Professional Documents
Culture Documents
:
____________________________________________________________
MARKEITH LOYD
Petitioner
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
Respondent
_____________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
Terence Lenamon
Fla. Bar. No. 970476
245 SE 1st Street, Suite 404
Miami, Florida 33131
Phone: 305-373-9911
Fax: 305-503-6973
Email: terry@lenamonlaw.com
Counsel for Petitioner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDEX OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
CERITIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
i
INDEX OF APPENDICES
ii
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases
Barnhill v. State
834 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Carey v. Piphus
435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Chastine v. Broome
629 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Chillingsworth v. State
846 So.2d 674 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Crosby v. State
97 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Dickenson v. Parks
104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459 (1932) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Fischer v. Knuck
497 So.2d 240 (Fla.1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Frengel v. Frengel
880 So.2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
In re Henderson
22 So.3d 58 (Fla. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 19
In re Murchison
349 U.S. 133 (1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7, 10
iii
Kielbania v. Jasberg
744 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 14
Livingstone v. State
441 So.2d 1083 (Fla. 1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Love v. State
569 So.2d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Marcotte v. Gloeckner
679 So.2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Martin v. State
804 So.2d 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Michaud-Berger v. Hurley
607 So.2d 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Pearson v. Pearson
870 So.2 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Rose v. State
601 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16, 20
Siegel v.State
861 So.2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
State v. McClain
572 So.2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16
iv
State v. Steele
348 So.2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Suarez v. Dugger
527 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Taylor v. Hayes
418 U.S. 488 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Other Authorities
v
I. INTRODUCTION
petitions this Court for a writ of prohibition restraining the Honorable Frederick
Lauten, Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for
This petition follows the denial of a timely filed motion for disqualification
where Mr. Loyd established that he is fearful that he will not receive a fair trial, or
that he will suffer prejudice or bias from the court. This petition is premised on the
Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Code of
Judicial Conduct, all of which require that a judge disqualify himself once the
defendant has established a reasonable fear that he will not obtain a fair hearing.
See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330; Fla. Stat. §§ 38.02, 38.10; Fla. Code Jud. Conduct,
Canon 3.
Article V, section 4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, and under Rule 9.100 and
proper remedy to test the validity of the denial of a motion for the disqualification
of a judge. See Pearson v. Pearson, 870 So.2 248, 248-250 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
1
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 13, 2016, Sade Dixon was shot and killed, and her unborn
child died, as a result. Markeith Loyd is presently charged with these murders via
Department was shot and killed. Mr. Loyd is presently charged with this murder
enforcement officers from local, state, and federal agencies was undertaken in an
attempt to locate and arrest Mr. Loyd. On January 17, 2017, at approximately 7pm,
Mr. Loyd was arrested and taken into custody. During the course of the arrest, Mr.
Loyd suffered serious injuries to his head, which caused him to lose his eye after
Frederick Lauten is the Chief Judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for
Orange County, Florida. Beginning on January 9, 2017, and until January 19, 2017,
Chief Judge Lauten was the only judge utilized by local police in obtaining
2
warrants related to the instant cases. During that time he reviewed numerous
affidavits for search warrants detailing both the Dixon and Clayton homicides, and
he signed the corresponding warrants. Those occurred on January 9, 10, and 17,
Unbeknownst to Mr. Loyd until recently, Chief Judge Lauten also reviewed
Chief Judge Lauten signed the corresponding orders authorizing the requested
wiretaps. Those occurred on January 11, 13, 15, and 19, 2017. These applications
targeted family and friends of Mr. Loyd, and Mr. Loyd himself was named
Loyd and others were intercepted by law enforcement officers. Appendix, Tab 4,
Tab 16. Mr. Loyd was not informed of these wiretap applications, affidavits, and
warrants until late November 2018. On January 17, 2017, Chief Judge Lauten
issued a warrant for a pen register and a trap and trace device for Mr. Loyd‟s
phone. Appendix, Tab 5. Again, Mr. Loyd was not informed of this warrant and
the application for warrant until late November 2018. Per the wiretap orders, Chief
Judge Lauten also received at least one weekly report regarding the wiretaps. This
3
occurred between the dates of January 11 – 17, 2017. This includes recorded
On January 18, 2017, the Administrative Judge for the Criminal Division of
the Ninth Judicial Circuit issued an order in Mr. Loyd‟s first case, Case No. 2016-
CD-01573-A-O (the murder of Sade Dixon and her unborn child) stating:
Mr. Loyd‟s phone number. On that same date, Chief Judge Lauten signed an order
authorizing the requested wiretap. This order also retroactively approved and
Department Detective Michael Moreschi, the affiant for the wiretap affidavits, later
confirmed that the 407-793-7288 was known to be Mr. Loyd‟s phone. Appendix,
4
Tab 8, pg. 258. As with all the other wiretap material, Mr. Loyd was not informed
2018.
Also on January 19, 2017, Chief Judge Lauten reviewed an affidavit for
arrest warrant for Mr. Loyd. The affidavit was sworn before Chief Judge Lauten,
As noted, it wasn‟t until November 2018 that Mr. Loyd learned of the
investigating Mr. Loyd‟s cases, it was discovered that wiretap notices were
provided to some of Mr. Loyd‟s friends and family members at some point in
2017. On November 20, 2018, Mr. Loyd filed a motion to compel production of
the wiretap notifications sent to his friends and family members. Subsequently,
defense counsel obtained a copy of a letter sent by the Orlando Police Department
to Jacqueline Hoilie. The letter, dated April 20, 2017, was a Notice of Inventory
regarding a telephone wiretap. The letter identified Chief Judge Lauten as the
person that authorized the wiretap, and it also listed Mr. Loyd as one of the parties
pending motions in Mr. Loyd‟s cases. During this hearing, Chief Judge Lauten
5
explained that he had previously (presumably in January 2017) directed the
Administrative Judge to assign Mr. Loyd‟s cases to him. Judge Lauten stated:
I don't really think I'm obligated to disclose this, but you raised it, and
I'm comfortable sharing it with you.
There were administrative discussions within the court about how the
impact that a case of this size would have on a judge handling a full
docket of other cases, and I talked to the administrative judge in
criminal, Judge Lisa Munyon, about the impact it would have and
decided that I would take the case because I don't have that kind of
docket, although I have a lot of responsibilities as chief judge. And so,
after conversation with the administrative judge in circuit criminal
about the impact of this case, I decided just send it to me and had her
enter the administrative order to transfer it to me. It was done for
efficiency and so that the other judges in the circuit could operate a
full caseload while this case was pending. So that's how this case
ended up with me.
At the November 27, 2018, hearing, the State acknowledged that there was a
discovery violation concerning the wiretap materials. Appendix, Tab 11, pg. 287.
All wiretap material, including applications, affidavits, and orders discussed herein
were not disclosed to Mr. Loyd until Friday, November 30, 2018, nearly two years
after the Mr. Loyd was charged with multiple counts of first degree murder. Tab
12.
the trial court. Appendix, Tab 13. In the motion, Mr. Loyd argued that
6
disqualification was required for a number of reasons, including the inconsistency
between the explanation given in the administrative order reassigning Mr. Loyd‟s
case and Chief Judge Lauten‟s own explanation as to why the case was transferred
to him, as well as other actions taken by Chief Judge Lauten, such as his numerous
communications with law enforcement concerning the wiretap warrants, and his
failure to ensure that Mr. Loyd received timely notice of those communications.
Appendix, Tab 13. On December 10, 2018, the State filed a response to the motion
to disqualify. Appendix, Tab 14. On December 10, 2018, Chief Judge Lauten
entered an order denying the motion for disqualification. Appendix, Tab 15.
that is reviewed by the appellate court de novo. Barnhill v. State, 834 So.2d 836,
843 (Fla. 2002); Aberdeen Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bristol Lakes
V. ARGUMENT
requirement of due process. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136-137 (1955).
