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Luz Farms vs Sec of DAR
FACTS:
 Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely affected
by the enforcement of some provisions of CARP.
 Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657,
insofar as they are made to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and
poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or
Agricultural Activity.
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and
swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-
sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian
Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation
to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan
mentioned in Section 13
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the
production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the
end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other
farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they
currently receive xxx
ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of
Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage
HELD:
 Said provisions are unconstitutional.
 The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word
"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
 Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner
Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker
sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at
livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker
kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock
workers.
 It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of
R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine
raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid,
to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities
are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of
the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock
and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.
National Housing Authority v Allarde
Facts:
Private respondent Rufino Mateo had lived in the disputed
lots since his birth in 1928. In 1959, he started farming and working
on a six-hectare portion of said lots, after the death of his father
who had cultivated a thirteen-hectare portion of the same lots. On
September 1, 1983, the National Housing Authority notified the
respondent spouses of the scheduled development of the Tala
Estate including the lots in question, warning them that it would not
be responsible for any damage which may be caused to the crops
planted on the said lots. In 1989, private respondent Rufino Mateo
filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for the
award to them of subject disputed lots under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). In January 1992, petitioner caused
the bulldozing of the ricefields of private respondents, damaging the
dikes and irrigations thereon, in the process. On March 18, 1992, the
respondent spouses, relying on their claim that subject lots are
agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP, brought before
the respondent Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner
from bulldozing further and making constructions on the lots under
controversy. Petitioner contended that the said lots which were
previously reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for housing and
resettlement purposes are not covered by the CARP as they are not
agricultural lands within the definition and contemplation of Section
3 (c) of R. A. No. 6657. The RTC issued the writ.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
2
Isidro v CA
Facts:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject
parcel of land. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent
and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro
to occupy the swampy portion of the land. The occupancy of a
portion of said land was subject to the condition that petitioner
would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land
without paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond.
In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from
petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate
and return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort
and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent
against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija. The trial court dismissed the case because it ruled that
it is an agrarian dispute, hence not cognizable by civil courts. Private
respondent appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the decision
of MTC. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the trial court was
reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not the case is an agrarian dispute and hence not
cognizable by civil courts
Held:
No. A case involving an agricultural land does not automatically
make such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has
jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso
facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The law
provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one
and the land being agricultural is only one of them. The law states
that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial
arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously
mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or
stewardship. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent
on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the
farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are
complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more
important.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
HARLES BUMAGAT,
et al. v
. REGALADO ARRIBAY G.R. No. 194818, 9 June 2014, SECOND
DIVISION, (Del Castillo,
A case involving agricultural land does not immediately qualify it as
an agrarian dispute. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does
not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee or tenant.
There are conditions before he can qualify as an agricultural lessee
or tenant, and the subject being agricultural land constitutes just
one condition. In order to qualify as an agrarian dispute, there must
likewise exist a tenancy relation between the parties.
Bumagat and others are the registered owners of about eight
hectares of agricultural land. They filed a complaint for forcible entry
against Arribay before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
alleging that with the aid of armed goons and through the use of
intimidation and threats of physical harm, the latter entered the
former’s
parcels of land and ousted them from their lawful possession.
Arribay sought for the dismissal of the complaint, claiming that the
subject properties are agricultural lands
–
which renders the dispute an agrarian matter and subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office

(MARO) denied the motion for failure to show the existence of a
tenancy or agrarian relationship between the parties. The Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) found that no tenancy or other agrarian
relationship existed between the parties. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) affirmed. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and
agreed that the dispute fell under the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
ISSUE:
Is the dispute within the jurisdiction of DARAB?
RULING: No.
The CA failed to realize the fact that as between the parties, there is
no tenurial arrangement, not even an implied one. For the DARAB to
acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy
relation between the parties.
“In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a di
spute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to
wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant of
agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is
an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to
the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on
the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest
is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee. In the present case, it is quite evident that not all of these
conditions are present. For one, there is no tenant, as both parties
claim ownership over the property.
Ccccccccccccccccccccccccccc
Alita v CA
Facts:
Private respondents' predecessors-in-interest acquired the subject
parcel of lands through homestead patent under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Private respondents herein are
desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse
to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316. On June
18, 1981, private respondents instituted a complaint for the
declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions
and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable
to lands obtained through homestead law. The RTC dismissed the
complaint but on motion for reconsideration it declared that P.D. 27
is not applicable to homestead lands. On appeal to the CA, the
decision of the RTC was sustained.
Issue:
Whether or not lands acquired through homestead law are covered
by CARP
Held:
Petitioners is correct in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and
transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping
social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the
social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention
cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of
the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Philippine
Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders'
rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian
Reform statute. Provided, that the original homestead grantees or
their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead
at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as
long as they continue to cultivate said homestead
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Association of Small Landowners v DAR Secretary
Facts:
These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of
the Agrarian Reform Program. The contention of the petitioners in
G.R. No. 79777 is that the provision of RA 6657 regarding the modes
of payment of just compensation is unconstitutional insofar as it
requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just
compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only
medium of payment allowed. RA 6657 allows the payment of just
compensation by means of LBP Bonds, Shares of Stocks in
government-owned or controlled corporations, and tax credits.
