TITLE: People vs.

Salafranca
CITATION: 666 SCRA 501, G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012
TOPIC: Dying declaration

FACTS:
S was charged with murder for stabbing B. During trial, the testimony of E, B’s uncle, was presented.
According to E, B went to E’s residence to seek help right after being stabbed in the chest. E brought B to
the hospital and on the way there, E asked B who stabbed him, and the latter answered that his assailant
was S. That time, B seemed to be having a hard time breathing. About ten minutes after his admission at
the hospital, B died.

Is B’s dying declaration admissible in evidence?

ANSWER:
Yes.

For a dying declaration to be admissible, the following requisites must concur: (a) that the declaration
must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant
is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder,
or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.

In this case, B communicated his ante-mortem statement to E, identifying S as the person who had
stabbed him. At the time of his statement, B was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a
stab wound in the chest and was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. B’s belief in the
imminence of his death can be shown by the his own statements. B would have been competent to testify
on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal
prosecution for murder in which B was the victim.
TITLE: People vs. Sabio
CITATION: 102 SCRA 218, No. L-26193 January 27, 1981
TOPIC: Dying declaration

FACTS:
An information for robbery with homicide was filed against X. During trial, one of the police officers
testified that when he asked the victim who had hacked him, the latter answered that it was X. The
statement was taken down in a detached leaf from a calendar and was thumbmarked by the victim with
his own blood. X objected to the admissibility of the declaration on the ground that it was not made under
a consciousness of an impending death because the victim had hopes of recovery tor his first word to his
grandnephew was for the latter to fetch the police. Is X’s contention tenable?

ANSWER:
No.

Case law provides that the probative force of a dying declaration does not depend on the declarant not
dying immediately after its execution. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible.

In this case, the fact that the victim died three days after the declaration was made will not alter its
probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant dies immediately thereafter. Further, the fact
that the victim told his grandnephew to fetch the police, does not negate the victim’s feeling of
hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the realization that he had so little time to disclose his
assailant to the authorities.
TITLE: People vs. Laquinon
CITATION: 135 SCRA 91, No. L-45470 February 28, 1985
TOPIC: Dying declaration

FACTS:
X was charged with the crime of murder for killing P. P did not immediately die and was able to make a
statement. P positively identified that it was X who shot him. When he was asked “Do you think you’ll die
with your wound?”, he answered “I don’t know.” X argues that the statement is inadmissible in evidence
as an ante-mortem declaration because it was not executed under a consciousness of an impending
death.

Is the statement admissible as a dying declaration?

ANSWER:
No.

Case law provides that where the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not, his dying
declaration is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration.

In the case at bar, the dying declaration of P is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the
deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die nor not. The declaration fails to show that the
deceased believed himself in extremis, “at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct,”
which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule.