure transparency, our Privatization Programme will involve
international privatization advisers. This will not only enhance
credibility but also guarantee access to the special skills and
knowledge required for handling the Privatization of utilities. It is
expected that the international advisers working with Nigerian
professionals will help to provide the desired investment climate.”
(vii) “Privatization is also one of the reforms we have to undertake to
integrate our economy into the mainstream of world economic order.
There are two inter‐related aspects of this integration. In the first
place, we need the technology; the managerial competence and the
capital from the developed world to enhance the performance of our
utilities. Another group that will be involved will be Core Group
Investors. These are experienced groups with the capabilities of
adding value to enterprise and making it operate efficiently in the face
of international competition. They should also possess the capabilities
of turning around the fortune of such unhealthy enterprises. The Core
Groups must not only possess the technical know‐how in relation to
the activities of the enterprises they wish to invest in but also possess
the financial capacity to pay competitive price for the enterprise and
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increase their capital base…. Secondly, there are very serious linkages
between the efficient functioning of our utilities and our ability to
attract foreign investments. We cannot be talking about creating a
conducive environment for foreign investments if the performance of
our transport, telecommunication and energy sectors remain dismal
and epileptic”.
This is where privatization began and ended in Nigeria. SLOGANS!
There are three public steel rolling mills at Jos, Oshogbo and Katsina which have
been liquidated some 3 years ago. The companies were subsequently sold to
private entrepreneurs at ridiculous prices. The Katsina Steel Rolling mill is the only
one that has been producing epileptically, and has never exceeded 10% of
capacity utilization following the privatization exercise. Oshogbo and Jos have not
commercially produced 1 kg of rolled products till date.
Metals industry privatization in Nigeria so far involves giving away the steel plant
assets to incompetent private companies, with very marginal participation by
Nigerians.
In privatization exercises in the metals industry it is strongly advocated that there
must be provision for participation by the public in the form of buying shares in
these companies, with special provisions made for the staff of the parastatals and
their unions. Such participation, as demonstrated in the South African example,
helps to legitimize the privatization process and to enhance transparency in the
subsequent operation of the resulting new companies.
Despite government platitudes, little or no concern is given to workers’ welfare.
Pleas by workers and workers’ unions that all staff of the plants privatized should
be paid their severance packages, while those continuing in the service of the new
owners/management should be engaged on clean slates, have fallen on deaf ears.
This has resulted in a number of worker apathy and low morale, shut downs,
demonstrations, kidnapping of management staff and threats. Answering these
pleas would have lead to industrial harmony that would have aided in the take‐off
of these plants as desired by all.
There is lack of transparency in the privatization exercise.
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2.6 A Tale of Two ISPATS
The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) announced (in August, 2004) that a
concession agreement had been signed between the Government and Ispat (an
Indian based company). When the dust settled, it was discovered that the
agreement was actually signed with a company called Global Infrastructure
Holdings Limited (GIHL)/Global Infrastructure Nigeria Limited (GINL) and not with
Ispat, as announced by the Government. Subsequently, a company that claims to
be Ispat has taken over the Ajaokuta Steel Company Management; this fact was
proclaimed on billboards at the Ajaokuta Steel Plant site at the inception of the
concession agreement. To compound the confusion, there are two different
organizations called “Ispat”. A brief statement on their genesis follow:
Ispat, an Indian company, was a family business which has been involved in iron
and steel operation and trading as its major business activity. The company was
later broken in to two. One of the children of the original founder of Ispat, Mr
Lakshmi Nivas Mittal, owns Ispat International Limited (the LNM Group) while the
other, Mr Pramod K Mittal became the Chairman of the Indian based business,
the Ispat Industries Limited (IIL). These are two separate companies with separate
legal identities.
The Ispat International is at the time regarded as the second world’s largest steel
producer with an estimated annual production of over 44million tonnes of steel
and turn over in excess of US$15 billion in 2004.
This company was also the largest producer and consumer of Direct Reduced Iron
(DRI) in the world. This Group had over 150,000 employees working in its steel
making operations in several countries in the world, including United States of
America, Canada, Mexico, Trinidad, Germany, France, Kazakhstan, South Africa,
Romania, Czech Republic and Indonesia.
On the other hand, Mr Pramod K Mittal is the Executive Chairman of Ispat
Industries Limited (IIL), a steel business with annual production of about 3 million
tones of steel, and an annual turnover of about US$750 million. The IIL is claimed
to have a total workforce of about 16,100 employees spread over 4 countries
(excluding Nigeria).
It is alleged that the IIL was facing a probe in its home base, India, for fraud and
tax evasion. The company was also alleged to have been referred, by the Indian
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Department of Company Affairs (DCA), to the Serious Frauds Investigation Office
(SFIO). Mr Pramod Mittal (a non resident Indian) is having trouble paying back a
loan of several hundreds of millions of US dollars.
Global Infrastructure Holdings Limited (GIHL) is claimed to be a holding company
of IIL. GIHL was incorporated in the Isle of Man. It came in to Nigeria less than one
year when the Government concessioned Ajaokuta Steel Company to it. Within
six months, the National Iron Ore Mining Company at Itakpe was also
concessioned to it. With quick succession, the Delta Steel Company was sold to
GIHL, and the Standard gauge rail link between Itakpe and Warri was also
concessioned to the same company. All in all within three years GIHL has
captured the entire Nigerian Nation. Not much is known about GIHL in the steel
world let alone its Nigerian counterpart, Global Infrastructure Nigeria Limited, to
warrant the qualification to rehabilitate, complete, commission and operate
Ajaokuta Steel Project let alone the compendium of the goodies that were dashed
out to them .
The Nigerian Government did not put in place an efficient and effective regulatory
mechanism to monitor and control the implementation of the agreement even
though the agreement itself was totally skewed in favour of GIHL to the detriment
of Nigeria.
The Nigerian Government was inundated with complains, petitions, and
incidences that confirm the lack of competence of GIHL to bring in the much
needed capital investment and positive turn‐around in to the country. They also
lack technical and managerial competence. The Company has resorted to
cannibalization, asset stripping, vandalization, un‐wholesome engineering
practices, capital flight and lack of sincerity of purpose.
Available records have shown that GIHL has mortgaged the title deeds of the
Nigerian companies they are managing and raised about US$200 million from
Nigerian banks, and have also repatriated over US$17 million out of the country.
This compelled the Nigerian Government to institute an administrative panel of
enquiry (to establish or exonerate GIHL) in November, 2007. The panel has since
submitted its report to the Government. Part of the findings and
recommendations of the Committee has been published in a Nigerian daily news
paper, and is hereby reproduced:
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LEADERSHIP NEWS PAPER OF 20TH FEBRUARY, 2008, PAGE 33.
“”AJAOKUTA STEEL: Indian Steel Company Sets to LOSE CONCESSION
The crisis that have been rocking the nation’s steel sector may well be at its end,
as Indian steel giant, the Global Infrastructure Holding (Nig.) Limited, would be
stripped off the rights of control over the Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited (ASCL)
and the Nigerian Iron Ore Mining Company (NIOMCO).
This follows the recommendation of the committee set up by the Federal
Government to probe the concession and later purchase agreement between
government and GIHL on the two steel companies to terminate the agreement
with immediate effect.
It would be recalled that the minister of mines and steel development, Chief
Sarafadeen Isola, had, on the orders from the presidency, set up a 5‐man
committee on October 30, 2007 to look into the Concession and Share
Sale/Purchase Agreement that was entered into between government and the
Indian steel company.
LEADERSHIP can authoritatively report that the report of the Mallam Magaji Inua‐
led committee, which is coming out nearly three months after it was originally
billed to be submitted six weeks from the day of the committee’s inauguration,
spells doom for the Indian company. Part of the report, which agreed that the
agreement was not in the over‐all interests of the country, reads: “An overview of
the agreement reveals that the covenants were largely skewed in favour of the
Concessionaire (GIHL) to the detriment of the government. The panel viewed the
conditionality of submission of Business Development Plan five months after
assuming full management and control of the company as not to the best interest
of the nation as this gave room for complacency. Three years after assuming full
control, no workable Business Plan has been submitted to the FGN by the
Concessionaire”. Noting the failure of the whole agreement, the report said that
“The basic purpose of the ASCL Agreement is to rehabilitate, complete,
commission and operate the Ajaokuta Steel Plant with a view of producing liquid
steel within 12 months, increase the production capacity, maintain the existing
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facilities of the township for the employees, complete the balance of the civil
engineering works necessary for the completion of the project and to submit
within five months of the date execution of this agreement, an initial Project
Business Plan to the Ministry. From all indications, the basic purpose of the
agreement has been defeated as none of those stipulations has been satisfactorily
carried out”.
It further disclosed that members of the committee also observed that there were
so many clauses in the agreement that dispossessed the federal government of
powers, and, therefore, recommended that in future, agreements of such nature
should be drawn and vetted by the office of the Attorney General of the
Federation (AGF).
It also reported that the agreement required GIHL to pay a concession fee of 1 per
cent of turn‐over annually to government, but the panel could not establish the
annual turn‐over of the company due to lack of records, adding that there was no
evidence that GIHL had paid any concession fee to date.
The panel observed that the company adopted an unwholesome accounting
practice by running ASCL and NIOMCO and Delta Steel Company, Aladja as one
financial unit, differentiating them only with ‘Memorandum Records’, and noted
that this contravened Provision 7.1 of the Concession Agreement.
The committee members also reported several other breeches of the covenants
of the agreement like cannibalization and vandalisation of plants and equipment,
dangerous engineering practices bordering on lack of maintenance, exporting
premium scraps imported for the project by government.””
2.7 Private Monopoly
The Nigerian Government, between 1999 and 2007 were encouraging the
transfer of public monopoly to private monopoly even though the Presidential
NCP inauguration speech clearly stated “it is not designed to share our national
assets to a few rich people. We are not about to replace public monopoly with
private monopoly”.
The GIHL were given concession of (1) Ajaokuta Steel Company (a 1.3 million
tonne capacity blast furnace/basic oxygen plant) and (2) the National Iron Ore
Mining Company at Itakpe. (3) Delta Steel Company, a 1.0 million tonne capacity
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Midrex‐DR plant, was out‐rightly sold to them at less than 0.2% of the cost of
building the plant. (4) The only standard gauge railway link in Nigeria between
Itakpe and Warri (Delta Steel Company) was concessioned to GIHL. (5) The same
company was given Warri port as well as (6) the Sapele power plant. (7) On top of
all these GIHL was given 160,000 barrels of oil lifting right every day. (8) They
were also given 2 oil blocks in addition to (9) assortment of 19 mining licenses to
mine several solid mineral deposits all over the country. (10) To cap it all they
were given host of wavers and grants as well as the repatriation of unlimited
quantum of money out of Nigeria.
With all these the President believes he is not transferring public monopoly to
private monopoly. God save Nigeria!
The privatization exercise in Nigeria has been so full of lack of transparency and
beclouded in corrupt practices that the post 2007 Government is now re‐
nationalizing some of the enterprises including the Nigerian National Petroleum
Company’s Kaduna refinery and Port Harcourt refinery, the Nigerian
Telecommunications (NITEL), and Nigerian Insurance Company (NICON).
From indication many more are soon to follow suit.
Globalization of macro‐economies of developing countries through the
instrumentality of privatization has created a peculiar challenge to the stake‐
holders in the metal industry in Africa because the policy is not designed to
develop the productive capacity of the countries’ economy since it de‐emphasizes
the role of the state as a leading and controlling factor in the economy.
Even in the developed capitalist economies, their governments have intervened
from time to time to protect the industry as was the case of introduction of a
regime of import restrictions and trade tariffs to protect the steel industry in the
United States in 2000 and 2003 against major European and Asian steel exporters.
