TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 1

ATTY. E. GO

I. INTRODUCTION
A. CONCEPT: CULPA AQUILIANA, QUASI DELICT, TORTS
CASE TITLE CASE SUMMARY RATIO KEY TAKE AWAY
1. Padilla v. Padilla, incumbent mayor, et al. SC held that they should still pay damages to Vergara et al. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of
CA [“Ps”], forcibly opened the door and Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the accused for damages only when it includes a
demolished/destroyed R’s stall by the civil liability. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
using axes and other massive acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, as might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
instruments. CFI found Ps guilty of only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. In extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based
GRAVE COERCION. CA other words, Ps were acquitted NOT because they did not on reasonable doubt, as only preponderance of
acquitted Ps on the ground of commit the acts. There is no dispute over the forcible opening of evidence is required in civil cases. There is nothing
reasonable doubt. Ps filed an MR the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments. contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition
contending that their acquittal Ps were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding
should result in the extinguishment when they properly constituted some other offense such as damages in the same criminal action. The two can
of their civil liability. CA denied and malicious mischief. stand side by side.
required them to pay damages for
destroying the stall of Rs.

ISSUE: W/N the CA committed an

error in requiring Padilla et al to pay
civil indemnity to Vergara et al. after
acquitting them from the criminal
charge. à NO
2. Syquia v. CA Juan Syquia authorized Manila
Memorial to inter the remains of
Vicente Syquia. To transfer the said
remains to a new family plot, the
concrete vault encasing the coffin of
the deceased was removed by
employees of Manila Memorial. It
was discovered that the concrete
vault had a hole and that for a
certain length of time, water drained
out of the hole. The hole was made
by Manila Memorial. The coffin and
the deceased’s remains were entirely
damaged by water, filth and silt. The
Syquias filed a complaint for
damages against Manila Memorial.
ISSUE: W/N the act of boring a
hole was a negligent act constituting
quasi-delict à NO
3. Gashem Gashem, an Iranian medical
Shookat student, promised marriage to
Baksh v. CA Marilou, his girlfriend and
complainant. He asked her to live
with her on and she agreed. After
There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of The law defines negligence as the "omission of that
Perpetual Care and in the Rules and Regulations that the vault diligence which is required by the nature of the
would be waterproof. "Sealed" cannot be equated with obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
"waterproof". Although a pre-existing contractual relation the persons, of the time and of the place." the
between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa diligence to be observed in the performance of the
aquiliana, no reason to disregard the respondent Court’s finding obligation is that which is expected of a good father of
that there was no negligence under Art. 2176. The law defines a family.
negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." the
diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is
that which is expected of a good father of a family. The
circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act
negate the allegation of negligence: if the hole was not made, the
vault will float and other stuff will happen. Hence, Manila
Memorial has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which
would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave
filling the same with earth.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry
an actionable wrong. Where a man's promise to marry is in fact per se is not an actionable wrong. Where a man's
the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes acceptance of his love by a woman and his
the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual representation to fulfill that promise thereafter

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living with him, Gashem changed
and started hurting her. Further,
Gashem denied his promise to
marry her and admitted that he is
already married to a girl in Bacolod
City. Gonzales filed a complaint for
damages against Gashem for the
alleged violation of their agreement
to marry. RTC and CA applied Art.
21 of the CC favoring Gonzales.
Gashem was ordered to pay moral
damages and attorney's fees.
ISSUE: W/N damages may be
recovered for a breach of promise to
marry on the basis of Art. 21 of the
CC à YES
4. LRTA v. A drunk NAVIDAD got into a fist
Navidad fight with a Security GUARD of an
LRT Station. It resulted in him
falling on the tracks and getting
killed by the train.
The wife sues the train DRIVER,
the GUARD, the LRTA, and
PRUDENT (security agency).
ISSUE: Who are liable? à Only
LRTA is liable (theoretically
PRUDENT possibly liable, but due
to lack of evidence, it were freed
from liability.) Also removed
nominal damages.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 2
ATTY. E. GO
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is of damages pursuant to Art. 21 not because of such
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
Here, Gashem's profession of love and promise to marry were reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and however, that such injury should have been committed
deceive the poor woman into believing that he loved her and in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure public policy.
lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly
believed that by accepting his offer of love and proposal of
marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.
[AWTS. SAKIT. </3] Gashem clearly violated the Filipino's
concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect
Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of
Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act
with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
obligations.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and
the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is when the same act or omission causes the injury, one
burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
ensuring the safety of passengers. The law requires common aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well
carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a
very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. The contract, where tort is that which breaches the
foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its contract. Stated differently, when an act which
obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had
required of the common carrier. A contractual obligation can be no contract existed between the parties, the contract
breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa allowing the rules on tort to apply.
aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a
liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is
that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act
which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no
contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to
have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply. Sadly, "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of
Navidad, for the reason that the negligence of its employee,
Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." There being, similarly,
no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of
any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from

B. DISTINCTIONS
1. CULPA AQUILIANA
2. CULPA CONTRACTUAL
3. CULPA CRIMINAL
1. Calalas v CA Sunga was a passenger in the
jeep of Calalas. While the jeep
was full, it nevertheless
accommodated Sunga by
giving him an extension seat
located at the rear of jeep.
During the trip, one of the
passengers went down and
thus, Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger.
Unfortunately, an Isuzu truck
bumped the jeepney. Sunga
obtained injuries because of
the incident. Sunga filed a
complaint for damages against
Calalas based on culpa contractual
(breach of contract of carriage).
ISSUE: W/N Calalas is liable to
Sunga? à YES
2. Barredo v. There was a collision between a
Garcia taxi driven by Fontanilla and a
carretela. Garcia was a passenger
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TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 3
ATTY. E. GO
liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRTA
and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter
and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own
fault or negligence.
1st, quasi-delict, aka culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, CULPA AQUILIANA: in quasi-delict, the negligence
has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. 2nd, breach of or fault should be clearly established because it is the
contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in basis of the action.
the performance of a contractual obli. CULPA CONTRACTUAL: the action can be
CULPA AQUILIANA: in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault prosecuted merely by proving (1) the existence of the
should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action. contract and (2) the fact that the obligor, in this case
CULPA CONTRACTUAL: the action can be prosecuted merely the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
by proving (1) the existence of the contract and (2) the fact that safely to his destination.
the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport
his passenger safely to his destination. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the CC actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach
provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at of contract.
fault or to have acted negligently as defined in Arts. 1733 and
1755 of the. This provision necessarily shifts to the common Where there is a pre-existing contractual relation
carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the create the obligation, and the function of the law is
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is merely to regulate the relation thus created. In the case
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the
involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for presumption of negligence at once arose, and it
imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to
him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his
by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual passengers.
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created. In the case at bar, upon the
happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he
had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers. Calalas did not observe extraordinary diligence. The
jeepney was not parked properly when it let out the passenger
and it took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity
of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension
seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. All of this was in violation of the laws
in transportation. And the incident was caso fortuito deserves no
merit. Calalas should have foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
Court ruled that the Garcias may bring a separate civil action Quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
against Barredo (employer) to make him primarily and directly institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all
responsible based on Article 2180. A paragraph of Article 2180 its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and

of the carretela and died 2 days
later. A criminal action was filed
against Fontanilla and he was
convicted. But he was not sued in
a civil action. Parents of the
deceased (Garcia) filed an action
against Barredo, employer of
Fontanilla, for damages based on
Article 1903 (Article 2180 now)
Barredo argued that his liability is
only subsidiary and since there
has been no civil action against
Fontanilla then he cannot be held
responsible.
ISSUE: WON the respondents
(Garcia) may bring this separate
civil action against Barredo, this
making him primarily and directly
responsible under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code as an employer of
Fontanilla. à YES
3. Cangco v. CANGCO one night alighted
Manila from the train onto the platform
Railroad Co. but stepped on some
watermelons placed there which
caused him to trip. He rolled
across the platform and was
eventually run over by a moving
car. His arm was crushed and was
amputated. He now sues R for its
negligence in allowing its
employees to leave the
watermelons there thus causing
his accident. R claims that
CANGCO was also negligent in
alighting from the train and thus
should not be allowed to claim
based on the doctrine of
contributory negligence.
ISSUE: W/N MANILA
RAILROAD is liable for damages
à YES
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provides: The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions. Authorities
support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from delict or crime. The taxi driver was found
guilty of criminal negligence, so that even if he had been sued for
his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have
been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would
have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs
are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because
of his own presumed negligence — which he did not overcome
— under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo:
first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi
driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second,
Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The
respondents were free to choose which course to take, and they
preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting
within their rights.
P was not negligent. He was not required to exercise the
diligence of an extraordinarily prudent man in alighting from the
train – but only ordinary diligence taking into consideration his
age, sex, and circumstances. The Court also differentiated
between a situation wherein a negligent act of an employee
causes damage which amounts to a breach of contract
(CONTRACTU) and that which does not amount to any breach
of contract (EX-CONTRACTU). Differentiating is important
because: In EX-CONTRACTU, the liability of the employer-
master is based on his personal liability/negligence in
selecting/supervising his employee. Hence, although there is a
presumption of negligence on the part of the employer here, it
may be rebutted by him and he can be absolved from liability if
he is able to prove that he exercised the proper diligence. In
CONTRACTU on the other hand, the employer cannot escape
liability merely by proving his diligence in selecting/supervising
his employee. Because in this case, the master ultimately
breached its contract with the victim. It would be absurd in
CONTRACTU situations that the master can evade liability for
failing to comply with the contract just by proving that it
exercised diligence in selecting its agent – that would be
completely unfair. In this case, R breached its contract of
carriage to keep P safe. Hence, it should be liable.
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 4
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independent from delict or crime.
In this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been
fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and
for which, after such a conviction, he could have been
sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
A difference must be made between a situation (1)
where the damage caused by the employee’s negligent
act results in the breach of a contractual obligation of
the master, from that of a situation (2) wherein the
damage caused does not amount to a breach of any
contractual obligation. The differences are: In situation
(2) when there is no breach of any contractual obligation (EX-
CONTRACTU):
From this article two things are apparent:
(1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of
a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection
of the servant or employee, or in supervision over
him, after the selection, or both; and
(2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris
et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the presumption is overcome
and he is relieved from liability.
"As a general rule * * * it is logical that in case of
extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume
the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact
upon which his action is based; while on the contrary,
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in a case of negligence which presupposes the

existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor
shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is
not necessary for him to prove the negligence." If the
negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a
means of discharging the liability arising from contract,
the anomalous result would be that persons acting
through the medium of agents or servants in the
performance of their contracts, would be in a better
position than those acting in person.
II. QUASI-DELICT
A. ELEMENTS (ART. 2176)
1. CULPABLE ACT OR NEGLIGENCE
2. DAMAGE TO ANOTHER
3. CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN THE CULPABLE ACT OR NEGLIGENCE AND THE DAMAGE TO ANOTHER
1. Picart v. Smith Picart was riding on his horse on The test to determine the existence of negligence is whether or The test to determine the existence of negligence is
the Carlatan Bridge when Smith, not the defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, used that whether or not the defendant, in doing the alleged
riding in his car, approached the reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person negligent act, used that reasonable care and caution
bridge. Smith blew his horn thrice would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
to give warning, as Picart was on of negligence. in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
Smith’s lane. BUT, instead of negligence.
moving to the other lane, Picart Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
moved the horse closer to the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in
railing, reasoning that he had no harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that
sufficient time to move to the right foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences. an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable
direction. Smith continued driving Here, although Smith initially had a right to assume that Picart to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding
towards Picart and when he had would move to the correct lane, the situation changed as the against its consequences.
gotten quite near, he quickly former, while nearing the center of the bridge, knew that the
swerved to the other lane. The latter would not be able to do so. Thus, control of the situation Where both parties are negligent, the person who has
horse was so frightened that it had entirely passed to Smith. the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
turned his body across the bridge. fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,
The horse’s limb was broken and Moreover, although Picart was negligent in the first place for without reference to the prior negligence of the other
Picart was thrown off, leading to being in the wrong lane, the SC held that where both parties are party.
several injuries that required negligent, the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
medical attention. impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the
ISSUE: W/N Smith was guilty of other party. Here, the negligence of Smith succeeded that of
negligence such as gives rise to a Picart because it is clear that the former had the final
civil obligation to repair the opportunity to avoid the accident, but he did not do so.
damage done? à YES he’s liable.
2. Daywalt v. La Teodorica entered into a contract (1) NO. Whatever may be the character of the liability, if any, A person is liable for damage done to another by a
Corporacion of sale with Daywalt. Father Sanz which a stranger to a contract may incur by advising or assisting culpable act.
de Los Padres was fully aware of the existence of one of the parties to evade performance, he cannot become CULPABLE ACT:
Agustino the contract of 1902 contract and more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of A stranger cannot become more extensively liable in
Recoletos 1908 contract. When the Torrens the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. damages for the nonperformance of the contract than
certificate was finally issued in 1909 Endencia was the party directly bound by the contract, it is the party in whose behalf he intermeddles.
in favor of Teodorica, she obvious that the liability of the defendant corporation, even Indemnification for damages resulting from the breach

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delivered it for safekeeping to the
defendant corporation. La
Corporacion allegedly induced
Teodorica to to refrain from
performing its obligation in the
contract of sale and withhold
delivery of Torrens title.
ISSUE: (1) Whether a person who
is not a party to a contract for the
sale makes himself liable for
damages to the vendee, beyond the
value of the use and occupation, by
colluding with the vendor and
maintaining him to evade specific
performance. à NO (2) Whether
the damages which the plaintiff
seeks to recover under this head
are too remote and speculative to
be the subject of recovery. à YES
3. Air France v. Air France issued to Carrascoso a
Carrascoso "first class" round trip airplane
ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso
travelled in "first class", but at
Bangkok, the Manager forced
Carrascoso to vacate the "first
class" seat that he was occupying
because, there was a "white man",
who had a "better right" to the
seat. When asked to vacate his
"first class" seat, Carrascoso
refused; a commotion ensued, and,
according to said witness "many of
the Filipino passengers got nervous
in the tourist class; and convinced
him to give up the seat. Carrascoso
reluctantly gave his "first class" seat
in the plane.
ISSUE: Is the award for damages
correct? à YES
4. Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the owner of a film called
Cuddy “Zigomar” rented it to Gilchrist
for a week for P125. A few days
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TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 6
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admitting that it has made itself coparticipant in the breach of of a contract is a right inseparably annexed to every
the contract, can in no even exceed hers. This leads us to action for the fulfillment of an obligation; if damages
consider at this point the extent of the liability of Teodorica are not sought or recovered in the action to enforce
Endencia to the plaintiff by reason of her failure to surrender performance, they cannot be recovered in an
the certificate of title and to place the plaintiff in possession. independent action. The damages ordinarily
recoverable against a vendor for failure to deliver land
(2) YES. Damages, known as special damages, are recoverable which he has contracted to deliver is the value of the
where it appears that the particular conditions which made such use and occupation of the land for the time during
damages a probable consequence of the breach were known to which it is wrongfully withheld
the delinquent party at the time the contract was made. If the
damages are in the legal sense remote or speculative, knowledge
of the special conditions which render such damages possible
will not make them recoverable. Special damages of this
character cannot be recovered unless made the subject of the
stipulation. The damages ordinarily recoverable against a
vendor for failure to deliver land which he has contracted to
deliver is the value of the use and occupation of the land for the
time during which it is wrongfully withheld.
A written document speaks a uniform language; the spoken The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act
word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability of its employees is well settled in law. A contract of air
in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to carriage generates a relation attended with a public
the terms of a ticket is desirable. Where at the start of the trial, duty; neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employees
respondent’s counsel placed petitioner on guard that he could give ground for an action for damages.
intended to prove that, while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Passengers have a right to be treated by the carrier’s
the respondent was ousted by petitioner’s manager, who gave employes with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
his seat to a white man, and evidence of bad faith in the consideration. Any rule or discourteous conduct on
fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the employees towards a passenger gives
the part of the petitioner, it is therefore unnecessary to inquire the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the
complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in
the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. The NCC
gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages in
contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that
defendant should have acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner. The manner of ejectment of
respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this
legal precept. The right to attorney’s fees is fully established.
The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for
attorney’s fees. The least that can be said is that the courts
below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorney’s fees be
given. We do not intend to break tradition that discretion well
exercised- as it was here- should not be disturbed.
The liability of Espejo arises from unlawful acts and not from The ground on which the liability of a third party for
contractual obligations, as they were under no such obligations interfering w/a contract b/n others rests, is that the
to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. If the interference was malicious A person who, by his act or

prior to May 26, Cuddy sent the
money back to Gilchrist, saying
that he had other arrangements
made (he rented it to Espejo at a
higher price). The trial court found
that Espejo had indeed induced
Cuddy to violate his contract, but
there was no showing that Espejo
knew that it was Gilchrist
specifically who contracted with
Cuddy first. Thus, Gilchrist applied
for and was granted by the CFI
Iloilo a preliminary injunction
forbidding Espejo from showing
the film and a mandatory
injunction requiring Cuddy to
deliver the film to Gilchrist.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred
in issuing the injunctions. à NO
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
1. Board of NACOCO was a non-profit
Liquidators v. governmental organization avowed
Kalaw in the development of the coconut
industry. It was granted the express
power to buy, sell, barter, export,
or in any manner, deal in coconut,
copra and other by-products.
NACOCO embarked on copra
trading activities, and Kalaw served
as its general manager and board
chairman. As general manager,
Kalaw, entered into several
contracts for delivery of copra,
without prior approval from the
Board of Directors of NACOCO.
But the contracts were later on
ratified by the Board of Directors.
An unexpected chain of events
transpired which deterred
NACOCO from fulfilling its
obligations in the contracts entered
into by Kalaw. Devastating
typhoons damaged coconut trees
throughout the country, which
resulted in the decrease in copra
production. NACOCO then failed
to deliver the amount of orders
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action of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be
governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code.
Article 1902 of that code provides that: “a person who, by act
or omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or
negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage do done.”
There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition
precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the
identity of a person to whom he causes damages. [In other
words, knowledge of identity of the injured party is NOT an
element of tort.] In fact, the chapter wherein this article is
found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order
that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision
absolving the defendants of any liability. It ruled that the case is
one of damnum absque injuria (damage without injury).
“Conjunction of damage and wrong was absent in this case.
There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other
is wanting.” SC held that there was absence of bad faith on the
part of Kalaw, because he was led to believe that he was
empowered to enter into such contracts even without the prior
approval of the Board of Directors (even though the by-laws of
the corporation requires such approval) since such was the
practice and record showed that the Board was knowledgeable
of the transactions he entered into without objecting thereto.
Moreover, the Court took note of the nature of the position of
a general manager, who has control of the business and has
implied authority to make any contract or do any act necessary
to the conduct of ordinary business of the corporation. Since
copra trading is one of the ordinary business of the corporation,
entering into contracts for delivery of copra was deemed to be
within the powers of Kalaw as general manager. Indeed, the
Board has ratified such acts by Kalaw. The Court further
pronounced that “settled jurisprudence has it that where similar
acts have been approved by the directors as a matter of general
practice, custom, and policy, the general manager may bind the
company without formal authorization of the board of
directors.” “In the case at bar, the practice of the corporation
has been to allow its general manager to negotiate and execute
contracts in its copra trading activities for and in NACOCO’s
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 7
ATTY. E. GO
omission, causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done Nothing requires as a condition precedent to the
liability of a tortfeasor that he must know the identity
of a person to whom he causes damage.
IRREPARABLE INJURY:
Species of injury, whether great or small, that ought
not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on
the other; because it is so large on the one hand or so
small on the other is of such constant and frequent
recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be
had therefor in a court of law. Does not mean injury
beyond the possibility of repair or beyond possible
compensation in damages. One who wrongfully
interferes in a contract between others, and for the
purpose of gain to himself induces one of the parties
to break it, is liable to the party injured thereby; his
continued interference may be ground for an
injunction where the injuries resulting will be
irreparable
BAD FAITH
Does not simply connote bad judgment; Imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of wrong; Breach of a known duty
through some motive or interest or ill will; Partakes of
the nature of fraud
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA (loss w/o injury)
The legitimate exercise of a person’s rights, even if it
causes loss to another, does not automatically result in
an actionable injury; The law does not prescribe a
remedy for this loss
à Does not apply when: there is an abuse of a
person’s right; The exercise of this right is suspended
or extinguished pursuant to court order
ACTIONS THAT SURVIVE DEATH:
Survive against a decedent’s executors or
administrators; Actions to recover real and personal
property; Actions to enforce a lien thereon;Actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or property
(extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is
injured or diminished)
ACTIONS THAT DO NOT SURVIVE DEATH:
Barred if not filed in estate settlement proceedings;
purely personal obligations; Claims for funeral
 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 8
ATTY. E. GO

covering the aforementioned
contracts. There was only partial
fulfilment of the contracts, which
resulted to a suit filed by one of the
buyers, Louis Dreyfus & Co.
(Overseas) Ltd. The case was
thereafter settled, but when Kalaw
management was already out of the
picture, the settlements sum up to
about P1.3M. Thereafter, a suit was
filed by NACOCO Board of
Liquidators, seeking to recover the
amount of settlement from Kalaw
and other past directors of
NACOCO. It charges Kalaw with
negligence under Art. 2176 of the
Civil Code. The directors, including
Kalaw, was charged with bad faith
and/or breach of trust for having
approved of the contracts.
behalf without prior board approval.” The contracts therefore expenses and those for the last sickness of the
were valid contracts. It was found that the cause of the losses of decedent; Judgments for money; All claims for money
NACOCO was not negligence or bad faith on the part of against the decedent, arising from contract, express or
Kalaw and other directors, but the typhoon and other force implied
majeure which prevented NACOCO from fulfilling its
contractual obligations. Further, no assertion was made and no
proof was presented which would link Kalaw’s acts, ratified by
the Board, to defraudation of the government.
*There were issues on the legal personality and prescription
which the Court resolved in favour of Board of Liquidators,
having legal personality and continuous existence despite the
lapse of 3-year period to liquidate.

ISSUE: W/N Kalaw is negligent

and in bad faith, thus, liable for
entering into contract without prior
approval of the Board of
Directors? à NO
2. Farolan v. Polypropylene, if rejected (called
Solmac OPP film waste) as defective, is
Marketing sold cheaper. Solmac imported 17
Corporation containers and presented the BoC
proof from the BOI that it will
import OPP film waste. Upon
examination of the shipment, the
material was found out to be
stronger than film waste thus it was
withheld by the Petitioners.
Farolan corresponded with the
BOI on what to do with the
material—the BOI suggested
drilling holes on the plastic. Solmac
then sued Farolan plus mandamus
and injunction in the RTC
There was good faith. 1. Film waste importation is restricted in
the Philippines. 2. Farolan kept asking the BOI on what to do
with the film waste. 3. Parayno testified that there was no clear-
cut policy on film waste. However, even if there was a mistake
in withholding the film, they’re not personally liable. This is
because it is the duty of the Court to see that public officers are
not hampered in doing their duties—mistakes committed by
public officials are not actionable if they were done in good
faith. This is damnum absque injuria. There is a presumption of
good faith that was never upturned.
GOOD FAITH
• Always presumed; it is upon him who alleges the
contrary that the burden of proof lies
• State of mind which is manifested by the acts of
the individual concerned
• Honest intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of
another
• Opposite of fraud
• Its absence should be established by convincing
evidence

ISSUE: BoC in good faith? àYES

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 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 9
ATTY. E. GO

B. NO DOUBLE RECOVERY RULE (ART. 2177)

CASE TITLE CASE SUMMARY RATIO KEY TAKE AWAY
1. Joseph v. Joseph boarded Perez’s truck, The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the CAUSE OF ACTION
Bautista going to Bulacan. On the road, the delict or wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, Delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
driver of the cargo truck tried to if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one defendant in violation of the primary rights of the
overtake a tricycle. At the same cause of action arises. In the case at bar, there is no question that plaintiff
time, a pick up truck tried to JOSEPH sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in A single act or omission can be violative of various
overtake the cargo truck while the him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of rights at the same time
cargo truck was overtaking the action against the different respondents through the appropriate Where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a
tricycle. The cargo truck hit a remedies allowed by law. The trial court was, therefore, correct single cause of action regardless of the number of
mango tree and Joseph sustained in holding that there was only one cause of action involved rights that may have been violated belonging to one
an injury, a bone fracture in his although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the person
legs. Jpseph sued everyone. The defendants therein were not necessarily Identical since the If only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts,
driver, the owner of the truck and respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a only one cause of action arises
other people as solidary debtors. recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars
Some of the defendants paid recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the ELEMENTS
Joseph so released his claim against proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act 1. Legal right of the plaintiff;
these people. Perez, filed MTD on or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule 2. Correlative obligation of the defendant; and
the ground that the payment of the against unjust enrichment. Moreover, the fact that the 3. Act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said defendant inured to his benefit defendants were impleaded as solidary debtors means that the that right
- granted and dismissed the case. payment of one should release the others of liability.
PROSCRIPTION AGAINST DOUBLE
ISSUE: W/N a judgment on the RECOVERY
compromise agreement under the Recovery by the petitioner under one remedy
CoA based on quasi-delict is a bar necessarily bars recovery under the other
to the cause of action for breach of Stems from the fundamental rule against unjust
contract of carriage. à YES enrichment
2. Bermudez, Sr. Pontino was driving a cargo truck Here, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs
v. Melencio- owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan. based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right has the choice between:
Herrera It bumped a jeep and resulted to in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not 1. Action to enforce the civil liability arising from
the death of Rogelio, Bermudez’ preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi- crime under Article 100, RPC; or
son. A crim case for Homicide delict. Rule 111, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court states that an 2. Action for quasi-delict under Arts 2176-2194, CC.
through Reckless Imprudence was independent civil action may be instituted by the injured party The fact that the right to file an independent civil
filed against Pontino but Bermudez for cases provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code (among action was reserved in the criminal case will not
reserved his right to file a civil others), provided that the party reserved their right to file the preclude the plaintiff from choosing to file a civil
action against Pontino. Bermudez civil case in the criminal action. Art. 2177 of the CC states that a action for quasi-delict
then filed a civil case in the CFI civil action entire separate and distinct from the civil liability
against Pontino and Cordova Ng arising from negligence in the RPC can be instituted. The only
Sun Kwan during the pendency of prohibition is that the injured party cannot recover damages for
the criminal case. CFI dismissed the same act. Here, Bermudez in the criminal case did reserve his
the case, holding that Bermudez by right to file a separate civil action arising from the bumping of
filing the criminal action already the jeepney that resulted to the death of his son. In fact, even
treated the accident as a crime, without such a reservation, an injured party in the criminal case
cannot institute a separate civil which resulted in the acquittal of the accused can recover
action during the pendency of the damages based on quasi-delict. In fact, in a criminal prosecution
criminal action. the guilt of the accused needs to be established beyond
reasonable doubt while in civil action for damages, only

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 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 10
ATTY. E. GO

ISSUE: W/N RTC correctly
assumed that the action was based
on a crime (and not a quasi-delict)
and could not proceed
independently from the criminal
action à NO
3. Singson v. BPI There was a previous civil case
where Sps Julian Singson were
defendants. Villa-Abrille & Co was
also a defendant. The lower court
ruled against these defendants and
they were ordered to pay Philippine
Milling Co. a certain sum of
money. All appealed except Villa-
Abrille. Hence, in so far as Villa-
Abrille was concerned, the
judgment was final and executory.
The Court sent a writ of
attachment to BPI where both the
Singsons and Villa Abrille’s had
accounts. NOTE: the writ of
attachment was only intended for
the attachment of villa abrille’s
credit and not the account of the
singsons, whose case was still on
appeal. However, the clerk of BPI
only read the title of the writ of
garnishment and not the whole
body where it stated that the court
only intended to attach Villa
Abrille’s account and not that of
the Singson’s. Subsequently,
Singson issued two BPI checks to
B.M Glass Service and Lega
Corporation respectively. The
checks were dishonored because of
the mistake of the bank.
preponderance of evidence is needed. The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes
a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.
We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a The existence of a contract between the parties does
contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a not bar the commission of a tort by one against the
tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of other and the consequent recovery of damages
damages therefor. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated therefor.
in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso,
involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket,
had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and
compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held
entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground
of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between a
passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature
... the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort".
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and
considering, particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done
to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the
bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had
committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages
— the amount of which need not be proven — in the sum of
P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees in the sum of P500, would
suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.

ISSUE: W/ON the Singsons were

entitled to damages on the basis of
quasi-delict despite the existence of
a contract with BPI. à YES
4. Air France v. Air France issued to Carrascoso a
Carrasco "first class" round trip airplane
ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso
travelled in "first class", but at
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation, it is vested with
public interest. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have
COMMENTARY ON DOUBLE RECOVERY:
The problem of double recovery exists in a situation
wherein the same negligent act or omission also
results in a breach of the contract of carriage.
Although under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code and the

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Bangkok, the Manager forced
Carrascoso to vacate the "first
class" seat that he was occupying
because, there was a "white man",
who had a "better right" to the
seat. When asked to vacate his
"first class" seat, Carrascoso
refused; a commotion ensued, and,
according to said witness "many of
the Filipino passengers got nervous
in the tourist class; and convinced
him to give up the seat. Carrascoso
reluctantly gave his "first class" seat
in the plane.
ISSUE: W/N Carrascoso was
entitled to damages à YES
5. Rafael Reyes Dunca (driver) was driving the
Trucking v. Truck owned and registered in the
People name of Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corp (RRT), which is engaged in
the business of delivering San
Miguel beer products from
Pampanga to any point in Luzon.
Upon descending the national road
in Isabela (coming from Cagayan
to Pampanga), the truck
approached a damaged portion on
its part of the road. It had potholes
5-6inches deep. Before
approaching the potholes, Dunca
saw the Nissan pick-up, driven by
Balcita with Dy as passenger,
coming from the opposite
direction. Because Dunca tried to
avoid hitting the Nissan, the Truck
hit the potholes, causing him to
lose control of the wheels,
ramming into the Nissan and
dragging it to the left shoulder of
the road. Balcita and Dy died.
Dunca was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting in double
homicide with violation of the
motor vehicle law. The heirs of Dy
and Balcita made a reservation to
file a separate civil action against
Dunca arising from the offense
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. Thus, although the
relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin
and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be
also a tort". Air France’s contract with Mr. Carrascoso is one
attended with public duty. The stress of Mr. Carrascoso's action
is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of
public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper.
1) In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of
the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not
instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was
for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
(quasi-delict), arising from the same act or omission of Dunca.
Dy intended to proceed primarily and directly against RRT as
employer of Dunca. Hence, RTC and CA erred in holding
Dunca civilly liable, and RRT subsidiarily liable for damages
arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action, as Dy in fact
filed a separate civil action against the RRT based on quasi delict
resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto. The
withdrawal of the civil case against Dunca cannot reverse the
effect of the reservation earlier made. Dy did not withdraw the
civil action against RRT based on quasi delict. Rule 111, Section 1,
paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear
that the reservation to file or the filing of a separate civil action
results in a waiver of other available civil actions arising from the
same act or omission of the accused. To avoid multiple suits
between the same litigants arising out of the same act or
omission of the offender. It covers all kinds of civil actions,
regardless of their source in law, provided that the action has for
its basis the same act or omission of the offender. However,
RRT as defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed
against it, based on quasi delict, may be held liable thereon. Thus,
the trial court grievously erred in dismissing Dy’s civil complaint.
And the Court of Appeals erred in affirming said decision.
Unfortunately, Dy did not appeal from such dismissal and could
not be granted affirmative relief.
2.) The award of damages in the criminal case was improper
because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 11
ATTY. E. GO
accepted notion of a tort action requires that there be
no contractual relation between the parties, it has
been consistently held the existence of the contract
does not bar the commission of a tort by one against
the other and the consequent recovery of damages
therefor, for although the relation between the
passenger and a carrier is “contractual both in origin
and in nature, the act that breaks the contract may be
a tort.”
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the
choice between: (1) an action to enforce civil liability
arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured
party cannot avail himself of any other remedy
because he may not recover damages twice for the
same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is
the rule against double recovery.
In this case, Dy chose to file a separate civil action for
damages against RRT as employer of Dunca, based
on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. The liability of the employer (RRT)
for the negligent conduct of the subordinate (Dunca)
is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee.
The enforcement of the judgment against the
employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not
require the employee to be insolvent since the nature
of the liability of the employer with that of the
employee, the two being statutorily considered joint
tortfeasors, is solidary. Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, provides that an
employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a
felony committed by his employee in the discharge of
his duty. Employee has to be found insolvent that
renders him unable to properly respond to the civil

charged. Subsequently, Dy and
Balcita filed before the RTC a civil
complaint against RRT, as
employer of Dunca, based on quasi
delict. Dy withdrew the reservation
to file a separate civil action against
Dunca and manifested that they
would prosecute the civil aspect ex
delicto in the criminal action.
However, they did not withdraw
the separate civil action based on
quasi delict against RRT as employer
arising from the same act or
omission of Dunca.
ISSUE: 1.) W/N RRT may be held
subsidiarily liable for the damages
awarded to Dy in the criminal
action against Dunca despite the
filing of a separate civil action by
Dy against RRT? – NO, RRT
cannot be subsidiarily liable.
2.) W/N the Court may award
damages to Dy in the criminal case
despite the filing of a civil action
against RRT? – NO, award of
damages is improper.
III. NEGLIGENCE
A. CONCEPT
1. Jarco Criselda Aguilar and her daughter
Marketing v. were shopping in Syvel’s
CA Department Store, owned by Jarco
Marketing. While paying for their
purchases, the store’s gift-wrapping
counter collapsed and fell on the 6-
year-old daughter. She was rushed
to the hospital, & died 14days later.
ISSUE: (1) whether the death of
Zhieneth was accidental or
attributable to negligence à
ATTRIBUTABLE TO
NEGLIGENCE
(2) In case of negligence, whether
the same was attributable to Jarco
for maintaining a defective counter
or to Criselda and Zhieneth for
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waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil
action against RRT. The damages awarded in the criminal action
was invalid because of its effective waiver (due to reservation).
The pronouncement was void because the action for recovery of
the civil liability arising from the crime has been waived in said
criminal action. By virtue of the reservation of the right to bring
a separate civil action or the filing thereof, there would be no
possibility that RRT would be held liable because in such a case
there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of
Dunca. As a final note, we reiterate that "the policy against
double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for
the same act or omission whether the action is brought against
the employee or against his employer. The injured party must
choose which of the available causes of action for damages he
will bring.
Jarco was negligent. Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. Gift-wrapping counter was described by
employees as shaky and can collapse at anytime, top heavy. Was
reported to management, but they did not do anything.
Meanwhile, a child under nine years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of
law.
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 12
ATTY. E. GO
liability adjudged.
The policy against double recovery requires that only
one action be maintained for the same act or
omission whether the action is brought against the
employee or against the employer
Definition of Negligence
An accident: pertains to an unforeseen event in
which no fault or negligence attaches to the
defendant. A fortuitous circumstance, event or
happening; An event happening without any human
agency, or if happening wholly or partly through
human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person
to whom it happens.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do.
Negligence is “the failure to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another person, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.”

failing to exercise due and
reasonable care while inside the
store premises. à JARCO
APPLICABILITY OF ARTS. 1172-1174
1. Sarmiento v. Dra. Lao requested Sarmiento to
Sun-Cabrido find her somebody to reset her
diamond earrings into 2 gold rings.
Sarmiento sent Payag to Dingding’s
Jewelry Shopped owned by the
Cabrido spouses and the jewelry
shop accepted for P400. The
diamond earrings were appraised as
worth .33 carat and perfect in cut
and clarity. Marilou, respondent,
tried dismounting the diamond and
when she was unsuccessful, she
asked their goldsmith, Santos, to
do it. Santos tried removing by
using pliers but broke the
diamonds in the process.
Sarmiento asked the Cabrido
spouses to replace it, but they
(Spouses) didn’t want to so
Sarmiento replaced it for P30,000.
Sarmiento filed a case in the
MTCC and it ruled in Sarmiento’s
favor. RTC reversed and CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: W/N the dismounting of
the diamond from its original
setting was part of the obligation
assumed by the private
respondents under the contract of
service so they should be held
liable for damages arising from its
breakage? à LIABLE
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Cabrido denied any transaction with Sarmiento but MTCC
debunked their claims. On appeal, Cabrido admitted that they
had a transaction but it didn’t include the obligation to dismount
the diamonds. The SC didn’t believe this claim because of
Marilou’s actions. Marilou could have asked Payag to have the
diamonds dismounted first but she didn’t. She asked P400 for
the job so there arose an obligation to reset the diamonds. It can
also be seen that Marilou told Payag to bring the diamond
earrings when the new settings were completed. Marilou
proceeded to dismount the diamonds and when unsuccessful,
asked Santos (goldsmith) to do it. Marilou cannot now deny the
shop’s obligation to reset the pair of earrings.
Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties. Corollarily, those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or
delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages. The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances
of the persons, of the time and of the place.
In the case at bar, it is beyond doubt that Santos acted
negligently in dismounting the diamond from its original setting.
It appears to be the practice of the trade to use a miniature wire
saw in dismounting precious gems, such as diamonds, from their
original settings.
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 13
ATTY. E. GO
Accident and negligence are intrinsically
contradictory; one cannot exist with the
other. Accident occurs when the person concerned
is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by
fault of any person and which could not have been
prevented by any means suggested by common
prudence. The test in determining the existence
of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case
of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties; those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence or delay and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages
The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place.

B. AS PROXIMATE CAUSE
1. Taylor v. David Taylor and Manuel
Manila Claparols (12 years old) were
Electric and looking for Mr. Murphy, an
Light employee of the Manila Electric.
Company Sine e’s not there, they spent some
time in wandering about the
company's premises & picked up
brass fulminating caps and carried
them home. The boys then made a
series of experiments with the caps.
David held the cap while Manuel
applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed,
causing more or less serious
injuries to all three. It seems that
the caps when found had been
lying for a considerable time, and
appeared to be discarded as
worthless. No measures seem to
have been adopted by the
defendant company to prohibit
visitors from entering and walking
about its premises unattended.
According to evidence, David is of
more than average intelligence,
taller and more mature both
mentally and physically than most
boys of fifteen. He has knowledge
on both mechanical drafting and
mechanical engineering.
ISSUE: 1) W/N the actions of the
Company and/or his employees is
the proximate cause of the injuries
suffered by Taylor? à NO
2. Vdav. De Shortly after midnight, a bus of
Bataclan v. Medina Transportation left Cavite
Medina on its way to Pasay City. While the
bus was running, one of the front
tires burst and the vehicle began to
zig-zag until it fell into a canal or
ditch on the right side of the road
and turned turtle. The passengers
seated beside the driver could not
get out. After half an hour, came
about 10 men, one of them
carrying a lighted torch, evidently
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 14
ATTY. E. GO
SC is satisfied that Taylor’s action in cutting open the detonating A man should suffer the damage which comes to him
cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause through his own fault; he cannot demand reparation
of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon from another Fault or negligence is a source of
Taylor. Under all the circumstances of this case, the negligence obligation when between such negligence and injury
of the Company in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was there exists a relation of cause and effect; but if the
not the proximate cause of the injury received by Taylor, which, injury produced should not be the result of acts or
properly speaking, not attributable to the negligence of the omissions of a third party, the latter has no obligation
Company. Taylor has sufficient capacity and understanding to be to repair the same.
sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put
the match to the contents of the cap. That the injury incurred by Test (according to the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf
him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of and Pacific Co.): Distinction must be made between
his own willful and reckless act. Test (according to the case of the accident and the injury, between the event itself,
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.): Distinction must be without which there could have been no accident,
made between the accident and the injury, between the event and those acts of the victim not entering into it,
itself, without which there could have been no accident, and independent of it, but contributing to his own proper
those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, hurt.
but contributing to his own proper hurt. o Under this test, the
immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in Contributory Negligence: When the immediate
Taylor’s injury, was his own act in putting a match to the cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the
contents of the cap, and that having “contributed to the principal Plaintiff’s own ac, which contributed to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot occurrence as one of its determining factors, he
recover”. Contributory Negligence: When the immediate cause cannot recover damages for the injury
of an accident resulting in an injury is the Plaintiff’s own ac,
which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its
determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury. It
is clear that the accident could not have happened had not the
detonating caps been left exposed at the point where they were
found if their own owner had exercised due care in keeping them
in an appropriate place. BUT it is equally clear that Taylor would
not have been injured had he not entered upon the Company’s
premises, and strolled around thereon without the express
permission of the Company, and had he not picked up an carried
away the property of the Company, which he found on its
premises, and had he not deliberately cut open one of the caps
and applied a match to its contents.
The coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was PROXIMATE CAUSE
a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of That cause, which, in natural and continuous
passengers and the call for outside help. The driver and the sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
conductor should and must have known that in the position in cause, produces the injury, and without which the
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have result would not have occurred.
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around
the bus, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would
appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not
to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

fueled with petroleum. Almost
immediately, a fierce fire started,
burning and all but consuming the
bus, including the 4 passengers.
ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause
of the death of Bataclan was the
overturning of the bus, and not the
lighted torch. à YES
3. Fernando v. The market master of the invited
CA people to bid the re-emptying of
the septic tank in Agdao. Bascon
won the bid. However, before the
bid was awarded, Bertulano (a
losing bidder) with four of his
companions were found dead
inside the septic tank. Cause of
death was loss of oxygen in the
body. Lungs burst due to
inhalation of toxic sulfide gas from
the septic tank. The families of the
victims sued the City Government
under Art. 2176.
ISSUE: 1) W/N the Davao City is
guilty of negligence? à NO
2) If so, W/N such negligence is
the immediate and proximate cause
of the deaths of the victims. à
NO
* City was not guilty of negligence
and that the proximate cause of the
death of the five victims was not
due to the City of Davao.
4. Urbano v. IAC Urbano’s place of storing palay was
flooded. When confronted, Javier
admitted to causing it. They
argued, and eventually, Urbano
brought out his bolo and struck
Javier, hitting his hand and causing
a wound. The wound was treated
and the two entered an amicable
settlement with Urbano paying for
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
Under the law, a person who by his omission causes damage to
another, there being negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done (Art. 2176 CC). Negligence has been defined as the failure
to observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the
negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation
between the omission and the damage. Here, he must prove
under Art. 2179 of the CC that Davao City’s negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury. [Proximate cause:
that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.] Where the
resulting injury was the product of the negligence of both parties,
there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be considered
the proximate cause of the accident. In Taylor v. Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co., the Court set a guideline: “The test is
simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the
injury, between the event itself, without which there could have
been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into
it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt.”
The accident in this case occurred because the victims on their
own and without authority from the city government opened the
septic tank. An accident such as toxic gas (hydrogen sulfide gas)
leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one
removes its covers. Bertulano, an old hand in septic tank
cleaning, is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His
failure, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for
their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
Here, the evidence on record does not clearly show that the
wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time
of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms
that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier
suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got
infected with tetanus. However, as to when the wound was
infected is not clear from the record. It delves into the medical
nature of tetanus. Long story short, based on how Javier died, it
is very unlikely that the wound caused the tetanus infection.
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 15
ATTY. E. GO
Negligence: Failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand whereby such other person suffers
injury; To be entitled to damages for an injury
resulting from the negligence of another, the claimant
must prove that the defendant’s negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury; the
relation between the omission and the damage must
be established; Proof of such relation of cause and
effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did not in
any way contribute to the negligence of the
defendant; Where the resulting injury was the product
of the negligence of both parties, there exists a
difficulty to discern which acts shall be the proximate
cause of the accident; Distinction must be made
between the accident and the injury, between the
event itself, without which there could have been no
accident, and those acts of the victim not entering
into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own
proper hurt; When a person holds himself out as
being competent to do things requiring professional
skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in
the particular work which he attempts to do
Death must be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicte
EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis
of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion
by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and

the medical expenses. Around 22
days after, Javier was rushed to the
hospital with symptoms of severe
tetanus poisoning. Next day, he
died. The two lower courts found
Urbano guilty of homicide.
Urbano’s main defense centered on
there being a supervening event
that caused death – that it was the
negligence of Javier that brought
about the infection.
ISSUE: W/N the wound caused by
Urbano is the proximate cause of
his Javier’s death? à NO.
Tetanus intervened and caused
death. Urbano is acquitted.
5. Bernal v. Daughter was frightened by a car.
House and As a result of which, she fell in a
Tacloban gutter with hot water. The hot
Electric water was coming out of the
Tacloban Electric and Ice Plant.
The child died as a result of the
burns she suffered. The parents
filed a civil complaint for damages
against The Plant and its owner,
J.V. House. It was dismissed upon
the finding that there was
contributory negligence on the part
of the mother and the child.
ISSUE: Does contributory
negligence bar recovery of
damages? à NO.
6. Gabeto v. When Julio Pagnaya, driver of the
Araneta carromata, started to proceed to
the cockpit, Araneta stepped out
into the street and laid his hands
on the reins to stop the horse. He
protested to the driver that he had
called the carromata first. Then
Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the
bridle to free the horse from the
control of Araneta in order that the
vehicle might pass on. But because
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 16
ATTY. E. GO
Here, the wound inflicted by Urbano was not the proximate the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and
cause, which the court defines as "that cause, which, in natural efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening would not have happened but for such condition or
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would occasion. An efficient intervening cause can wipe out
not have occurred." As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. the criminal liability of the accused
Remoquillo, et al. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior
or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets
into operation the instances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause." We must stress, however, that our discussion
of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal
aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow
that the petitioner is also free of civil liability.
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the The contributory negligence of the child and her
principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery,
religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction
allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the of the damages.
mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile
appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a
ditch filled with hot water. Article 1902 of the old Civil Code
must again be enforced. (Any person who by act or omission
causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable
for the damage so done.) The contributory negligence of the
child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to
recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction
of the damages. The death of the child Purificacion Bernal was
the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow
through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-
by who were unfortunate enough to fall into it.
The evidence in this case was only the testimony of Pagnaya and The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote
Ilano. They both say that while in the middle of the street, from the accident that presently ensued to be
Araneta jerked the bridle which caused the bit to come out of the considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. By
horse’s mouth and at that juncture the throat latch of the bridle getting out and taking his post at the head of the
was broken. The mere fact that Araneta interfered with the horse, Pagnaya was the person primarily responsible
carromata by stopping the horse in the manner stated would not for the control of the animal and Araneta cannot be
make him liable for the death of Gayetano because it is admitted charged with liability for the accident resulting from
by Pagnaya that he afterwards got out of the carromata to fix the the action of the horse thereafter.
bridle. After Pagnaya alighted, the horse was conducted to the
curb and than an appreciable interval of time lapsed (several
minutes) before the horse started on his career up the street. The
 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 17
ATTY. E. GO

of the looseness of the bridle on
the horse’s head or to the
rottenness of the material of which
it was made, the bit came out of
the horse’s mouth and it was
necessary for the driver to get out
in order to find the bridle. The
horse was then pulled over to near
the curb and Pagnaya tried to fix
the bridle. Then the carromata
struck a police telephone box and
the box came down with a crash
and caused the horse to run away.
Gayetano did not get off from the
carromata. He jumped off or fell
and suffered injuries from which
he died. Gabeto, wife of Gayetano,
filed a civil action for damages
against Araneta because of the
death of Gayetano.
stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the accident
that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate
cause thereof. By getting out and taking his post at the head of
the horse, Pagnaya was the person primarily responsible for the
control of the animal and Araneta cannot be charged with
liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse
thereafter. Pagnaya also testified that when the horse was pulled
over to the curb, Araneta gesticulated with one of his arms and
incidentally brought his hand down on the horse’s nose and that
this made the horse run away. However, there is no other
witness who testifies to this. The evidence indicates that the
bridle was old and the leather of which it was made was probably
so weak as to be easily broken. The several witnesses who
testified for Araneta gave a more credible account of the affair
than the witnesses for Gabeto. The witnesses for Araneta said
that it was Pagnaya who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit
to come out of the horse’s mouth and that when Pagnaya tried to
fix the bridle, the bridle was slipped entirely off.

ISSUE: W/N the death of

Gayetano was due to the wrongful
act of Araneta. à NO
7. McKee v. IAC A head-on collision between a
TRUCK (driven by Galang) and a
CAR took place. CAR was driving
on right lane going northbound
when from a little distance, 2 boys
crossed the road and stayed in the
middle of CAR’s lane, moving back
and forth unsure of whether to
cross all the way to the other side
or turn back. The CAR shifted to
the left lane to avoid them. CAR
saw TRUCK coming so it signalled
it and honked for it to slow down
and allow it to move back to its
proper lane after passing the boys.
The TRUCK didn’t f*cking care. It
moved forward at full speed. It
stopped only when it was too late
and there was a collision. 2
passengers of the CAR died and
several injured. Crim case was first
filed against Galang. 2 civil cases
were then filed against owners of
truck based on quasi-delict.
CAR was not negligent because the prudent thing to do upon
seeing the 2 boys in the middle of the road was to really move
lanes to avoid them. It also signalled the TRUCK sufficiently
upon doing so and warned it to slow down. Assuming that CAR
was negligent, TRUCK was still the proximate cause.
Proximate cause: that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground
to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.” TRUCK here
should have heeded the warnings. It only stopped when the car
was 10 meters away from it which was too late. Ridiculous since
it saw the CAR’s signals from hundreds of meters away. Hence,
it is also guilty under the last fair chance doctrine. Owners are
Proximate cause: that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.”

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ISSUE: W/N Galang and owners
are guilty à YES
C. PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE
1. Ong v. Dominador Ong (14y/o) and his
Metropolitan brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went
Water District to the pool. Dominador told his
brothers that he was going to the
locker room to drink coke. Ruben
and Eusebio went to the bigger
pool, leaving Dominador in the
small pool. There were two
lifeguards on duty in the pool
compound. Some boys who were
in the pool area informed that
somebody was swimming under
water for quite a long time. Abaño
immediately jumped into and
retrieved the apparently lifeless
body of Dominador Ong from the
bottom. Abaño immediately
applied manual artificial
respiration. Soon after, male nurse
Armando Rule came to render
assistance, followed by sanitary
inspector Iluminado Vicente. After
the injection, Vicente left on a jeep
in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from
UP. Meanwhile, Abaño continued
the artificial manual respiration,
and applied the resuscitator until
the two oxygen tanks were
exhausted. The doctor ordered that
the body be taken to the clinic. An
autopsy was performed and found
that the death was due to asphyxia
by submersion in water.
ISSUE: W/N the death of
Dominador Ong can be attributed
to the negligence of MWD and/or
its employees. à NO
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
also liable since they did not prove that they exercised the
diligence required in the selection and supervision of Galang.
The present action is governed by Article 2176 in relation to
Article 2080 of the new Civil Code. The first article provides that
"whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages
done." Such fault or negligence is called quasi-delict. Under the
second article, this obligation is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. The present action is one for DAMAGES
FOUND ON CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE. The principle to
be observed is that the person claiming damages has the burden
of proving that the damage is caused by the fault or negligence of
the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of his
employees. there is sufficient evidence to show that MWD has
taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its
patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death, (i.e.
bouys, rules and regulations, six lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary
inspector, security guards) The record also shows that when the
body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool,
the employees of MWD did everything possible to bring him
back to life (i.e. manual artificial respiration, oxygen resuscitator,
calling for a doctor). All of the foregoing shows that MWD has
done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to
restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold
it liable for his death.
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 18
ATTY. E. GO
In an action for damages founded on culpable
negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
that the damage is caused by the fault or negligence
of the defendant
Operators of resorts will not be held liable for the
drowning or death of a patron if said operator had:
Exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees; and Observed the
diligence required by law under the circumstances
The present action is governed by Article 2176 in
relation to Article 2080 of the new Civil Code. The
first article provides that "whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done."
Such fault or negligence is called quasi-delict. Under
the second article, this obligation is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. The
present action is one for DAMAGES FOUND ON
CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE. The principle to be
observed is that the person claiming damages has the
burden of proving that the damage is caused by the
fault or negligence of the person from whom the
damage is claimed, or of one of his employees.
 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 19
ATTY. E. GO

D. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
1. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR (ARTS. 1755-1756)
CASE TITLE CASE SUMMARY RATIO KEY TAKE AWAY
1. Joseph v. Joseph boarded Perez’s truck, going Joseph only sustained one single injury on his person. This A cause of action is a delcit or wrongful act of
Bautista to Bulacan. On the road, the driver vested in him a single cause of action albeit with the correlative omission committed by the defendant in violation of
of the cargo truck tried to overtake rights of action against the different respondents (owners of the the primary rights of the plaintiff. A single act or
a tricycle. At the same time, a pick pick up truck and cargo truck) through the appropriate omission can be violative of various rights at the
up truck tried to overtake the cargo remedies allowed by law o Trial court is correct that THERE SAME TIME. However, if there is ONLY ONE
truck while the cargo truck was WAS ONLY ONE CAUSE OF ACTION INVOLVED DELICT OR WRONG, there is but a single cause of
overtaking the tricycle. The cargo ALTHOUGH THE BASES OF RECOVERY INVOKED BY action regardless of the number of rights that may
truck hit a mango tree and Joseph JOSEPH AGAINTS PRIVATE DEFENDANTS WERE have been violated belonging to one person. Singleness
sustained an injury, a bone fracture NOT NECESSARILY IDENTICAL SINCE RSPONDENTS of the cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict
in his legs. Joseph sued everyone. WERE IDENTICALLY CIRCUMSTANCED. Therefore, a or wrong violating the rights of one person. If only
The driver, the owner of the truck recovery of Joseph under one remedy necessarily bars recovery one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only
and other people as solidary under the other. Rationale for the same act of omission which one cause of action arises.
debtors. Some of the defendants stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment. No
paid Joseph so released his claim contention that respondents are solidarily liable; this was even
against these people. Perez, filed prayed for by Joseph in his amended complaint the trial court
MTD on the ground that the also found respondents solidarily liable Hence, the full payment
payment of the said defendant made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent
inured to his benefit - granted and release from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted
dismissed the case. in the extinguishment and release from liability of the other
solidary debtors including Perez
ISSUE: W/N the release of claim in
favor of the owners of the pick-up
truck inured to the benefit of the
owner of the cargo truck à YES
2. Philippine Gross negligence of PAL in A common carrier is required to exercise the highest degree of A common carrier is required to exercise the highest
Airlines v. CA allowing Capt. Bustamante to fly care in the discharge of its business. At least, the law presumes degree of care in the discharge of its business. At least,
the plane to Daet. Bustamante’s the employer negligent imposing upon it the burden of proving the law presumes the employer negligent imposing
slow reaction and poor judgment that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the upon it the burden of proving that it exercised the
caused the crash-landing of the supervision of its employees. The duty to exercise the utmost diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision
plane, which resulted in his co-pilot diligence on the part of common carriers is for the safety of of its employees. The duty to exercise the utmost
Samson’s injuries after hitting his passengers as well as for the members of the crew or the diligence on the part of common carriers is for the
head against the windshield. complement operating the carrier (the airplane, in this case). safety of passengers as well as for the members of the
Because of Samson’s periodic For having allowed Bustamante to fly as a First Officer despite crew or the complement operating the carrier.
spells, headache and general debility his medical condition (he has a tumor on the nose), PAL is
produced from said injuries, PAL guilty of gross negligence and therefore should be made liable
terminated his services and for the resulting accident.
employment as pilot after refusing
to provide him with the necessary
medical treatment. Samson prayed
for damages against PAL.
ISSUE: PAL negligent? à YES
3. Nat’l Dev’t NDC and MCP entered into an PH LAW, because the law of the country to which the goods Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary
Company v. agreement, whereby NDC are to be transported governs the liability of the common diligence in the vigilance over goods transported by
CA appointed MCP as its agent to carrier. It is evident that the laws of the Philippines will apply, them. Both the owner and agent of the offending

Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018


manage and operate the vessel
“Doña Nati” for and in its behalf
and account. Thereafter, the vessel
sailed at sea having on board: (1)
cotton and (2) cartons of sodium
lauryl sulfate and cases of aluminum
foil. Ship Route: San Francisco-
Tokyo-Manila. On its way to
Manila, “Doña Nati” COLLIDED
with a Japanese ship in Japan (due
to high speed albeit thick fog). This
resulted in damages amounting to a
total of P364,915.86. DISC, as the
insurer, paid this amount to the
consignees. Hence, now DISC
wants to collect from NDC and
MCP, as owner and agent of the
vessels, respectively.
ISSUE: Which laws govern loss or
destruction of goods due to
collision of vessels outside
Philippine waters, and the extent of
liability? à PH LAW; NDC and
MC: SOLIDARY LIABLE.
4. Int’l Flavors v. Respondents Argos and Pineda
Argos [“Argos”] were the general manager
and commercial director,
respectively, of the fragrance
division of petitioner IFFI. Costa, a
Spaniard who has since left the
country, is the managing director of
IFFI. Costa and Argos had serious
differences, which resulted in the
termination of Argos. However, in
addition to the termination, Costa
labeled Argos persona non grata and
discouraged IFFI employees from
dealing with them. Aggrieved,
Argos filed a criminal suit for libel
against Costa in the MTC. Argos
also filed a civil case for damages
against Costa and IFFI, in its
subsidiary capacity, in the RTC.
ISSUE: W/N Argos can sue IFFI
for damages based on subsidiary
liability in an independent civil
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
and it is immaterial that the collision actually occurred in
foreign waters, such as Ise Bay, Japan.
Common carriers shall be presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the
extraordinary diligence required by law.
NDC and MC were held SOLIDARY liable. Both the owner
and the agent should be declared jointly and severally liable,
since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its
origin in a tortious act and did not arise from contract
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of
defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal
prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence. In
Joaquin vs. Aniceto, we held that Article 33 contemplates an
action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does
not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its
subsidiary civil liability, because such liability arises only after
conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the
employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal
action and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties. However, we note that by invoking the
principle of respondeat superior, Argos tried to rely on Art. 33 to
hold IFFI primarily liable for its employee's defamatory
statements. But we also find that respondents did not raise the
claim of primary liability as a cause of action in its complaint
before the trial court. On the contrary, they sought to enforce
the alleged subsidiary liability of IFFI as the employer of Costa,
the accused in pending criminal cases for libel, prematurely.
[aka the Court here is saying that in order to invoke the
principle of respondeat superior, it is necessary that the injured
party raise the claim of primary liability of the employer as a
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 20
ATTY. E. GO
vessel are liable for the damage done where both are
impleaded; in case of collision, both are also civilly
responsible for the acts of the captain. The agent, even
though he was not the owner of the vessel, is liable to
the shippers and owners of the cargo, without
prejudice to his rights against the owner of the ship.
Common carriers cannot limit their liability for injuries
to loss of goods where such was caused by their own
negligence
Article 33, CC provides that in cases of defamation, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party and such proceeds independently of the
criminal prosecution and requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Contemplates an action
against the employee in his primary civil liability. Does
not apply to an action against the employer to enforce
its subsidiary civil liability because such liability arises
only after the conviction of the employee in the
criminal case
Any action brought against the employer based on its
subsidiary liability before the conviction of its
employee is premature

action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code, during the pendency of the
criminal libel cases against IFFI’s
employee? NO. cannot sue
5. Castilex Vasquez was driving a motorcycle
Industrial v. around a rotunda, travelling the
Vasquez normal flow of traffic in such
rotunda, while Abad was driving a
Hi Lux owned by Castilex, out of a
parking slot BUT instead of going
around the same rotunda, he made
a short cut against the flow of
traffic. A collision occurred
between the car and the motorcycle,
inflicting serious injuries to
Vasquez, who eventually died. On
the same occasion of Vasquez’s
death, Abad signed an
acknowledgment of Responsible
Party wherein he agreed to pay
whatever expenses Vasquez may
incur. Crim case was filed against
Abad (dismissed due to failure to
prosecute). Action for damages was
instituted by the parents of Vasquez
against Abad and Castilex. RTC:
solidarily liable. CA: Castilex was
only vicarious and not solidary.
ISSUE: Castilex liable? à NO
2. VIOLATION OF TRAFFIC RULES
a. TRAFFIC RULES (ARTS. 2184-2985)
1. Manuel v. CA Manuel, the driver of a Superlines
Bus hit the left side of an
International Harvester Scout car
on its left side, which is owned by
Ramos and driven by Abcede. The
collision was at a zigzag road in
Camarines Norte during a drizzle.
The 10 passengers of the Scout car
were injured.
There was a complaint of multiple
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence filed against Manuel,
but he can’t be found, so the
passengers and Ramos filed for
damages based on quasi-delict
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
cause of action.
The SC absolved Castilex of any liability and held that it was
not proved that Abad was acting within the scope of his duties,
thus Castilex had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence
of a good father in providing Abad with a service vehicle.
However, the Court held that the 5th paragraph of Art. 2180 is
equally applicable to employers either engaged in business or
not. The SC held that the burden to prove that the employee
was acting within the scope of his duties when the negligent
acts were committed is upon the person who asserts such, and
only when such was proved must the employer prove due
diligence in management of its employees.
While it may be accepted that some of the skid marks may have
been erased by the "heavy downpour" on or about the time of
the accident, it remains a possibility that not all skid marks were
washed away. The strong presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty (Rule 131, Sec. 3(m), 1989 Rules
on Evidence) erases, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
any suspicions that the police investigator just invented the skid
marks indicated in his report. Granting, however, that the skid
marks in the questioned sketch were inaccurate, nonetheless,
the finding of the Court of Appeals that the collision took place
within the lane of the Scout car was supported by other
conclusive evidence. "Indeed, a trail of broken glass which was
scattered along the car's side of the road, whereas the bus lane
was entirely clear of debris. The evidence with respect to the
issue that Fernando Abcede, Jr. who was not duly licensed, was
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 21
ATTY. E. GO
Acts done within the scope of the employee’s assigned
tasks: Any act done by an employee in furtherance of
the interests of the employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of the infliction of the injury. The
mere fact that the employee was using a service vehicle
at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself
sufficient to charge his employer with liability for the
negligent operation of said vehicle, unless it appears
that the employee was operating the vehicle within the
course or scope of his employment
Requisites to hold employer liable under CC:
[Whether or not engaged in any business or industry,
an employer is liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his assigned tasks]
1. Employer-employee relationship;
2. Plaintiff was acting within the scope of his assigned
task when the tort was committed
3. Defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees not duly proven
Under RPC:
1. Employer is engaged in any kind of industry
2. Employee commits a felony while in the discharge
of his duties
3. EE insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability
Lack of driver’s license of complainant’s driver does
not exempt negligent driver from liability
 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 22
ATTY. E. GO

against Superlines. the one driving the Scout car at the time of the accident, could
not simply exempt petitioner's liability because they were parties
ISSUE: W/N Manuel (bus driver) at fault for encroaching on the Scout car's lane. Nevertheless,
and Superlines should be liable OR the witnesses presented by petitioners who allegedly saw "the
Abcede (driver of the Scout car) à younger Abcede pined behind the driver's wheels," testified on
MANUEL + Superlines is Liable matters that transpired after the accident. Discrediting this
allegation, the Court of Appeals noted that none of the
aforesaid witnesses actually saw the younger Abcede driving the
car and that the younger Abcede could have simply been
thrown off his seat toward the steering wheel
2. Mallari v. CA A jeep driven by Mallari Jr. and Testimony showed that Mallari, Jr. saw the van 100 feet away A driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of
owned by Mallari Sr. collided with before overtaking and that indeed he overtook at a curve. The overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has
the delivery van of Bulletin collision occurred AFTER Mallari, Jr. overtook, and he the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to
Publishing. Sketch shows that the overtook at a CURVE. This is a clear violation of The Land proceed if he cannot do so in safety.
jeep overtook the fiera while Transportation and Traffic Code (Sec. 41) which says that a
negotiating a curve in the highway. vehicle should not overtake unless he sees that the road is clear When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a
The left rear portion of the jeep and and that in a curve, the rule is “to keep to the right side of the curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right
the left front side of the van road and the driver does NOT have the right to drive on the side of the road • The driver does not have the right to
collided. The impact caused the jeep left hand side relying upon having time to turn right if a car drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to
to turn around and fall on its left approaching in the opposite direction comes into view.” In this turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite
side and resulted to the death of case, not only did he overtake in a curve, but Mallari also failed direction comes into view
Israel Reyes. Widow of Reyes filed a to consider the speed of the van which he already saw even
complaint for damages alleging that before overtaking. Further, it occurred around 5am so it was
the death of Reyes was caused by still dark. (He even overtook 2 vehicles! WTF right? Sooo
the fault and negligence of both negligent K) Of course, the owner of the jeep, Mallari Sr. (as a
drivers. common carrier) is also liable since the negligence and
recklessness of the driver of the jeep is binding against Mallari
ISSUE: Who is liable? à Sr. (owner). Art 1759: common carrier is liable for the death or
MALLARIS NOT THE VAN injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of
the former’s employees. Liability of a common carrier does not
cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
b. STATUTES AND ORDINANCES/ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
1. Marinduque Mamador was a laborer of Mamador was not negligent. It has been held that a violation of Violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or
Iron Mines Marinduque Iron Mines and a rule promulgated by a commission or board is not negligence board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence
Agent v. boarded a truck being driven by per se, but it may be evidence of negligence. Here, Mamador’s of negligence. The order or prohibition of the
Workmen’s Macunat. The truck was heading to act can only be considered as possible evidence. As found by employer could not be of a greater obligation than the
Compensatio their place of work. Macunat was the referee in the WCC, “can we truthfully say that he boarded rule of a Commission or board; violation of such order
n trying to overtake another truck on the fatal truck with full apprehension of the existence of the or prohibition is possible evidence of negligence
the company road when it turned danger, if any at all, that an ordinary prudent man would try to
over and hit a coconut tree, avoid?” There is no doubt that riding on a haulage truck is not
resulting to Mamador’s death. negligence. Mamaodr cannot even be considered notoriously
Macunat was criminally prosecuted negligent in boarding the truck because getting or accepting a GROSS OR NOTORIOUS NEGLIGENCE
but was not able to indemnify the free ride on the company’s haulage truck couldn't be gross Implies: Conscious indifference to consequences;
heirs. The heirs of Mamador filed a negligence, because as the referee found, “no danger or risk was Pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally
claim against Marinduque before apparent”. and probably result in injury

Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018

 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 23
ATTY. E. GO

the WCC (since what type of action

was brought was not stated in the
case, I’m assuming that its for
damages). WCC rendered an award
in favor of the heirs. Marinduque
appealed to the SC, contending that
when Mamador boarded the truck,
he violated the a prohibition by the
company.

ISSUE: W/N the claim is barred

under Sec. 6 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act à NO;
W/N Mamador can be considered
negligent when he violated the
prohibition against the boarding of
trucks à NO
2. Cipriano v. Cipriano, owner of Cipriano Violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se. Indeed, the Violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se.
CA Enterprise, is engaged in the existence of a contract between Cipriano and Maclin does not Where the very injury which was intended to be
business of rustproofing vehicles. bar a finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict. prevented by the ordinance has happened, non-
Maclin, through an employee, Cipriano's negligence is the source of his obligation. Here, he is compliance with the ordinance is not only an act of
brought a Kia car to the shop of not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation negligence, but also the proximate cause. The existence
Cipriano to undergo rustproofing. due to negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a of a contract between the parties does not bar a
Subsequently, a fire broke out in a duty imposed on him by law. It is therefore immaterial that the finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-
restaurant (owned by Cipriano) loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous delict.
beside Cipriano’s rustproofing event, since it was petitioner’s negligence in not insuring against
shop. The rustproofing shop was the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss. Thus, P.D.
destroyed together with the car. No. 1572, § 1 requires service and repair enterprises for motor
Maclin was asking for vehicles, like that of petitioner’s to register with the Department
reimbursement for the value of the of Trade and Industry. As condition for such registration or
car. Cipriano said that he was not accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32 requires covered
liable due to fortuitous event. enterprises to secure insurance coverage.
Maclin argued that the car was lost
due to negligence and imprudence
of Cipriano for failing to comply
with the order of the DTI pursuant
to PD No. 1572 which required
him to register under said
department and to insure his
business and the cars of his
customers.