Issue:
Page 2 of 9
Whether or not payment of just compensation other than money is
allowed
Held:
It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the payment of
just compensation is money and no other. However, we do not deal
here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain.
This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property
of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its
owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with
here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. Agrarian Reform
program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be
tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to
expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds
of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount
of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it
is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully
available at this time. It is assumed that the framers of the
Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for
agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a
part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation
that would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a
less conventional if more practical method.
Cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Honorable
Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742
July 14, 1989
Ponente: CRUZ, J.
FACTS
 Cases have been consolidated because they involve
common legal questions. They will be subject to one
common discussion and resolution.
G.R. No. 79777:
 The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay and his wife who own
a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and Augustin
Hermano, Jr. who owns a 5-hectare riceland worked by
four tenants. They question the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 & 229, and R.A. No. 6657 since their
tenants were declared full owners of the mentioned lands.
G.R. No. 79310
 Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill
District, Victorias, Negros Occidental and Planters’
Committee Inc., with 1400 planter-members, submitted a
petition seeking to prohibit the implementation of Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
 Aug. 27, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by the
National Federation of Sugarcane Planters, which claim 20
000 members). It was granted by the court.
 Sept. 10, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by
Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and
riceland owners. It was granted by the court.
G.R. No. 79744
 Sept. 3 1986 – The petitioner protested the erroneous
inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land
Transfer accusing the then Secretary of DAR of violation of
due process and the requirement for just compensation.
Certificates of Land Transfer were issued to the private
respondents who then refused to pay lease rentals. The
petitioner is asking for the recall and cancellation of these
certificates.
 Dec. 24, 1986 – Petitioner claims his petition was denied
without hearing.
 Feb. 17, 1987 – A motion for reconsideration was filed
which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 & 229
were issued which rendered his motion moot.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the President had the power to
promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229
2. Whether or not the President had the legislative power for
issuing the measures

3. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 conforms to the
requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the
Constitution
4. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention
limits required by Article 13, Section 4 of the Constitution
5. Whether or not E.O. No. 229 violates constitutional
requirement that a bill should only have one subject, to be
expressed in its title
6. Whether or not the writ of mandamus can issue to compel
the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a
specific department of the government.
7. Whether this statute is an exercise of police power or the
power of eminent domain
8. Whether or not the statutes are valid exercises of police
power
9. Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated
10. Whether or not the content and manner of the just
compensation provided for in the CARP Law is not violative
of the Constitution
11. Whether or not there is contravention of a well- accepted
principle of eminent domain by divesting the landowner of
his property even before actual payment to him in full of
just compensation
RULING
1. YES. P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos during Martial Law
has been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella. President
Aquino is authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229.
2. YES. The said measures were issued before July 27, 1987,
when the Congress was formally convened and took over
legislative power.
3. NO. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure for that
is not its principal purpose and therefore is not required to
conform to the requirements.
4. NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in
Section 6 of the law.
5. NO. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be
a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters
embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may
be inferred from the title.
6. NO. The rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the
discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control
the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus
can issue to require action only but not specific action.
7. It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because
there is payment of just compensation unlike in the
exercise of police power wherein confiscation of property
is not compensable.
8. YES. A statute may be sustained under the police power
only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the
lawful method. As the subject and purpose of agrarian
reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we
may say that the first requirement has been satisfied.
What remains to be examined is the validity of the method
employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
9. NO. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of
other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not
see.
10. NO. It is declared that although money is the traditional
mode of payment, other modes of payment shall be
permitted as compensation. The court accepts the theory
that payment of the just compensation is not always
required to be made fully in money, they find further that
the proportion of cash payment to the other things of
value constituting the total payment, as determined on
the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not
unduly oppressive upon the landowner. The other modes,
which are likewise available to the landowner at his
Page 3 of 9
option, are also not unreasonable because payment is
made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or
assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to
the amount of just compensation.
(Court: We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue. The Court is as
acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian
reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our
peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are
aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the
nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as
they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent
and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the
intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree
today.)
11. NO. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession
and ownership of the land to the government on receipt
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP
bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and
229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in
the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the
State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective
owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D.
No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention
under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No.
6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are
DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM & PABLO MENDOZA vs.
ROMEO C. CARRIEDO
G.R. No. 176549, January 20, 2016
Facts: On May 23, 1972, petitioner Pablo Mendoza (Mendoza)
became the tenant of the land by virtue of a Contrato King
Pamamuisan executed between him and Roman De Jesus (Roman),
owner of the 73.3157 hectares of agricultural land. Pursuant to the
Contrato, Mendoza has been paying 25 piculs of sugar every crop
year as lease rental to Roman, it was later changed to P2,000.00 per
crop year, the land being no longer devoted to sugarcane.
On November 7, 1979, Roman died leaving the entire 73.3157
hectares to his surviving wife Alberta Constales (Alberta), and their
two sons Mario De Jesus (Mario) and Antonio De Jesus (Antonio). On
August 23, 1984, Antonio executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Succession with Waiver of Right which made Alberta and Mario co-
owners in equal proportion of the agricultural land left by Roman.
On June 26, 1986, Mario sold approximately 70.4788 hectares to
respondent Romeo C. Carriedo (Carriedo). The area sold to Carriedo
included the land tenanted by Mendoza (forming part of the area
covered by TCT No. 17680). Mendoza alleged that the sale took
place without his knowledge and consent.
In June of 1990, Carriedo sold all of these landholdings to the
Peoples' Livelihood Foundation, Inc. (PLFI) represented by its
president, Bernabe Buscayno. All the lands, except that covered by
TCT No. 17680, were subjected to Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct
Payment Scheme and were awarded to agrarian reform
beneficiaries in 1997.
The parties to this case were involved in three cases concerning the
land:

The Ejectment Case
On October 1, 1990, Carriedo filed a Complaint for Ejectment and
Collection of Unpaid Rentals against Mendoza before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Tarlac docketed as
DARAB Case No. 163-T-90. PARAD ruled that Mendoza had
knowledge of the sale, hence, he could not deny the feet nor assail
the validity of the conveyance.
Mendoza filed an appeal with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). The DARAB affirmed the PARAD
Decision. The DARAB ruled that ownership of the land belongs to
Carriedo. That the deed of sale was unregistered did not affect
Carriedo's title to the land. By virtue of his ownership, Carriedo was
subrogated to the rights and obligation of the former landowner,
Roman.
Mendoza then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA affirmed the DARAB decision in toto. The CA ruled that
Mendoza's reliance on Section 6 of RA No. 6657 as ground to nullify
the sale between De Jesus and Carriedo was misplaced, the section
being limited to retention limits. It reiterated that registration was
not a condition for the validity of the contract of sale between the
parties.ralawred
Mendoza thus filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC.
The Court denied the petition for failure to comply with the
requirements under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An Entry of
judgment was issued on October 25, 2000. In effect, the Decision of
the CA was affirmed, and the following issues were settled with
finality:
1) Carriedo is the absolute owner of the five (5) hectare land;
2) Mendoza had knowledge of the sale between Carriedo and Mario
De Jesus, hence he is bound by the sale; and
3) Due to his failure and refusal to pay the lease rentals, the tenancy
relationship between Carriedo and Mendoza had been terminated.
The Redemption Case
On July 21, 1997, Mendoza filed a Petition for Redemption with the
PARAD. In an Order dated January 15, 2001, the PARAD dismissed
his petition on the grounds of this pendentia and lack of the
required certification against forum-shopping. It dismissed the
petition so that the pending appeal of DARAB Case No. 163-T-90 (the
ejectment case discussed above) with the CA can run its full course,
since its outcome partakes of a prejudicial question determinative of
the tenability of Mendoza's right to redeem the land under tenancy.
Mendoza appealed to the DARAB which reversed the PARAD Order
in a Decision dated November 12, 2003. The DARAB granted
Mendoza redemption rights over the land. It ruled that at the time
Carriedo filed his complaint for ejectment on October 1, 1990, he
was no longer the owner of the land, having sold the land to PLFI in
June of 1990. Hence, the cause of action pertains to PLFI and not to
him. It also ruled that Mendoza was not notified of the sale of the
land to Carriedo and of the latter's subsequent sale of it to PLFI. The
absence of the mandatory requirement of notice did not stop the
running of the 180 day-period within which Mendoza could exercise
his right of redemption. Carriedo's Motion for Reconsideration was
subsequently denied.
Carriedo filed a Petition for Review with the CA. In a Decision dated
December 29, 2006, the CA reversed the DARAB Decision. It ruled
that Carriedo's ownership of the land had been conclusively
established and even affirmed by this Court. Mendoza was not able
to substantiate his claim that Carriedo was no longer the owner of
the land at the time the latter filed his complaint for ejectment. It
held that the DARAB erred when it ruled that Mendoza was not
guilty of forum-shopping.Mendoza did not appeal the decision of the
CA.
The Coverage Case
On February 26, 2002, Mendoza, his daughter Corazon Mendoza
(Corazon) and Orlando Gomez (Orlando) filed a Petition for
Coverage of the land under RA No. 6657. They claimed that they
had been in physical and material possession of the land as tenants
since 1956, and made the land productive. They prayed (1) that an
Page 4 of 9
order be issued placing the land under Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP); and (2) that the DAR, the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) and the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) of Tarlac City be ordered to proceed with the
acquisition and distribution of the land in their favor. The petition
was granted by the Regional Director (RD) in an Order dated
October 2, 2002.
On October 24, 2002, Carriedo received a copy of a Notice of
Coverage dated October 21, 2002 from MARO Maximo E. Santiago
informing him that the land had been placed under the coverage of
the CARP. On December 16, 2002, the RD denied Carriedo's protest
in an Order dated December 5, 2002. Carriedo filed an appeal to the
DAR-CO.
In an Order dated February 22, 2005, the DAR-CO, through Secretary
Rene C. Villa, affirmed the Order of the RD granting coverage. The
DAR-CO ruled that Carriedo was no longer allowed to retain the land
due to his violation of the provisions of RA No. 6657. His act of
disposing his agricultural landholdings was tantamount to the
exercise of his retention right, or an act amounting to a valid waiver
of such right in accordance with applicable laws and jurisprudence.
However, it did not rule whether Mendoza was qualified to be a
farmer-beneficiary of the land. The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:
Carriedo filed a Petition for Review with the CA assailing the DAR-CO
Order. The CA reversed the DAR-CO, and declared the land as
Carriedo's retained area. The CA ruled that the right of retention is a
constitutionally-guaranteed right, subject to certain qualifications
specified by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of
compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the
landowner and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social
justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the
landowner. It held that Carriedo did not commit any of the acts
which would constitute waiver of his retention rights found under
Section 6 of DAR Administrative Order No. 02, S.2003
Hence this petition. Petitioners maintain that the CA committed a
reversible error in declaring the land as Carriedo's retained area.
They claim that Paragraph 4, Section 6 of RA No. 6657 prohibits any
sale, disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of
possession of private lands upon effectivity of the law. Thus,
Regional Director Renato Herrera correctly observed that Carriedo's
act of disposing his agricultural property would be tantamount to his
exercise of retention under the law. By violating the law, Carriedo
could no longer retain what was left of his property. "To rule
otherwise would be a roundabout way of rewarding a landowner
who has violated the explicit provisions of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law."
They also assert that Carriedo waived his right to retain for failure or
neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do that which he may
have done earlier by exercising due diligence, warranting a
presumption that he abandoned his right or declined to assert
it. Petitioners claim that Carriedo has not filed an Application for
Retention over the subject land over a considerable passage of time
since the same was acquired for distribution to qualified farmer
beneficiaries.
Lastly, they argue that Certificates of Land Ownership Awards
(CLOAs) already generated in favor of his co-petitioners Corazon
Mendoza and Rolando Gomez cannot be set aside. CLOAs under RA
No. 6657 are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration which
makes them indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration
proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not Carriedo has the right to retain the land.
Held: Carriedo did not waive his right of retention over the land.
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes landowner retention
rights under Article XIII, Section 4, to wit:
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,

who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or,
in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities
and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing.
RA No. 6657 implements this directive, thus:
Section 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this
Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or
private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to
factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created
hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed
five (5) hectares.
xxx
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact
or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner: Provided, however,
That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is
tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to
remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another
agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case the
tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be
considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary
under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in
another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the
land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this
option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner
manifests his choice of the area for retention. In all cases, the
security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to
the approval of this Act shall be respected.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which
is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the
effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the
landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that
social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the
landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not
supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus sparing
the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to
return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless
process. For as long as the area to be retained is compact or
contiguous and does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5)
hectares, a landowner's choice of the area to be retained must
prevail.
Section 6 of DAR AO 02-03 provides for the instances when a
landowner is deemed to have waived his right of retention, to wit:
Section 6. Waiver of the Right of Retention. - The landowner waives
his right to retain by committing any of the following act or
omission:
6.1 Failure to manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain
within sixty (60) calendar days from receipt of notice of CARP
coverage.
6.2 Failure to state such intention upon offer to sell or application
under the [Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT)]/[Direct Payment
Scheme (DPS)] scheme.
6.3 Execution of any document stating that he expressly waives
his right to retain. The MARO and/or PARC) and/or Regional
Director shall attest to the due execution of such document.
6.4 Execution of a Landowner Tenant Production Agreement and
Farmer's Undertaking (LTPA-FU) or Application to Purchase
and Farmer's Undertaking (APFU) covering subject property.
6.5 Entering into a VLT/DPS or [Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)] but
failing to manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain
Page 5 of 9
upon filing of the application for VLT/DPS or VOS.
6.6 Execution and submission of any document indicating that he
is consenting to the CARP coverage of his entire landholding.
6.7 Performing any act constituting estoppel by laches which is
the failure or neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do
that which he may have done earlier by exercising due
diligence, warranting a presumption that he abandoned his
right or declined to assert it.
Petitioners cannot rely on the RD's Order dated October 2, 2002
which granted Mendoza's petition for coverage on the ground that
Carriedo violated paragraph 4 Section 6 of RA No. 6657 for disposing
of his agricultural land, consequently losing his right of retention. At
the time when the Order was rendered, up to the time when it was
affirmed by the DAR-CO in its Order dated February 22, 2005, the
applicable law is Section 6 of DAR 02-03. Section 6 clearly shows that
the disposition of agricultural land is not an act constituting waiver
of the right of retention.
Thus, as correctly held by the CA, Carriedo "[n]ever committed any
of the acts or omissions above-stated (DAR AO 02-03). Not even the
sale made by the herein petitioner in favor of PLFI can be considered
as a waiver of his right of retention. Likewise, the Records of the
present case is bereft of any showing that the herein petitioner
expressly waived (in writing) his right of retention as required under
sub-section 6.3, section 6, DAR Administrative Order No. 02-
S.2003."68
Petitioners claim that Carriedo's alleged failure to exercise his right
of retention alter a long period of time constituted a waiver of his
retention rights, as envisioned in Item 6.7 of DAR AO 02-03.
We disagree. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.69 Where a party sleeps on
his rights and allows laches to set in, the same is fatal to his case.70
Section 4 of DAR AO 02-03 provides:
Section 4. Period to Exercise Right of Retention under RA 6657
4.1 The landowner may exercise his right of retention at any time
before receipt of notice of coverage.
4.2 Under the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) scheme, the
landowner shall exercise his right of retention within sixty (60)
days from receipt of notice of coverage.
4.3 Under the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and the Voluntary
Land Transfer (VLT)/Direct Payment Scheme (DPS), the
landowner shall exercise his right of retention simultaneously
at the time of offer for sale or transfer.
The foregoing rules give Carriedo any time before receipt of the
notice of coverage to exercise his right of retention, or if under
compulsory acquisition (as in this case), within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the notice of coverage. The validity of the notice of
coverage is the very subject of the controversy before this court.
Thus, the period within which Carriedo should exercise his right of
retention cannot commence until final resolution of this case.
Even assuming that the period within which Carriedo could exercise
his right of retention has commenced, Carriedo cannot be said to
have neglected to assert his right of retention over the land. The
records show that per Legal Report dated December 13, 1999
prepared by Legal Officer Ariel Reyes, Carriedo filed an application
for retention which was even contested by Pablo Mendoza's son,
Fernando. Though Carriedo subsequently withdrew his application,
his act of filing an application for retention belies the allegation that
he abandoned his right of retention or declined to assert it.

In their Memorandum however, petitioners, for the first time, invoke
estoppel, citing DAR Administrative Order No. 05 Series of
2006 (DAR AO 05-06) to support their argument that Carriedo
waived his right of retention. DAR AO 05-06 provides for the rules
and regulations governing the acquisition and distribution of
agricultural lands subject of conveyances under Sections 6, 70 and
73 (a) of RA No. 6657. Petitioners particularly cite Item no. 4 of the
Statement of Policies of DAR AO 05-06, to wit:
II. Statement of Policies
4. Where the transfer/sale involves more than the five (5) hectares
retention area, the transfer is considered violative of Sec. 6 of R.A.
No. 6657.
In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five (5)
hectares sold/conveyed without DAR clearance and the
corresponding titles issued by the Register of Deeds (ROD) in the
name of the transferee shall, under the principle of estoppel, be
considered valid and shall he treated as the transferor/s' retained
area but in no case shall the transferee exceed the five-hectare
landholding ceiling pursuant to Sections 6, 70 and 73(a) of R.A. No.
6657. Insofar as the excess area is concerned, the same shall
likewise be covered considering that the transferor has no right of
disposition since CARP coverage has been vested as of 15 June 1988.
Any landholding still registered in the name of the landowner after
earlier dispositions totaling an aggregate of five (5) hectares can no
longer be part of his retention area and therefore shall be covered
under CARP.
Citing this provision, petitioners argue that Carriedo lost his right of
retention over the land because he had already sold or disposed,
after the effectivity of RA No. 6657, more than fifty (50) hectares of
land in favor of another.78
In his Memorandum, Carriedo maintains that petitioners cannot
invoke any administrative regulation to defeat his right of retention.
He argues that "administrative regulation must be in harmony with
the provisions of law otherwise the latter prevails."80
We cannot sustain petitioners' argument. Their reliance on DAR AO
05-06 is misplaced. As will be seen below, nowhere in the relevant
provisions of RA No. 6657 does it indicate that a multiple or series of
transfers/sales of land would result in the loss of retention rights.
Neither do they provide that the multiple or series of transfers or
sales amounts to the waiver of such right.
The relevant portion of Section 6 of RA No. 6657 referred to in Item
no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 provides:
Section 6. Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this
Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or
private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to
factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as the commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereundcr,
but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. xxx
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease,
management, contract or transfer of possession of private lands
executed by the original landowner in violation of the Act shall be
null and void: Provided, however, That those executed prior to this
Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds
within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act.
Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) within thirty (30) days of any transaction
involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.
Section 70 of RA No. 6657, also referred to in Item no. 4 of DAR AO
05-06 partly provides:
The sale or disposition of agricultural lands retained by a landowner
as a consequence of Section 6 hereof shall be valid as long as the
total landholdings that shall be owned by the transferee thereof
inclusive of the land to be acquired shall not exceed the landholding
ceilings provided for in this Act. Any sale or disposition of
Page 6 of 9
agricultural hinds after the effectivity of this Act found to be
contrary to the provisions hereof shall be null and void. xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, Section 73 (a) of RA No. 6657 as referred to in Item No. 4 of
DAR AO 05-06 provides,
Section 73. Prohibited Ads and Omissions. - The following are
prohibited:
(a) The ownership or possession, for the purpose of circumventing
the provisions of this Act, of agricultural lands in excess of the
total retention limits or award ceilings by any person, natural
or juridical, except those under collective ownership by
farmer-beneficiaries; xxx
Sections 6 and 70 are clear in stating that any sale and disposition of
agricultural lands in violation of the RA No. 6657 shall be null and
void. Under the facts of this case, the reasonable reading of these
three provisions in relation to the constitutional right of retention
should be that the consequence of nullity pertains to the area/s
which were sold, or owned by the transferee, in excess of the 5-
hectare land ceiling. Thus, the CA was correct in declaring that the
land is Carriedo's retained area.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Petitioner: ALEJANDRO DANAN et al. (there are other petitioners go
check out
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/oct2005/132759.htm
for the deets. thanks guys!)
versus
Respondents: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ESTRELLA
ARRASTIA,
G.R. No. 132759
October 25, 2005
Facts:
Sometime in 1976, a certain Rustico Coronel leased the
subject property for a period of twelve (12) years or until the crop
year 1987 to 1988. Then, persons claiming to be farmers and
residents of Barangay Lourdes and Barangay San Rafael signed a
joint resolution as members of the Aniban ng mga Manggagawa sa
Agrikultura ("AMA") to enter and lease the subject property from
the Arrastia heirs. They entered the disputed land and planted
various crops thereon. This culminated in a violent confrontation on
May 21, 1988 that led to the filing of criminal charges against AMA
members.
On June 2, 1988, the AMA filed a complaint with petitioner
DARAB, praying that respondent Arrastia be prevented from
destroying standing crops on the disputed property and from
fencing said property and that petitioners be allowed to continue
with their farming thereon. On August 15, 1988, the DARAB ordered
the DAR Regional Director to conduct an ocular inspection on the
disputed property. The inspection team submitted an
Ocular/Investigation Report stating that there were no substantially
significant plantings on the disputed property. The Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer ("MARO") of Lubao, Pampanga also
submitted a report recommending the disqualification of private
petitioners from availing of the benefits under the CARP.
On October 5, 1988, the DARAB issued an order denying
AMA's motion for authority to cultivate and the order became final
and executory on July 29, 1989.
Arrastia instituted an action against private petitioners for
violation of Section 73(b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 on October
9, 1989 and the trial court, sitting as a special agrarian court ("SAC"),
issued a temporary restraining order. Subsequently a preliminary
injunction, both enjoining private petitioners from entering and
cultivating the disputed property was issued to the latter.
On November 29, 1989, private petitioners filed a
complaint for injunction and damages before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board ("PARAD") against Arrastia, alleging that
they were actual tillers of the disputed property who were forcibly
evicted by Arrastia from their tenanted lots through the use of

armed men. The matter was referred to BARC but the dispute could
not be settled amicably per recommendation of BARC Officials.
On the basis of the reports submitted by BARC officials and
private petitioners' affidavits, the hearing officer issued on
December 9, 1990 an order granting a preliminary injunction in favor
of petitioners and the PARAD also directed the MARO to act on the
petition for the coverage of the disputed property under the CARP.
On January 30, 1991, Arrastia filed an omnibus motion in
DARAB Case No. 0001, questioning the jurisdiction of the hearing
officer to issue an order of injunction. The DARAB denied said
motion and subsequently issued the writ of injunction on September
22, 1992.
Arrastia filed an answer in DARAB Regional Case No. 161-P'
89, interposing the defense that the disputed land was not devoted
to agriculture and that private petitioners were not tenants thereof.
After due hearing, the PARAD rendered a decision in
DARAB Regional Case No. 161-P' 89 on May 13, 1993, declaring that
the subject property is covered by the CARP and that private
petitioners are qualified beneficiaries of the program. The
adjudicator also issued an injunction prohibiting Arrastia from
disturbing private petitioners' occupation of the property.
Arrastia appealed the aforementioned decision to
petitioner DARAB. The appeal was docketed as DARAB Case No.
1551. On March 28, 1994, the DARAB rendered its decision
modifying the appealed judgment.
Aggrieved, Arrastia elevated the controversy to the Court
of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the decision of the DARAB.
Issue:
Whether or not private petitioners are qualified
beneficiaries under the CARP?
Held:
The Court affirms factual findings and conclusions of the
Court of Appeals.
The appellate court's conclusion that private petitioners
committed particular violations warranting their disqualification
from the CARP is based on the MARO report which has not been
disputed by all the private petitioners. The MARO who prepared the
report enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of
her functions. Absent any showing that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in giving evidentiary weight to
said report, said factual findings are generally deemed conclusive on
this Court, which is not a trier of facts.
Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does
not automatically convert a tiller or farmworker into an agricultural
tenant recognized under agrarian laws. The essential requisites of a
tenancy relationship are:
o (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
o (2) the subject is agricultural land;
o (3) there is consent among the parties;
o (4) the purpose is agricultural production;
o (5) there is personal cultivation; and
o (6) there is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties. In the case at bar, it has not been
sufficiently established that private petitioners' occupation and
cultivation of the disputed property was with the consent of the
landowners.
As borne by the case records, respondent Arrastia owns
only 4.4630 hectares of the subject property, which is below the
retention limit under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 granting a right of
retention of up to a maximum of five (5) hectares of agricultural land
in favor of a landowner whose property may be acquired for
distribution to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Consequently, a
landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate
size does not exceed the retention limit of five (5) hectares. His land
will not be covered at all by the operation land transfer program
although all requisites for coverage are present.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed
right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to
mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the
rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the
doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice
against the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land
which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion,
thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land
Page 7 of 9
only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a
pointless process. For as long as the area to be retained is compact
or contiguous and does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5)
hectares, a landowner's choice of the area to be retained must
prevail. Moreover, Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991, which
supplies the details for the exercise of a landowner's retention
rights, likewise recognizes no limit to the prerogative of the
landowner, although he is persuaded to retain other lands instead to
avoid dislocation of farmers. Therefore, there is no legal and
practical basis to order the commencement of the administrative
proceedings for the placement of respondent Arrastia's land under
the CARP since her property's land area falls below the retention
limit of five (5) hectares.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Daez v CA
Facts:
Eudosia Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in
Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by
respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio
Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The
said land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer Program
under Presidential Decree No. 27 as amended by Letter of
Instruction Armed with an affidavit, allegedly signed under duress by
the respondents, stating that they are not share tenants but hired
laborers, Eudosia Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland
from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the
cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. The
application of the petitioner was denied. Exemption of the 4.1685
riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied
her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same
riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657. The DAR Regional Director
allowed Daez to retain the subject land but the DAR Secretary
reversed that decision. She appealed to the Office of the President
which ruled in her favour. Respondents appealed to the CA which
reversed the decision of the Office of the President.
Issue:
Whether or not the denial of application for exemption under PD 27
would bar an application for retention under RA 6657
Held:
The requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from
coverage of OLT and those for the grant of an application for the
exercise of a landowner’s right of retention are different. Hence, it is
incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an
application for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct
remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the
subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural
impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the
retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her
appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that
became final and executory.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Republic v CA
Facts:
Private respondent is the owner of the five parcels of land in issue
which have a combined area of approximately 112.0577 hectares
situated at Barangay Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Rizal. The tax
declarations classified the properties as agricultural. On June 16,
1994, petitioner DAR issued a Notice of Coverage of the subject
parcels of land under compulsory acquisition pursuant to Section 7,
Chapter II of R.A. 6657. On July 21, 1994, private respondent filed
with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of the
land from agrarian reform. Private respondent alleged that the
property should be exempted since it is within the residential and
forest conservation zones of the town zoning ordinance of Jala-Jala.
On October 19, 1995, the DAR Secretary issued an Order denying
the application for exemption of private respondent. On appeal to
the CA, the decision of DAR was reversed. Petitioner DAR maintains
that the subject properties have already been classified as
agricultural based on the tax declarations.
Issue:
Whether or not the land classification on tax declarations are
conclusive
Held:

There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land
classification embodied in a tax declaration is conclusive and final,
nor would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax
declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a
land. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6 lists other documents,
aside from tax declarations, that must be submitted when applying
for exemption from CARP.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v CA
Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the
registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area of 254.6
hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are
watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang
community. Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights
over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in
December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial
Court seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay
Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the
ejectment of private respondents. After the filing of the ejectment
cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform
for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the
CARP. The landholding of SRRDC was placed under compulsory
acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory acquisition of the
property contending that the area was not appropriate for
agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of
18% and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters,
who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. The DARAB ruled
against the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of
DARAB.
Issue:
Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite
the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area
prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657
Held:
Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from
its coverage. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of
land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for
watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures an
adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of
flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives.
Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that
needs to be answered now.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Central Mindanao University vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board 215 SCRA 86 (1992)
Central Mindanao University vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board
215 SCRA 86 (1992)
Facts:
On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation
No. 467 reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, now the
CMU, a piece of land to be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU
embarked on a project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein
parcels of land were leased to its faculty members and employees.
Under the terms of the program, CMU will assist faculty members
and employee groups through the extension of technical know-how,
training and other kinds of assistance. In turn, they paid the CMU a
service fee for use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided
that there will be no tenancy relationship between the lessees and
the CMU.
When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the
participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status
as tenants under the CARP. In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among
others, the segregation of 400 hectares of the land for distribution
under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage on the basis of
DAR's determination that the lands do not meet the condition for
exemption, that is, it is not "actually, directly, and exclusively used"
for educational purposes.
Issue:
Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands
reserved for public use by presidential proclamation is no longer
Page 8 of 9
actually, directly and exclusively used and necessary for the purpose
for which they are reserved?
Held:
The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to
resolve and answer the question of when and what lands are found
necessary for its use. The Court also chided the DARAB for resolving
this issue of exemption on the basis of "CMU's present needs." The
Court stated that the DARAB decision stating that for the land to be
exempt it must be "presently, actively exploited and utilized by the
university in carrying out its present educational program with its
present student population and academic faculty" overlooked the
very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to
come.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Roxas & Co. Inc. v CA
Facts:
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the
registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico,
Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu,
Batangas. On May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a
voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions
of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed
under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance
with the CARL. Petitioner tried to withdraw the VOS of Hacienda
Caylaway but the sane was denied. Thereafter, petitioner sought the
conversion of the three haciendas from agricultural to other use but
the petition was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not process of land acquisition under CARL should
observe due process
Held:
For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are
required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a
preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives
of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties;
and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under
Section 16 of the CARL. They are steps designed to comply with the
requirements of administrative due process. The taking
contemplated in Agrarian Reform is not a mere limitation of the use
of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of
Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. The CARL was not intended to
take away property without due process of law. The exercise of the
power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in
the taking of private property.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
1. Land Bank vs. Dumlao (2008)
FACTS
The DUMLAOS were co-owners of a 32 hectare ricelands in Nueva
Vizcaya which was placed under OLT by virtue of PD27 (note that
actual date of taking was not stated.)
The DAR made a preliminary valuation on 16 hectares (2 lots) and
payments were made to the DUMLAOs by Landbank. The DUMLAOs
filed a complaint before the RTC to determine just compensation,
and requested the appointment of 3 commissioners to make the
determination.
The DAR moved to dismiss claiming that the RTC does not have
jurisdiction. The RTC eventually recognized the case and ordered
payment at 6,912.50 per hectare for one lot & to follow the amount
provided for in the Land Valuation Summary and Farmers
Undertaking for the other lot. The DUMLAOs was claiming market
value of 109,000 per hectare.
The DUMLAOs appealed to the CA which ruled in their favor, which
noted that the time of taking was not certain. The CA held that after

the passage of RA No. 6657, the formula relative to valuation under
PD No. 27 no longer applies.
Under PD 27 and EO No. 228, the formula for computing
the Land Value (LV) or Price Per Hectare (PPH) of rice and corn lands
is: 2.5 x AGP x GSP = LV or PPH.
Under the CARL, it is provide:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value
of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn
valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment
made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment
of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution
on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to
determine its valuation.
ISSUE
Which law should be followed to determine just compensation
HELD
(1) The just compensation due to respondents should be
determined under the provisions of RA No. 6657.
The Court has repeatedly held that if just compensation was not
settled prior to the passage of RA No. 6657, it should be computed
in accordance with said law, although the property was acquired
under PD No. 27. The latter law, being the latest law in agrarian
reform, should control, as held in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Heirs of Angel T. Domingo.
Section 75 of RA 6657 clearly states that the provisions of PD 27 and
EO 228 shall only have a suppletory effect. Section 7 of the Act also
provides
Sec. 7. Priorities. – The DAR, in coordination with the PARC shall plan
and program the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands
through a period of ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act.
Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:
Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or abandoned
lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by the owners for agrarian
reform; x x x and all other lands owned by the government devoted
to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be acquired and distributed
immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the implementation
to be completed within a period of not more than four (4) years.
This demonstrates that RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the
properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the
landless.
DAR’s failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable
length of time makes it inequitable to follow the guidelines provided
by PD No. 27 and EO No. 228. Hence, RA No. 6657 should apply.
NOTE HOWEVER that the CA’s act of setting just compensation in
the amount of P109,000.00 would have been a valid exercise of this
judicial function, had it followed the mandatory formula prescribed
by RA No. 6657. However, the appellate court merely chose the
lower of two (2) values specified by the commissioner as basis for
determining just compensation, namely: (a) P109,000.00 per hectare
as the market value of first class unirrigated rice land in the
Municipality of Villaverde; and (b)P60.00 per square meter as
the zonal value of the land in other barangays in Villaverde.
This is likewise erroneous because it does not adhere to the formula
provided by RA No. 6657 under Section 17, as implemented through
DAR Admin Order No. 6 (1992) - LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x
0.1),
where: LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
(2) The “taking” of the properties for the purpose of computing
just compensation should be reckoned from the date of
issuance of emancipation patents.
The nature of the land at that time determines the just
compensation to be paid.
(3) The DUMLAOs are entitled to payment of just compensation
on their entire landholdings covered by Operation Land
Page 9 of 9
Transfer, except for the five hectares of retention area each of
them are entitled to (RIGHT OF RETENTION).
The determination of just compensation is judicial in
nature. The DAR’s land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by
any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other
interested party. In the exercise of its functions, the courts still have
the final say on what the amount of just compensation will be.
A reading of Section 18 of RA No. 6657 shows that it is the courts,
not the DAR, which make the final determination of just
compensation.
Also, to wait for the DAR valuation despite its unreasonable neglect
and delay in processing the four properties’ claimfolders is to violate
the elementary rule that payment of just compensation must be
within a reasonable period from the taking of property.
While the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine in a
preliminary manner the amount of just compensation, the
circumstances of this case militate against the application of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cabral v CA
Facts:
On January 16, 1990, petitioner Victoria Cabral filed a petition
before the BARC for the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents
and Torrens Titles issued in favour of private respondents. The
patents and titles covered portions of the property owned and
registered in the name of petitioner. On February 11, 1990, Regional
Director Eligio Pacis issued an order dismissing the petition for
cancellation of Emancipation Patents. The Regional Director likewise
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration dated July 11, 1990.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Director and
claiming denial of due process. On January 8, 1991, the appellate
court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction to decide on
the petition
Held:
The DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case. It
is amply clear from the provisions of CARL and other pertinent rules
that the function of the Regional Office concerns the
implementation of agrarian reform laws while that of the
DARAB/RARAD/PARAD is the adjudication of agrarian reform cases.
The first is essentially executive. It pertains to the enforcement and
administration of the laws, carrying them into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance. Thus, the Regional Director is
primarily tasked with implementing laws, policies, rules and
regulations within the responsibility of the agency, as well as the
agency program in the region. The second is judicial in nature,
involving as it does the determination of rights and obligations of
the parties.
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In expropriation proceedings, as in judicial proceedings, notice is
part of the constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the
landowner of the State’s intention to acquire private land upon
payment of just compensation and gives him the opportunity to
present evidence that his landholding is not covered or is
otherwise excused from the agrarian law.(Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste
v. Land Bank of the Philippines et al., citing Heirs of Juga!botv. CA,
G.R. No. 170346, March 12, 2007, 518 SCRA 202, 210-213. 67ld.
citing Sta. Monica Industrial & Devt. Corp. v. DAR, G.R. No. 164846,
June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA 97, 104)
In this case, the respondents and the DAR failed to adduce
evidence to prove actual notice to the petitioner and payment of
just compensation for the taking of the latter’s property.