Privatization as prescribed by the World Bank/IMF and championed by their
lackeys and pseudo‐intellectuals in the continent as a policy option has created
the profound economic dislocation in Africa leading to socio‐ethnic crisis and
political instability.
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The UNDP reports of 1994, 2001, 2003 and even the World Bank, in a self
indictment report of 2003, clearly shows that the development models prescribed
for Africa have failed to bring development in these societies.
3.0 CONCLUSION
From the above, it can be seen that the privatization exercise in South Africa and
Egypt has followed due process and is a success case, while that of Nigeria is
laden with arbitrariness, insincerity and fraud exhibiting a typical case of
unsuccessful privatization model.
The Zimbabwean exercise could not be classified as there are definite external
forces that are working against the effort of the Government.
With the incoming of Lakshmi Nivas Mittal in to Africa, he has shown that with
good intent and sincerity, Africa can be a gold mine in terms of investment in the
iron and steel sector.
At this juncture, a quote from some relevant statements is apt, which we hope
will guide the developing countries in the quest for privatization:
1. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, elected president of Brazil in 1994, has rejected the view
that “…..One cannot make the private sector the universal salvation, because it is not.
The market does not solve the problem of misery. The problem of poverty has to be
solved along the lines of coordinated actions by the state”.
2. A famous Nigerian economist, Dr Pious Okigbo, observed that:
“It is also presumed that in this free market world, domestic national economic
relations would be deregulated and privatised to give government no more than
minimal function in the national economy…. Multinationals and trans‐nationals
organise cross border economic activities leading to their greater growth and to the
weakening of the already weak institutions in the developing world. Acting as if they
are not subject to any national rules or laws, they appear to be a government of their
own obeying only their laws of growth and decay, and accountable to no one even in
their own country.
They are now pressurising the developing countries to relax their guards and liberalise
their economies, meaning by that to edge out government from intervening or
participating directly in economic activity and to rely primarily on the forces of the
market; but there is no convincing proof that such liberalisation will, of necessity,
promote growth at rates sufficient to meet the needs of these countries. The
developing countries must therefore re‐assess their attitude to globalisation and
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liberalisation and define for themselves how they can not merely exist in a global
world but participate in it as full members.
Globalisation carries with it some incipient risks that must be recognised. First, since
the members of the global community are unequal, the gains accruing to each partner
are unequal. Second, players with inadequate support of purchasing power get
excluded from the so called free market. The market is free only to those with
purchasing power. The developing world is urged to open their markets for the free
entry of products from industrialised countries and, at the same time, strive to produce
more for export to the industrialised countries. The two movements are neither
symmetrical nor synchronous. The preparations required to mitigate the worst
features of dumping in, and disorganisation of, the local market by free entry of
industrial products are not the same as those required to prepare the developing
country for export led growth. Third, the market may be free for the movement of
finance and capital but certainly not for the physical movement of labour across
national boundaries. It is ironical that the most important factor, labour, is debarred
from operating globally as the countries of the industrialised North set stricter and
stricter barriers to entry of labour from the less developed countries. In the light of all
this, there is urgent need not for government to withdraw entirely but to intervene for
the purpose of strategic integration into the global economy”.
Privatization when properly implemented is certainly an engine of economic
growth, but when hurriedly and selfishly designed and implemented it leads to
economic and social catastrophe as witnessed in Nigeria and indeed other African
countries today. Africa is certainly not yet ready for privatization, the World Bank
way!
His Excellency
Dr. Sanusi Alhaji Mohammed (FNMS)
Executive Secretary General
AFRICAN IRON AND STEEL ASSOCIATION
19B Suez Crescent, Wuse Zone 4, P. M. B 268 Garki
Abuja‐ Nigeria
Telephone:+234‐9‐523 3170, 523 2135 Fax: +234‐9‐523 3275
Website: www.afristeel.org e‐mail: afristeel@afristeel.org
afristeel@yahoo.com
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