ISSUE: W/N Cipriano is liable for

failure to register à YES
3. FF Cruz & The furniture manufacturing shop The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be stated as follows: The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for
Co. v. CA of FF Cruz & Co was situated Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is safety regulations is an act of negligence.
adjacent to the residence of shown to be under the management of the defendant or his

Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018


Gregorio Mable and his family.
Gregorio approached Eric Cruz, the
plant manager of the shop, to
request a firewall be constructed
between the shop and the Mable
residence. The request was denied.
The request was repeated several
times, but it fell on deaf ears. Later
on, fire broke out in the shop. The
employees in the shop tried to put
out the fire, but failed. The fire then
spread to the house of the Mables.
Mable then filed for damages.
ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is applicable in this case à
YES
4. Sanitary Sanitary’s panel truck was traveling
Steam south-bound along Aguinaldo
Laundry v. CA Highway in Imus, Cavite when it
collided with a Cimarron going
north-bound. The accident led to
the death and injuries of several
persons, all of whom were
passengers in the Cimarron.
According to Sanitary’s driver, the
jeep in front of it suddenly stopped,
forcing him to hit the breaks, but
this caused the truck to swerve to
the opposite lane, which prompted
the collision. Both the RTC and the
CA ruled against Sanitary.
ISSUES: 1) W/N the driver of the
Cimarron guilty of contributory
negligence? à NO.
2) W/N Sanitary can be held liable
as the employer of the negligent
driver? à YES
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 24
ATTY. E. GO
servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have its management or
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care. The facts of the case call for the application
of the doctrine, since in the normal course of business of a
furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material may be
found thereon (wood chips, sawdust, varnish, fuel, etc.)
Furthermore the Court of Appeals made a finding that FF Cruz
failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence
of Mable as required by a city ordinance. Also, the fire could
have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette. Gasoline
and alcohol were used and stored in the shop and that the
workers sometimes smoked inside the shop Thus, even if the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor was not applied, it can readily be
seen that the company was negligent. It failed to construct a
firewall, contrary with the city ordinances. The failure to
comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had
been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence.
Was the driver of the Cimarron guilty of contributory A party who asserts that another person, by violation
negligence? The SC held that negligence in violation of the law of traffic laws or rules, contributed to the collision of
is without legal consequence if it is not a contributing cause of vehicles, has the burden of showing a causal
the injury. Here, the mere allegations of Sanitary were not connection between the injury received and the alleged
enough to prove that the violation of the statute was the violation (i.e., that the violation of the statute was the
proximate cause of the injury sustained. Based on the proximate cause of the injury or that it has
testimonies of the parties, the truck simply went out of control substantially contributed thereto). Negligence,
and crashed into the Cimarron, which would not have been consisting in whole or in part of violation of law, like
prevented even if the Cimarron had the right number of any other negligence, is without legal consequence
passengers and two working headlights. Moreover, the panel unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Although
truck’s sudden swerve to the opposite lane could only mean no law requires the passing of psychological and
that it was speeding and tailgating the jeep, which renders the physical tests prior to employment, such circumstance
acts of Sanitary’s dirver as the proximate cause of the accident. would certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of
due diligence. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on
Did Sanitary exercise the diligence of a good father of a family? the senses; it behooves employers to exert extra care in
The SC held that when it comes to driving, employers must the selection and supervision of their employees; they
exert extra effort in the selection and supervision of its must go beyond the minimum requirements fixed by
employees. Here, Sanitary’s policy of requiring its employees to law.
submit NBI and police clearance and to have at least 2 years of
experience as a driver did not necessarily prove that it exercised
due diligence. For one thing, the supposed company polices
were not in writing. Moreover, Sanitary did not show in what
manner he supervised the drivers to ensure that they drove
their vehicles in a safe way. On the contrary, Sanitary did not
conduct skill tests nor provide seminars to their would-be
drivers. What is worse that Sanitary even failed to present the
NBI and police clearance of its driver during trial.
 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 25
ATTY. E. GO

3. DANGEROUS WEAPONS AND SUBSTANCES (ART. 2188)

1. Araneta v. Araneta and his friends were The father's failure to submit his son to a plastic operation as Licensed possessors of firearms have a peremptory
Arreglado hanging out around the streets of soon as possible does not prove that such treatment is not duty to adequately safeguard such dangerous weapons
the old Ateneo when Arreglado called for. The damage to the jaw and the existence of the scar at all times, and to take all requisite measures to
walked by. (14 yo kids). Araneta and in Benjamin Araneta's face are physical facts that cannot be prevent minors and other unauthorized parties from
friends teased Arreglado about reasoned out of existence. That the injury should be treated in having access thereto
transferring to La Salle and the order to restore him as far as possible to his original condition
latter got mad, pulled a gun is undeniable. The father's delay, or even his negligence, should
(licensed to dad) and shot Araneta not be allowed to prejudice the son who has no control over
in the jaw. He lived, but suffered the parent's action nor impair his right to a full indemnity. It is
face injuries which caused him a lot also the hope of the Court that the award in the present case
of pain and an inferiority will remind licensed possessors of firearms of their peremptory
complex—he was an introvert now duty to adequately safeguard such dangerous weapons at all
and not the same. Arreglado times. To take all requisite measures to prevent minors and
pleaded guilty to frustrated other unauthorized parties from having access thereto.
homicide, but was released due to
minority and good behavior

ISSUE: 1) W/N the father was

guilty of negligence for allowing the
kid access to the gun? à YES 2)
W/N damages given was
inadequate à YES
4. RES IPSA LOQUITUR

The following are the elements of res ipsa loquitur (for exams, you may just cite the following):
1. the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2. the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3. the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured
1. Africa v. Fire broke out at the Caltex service Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the thing Res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself)
Caltex station at the corner of Antipolo which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the In culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the
Street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. management of defendant or his servants and the accident is plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause of his
The fire spread to the neighboring such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if injury was the negligence of the defendant. Where the
houses of petitioners. - The those who have its management or control use proper care, it thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured
petitioners sued Caltex, Inc. and affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation of person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant
Mateo Boquiren (as agent of Caltex) defendant, that the incident happened because of want of care.” and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of
on the basis of negligence. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and things does not occur if he having such control use
employees, was under the control of Boquiren and Caltex. A proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
ISSUE: W/N res ipsa loquitor is fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from
applicable. à YES houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the defendant’s want of care. The burden of evidence is
fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave shifted to the defendant to establish that he has
no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable observed due care and diligence. Where the thing
inference that the incident happened because of want of care. which caused the injury complained of is shown to be
The report by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the under the management of the defendant or his
statement of the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who was servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary
transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage course of things does not happen if those who have its
when the fire broke out, strengthen the presumption of management or control use proper care, it affords

Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018


2. Cebu William Lines, Inc. Brought its
Shipyard v. vessel, M/V Manila City, to the
William Lines Cebu Shipyard in Lapulapu City for
annual dry-docking and repair.
After subject vessel was transferred
to the docking quay, it caught fire
and sank, resulting to its eventual
total loss. Subsequently, William
Lines, Inc. Filed a complaint for
damages against CSEW, alleging
that the fire, which broke out in
M/V Manila City was caused by
CSEW’s negligence and lack of
care. William Lines had the vessel
insured by Prudential for 45 M
prior to the unfortunate incident.
After William Lines had claimed
said amount from Prudential,
Prudential was subrogated to the
claim of William Lines against
CSEV for the amount of 45M.
ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of Res
Ipsa Loquitur applies to petitioner
CSEW. à YES
3. D.M. A construction worker fell from a
Consunji, Inc. construction site. He died. Police
v. CA report stated that the elevator was
not bolted that's why elevator
carrying the worker fell from 14th
floor. Wife of dead worker sued
employer. One of the arguments of
the wife is res ipsa loquitur. The
thing speaks for itself. The cause of
the injury was the unbolted
elevator. The elevator was under
the control of the employer The
injury would not have occurred in
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
negligence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district and
pedestrians often pass through or mill around the premises; (2)
the area is used as a car barn for around 10 taxicabs owned by
Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and possibly
smoke cigarettes is located one meter from the hole of the
underground tank; and (4) the concrete walls adjoining the
neighborhood are only 2½ meters high at most and cannot
prevent the flames from leaping over it in case of fire
Under the circumstances of the case, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to
a given situation, the following conditions must concur: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; and (2) that the instrumentality or agency
which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged with negligence. The facts of the case show said
conditions are present. First, the fire that occurred and
consumed M/V Manila City would not have happened in the
ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence had
been exercised. In other words, some negligence must have
occurred. Second, the agency charged with negligence, as found
by the TC and the CA and as shown by the records, is Cebu
Shipyard, which had control over subject vessel when it was
docked for annual repairs.
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity: The complainant is not
in a position to prove the negligence of the defendant because
he is not knowledgeable of facts that caused the incident. The
onus of explaining what really happened is on the defendant
because he is in a position to know what might have caused the
incident.
Requisites of res ipsa loquitur: 1) The accident was of a kind
which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; 2)
The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and 3) The injury suffered must not have been due
to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 26
ATTY. E. GO
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care. Those who distribute a dangerous article or agent
owe a degree of protection to the public proportionate
to and commensurate with the danger involved. The
intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause is
not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from
consequences of negligence if such negligence directly
and proximately cooperates with the independent
cause in the resulting injury
For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply to a given
situation, the following conditions must concur: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; and (2) that the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence.
As a rule of evidence, res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to
the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred
when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur; the presumption or
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other
evidence and under appropriate circumstances, a
disputable presumption, such as that of due care or
innocence, may outweigh the inference

the ordinary course of things had
the person who had control on the
construction operations exercised
due care.
ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable
à YES
4. National Petition for review. NPC seeks the
Power reversal of CA decision. which
Corporation v. affirmed RTC decision for damages
CA against NPC. NPC built the Agus
Regulation Dam in Lanao Del Sur
in accordance with M.O. No. 398.
It was supposed to keep the
maximum water level of Lake
Lanao at 702 meters elevation. The
fishponds of Abdullah and other
owners were washed away in Oct
and Nov 1986 when the water level
of the lake increased and the
lakeshore area was flooded. The
owners blamed NPC as it failed to
increase the outflow of water even
as the water level of the lake rose
due to heavy rains. The owners filed
a complaint for damages.
ISSUE: W/N NPC is liable for
damages. à YES
5. Perla Sps. Sarangaya owned a one-story
Compania v. commercial building with 3 doors
Sps. for rent. Their residence was behind
Sarangaya this building. Perla Compania,
through its branch manager,
Pascual, rented the first door. Half
the space served as office, the other
for parking of the old company car.
One day, while Pascual was trying
to “warm up” the car, it combusted
into flame. It burned the garage
and the residence of the spouses.
ISSUE: W/N the lower courts are
correct in applying doctrine of Res
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
To overcome res ipsa loquitur: prove due care.
Employer: I exercised due care. Basis: the sworn statement of
its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police
investigator -- the company enacted rules and regulations for
the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman
and the bodegero inspected the elevator before allowing its use.
SC: Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible.
Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule,
unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon. Therefore, employer is liable.
Based on evidence, SC applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
the thing speaks for itself. Where the thing which causes injury
is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. It
was established that in the subject areas, the benchmarks as
pointed out by the NPC representative, could not be seen nor
reached because they were totally covered with water. Water
level reached more than 702 M.
Pascual was liable, based on the Res Ipsa Loquitur (thing speaks
for itself), the elements of which are:
4. the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent;
5. the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person in charge and
6. the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured
The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin
liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to
explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident
complained of. Thus, it is the defendant’s responsibility to show
that there was no negligence on his part. Pascual failed to do
this. Perla Compania also liable as an employer.
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 27
ATTY. E. GO
Res ipsa loquitur
Where the thing which caused the injury complained
of is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have its management or control use proper care,
it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an
inference to the cause thereof or establishes the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. Rests on inference, not on
presumption. Facts of the occurrence warrant the
supposition of negligence and furnish circumstantial
evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking.
Basis
1. Defendant either knows the cause of the accident or
has the best opportunity of ascertaining it; and
2. Plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled
to allege negligence in general terms and thus relies on
proof of the happening of the accident alone to
establish negligence
Provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability
on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to
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Ipsa Loquitur in the present case à explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident; it
YES; W/N Perla Compania is is the defendant’s responsibility to show that there was
negligent in the supervision of no negligence on his part
Pascual à YES
E. DEFENSES
1. PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE IS PROXIMATE CAUSE OR INJURY
2. PLDT v. CA Sps. Esteban were residents of The accident which befell the Spouses Esteban was due to the When the negligence of the plaintiff is not only
Lacson Street [Take note, they were lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not contributory to his injuries but goes to the very cause
residents of the area. AKA, imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner of the occurrence of the accident, his right to recover
everyday sila dumadaan sa area] PLDT. The perils of the road were known to, hence damages is precluded. One should exercise a
While they were driving one night appreciated and assumed by Sps. Esteban. By exercising reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
along that street, which at that time reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban One who claims damages for the negligence of another
was raining, their jeep ran over a could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even has the burden of proof to show existence of such
mound of earth and fell into an assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on fault or negligence causative thereof. Facts constitutive
open trench, excavated by PLDT the part of petitioner. The presence of warning signs could of negligence must be affirmatively established by
for their conduit system. As a result not have completely prevented the accident; the only competent evidence.
they were injured and the purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the
windshield of the jeep was presence of excavations on the site. [LET ME STRESS THIS:]
shattered. They instituted an action It was NOT THE LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THESE
for damages against PLDT claiming EXCAVATIONS which caused the jeep of respondents to fall
that PLDT did not put up signs to into the excavation but the UNEXPLAINED SUDDEN
warn people of the manhole. SWERVING of the jeep from the inside lane towards the
PLDT, for its defense, claims that accident mound. It is both a societal norm and necessity that
the spouses were the ones who one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own
were negligent. protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the
last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident,
ISSUE: Who is liable, PLDT or the notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT.
Sps. Esteban? à SPS. ESTEBAN TAKE NOTE: They were residents of the street. They knew
of the excavation ongoing. They were stupid for falling into the
hole which they knew of. Also, it was found that they were
swerving from their driving lane. Their own negligence was the
proximate cause of their injury.
3. Kim v. Kim bought in Manila a passenger By SHEER COMMON SENSE, Kim ought to know that a Plaintiff’s negligence alone was the direct cause of the
Philippine ticket for a flight to Iloilo in one of propeller is dangerous while in motion and that to approach it accident, therefore, he alone must suffer the
Aerial Taxi Philippine Aerial Taxi Co’s is to run the risk of being caught and injured thereby. He also consequences of his act.
Co. (COMPANY) HYDROPLANES ought to know that inasmuch as the plane was on the water, he
starting from Madrigal Field in had to wait for a banca to take him ashore. Notwithstanding the
Pasay. Since the engine of the plane shouts, Kim, hastily left the cabin of the plane, walked along
Mabuhay, in which he was to take one of the pontoons and directly into the revolving propeller,
the flight, was not working while the banca, which was to take him ashore was still some
satisfactorily, Kim had to wait for distance away. Thus, it is not difficult to understand that the
some time. Before the plane Kim acted with reckless negligence in approaching the propeller
Mabuhay was put in condition for while it was still in motion, and when the banca was not yet in a
the flight, the plane Taal arrived and position to take him. The injury to his right arm and the
it was decided to have Kim make subsequent amputation thereof were due entirely and
the flight therein. Passengers were exclusively to his own imprudence and not to the slightest
shown how the straps could be negligence attributable to the company or to its agents. [In

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tightened or loosened in case of other words, mej fail talaga yung ginawa niya. Why would you
accident and were told not to touch do that?? Whyy???]
anything in the plane. When the
plane landed on the waters of
Guimaras strait, the pilot shut off
the gasoline pipe until all gasoline
was drained from the feed pipe.
This was necessary in accordance
with aviation procedures and to
avoid danger of fire. A banca was
approaching so the pilot warned the
boatman to keep his banca at a
distance in order to avoid a
collision. While doing so, the
propeller stroked Kim. What
happened was that at the moment
the pontoons touched bottom and
while the pilot was signaling to the
banca, Kim unfastened the straps
around him and climbed over the
door to the lower wing, went down
the ladder to the pontoon and
walked along the pontoon toward
the revolving propeller. Kim was
grazed on his forehead and his arms
had to be amputated. The
consignees of the Company were
on the beach to meet the plane and
they warned Kim to keep away but
this was ignored.
4. American NOEL was the holder of an GENERAL RULE: In order that an obligation based on quasi- GENERAL RULE: In order that an obligation based
Express v. AMERICAN EXPRESS extension delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing contractual on quasi-delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing
Cordero credit card. Someone tried to use relation between the parties. contractual relation between the parties.
his card fraudulently but this was However, there are EXCEPTIONS. There may be an action
promptly discovered by for quasi-delict notwithstanding that there is a subsisting EXCEPTIONS. There may be an action for quasi-
AMERICAN EXPRESS and was contract between the parties. delict notwithstanding that there is a subsisting
thus disallowed. Consequently, • A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, contract between the parties:
AMERICAN EXPRESS put where tort is that which breaches the contract. • A liability for tort may arise even under a
NOEL’s card under the “Inspect • Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a contract, where tort is that which breaches
Airwarn Support System.” This just breach of contract would have itself constituted the the contract.
means that in order to protect source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can • Stated differently, when an act which
NOEL, merchants should first call be said to have been breached by tort, thereby constitutes a breach of contract would have
the AMERICAN EXPRESS office allowing the rules on tort to apply. itself constituted the source of a quasi-
in order to verify NOEL’s identity Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence delictual liability, the contract can be said to
before allowing the purchase. If must be the PROXIMATE CAUSE of the damage or injury have been breached by tort, thereby allowing
there was an identity mismatch, the suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is determined by the the rules on tort to apply.
card would be confiscated. NOEL facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common
and his family subsequently went on

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 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 30
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a HK vacation. When they bought sense, policy and precedent. To constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must
chocolates from Watsons during be the PROXIMATE CAUSE of the damage or injury
the trip, the saleswoman called Here, the facts show that NOEL could have used his extension suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is determined
AMERICAN HK office to verify card if he spoke with the AMERICAN EXPRESS by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of
NOEL’s identity, but NOEL representative over the phone to verify his identity. However, logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
refused to talk to the AMERICAN he refused! [SEE, KASALANAN TALAGA NIYA
representative. Consequently, the MEEENNN] Clearly, no negligence can be imputed on
store manager had to confiscate the AMERICAN. If at all, the cause of NOEL’s humiliation and
credit card and cut it in half embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioner’s
[kasalanan mo bro!] NOEL now representative.
claims that he was humiliated by
this because everyone saw and sues
for damages.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC and CA
erred in ruling that AMERICAN’s
action was the proximate cause. à
YES. NOEL’s action is the
proximate cause.
2. COMPARATIVE v. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE (ART. 2179)
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
1. Umali v. A storm hit Alcala, Pangasinan. The First, there were big and tall banana plants about 30 feet high Contributory negligence might mitigate respondent’s
Bacani banana plants in the barrio road and which were higher than the electric post supporting the liability.
near the transmission line of the electric line, and yet the employees of the Umali did not even
Alcala Electric Plant were blown take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger
down and fell on the electric wire. to the electric line. Second, even after the employees of the
The live electric wire was cut and Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible damage
one end of which was left hanging the storm could have caused their electric lines, they did not cut
on the electric post and the other off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines. Third,
fell to the ground under the fallen employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent because even if he
banana plants. The barangay captain was already made aware of the live cut wire, he left the
saw an employee of the Plant and premises! He should have taken the necessary precaution to
told him to fix the wire, as it is prevent anybody from approaching the live wire. It may be true
dangerous. The employee left the that the contributory negligence of the victim's parents in not
place and looked for a lineman who properly taking care of the child, which enabled him to leave
would fix the wire. Manuel Saynes, the house alone on the morning of the incident and go to a
3years and 8mos old boy, whose nearby place where the fatal fallen wire electrocuted him, might
house is on the opposite side of the mitigate Umali's liability, but we cannot agree with his theory
road, went to the place where the that the parents' negligence constituted the proximate cause of
broken line wire was and got in the victim's death. The proximate cause: the fallen LIVE WIRE
contact with it. He was which posed a threat to life and property on that morning due
electrocuted. He died. It was only to the SERIES OF NEGLIGENCE adverted to above
after the electrocution of Manuel committed by Umali's' employees and which could have killed
that the broken wire was fixed by ANY OTHER PERSON who might, by accident, get into
the lineman. RTC found the death contact with it. Stated otherwise, even if the child was allowed
by electrocution of Manuel "due to to leave the house unattended due to the parents' negligence, he
the fault or negligence of the Umali, would not have died that morning WERE IT NOT FOR THE
as owner and manager of the Alcala CUT LIVE WIRE he accidentally touched. Art. 2179 of the CC

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Electric Plant" although the liability
of Umali is mitigated by the
contributory negligence of the
parents of the boy "in not providing
for the proper and delegate
supervision and control over their
son".
ISSUE: W/N Umali is liable for the
electrocution of Manuel à YES
2. Phoenix v. Dionisio was on his way home and
Construction had taken “a shot or two” of liquor
from a cocktail party. He alleged
that his HEADLIGHTS HAD
FAILED so he switched it on
“BRIGHT” and saw an improperly
parked (not parallel to the street
curb) DUMP TRUCK on the
street. He smashed into the dump
truck. As a result, he suffered some
physical injuries, permanent facial
scars, a nervous breakdown and
loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio filed an action for
damages against Carbonel (truck
driver) and Phoenix (employer),
claiming that the proximate cause
of his injuries was the negligence of
Carbonel in parking his truck.
Phoenix countered that Dionisio
was recklessly driving at the time of
the accident while under the
influence of liquor.
ISSUE: W/N there was
comparative negligence on the part
of Dionisio. – YES! But Phoenix
is still liable. Comparative
negligence merely decreased the
award of damages.
3. PCI Bank v. FORD drew and issued its Citibank
CA (1st case) CHECK 1 in the amount of
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TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 31
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provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the
victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of
by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability.
Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees
negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the CC.
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the
negligence of the employer because the employer is supposed
to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This
liability of the EMPLOYERS is PRIMARY and DIRECT. The
proper defense for the employer (Umali) to raise so that he may
escape liability is to prove that he exercised the diligence of the
good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the
selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising
them over their work. This defense was not adequately proven.
Dionisio was negligent at the night of the accident. He was The common law rule of contributory negligence
hurrying home and driving faster than he should have been and prevented any recovery at all • by a plaintiff who was
he purposely extinguished his headlights because there was a also negligent, even if the plaintiff’s negligence was
nearby police station and there was a curfew since it was martial relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or
law at the time. However, the SC agreed that the omission of the defendant. Since the plaintiff’s
PROXIMATE CAUSE of the accident was the negligent negligence was only contributory, he may still recover
manner in which the dump truck was parked. Dionisio’s damages subject to mitigation by the courts.
negligence was merely a FORESEEABLE INTERVENING
CAUSE [meaning of foreseeable interbening cause: If the intervening cause
is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated
or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be negligent among other reasons, because
of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that
reason] to which Phoenix should be ultimately liable for. In
other words, the collision between the dump truck and car
would in all probability not have occurred had the dump truck
not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector
devices. The truck driver owed a duty to Dionisio and others
similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk he had
created.
Thus, the court held that Dionisio’s negligence was only
contributory. Hence, the award of damages to Dionisio was
decreased by 20%.
Although the employees of Ford initiated the transactions Where both the collecting and drawee banks failed in
attributable to an organized syndicate, in our view, their actions their respective obligations and both were negligent in
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P4.7MIO in favour of the CIR as were not the proximate cause of encashing the checks payable the selection and supervision of their employees, both
payment of FORD’s percentage or to the CIR. The degree of Ford’s negligence, if any, could not are equally liable for the loss of the proceeds of checks
manufacturer’s sales taxes for the be characterized as the proximate cause of the injury to the fraudulently encashed
Q3 of 1977. CHECK 1 was parties. The Board of Directors of Ford, we note, did not
deposited with the IBAA (now confirm the request of Godofredo Rivera to recall CHECK 1 The banking business is so impressed with public
PCIB) and was subsequently cleared (4.7MIO). Rivera’s instruction to replace the said check with interest where the trust and confidence of the public in
at the Central Bank. Upon PCIB’s Manager’s Check was NOT IN THE ORDINARY general is of paramount importance such that the
presentment with drawee Citibank, COURSE OF BUSINESS, which could have prompted PCIB appropriate standard of diligence must be very high, if
the proceeds of the check was paid to validate the same. PCIB FAILED TO VERIFY THE not the highest, degree of diligence.
to PCIB as collecting bank. AUTHORITY of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks. The
HOWEVER, proceeds of CHECK neglect of PCIB employees to VERIFY whether his letter Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of
1 was never received by the payee requesting for the replacement of the CHECK 1 was DULY pesos. By the very nature of their work the degree of
CIR. As a consequence, FORD was AUTHORIZED, showed lack of care and prudence required in responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of
compelled to make a SECOND the circumstances. Since the questioned crossed check was their employees and officials is far greater than those
payment to the BIR of its deposited with PCIB, which claimed to be a of ordinary clerks and employees. Banks are expected
percentage/ manufacturers’ sales depository/collecting bank of the BIR, it had the responsibility to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the
taxes for Q3 of 1977. CHECK 1 to make sure that the check in question is deposited in Payee’s selection and supervision of their employees.
was a CROSSED CHECK in that, account only. For this reason, a bank which cashes a check
on its face were two parallel lines drawn upon another bank, without requiring proof as to the
and written in between said lines identity of persons presenting it, or making inquiries with
was the phrase “Payee’s Account regard to them, cannot hold the proceeds against the drawee
Only”. Moreover, BIR designated when the proceeds of the checks were afterwards diverted to
Metrobank, Alabang Branch to the hands of a third party.
receive the tax payment of FORD
as the authorized agent bank BIR.
Hence, ideally, PCIB should only
pay to Metrobank Alabang, as
designated payee. Later on NBI
revealed that CHECK 1 was
recalled by Godofredo RIVERA,
the General Ledger Accountant of
Ford (part of the syndicate). He
purportedly needed to hold back
the check because there was an
error in the computation of the tax
due to BIR. With RIVERA’s
instruction, PCIB replaced the
CITIBANK CHECK 1 with two of
its own (PCIB) Manager’s Checks
(MCs).

ISSUE: W/N the action of

Godofredo Rivera, Ford’s General
Ledger Accountant was the
proximate cause of the loss or
damage? à NO.
4. PCI Bank v. The same syndicate apparently As to the preparation of Citibank Checks Nos. CHECK 2 Where both the collecting and drawee banks failed in
CA (2nd case) embezzled the proceeds of checks (5.8MIO) and CHECK 3 (6.3MIO), it was established that their respective obligations and both were negligent in

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intended, this time, to settle
percentage taxes appertaining to the
Q2 1978 and Q1 of 1979. Ford
drew 2 Citibank CROSSED checks
for which BIR tax receipts were
issued: CHECK 2 in the amount of
P5.8MIO representing the
percentage tax due for the Q2 of
1978 payable to the CIR. CHECK 3
in the amount of P6.3MIO,
representing the payment of
percentage tax for the first quarter
of 1979 and payable to the CIR.
The checks never reached the
payee, CIR. As far as the BIR is
concerned, the said two BIR
Revenue Tax Receipts were
considered “fake and spurious”.
The findings forced Ford to pay the
BIR anew, while an action was filed
against Citibank and PCIB for the
recovery of the amount of CHECK
2 and CHECK 3. Investigations
found that: Mr. Godofredo
RIVERA, FORD’s General Ledger
Accountant, prepared the FORD’s
CHECK 2 for payment to the BIR.
Instead, however, of delivering the
same to the payee BIR, he passed
on the check to a co-conspirator
named CASTRO who was a pro-
manager of the San Andres Branch
of PCIB. In connivance with
DULAY, CASTRO himself
subsequently opened a Checking
Account in the name of a fictitious
person denominated as ‘Reynaldo
Reyes’ in the Meralco Branch of
PCIB where DULAY works as
Assistant Manager. After an initial
deposit of P100.00 to validate the
account, Castro deposited a
worthless Bank of America Check
in exactly the same amount as the
first Ford check (P5.8MIO) while
this worthless check was coursed
through PCIB’s main office enroute
to the Central Bank for clearing,
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these checks were made payable to the CIR. Both were crossed the selection and supervision of their employees, both
checks. These checks were apparently turned around by Ford’s are equally liable for the loss of the proceeds of checks
employees, who were acting on their own personal capacity. fraudulently encashed
Given these circumstances, the mere fact that the forgery was
committed by a drawer-payor’s (FORD’s) confidential The banking business is so impressed with public
employee or agent, who by virtue of his position had unusual interest where the trust and confidence of the public in
facilities for perpetrating the fraud and imposing the forged general is of paramount importance such that the
paper upon the bank, does not entitle the bank to shift the loss appropriate standard of diligence must be very high, if
to the drawer-payor, in the absence of some circumstance not the highest, degree of diligence.
raising estoppel against the drawer. This rule likewise applies to
the checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by the Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of
confidential employees who hold them in their possession. In pesos. By the very nature of their work the degree of
this case, there was no evidence presented confirming the responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of
conscious participation of PCIB in the embezzlement. As a their employees and officials is far greater than those
general rule, however, a banking corporation is liable for the of ordinary clerks and employees. Banks are expected
wrongful or tortuous acts and declarations of its officers or to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the
agents within the course and scope of their employment. A selection and supervision of their employees.
bank will be held liable for the negligence of its officers or
agents when acting within the course and scope of their
employment. It may be liable for the tortuous acts of its
officers even as regards that species of tort of which malice is
an essential element. In this case, we find a situation where
PCIB appears also to be the victim of the scheme hatched by a
syndicate in which its own management employees had
participated. The PCIB Pro-manager, Castro, and his co-
conspirator Assistant Manager apparently performed their
activities using facilities in their official capacity or authority but
for their personal and private gain or benefit. But in this case,
responsibility for negligence does not lie on PCIB’s shoulders
alone. The evidence on record shows that Citibank as drawee
bank was likewise negligent in the performance of its duties.
Citibank failed to establish that its payment of Ford’s checks
were made in due course and legally in order. Citibank should
have scrutinized CHECK 2 and CHECK 3 before paying the
amount of the proceeds thereof to the collecting bank of the
BIR. One thing is clear from the record: the clearing stamps at
the back of CHECK 2 and CHECK 3 DO NOT BEAR ANY
INITIALS. Citibank failed to notice and verify the absence of
the clearing stamps. Had this been duly examined, the
switching of the worthless checks to CHECK 2 and CHECK 3
would have been discovered in time. Thus, invoking the
DOCTRINE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, we are
of the view that both PCIB and Citibank failed in their
respective obligations and both were negligent in the selection
and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment
of CHECK 2 and CHECK 3. Thus, we are constrained to hold
them equally liable for the loss of the proceeds of said checks
issued by Ford in favor of the CIR. Time and again, we have

replaced this worthless check with
Ford’s 5.8MIO CHECK and
accordingly tampered the
accompanying documents to cover
the replacement. As a result, the
5.8MIO CHECK was cleared by
defendant CITIBANK, and the
fictitious deposit account of
‘Reynaldo Reyes’ was credited at the
PCIB Meralco Branch with the total
amount of the Ford check. The
same method was again utilized by
the syndicate in profiting from the
6.3MIO CHECK [CHECK 3]
which was subsequently pilfered by
Marindo, Rivera’s Assistant at Ford.
5. Estacion v. Noe Bernardo boarded a Ford Fiera
Bernardo passenger jeep his way home. It was
full, so he just hung on the left rear
carrier of the vehicle (sabit lang). As
the jeep slowed down to pick up
passengers, an Isuzu cargo truck hit
the rear end of the jeep, and
crushed his legs and feet, and as a
result his lower left leg was
amputated. Noe, through his
guardian ad litem, filed with the RTC
for a complaint for damages arising
from quasi-delict against Estacion
and Gerosano, the owner and the
driver of the Isuzu, respectively.
Gerosono (isuzu driver) would also
be charged criminally for reckless
imprudence. In response, Estacion
and Gerosano filed a third party
complaint against Bandoquillo and
Quinquillera, the owner and driver
of the ford jeepney. furthermore,
they allege that noe's act of standing
in the rear of the jeepney was
negligence itself. Therefore, the
liabilities must be mitigated as per
2179.
ISSUE: W/N Noe contributed to
the injury he suffered? à YES
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stressed that banking business is so impressed with public
interest where the trust and confidence of the public in general
is of paramount importance such that the appropriate standard
of diligence must be very high, if not the highest, degree of
diligence.
The proximate cause of the injury was the negligent and Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
careless driving of Gerosano (ISUZU) who was driving at a fast injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
speed with a faulty brake. HOWEVER, Noe’s act of standing he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
on the rear carrier of the jeepney exposing himself to bodily which he is required to conform for his own
injury is in itself negligence on his part. It showed his lack of protection. To hold a person as having contributed to
ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act
or put his life in danger. Contributory negligence is conduct on that brought his injuries in disregard of warnings or
the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the signs of an impending danger to health and body. A
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury
he is required to conform for his own protection. To hold a should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown must bear the consequences of his own negligence.
that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in Defendant must be liable only for the damages actually
disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health caused by his negligence.
and body. Since there was contributory negligence on the part
of Noe, Estacion's liability should be mitigated in accordance
with Article 2179 of the Civil Code. The underlying precept of
the above article on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff
who is PARTLY responsible for his own injury should not be
entitled to recover damages IN FULL but must bear the
consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus
be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence. In Phoenix Construction, Inc., v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, where we held that the legal and proximate cause of the
accident and of Dionisio’s injuries was the wrongful and
negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked but
found Dionisio guilty of contributory negligence on the night
of the accident, we allocated most of the damages on a 20-80
ratio. In said case, we required Dionisio to bear 20% of the
damages awarded by the appellate court, except as to the award
of exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. In the present
case, taking into account the contributing negligence of
respondent Noe, we likewise rule that the demands of

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
1. Rakes v. Rakes, one of a gang of eight negro
Atlantic Gulf labourers in the employment of
and Pacific Atlantic, was at work transporting
Company iron nails from a barge in the
harbour to the company’s yard.
There were two cars used in the
work following one another, upon
which were piled rails, long enough
that the ends of the rails projected
beyond the cars both in front and
behind. Such rails lay upon two
crosspieces or sills secured to the
cars, but without side pieces or
guards to prevent them from
slipping off. The workers were
either in the rear or at the sides of
the car. Some were also in front,
hauling by a rope. At a certain spot
at or near the water’s edge, the track
sagged, the tie broke, the car either
canted or upset, the rails slid off
and caught Rakes, breaking his leg,
which was afterwards amputated at
about the knee. Rakes now filed an
action for damages against his
employer, Atlantic. Atlantic denied
liability on the ground that Rakes
was negligent and his acts
contributed to the accident.
2. Taylor v. David Taylor and Manuel Claparols
Manila (12 years old) were looking for Mr.
Electric Murphy, an employee of the Manila
Railroad & Electric. Sine e’s not there, they
Light Co. spent some time in wandering
about the company's premises &
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substantial justice are satisfied by distributing the damages also
on a 20-80 ratio excluding attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses. Consequently, 20% should be deducted from the
actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court in favor of
respondent Noe.
Atlantic was negligent because it failed to maintain the safety of The negligence of the injured person contributing to
its working premises and equipment. The following his injury but not being one of the determining causes
circumstances led to this decision: The cause of the sagging of of the principal accident, does not operate as a bar to
the tracks and the breaking of the tie, which was the immediate recovery, but only in reduction of his damages. Each
occasion of the accident, is not clear in the evidence, but is party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his
found by the trial court and is admitted in the briefs and in the fault. Where he contributes to the principal
argument to have been the dislodging of the crosspiece or occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he
piling under the stringer by the water of the bay raised by a cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the
recent typhoon. No effort was made to repair the injury at the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he
time of the occurrence. According to witnesses, a depression of may recover the amount that the defendant
the track, varying from one half inch to one inch and a half, was responsible for the event should pay for such injury,
thereafter apparent to the eye, and a fellow workman of Rakes less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
swears that the day before the accident he called the attention imprudence.
of McKenna, the foreman, to it and asked by simply
straightening out the crosspiece, resetting the block under the
stringer and renewing the tie, but otherwise leaving the very
same timbers as before. It has not been proven that the
company inspected the track after the typhoon or had any
proper system of inspection. It is upon the failure of Atlantic to
repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition. Rakes
did perceive the sagging of the track and that was reported in
his hearing to the foreman who neither promised nor refused to
repair the same. His lack of caution in continuing his work
AFTER NOTICING the slight depression of the rail was not
of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his
recovery. Indeed, there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all the workers against walking by the side of
the car, and the foreman swore that he repeated the prohibition
before the starting of the particular load. The disobedience of
Rakes in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree
to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury
but NOT being one of the determining causes of the principal
accident, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but only in
reduction of his damages. Each party is chargeable with
damages in proportion to his fault.
Contributory Negligence: When the immediate cause of an Contributory Negligence: When the immediate
accident resulting in an injury is the Plaintiff’s own ac, which cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the
contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its Plaintiff’s own ac, which contributed to the principal
determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury. occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot
It is clear that the accident could not have happened had not recover damages for the injury.
the detonating caps been left exposed at the point where they

picked up brass fulminating caps
and carried them home. The boys
then made a series of experiments
with the caps. David held the cap
while Manuel applied a lighted
match to the contents. An
explosion followed, causing more
or less serious injuries to all three. It
seems that the caps when found
had been lying for a considerable
time, and appeared to be discarded
as worthless. No measures seem to
have been adopted by the
defendant company to prohibit
visitors from entering and walking
about its premises unattended.
According to evidence, David is of
more than average intelligence,
taller and more mature both
mentally and physically than most
boys of fifteen. He has knowledge
on both mechanical drafting and
mechanical engineering.
ISSUE: 1) W/N the actions of the
Company and/or his employees is
the proximate cause of the injuries
suffered by Taylor? à NO
3. Philippine RMC through ROMEO LIPANA
Bank of (general manager and president)
Commerce v. entrusted their companies funds to
CA her secretary, Irene Yabut. Irene
was supposed to deposit these
funds to the BANK (PBC). She
deposited the funds, however,
through her modus operandi, the
funds were being credited to her
husband’s account instead of being
deposited in RMC’s account
(YABUT’s husband also has an
account in PBC). The teller of the
bank, MABAYAD, accepted the
deposits even though they seemed
to be irregular. YABUT would
prepare to duplicate deposit slips.
The original would show the name
of her husband as depositor and his
current account number. In the
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were found if their own owner had exercised due care in
keeping them in an appropriate place. BUT it is equally clear
that Taylor would not have been injured had he not entered
upon the Company’s premises, and strolled around thereon
without the express permission of the Company, and had he
not picked up an carried away the property of the Company,
which he found on its premises, and had he not deliberately cut
open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered When the plaintiff’s omission amounts to contributory
by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or negligence, the damages that may be awarded to him
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the may be mitigated.
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. In
the case, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by RMC.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. it
appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was
negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the
deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the
glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely
accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the
bank with respect to the PROPER VALIDATION of deposit
slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad
herself. Clearly, Ms. MABAYAD failed to observe this very
important procedure. Negligence also lies on the part of the
bank itself in its careless selection and supervision of Mabayad.

duplicate was written the account
number of her husband but the
name of the account holder was left
blank. The teller MABAYAD
would validate and stamp both
deposit slips, retaining only the
original copy. The second copy was
kept by YABUT allegedly for
record purposes. After validation,
YABUT would then fill up RMC in
the blank space and change the
account number to RMC’s account
number. These slips were the ones
delivered to RMC thus making
RMC believe that the amounts were
being credited to its account. This
went on for 1 year without RMC’s
knowledge. When the fraud was
discovered, RMC filed a complaint
to recover from the BANK the sum
of P304, 974.74, representing the
various deposits it had made its
account with the BANK.
ISSUE: 1) W/N the proximate
cause of the loss of RMC is the
bank’s negligence or that of RMC?
à BANK was the proximate cause
2) W/N RMC was negligent in not
checking its accounts à YES, only
contributory; damages reduced.
4. Lambert v. Castillon borrowed his brother’s
Heirs of motorcycle, and was accompanied
Castillon by his friend Labang. They ate
supper and drank some beer, and
afterwards were driving back home
when the accident occurred.
Castillon was NOT wearing a
protective helmet when he drove
the motorcycle. On the other hand,
Gamot was driving the Tamaraw
jeepney owned by Lambert. Gamot,
who was going to a side road veered
slightly to the right. Castillon, who
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This was exemplified in the testimony that, while he ordered
the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that
blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the
bank's validation procedures. It was this negligence of Ms.
Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in
the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the
PROXIMATE CAUSE of the loss suffered by the private
respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, as insisted by the bank. While it is true that
had private respondent checked the monthly statements of
account sent by the petitioner bank to RMC, the latter would
have discovered the loss early on, such cannot be used by the
bank to escape liability. This omission on the part of the
private respondent does not change the fact that were it not for
the wanton and reckless negligence of the bank’s employee in
validating the incomplete duplicate deposit slips presented by
Ms. Irene Yabut, the loss would not have occurred.
Considering, however, that the fraud was committed in a span
of more than one (1) year covering various deposits, common
human experience dictates that the same would not have been
possible without any form of collusion between Ms. Yabut and
bank teller Mabayad. Ms. Mabayad was negligent in the
performance of her duties as bank teller nonetheless. Thus,
BANK are entitled to claim reimbursement from her for
whatever they shall be ordered to pay in this case.The foregoing
notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed, RMC was
likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of
account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted
to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its
secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to
such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had
exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This
omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which
shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private
respondent under Article 2179 of the CC.
Castillon was only guilty of contributory negligence. The Court A plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury
found that while Castillo’s drunk driving, tailgating, high speed should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
driving and failure to wear the protective helmet as negligence must bear the consequences of his own negligence.
THAT contributed to the accident, the PROXIMATE CAUSE The defendant must be held liable only for the
of the accident was Gamot’s veering right then veering left damages actually caused by his negligence. The
WITHOUT CHECKING FOR VEHICLES FOLLOWING determination of the mitigation of defendant’s liability
HIM. Thus, the damages must be mitigated and the percentage varies depending on the circumstances of each case.
of mitigation is 50%. The underlying precept on contributory
negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The
defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually
caused by his negligence. The determination of the mitigation

was tailgating Gamot, instinctively
veered towards the left. Gamot
after veering to the right, made a
sharp turn left towards the side
road. Hence, Castillon hit the
Tamarraw and his head hit the left
front door. Castillon died. The heirs
of Castillon filed an action for
damages against Lambert in the
RTC.
ISSUE: W/N the acts of Ray
Castillon can only be considered
contributory negligence and not the
proximate cause of the accident à
YES. HALF-HALF SHARING.
5. Estacion v. Noe Bernardo boarded a Ford Fiera
Bernardo passenger jeep his way home. It was
full, so he just hung on the left rear
carrier of the vehicle (sabit lang). As
the jeep slowed down to pick up
passengers, an Isuzu cargo truck hit
the rear end of the jeep, and
crushed his legs and feet, and as a
result his lower left leg was
amputated. Noe, through his
guardian ad litem, filed with the RTC
for A COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES ARISING FROM
QUASI-DELICT against Estacion
and Gerosano, the owner and the
driver of the Isuzu, respectively.
Gerosono (ISUZU DRIVER)
would also be charged
CRIMINALLY FOR RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE. In response,
Estacion and Gerosano filed a
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
against Bandoquillo and
Quinquillera, the owner and driver
of the FORD JEEPNEY.
Furthermore, they allege that Noe's
act of standing in the rear of the
jeepney was negligence itself.
Therefore, the liabilities must be
mitigated as per 2179.
ISSUE: W/N Noe contributed to
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of the defendant’s liability varies depending on the
circumstances of each case.
The proximate cause of the injury was the negligent and Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
careless driving of Gerosano (ISUZU) who was driving at a fast injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
speed with a faulty brake. HOWEVER, Noe’s act of standing he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
on the rear carrier of the jeepney exposing himself to bodily which he is required to conform for his own
injury is in itself negligence on his part. It showed his lack of protection. To hold a person as having contributed to
ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act
or put his life in danger. Contributory negligence is conduct on that brought his injuries in disregard of warnings or
the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the signs of an impending danger to health and body. A
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury
he is required to conform for his own protection. To hold a should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown must bear the consequences of his own negligence.
that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in Defendant must be liable only for the damages actually
disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health caused by his negligence.
and body. Since there was contributory negligence on the part
of Noe, Estacion's liability should be mitigated in accordance
with Article 2179 of the Civil Code. The underlying precept of
the above article on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff
who is PARTLY responsible for his own injury should not be
entitled to recover damages IN FULL but must bear the
consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus
be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence. In Phoenix Construction, Inc., v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, where we held that the legal and proximate cause of the
accident and of Dionisio’s injuries was the wrongful and
negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked but
found Dionisio guilty of contributory negligence on the night
of the accident, we allocated most of the damages on a 20-80
ratio. In said case, we required Dionisio to bear 20% of the
damages awarded by the appellate court, except as to the award
of exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. In the present
case, taking into account the contributing negligence of
respondent Noe, we likewise rule that the demands of

the injury he suffered? à YES,
NOE WAS GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE
6. PNR. v. Rhonda and Garcia were on their
Brunty way to Baguio onboard a Mercedes
Benz sedan driven by Mercelita. At
around 2AM, the sedan approached
the railroad crossing in Tarlac, but
Mercelita was clearly unaware of
such fact, as it even overtook a
vehicle despite being within 50
yards away from the tracks. The
sedan crashed into PNR’s train,
which led to the deaths of
Mercelita, Rhonda, and serious
physical injuries on the part of
Garcia. Rhonda’s mother filed a
complaint for damages against
PNR, alleging that the gross
negligence of PNR in not providing
for the necessary equipment and
safety devices to warn motorists
was the proximate cause of the
injury. On the other hand, PNR
claimed that it had no legal duty to
put up a bar or any red signal in
such crossing and that there were
sufficient warning signs, but
Mercelita negligently ignored the
same and even overtook a car.
Moreover, Mercelita had the last
clear chance to avoid the injury, as
it is easier to maneuver a sedan.
Thus, at the very least, Rhonda et
al. were guilty of contributory
negligence.
ISSUE: 1) Whose negligence
resulted in the unfortunate
collision? PNR; 2) Was Mercelita
guilty of contributory negligence?
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substantial justice are satisfied by distributing the damages also
on a 20-80 ratio excluding attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses. Consequently, 20% should be deducted from the
actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court in favor of
respondent Noe, that is: 20% of P129,584.20 for actual
damages is P25,916.84 and 20% of P50,000.00 for moral
damages is P10,000.00. Thus, after deducting the same, the
award for actual damages should be P103,667.36
and P40,000.00 for moral damages or 80% of the damages so
awarded.
In order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
elements must concur: (1) damage to the plaintiff; (2) injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
negligence by the defendant; and (3) causal connection between he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
such negligence and damage. Here, (1) Rhonda et al. sustained which he is required to conform for his own
injuries due to the collision; (2) PNR was negligent in providing protection. To hold a person as having contributed to
mediocre safety measures, e.g., lack of proper lighting, his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act
inadequate warning signals, absence of flagbars, etc.; and (3) that brought his injuries in disregard of warnings or
PNR’s negligence in failing to properly warn motorists led to signs of an impending danger to health and body. To
the collision between its train and the sedan. prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to
establish a causal link, although not proximate,
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured between the negligence of the party and the succeeding
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, injury. Negligence is contributory only when it
which falls below the standard to which he is required to contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a
conform for his own protection. Here, seeing as how the place condition for its occurrence.
was not adequately lit, there was a slight curve before
approaching the tracks, and Mercelita himself was unfamiliar
with the road, he shouldn’t have driven the way he did. But
although Rhonda et al. were guilty of contributory negligence,
the same only serves to mitigate the liability of PNR.
Doctrine of last clear chance provides that the antecedent
negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering
damages caused by the supervening negligence of defendant,
who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by
the exercise of due diligence. Here, because it was established
that PNR’s negligence was the proximate and direct cause of
the injury, then the said doctrine is inapplicable.

YES; 3) Does the doctrine of last
clear chance apply in this case? NO
3. ASSUMPTION OF RISK (ART. 1174)
1. Afialda v. Loreto Afialda was employed by the
Hisole defendant spouses as caretaker of
their carabaos. While tending the
animals he was gored by one of
them and later died as a
consequence of his injuries; That
the mishap was due neither to his
own fault nor to force majeure;
Plaintiff is his elder sister depending
upon him for support. Afiala seeks
to hold defendants liable under Art.
1905: The possessor of an animal,
or the one who uses the same, is
liable for any damages it may cause,
even if such animal should escape
from him or stray away. Liability
shall cease only in case, the damage
should arise from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who
may have suffered it.
ISSUE: W/N the owner of the
animal is liable when damage is
caused to its caretakerà NO
2. Transporto v. There’s a big-sized firecracker on
Mijares the table of Lim. Transporto
approached and claimed that the
firecracker was fake. He also said
that he used to explode bigger
firecrackers and that if held tightly,
one would not get hurt by the
explosion. The rest laughed so he
made a bet for P100 despite the
statement of lim that it was real and
would explode. Mijares accepted
the bet for P20 to which
Transporto agreed. [WTH?] Mijares
was afraid that Transporto might
throw the firecracker at it to him so
he asked that the firecracker be tied
to his hand. Transporto shouted
“BOOM” and Mijares ran away so
Mijares dared Transporto if he can
really ignite the fuse. [WTF?!]
Transporto held the firecracker
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The distinction between caretaker and stranger is important.
For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the
person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the
obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and
control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to
prevent it from causing damage. In the present case, the animal
was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was
paid for his work as such. It was the caretaker's business to try
to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone,
including himself. And being injured by the animal under those
circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation, which he
had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences. In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, the
death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his
master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said
tribunal declared to be "a veritable accident of labor." (Manresa)
OBITER: if action is to be based on article 1902 of the Civil
Code, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part
of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the
damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on those
points.
The plaintiff played part of a bravado. He boasted that even if This case should be governed by the DOCTRINE OF
the firecracker was a real one, it wouldn’t explode if he held it VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA (no wrong is done to
tightly. Even if Mijares accepted the bet, Transporto accepted him who consents). That to which a person assents is
the P20. not esteemed, in law, an injury When a person,
Transporto said that he cancelled the bet when the fuse was lit knowing and appreciating the danger and the risk,
but Mijares refused. This theory was rejected because elects voluntarily to encounter them, he can no more
Transporto could have easily pulled out the fuse with his left maintain an action founded upon the statute than he
hand. This case should be governed by the doctrine of can in cases to which the statute has no application.
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA (no wrong is done to him
who consents). A person who voluntarily assumed the risk of ASSUMPTION OF RISK
injury from a KNOWN DANGER is debarred from a One who knows, appreciates and deliberately exposes
recovery. himself to a danger assumes the risk thereof. One
cannot deliberately incur an obvious risk of personal
injury, especially when preventive measures are at
hand, and then hold the author of the danger for the
ensuing injury.

tightly and it exploded but he
wasn’t hurt so he said Mijares lost.
However, another officemate
pointed out that Transporto’s hand
was bleeding. Transporto said it’s
an accident so he went to the
hospital and he was confined for 14
days. [Ayaaann, ginusto mo yaaann].
ISSUE: W/N Mijares is liable –NO
3. Ilocos Norte Typhoon "Gening" in ilocos norte
Electric v. CA brought floods and heavy rain.
Isabel Lao Juan went to her store,
five sisters emporium, to look after
the merchandise to see if they were
damaged. Wading in waist-deep
flood, juan suddenly screamed "ay"
and quickly sank into the water. Her
companions, two girls (sales girls of
the deceased) attempted to help,
but were afraid because they saw an
electric wire dangling from a post
and moving in snake-like fashion in
the water. Yabes, the son-in law,
upon hearing the electrocution of
his mother-in-law, passed by the
city hall of laoag to request the
police to ask ilocos norte electric
company or INELCO to cut off the
electric current. The body was
recovered about two meters from
an electric post. Engr. Juan, noticed
certain fluctuations in their electric
meter that indicated such
abnormalities as grounded or short-
circuited lines. He set out of the
Laoag NPC compound on an
inspection and saw grounded and
disconnected lines. Electric lines
were hanging from the posts to the
ground. When he went to INELCO
office, he could not see any inelco
lineman. Upon learning of the
incident, Engr. Juan attempted to
resuscitate Nana Belen but his
efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis
was setting in. On the left palm of
the deceased, there was a hollow
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While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF
God for which no person may be held responsible, it was NOT VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA:
said eventuality, which directly caused the victim's death. It was 1. Emergency is found to exist;
through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death 2. Life or property of another is in peril; or
took place. Although the defendant presented witnesses such as 3. He seeks to rescue his endangered property
its electrical engineer, chief lineman, and lineman to show
exercise of extraordinary diligence and to negate the charge of In times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires
negligence, the witnesses testified in a general way about their a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to
duties and the measures which defendant usually adopts to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might
prevent hazards to life and limb. Thus, the finding of the TC imperil life or limb. The measure of care required of
was based on what the defendant's employees were supposed to electric companies must be commensurate with or
do, not on what they actually did or failed to do on the date in proportionate to the danger; this duty extends to every
question, and not on the occasion of the emergency situation place where persons have a right to be. When an act of
brought about by the typhoon. In times of calamities such as God combines or concurs with the negligence of the
the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28 defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable
until the early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence if the injury would not have resulted but for his own
requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or negligent conduct or omission
avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The
evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the
contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or
otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office!
Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was
negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general
public considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and
deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must
be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The
duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends
to every place where persons have a right to be. The negligence
of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself
from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due
to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs
with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for
his own negligent conduct or omission.” Likewise, the maxim
"volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no
application in the case at bar. Clearly, an emergency was at hand
as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced
with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time

wound (note: Dr. Castro, doctor
friend of deceased, determined this
as an electrically charged wound or
a first degree burn; other signs of
death by electrocution. In the
afternoon, the dangling wire was no
longer present in the area.
ISSUE: WON Ilocos Norte Electric
may be held liable for the
deceased's death à YES
4. Co. v. CA A customer had his car repaired,
including replacement of batteries.
o When the customer returned to
the repair shop to claim his vehicle
on the agreed completion date, he
could not do so because the battery
was not replaced. Left with no
choice, the customer just bought a
new battery from outside the repair
shop and asked the repair shop to
install it in the same day. But the
repair shop did not install the
battery, delaying the release of the
car 3 days later. After 3 days, the
customer went back to the repair
shop but the repair shop could not
deliver the car because it was
carnapped in the morning of that
day while it was roadtested by its
employees. The carnapping was
reported to the police. The
customer filed for damages based
on negligence. The repair shop's
defense was fortuitous event.
ISSUE: W/N a repair shop can be
held liable for the loss of a
customer’s vehicle while the same is
in its custody for repair or other job
services? à YES
4. DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
1. Picart v. Picart was riding on his horse on
Smith the Carlatan Bridge when Smith,
riding in his car, approached the
bridge. Smith blew his horn thrice
to give warning, as Picart was on
Smith’s lane. BUT, instead of
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the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right
to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her
way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as
heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of
the death caused by petitioner's negligence.
Delay may be tackled at trial because it is intertwined with Liability attaches even if the loss was due to a
NEGLIGENCE. The negligence is based on delay. Carnapping fortuitous event if the nature of the obligation requires
per se is not a fortuitous event. The repair shop must prove the assumption of risk. Carnapping is a normal
that the carnapping was a fortuitous event. The repair shop business risk for those engaged in the repair of motor
failed to prove this. All that is presented was the police report vehicles
of the carnapping, which does not prove that the repair shop is
without fault in the incident. Even if carnapping is a fortuitous event,
Art. 1165 of the civil code makes the obligor liable for
fortuitous events when he is in delay. Even if the customer had
agreed to the new delivery period, it cannot be taken against
him because he had no option but to agree to it. Even if there was
no delay, Art. 1265 of the civil code presumes that in cases of
fortuitous events he who holds the thing is presumed to be at
fault. The only time when such presumption is not applicable is
when there is earthquake, flood, storm or other natural
calamity. Furthermore, Articles 1174 and 1262 of the Civil
Code does not exempt the obligor even from fortuitous events
if the obligation requires the assumption of risk. Car repairing
requires the assumption of risk. That's why DTI requires repair
shops to procure an insurance to cover such risks. The reason
for such insurance is that the customer cannot exercise the 7
jusses of ownership when he left the car at the shop, so the
shop must provide some sort of security. Failure to get
insurance is negligence per se. On the other hand if there is
insurance, it would be an unjust enrichment on the part of the
repair shop if it does not give to the customer the proceeds he
collected from the insurance.
Although Picart was negligent in the first place for being in the Although Picart was negligent in the first place for
wrong lane, the SC held that where both parties are negligent, being in the wrong lane, the SC held that where both
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending parties are negligent, the person who has the last fair
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so
without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.

moving to the other lane, Picart
moved the horse closer to the
railing, reasoning that he had no
sufficient time to move to the right
direction. Smith continued driving
towards Picart and when he had
gotten quite near, he quickly
swerved to the other lane. The
horse was so frightened that it
turned his body across the bridge.
The horse’s limb was broken and
Picart was thrown off, leading to
several injuries that required
medical attention.
ISSUE: W/N Smith was guilty of
negligence such as gives rise to a
civil obligation to repair the damage
done? à YES
2. Ong v. Dominador (14y/o) and his
Metropolitan brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went
Water District to the pool. Dominador told his
brothers that he was going to the
locker room to drink coke. Some
boys who were in the pool area
informed that somebody was
swimming under water for quite a
long time. Abaño immediately
jumped into and retrieved the
apparently lifeless body of
Dominador Ong from the bottom.
Abaño immediately applied manual
artificial respiration. The doctor
ordered that the body be taken to
the clinic. An autopsy was
performed and found that the death
was due to asphyxia by submersion
in water.
ISSUE: W/N the death of
Dominador Ong can be attributed
to the negligence of MWD and/or
its employees. à NO
3. PLDT v. CA Sps. Esteban were residents of
Lacson Street [Take note, they were
residents of the area. AKA,
everyday sila dumadaan sa area]
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Here, the negligence of Smith succeeded that of Picart because
it is clear that the former had the final opportunity to avoid the
accident, but he did not do so.
The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery
negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by for the negligence of defendant where it appears that
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence,
injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
negligence; “A person who has the last clear chance or notwithstanding his negligence; “A person who has the
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law opponent or the negligence of a third person which is
solely responsible for the consequences of the accident." Since imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely
it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming responsible for the consequences of the accident."
pool and it being apparent that he went there without any
companion in violation of one of the regulations of MWD as
regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard
responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was
called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts
at the disposal of MWD had been put into play in order to
bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the
application of the doctrine now invoked by Ong to impute
liability to MWD. The last clear chance doctrine can never
apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously,
and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all
means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered;
at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party
charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
The accident which befell the Spouses Esteban was due to the When the negligence of the plaintiff is not only
lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not contributory to his injuries but goes to the very cause
imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner of the occurrence of the accident, his right to recover
PLDT. The perils of the road were known to, hence damages is precluded. One should exercise a

While they were driving one night
along that street, which at that time
was raining, their jeep ran over a
mound of earth and fell into an
open trench, excavated by PLDT
for their conduit system. As a result
they were injured and the
windshield of the jeep was
shattered. They instituted an action
for damages against PLDT claiming
that PLDT did not put up signs to
warn people of the manhole.
PLDT, for its defense, claims that
the spouses were the ones who
were negligent.
ISSUE: Who is liable, PLDT or the
Sps. Esteban? à SPS. ESTEBAN
4. Raynera v. A motorcycle driven by
Hiceta RAYNERA was travelling behind
an Isuzu Truck owned by HICETA
and driven by ORPILLA. The truck
was carrying steel sheets that
extended past the width of the truck
(2 feet to the left, 3 feet to the
right). There were 2 pairs of red
lights on each end of the sheets.
However, it was dark and the truck
had no tail lights. The truck was
traveling 20-30kmh only. Collision
occurred and bec of this,
RAYNERA died.
ISSUE: Who was the proximate
cause? à RAYNERA
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appreciated and assumed by Sps. Esteban. By exercising reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban One who claims damages for the negligence of another
could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even has the burden of proof to show existence of such
assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on fault or negligence causative thereof. Facts constitutive
the part of petitioner. The presence of warning signs could of negligence must be affirmatively established by
not have completely prevented the accident; the only competent evidence.
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the
presence of excavations on the site. [LET ME STRESS THIS:] Here, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear
It was NOT THE LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THESE chance or opportunity to avoid the accident,
EXCAVATIONS which caused the jeep of respondents to fall notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to
into the excavation but the UNEXPLAINED SUDDEN petitioner PLDT.
SWERVING of the jeep from the inside lane towards the
accident mound. It is both a societal norm and necessity that
one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own
protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the
last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident,
notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT.
TAKE NOTE: They were residents of the street. They knew
of the excavation ongoing. They were stupid for falling into the
hole which they knew of. Also, it was found that they were
swerving from their driving lane. Their own negligence was the
proximate cause of their injury.
Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents Drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another
truck was visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident
speed, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It used the unless contradicted by other evidence. The driver of
service road, instead of the highway, because the cargo they the rear vehicle has full control of the situation and has
were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.
compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code,
respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates,
as the vehicle's cargo load extended beyond the bed or body
thereof. We find that the direct cause of the accident was the
negligence of the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had the
responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.
He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was
equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front
of him. He was traversing the service road where the prescribed
speed limit was less than that in the highway. Virgilio Santos'
testimony strengthened respondents' defense that it was the
victim who was reckless and negligent in driving his motorcycle
at high speed. The tricycle where Santos was on board was not
much different from the victim's motorcycle that figured in the
accident. Although Santos claimed the tricycle almost bumped
into the improperly parked truck, the tricycle driver was able to
void hitting the truck.It has been said that drivers of vehicles
"who bump the rear of another vehicle" are presumed to be
"the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other
evidence". The rationale behind the presumption is that the
driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is

5. Phoenix Dionisio was on his way home and
Construction had taken “a shot or two” of liquor
v. IAC from a cocktail party. He alleged
that his HEADLIGHTS HAD
FAILED so he switched it on
“BRIGHT” and saw an improperly
parked (not parallel to the street
curb) DUMP TRUCK on the
street. He smashed into the dump
truck. As a result, he suffered some
physical injuries, permanent facial
scars, a nervous breakdown and
loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio filed an action for
damages against Carbonel (truck
driver) and Phoenix (employer),
claiming that the proximate cause
of his injuries was the negligence of
Carbonel in parking his truck.
Phoenix countered that Dionisio
was recklessly driving at the time of
the accident while under the
influence of liquor.
ISSUE: Who is liable? à
PHOENIX AND CARBONEL
5. PRESCRIPTION (ART. 1146)
1. Kramer v. CA On April 8, 1976, fishing boat
owned by Sps. Kramer collided
with M/V Asia Phils. owned by
Trans-Asia Phils. The fishing boat
sank. The Board of Marine Inquiry
conducted an investigation and
concluded that the loss of the
fishing boat was attributable to the
negligence of the employees on
board the vessel of Trans-Asia.
This was affirmed by the Phil Coast
Guard on April 28, 1982. On May
30, 1985, the Kramers filed a
complaint for damages against
Trans-Asia. Trans-Asia argued that
the period for filing a complaint for
damages arising from a quasi-delict
like a maritime collision is 4 years
under Article 1146 of the CC. The
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
Phoenix also asks us to apply what they refer to as the "last
clear chance" doctrine. The common law notion of last clear
chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff
who had also been negligent provided that the defendant
had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed
to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any,
the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a
jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff,
has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task
of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence
— the plaintiff's or the defendant's — was the legal or
proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even
primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners
seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or
"immediate." Of more fundamental importance are the nature
of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character
and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the
rest of the community.
Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a
quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 years. The prescriptive
period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In
Paulan vs. Sarabia, Court ruled that in an action for damages
arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being
based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period
must be counted from the day of the collision. In Espanol vs.
Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, Court held: The right
of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect
such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when
the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law
that a cause of action has arisen. It is clear that the prescriptive
period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes
place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission
violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the
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Function of the doctrine: Serves to mitigate the
harshness of the doctrine of contributory negligence.
The doctrine of last clear chance permitted courts to
grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been
negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. There
is no general concept of last clear chance that can be
extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a
general rule in negligence cases in our civil law
jurisdiction. Under Article 2179, CC, the task of the
court is to determine whose negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury. This task is not simply
an exercise in chronology or physics; the relative
location in the continuum of time of the parties’
negligent acts or omissions is only one of the relevant
factors that may be taken into account. Of more
fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent
act or omission and the character and gravity of the
risk created by such act or omission for the
community.
The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-
delict is committed • An aggrieved party need not wait
for a determination by an administrative body that the
collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the
other party before he can file an action for damages.
Immediately after the occurrence of the incident, the
aggrieved party can already seek relief from the courts
by alleging such negligence.

Kramers should have filed their
complaint on April 8, 1976 which is
the date their cause of action
accrued. The complaint was
instituted beyond the 4-year
prescriptive period. Kramers argued
that the running of the prescriptive
period was tolled by the filing of the
marine protests and that their cause
of action accrued only on April 29,
1982 (date when the Decision
ascertaining the negligence of the
crew of M/V Asia Phils had
become final). Therefore, the 4-year
prescriptive period should be
computed from said date.
ISSUE: W/N complaint for
damages is barred by the statute of
Limitations. à YES
2. Sps. Santos v. In 1994, a vehicle collision occurred
Pizarro between a VIRON transit bus
(driven by SIBAYAN) and a Lite
Ace van. The van driver and 3
passengers was killed, and 5 were
injured. A criminal case was filed
against SIBAYAN for reckless
imprudence resulting to multiple
homicide by petitioners with
reservation as to the civil action.
SIBAYAN was convicted in the
crim case. 6 years later, victims then
instituted the separate civil action.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners’ action has
prescribed. à NO it has not. It is
based on ex delicto liability and
not quasi-delict
3. De Guzman v. In Nov 1997, De Guzman
Toyota Cubao purchased a vehicle from Toyota.
In Oct 1998, the engine developed
a crack. De Guzman demanded for
replacement but Toyota refused. In
April 1999, De Guzman filed a case
for damages against Toyota.
Toyota's said that the case should
be dismissed because the action,
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cause of action arises. It is therefore clear that in this action for
damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four
(4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of
the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a
determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine
Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence
of the other party before he can file an action for damages. The
ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after
the collision, the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts
by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or
personnel of the other vessel.
The RTC made a mistake in ruling that the action was based on The prescription of action ex quasi delicto does not
the quasi-delict civil liability. The allegations in the civil operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil
complaint clearly reveal that the action was based on the liability arising from the crime3 especially when the
enforcement of the civil liability ex delicto, and NOT on quasi- latter had been expressly reserved.
delict. The action for the civil liability ex delicto prescribes after
10 years from the date of final judgment. Hence, this petition
was filed within the required period. In a criminal case, there
are 2 possible bases for civil actions: ex delicto or separate
quasi-delicto. Petitioners can choose which action to file as long
as it doesn’t lead to double recovery. The prescription of the
action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime ex delicto, especially
as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
The action has prescribed, being filed more than 6 months Where the cause of action is to hold the seller of a
(19months) from the date of purchase/delivery. In actions vehicle for breach of implied warranty for having sold
arising from implied warranties or hidden defects, the Civil a vehicle with defective engine, the action should be
Code applies, which provides: filed within six months from the delivery of the thing
Art. 1561. The vendor shall be responsible for warranty against sold
the hidden defects which the thing sold may have, should they
render it unfit for the use for which it is intended, or should
they diminish its fitness for such use to such an extent that, had
the vendee been aware thereof, he would not have acquired it
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which is based on an implied
warranty, has already prescribed,
being filed more than 6months (art
1571 of civil code) from the date of
delivery.
ISSUE: W/n the action of De
Guzman has already prescribe à
YES
or would have given a lower price for it; but said vendor shall
not be answerable for patent defects or those which may be
visible, or for those which are not visible if the vendee is an
expert who, by reason of this trade or profession, should have
known them.
Art. 1566. The vendor is responsible to the vendee for any
hidden faults or defects in the thing sold, even though he was
not aware thereof. This provision shall not apply if the contrary
has been stipulated and the vendor was not aware of the hidden
faults or defects in the thing sold.
Art. 1571. Actions arising from the provisions of the preceding
ten articles shall be barred after six months from the delivery of
the thing sold.

De Guzman's contention that this case falls under RA 7394

(The Consumer Act), which gives 2 years to enforce an action
based on implied warranty, is erroneous. Art 68 of the RA
provides: The duration of the implied warranty (not
accompanied by an express warranty) shall endure not less than
sixty days nor more than one (1) year following the sale of new
consumer products. The Court held that the two (2) year
prescriptive period under Art. 169 cannot prevail over Art. 68
because the latter is the specific provision on the matter. Hence,
even if the court holds that the case falls under RA 7394, the
action still has prescribed because it was file more than 1 year
from the sale of the product.
6. FORCE MAJEURE / FORTUITOUS EVENT
1. Gotesco Gloria Chatto and her daughter Collapse of ceiling was DUE TO CONSTRUCTIONAL Force majeure as cause of accident not necessarily
Investment Lina went to see the movie "Mother DEFECTS and not force majeure. Witness of Gotesco, Mr. exculpatory where negligence is also proved. For one
Corp v. Dear" at a theater owned by Ong, was unable to explain the collapse and no adequate to be exempt from any liability because of force
Chatto Gotesco. They bought balcony inspection of premises were done prior to said collapse. Having majeure, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should
tickets. Hardly ten minutes after interposed it as a defense, Gotesco had the burden to prove not have been guilty of negligence.
entering the theater, the ceiling of that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not
theater’s balcony collapsed. Gloria have collapsed without a cause. That Ong could not offer any
and her daughter suffered injuries explanation does not imply force majeure. Force majeure is
and filed a complaint for defined:
DAMAGES against Gotesco. -Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any
Gotesco claims that the collapse physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning tempest,
was due to force majeure. perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the sudden illness
or death of a person. (Blackstone’s Commentary)
ISSUE: W/N Gotesco has -The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as for
sufficiently established that the example, the lightning stroke, hail, inundation, hurricane, public
collapse of the ceiling was due to enemy, attack by robbers. (Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion
force majeuere. à NO y Jurisprudencia)
-Any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively without
human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by
any kind of oversight, pains and care reasonably to have been
expected. (Bouvier)

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2. Servando v. BICO and SERVANDO loaded on
Philippine board PHILSTEAM’s vessel for
Steam carriage from Manila to
Navigation Pulupandan, Negros Occidental the
Co. following: BICO - 1,528 cavans of
RICE worth P40,907.50;
SERVANDO - 44 cartons of
colored PAPER, TOYS and general
merchandise worth P1,070.50.
Contained in the Bill of
Lading/contract: “Clause 14.
Carrier shall not be responsible for
loss or damage to shipments billed
'owner's risk' unless such loss or
damage is due to negligence of
carrier. Nor shall carrier be
responsible for loss or damage
caused by FORCE MAJEURE,
dangers or accidents of the sea or
other waters; war; public
enemies;…fire...” Upon arrival of
the vessel at Pulupandan the
cargoes were discharged, complete
and in good order unto the
warehouse of the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). By 2 pm: BOC
warehouse was razed by fire. Before
the fire, 907 cavans of rice were
delivered to BICO.
BICO&SERVANDO filed a claim
for the value of the goods but they
were rejected by PHILSTEAM.
ISSUE: W/N PHILSTEAM should
NOT be liable because of the
stipulation in the bill of lading
exempting it from fortuitous event?
à PHILSTEAM NOT LIABLE.
3. Yobido v. CA Tumboy spouses and their children
boarded a Yobido Liner bus in
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There is implied warranty from owner of place of public
amusement to keep premises safe. Exception: he is not liable
for unknown defects which could not be discovered by
ordinary means.
For one to be exempt from liability because of force majeure,
he should not have been guilty of negligence. Assuming for the
sake of argument that the cause of the collapse was force
majeure, Gotesco would still be liable because it was guilty of
negligence.
The agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a Where fortuitous event or force majeure is the
mere iteration of the basic principle of law written in Article immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor
1174 of the Civil Code: is exempt from liability for non-compliance.
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is Caso fortuito—an event that takes place by accident
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation and could not have been foreseen.
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were ELEMENTS
inevitable. 1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply
A 'caso fortuito' presents the following essential characteristics: with his obligation must be independent of human
1. the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected will;
occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to 2. It may be impossible to foresee the event which
comply with his obligation, must be constitutes the caso fortuito or if it can be foreseen, it
INDEPENDENT of the human will; must be impossible to avoid;
2. it must be impossible to FORESEE the event 3. The occurrence must be such as to render it
which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; normal manner; and
3. the occurrence must be such as to render it 4. The obligor must be free from any participation in
impossible for the debtor to FULFILL his the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor
obligation in a normal manner; and
4. the obligor must be FREE from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.
In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was
an extraordinary event which happened independently of the
will of PHILSTEAM. The latter could not have foreseen the
event.
A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics: For one to be exempt from any liability because of
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or force majeure, there must be an entire exclusion of

Surigao del Sur headed for Davao.
Along Picop Road in, Agusan del
Sur, the LEFT FRONT TIRE of
the bus exploded. The bus fell into
a ravine around 3 feet from the
road and struck a tree. The incident
resulted in the death of 28-year-old
Tito Tumboy.It was established that
the tire was new and that it was a
Goodyear brand tire! Leny
Tumboy, Tito’s widow, filed a
complaint for BREACH OF
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE
against Yobido Liners and the
driver, Cresencio Yobido. Tumboy
contended that, inter alia, lack of due
diligence on the part of Yobido.
Yobido motions to dismiss the case,
asserting that the incident was caso
fortuito.
ISSUE: W/N the blowing up of the
left front tire of the bus is caso
foruito? à NO
7. DILIGENCE (ART. 2180, LAST PAR.)
1. Ong v. Dominador (14y/o) + his brothers
Metropolitan Ruben and Eusebio, went to the
Water District pool. Dominador told his brothers
that he was going to the locker
room to drink coke. Some boys
who were in the pool area informed
that somebody was swimming
under water for quite a long time.
Abaño immediately jumped into
and retrieved the apparently lifeless
body of Dominador Ong from the
bottom. Abaño immediately applied
manual artificial respiration. The
doctor ordered that the body be
taken to the clinic. An autopsy was
performed and found that the death
was due to asphyxia by submersion
in water.
ISSUE: W/N the death of
Dominador Ong can be attributed
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TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 49
ATTY. E. GO
the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations, must be human agency from the cause of injury or loss. An
independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee accident caused either by defects in the automobile or
the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be through the negligence of its driver is not a caso
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence fortuito that would exempt the carrier from damages.
must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be
free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor. In other words, there must be an
ENTIRE EXCLUSION OF HUMAN AGENCY from the
cause of injury or loss. Under the circumstances of this case, the
explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous
event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The
fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free
from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on
the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used
in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in
the conclusion that it could not explode within five days’ use.
Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either by
defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver
is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability
for damages. Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved
from liability in case of force majeure or fortuitous event alone.
The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in
causing the death or injury resulting from an accident. HERE,
the driver was speeding and the jeepney was overloaded at the
time of the accident. ALSO, the blow-up could have been
caused by too much air pressure inject into the tire.
The present action is governed by Article 2176 in relation to The operator of swimming pools will not be held liable
Article 2080 of the new Civil Code. The first article provides for the drowning or death of a patron if said operator
that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, had exercised due diligence in the selection and
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the supervision of its employees and that it has observed
damages done." Such fault or negligence is called quasi-delict. the diligence required by law under the
Under the second article, this obligation is demandable not only circumstances—that it has taken all necessary
for one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons precautions to avoid danger to the lives of the patrons
for whom one is responsible. The present action is one for or prevent accident which may cause their death
DAMAGES FOUND ON CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE. The
principle to be observed is that the person claiming damages
has the burden of proving that the damage is caused by the
fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is
claimed, or of one of his employees. There is sufficient
evidence to show that MWD has taken all necessary
precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or
prevent accident which may cause their death, (i.e. bouys, rules
and regulations, six lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary inspector,
security guards) The record also shows that when the body of
minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the
employees of MWD did everything possible to bring him back

to the negligence of MWD and/or
its employees. à NO. They
exercised diligence
2. Dulay v. CA An altercation happened between
TORZUELA (Security guard) and
Atty. NAPOLEON DULAY
during the “Big Bang sa Alabang,”
to which Dulay was shot by
Torzuela. MARIA DULAY (Dead
guy’s wife) filed an ACTION FOR
DAMAGES against Torzuela,
SAFEGUARD and/or
SUPERGUARD [the last 2 being
allegedly the employers of Torzuela
and liable for not exercising the
diligence of a good father of a
family]. Superguard filed an answer
on the following grounds: No valid
cause of action because the act was
committed with deliberate intent,
and Article 100 of the RPC shall
govern. To be excluded as
defendants because Torzuela was
not its employee. The acts of
Torzuela was beyond the scope of
his duties. Dulay opposed, arguing:
The liability of Superguard is based
on Article 2180 of the CC.
ISSUE: W/N Superguard can be
held liable for the act of Torzuela.
à YES
3. Go v. IAC Jazmin is a retired American citizen
who receives checks annually as
benefits. Meanwhile, Go allowed an
impostor to open a bank account.
The impostor deposited 2 US
Treasury checks. Without any word
from the drawee bank, Solidbank
allowed the checks to be
withdrawn. Thereafter, Solidbank
learned that the checks were altered.
Go reported the matter to the Phil.
Constabulary. The latter in turn
conducted an investigation and
called on Jazmin. It was found out
that the person who opened the
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 50
ATTY. E. GO
to life (i.e. manual artificial respiration, oxygen resuscitator,
calling for a doctor). All of the foregoing shows that MWD has
done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to
restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold
it liable for his death.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the CC, Under Article 2180, CC, when an injury is caused by
private respondents are PRIMARILY LIABLE for their the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
negligence either in the selection or supervision of their presumption of law that there was negligence on the
employees. This liability under Article 2180 is independent of part of the employer in the selection or supervision of
the employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is his employee. Such liability is direct and immediate; it
distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the employer negligent employee and a prior showing of the
may therefore proceed independently of the criminal action insolvency of such employee. It is incumbent upon the
pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of Court. It having employer to prove that he exercised the diligence of a
been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, good father of a family in the selection and supervision
petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the of his employee
private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of
the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection or both The liability of the
employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee
and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to
prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Go and Solidbank are liable for the damages. The employer is responsible for the acts of its
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all employee unless there is proof that it exercised the
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damage. The burden of proof lies upon the employer.
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant. Here, as GO's negligence was the Article 2180 of the Civil Code, "(E)mployers shall be
root cause of the complained inconvenience, humiliation and liable for the damages caused by their employees . . .
embarrassment, Go is liable to private respondents for acting within the scope of their assigned tasks."
damages.
Pursuant to this provision, the bank is responsible for
Anent petitioner bank's claim that it is not "co-equally liable" the acts of its employee unless there is proof that it
with Go for damages, under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
of the Civil Code, "(E)mployers shall be liable for the damages prevent the damage. Hence, the burden of proof lies
caused by their employees . . . acting within the scope of their upon the bank and it cannot now disclaim liability in
assigned tasks." Pursuant to this provision, the bank is view of its own failure to prove not only that it
 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 51
ATTY. E. GO

account was just an impostor. responsible for the acts of its employee unless there is proof exercised due diligence to prevent damage but that it
Jazmin then filed a civil case for that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to was not negligent in the selection and supervision of
damages. prevent the damage. Hence, the burden of proof lies upon the its employees.
bank and it cannot now disclaim liability in view of its own
ISSUE: W/N Go and Solidbank are failure to prove not only that it exercised due diligence to
liable for damages. à YES! prevent damage but that it was not negligent in the selection
and supervision of its employees.
8. MISTAKE & WAIVER
1. Gatchalian v. Gatchalian boarded the Thames bus The waiver is invalid because from the wording of the affidavit, A waiver, to be valid and effective, must be couched in
Delim in Aringay La Union, bound for the waiver of the right to institute an action is not clear and clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as
Bauang, La Union. When it was in unequivocal, which is the requirement under the Yepes case. to the intention of a person to give up a right or
Barrio Payocpoc, a snapping sound Failure of the waiver to be clear and unequivocal (in waiving the benefit which legally pertains to him. An expression of
was heard, which the driver right) will result to the waiver not being attributed to the person desire to make the waiver is not the same as making an
dismissed as a normal thing. After a who signed as it cannot explicitly and clearly evidence an intent actual waiver of the right. For a waiver to be valid and
while, the bus hit a ceramic flower to abandon a right vested in such person. Moreover, Gatchalian effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public
pot at the side of the road, turned (based on the facts) was not able to read the waiver because of policy or good customs
turtle and ended up in the ditch. the recent accident. Also, waivers like these must not be against
Gatchalian and some other law, contract, morals, custom and public policy, and should be
passengers were injured and strictly construed against the common carrier. The waiver in
brought to the hospital. While they effect will dilute the responsibilities of a common carrier to act
were there, Mrs. Delim (wife of the with extraordinary diligence. This is against public policy, and
owner) visited them, paid their thus the waiver cannot be enforced.
hospital expenses and made them
sign an affidavit (in effect a waiver),
which states that the injured
passengers “are no longer
interested” in instituting an action
against Delim and Thames.
Gatchalian instituted an action ex
contractu (damages) against Delim
for breaching its contract of
carriage with her. She also claimed
damages for the disfigurement
caused by the laceration on her
forehead. Delim claimed that he is
no longer liable because of
Gatchalian’s waiver. Both the RTC
and CA dismissed the action, the
RTC ruling that there was already a
waiver of the right to institute the
action.

ISSUE: 1) W/N the the waiver of

Gatchalian is valid à NO, invalid;
2) W/N Delim (as owner of the
Thames bus) for failing to exercise
extraordinary diligence required of a

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common carrier àYES, liable for
contract of carriage; 3) What kind
of damages can Gatchalian claim
from the accident? à For surgery
2. Theis v. CA Calsons owned 3 lots in Tagaytay.
These lots for brevity are parcels 1,
2 and 3. Calsons had these lots
surveyed. These lots were
mistakenly surveyed. Parcels 1 and
2 were under the TCT of parcel 4,
the lot adjacent to parcel 3. Parcel 4
is not owned by Calsons. Calsons
now sold parcels 1 and 2 to spouses
Heinrich. Spouses after a two-year
trip in Germany came back to the
Philippines. They wanted to build a
house on the land they bought from
Calsons. To their dismay, they
found out that the land (Parcel 4)
was owned by another person. This
was brought to the attention of
Calsons. Calsons explained that
there was a mistake in the TCT as
explained earlier. Calsons offered to
give parcels 1 and 2 which was its
true intention to the spouses or
return the amount double the price
paid by the spouses. Spouses
declined the offer. They wanted
parcel 3 where a two-storey building
was constructed.
ISSUE: W/N the contract could be
annulled because of a good faith
mistake. à YES
3. YHT Realty v. McLoughlin Aussie businessman
CA philanthropist. He used to stay at
the Sheraton, but now stayed at
Tropicana Hotel because he was
convinced by Tan. During his stays
there, he rented a safety deposit
box, which could only be opened
through the use of 2 keys. One is
given to the guest, and the other in
the possession of the management.
During his trips, he would leave
two envelopes which have a total of
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
In the case at bar, Calsons obviously committed an honest
mistake in selling parcel no. 4. As correctly noted by the Court
of Appeals, it is quite impossible for said private respondent to
sell the lot in question as the same is not owned by it. The good
faith of Calsons is evident in the fact that when the mistake was
discovered, it immediately offered two other vacant lots to the
spouses or to reimburse them with twice the amount paid. That
spouses refused either option left the private respondent with
no other choice but to file an action for the annulment of the
deed of sale on the ground of mistake. In Mariano vs. CA: “A
contract may be annulled where the consent of one of the
contracting parties was procured by mistake, fraud,
intimidation, violence, or undue influence.” Art. 1331 of CC
provides for the situations whereby mistake may invalidate
consent.
Art. 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it
should refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of
the contract, or to those conditions which have principally
moved one or both parties to enter into the contract."
Tolentino explains that the concept of error in this article must
include both ignorance, which is the absence of knowledge with
respect to a thing, and mistake properly speaking, which is a
wrong conception about said thing, or a belief in the existence
of some circumstance, fact, or event, which in reality does not
exist. In both cases, there is a lack of full and correct knowledge
about the thing.
Here, the mistake committed by the private respondent in
selling parcel no. 4 to the petitioners falls within the second
type (mistake).
Verily, such mistake invalidated its consent and as such,
annulment of the deed of sale is proper.
The undertaking was against public policy. Article 2003 was
incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public
policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in
this case. The hotel business is one imbued with public interest.
Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide
lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and
belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
business. In an early case (De Los Santos v. Tan Khey), CA
held that it is not necessary that the goods be actually delivered
to the innkeepers or their employees to make hotelkeepers or
innkeeper liable for the effects of their guests. It is enough that
such effects are within the hotel or inn. Here, Paragraphs (2)
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 52
ATTY. E. GO
A contract may be annulled where the consent of one
of the contracting parties was procured by mistake,
fraud, intimidation, violence or undue influence.
Article 1331, CC, provides that in order that mistake
may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance
of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to
those conditions which have principally moved one or
both parties to enter into the contract. The concept of
error must include both ignorance and mistake.
IGNORANCE: Absence of knowledge with respect to
a thing
MISTAKE: Wrong conception about said thing or a
belief in the existence of some circumstance, fact or
event which in reality does not exist.
In both cases, there is a lack of full and correct
knowledge about the thing.
Art 2003 CC, provides that the hotel-keeper cannot
free himself from liability by posting notices to the
effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by
the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper
and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former
as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001 is suppressed or
diminished shall be void. The hotel business is imbued
with public interest; hotelkeepers are bound to provide
lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons
and belongings. To hold hotelkeepers liable for the
effects of the guests, it is not necessary that they be
actually delivered to the hotelkeeper; it is enough that
 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 53
ATTY. E. GO

15k USD and 10k AUD, along with and (4) of the “undertaking” contravene Article 2003. It such effects are within the hotel. The responsibility of
other valuables. On three separate allowed Tropicana to be released from liability arising from any the hotelkeeper shall extend to loss of or injury to
occasions he discovered that the loss in the contents and/or use of the safety deposit box for personal property of the guests even if caused by
money he deposited would go any cause whatsoever. It was intended to bar any claim against servants or employees of the hotelkeepers as well as by
missing. Total of 9k USD and Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box strangers, except as it may proceed from force
4500AUD went missing, along with whether or not negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its majeure.
several jewelry. Eventually he employees.
confronted the mgt who admitted
that Tan opened the safety deposit
box with the key assigned to him.
McLoughlin went up to his room
where Tan was staying and
confronted her. She admitted to
stealing the key and was able to
open the safety deposit box with
the assistance of mgt. Lopez also
told McLoughlin that Tan stole the
key assigned to McLouglin while
the latter was asleep. McLoughlin
insisted that it must be the hotel
who must assume responsibility for
the loss he suffered. Lopez refused
relying on the conditions for renting
the safety deposit box entitled
“Undertaking For the Use of Safety
Deposit Box,” which contained
stipulations absolving Tropicana
from the loss of a patron's goods.

ISSUE: W/N a hotel may evade

liability by having these guests
execute written à NO
9. EMERGENCY OR SUDDEN PERIL DOCTRINE
1. McKee v. IAC A head-on collision between a CAR was not negligent because the prudent thing to do upon Emergency rule
TRUCK (driven by Galang) and a seeing the 2 boys in the middle of the road was to really move One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger,
CAR took place. CAR was driving lanes to avoid them. It also signalled the TRUCK sufficiently and is required to act without time to consider the best
on right lane going northbound upon doing so and warned it to slow down. Assuming that means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
when from a little distance, 2 boys CAR was negligent, TRUCK was still the proximate cause. danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
crossed the road and stayed in the what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
middle of CAR’s lane, moving back TRUCK here should have heeded the warnings. It only stopped have been a better method, unless the emergency in
and forth unsure of whether to when the car was 10 meters away from it which was too late. which he finds himself is brought about by his own
cross all the way to the other side or Ridiculous since it saw the CAR’s signals from hundreds of negligence
turn back. The CAR shifted to the meters away. Hence, it is also guilty under the last fair chance
left lane to avoid them. CAR saw doctrine. Owners are also liable since they did not prove that
TRUCK coming so it signalled it they exercised the diligence required in the selection and
and honked for it to slow down and supervision of Galang.
allow it to move back to its proper
lane after passing the boys. The

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TRUCK didn’t f*cking care. It
moved forward at full speed. It
stopped only when it was too late
and there was a collision. 2
passengers of the CAR died and
several injured. Crim case was first
filed against Galang. 2 civil cases
were then filed against owners of
truck based on quasi-delict.
ISSUE: W/N Galang and owners
are guilty à YES
F. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
1. Gula v. Esperanza was run over by a cargo
Dianala truck driven by Pedro and owned
by Ponciano in Bago City, Negros
Occidental. Initially, Ismael,
Esperanza’s husband, filed a
criminal case against Pedro for
homicide thru reckless imprudence,
in which Ismael participated
through a private prosecutor and
made no reservation to file a
separate civil action. court acquitted
Pedro on the ground of reasonable
doubt, holding that prosecution
failed to prove the negligence of
Pedro. Eventually, Ismael filed a
civil case for culpa aquilana against
both Pedro and Ponciano in the
CFI. Pedro et al. alleged that the
civil liability has been waived and
that Ismael’s second action was
barred by res judicata.
ISSUE: W/N CFI incorrect in
dismissing the case à CFI erred
2. San Ildefonso A bus of San Ildefonso bumped
Lines v. CA Lite Ace driven by Jao. This
resulted to the total wreck of the
vehicle and injuries of the
passengers. A criminal Case filed
with RTC for reckless imprudence.
Insurance Corp. paid Jao under a
car insurance policy. Now a
subrogee of her rights. Filed with
RTC a civil case seeking to recover
sums abovementioned. Bus Co.
wanted the civil case to be
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
SC held that (a) the injured party may bring separate civil action
against the offender in a criminal act whether or not the
offender is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
so long as the injured party does not recover twice on the same
cause act or omission and (b) the extinction of civil liability
where the court finds that the facts from which the same may
arise do not exist refers only to civil liability ex delicto. Here, it
was clear that Ismael filed the second case on the ground of
culpa aquilana under the Civil Code and, thus, it was
unnecessary for him to file a reservation to file a separate civil
action because as Article 31 of the Civil Code finds full
application. Last but not least, res judicata cannot apply as
regards Ponciano not only because he was not a co-accused in
the earlier criminal case, but also because the second case
claimed his liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and
under the RPC.
Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these
independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a
continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the
criminal action. It is only in those cases where the offended
party has not previously filed a civil action or has not reserved
his right to file a separate civil action that his civil action is
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Without
such reservation, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless previously waived or instituted.
Requiring previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as
defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the
same act or omission of the accused. The Yakult Phils. case,
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 54
ATTY. E. GO
A separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed to recover damages on
both scores. He would be entitled to the bigger award
of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary.
Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of
these independent civil actions can be instituted and
thereafter have a continuous determination apart from
or simultaneous with the criminal action. It is only in
those cases where the offended party has not
previously filed a civil action or has not reserved his
right to file a separate civil action that his civil action is
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
Without such reservation, the civil action is deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
previously waived or instituted. Requiring previous
reservation also covers quasi-delict as defined under

suspended due to the pendency of
the criminal suit and the Insurance
Co/Jao’s failure of respondent
PISC to make a reservation to file a
separate damage suit in said
criminal action. RTC denied this
saying that in cases of tort, which
can proceed independently of the
civil action need not be reserved.
ISSUE: If a criminal case was filed,
can an independent civil action
based on quasi-delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no
reservation was made in the said
criminal case? à NO.
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TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 55
ATTY. E. GO
which ruled that “Although the separate civil action filed in this Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same
case was without previous reservation in the criminal case, act or omission of the accused.
nevertheless since it was instituted BEFORE THE
PROSECUTION PRESENTED EVIDENCE in the criminal
action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed
thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far
better than a compliance with the requirement of an express
reservation that should be made by the offended party before
the prosecution presents its evidence,” does not apply in this
case.
 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 56
ATTY. E. GO

III. VICARIOUS/PRIMARY/SOLIDARY LIABILITY

A. VICARIOUS LIABILITY (ARTS. 2180-2182)
1. PARENTS & GUARDIANS
2. OWNERS & MANAGERS OF ENTERPRISES
CASE TITLE CASE SUMMARY RATIO KEY TAKE AWAY
1. Pestano v. Sumayang was riding a Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of CC, owners and
Sumayang motorcycle and his passenger was managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. managers are responsible for damages caused by their
Romagos. As they came upon a This PRESUMPTION may be overcome only by satisfactorily employees. When an injury is caused by the
JUNCTION, where the highway showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or
connected with the road leading a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employer is presumed to be negligent either in the
to Tabagon, they were hit by a employee. Here, allowing Pestaño to ply his route with a selection or in the supervision of that employee. This
bus driven by Petitioner Pestaño DEFECTIVE SPEEDOMETER showed laxity on the part of presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily
and owned by Metro Cebu Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the supervision showing that the employer exercised the care and the
Autobus Corporation (Metro of its employees. The fact that Pestaño was able to use a bus with diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
Cebu), which had tried to a faulty speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the and supervision of its employees
overtake them, sending the supervision of its employees and in the proper care of its vehicles.
motorcycle and its passengers METRO had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence
hurtling upon the pavement. required by law.
Sumayang and Romagos died
Respondents filed a criminal case
against Pestano. They also filed a
separate civil action for damage
against Pestano (as driver), Metro
Cebu (as owner and operator),
and Perla Compania de Seguros
(as insurer of Metro Cebu).
Pestano asked that both cases be
consolidated and RTC allowed.
Metro Cebu tried to establish that
it exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family by
showing that they conducted tests
and lectures for the drivers and
that they posted random
inspectors along the route of the
drivers.

ISSUE: W/N Metro Cebu is

liable. à YES
2. Real v. Belo REAL owned and operated the
Wasabe Fastfood stall located at
the Food Center of the Philippine
Women’s University (PWU);
whereas BELO owned and
operated the BS Masters fastfood
stall, also located at the same
place. A fire broke out at Wasabe
This is not a fortuitous event: Article 1174 of the Civil Code
provides that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event
which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable. There must be an entire exclusion of human agency
from the cause of injury or loss. It is established by evidence that
the fire originated from LEAKING FUMES FROM THE LPG
stove and tank installed at Real’s fastfood stall and her employees
failed to prevent the fire from spreading and destroying the other
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage
or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection
or supervision of its employees. To avoid liability for
a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an
employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the

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Fastfood stall, which destroyed
Belo’s stall. The fire investigator
determined the cause of the fire
to the leaking fumes coming from
the LPG stove and tank installed
at Real’s stall. Belo demanded
compensation from Real.
However, the Real refused to pay.
Thus, Belo filed a case against
Real, alleging that the
NEGLIGENCE of Real was the
proximate cause of the fire that
destroyed Belo’s stall and that
Real failed to exercise due
diligence in: (1) upkeep &
maintenance of her cooking
equipment; (2) selection &
supervision of her employees. On
the other hand, Real denied
liability on the grounds that: (1)
the fire was a fortuitous event;
and, (2) she exercised due
diligence in the selection and
supervision of her employees.
ISSUE: W/N Real is liable?–YES
3. Castilex Vasquez was driving a motorcycle
Industrial v. around a rotunda, travelling the
Vasquez normal flow of traffic in such
rotunda, while Abad was driving a
Hi Lux owned by Castilex, out of
a parking slot BUT instead of
going around the same rotunda,
he made a short cut against the
flow of traffic. A collision
occurred between the car and the
motorcycle, inflicting serious
injuries to Vasquez, who
eventually died. On the same
occasion of Vasquez’s death,
Abad signed an acknowledgment
of Responsible Party wherein he
agreed to pay whatever expenses
Vasquez may incur. Crim case
was filed against Abad (dismissed
due to failure to prosecute).
Action for damages was instituted
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fastfood stalls, including Belo’s fastfood stall. Such circumstances care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
do NOT support Real’s theory of fortuitous event. The bare selection and supervision of his employees.
allegation of the Real is not sufficient proof because mere
allegation is not evidence.
REAL IS NEGLIGENT. The obligation imposed by Article 2176
is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The owners
and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service
of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions. Whenever an employee’s negligence
causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION that the employer failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of its
employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. In this case, petitioner not only failed
to show that she submitted proof that the LPG stove and tank in
her fast food stall were maintained in good condition and
periodically checked for defects, but she also failed to submit
proof that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of her employees. For failing to
prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her cooking
equipment and in the selection and supervision of her employees,
the necessary inference was that petitioner had been negligent.
The SC absolved Castilex of any liability and held that it was not Art. 2080, par. 4 CC Art. 2080, par. 5 CC
proved that Abad was acting within the scope of his duties, thus The owners and Employers shall be
Castilex had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a managers of an liable for the damages
good father in providing Abad with a service vehicle. However, establishment or caused by their
the Court held that the 5th paragraph of Art. 2180 is equally enterprise are likewise employees and
applicable to employers either engaged in business or not. The SC responsible for household helpers
held that the burden to prove that the employee was acting within damages caused by acting within the scope
the scope of his duties when the negligent acts were committed is their employees in the of their assigned tasks,
upon the person who asserts such, and only when such was service of the branches even though the
proved must the employer prove due diligence in management of in which the latter are former are not engaged
its employees. employed or on the in any business or
occasion of their industry.
functions.
Applies to owners and Applies to employers in
managers of an general, whether or not
establishment or engaged in any
enterprise business or industry
Covers negligent acts Encompasses negligent
of employees acts of employees
committed either in the acting within the scope
 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 58
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by the parents of Vasquez against service of the branches of their assigned task
Abad and Castilex. RTC: or on the occasion of
solidarily liable. CA: Castilex was their functions
only vicarious and not solidary. Expands par. 4 both in
employer coverage and
ISSUE: Castilex liable? à NO acts included
Necessary to establish
the employer-
employee relationship;
once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to
hold the employer
liable, that the
employee was acting
within the scope of his
assigned task when the
tort was committed;
only then can the
employer interpose the
defense of due
diligence in the
selection and
supervision of the
employee

Acts done within the scope of the employee’s

assigned tasks: Any act done by an employee in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the
account of the employer at the time of the infliction
of the injury. The mere fact that the employee was
using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious
incident is not of itself sufficient to charge his
employer with liability for the negligent operation of
said vehicle, unless it appears that the employee was
operating the vehicle within the course or scope of
his employment

Requisites to hold Under the RPC:

employer liable under
Civil Code:
W/N engaged in any Subsidiary Liability
business or industry, an
employer is liable for
the torts committed by
employees within the
scope of his assigned
tasks

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3. EMPLOYERS
1. Carticiano v. Zacarias was on his way home to
Nuval Imus, Cavite. He was driving his
father’s Ford Laser car when it
collided with Nuval’s owner-type
Jeep, then driven by defendant
Darwin. The two vehicles were
travelling on opposite directions
when the owner jeep apparently
veered to the left and occupied
Zacarias’s lane. Zacarias was
brought to the hospital. He
suffered multiple fractures on his
left leg and other injuries in his
body. He underwent a leg
operation and physical therapy to
repair the damaged leg. Nuval
offered compensation for the
injuries caused. Zacarias refused.
Zacarias filed crim case and civil
case against Nuval for damages.
Zacarias claimed that the
proximate cause of the accident is
Darwin’ recklessness in driving
defendant Nuval’s jeep; and that
Nuval did not exercise due
diligence in the supervision of his
employee. Nuval insisted that he
cannot be liable.
ISSUE: W/N Nuval liable? YES
2. L.G. Foods v. LG Foods Corp is the owner of a
Pagapong- van driven by their employee
Agraviador Yeneza. Yeneza hit a child, which
resulted to the boy’s death. Before
the criminal case could be
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1. Employer-employee 1. Employer is engaged
relationship; in any kind of industry
2. Plaintiff was acting 2. Employee commits a
within the scope of his felony while in the
assigned task when the discharge of his duties
tort was committed 3. EE insolvent and
3. Defense of due has not satisfied his
diligence in the civil liability
selection and
supervision of
employees not duly
proven
SC ruled that 1) there was no proof that Darwin’s employment Third parties are not bound by the allegation that the
was terminated 2) His main defense that at the time of the driver was authorized to operate the jeep only when
accident Darwin was no longer his employee, having been merely the employer’s children were on board the vehicle —
hired for a few days, is inconsistent with his other argument of giving credence to this outlandish theory would
due diligence in the selection of an employee. enable employers to escape their legal liabilities with
Art. 2180 of CC provides that employers shall be liable for impunity. An employer’s main defense that at the
damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of time of the accident a certain person was no longer
their assigned tasks. The claim of Nuval that he had exercised the his employee, having been merely hired for a few
diligence of a good father of a family is not borne out by the days, is inconsistent with his other argument of due
evidence. Neither is it supported by logic. His main defense that at diligence in the selection of an employee. Once a
the time of the accident Darwin was no longer his employee, driver is proven negligent in causing damages, the law
having been merely hired for a few days, is inconsistent with his presumes the vehicle owner equally negligent and
other argument of due diligence in the selection of an employee. imposes upon the latter the burden of proving proper
Once a driver is proven negligent in causing damages, the law selection of employee as a defense.
presumes the vehicle owner equally negligent and imposes upon
the latter the burden of proving proper selection of employee as a
defense. Nuval failed to show that he had satisfactorily discharged
this burden.
Respondent Nuval’s accusation that Petitioner Zacarias Carticiano
is guilty of contributory negligence by failing to stop his car or to
evade the oncoming jeep is untenable. Both the trial and the
appellate courts found that the accident was caused by the fact
that Darwin’s jeep suddenly veered towards Zacarias’ lane when
the vehicles were about to pass each other, thus making it difficult
if not impossible for petitioner to avoid the head-on collission.
Nuval utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to show that
Zacarias could have evaded the jeep.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to Under Article 2180, CC, the liability of the employer
two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., Civil is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
liability ex delicto; and Independent civil liabilities, such as those not prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa prior showing of insolvency of such employee
contractual or obligations arising from law; the intentional torts; and

concluded, Yeneza committed
suicide. The parents filed a CIVIL
CASE against LG. LG said there
must first be a conviction against
the employee for them to be held
subsidiarily liable. But since the
Yeneza is already dead, there is no
more cause of action to hold the
case.
ISSUE: W/N Employer is liable
à YES
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE/MALPRACTICE
1. Ramos v. CA Erlinda Ramos was advised to
(1999) undergo an operation for removal
of gall bladder stone, after
examinations indicated that she
was fit for surgery. She and her
husband Rogelio met Dr. Orlino
Hozaka. They agreed that the
"cholecystectomy" operation at
the DLSMC would be on June 17,
1985 at 9:00 A.M. Dr. Hosaka
assured Rogelio that he will get a
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culpa aquiliana); or where the injured party is granted a right to file
an action independent and distinct from the criminal action.
Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the
offender. Victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice
between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa
criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an
action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194
of CC. Here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict. The plaintiff
may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee,
subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a
good father of the family. The employer’s liability is primary and
direct. Under Art. 2180 CC, the liability of the employer is direct
or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such
employee. Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death
of the couple's minor son was caused by the negligent act of the
petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly
liable for the negligence of their driver for failing "to exercise the
necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which
diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said accident." Since
there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver,
precisely because death intervened prior to the termination of the
criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue
the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based on quasi-
delict. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for
damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is
not engaged in any business or industry. The circumstance that no
reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was
made when the criminal case was filed is of no moment for the
simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed without any
pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, therefor, it is
as if there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place.
1. Res ipsa loquitur is applied with the doctrine of common knowledge. The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical
negligence cases presents a question of law. The need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because THE
INJURY ITSELF PROVIDES THE PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE. BUT Res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice
suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. We find the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. Erlinda delivered her person over to the care, custody and control of
private respondents. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and physically fit in mind and body. (1)
However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable
damage to her brain, which does not normally occur in the absence of negligence. (2) The instruments used in the
administration of anesthesia were all under the exclusive control of private respondents. (3) Erlinda could not have been
guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.

good anesthesiologist. At around
7:30 A.M. of June 17, Erlinda was
prepared for the operation. Her
sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, a
dean of a college of nursing, was
there for moral support. At the
operating room, Herminda saw
Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, who was
to administer anesthesia. At
around 10:00 A.M., Rogelio E.
Ramos was "already dying [and]
waiting for the arrival of the
doctor". At around 12:10 P.M., he
came to know that Dr. Hosaka
arrived. At about 12:15 P.M.,
Herminda Cruz saw Dr. Gutierrez
intubating the hapless patient. She
heard Dr. Gutierrez say, "ang
hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata
ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki
ang tiyan". She thereafter noticed
bluish discoloration of the
nailbeds of the left hand of the
hapless Erlinda even as Dr.
Hosaka approached her. She then
heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order
for someone to call Dr. Calderon,
another anesthesiologist. At
almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful
day, Herminda Cruz saw the
patient taken to the ICU. About
four months thereafter, the
patient was released from the
hospital. Since then she has been
comatose due to brain damage.
Sps. filed a civil case for damages.
ISSUES:
1) W/N doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur can be applied.
2. Ramos v. CA
(2002 2) W/N Dra. Gutierrez
Resolution) (Anaesthesiologist) is liable
3) W/N Dr. Hosaka is liable
4) W/N DLSMC is liable
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2. Dra. Gutierrez liable and negligent. Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. This was attested to by
Herminda Cruz, Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing and petitioner's sister-in-law, who was in the
operating room. Although Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can very well testify upon matters on which she is capable of
observing such as, the statements and acts of the physician and surgeon which are observable by any one. This is precisely
allowed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where the testimony of expert witnesses is not required. We take judicial
notice of the fact that anesthesia procedures have become so common, that even an ordinary person can tell if it was
administered properly. Most of all, her testimony was affirmed by no less than respondent Dra. Gutierrez who admitted
that she experienced difficulty in inserting the tube into Erlinda's trachea. Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the
first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was an act of EXCEPTIONAL NEGLIGENCE and
PROFESSIONAL IRRESPONSIBILITY. And negligence of Dra. Gutierrez was the proximate cause not the alleged
allergic response to the drug, Thiopental Sodium.
3. Dr. Hosaka is liable. Under the so-called "CAPTAIN OF THE SHIP," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it that
those under him perform their task in the proper manner. Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise
the proper authority (as the "captain" of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper
anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that Dr. Hosaka verified if Dra. Gutierrez properly
intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different
hospital at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation.
Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates
that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which
resulted in Erlinda's condition.
4. Hospital liable. In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying
all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill
the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing
whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule
that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASES, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question
now arises as to whether or not DLSMC is solidarily liable with the doctors for Erlinda's condition. The basis for holding
an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility
under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they
have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In other words, while the burden of proving
negligence rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents (parent, guardian, teacher
or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In the
instant case, DLSMC, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over its physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. In neglecting to offer
such proof, or proof of a similar nature, DLSMC thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article
2180. Having failed to do this, DLSMC is consequently SOLIDARILY responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's
condition.
1. Dr. Gutierrez is liable.
2. Dr. Hosaka is liable. There is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine does
not mean that the Court will ipso facto follow said trend. Due regard for the peculiar factual circumstances obtaining in this
case justify the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. Here, Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain degree of, at the very
least, SUPERVISION over the procedure then being performed on Erlinda. [They were like partners in crime…uhm
literally…]

3. Nogales v. Corazon was giving birth to her
Capitol fourth child. She was under the
Medical care of Dr. Estrada. She was
experiencing complications.
Because of this, Dr. Estrada had
her sent to the emergency room
of CMC hospital. There, she
started the whole birthing
process. ESTRADA, with
Villaflor, used forceps to extract
the baby. In the process, some
cervical tissue was torn. Baby
came out okay but weak and
needed to be intubated and
resuscitated. Corazon began to
bleed moderately then rapidly
became profuse. Blood pressure
dropped rapidly. ESTRADA
ordered blood typing and cross
matching with bottled blood. Dr.
Lacson took about 30 minutes in
the CMC lab to comply with
request. Head of OB-Gyne, Dr.
Espinola was called. He ordered
immediate hysterectom. Rogelio
was made to sign “consent to
operation” Due to bad weather,
Espinola had to be fetched by
ambulance. He arrived 9 a.m. It
was too late. Corazon died.
Petitioners filed a complaint for
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3. Hostpital is NOT liable. There is no employer-employee relationship between DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and
Hosaka which would hold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180 of CC.
The admission of a physician to membership in DLSMC’s medical staff as active or visiting consultant is first decided upon
by the Credentials Committee thereof, which is composed of the heads of the various specialty departments such as the
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Pediatrics, Surgery with the department head of the particular specialty applied
for as chairman. The Credentials Committee then recommends to DLSMC's Medical Director or Hospital Administrator
the acceptance or rejection of the applicant physician, and said director or administrator validates the committee's
recommendation. Similarly, in cases where a disciplinary action is lodged against a consultant, the same is initiated by the
department to whom the consultant concerned belongs and filed with the Ethics Committee consisting of the department
specialty heads. The medical director/hospital administrator merely acts as ex-officio member of said committee. Neither is
there any showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants for medical services rendered by the latter to their
respective patients. The contract between the consultant in the hospital and his patient is separate and distinct from the
contract between DLSMC and said patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the consultant to
the patient; While the second concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and
laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient. Further, no evidence was adduced to show that the
injury suffered by Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary
for her treatment.
1. Dr. Estrada is an independent contractor. In Ramos v. CA, General Rule: A hospital is not liable for the
the CA held that private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real negligence of an independent, contractor-physician
control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While
"consultants" are not, technically employees, the control exercised, Exception: Doctrine of apparent authority—the
the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the hospital may be liable if the physician is the ostensible
important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with agent of the hospital. A hospital can be held
the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician
a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether
Accordingly, for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical the physician is an independent contractor, unless the
negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect patient knows, or should have known, that the
exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physician is an independent contractor. A species of
physicians. Employers and employees are solidarily liable under the doctrine of estoppel
Art. 2180 and the relationship of patria potestas. Under the control ELEMENTS:
test, the hospital must have the right to control both the means 1. Hospital or its agent acted in a manner that would
and the details of the process by which the physician is to lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
accomplish his task. No such control was found in this case. individual who was alleged to be negligent was an
Throughout Corazon's pregnancy and even during her admission employee or agent of the hospital; Does not require
at CMC and her subsequent delivery, she was under the exclusive an express representation by the hospital that the
prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. While Dr. Estrada enjoyed staff person alleged to be negligent is an employee
privileges at CMC, that alone did not make him an employee of Element satisfied if the hospital holds itself out as a
CMC. CMC merely allowed Dr. Estrada to use its facilities. Thus, provider of emergency room care without informing
Dr. Estrada is an independent contractor. the patient that the care is provided by independent
contractors.
2. Hospital is liable. A hospital is not liable for the negligence of 2. Where the acts of the agent create the appearance
an independent contractor-physician. However, a hospital may of authority; the plaintiff must show that the hospital
still be held liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and
hospital under the doctrine of apparent authority. Its elements are 3. Plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the
as follows: hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care
(1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would and prudence. Element satisfied if the plaintiff relies
lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was upon the hospital to provide complete emergency
alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; room care, rather than upon a specific physician

damages a. Against all the doctors
for negligence b. Against CMC
for failure to supervise employees.
ISSUES:
1) W/N Dr. Estrada is an
independent contractor- YES
2) CMC is vicariously liable- YES
3. Other respondents liable- NO
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(2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of
authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had
knowledge of and acquiesced in them;
(3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the
hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two
factors: First: focuses on the hospital's manifestations as to
whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the negligent individual was an
employee or agent of the hospital. Representation may be general
and implied rather than express. The doctrine of apparent
authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel. Here, CMC
impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff.
Second: focuses on the patient's reliance, as to whether the
plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or
its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence. Sps.
Nograles relied upon a perceived employment relationship with
CMC in accepting Dr. Estrada's services. Rogelio testified that he
and his wife specifically chose Dr. Estrada to handle Corazon's
delivery not only because of their friend's recommendation, but
more importantly because of Dr. Estrada's "connection with a
reputable hospital, the [CMC]." In other words, Dr. Estrada's
relationship with CMC played a significant role in the Spouses
Nogales' decision in accepting Dr. Estrada's services as the
obstetrician-gynecologist for Corazon's delivery. Moreover, there
is no showing that before and during Corazon's confinement at
CMC, the Spouses Nogales knew or should have known that Dr.
Estrada was not an employee of CMC. Further, the Spouses
Nogales looked to CMC to provide the best medical care and
support services for Corazon's delivery. Moreover, Rogelio's
consent in Corazon's hysterectomy to be performed by a different
physician, namely Dr. Espinola, is a clear indication of Rogelio's
confidence in CMC's surgical staff. Moreover, the consent forms
do not expressly release CMC from liability for Corazon’s injury
or death due to negligence, and this being a contract of adhesion,
must be construed strictly against the hospital. A blanket release in
favor of hospitals "from any and all claims," including those due
to bad faith or gross negligence, would be contrary to public
policy and thus void. Even simple negligence is not subject to
blanket release in favor of establishments like hospitals but may
only mitigate liability depending on the circumstances. When a
person needing urgent medical attention rushes to a hospital, he
cannot bargain on equal footing with the hospital on the terms of
admission and operation. Thus, the release forms of CMC cannot
relieve CMC from liability for the negligent medical treatment of
Corazon.
3. Others NOT liable since they were merely following directions.
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 63
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Hospitals are in the business of treatment. They do
more than furnish facilities for treatment. They
regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of
physicians, nurses and interns, as well as
administrative and manual workers, and they charge
patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for
such services, if necessary, by legal action. The person
who avails himself of “hospital facilities” expects that
the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its
nurses or other employees will act on their own
responsibility
A blanket release in favor of hospitals “from any and
all claims”, which includes claims due to bad faith or
gross negligence, would be contrary to public policy
and thus void. Being in the nature of an adhesion
contract, is strictly construed. Even simple negligence
is not subject to blanket release in favor of
establishments like hospitals, but may only mitigate
liability depending on the circumstances
Art. 1431, CC: Through estoppel, an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved
as against the person relying thereon Whenever a
party has, by his own declaration, act or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it

4. Professional Natividad Agana was rushed to
Services v. the Medical City Hospital because
Natividad of difficulty of bowel movement
(2007) and bloody anal discharge. After a
series of medical examinations,
Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her
to be suffering from "cancer of
the sigmoid." Dr. Ampil, assisted
by the medical staff of the
Medical City Hospital, performed
a surgery on Natividad. He found
that the malignancy in her
sigmoid area had spread on her
left ovary, necessitating the
removal of certain portions of it.
Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the
consent of Natividad’s husband,
Enrique Agana, to permit Dr.
Juan Fuentes to perform
hysterectomy on her. After Dr.
Fuentes’ operation, Dr. Ampil
took over and finished the surgery
and closed the incision. However,
the operation appeared to be
flawed. The Record of Operation
prepared by the attending nurses
provided that 2 pieces of sponge
were lacking and despite
informing the surgeon and
conducting a diligent search, the
closure of the incision pushed
through. After a couple of days,
Natividad complained of
excruciating pain in her anal
region. She consulted both Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it.
They told her that the pain was
the natural consequence of the
surgery. Dr. Ampil then
recommended that she consult an
oncologist to examine the
cancerous nodes which were not
removed during the operation.
Natividad then proceeded to the
US to seek further treatment.,
Natividad was told that she was
free of cancer. Natividad flew
back to the PH, still suffering
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 64
ATTY. E. GO
1. Dr. Ampil is negligent and liable. An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until
the sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound
after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. The removal of all sponges
used is part of a surgical operation, and when a physician or surgeon fails to remove a sponge he has placed in his patient’s
body that should be removed as part of the operation, he thereby leaves his operation uncompleted and creates a new
condition which imposes upon him the legal duty of calling the new condition to his patient’s attention, and endeavoring
with the means he has at hand to minimize and avoid untoward results likely to ensue therefrom. Here, Dr. Ampil did not
inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she was experiencing was
the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he been more candid, Natividad could have taken the immediate and
appropriate medical remedy to remove the gauzes from her body. To our mind, what was initially an act of negligence by
Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient.This is a clear case of medical malpractice or
more appropriately, medical negligence. To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health
care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he
did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the
patient. Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the
duty to remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he failed to
do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to
Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another surgery.That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is
the proximate cause of Natividad’s injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given
by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s
vagina established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such injury
was his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.
2. Dr. Fuentes is not liable; res ipsa loquitur is not applicable. We find the element of "CONTROL and
MANAGEMENT of the thing which caused the injury" to be wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie.
Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He only asked Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy.
When the operation was done, Dr. Ampil examined it and found everything in order and let Dr. Fuentes leave the
operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending
nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes
were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer
in the operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital. Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the
person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his
orders. Dr. Ampil is considered as the Captain of the Ship. Clearly, the control and management of the thing which caused
the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes. Mere invocation and application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Here, the negligence was proven to have been committed
by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.
3. PSI is liable.
[OLD DOCTRINE] The professional status and the very nature of the physician’s calling preclude him from being
classified as an agent or employee of a hospital whenever he acts in a professional capacity. Medical practice strictly
involves a highly developed and specialized knowledge; physicians are generally free to exercise their own skill and
judgment in rendering medical services sans interference. When a doctor practices medicine in a hospital setting, the
hospital and its employees are deemed to subserve him in his ministrations to the patient and his actions are of his own
responsibility.
[CURRENT DOCTRINE] Nature of the relationship between hospital and the physicians is rendered inconsequential in
view of Ramos v. CA. With the significant developments in medical care, modern hospitals are increasingly taking active role
in supplying and regulating medical care to patients. Modern hospitals actually do far more than provide facilities for
treatment.

from pains. Two weeks thereafter,
her daughter found a piece of
gauze protruding from her vagina.
Upon being informed about it,
Dr. Ampil proceeded to her
house where he managed to
extract by hand a piece of gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in width. He
then assured her that the pains
would soon vanish. Dr. Ampil’s
assurance did not come true.
Instead, the pains intensified,
prompting Natividad to seek
treatment at the Polymedic
General Hospital. While confined
there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez
detected the presence of another
foreign object in her vagina ­­ a
foul­smelling gauze measuring 1.5
inches in width which badly
infected her vaginal vault. A
recto­vaginal fistula had formed
in her reproductive organs which
forced stool to excrete through
the vagina. Another surgical
operation was needed to remedy
the damage. Thus, in October
1984, Natividad underwent
another surgery.
The Spouses Agana then filed a
complaint for damages
ISSUES:
1. Dr. Fuentes liable?
2. Dr. Ampil liable?
3. PSI vicariously libale?
5. Professional
Services v.
Natividad
(2008)
6. Professional
Services v.
Natividad
(2010)
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 65
ATTY. E. GO
[OLD DOCTRINE] Under the Schloendorff doctrine: a physician, even if employed by a hospital, is regarded as an
independent contractor because of the skill he exercises and the lack of control exerted over his work; hospitals are exempt
from the application of the doctrine of respondeat superior VS.
[CURRENT DOCTRINE] There is no reason to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of respondeat superior.
à DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY Ramos pronouncement is not our only basis in sustaining PSI’s liability.
Its liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of
corporate negligence. In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and
specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. It is now
estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory leading the
public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence. Indeed, PSI’s act is tantamount to holding out to the public
that Medical City Hospital, through its accredited physicians, offers quality health care services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil
and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its agents,
authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients. Corporate entities, like PSI, are capable of acting only
through other individuals, such as physicians. If these accredited physicians do their job well, the hospital succeeds in its
mission of offering quality medical services and thus profits financially. Logically, where negligence mars the quality of its
services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape liability for the acts of its ostensible agents. Also, premised on the
doctrine of corporate negligence, it is held that PSI is directly liable for such breach of duty.
à DOCTRINE OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: A hospital has the duty to see that it meets the standards of
responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty includes the proper supervision of the members of its medical staff. A
patient who enters a hospital does so with the reasonable expectation that it will attempt to cure him. The hospital
accordingly has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treatment prescribed and administered by
the physicians practicing in its premises. In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City
Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to the public. Accordingly, it
has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment.
Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform such duty. PSI’s liability is traceable to its FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATION ON THE MATTER reported in the nota bene of the count nurse. Such failure established PSI’s part
in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
operated on Natividad with the assistance of the Medical City Hospital’s staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and
interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or constructive knowledge
of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of the attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing. A
corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired by or notice given to its agents or officers within the scope of their
authority and in reference to a matter to which their authority extends. Anent the corollary issue of whether PSI is solidarily
liable with Dr. Ampil for damages, let it be emphasized that PSI, apart from a general denial of its responsibility, failed to
adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and supervision of
the latter. In neglecting to offer such proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180 cited
earlier, and, therefore, must be adjudged solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil. Moreover, as we have discussed, PSI is also
directly liable to the Aganas.
SAME RULING. Ampil is liable. PSI is liable.
ONLY DIFFERENCE: NO EER RELATIONSHIP
A hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice medicine, in reality it utilizes doctors, surgeons and medical practitioners in
the conduct of its business of facilitating medical and surgical treatment. Within that reality, three legal relationships
crisscross:
 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 66
ATTY. E. GO

(1) Between the hospital and the doctor practicing within its premises;
(2) Between the hospital and the patient being treated or examined within its premises and
(3) Between the patient and the doctor.
The exact nature of each relationship determines the basis and extent of the liability of the hospital for the negligence of the
doctor.

1. No employer-employee relationship. To allay the anxiety of the intervenors, the Court holds that, in this particular
instance, the concurrent finding of the RTC and the CA that PSI was not the employer of Dr. Ampil is correct. Control as
a determinative factor in testing the employer-employee relationship between doctor and hospital under which the hospital
could be held vicariously liable to a patient in medical negligence cases is a requisite fact to be established by preponderance
of evidence. Here, there was insufficient evidence that PSI exercised the power of control or wielded such power over the
means and the details of the specific process by which Dr. Ampil applied his skills in the treatment of Natividad.
Consequently, PSI cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under the principle of respondeat
superior.

2. DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY: PSI still liable as principal. There is ample evidence that PSI held
out to the patient (Natividad) that the doctor (Dr. Ampil) was its agent. Present are the two factors that determine apparent
authority: first, the hospital’s implied manifestation to the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor was the
hospital’s agent; and second, the patient’s reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and the doctor, consistent with
ordinary care and prudence.

3. DOCTRINE OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY - As it happened, PSI took no heed of the record of operation
and consequently did not initiate a review of what transpired during Natividad’s operation. Rather, it shirked its
responsibility and passed it on to others—to Dr. Ampil whom it expected to inform Natividad, and to Natividad herself to
complain before it took any meaningful step. By its inaction, therefore, PSI failed its own standard of hospital care. It
committed corporate negligence. It should be borne in mind that the corporate negligence ascribed to PSI is different from
the medical negligence attributed to Dr. Ampil. The duties of the hospital are distinct from those of the doctor-consultant
practicing within its premises in relation to the patient; hence, the failure of PSI to fulfill its duties as a hospital corporation
gave rise to a direct liability to the Aganas distinct from that of Dr. Ampil.
4. STATE
5. TEACHERS/HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS

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 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 67
ATTY. E. GO

B. PRIMARY LIABILITY
1. POSSESORS/USERS OF ANIMALS (ART. 2183)
2. OWNERS OF MOTOR VEHICLES (ART. 2184)
CASE TITLE CASE SUMMARY RATIO KEY TAKE AWAY
1. Mallari v. CA A jeep driven by Mallari Jr. and Evidence show that Mallari Jr overtook a vehicle at a curve on the A driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose
owned by Mallari Sr. collided with road. Based on the sketch, its shown that the collision occurred of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation
the delivery van of Bulletin immediately after the jeep driver overtook a vehicle in front of it o has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not
Publishing. Sketch shows that the This act is contrary to Sec 41 par (a) and (b) of RA 4136 “The to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a
jeep overtook the fiera while Land Transportation and Traffic Code”: a driver abandoning his motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve,
negotiating a curve in the proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an there is special necessity for keeping to the right side
highway. The left rear portion of ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear of the road. The driver does not have the right to
the jeep and the left front side of and not proceed if he cannot do so in safety When the vehicle is drive on the left hand side relying upon having time
the van collided. The impact approaching a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the to turn to the right if a car approaching from the
caused the jeep to turn around right. Negligence and recklessness of the driver of the jeep is opposite direction comes into view.
and fall on its left side and binding against Mallari Sr. (owner). The owner is a common Negligence and recklessness of the driver of the jeep
resulted to the death of Israel carrier and that when an action is based on a contract of carriage, is binding against Mallari Sr. (owner). The owner is a
Reyes. Widow of Reyes filed a the court DOES NOT NEED to make an express finding of fault common carrier and that an action based on a
complaint for damages alleging of negligence on the part of the carrier to hold it responsible for contract of carriage, the court DOES NOT NEED
that the death of Reyes was the payment of damages. to make an express finding of fault of negligence on
caused by the fault and negligence 1) Art 1755 of CC: a common carrier is bound to carry the the part of the carrier to hold it responsible for the
of both drivers. passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide payment of damages.
using utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard 1) Art 1755 of CC: a common carrier is bound to
ISSUE: W/N Mallari Sr. as an for all the circumstances. 2) Art 1756: death or injuries to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
employer is liable? à YES passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or foresight can provide using utmost diligence of very
to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed cautious persons with due regard for all the
extraordinary diligence. 3) Art 1759: common carrier is liable for circumstances.
the death or injuries to passengers through the negligence or 2) Art 1756: death or injuries to passengers, a
willful acts of the former’s employees. common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
Liability of a common carrier does not cease upon proof that it to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the observed extraordinary diligence.
selection of its employees. By the contract of carriage, the jeep 3) Art 1759: common carrier is liable for the death or
owned by Mallari Sr. assumed the express obligation to transport injuries to passengers through the negligence or
the passengers to their destination safely and to observe willful acts of the former’s employees.
extraordinary diligence with due regard for all circumstances and Liability of a common carrier does not cease upon
or any injury that might be suffered by its passengers is right away proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good
attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. father of a family in the selection of its employees.
3. MANUFACTURERS & PROCESSORS
1. Coca-cola Lydia Geronimo is a proprietress The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect to the Vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect to
Bottlers v. CA of Kindergarten Wonderland warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances is not warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances
Canteen. An enterprise engaged in limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of Civil Code Vendee upon the thing sold are not limited to those
sale of softdrinks which include may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of prescribed in Article 1567, CC: (a) withdrawing from
coke and sprite and other goods error or fraud in which case, ordinary rule on obligations shall be the contract; (b) or demanding a proportionate
to the students of the school. In applicable Under law on obligations, responsibility arising from reduction of the price, with damages in either case).
August, some parents of the fraud is demandable in all obligations o Responsibility arising The vendee may also: 1. Seek annulment of the
students complained for the coke from negligence is also demandable in any obligation, but such contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which case
and sprite products sold by her liability may be regulated by the courts Vendor can be also liable the ordinary rule on obligations shall apply; 2. Make
contained fiber-like substances for quasi-delict. Although there is a pre-existing contract between vendor liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176, CC

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 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 68
ATTY. E. GO

and other foreign substances and the parties, the liability itself may arise from a quasi-delict. Liability
particles. Lydia brought the may arise despite presence of contractual situation. American Law
bottles to the Regional Health provides that liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of an injury-
office for examination. Later on, causing products may be based on (1) negligence, (2) tort, (3) or
DOH informed her that the other ground such as fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. Quasi-
samples were “adulterated.” As a delict according to Art 2167 is homologous but not identical to
consequence of the discovery of tort under common law, which includes not only negligence but
the foreign substance in the also intentional crimes.
beverages, the sale of softdrinks
severely dropped from the usual
10 cases/day to 2 to 3 cases/day
resulting in losses. Lydia also
became jobless and destitute.
Coca-cola now moved to dismiss
the complaint on the grounds of
failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and prescription.

ISSUE: W/N the cause of action

of Lydia is one for quasi-delict or
breach of warranty à QUASI-
DELICT
4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (ART. 2189)
1. City of Manila Around 8pm, Genaro Teotico Sec. 4 refers to liability arising from negligence in general and Article 2189 constitutes a particular prescription
v. Teotico was at the corner of Old Luneta regardless of the object thereof while Art. 2189 governs liability making provinces, cities and municipalities liable for
and P. Burgos in Manila. He is a due to “defective streets” in particular. Under Article 2189 of the damages for the death of, or injury suffered by, any
businessman and professor of UE Civil Code, it is not necessary that the defective roads and streets person by reason, specifically, of the defective
and held responsible positions in belong to the province, city, or municipality what is important is condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
several companies and he’s also for it to have “control or supervision” over the said street or road and other public works under their control or
associated with different civic and for the liability to attach; even if the catchbasin was on the supervision. It is not necessary for the liability therein
organizations (Wow, so bibbo national highway it does not necessarily detract from its “control established to attach that the defective roads or
naman this guy). He’s within a and supervision” because of Section 18 of RA409 which provides streets belong to the province, city or municipality
“loading and unloading” zone for the different legislative powers of the city of manila which from which responsibility is exacted. The said article
waiting for a jeep to take him to include the “laying out, construction, and improvement and only requires that the province, city or municipality
downtown. Teotico managed to regulation of the streets, avenues, alleys, etc” This statues is have either control or supervision over the said street
hail a jeep but when he stepped neither withdrawn nor restricted by RA 917 and E0 113 for the or road
down from the curb to board the said act governs the disposition and appropriation of highway
jeep and took a few step, he fell funds and giving of aids to provinces, chartered cities et. o The act
inside an uncovered and unlighted provides that “the construction, maintenance and improvement of
catchbasin manhole in P. Burgos. national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial
Because of the injuries, he was and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District
bought to the Philippine General Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of
Hospital. The injuries and the the Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from
allergic eruptions caused by the such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the
anti-tetanus injections cost him Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts." Given that
1,400. the determination of whether P. Burgos is under control and
supervision of the city.
ISSUE: W/N Mnl is liable? YES

Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018


2. Jimenez v. Jimenez, together with his
City of Manila neighbors, went to the Sta. Ana
public market to buy “bagoong.”
The public market was flooded
with ankle deep rain rainwater.
After purchasing the bagoong, he
turned around to return home
and then he stepped on an
uncovered opening which could
not be seen due to the dirty water
causing a dirty and rusty four-inch
nail, stuck inside the uncovered
opening to pierce his left leg. He
was confined and hence, was
forced to hire someone to manage
his business. Jimenez sued the city
of manila and Asiatic integrated
Corporation under whose
administration the Sta. Ana public
market has been placed by virtue
of the management and operating
contract.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in not
ruling that the Manila is solidarily
liable with asiatic integrated à
YES
3. Guilatco v. Guilatco is a court interpreter of
City of Dagupan City and while she was
Dagupan about to board a motorized
tricycle at a sidewalk located at
Perez Blvd (National Road under
the control and supervision of the
City of Dagupan), she accidentally
fell into the manhole located on
the sidewalk which caused her leg
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
Art. 1, sec. 4, R.A. No. 409 refers to liability arising from
negligence, in general, regardless of the object, while Article 2189
of the CC governs liability due to "defective streets, public
buildings and other public works" in particular and is therefore
decisive on this specific case. Under Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, it
is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach, that
the defective public works belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality has either
"control or supervision" over the public building in question.
Here, despite contract between Mnl and Asiatic, market remained
under the control of City. Fact of supervision and control of the
City over subject public market was admitted by the mayor. The
City even employed a market master whose primary duty is to take
direct supervision and control of that particular market, more
specifically, to check the safety of the place for the public.
Contention of City that petitioner should not have ventured to go
to the market during a stormy weather is untenable. Defense
against liability on the basis of a quasi-delict, one must have
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. It is the duty
of the City to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market
reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for their
marketing needs. While it may be conceded that the fulfillment of
such duties is extremely difficult during storms and floods, it must
be admitted that ordinary precautions could have been taken
during good weather to minimize the dangers. Example: Drainage
hole could have been placed under the stalls instead of on the
passage ways and the City should have seen to it that the openings
were covered. Evidence indicates that 5 mos. before Jimenez fell
into the opening, it was already uncovered, after the incident, the
opening was still uncovered. The City is likewise liable for
damages under Art. 2189 of the CC, for it retained control and
supervision over the Market and as tortfeasor under Art. 2176 of
the CC on quasi-delicts. Jimenez had the right to assume that
there were no openings in the middle of the passageways and if
any, that they were adequately covered. Had the opening been
covered he could not have fallen into it. Negligence of the City is
the proximate cause of the injury suffered, the City is therefore
liable for the injury suffered by the Jimenez.
Article 2189 says that it is not necessary for the defective road or
street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to
attach. It only requires that either control or supervision is
exercised over the defective road or street. The express provision
in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injury
sustained by persons or property due to failure of any city officer
to enforce the provision of the charter CANNOT be used to
exempt it. Charter only lays down general rules regulating the
liability of the city as compared to Article 2189 which applies in
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 69
ATTY. E. GO
Art. 1, sec. 4, R.A. No. 409 refers to liability arising
from negligence, in general, regardless of the object,
thereof, while Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs
liability due to "defective streets, public buildings and
other public works" in particular and is therefore
decisive on this specific case. Under Article 2189 of
the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach, that the defective public
works belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality has
either "control or supervision" over the public
building in question.
Defense against liability on the basis of a quasi-delict,
one must have exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family. It is the duty of the City of Manila
to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market
reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for
their marketing needs
The City is likewise liable for damages under Article
2189 of the Civil Code, for it retained control and
supervision over the Sta. Ana Public Market and as
tort- feasor under Article 2176 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts.
Had the opening been covered he could not have
fallen into it. Negligence of the City of Manila is the
proximate cause of the injury suffered, the City is
therefore liable for the injury suffered by the Jimenez
Article 2189 says that it is not necessary for the
defective road or street to belong to the province, city
or municipality for liability to attach. It only requires
that either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street. The express provision in the
charter holding the city not liable for damages or
injury sustained by persons or property due to failure
of any city officer to enforce the provision of the
charter CANNOT be used to exempt it. Charter only
 TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 70
ATTY. E. GO

to be fractured. particular to the liability arising from “defective streets, public lays down general rules regulating the liability of the
buildings and other public works.” Although the the maintenance city as compared to Article 2189 which applies in
ISSUE: W/N City Of Dagupan engineer and foreman are detailed with a City, they still received particular to the liability arising from “defective
have control and supervision over instructions from the city engineer. Hence, city engineer still streets, public buildings and other public works.”
the national road. à YES exercises control and supervision over the public works.
4. QC Govt v. Dacara, while driving his Toyota What really caused the vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue Proximate cause is really QC Gov’t’s negligence as
Dacara Corolla, rammed into a pile of which the SC will not touch. QC Gov’t hasn’t shown that this case found by the lower courts. Art. 2189 capsulizes the
earth/street diggings at does not merit an exception to this rule, it hasn’t demonstrated responsibility of the city government relative to the
Matahimik St., QC, which was any special circumstance to justify a factual review. Proximate maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises
being repaired by the QC Gov’t. cause is really QC Gov’t’s negligence as found by the lower courts. the control and supervision over the same – failure of
Because of this, Dacara sustained On that night there was no lighting device or reflectorized QC Gov’t to comply with this is tantamount to
injuries and the vehicle suffered barricade or sign which could have sufficiently warned motorists negligence per se, for which it is liable for damages.
extensive damage (turned turtle of the excavation, during the thick of the night where darkness is Harsh application of the law ensues as a result
when it hit the pile of earth). pervasive. Contrary to QC Gov’t’s witness testimonies that there thereof, but this is just because the state assumed the
were signs and a gasera (gas lamp), none was ever presented to responsibility for the maintenance and repair of roads
ISSUE: W/N QC Gov’t is liable stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs and bridge.
to Dacara for damages à YES were placed at the street. If indeed signs were placed, how could it
be explained that according to the police report, none was found
at the scene. Art. 2189 capsulizes the responsibility of the city
government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since
it exercises the control and supervision over the same – failure of
QC Gov’t to comply with this is tantamount to negligence per se,
for which it is liable for damages. Harsh application of the law
ensues as a result thereof, but this is just because the state
assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of roads
and bridge. QC Gov’t belatedly pointed out that Dacara was
driving at 60 kph that night – this speed was allegedly above the
max limit of 30 kph on “city streets with light traffic, when not
designated ‘through streets,’ as provided under the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code” However, this matter was not
raised by QC Gov’t during trial – they brought it up for the first
time in their MR of the CA’s decision. It is too late in the day for
them to raise this new issue – points of law, theories or arguments
not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered
on review or appeal.
5. BUILDING PROPRIETORS (ART. 2190-2191, 2193)
1. Deroy v. CA The firewall of a burned-out CA did not err when it held De Roy liable under Art. 2190. Art. Art. 2190 states that the proprietor of a building or
building owned by petitioners 2190 states that the proprietor of a building or structure is structure is responsible for the damages resulting
collapsed and destroyed the responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to
tailoring shop beside it, occupied collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. It is the lack of necessary repairs.
by the family of Bernal et al applicable even if De Roy gave warning to the Bernals to vacate. It
(respondents). It caused injuries was the responsibility of De Roy to repair the burned firewall De
to respondents and the death of Roy argues that Bernals had the last clear chance to avoid the
the daughter. The Bernals had accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring
already been warned by De Roy shop, and therefore, Bernals prior negligence should be
and Ramos to vacate their shop disregarded. HELLO NO!! Doctrine of last clear chance, which
because of its proximity to the has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

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weakened wall, but the Bernals

failed to do so. Bernals filed a
case against De Roy to recover
damages for the injuries and death

ISSUE: W/N Art. 2190 should be

applied to this case à YES
6. ENGINEERS/ARCHITECTS/CONTRACTORS (ART. 2192 & 1723)
C. SOLIDARY LIABILITY
1. Lanuzo v. Mendoza was driving the truck A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime A distinction exists between the civil liability arising
Ping owned by Sy Bon Ping along the and the responsibility for cuasi delitos/culpa extra-contractual. from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi
national highway in Camarines The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability delitos/culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent
Sur, and because of his reckless arising from a crime under Art. 100 of RPC, or create an action act causing damages may produce civil liability arising
negligence, rammed into the for cuasi delito or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 1902-1910 from a crime under Art. 100 of RPC, or create an
residential house and store of of the CC. Plaintiffs were free to choose which remedy to enforce. action for cuasi delito or culpa extra-contractual
petitioner Felix Lanuzo. House The terms of Lanuzo’s reservation clearly and unmistakably make under Arts. 1902-1910 of the CC. Plaintiffs were free
and store were completely razed out a case for quasi-delict. This is also evident from the recitals in to choose which remedy to enforce.
to the ground, causing damage of Lanuzo’s complaint, averring the EER relationship between Ping and
Php13k. Lanuzo filed a complaint Mendoza, alleging that damages to the house and store were caused by the fact The institution of a criminal action cannot have the
for damages in the CFI against that Mendoza had driven the truck “recklessly, with gross negligence and effect of interrupting the civil action based on quasi-
Ping and Mendoza. He claimed imprudence, without observance of traffic rules and regulations and without delict. The separate civil action for quasi-delict may
that because of the hit, Lanuzo regard to the safety of persons and property,” and praying that respondents be proceed independently and regardless of the result of
became destitute, lost his means held jointly and solidarily liable for damages. These are basically what the criminal case, except that the plaintiff cannot
of livelihood from the store should be alleged in actions based on quasi-delict. As Lanuzo had recover twice for the same act or omission of the
which used to give him an income predicated his present claim for damages on quasi-delict, he is not defendant.
of P300/month. barred from proceeding with this independent civil suit. The
institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck
ISSUE: W/N Lanuzo’s interrupting the civil action based on quasi-delict. The separate owned and operated by his employer, the driver is
reservation referred to the civil civil action for quasi-delict may proceed independently and primarily liable under Art. 2176. The liability of his
liability arising from a crime or to regardless of the result of the criminal case, except that the employer, is also primary and direct under Art. 2180
the civil liability arising from a plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the for failure of Ping to rebut the legal presumption of
quasi-delict à QUASI-DELICT defendant. For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck his negligence in the selection and supervision of his
owned and operated by his employer, the driver is primarily liable employee Mendoza, he is responsible for the damages
under Art. 2176. The liability of his employer, is also primary and caused by the negligent act of the latter, and Ping’s
direct under Art. 2180 for failure of Ping to rebut the legal liability for this is primary and solidary. What needs
presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision of only to be alleged under Article 2180 is that the
his employee Mendoza, he is responsible for the damages caused employee (driver) has, by his negligence (quasi-delict)
by the negligent act of the latter, and Ping’s liability for this is caused damage to make the employer. So the
primary and solidary. What needs only to be alleged under Article employer is responsible for the tortious act of the
2180 is that the employee (driver) has, by his negligence (quasi- employee, and his liability is primary and solidary. But
delict) caused damage to make the employer. So the employer is although the employer is solidarity liable with the
responsible for the tortious act of the employee, and his liability is employee for damages, the employer may demand
primary and solidary. But although the employer is solidarity liable reimbursement from his employee (driver) for
with the employee for damages, the employer may demand whatever amount the employer will have to pay the
reimbursement from his employee (driver) for whatever amount offended party to satisfy the latter's claim.
the employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the
latter's claim.

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2. Gelisan v. Gelisan is the owner of a freight
Alday truck. He entered into a contract
with one Roberto Espiritu
whereby the former would haul
rice, sugar, flour, and fertilizer per
trip within the limits of the City
of Manila. It was also agreed that
Espiritu would bear and pay all
losses and damages attending the
carriage of the goods. The truck
was also driven by an employee of
Espiritu. Benito Alday, a trucking
operator, had known Espiritu
since 1948 as a truck operator.
Alday had a contract with with
Atlas Fertilizer Corp from North
Harbor to its warehouse in
Mandaluyong. Alday met Espiritu
at the pier and Espiritu offered
the use of his truck with the
driver. Alday accepted; however,
Espiritu never delivered the
fertilizer to Atlas. Espiritu later on
disappeared, and was booked for
theft. Subsequently, Alday saw the
truck and notified the police. The
truck was then impounded by the
police. Gelisan tried to claim his
truck, but since he could not
produce at the time the
registration papers, the police
would not release it to him. Alday
was compelled to pay the value of
the 400 bags of fertilizer to Atlas.
Due to this, he filed a complaint
against Espiritu and Gelisan.
Gelisan’s claim that he is not liable in view of the lease contract The registered owner/operator of a public service
executed between him and Espiritu which exempts him from vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver
liability to third persons cannot be sustaine. It appears that the for damages incurred by passengers or third persons
lease contract had not been approved by the Public Service as a consequence of injuries sustained in the
Commission. If the property covered by a franchise is transferred operation of said vehicles. Gelisan’s liability is not
or leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval, the only subsidiary.
transfer is not binding upon the public and third persons. There’s
no merit to Gelisan’s argument that the rule requiring previous
approval by the PSC cannot be applied where the person
responsible for damages has been fixed or determined
beforehand, as in this case. The law really requires the approval of
the PSC in order that a franchise, or any privilege pertaining
thereto, may be sold or leased without infringing the certificate
issued to the grantee. Since a franchise is personal in nature, any
transfer or lease thereof should be notified to the PSC so that the
latter may take proper safeguards to protect the interest of the
public. It follows that if the property covered by the franchise is
transferred or leased to another without obtaining the PSC’s
approval, the transfer is not binding against the PSC, and in
contemplation of law, the grantee continues to be responsible
under the franchise in relation to the PSC and to the public
Gelisan, the registered owner, is not without recourse – he has a
right to be indemnified by Espiritu for the amount that he may be
required to pay as damages for the injury caused to Alday (since
the lease contract in question, though it may not be effective
against the public for not having been approved by the PSC, is
valid and binding between the contracting parties). The registered
owner/operator of a public service vehicle is jointly and severally
liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third
persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the operation of
said vehicles. Gelisan’s liability is not only subsidiary.

ISSUE: W/N Gelisan is solidarily

or subsidiarily liable to Alday for
the stolen fertilizer
SOLIDARILY LIABLE
3. Rabbit v. IAC Some people boarded a jeep
owned by Sps Mangune and was
driven by Manalo. They usually
ride buses when they spend
Christmas at home. But because
the buses were full, they were
constrained to ride in the said
à
It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when
the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 km/hr,
assuming such calculation to be correct, is within the speed limit
allowed in the highways. The proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of Manalo and Sps. They all failed to exercise the
precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice. In culpa
contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier
In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or
is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that
he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the
New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the

Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018


jeep. On their way, the right rear
wheel of the jeep was detached,
so it was running in an
unbalanced position. Manalo
stepped on the brake which
resulted in the jeep (then on the
eastern lane; its proper lane)
making a u-turn, invading and
eventually stopping on the
western lane of the road. The jeep
practically occupied and blocked
the greater portion of the western
lane, which is the right of way of
vehicles coming from the north,
including the Bus owned by
Rabbit. The Rabbit bus was then
being driven by delos Reyes. At
the time when the jeep made a
sudden u-turn and encroached on
the western lane, the bus bumped
from behind the right rear portion
of the jeep. As a result of the
collision, 3 passengers died.
ISSUE: Who is liable for the
death and physical injuries
suffered by the Passengers of the
jeep? à MANALO AND SPS.
4. PNCC v. CA When Mt Pinatubo erupted and
damaged national bridges,
PASUDECO requested
permission from TRB for its
trucks to pass through the NLEX.
One day, at around 2:30am,
PNCC employees found a pile of
sugarcane in the middle portion
of both north and southbound
lanes of the NLEX as they were
on their patrol. They placed lit
cans of diesel oil in the area and
lane dividers with reflectorized
markings to warn motorists of the
obstruction. Believing that the
sugarcane was from
PASUDECO, they requested the
company to send someone to
clear the area. At 4am,
PASUDECO arrived and started
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and
this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence
that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in
Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the
death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event. The
negligence of Manalo was proven during the criminal case. The
negligence of Sps. was likewise proven during the trial. In any
event, "in an action for damages against the carrier for his failure
to safely carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused
either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of
its driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers
liability for damages. The CFI was therefore right in finding that
Manalo and Sps. Mangune were negligent.
[SOLIDARY LIABILITY] However, its ruling that Sps.
Mangune are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is
erroneous. The driver cannot be held solidarily liable with the
carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage.
1) the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the
passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is
exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such
breach be due to the negligence of his driver. In other words, the
carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver
nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his.
2) if we make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier,
that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely
vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share
which corresponds to the driver, contradictory to the explicit
provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the PNCC failed to exercise the
requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists.
PNCC cannot escape liability under the MOA between
PASUDECO and TRB, since Latagan (sister of driver) was not a
party thereto. Both PASUDECO and PNCC, should be held
liable. o PNCC, in charge of the maintenance of the expressway,
has been negligent in the performance of its duties. The obligation
of PNCC should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private
agreement, to other parties. PNCC declared the area free from
obstruction since there were no piles of sugarcane, but evidence
shows there were still pieces of sugarcane stalks left flattened by
motorists. There must be an observance of that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. o There
should have been sufficient warning devices considering that there
were scattered sugarcane stalks still left along the tollway.
PASUDECO’s negligence in transporting sugarcanes without
proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing the
emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts
which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan’s injuries.
As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable.
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 73
ATTY. E. GO
passenger was due to a fortuitous event.
In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the
carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to
his destination, an accident caused either by defects in
the automobile or through the negligence of its
driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the
carriers liability for damages.
The driver cannot be held solidarily liable with the
carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage.
1) the contract of carriage is between the carrier and
the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability,
the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the
passenger, even if such breach be due to the
negligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier
can neither shift his liability on the contract to his
driver nor share it with him, for his driver's
negligence is his.
2) if we make the driver jointly and severally liable
with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability
personal instead of merely vicarious and
consequently, entitled to recover only the share which
corresponds to the driver, contradictory to the
explicit provision of Art 2181 of the CC.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third
person and it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act
alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the
same damage might have resulted from the acts of
the other tortfeasor
As a general rule, negligence in order to render a
person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury.
It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with
one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is
the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where
several causes combine to produce injuries, a person
is not relieved from liability because he is responsible
for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
negligence of the person charged with injury is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not

clearing the highway. They left a
few flattened sugarcane at the side
of the road, the bulk of the
blockage having been piled along
the roadside. As it was getting
light, the PNCC employees
thought there was no more need
to man the traffic, so they
removed the lighted cans and lane
dividers. At 6:30am, Arnaiz was
driving a Toyota Corolla on his
way to Baguio. As they ran over
the scattered sugarcane, the car
flew out of control and turned
turtle several times. The three
filed a complaint for damages
against PASUDECO and PNCC,
alleging that through its
negligence, PNCC failed to keep
and maintain the NLEX safe, and
PASUDECO negligently spilled
sugarcanes on the NLEX. PNCC
argued that the unreasonable
speed at which Arnaiz’ car was
running contributed to the
incident, and that PASUDECO’s
gross negligence in spilling the
sugarcane was the proximate
cause of the accident.
ISSUE: Who should be liable? à
PASUDECO AND PNCC
5. Chan v. Iglesia The gas station of Chan needed
ni Cristo additional sewage and septic tank
for its washrooms. In view of
this, the services of Yoro, a
construction contractor was
procured by Chan. Chan and Yori
executed a MOA, stating that in
the event that valuable objects are
found on the property, it shall be
divided among the parties as
follows: Chan 60%; Yoro 40%;
Any damage within or outside the
property of Chan incurred during
the digging shall be borne by
Yoro. Diggings commenced.
Chan was informed by INC, that
Compiled by Ada Albaña 3C Batch 2018
Thus, with PASUDECO’s and the petitioner’s successive
negligent acts, they are joint tortfeasors who are solidarily liable
for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the New Civil
Code
All the requisites for quasi-delict are attendant in the instant case.
The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to the
respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises
and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The
excavation on INC’s premises was caused by fault. Finally, there
was no pre-existing contractual relation between the Chan and
Yoro on the one hand, and the INC on the other. For the damage
caused to respondent, Chan and Yoro are jointly liable as they are
joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. As a general rule, joint
tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit. Indubitably, Chan and Yoro cooperated in
committing the tort. They even had provisions in their MOA as to
how they would divide the treasure if any is found within or
TORTS AND DAMAGES CASE MATRIX 74
ATTY. E. GO
have resulted to as great an extent, and that such
cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no
defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the
injury would not have resulted from his negligence
alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the
other concurrent tortfeasors. Where several causes
producing an injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not
have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or
any of the causes and recovery may be had against
any or all of the responsible persons although under
the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one
of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed
by them to the injured person was not the same. No
actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause
merely because it does not exceed the negligence of
other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the
sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors
whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable
for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons, although acting independently, are in
combination with the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole
injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in
injury or damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting
damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code
For the damage caused to respondent, Chan and
Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors.
Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort or
who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit. Verily, the responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
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the digging traversed and outside petitioner’s property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of
penetrated a portion of the land exculpating petitioner from liability, is the very noose that insures
belonging to the INC. The that he be so declared as liable. Surreptitiously digging under the
foundation of the chapel was respondent’s chapel which may weaken the foundation thereof,
affected since a tunnel was dug thereby endangering the lives and limbs of the people in worship,
directly under it to the damage unquestionably amounts to gross negligence. Not to mention the
and prejudice of INC. damage that may be caused to the structure itself. INC may indeed
ISSUE: W/N Chan should be be awarded exemplary damages.
held solidarily liable with Yoro à
YES
D. STRICT LIABILITY TORTS
1. POSSESORS/USERS OF ANIMALS (ART. 2183)
1. Vestil v. IAC Uy was in the house of Sps. Vestil What must be determined is the possession of the dog that Article 2183 holds the possessor liable even if the
playing with the latter’s child. The admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the animal should escape or be lost and so be removed
house was owned by Miranda, ownership of the dog or of the house. Art. 2183 states that: The from his control. It does not matter either that the
father of Purita Vestil. Uy was possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is dog was tame and was merely provoked; the law does
bitten by a dog while she’s there. responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may not speak only of vicious animals but covers even
Uy was rushed to the hospital escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the tame ones as long as they cause injury. The obligation
where she was treated for damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the imposed by Article 2183 is not based on the
multiple lacerated wounds on the person who has suffered damage. In Afialda vs. Hisole, a person negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of
forehead and administered an hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs the possessor or user of the animal causing the
anti-rabies vaccine. She was thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The damage; it is based on natural equity and on the
readmitted 1 week later due to complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's principle of social interest that he who possesses
vomiting of saliva. Eventually, she duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one, animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer
died. 7 months later, Uys sued for including himself. While it is true that she is not really the owner for the damage which such animal may cause.
damages, alleging that the Sps. of the house, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its
Vestil were liable to them, as possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the
possessors of the dog that bit and only heir residing in Cebu and the most logical person to take care
eventually killed their daughter. of the property, which was only 6km from her house.
The Sps Vestil rejected the Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Uy
charge, insisting that the dog was when the little girl was bitten by the dog. The dog itself remained
tame and belonged to Miranda. in the house even after the death of Miranda, when the incident in
And no one witnessed it bite Uy. question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners
offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses
ISSUE: W/N Sps Vestil should although Purita said she knew them only casually. According to
be held liable? à YES Manresa the obligation imposed by Art. 2183 of the CC is not
based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of
the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based
on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he
who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
2. MANUFACTURERS & PROCESSORS (ART. 2187)
3. HEAD OF FAMILY (ART. 2193)

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V. SPECIAL TORTS (HUMAN RELATIONS)

A. ABUSE OF RIGHT (ART. 19)
CASE TITLE CASE SUMMARY RATIO KEY TAKE AWAY
1. Velayo v. Shell Prior to 1948, CALI owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell Company. CAL offered its It may be said that Article 19 contains a mere declaration of principles yet
C-54 plane (which is in California) as payment to Shell but Shell declined as it such declaration is implemented by Article 21. The article vouchsafes
thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. The impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
creditors agreed in that mtg to appoint representatives to a working committee These cover injurious acts that are contrary to public policy but are not
that would determine the order of preference of payment. They also agreed not forbidden by the statute (e.g., business practices that are unfair or
to file suit against CALI but CALI reserved that it will file insolvency oppressive). A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a
proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them. Shell was represented violation of law, should be compensated by damages.
by a certain Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising
the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount
of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of
CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54
plane in California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have
the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted. Meanwhile,
the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by
Shell Ph to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to
the PAL. The other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This
prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against
CALI’s assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in
the Ph from being attached. Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was
approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the
C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell Ph in order
for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in
the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double
the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell argued it
is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a
company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice.

ISSUE: W/N Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any
law. à YES. in the absence of law, basis for liability is Art. 21 of the CC.
HELD: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage”. Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the
forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury,
even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated
by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article
20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law.
In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
B. CONTRARY TO LAW AND MORALS (ARTS. 20 AND 21)
1. Hermosissima Soledad was a teacher turned insurance underwriter in Cebu while Francisco is Breach of promise to marry (Balm suit) is not actionable
v. CA around 10 years younger. They were deemed engaged despite no promise to
marry yet. After watching a movie, they had intercourse in his cabin on board

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M/V Escano where he was an apprentice pilot. (Woah there! That escalated
quickly! HAHAHA) Soledad told Francisco she was pregnant, whereupon he
promised to marry her. Chris (child) was born, however, Francisco married
someone else (Romanita). Soledad filed a complaint for Francisco Hermosisima
to the acknowledge (Chris) as his natural child; Support the child; moral
damages for the breach of a promise. Francico acknowledged the child and
willing to support but DENIED that he promised to marry her.

ISSUE: W/N moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry à
NO, breach of promise to marry is not actionable.
HELD: Moral damages therefore are not recoverable. Civil Code of Spain
permitted the recovery of damages for a breach of a promise to marry. De Jesus
v. Syquia has held that there is only a right to recover money or property
advanced (before the new code). In drafting the new code by the Code
Commission, several articles would’ve addressed the instance of a breach of
marriage, however, they were eliminated in Congress. Breach of promise to
marry is not actionable has been decided already in De Jesus v. Syquia. Articles
may easily be abused. Clear and manifest intent that a breach of promise to
marry is not actionable. CA ruled that the promise was used for seduction. SC
disagrees. Seduction to allow moral damages in 2219 of the Civil Code is
seduction committed in the RPC. Seduction does not exist in this case. The age
of the woman (10 yrs older) plus teacher turned insurance agent + she gave
herself freely, even without first going to the clergy. Hence, Francisco is only
liable to pay for the support, income she failed to earn during pregnancy (actual
and compensatory damages) BUT NO MORAL DAMAGES.
2. Ponce v. Ponce filed a case for disbarment against Atty. Legaspi, the legal counsel of Malicious prosecution
Legaspi LNOR (company owned by Ponce). Ponce thought the Porters (other Generally, malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal actions and
stockholders) with Atty. Legaspi were cheating by creating Yrasport, a direct has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits just to vex and humiliate
competitor of LNOR. Ponce alleged that the facilities of LNOR were being used the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause.
for Yrasport. Ponce says that there has been malicious acts, anomalous The foundation of an action for malicious prosecution is an original
management, and fraudulent operations to her prejudice (because L’NOR is proceeding, judicial in character. A disbarment proceeding is judicial in
losing profits). Specifically, she alleged Legaspi of gross misconduct in violating character, and may be the basis for a subsequent action for malicious
duty and trust to his client, receives retainer fees from Porter, aided the prosecution.
organization of Yrasport to the detriment of LNOR and was also the corp.sec. An action for damages arising from malicious prosecution is anchored on
of Yrasport. Articles 21, 2217 and 2219(8).
Legaspi said that Yrasport was to complement LNOR, since LNOR could not Elements
keep up with the business; no law prohibiting stockholder from competing with a. Fact of prosecution and that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and
the business of the corp; and that he defended Porter in estafa case by order of that the action finally terminated with an acquittal;
the mgt. Disbarment case was dismissed. Atty. Legaspi now files a case for b. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause;
damages. c. That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice—by
improper or sinister motive.
ISSUE: W/N Ponce is liable for damages à No. The foregoing are necessary safeguards to preserve a person’s right to litigate
HELD: Malice alone does not make one liable for malicious prosecution where which may otherwise be emasculated by the undue filing of malicious
probable cause is shown, even where it appears that the suit was brought for the prosecution cases. Malice is essential to the maintenance of an action for
mere purpose of vexing, harassing and injuring his adversary. In this case, Ponce malicious prosecution cases, not merely to the recovery of exemplary
believed that L’NOR was defrauded by Porter, thus, he filed a complaint for damages. Malice alone does not make one liable for malicious prosecution
estafa against him. In fact, Porter was convicted by the trial court but, upon where probable cause is shown even where it appears that the suit was
appeal, was acquitted. On the other hand, Atty. Legaspi did not deny that he brought for the mere purpose of vexing, harassing and injuring his adversary.

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represented Porter and helped in facilitating the incorporation of Yrasport, but
instead justified his actions. The disbarment case was dismissed because of the
honest perception of Atty. Legaspi. True, at that time, the Corporation Law did
not prohibit him from engaging in a venture which competed with his client
corporation. But as a lawyer, those acts are nevertheless circumscribed upon
ethical and moral considerations. Had he turned to American jurisprudence, he
would have known that it was unfair for him to take advantage of the
opportunity when the interest of the corporation justly calls for protection.
From the foregoing, the SC found sufficient basis to declare that the petitioner
had probable cause in filing the administrative case. Facts and circumstances
existed which excited belief in Ponce’s that Atty. Legaspi indeed committed
unethical acts. W/N his perception is actually correct is not relevant, the only
issue being whether or not he had probable cause in filing the complaint. In this
case, there is no need to ascertain whether he acted in malice in filing the
complaint because the existence of probable cause alone is sufficient to defeat
the charge of malicious prosecution.
C. UNJUST ENRICHMENT (ARTS. 22 AND 23)
1. Pecson v. CA Pecson owns a commercial lot in Kamias, QC. P built a four-unit apartment but
failed to pay taxes. Lot was then sold at public auction where Mamerto won.
Mamerto then sold it to Sps. Naguid. Pecson challenged the auction sale
claiming the apartment is not part the auction sale. Court ruled in this case that
the apartment building is not part of the auction sale. Sps. Naguid then filed a
motion for delivery of possession of the lot and apartment building.
Malice and want of probable cause must both exist to justify the action.
Probable cause—existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of
the prosecutor that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he
was prosecuted. One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously
instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. The adverse
result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the
actor to make payment of damages for the law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate
One who exercises his rights does no injury—damnum absque injuria
Article 546 of the CC was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the
owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer justice to
both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself
of that which does not belong to him. The current market value of the
improvements should be made the basis of reimbursement.

ISSUE: Who is entitled to the ownership, possession and bears the indemnity of
the apartment? (dundundundun, remember Property? HAHAHA) à
1) Choice is with sps. Naguid to either appropriate or oblige pecson to pay (here,
they opted to appropriate)
2) No indemnity has been paid yet, therefore, possession (until indemnified)
belong to Pecson. (including the rents paid by lessees of the apartment)
3) Value to be paid for indemnity for the apartment is current market value
HELD: Parties agree, Pecson is a builder in good faith (built it when he was still
owner) o Lower courts focused on application of Art 448 and 546 o SC: those
articles aren’t actually applicable (Case is about an owner who lost ownership) !
Issue of good faith is irrelevant where owner himself built on the land. ! BUT
448 may apply by ANALOGY on INDEMNITY Art 448 o Owner has option !
1) Right to appropriate to himseld after payment of indemnity ! 2) oblige the one
who built to pay the value of the land (is sow then value of rent) • If value of
land considerably higher than the building or trees then only rent (if owner does
not choose to appropriate to himself) Art 546 o Reimbursement for necessary
expenses In case opted to appropriate to self. What then is the value as basis of
indemnity? o CURRENT MARKET VALUE ! Objective of 546 is justice ! If
not current, then unjust enrichment from a high income wielding apartment
Parties should be allowed to present evidence on the current market value.
Rentals currently paid by lessees of the apartment go to PECSON first, why? !
Sps. Naguid chose to APPROPRIATE,therefore, PECSON is entitled to the
right of possession and enjoyment until he is paid the proper INDEMNITY. !
Until indemnity is paid, right to ownership of the apartment, and necessarily the

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rents. 3-C Torts and Damages • • • • REMANDED so that will know current
market value.
2. Security Bank Ferrer was contracted by Security Bank to construct the Security Bank building
v. CA in Davao for 1.76M. The building was completed but due to drastic increase in
construction materials, incur expenses of 300K on top of the original cost.
Timely demands and evidences (invoices, receipts, and invoices) were presented
by Ferrer showing the increase. Security Bank consulted with an architectural
firm which verified the claims for additional costs, but, recommended to settle
claim with only 200K. Security Bank still unfazed, argued they did not authorize
any increase, and are willing to pay only the original cost. Using the building
contract as a basis which stated any increase at the cost of the project will be
equitably agreed upon by both of the parties. Ferrer files a complaint for breach
of contract.
Article 22 embodies the maxim, nemo ex alterius incommodo debet
lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another’s injury). The
provisions of the chapter on Human Relations of the CC were formulated as
basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order, designed to indicate certain
norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience, guides for human
conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that
law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of
justice

ISSUE: W/N Security Bank is liable to pay for the increase in materials. à YES
HELD: Art.22 of the CC which embodies the maxim, Nemo ex alterius incommodo
debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another's injury) states,
“Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.” SBTC denied
authorizing anyone to make a settlement of Ferrer’s claim and likewise denied
any liability, contending that the absence of a mutual agreement made Ferrer’s demand
premature and baseless. However, SBTC was able to evaluate and audit the
increased cost. When Ferrer demanded payment, SBTC’s VP and the
architectural consultant verified and computed Ferrer’s claims of increased cost.
SBTC admitted liability for the increased cost and made a recommendation to
settle Ferrer’s claim for P200,000.00. Despite this recommendation and several
demands from Ferrer, SBTC failed to make payment. It is not denied that Ferrer
incurred additional expenses. Ferrer’s claim for the increased amount was
adequately proven during the trial by receipts, invoices and other supporting
documents. Also, under Article 1182 of the Civil Code, a conditional obligation
shall be void if its fulfillment depends upon the sole will of the debtor. In the
present case, the mutual agreement is in effect a condition dependent on
petitioner bank's sole will, since Ferrer would naturally and logically give consent
to such an agreement which would allow him recovery of the increased cost. It
cannot be denied that petitioner bank derived benefits when Ferrer completed
the construction even at an increased cost. Hence, to allow SBTC to acquire the
constructed building at a price far below its actual construction cost would
undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the bank to the prejudice of
Ferrer. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law.
D. JUDICIAL VIGILANCE (ART. 24)
1. Cruz v. NLRC Cruz a high school graduate agreed to work in Kuwait as a domestic helper. The domestic helper is particularly susceptible to abuse because she usually
After completing her 2 year engagement, she went back to the Ph with a works only by herself in a private household unlike other workers employed
grievance. She filed a complaint against EMS Manpower and Placement Services in an open business concern who are able to share and discuss their
and its foreign principal Al Yahya, for underpayment of salary and non-payment problems and bear or solve them together. The domestic helper is denied
of vacation leave. Placement fee asked exceeded the maximum (7k; max daw is that comfort; she has no companions in her misery; she usually broods alone;
5k). Foreign employer also treated her as a slave, 18-hr work days, & beaten up. there is no one to turn to for help That is why we must carefully listen to her

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Settlement was made as shown by affidavit of desistance. BUT Cruz said: it was when she is finally able to complain against those who would rob her of her
obtained under duress and false pretenses; unaided by a lawyer; believed only a just rewards and even of her dignity as a human being.
settlement of 1 mo. vacation leave. POEA dismissed the complaint and affirmed
by NLRC. Petition now GADALEJ. Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy; if the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable
ISSUE: W/N CA committed GADLEJ for dismissing the complaint à YES settlement, it is binding on the parties. It is only where there is clear proof
HELD: Cruz was not fully aware of the import and consequences of the that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the
Affidavit of Desistance when she executed it, allegedly with the assistance of terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to
counsel. Except for the disputable presumptions invoked by the private annul the questionable transaction. The fact that the consideration given in
respondent, such assistance has not been established against the petitioner's exchange of the quitclaim was very much less than the amount the plaintiff is
allegation that the "Atty" Alvarado who supposedly counseled her was not even claiming renders the quitclaim null and void for being contrary to public
a lawyer. Indeed, even assuming that such assistance had been duly given, there policy. The State must be firm in affording protection to labor
is still the question of the intrinsic validity of the quitclaim in view of the gross
disparity between the amount of the settlement and the petitioner's original
claim. It is difficult to believe that the petitioner would agree to waive her total
claim of P88,840.00 for the unseemly settlement of only P2,400.00. And even if
she did, the waiver would still be null and void as violative of public policy.
E. THOUGHTLESS EXTRAVAGANCE (ART. 25)
F. DISRESPECT FOR PERSON (ART. 26)
1. Tenchavez v. Vicenta Escaño married Pastor Tenchavez, before a Catholic chaplain. The An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does
Escaño marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part
with the local civil register. Mamerto and Mena Escaño, parents, were surprised
to learn that the two got married, because Pastor never asked for the hand of
Vicenta, and disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage
would provoke. Fr. Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate marriage, from
the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop
to celebrate the marriage. But no recelebration took place bec. Vicenta learned
of Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel’s affari. In 1948 they were already
estranged. Vicenta went to Misamis Occ. to escape from the scandal. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition to annul her marriage which she did not sign. Case
was dismissed. In 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a
passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose was
to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City. It was approved, and left for US.
She filed a verified complaint for divorce against Pastor in the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the
ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." A final and absolute
decree of divorce was issued. Parents then filed a petition with the Arch. of
Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor. Vicenta then married an
American, Russell, in Nevada. She acquired American citizenship thereafter.
Tenchavez initiated a complaint for damages in the CFI of Cebu against Vicenta,
her parents, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta
from joining him, and alienating her affections, and for having decreed the
annulment of the marriage. Vicenta claimed that there was a valid divorce and
valid marriage to her present husband.
ISSUE: 1) W/N divorce acquired in US is valid? à NO.
2) W/N Vicenta is liable for damages? à YES.
HELD: There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper

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motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent
divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was
entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected.
Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of
affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been
shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved. Pastor, in
falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,
unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover
damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the
charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances.
Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or
spleen. In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by Pastor from
Vicenta, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim
for a million pesos in damages. While Pastor is unable to remarry under our law,
this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that he
entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her
second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover
P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees. With regard to the
P45,000 damages awarded to Vicenta’s parents, by the court below, we opine
that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have
wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having
become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has
been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that they were
not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court,
therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
G. DERELICTION OF DUTY (ART. 27)
1. Javellana v. The Municipal Council of a town in Ilo-Ilo and Mayor Tayo approved Res. 5, The award of moral damages to a councilor as a consequence of the
Tayo setting their Reg. Sessions every 1st and 3rd Wednes. of the month. On one municipal mayor’s refusal to perform his official duties is proper under
occasion where a Reg. Sesh was supposed to be held, Mayor Tayo, Vice-Mayor, Article 27. To declare that the proceedings of the councilors were null and
and top 2 Councilors were absent. Despite the absence, the 6 Councilors went void is to encourage recalcitrant public officials who would frustrate valid
on with the mtg. and just appointed a temporary presiding officer in the absence sessions for political end or consideration; public interest would immensely
of the Mayor. This kept happening for 4 mos. because of the consistent suffer if a mayor who belongs to one political group refused to call or attend
absences. In every mtg, the minutes of the proceedings were sent to Mayor for a session because the council is controlled by another political party.
approval, but refused to act on them, particularly to approve or disapprove of
the resolutions. Mayor claimed that all the sesh conducted are null and void;
refused to sign the payrolls of the Councilors, due to their nullity. Now,
Councilors seek their per diems from the meetings and moral damages. After
exhausting administrative remedies, case was filed in the RTC which held that
Tayo is liable for moral damages under Art. 21 and 27.
ISSUE: W/N Mayor is liable for damages. à YES
HELD: We find said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil
Code, considering that according to the trial court, he (Golez) was able to prove
that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his
official duty (to pay his per diem), not withstanding the action taken by the
Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Board upholding the validity of the session
in question.

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H. UNFAIR COMPETITION (ART. 28)

1. Manila Manila Oriental Sawmill Co. (MOS) has a union of its employees, named United It cannot have been the intent of the Legislature to permit employees, where
Oriental Employees Welfare Association. Both entered into an agreement of working a valid existing contract is involved and under the circumstances present, to
Sawmill Co. v. conditions pursuant to a settlement concluded in the Court of Industrial substitute one bargaining agency for another whenever it suits their purpose
NLU Relations. Thereafter, 36/37 members of the Original Union resigned from the or the purpose of a rival labor organization during the life of that contract. If
union in order to join an new union, National Labor Union (NLU). The employees are to enjoy actual liberty of contract through their labor
resignations from the union were made with the approval of MOS. NLU now organizations or other bona fide representatives, and their contracts are to be
made several demands upon MOS regarding working conditions. MOS claimed effective, their obligations may not be repudiated simply by the process of
that the second union is not a recognized union. Hence, NLU cannot make new changing their representatives, and in their own interest they should not seek
demands for them. NLU continued making its demands. MOS replied that it to do so.
cannot recognize the new union formed “until and after the agreement of May
4, 1950, entered into by the original union and the employer, is declared null and
void by the Court of Industrial Relations.” Because of the non-recognition,
employees concerned resorted to a strike. MOS filed a petition in the CIR to
declare the strike illegal (denied).
ISSUE: W/N strike is illegal: YES
HELD: It is evident that the purpose of their transfer is merely to disregard and
circumvent the contract entered into between the same employees and the
petitioner on May 4, 1950, knowing full well that contract was effective for one
year, and was entered into with the sanction of the Court of industrial Relations.
If this move were allowed the result would be a subversion of a contract freely
entered into without any valid and justifiable reason. Such act cannot be
sanctioned in law or in equity as is it in derogation of the principle underlying
the freedom of contract and the good faith that should exist in contractual
relations. A labor organization is wholesome if it serves its legitimate purpose of
settling labor disputes. That is why it is given personality and recognition in
concluding collective bargaining agreements. but if it is made use of as
asubterfuge, or as a means to subvert valid commitments, it outlives its purpose
for far from being an aid, it tends to undermine the harmonious relations
between management and labor. Such is the move undertaken by the respondent
union. Such a move cannot be considered lawful and cannot receive the sanction
of the Court. Hence, the strike it has staged is illegal. If employees, are to enjoy
actual liberty of contract through their labor organizations or other bona fide
representatives, and their contracts are to be effective, their obligations may not be
repudiated simply by the process of changing the representatives, and in their own interest
they should not seek to do so
2. Spinner v. Spinner has long been engaged in the manufacture and sale of textile fabrics, Law concerning infringement of trademarks and unfair competition have a
Hesslein including khaki cloth. Among the brands of khaki was the grade indicated by the common conception at their root: one person shall not be permitted to
manufacturer as “Wigan.” These “grades” are all under a trademark approved by misrepresent that his goods or his business are the goods or the business of
the Bureau of Patents,Copyrights & Trademarks of the Phil Gov’t. The another.
trademark is pasted on the outside of each bolt of khaki. After years of selling,
Spinner learned that Hesslein was selling a brand of khaki in the Ph with the Trademark Infringement Unfair Competition
word “Wigan” stenciled on the bolts below Hesslein’s own trade-mark. Hesslein More limited range but recognizes Broader and more inclusive law;
said: the word “Wigan” purports to show the color (not grade) of Hesslein’s a more exclusive right derived the tort is strictly one of fraud
khaki, but the proof shows that the word was thus used by Hesslein upon khaki from the adoption and registration
of different shades. Spinner had its trademark re-registered. The purpose of this of the trademark
registration was to incorporate the word “Wigan” as an integral part of the One who has identified a particular Any conduct may constitute unfair
registered trade-mark. Hassleim has also been selling khaki even before it sold

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for Spinner. After Hesslein assumed the agency in Ph for NYC house’s symbol or mark with his goods competition if the effect is to pass
products, the manager of Hesslein began to give orders to the NYC house for thereby acquires a property right in off on the public the goods of one
the printing of the word “Wigan” upon the bolts of khaki intended for sale in such symbol or mark; if another man as the goods of another (i.e.
the Ph. Thus, Hesslein’s khaki began to be marketed here with the word infringes the trademark, he thereby simulation of labels, reproduction
“Wigan” Spinner uses the word “Wigan” to indicate quality, while Hesslein invades this property right of the form, color and general
purports to use it to indicate color but the latter’s practice in this usage is appearance of the package used)
somewhat loose. Spinner instituted an action for the purpose of restraining
Hesslein from using the word “Wigan” and to recover damages for violation of General Principle: A competitor
its trade-mark right in the word “Wigan” cannot be permitted to do acts
ISSUE: W/N Hesslein is liable for damages à NO which have deceived, or are
HELD: They were enjoined from using the word “Wigan” upon the khaki sold by it in reasonably designed to deceive the
the Philippine Islands, and from otherwise representing its khaki to be of the "Wigan" public into buying his goods as
brand. In absolving the defendant from the claim for damages, the judgment will be those of another
affirmed. In the case before us it is revealed that the word "Wigan" was first Of late years, has been restricted to Used to include wrongful acts of
stamped upon the khaki sold by the defendant at the suggestion or request of a its proper technical meaning competition not involving any
Chinese customer, presumably a tailor or merchant, and the purpose behind the violation of trademark right proper
suggestion undoubtedly was that, if this term were found stamped upon the The use of only one of the words In the action to enjoin unfair
khaki thus sold it could be represented to the ultimate purchaser that the khaki constituting a trademark may be competition, the fraudulent
thus sold was the plaintiff's "Wigan." In this connection it should be noted that, sufficient to constitute an intention on the part of the
in the action to enjoin unfair competition, the fraudulent intention on the part of infringement; it is not necessary defendant may be inferred from
the defendant may be inferred from the similarity of the goods offered for sale that all of the words comprising the similarity of the goods offered
by him to the goods of the plaintiff In the case before us the use of the word the trademark should be for sale by him to the g oods of the
"Wigan," stamped by the defendant upon the bolts of khaki sold by it, appropriated plaintiff. It makes no difference
sufficiently discloses an intention to mislead the consumer. It even makes no that dealers are not deceived; the
difference that dealers in the article are not deceived. They are informed and law concerns itself with the casual
usually know what they are buying. The law concerns itself with the casual purchaser who knows the
purchaser who knows the commodity only by its name. In obtaining what he commodity only by its name; thus
asks for he is entitled to protection against unfair dealing. The Court viewed he is entitled to protection against
Spinner’s claim for damages should intead be interpreted as a prayer for an unfair dealing
assessment of the compensation to which the plaintiff might be entitled for the
damage done to its business. The proof, however, shows that the Spinner's
business has shown a healthy growth during the period covered by the wrongful
acts which are the subject of this action, and it is not proved that any assessable
damage has been inflicted upon the plaintiff by the wrongful acts of the
defendant, though the infringement of legal right is clear. We are therefore of
the opinion that no damages should be awarded to the plaintiff. Act No. 666
gives the plaintiff a right to elect between the recovery of damages for the harm
done to the plaintiff's business and the enforcement of an accounting against the
defendant for the profits which may be shown to have accrued to it by reason of
the sales made in violation of the plaintiff's right. But these two remedies are
different and, where the plaintiff has elected to sue for damages and no damages
are proved, none can be awarded. This makes it unnecessary to analyze the
proof with a view to discovering the profits which the defendant may have
earned by the illegitimate sales.
I. VIOLATION OF CIVIL/POLITICAL RIGHT (ART. 32)
1. Lim v. Ponce Jikil Taha sold to Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L SAN A person whose constitutional rights have been violated is entitled to actual
de Leon RAFAEL. A year later, Alberto filed a complaint alleging that after the sale, Jikil and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor
Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him. Fiscal Ponce de Leon To be liable under Article 32, it is enough that there was a violation of the

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requested to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants
Delfin Lim cannot prevent the court from taking custody over the same. Hence, should have acted with malice or bad faith. The wrong may be civil or
upon order of Maddela, the Detachment Commander, seized the motor launch criminal. Main purpose of the article: Effective protection of individual
from Delfin Lim without being armed with a search warrant. Plaintiffs filed a rights. Object: Put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith
complaint for damages against Fiscal Ponce de Leon and Detachment
Commander Maddela, alleging that the latter entered the premises of Delfin Lim
without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor
lauch without his consent. As affirmative defenses, Fiscal Ponce de Leon
alleged that the motor launch in question was forcibly taken with violence and
with intent to gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya, thus giving rise to
the filing of the criminal charge of robbery against Jikil Taha; and that being the
corpus delicti of the robbery, there was sufficient reason to impound it. The trial
court upheld the validity of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that
the authority to impound the corpus delicti in a case pending investigation is
inherent in the Provincial Fiscal who controls the prosecution of the case and
who introduces said exhibits in court. Hence, this appeal on a pure question of
law under Rule 45 of the Rules.
ISSUE: W/N Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the
motor launch in question without a search warrant, seeing that the same was
admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime.
W/N Fiscal Ponce de Leon and Detachment Commander Maddella are civilly
liable to plaintiffs for damages suffered by the latter on the occasion of the
search and seizure.
HELD: Fiscal Ponce de Leon had no authority to order the seizure of the motor
launch without a warrant. He thereby violated the constitutional right of the
plaintiffs against unreasonable searches and seizures; and consequently, he is
liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiffs. The general rule is that for a
search and seizure to be reasonable, it must be effected by means of a valid
search warrant. For a warrant to be valid: (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) to be determined personally by a judge; (3) after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and
(4) particularly describing the place to searched and the persons or things to be
seized. (Art III Sec 2 of the 1987 Consitution). In his vain attempt to justify the
seizure of the motor launch without warrant, Fiscal Ponce de Leon invoked
provisions of RA 732. But there is nothing in said law which confers upon the
fiscals the authority to issue warrants, much less order without warrant the
seizure of personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime. The fact
that a thing is the corpus delicti of a crime does not justify its seizure
without a warrant. The records also show that he was able to make two (2)
requests for the impounding of the motor launch. In short, he had all the time to
procure a search warrant but he did not. Also, the very nature of Article 32 is
that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there
should be malice or bad faith. Precisely, the object of the article is to put an end
to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in most cases the
plea of official abusing individual’s rights.
While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing unlawful orders of
his superior officer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant
Maddela’s exculpation from liability. The records show that after Fiscal Ponce de

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Leon made his first request to the Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962
Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor launch despite repeated orders
from his superior officer. It was only after he was furnished a copy of the reply
of Fiscal Ponce de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter of the Provincial
Commander, justifying the necessity of the seizure of the motor launch on the
ground that the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent
the court from taking custody of the same, that he impounded the motor launch
on July 6, 1962. With said letter coming from the legal officer of the province,
Maddela was led to believe that there was a legal basis and authority to impound
the launch.
2. MHP MHP Garments (MHP) was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly
Garments v. exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, responsible for the violation. It is not the actor alone who must answer for
CA badges, and insignias. Additionally, through a memorandum agreement, it was damages; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the
given the authority to undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in damages. The law makes the persons who are directly and indirectly
court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies. responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors
Subsequently, it learned that Villacruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales (lezz call them
“The Fakers”) were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any
authority. Hence, De Guzman, an employee of MHP was tasked to undertake
the necessary surveillance and make a report to the Phil. Constabulary (PC). On
October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner de Guzman together with
constabulary men went to the stores of The Fakers and seized the boy and girl
scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display without any warrant. The seizure
caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued
for the seized items. The items were then turned over by Capt. Peñafiel to MHP
for safekeeping. A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed
against The Fakers. For the complaint to be dropped, De Guzman exacted 3,100
pesos from The Fakers. After preliminary investigation, the Provincial fiscal
dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the seized items. However,
even with such order, The Fakers had to go personally to MHP’s place of
business to recover the seized items. Even then, not all items were recovered
and some were of inferior quality. The Fakers filed a case for sums of money
and damages against MHP and De Guzman. MHP and De Guzman claims as
defense that they are not liable since they did not effect the seizure of the subject
merchandise.
ISSUE: Can MHP and De Guzman be held liable even if they did not personally
effect the seizure of the subject items? à YES
HELD: Art. III, Sec. 2, of the Consti protects our people from unreasonable
search and seizure. Under the Rules of Court, a warrantless search can only be
undertaken under exceptional circumstance. We hold that the evidence did not
justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. The
progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the
stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and
the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of
time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private
respondents. Hence, the search and seizure was clearly illegal. Art. 32. Any
public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for

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damages. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private

respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the
raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake
the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. Secondly,
Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was precisely crafted on March 9, 1983 to
safeguard not only the privilege of franchise holder of scouting items but also
the citizen's constitutional rights. Under said letter, apprehension of
unauthorized manufacturers and distributors shall only be authorized upon
proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of
the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law.
3. ABS-CBN v. Viva, through Del Rosario, offered ABS-CBN through its vice-president Charo Actual damages
CA Santos-Concio, a list of 3 film packages or 36 titles from which ABS may Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to compensation
exercise its right of first refusal Mrs. Concio informed Vic through a letter that for actual damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
they can only purchase 10 titles to be schedules on non-primetime slots because duly proved. In cases where a writ of preliminary injunction is issued, the
they were very adult themes which the ruling of the MTRCB advises to be aired damages which the defendant may suffer by reason of the writ are
at 9:00 p.m. Del Rosario approached ABS’ Ms. Concio with a list consisting of recoverable from the required bond.
52 original movie titles as well as 104 re-runs proposing to sell to ABS airing
rights for P60M (P30M cash and P30M worth of television spots). Del Rosario Atty’s fees
and ABS-CBN general manager, Eugenio Lopez III met wherein Del Rosario In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees may be recovered as actual or
allegedly agreed to grant rights for 14 films for P30M April 06, 1992: Del compensatory damages
Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon of RBS Senior vice-president for Finance General Rule: Attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages
discussed the terms and conditions of Viva's offer to sell the 104 films, after the because no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Even when a
rejection of the same package by ABS April 07, 1992: Ms. Concio sent the claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
proposal draft of 53 films for P35M which Viva's Board rejected since they will protect his rights, attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient
not accept anything less than P60M April 29, 1992: Viva granted RBS exclusive showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case
grants for P60M RTC: Issued TRO against RBS in showing 14 films as filed by other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause
ABS. RBS also set up a cross-claim against VIVA. RTC: ordered ABS to pay
RBS P107,727 premium paid by RBS to the surety which issued their bond to Exemplary damages
lift the injunction, P191,843.00 for the amount of print advertisement for These are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good; they
"Maging Sino Ka Man" in various newspapers, P1M attorney's fees, P5M moral are recoverable
damages, P5M exemplary damages and costs. Cross-claim to VIVA was
dismissed. ABS appealed. VIVA and Del Rosario also appealed seeking moral Criminal cases Part of the civil liability when the crime is
and exemplary damages and additional attorney's fees. CA: reduced the awards committed with 1/ more aggravating circumstances
of moral damages to P2M, exemplary damages to P2M and attorney's fees to Quasi-delicts If the defendant acted with gross negligence
P500,000. Denied VIVA and Del Rosario's appeal because it was RBS and not Contracts and If the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
VIVA which was actually prejudiced when the complaint was filed by ABS. quasi- contracts reckless manner
ISSUES: W/N there was a perfected contract between VIVA and ABS à NO. Art. 19 Art. 20 Art. 21
W/N RBS is entitled to damages and attorney's fees. It may be noted that the Elements of abuse of The general sanction Elements of acts contra
award of attorney's fees of P212,000 in favor of VIVA is not assigned as another right: for all other bonus mores:
error. à NO. 1. Legal right or duty provisions of law 1. Legal act
HELD: The claim of RBS for actual damages did not arise from contract, quasi- 2. Exercised in bad which do not provide 2. But contrary to
contract, delict, or quasi-delict. It arose from the fact of filing of the complaint faith for their own sanction morals, good custom,
despite ABS’ alleged knowledge of lack of cause of action. Needless to state the 3. For the sole intent public order or public
award of actual damages cannot be comprehended under the above law on of prejudicing another policy
actual damages. RBS could only probably take refuge under Arts. 19, 20, and 21 3. Done with intent to
of the CC It may further be observed that in cases where a writ of preliminary injure
injunction is issued, the damages which the defendant may suffer by reason of

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the writ are recoverable from the injunctive bond. In this case, ABS had not yet Malice or bad faith is at the core of Articles 19, 20 and 21; malice or bad
filed the required bond; as a matter of fact, it asked for reduction of the bond faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
and even went to the Court of Appeals to challenge the order on the matter, dishonest purpose or moral obliquity, and such must be substantiated by
Clearly then, it was not necessary for RBS to file a counterbond. Hence, ABS evidence. The adverse result of an action does not per se make the action
cannot be held responsible for the premium RBS paid for the counterbond. wrongful and subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have
Neither could ABS be liable for the print advertisements for "Maging Sino Ka meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result from
Man" for lack of sufficient legal basis. The RTC issued a temporary restraining a person’s exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria
order and later, a writ of preliminary injunction on the basis of its determination
that there existed sufficient ground for the issuance thereof. Notably, the RTC
did not dissolve the injunction on the ground of lack of legal and factual basis,
but because of the plea of RBS that it be allowed to put up a counterbond. As
regards attorney's fees, the law is clear that in the absence of stipulation,
attorney's fees may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages under any
of the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. RBS's claim
for moral damages could possibly fall only under item (10) of Article 2219. The
award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because,
being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has
no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical
suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a
nervous system. The statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v.
PNB that a corp. may recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation that is
debased, resulting in social humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On this score alone
the award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation. It may be
reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS is not based on contract, quasi-
contract, delict, or quasi-delict, Hence, the claims for moral and exemplary
damages can only be based on Arts. 19, 20, and 21 of the CC. There is no
adequate proof that ABS was inspired by malice or bad faith. It was honestly
convinced of the merits of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations
culminating in its formal submission of a draft contract. Settled is the rule that
the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and
subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result from a person's exercise of a
right, it is damnum absque injuria.
4. Bricktown BRICKTOWN executed 2 Contracts to Sell in favor of AMOR TIERRA The relationship between parties in any contract must always be
Development covering a total of 96 residential lots. Out of the total price of P21.6MIO, characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing
Corp v. CA AMOR TIERRA was only able to pay BRICKTOWN the sum of P1.3MIO.
(Hence, leaving a balance of 20.3MIO). In the meanwhile, however, the parties
continued to negotiate for a possible modification of their agreement, although
nothing conclusive would appear to have ultimately been arrived at.
BRICKTOWN sent AMOR TIERRA a "Notice of Cancellation of Contract" on
account of the latter's continued failure to pay the installment. Several months
later, AMOR TIERRA demanded the refund of its various payments to
BRICKTOWN. However, BRICKTOWN did not return AMOR TIERRA’s
payments. Hence, AMOR TIERRA sued BRICKTOWN.