Due process guarantees the right to a neutral, detached judiciary in order “to
7
convey to the individual a feeling that the government has dealt with him fairly, as
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978). Rules of law are meaningless unless they are
administered and applied by a fair court. The “legitimacy of the Judicial Branch
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
A litigant may file a motion to disqualify a trial judge where he fears that he
will not receive a fair trial or hearing due to a judge‟s prejudice or bias. Fla. R. Jud.
the facts are reasonably sufficient to create a well-founded fear in the mind of the
8
moving party that he will not receive a fair trial.” Martin v. State, 804 So.2d 360,
362-363 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citing Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240, 242
(Fla.1986)). The disqualification rules require judges to avoid even the appearance
of impropriety:
It is the established law of this State that every litigant, including the
State in criminal cases, is entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. It is the duty of the court to
scrupulously guard this right of the litigant and to refrain from
attempting to exercise jurisdiction in any manner where his
qualification to do so is seriously brought into question. The exercise
of any other policy tends to discredit and place the judiciary in a
compromising attitude which is bad for the administration of justice.
Crosby v. State, 97 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1957); State ex rel. Davis v. Parks,
141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613 (1939); Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577,
140 So. 459 (1932); State ex rel. Mickle v. Rowe, 100 Fla. 1382, 131
So. 3331 (1930).
A party does not need to prove actual prejudice. Aberdeen Property Owners
Ass'n, Inc. v. Bristol Lakes Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 8 So.3d at 472. “In
determining whether the allegations are sufficient, the facts alleged must be taken
as true and must be viewed from the movant's perspective. The inquiry focuses on
whether the defendant may reasonably question a judge's impartiality rather than
whether the judge perceives she is able to act fairly and impartially.” Siegel v.State,
861 So.2d 90, 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citation omitted); See Livingstone v. State,
441 So.2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983) (“It is not a question of how the judge feels; it is
9
a question of what feeling resides in the affiant's mind and the basis for such
feeling.”) (quoting State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566, 573, 179 So. 695,
697–98 (1938)).
The basic premise for disqualification is that “[j]ustice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.” Atkinson Dredging Co. v. Henning, 631 So.2d 1129, 1130
(Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). This
dictate must be followed even if there is a lack of actual bias or prejudice. This is
the case “even though this „stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who
have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice
disqualification with the appearance of bias just as readily as with actual bias. See,
e.g., Kielbania v. Jasberg, 744 So.2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“even
satisfy the appearance of justice.”); Marcotte v. Gloeckner, 679 So.2d 1225, 1226
(Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“Though the trial judge in the instant case may not have
justice proscribes the trial judge from continuing, even though the record may be
10
void of any actual bias or prejudice on her part.”) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has explained that in deciding whether a
the inquiry must be not only whether there was actual bias on
respondent‟s part, but also whether there was such a likelihood of bias
or an appearance of bias that the judge was unable to hold the balance
between vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of the
accused. Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who
have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the
scales of justice equally between contending parties, but due process
of law requires no less.
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In a capital case, the courts “should be especially sensitive to the basis for
the fear, as the defendant‟s life is literally at stake, and the judge‟s sentencing
decision is in fact a life or death matter.” Chastine v. Broome, 629 So. 2d 293, 294
(Fla. 4th DCA 1993). The circumstances of the instant case are of such a nature
that they are “sufficient to warrant fear on [Mr. Loyd‟s] part that he would not
receive a fair hearing by the assigned judge.” Suarez v. Dugger, 527 So. 2d 191,
11
a. The circumstances surrounding the assignment of Mr. Loyd’s cases to
Chief Judge Lauten’s division require disqualification1
In the State‟s response to Mr. Loyd‟s motion to disqualify, it claims that the
wording of the order assigning Mr. Loyd‟s case to Chief Judge Lauten “makes
clear” that the reassignment to the chief judge “was to help reduce the workload on
the other judges of the Ninth Circuit.” Appendix, Tab 14, pg. 425. Despite the
State‟s assertion, the order does no such thing. The order makes no mention or
implication whatsoever that it was entered for the purposes of reducing the
workload on other judges of the Ninth Circuit. The order simply states that the case
was being reassigned because it was in the interest of justice to assign murder
cases on a rotating basis. Appendix, Tab 7. Moreover, the order does not state that
the case was being reassigned to Chief Judge Lauten on the basis of Chief Judge
Lauten‟s own instructions. Instead, the order incorrectly states that the issue of
Thus, the explanation given in the order regarding the reassignment of Mr.
Loyd‟s case (it is in the interest of justice to assign murder cases on a rotating
basis) is directly at odds with the reason for the reassignment according to Chief
Judge Lauten (that he directed the administrative judge to reassign the case to him
1
Although the order only assigns Case No. 2016- CF-015738 to Chief Judge
Lauten, his explanation for how the case was assigned to his division makes clear
that he directed for both cases to be assigned to him.
12
for “efficiency” and in order to allow other judges in the circuit to "operate a full
caseload while this case was pending.” Appendix, Tab 11, pg. 293.
The fact that a substantial gulf exists between the language of the order and
Chief Judge Lauten‟s explanation for the reassignment isn‟t the only troubling
aspect of this issue. A related and disconcerting matter is that it took approximately
22 months for Chief Judge Lauten‟s explanation to come to light. Assuming Chief
Judge Lauten‟s claims to be accurate, nearly two years elapsed before Mr. Loyd
became aware that of how his cases ended up before Chief Judge Lauten. For this
entire time, Mr. Loyd had no idea whatsoever that the presiding judge in his case
personally intervened in the process of assigning cases in order to transfer the case
Further, Chief Judge Lauten‟s decision to assign Mr. Loyd‟s case to his own
division is itself unsettling. The chief judge assigned to himself two of the highest
profile murder cases in Orange County; these cases have received enormous
pretrial media exposure, with countless TV reports and newspaper and internet
articles discussing Mr. Loyd‟s cases. Curiously, Chief Judge Lauten has decided
to send Mr. Loyd‟s cases to his own division, but he has not done so with all other
capital murder cases which haven‟t received such high levels of media attention.
13
When a judge chooses to assign a case to his own division, it undermines
the judiciary‟s purported neutrality. A judge shouldn‟t be able to pick and choose
which cases to preside over, and potentially affect outcomes in these cases in the
manner he sees fit. A trial court should have no stake in the cases pending before
it. But when a judge steers a case to his own division, this gives the impression that
he has some interest in what happens in that case. This needlessly weakens the
cases. These circumstances give rise to a reasonable fear that Mr. Loyd will not
receive a fair trial before the trial court. “A judge must avoid
(Fla. 2009) (quoting Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2). Even if there
14
Regarding Chief Judge Lauten‟s communications with law enforcement
concerning the issuance of warrants, the most disconcerting issue isn‟t simply that
Chief Judge Lauten received ex parte testimony and issued warrants before he was
assigned either of Mr. Loyd‟s cases. This is a fairly routine occurrence and isn‟t
itself dispositive. And the State correctly noted in its response to Mr. Loyd‟s
motion to disqualify that merely issuing a search warrant is not grounds for
recusal. Appendix, Tab 14, pg. 426. But Chief Judge Lauten didn‟t merely hear
testimony and issue warrants before he had Mr. Loyd‟s cases sent to his division.
He also considered testimony and issued warrants even after he knew that he
would be the presiding judge over Mr. Loyd‟s cases, which is significantly more
troubling. “[A] judge should not engage in any conversation about a pending case
with only one of the parties participating in that conversation.” Rose v. State, 601
“Ex parte communications concerning a matter before the court violates the
concept and appearance of impartiality and may rise to the level which would
require disqualification of a trial judge.” Love v. State, 569 So.2d 807, 810 (Fla. 1st
15
Florida courts have not hesitated to reassign cases when a trial judge has
engaged in ex parte communications. See, e.g., Frengel v. Frengel, 880 So.2d 763
(Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (requiring disqualification where trial judge in custody dispute
gave her phone number and email address to the children, and failed to notify the
mother of emails that she received from the children); State v. McClain, 572 So.2d
at 24 (reversed and remanded for resentencing before a different judge where the
trial judge had ex parte communications with two witnesses prior to sentencing;
Rose v. State, 601 So.2d at 1183 (the court assumed the existence of ex parte
communications and found a due process violation when the defendant was not
served with a copy of the State's proposed order or given an opportunity to file
objections).
(i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural
or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and
(ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of
the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an
opportunity to respond.
division was entered on January 18, 2017. On January 19, 2017, Chief Judge
Lauten was presented with at least one application and affidavit for a wiretap. This
application and affidavit, which was authorized by the State Attorney for the Ninth
Judicial Circuit and sworn before the chief judge by Orlando Police Department
alleged role in the deaths of Ms. Dixon and Sgt. Clayton. On that same day, the
chief judge entered an order authorizing the requested wiretap (of a phone number
known to belong to Mr. Loyd). Appendix, Tab 16, pg. 462-473. On January 19,
17
2017, Chief Judge Lauten also reviewed an application for Mr. Loyd‟s arrest, and
Mr. Loyd wasn‟t informed of Chief Judge Lauten‟s role in reviewing and
authorizing the wiretaps (including those authorized both before and after he was
assigned Mr. Loyd‟s cases) until November 2018, approximately 22 months after
the wiretap orders were entered. Yet Chief Judge Lauten was statutorily required,
per Fla. Stat. Sec. § 934.09 to “cause to be served” on Mr. Loyd notice of the entry
of the order and other materials concerning the wiretap within 90 days after the
Within a reasonable time but not later than 90 days after the
termination of the period of an order or extensions thereof, the issuing
or denying judge shall cause to be served on the persons named in the
order or the application, and such other parties to intercepted
communications as the judge may determine in his or her discretion to
be in the interest of justice, an inventory which shall include notice of:
The judge, upon the filing of a motion, may make available to such
person or the person‟s counsel for inspection such portions of the
intercepted communications, applications, and orders as the judge
determines to be in the interest of justice. On an ex parte showing of
good cause to a judge of competent jurisdiction, the serving of the
inventory required by this paragraph may be postponed.
18
Fla. Stat. § 934.09(8)(e).
judge‟s obligations to provide notice to persons, such as Mr. Loyd, who were the
target of the intercepts, Chief Judge Lauten failed to “cause to be served” on Mr.
Loyd of any of the information required under 934.09(8)(e) within the allotted time
period (nor, as far as Mr. Loyd is aware, was there ever a “showing of good cause”
approximately 22 months after the wiretap orders were entered that Mr. Loyd was
Once Chief Judge Lauten knew that he would be assigned Mr. Loyd‟s cases,
all ex parte communications with law enforcement officers concerning Mr. Loyd‟s
cases, even if only for the purposes of issuing orders or warrants, should have
raises the specter of impropriety and gives rise to a reasonable fear that Mr. Loyd
will not receive a fair trial before the trial court. “A judge must avoid
(quoting Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2). “We are not here concerned
19
expense of the other. The most insidious result of ex parte communications is their
effect on the appearance of the impartiality of the tribunal. The impartiality of the
trial judge must be beyond question.” Rose v. State, 601 So.2d at 1183 (emphasis
original).
“can cause a party to have a well-founded fear” that he will not receive fair and
impartial handling of his case.” Chillingworth v. State, 846 So.2d 674, 676 (Fla.
4th DCA 2003) (quoting Michaud-Berger v. Hurley, 607 So.2d 441, 446 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1992)). Here, Chief Judge Lauten ordered Mr. Loyd‟s cases to be assigned to
himself, the administrative order reassigning the cases provided an explanation for
the assignment that doesn‟t match with Chief Judge Lauten‟s explanation, and Mr.
Loyd wasn‟t made aware of any of this for approximately 22 months. Further,
concerning wiretap warrants both before and after he ordered Mr. Loyd‟s cases
transferred to his division, and Mr. Loyd was not informed of the judge‟s role in
these wiretap warrants until approximately 22 months after they were issued. The
cumulative effect of all of this gives give to a reasonable fear that Mr. Loyd will
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the Petition and
issue a Writ of Prohibition disqualifying Chief Judge Lauten from further presiding
s/Terence Lenamon
Terence Lenamon
Fla. Bar. No. 970476
245 SE 1st St.
Suite 404
Miami, FL 33131
Phone: 305-373-9911
Fax: 305-503-6973
terry@lenamonlaw.com
Counsel for Petitioner Markeith Loyd
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has
been sent via email to the Honorable Frederick Lauten, Circuit Court Judge,
s/ Terence Lenamon
Terence Lenamon
21
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this Petition is prepared in Times New Roman 14-point font
and complies with the font requirements of Rule 9.210 of the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
s/ Terence Lenamon
Terence Lenamon
22