ISSUE: W/N the amounts already remitted by AMOR TIERRA under said
contracts were rightly forfeited by BRICKTOWN. à the cancellation of the
contract by bricktown was valid, but bricktown must return the 1.3mio to

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amor tierra.
HELD: While we must conclude that BRICKTOWN still acted within its legal
right to declare the contracts to sell rescinded or cancelled, nevertheless it would
be unconscionable to likewise sanction the forfeiture by BRICKTOWN of
payments made to it by AMOR TIERRA. There is reasonable ground to believe
that because of the negotiations between the parties (coupled with the fact that
the AMOR TIERRA never took actual possession of the properties and
BRICKTOWN did not also dispose of the same during the pendency of said
negotiations) AMOR TIERRA was led to believe that the parties may ultimately
enter into another agreement in place of the "contracts to sell." There was,
evidently, no malice or bad faith on the part of AMOR TIERRA in suspending
payments. On the contrary, BRICKTOWN not only contributed, but had
consented to the delay or suspension of payments. They did not give the AMOR
TIERRA a categorical answer that their counter-proposals will not materialize.
We do not find it equitable, however, to adjudge any interest payment by
BRICKTOWN on the amount to be thus refunded, computed from judicial
demand, for, indeed, AMOR TIERRA should not be allowed to totally free itself
from its own breach.
5. Newsweek v. Private respondents are incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in To maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although
IAC Negros Occidental. They filed a prior case/ class suit against Newsweek and its it is not necessary that he be named. Defamatory matter which does not
two reporters, Fred Bruning and Barry Came. Newsweek and its reporters reveal the identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast affords
committed libel against respondents by publishing the article “An Island of no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers could have identified
Fear” in February 1981 (Marcos[not a hero‼!] period). The article allegedly the personality of the individual defamed. Defamatory remarks directed at a
portrayed the island of Negros Occidental as dominated by big landowners or class or group of persons in general language only are not actionable by
sugar planters who exploited impoverished and underpaid sugarcane laborers, as individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping;
well as brutalized and killed them with impunity. Respondents allege that the even then no action would lie where the body is composed of so large a
article, taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, a number of persons that common sense would tell those whom the
misrepresentation of facts, exposed them in a bad light, discredited them and publication was made that there was room for persons connected with the
exposed them to public ridicule, hatred, etcetera. Respondents prayed that body to pursue an upright and law abiding course and that it would be
petitioners pay them P1 Million as actual and compensatory damages. unreasonable and absurd to condemn all because of the actions of a part.
Newsweek filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: the printed article sued Where defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is
is not actionable in fact and in law; the complaint does not state a cause of essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all- embracing as to
action. Newsweek argued that the complaint failed to state a cause of action apply to every individual in that group or class or sufficiently specific so that
because the complaint made no allegation that anything in “An Island of Fear” each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement
actually referred specifically to any one of the private respondents. Newsweek specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need
argues that libel can only be done if committed against individual reputation, or be.
if done against a group, only if there is damage to a specific, individual group
member’s reputation. Trial court denied Newsweek’s motion to dismiss. Hence
this present case for certiorari.

ISSUES: W/N respondent’s complaint failed to state a cause of actionàYES

W/N Newsweek committed libel against respondents à NO
HELD: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be
identifiable, although it is not necessary that he be named. Defamatory matter
which does not reveal the identity of the person upon whom the imputation is
cast, gives no ground of action unless it is shown that the readers of the libel
could have identified the personality of the individual defamed. Thus, the larger
the collectivity, the more difficult it is for the individual member to prove that

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the defamatory remarks apply to him. Defamatory remarks directed at a class or

group of persons in general language only, are not actionable by individuals
composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping. Thus, where
the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential
that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual
in the group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or
group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him. Only
then can be bring the action. Private respondents filed a “class suit” in
representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane planters of Negros Occidental. This
cannot cure the lack of actionable basis in the complaint. The case is not even a
class suit, or a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all. Each of the
plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not
have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy. The
disputed portion of the article that refers to plaintiff Sola (one of the
respondents) and was claimed to be libelous never actually singled out plaintiff
Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that the victim had been
arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola,
the mayor of Kabankalan. Thus, since the report refers to an official act
performed by an elective public official, it is within the realm of privilege and
protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. The article
also stated that Sola and the commander of the special police unit were arrested.
The Court already takes judicial notice of this fact in the case of People v. Sola.
Also, the allegation in the complaint was that the article attributed to the
sugarcane planters the deaths and brutalization of sugarcane workers, which was
not even seen by a perusal of the actual text. The respondents’ civil case is
hereby dismissed. The Court reminded Newsweek that it “would do well to heed
the admonition of the President (Marcos) to media that they should check the
sources of their information to ensure the publication of the truth. Freedom of
the press, like all freedoms, should be exercised with responsibility.”
6. MVRS The Islamic Da'wah Council of the Defamation
Publication v. Philippines, Inc., a local federation of The offense of injuring a person’s character, fame or reputation through false or malicious statements. An invasion
Islamic more than 70 Muslim religious of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have or tend to have, of the
Da’wah organizations, and individual Muslims plaintiff. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se; mere words of general abuse
(Linzag, Arcilla, de Guzman, da Silva, however opprobrious, ill-natured or vexatious do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence
Junio) filed in the RTC a complaint for of an allegation for special damages. Declarations about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an
damages in their own behalf and as a class identified or identifiable individual; absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of
suit in behalf of the Muslim members a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free
nationwide against MVRS Publications, speech and expression as well as of the press. Defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause of action on
Inc., arising from an article published in the part of an individual unless it can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter.
the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily As the size of the groups increases, chances for members of such groups to recover damages on tortious libel
tabloid. The article reads: "ALAM BA become elusive because:
NINYO? Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong a. Where the group referred to is large, courts presume that no reasonable reader would take the statements as so
uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng literally applying to each individual member; and
mga Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay b. The limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and expression, as well as of the
isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito press, effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests involved in libel cases • If the
kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, they applied to any member; an
at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. individual member could maintain an action for defamation; each could maintain an action.
Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila

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ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin Small Group Big group

lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang If defamed, entitles ALL its members to sue If defamed, entitles NO ONE to sue
'Ramadan'." Islamic Da’Wah claims that
the libelous statement was insulting and Prime Consideration
damaging to the Muslims; not only a. Public perception of the size of the group
published out of sheer ignorance but with b. Whether a statement will be interpreted to refer to every member
intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and Thus, the more organized and cohesive a group, the easier it is to tar all its members with the same brush and the
disparage the Muslims and Islam,; that on more likely a court will permit a suit from an individual even if the group includes more than 25 members
account of these libelous words Bulgar The mere fact that the plaintiff’s feelings and sensibilities have been offended is not enough to create a cause of
insulted not only the Muslims in the action for defamation.
Philippines but the entire Muslim world. Defamation requires that something be communicated to a third person that may affect the opinion others may
In defense, MVRS Publications, said that have of the plaintiff. Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury to reputation, the focus is upon the
the article did not mention respondents allegedly defamatory statement itself and its predictable effect upon third persons. Defamatory—tends to expose
as the object of the article and therefore one to public hatred. Defamatory statement—tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
were not entitled to damages; and, that estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.
the article was merely an expression of
belief or opinion and was published As a prerequisite to recovery, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant:
without malice nor intention to cause a. Published a statement that was
damage RTC: dismissed the complaint; b. Defamatory
persons allegedly defamed by the article c. Of and concerning the plaintiff
were not specifically identified. CA: Thus, even when a publication may be clearly defamatory, if the words have no personal application to the plaintiff,
reversed RTC decision. The defamation they are not actionable by him. If no one is identified, there can be no libel because no one’s reputation has been
was directed to all adherents of the injured
Islamic faith. The suit for damages was a
"class suit" and that Islamic Da’wah’s Emotional distress tort
religious status as a Muslim umbrella Personal in nature; filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks
organization gave it the requisite on his character Does not apply in case no particular individual is identified
personality to sue and protect the
interests of all Muslims. Principle of Relational Harm Principle of Reactive Harm
Harm to social relationships in the form of Injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form
ISSUES/HELD: defamation of an infliction of emotional distress
1. WON Islamic Da’Wah has a cause of To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must show that:
action for libel - NO, there is no cause a. Conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff;
of action for libel. b. Conduct was extreme and outrageous; (So outrageous and so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of
2. WON in the alternative, the action can indecency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable)
be considered as one is for intentional c. Causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s mental distress; and
tort (for emotional distress) and not libel d. Plaintiff’s mental distress was extreme and severe
- NO, respondents cannot recover A highly unpleasant mental reaction; so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
based on intentional tort. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions or other trivialities. In
3. WON it is a valid class suit. – No, it is determining whether the tort or outrage had been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be
not a valid class suit. hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough language and to occasional acts and words that are definitely
inconsiderate and unkind.
Damages may not be recovered for intentional infliction of emotional distress; an intentional tort causing emotional
distress must necessarily give way to the fundamental right of free speech
7. Silahis v. Int’l Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the Constitutional rights occupy a lofty position in every civilized and
Hotel v. Soluta female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding democratic community; their violation, whether constituting a penal offense
sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to or not, must be guarded againstArticle 2219, CC provides that moral

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recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening damages may be recovered in acts and actions referred to in Article 32
the door of the union office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying
in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had
witnessed at dawn. Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security
Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog
armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio
thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once
inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the
objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic
bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops. As a result of the discovery
of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted
an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was
filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal,
the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners may be held civilly liable for violation of constitutional
rights under Art 32 à YES
HELD: Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides that Any public officer or
employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. According to
the Code Commission, the violation of constitutional rights, whether
constituting a crime or not, must be guarded against, as they cause a danger to
democracy. Thus, the injured citizen should have an adequate civil remedy, even
when the act does not constitute a crime. It is not even necessary that the
defendant under Article 32 should have acted with malice or bad faith,
otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of
individual rights. The violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional right is sufficient.
In the present case, petitioners had already received reports in late 1987 of illegal
activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted
surveillance of the union officers. Despite ample time to get a search warrant,
the search was done without one, and over Babay’s objection. The situation also
does not fall under the instances when a warrantless search is allowed by law.
Respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise the
question of validity of the search and seizure. Neither do petitioners claim that
they were allowed by union officer Babay to enter the union office
lie. Babays account of why petitioners and company went to the union office to
consider Panlilios suggestion to settle the mauling incident is more credible, as is
his claim that he protested the search, and even asked if they were armed with a
search warrant. While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by
implication cannot be presumed. To constitute a valid waive, there must be
proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c)
that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other
words, the waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. This
was absent in this case. Since the complaint filed before the trial court was for
damages due to malicious prosecution and violation of constitutional right

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against illegal search and seizure, the award by the trial court of actual damages
to respondent union was correctly set aside by the CA. Article 32 speaks of an
officer or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation
of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor
alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved
party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva,
the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are solidarily iable for actual, moral
and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the
earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219,
which allows for moral damage in case of (6) (illegal search) and (10) (violations
of Article 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35).
8. RCPI v. Editha was confined at the Sorsogon due to an ailment. Grace immediately went Article 2219, CC provides that moral damages may be recovered in acts and
Verchez to RCPI Sorsogon whose services she engaged to send a telegram to her sister actions referred to in Article 32
Zenaida who was residing in QC reading: "Send check money Mommy
hospital." Three days after RCPI was engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida
no response was received from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this time thru
JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not sending any financial aid.
Immediately after she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida, along with her husband
Fortunato, left for Sorsogon. On her arrival at Sorsogon, she disclaimed having
received any telegram. The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days
later. On inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it, a messenger of
RCPI replied that he had nothing to do with the delivery thereof as it was
another messenger who previously was assigned to deliver the same but the
address could not be located, hence, the telegram was resent 13 days later, and
the second messenger finally found the address 12 days after that. RCPI: “Our
investigation on this matter disclosed that subject telegram was duly processed in
accordance with our standard operating procedure. However, delivery was not
immediately effected due to the occurrence of circumstances which were beyond
the control and foresight of RCPI. Among others, during the transmission
process, the radio link connecting the points of communication involved
encountered radio noise and interferences such that subject telegram did not
initially register in the receiving teleprinter machine. Our internal message
monitoring led to the discovery of the above. Thus, a repeat transmission was
made and subsequent delivery was effected.” Verchez, along with his daughters
Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI
for damages. The plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay in delivering the
telegram contributed to the early demise of the late Editha to their damage and
prejudice, for which they prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: Is the award of moral damages proper even if the trial court found that
there was no direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts
HELD: In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the
shortest possible time. It took 25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it. RCPI
invokes force majeure, but for the defense of force majeure to prosper, it is necessary
that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned
the loss. Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from
delivering the telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least

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informed Grace of the non-transmission and the non-delivery so that she could
have taken steps to remedy the situation. But it did not. There lies the fault or
negligence. Considering the public utility of RCPI’s business and its contractual
obligation to transmit messages, it should exercise due diligence to ascertain that
messages are delivered to the persons at the given address and should provide a
system whereby in cases of undelivered messages the sender is given notice of
non-delivery. RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation
undoubtedly disturbed the peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-
respondents. As observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the "filial
tranquillity" among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond
swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in
this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the
Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may
award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
9. PEA v. Ganac- This case originated from a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance Actual or compensatory damages
Chu of a writ of injunction and temporary restraining order filed by respondent Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to compensation
Rosario Ganac Chu against PEA and the National Housing Authority (NHA). for actual damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
In her complaint, Chu alleged that she is the owner of a parcel of land situated in duly proved. Indemnification covers the value of the loss suffered and also
Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. In June 1993, without notice and due process, the profits that the obligee failed to obtain.
PEA entered her property and bulldozed the land, destroying her black pepper
plantation, causing damage to her operations and depriving her of her means of Contracts or Quasi-Contracts Crimes and Quasi-
livelihood. Thus, she asked for the following amounts: (1) P5,000,000.00 as Delicts
actual damages; (2) P200,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary Obligor in good faith Obligor in bad faith
damages; (4) P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and (5) P30,000.00 for litigation a. Natural and All damages which All damages which are
expenses PEA filed its Answer alleging lack of cause of action. It contended probable may be reasonably the natural and
that: it is the owner of a property located in Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, and consequences of the attributed to the non- probable
measuring 51 hectares and under a Memorandum of Agreement dated March breach b. Those performance of the consequences of the
12, 1991, PEA and the NHA undertook to relocate the squatters of the which the parties have obligation act or omission,
reclaimed land in the Financial Center District of Manila Bay, to the Paliparan or could have whether or not such
site; during the relocation and site development, Chu appeared claiming that reasonably foreseen damages may have
PEA is encroaching upon her property; but respondent failed to prove her been or could have
ownership thereof; that way back in 1990, respondent had already sold 65,410 been reasonably
square meters out of the 70,410 square meters of her property to one Renato foreseen
Ignacio. Thus, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. The Trial Awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss he has suffered.
Court rendered a partial decision that petitioner together with the NHA is jointly There must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss and credence
and severally liable to pay respondent actual and compensatory damages, can be given only to claims that are duly supported by receipts.
attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit. CA sustained.
ISSUE: W/N there is a valid basis for the award for damages in favor of Temperate damages
respondent à YES Awarded when the plaintiff had suffered some pecuniary loss but its amount
HELD: There is no question that respondent is entitled to damages. However, cannot be proved with certainty
respondent’s cause of action before the trial court is not premised on any
contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict. At best, her demand for damages Abuse of rights principle under Article 19
can be anchored on the "abuse of rights" principle under Article 19 of the Civil When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting
Code. The foregoing provision sets standards which must be observed in the in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be
exercise of one’s rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act held accountable
with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. When a
right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable.

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Respondent’s ownership of the property on which the pepper trees stand is

immaterial in this petition. There is no dispute that respondent owned the
pepper trees that were destroyed by petitioner. Even assuming that petitioner
owns the property or that it bulldozed the land within its boundaries, still, as the
trial court aptly reasoned, there was no excuse for petitioner to disregard
respondent’s rights over her trees. The exercise of one’s rights is not without
limitations. Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which
such right is to be exercised. Property rights must be considered, for many
purposes, not as absolute, unrestricted dominions but as an aggregation of
qualified privileges, the limits of which are prescribed by the equality of rights,
and the correlation of rights and obligations necessary for the highest enjoyment
of property by the entire community of proprietors. Nevertheless, the Court
finds that both the trial court and the CA seriously erred in awarding in favor of
respondent the colossal sum of P2,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, and the amount of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of suit, as
the evidence on record does not support the award of such amount.

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VI. INTERFERENCE IN CONTRACTUAL RELATION (ART. 1314)

CASE TITLE CASE SUMMARY
1. Yu v. CA Philip Yu, herein petitioner, is the exclusive distributor of the House of Mayfair
wall covering products in the Philippines. Herein respondent, Unisia
Merchandising Co., Inc., was its former dealer for the same goods. Respondent
later on purchased merchandise from House of Mayfair in England through
FNF Trading in West Germany and sold the said merchandise in the
Philippines. Petitioner filed a case against respondent for unfair competition
within the context of Article 28 of the New Civil Code and prayed for an
injunction. Both the lower court and the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
prayer for a preliminary injunction, holding that respondent was not privy to the
contract between House of Mayfair and petitioner. The appellate court also
noted that petitioner could be fully compensated for the prejudice he suffered
judging from the tenor of the letter sent by Mayfair to FNF Trading wherein the
former sought compensation from the latter on behalf of petitioner for the loss
he suffered because of respondent’s scheme.
KEY TAKE AWAY
Injury is irreparable where it is continuous and repeated since from its
constant and frequent recurrence, no fair and reasonable redress can be had
therefor by petitioner insofar as his goodwill and business reputation as sole
distributor are concerned.
The fact that the exclusive sales contract which links petitioner and House of
Mayfair is solely the concern of the privies thereto and cannot thus extend its
chain as to bind respondent is beside the point. Injunction is the appropriate
remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to
such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury
is irreparable (Gilchrist v. Cuddy). The liability of respondent does not emanate
from the four corners of the contract since it is not a party thereto but its
accountability is “an independent act generative of civil liability” (Daywalt v.
Corporacion de PP Agustinos Recoletos).

ISSUE: W/N petitioner is entitled to a preliminary injunction. à YES

HELD: A TRO was issued against respondent by this Court which was to last
until further notice. In the injunction suit filed by petitioner, he alleged that
respondent acted in concert with FNF Trading in misleading Mayfair into
believing that the goods ordered by the trading firm were to be shipped to
Nigeria although they were actually sold and shipped to the Philippines. This
allegation was not disputed by respondent. A ploy of this character is akin to the
scenario of a third person who induces a party to renege on or violate his
undertaking under a contract, thereby entitling the other party to relief
therefrom. The breach caused by private respondent was even aggravated by the
consequent diversion of trade from the business of petitioner to that of private
respondent caused by the latter’s species of unfair competition as demonstrated
no less by the sales effected inspite of this Court’s restraining order. Injury is
irreparable where it is continuous and repeated since from its constant and
frequent recurrence, no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor by
petitioner insofar as his goodwill and business reputation as sole distributor are
concerned. The fact that the exclusive sales contract which links petitioner and
House of Mayfair is solely the concern of the privies thereto and cannot thus
extend its chain as to bind respondent is beside the point. Injunction is the
appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by
strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the
resulting injury is irreparable (Gilchrist v. Cuddy). The liability of respondent does
not emanate from the four corners of the contract since it is not a party thereto
but its accountability is “an independent act generative of civil liability” (Daywalt
v. Corporacion de PP Agustinos Recoletos).
2.So Ping Bun v. In 1963, Tek Hua Trading entered into a lease agreement with DCCSI in order Damages is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury. One is liable in
CA to store textiles. The contracts each had a one-year term. If Tek Hua continued an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in
to occupy the premises after the term, the lease shall be on a monthly basis. the private use and enjoy of an asset if: the other has property rights and
When the contract expired, the parties did not renew the contracts but Tek Hua privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; the invasion
still occupied the premises. Tek Hua Trading was then replaced by Tek Hua is substantial; the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of invasion; and the

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Enterprises. So Ping Bun then occupied the warehouse for his own textile invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and
business, Trendsetter Marketing. On August 1, 1989, DCCSI sent letters to Tek actionable under general negligence rules. The elements of tortuous
Hua informing them of rental increases. The letters also included the new lease interference are: the existence of a valid contract; knowledge on the part of
contracts for signing; however, Tek Hua did not answer any of the letters. The the third person of the existence and the interference of the third person
Lease Contracts were not rescinded. Tiong, a member of Tek Hua sent a letter without legal justification or excuse.
to So Ping Bun requesting the latter to vacate the premises. So Ping Bun refused
to vacate. He then requested DCCSI to create new contracts of lease in his While the court does not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic
favor. Hence, Tek Hua pressed for the nullification and injunction of the lease interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, however,
contracts through an action in the Trial Court. The Trial Court ruled in favor of they find that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits
Tek Hua by annulling the contracts and making the injunction permanent. Upon forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice.
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial but modified the The business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the
awarded damages. contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does
not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and
ISSUE: W/N there was tortuous interference. à NO causing breach of existing ones.
HELD: Damages is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury. One is
liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another’s
interest in the private use and enjoy of an asset if: the other has property rights
and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; the invasion
is substantial; the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of invasion; and the
invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable
under general negligence rules. The elements of tortuous interference are: the
existence of a valid contract; knowledge on the part of the third person of the
existence and the interference of the third person without legal justification or
excuse. In the present case, Trendsetter asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts
in its favor, and as a result has deprived respondents of their property right.
However, there has been a discussion on whether such interference is justified
when one acts in furtherance of his own financial or economic interest. Hence,
while So Ping Bun benefited from the property of the respondent, there is
nothing on record which imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.
While the court does not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic
interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, they
find that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits
forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The
business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting
parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve
petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of
existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the
permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI
and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved the
respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner's interference.
3. Lagon v. CA Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi, two parcels of land located Article 1314 of the CC provides that any person who induces another to
at Tacurong Sultan Kudarat. Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
agains Lagon. He claimed that he and Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guiabar The act is penalized because it violates the property rights of a party in a
entered into a contract of lease over three parcels of land wherein he would contract to reap the benefits that should result therefrom. Not all elements
construct buildings that are to be leased to tenants. The rent from the tenants of are present.
his buildings goes directly to Bai to answer for his rent over the land. When Bai Elements:
died, Lapuz started remitting his rent to the court-appointed administrator of 1) Existence of a valid contract

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her estate. One day, the administrator told him to stop collecting the rentals, he
discovered that Lagon had become the new owner of the property and had been
collecting rent from the tenants. So Lapuz filed a case against Lagon, accusing
him of inducing the heirs of Bai to sell the property to him, thereby violating his
leasehold rights. Lagon denied the allegations contending that the heirs were in
dire need of money to pay of the deceased’s obligations He also denied
interfering with Lapuz’ leasehold rights because there was no lease contract
covering the property when he purchased it. Atty. Benjamin Fajardo, the lawyer
who allegedly notarized the lease contract showed Lagon four copies of the lease
renewal but all were unsigned. He only learned of the alleged lease contract
when he was informed that Lapuz was collecting rent from the tenants of the
building. RTC ruled in favour of Lapuz. CA affirmed with modifications. Hence
this case.
d. Knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the
contract
e. Interference of the third person without legal justification or
excuse
Knowledge on the part of the interferer of the subsistence of the contract is
an essential element to state a cause of action for tortuous interference.
Defendant cannot be made liable for interfering with a contract he is
unaware of.
To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted
with malice or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the
plaintiff. His act cannot be justified

ISSUE: W/N the purchase by Lagon of the subject property during the In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner
supposed existence of the lease contract, constituted tortuous interference for liable for tortuous interference are present, petitioner cannot be made to
which he should be held liable for damages? à NO answer for private respondent’s losses. This was damnum absque injuria.
HELD: Article 1314 of the CC provides that any person who induces another to Petition Granted.
violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
The act is penalized because it violates the property rights of a party in a
contract to reap the benefits that should result therefrom. Not all elements are
present.
Elements:
a. Existence of a valid contract
b. Knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the
contract
c. Interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse
Knowledge on the part of the interferer of the subsistence of the contract is an
essential element to state a cause of action for tortuous interference. Defendant
cannot be made liable for interfering with a contract he is unaware of.
To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with
malice or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the
plaintiff. His act cannot be justified
In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner liable
for tortuous interference are present, petitioner cannot be made to answer for
private respondent’s losses. This was damnum absque injuria. Petition Granted.
4. Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the owner of a film called “Zigomar” rented it to Gilchrist for a week for The ground on which the liability of a third party for interfering w/a
Cuddy P125. A few days prior to May 26, Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist, contract b/n others rests, is that the interference was malicious A person
saying that he had other arrangements made (he rented it to Espejo at a higher who, by his act or omission, causes damage to another when there is fault or
price). The trial court found that Espejo had indeed induced Cuddy to violate negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done Nothing requires as
his contract, but there was no showing that Espejo knew that it was Gilchrist a condition precedent to the liability of a tortfeasor that he must know the
specifically who contracted with Cuddy first. Thus, Gilchrist applied for and was identity of a person to whom he causes damage.
granted by the CFI Iloilo a preliminary injunction forbidding Espejo from
showing the film and a mandatory injunction requiring Cuddy to deliver the film IRREPARABLE INJURY:
to Gilchrist. Species of injury, whether great or small, that ought not to be submitted to
on the one hand or inflicted on the other; because it is so large on the one
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in issuing the injunctions. à NO hand or so small on the other is of such constant and frequent recurrence
HELD: The liability of Espejo arises from unlawful acts and not from that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law. Does

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contractual obligations, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy not mean injury beyond the possibility of repair or beyond possible
to violate his contract with Gilchrist. If the action of Gilchrist had been one for compensation in damages. One who wrongfully interferes in a contract
damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code. between others, and for the purpose of gain to himself induces one of the
Article 1902 of that code provides that: “a person who, by act or omission, parties to break it, is liable to the party injured thereby; his continued
causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to interference may be ground for an injunction where the injuries resulting will
repair the damage do done.” There is nothing in this article which requires as a be irreparable
condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the
identity of a person to whom he causes damages. [In other words, knowledge of
identity of the injured party is NOT an element of tort.] In fact, the chapter
wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in
order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.
5.Daywalt v. La Teodorica entered into a contract of sale with Daywalt. Father Sanz was fully A person is liable for damage done to another by a culpable act.
Corporacion de Los aware of the existence of the contract of 1902 contract and 1908 contract. When CULPABLE ACT:
Padres Agustino the Torrens certificate was finally issued in 1909 in favor of Teodorica, she A stranger cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the
delivered it for safekeeping to the defendant corporation. La Corporacion nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he
allegedly induced Teodorica to to refrain from performing its obligation in the intermeddles. Indemnification for damages resulting from the breach of a
contract of sale and withhold delivery of Torrens title. contract is a right inseparably annexed to every action for the fulfillment of
an obligation; if damages are not sought or recovered in the action to
ISSUE: (1) Whether a person who is not a party to a contract for the sale makes enforce performance, they cannot be recovered in an independent action.
himself liable for damages to the vendee, beyond the value of the use and The damages ordinarily recoverable against a vendor for failure to deliver
occupation, by colluding with the vendor and maintaining him to evade specific land which he has contracted to deliver is the value of the use and
performance. à NO (2) Whether the damages which the plaintiff seeks to occupation of the land for the time during which it is wrongfully withheld
recover under this head are too remote and speculative to be the subject of
recovery. à YES
HELD: (1) NO. Whatever may be the character of the liability, if any, which a
stranger to a contract may incur by advising or assisting one of the parties to
evade performance, he cannot become more extensively liable in damages for
the nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he
intermeddles. Endencia was the party directly bound by the contract, it is
obvious that the liability of the defendant corporation, even admitting that it has
made itself coparticipant in the breach of the contract, can in no even exceed
hers. This leads us to consider at this point the extent of the liability of
Teodorica Endencia to the plaintiff by reason of her failure to surrender the
certificate of title and to place the plaintiff in possession.
(2) YES. Damages, known as special damages, are recoverable where it appears
that the particular conditions which made such damages a probable consequence
of the breach were known to the delinquent party at the time the contract was
made. If the damages are in the legal sense remote or speculative, knowledge of
the special conditions which render such damages possible will not make them
recoverable. Special damages of this character cannot be recovered unless made
the subject of the stipulation. The damages ordinarily recoverable against a
vendor for failure to deliver land which he has contracted to deliver is the value
of the use and occupation of the land for the time during which it is wrongfully
withheld.
6.Tayag v. Lacson Lacson and her children were the registered owners of 3 parcels of land. A
group of original farmers/tillers, individually executed in favor of Herminio
Tayag separate Deeds of Assignment in which the assignees assigned to Tayag

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their respective rights as tenants/tillers of the landholdings possessed and tilled

by them for and in consideration of P50.00 per square meter. Tayag was also
granted the exclusive right to buy the property if and when the owners, with the
concurrence of the defendants-tenants, agreed to sell the property. However, the
defendant-tenants wrote Tayag stating that they were not attending the meeting
and instead gave notice of their collective decision to sell all their rights and
interests, as tenants/lessees, over the landholding to the Lacsons. Tayag filed a
complaint for the court to fix a period within which to pay the agreed purchase
price of P50.00 per square meter to the defendant-tenants, as provided for in the
Deeds of Assignment. Tayag avers that the defendant-tenants/millers have no
right to deal with the Lacsons or with any third persons while their contracts
with the plaintiff are subsisting; that the Lacsons are inducing or have induced
the tenants/millers to violate their contracts with the Tayag. The Lacsons
contend that they never induced the defendants Tiamson to violate their
contracts with the petitioner; and, being merely tenants-tillers, the defendants-
tenants had no right to enter into any transactions involving their properties
without their knowledge and consent.

ISSUES: W/N Tayag has a cause of action against the respondent-owners of the
land (Lacsons) à NONE
W/N the Lacsons are guilty of tortious interference à No. One who is not a
party to a contract and who interferes thereon is not necessarily an
officious or malicious intermeddler.
HELD: (1) As the registered owners of the property, the respondents have the
right to enjoy and dispose of their property without any other limitations than
those established by law, in accordance with Article 428 of the Civil Code. The
Lacsons cannot be enjoined from selling or encumbering their property simply
and merely because the tenants/millers had executed Deeds of Assignment in
favor of Tayag, obliging themselves to assign and transfer their rights or interests
as agricultural farmers/laborers/sub-tenants over the landholding, and granting
the petitioner the exclusive right to buy the property subject to the occurrence
of certain conditions. The Lacsons were not parties to the said deeds. There is
no evidence that the respondents agreed, expressly or impliedly, to the said
deeds or to the terms and conditions set forth therein. The deeds of assignment
executed by the defendants-tenants are not perfected option contracts. Not
being the registered owners of the property, the defendants-tenants could not
legally grant to the petitioner the option, much less the “exclusive right” to buy
the property.
(2) The only evidence adduced by the petitioner to prove his claim is the letter
from the defendants-tenants informing him that they had decided to sell their
rights and interests over the landholding to the respondents, instead of honoring
their obligation under the deeds of assignment because, according to them, the
petitioner harassed those tenants who did not want to execute deeds of
assignment in his favor, and because the said defendants-tenants did not want to
have any problem with the respondents who could cause their eviction for
executing with the petitioner the deeds of assignment. The defendants-tenants
did not allege therein that the respondents induced them to breach their
contracts with the petitioner. The petitioner himself admitted when he testified

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that his claim that the respondents induced the defendants-assignees to violate
contracts with him was based merely on what “he heard.” Even if the
respondents received an offer from the defendants-tenants to assign and transfer
their rights and interests on the landholding, the respondents cannot be enjoined
from entertaining the said offer, or even negotiating with the defendants-tenants.
It is quite evident that his purpose in having the defendants-tenants execute the
Deeds of Assignment in his favor was to acquire the landholding without any
tenants thereon, in the event that the respondents agreed to sell the property to
him. The petitioner’s scheme is subversive, not only of public policy, but also of
the letter and spirit of the agrarian laws. That the scheme of the petitioner had
yet to take effect in the future or ten years hence is not a justification.
VII. CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIME (RULES OF COURT)
A. REMEDIES
1. Civil action with criminal action (Rule 111[1], ROC)
2. Separate civil action (Rule 111 [2a])
3. Independent civil action (Arts. 30 & 31, CC; Rule 111[3], Rules of Court)
1.DMPI Employees Prosecuting attorney filed an information for ESTAFA in the RTC branch 37
v. Velez against Carmen Mandawe for failure to account to Eriberta Villegas the amount
of P608,532.46. Eriberta also filed a case for money and damages with
preliminary attachment in RTC branch 20. Carmen sought to dismiss the civil
case because the complaint failed to contain a certification against forum
shopping and that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37 arising
from the same case. RTC dismissed. However, MR granted.
ISSUES: (1) W/N the plaintiffs failure to attach a certification against forum
shopping in the complaint is a ground to dismiss the case? à NO
(2) W/N the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for
estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action? à YES
HELD: SC held that Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for
damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under
Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no
reservation as to its filing.
2.Casupanan v. Two vehicles figured in an accident. Driver of Vehicle A files criminal case
Laroya against driver and owner of vehicle B. Driver and owner of vehicle B files a case
for quasi delict against driver of vehicle A. Driver of vehicle A files motion to
dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum shopping. Petition approved of
lower court.
Issue: W/N the accused in the criminal case can file a separate civil action for
quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case? à YES.
HELD: These are separate, independent, and distinct actions. There are
different causes of action. No forum shopping in this case.
3.Cerezo v. Tuazon A Country Bus Lines bus owned by Cerezo collided with a tricyle driven by
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GEN. RULE: an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries.
• Social injury produced by the criminal act, which is sought to be
repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty
• Personal injury caused to the victim of the crime, which injury is sought
to be compensated through indemnity, which is civil in nature.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Civil liability
includes restitution, reparation for damage caused and indemnification of
consequential damages • Only the civil liability arising from the offense
charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute is separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action
There is no more need for reservation of the right to file the independent
civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, CC • The reservation and
waiver refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense charged • This does not include recovery of civil
liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the CC arising from the same
act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a
reservation.
Since the accused in a criminal action is required to file his counterclaim in a
separate civil action, there is no forum shopping when the accused files such
separate civil action. What is deemed instituted with the criminal action is
only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto.
The other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, CC are no longer
deemed instituted and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently
even without any reservation in the criminal action. Failure to make a
reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate
and independent civil action based on the foregoing CC articles. The accused
can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case He is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case.
An action based on quasi-delict may proceed independently from the
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Tuazon. Tuazon suffered injuries. He filed a complaint for damages against
spouses Cerezo. There was no evidence that summons was served on Foronda,
the bus driver. Spouses Cerezo filed multiple motions (petition for
relief/petition for review on certiorari/motion for reconsideration) but the
courts denied all. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly render
judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda (no summons).
Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action
for damages in the criminal action.
criminal action. The responsibility of 2 or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary. Where the obligation is solidary, either of the parties
is indispensable and the other is not even a necessary party because complete
relief is available from either; each debtor is liable for the entire obligation in
full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, only mutual representation.

ISSUES: 1. W/N the CA ignored the allegation that Foronda is an indispensable

party whose presence is compulsory but [whom] the lower court did not
summon. à NO
2. W/N spouses Cerezo have waived the right to question the lower court’s
jurisdiction by voluntarily appearing in the civil case for damages.
HELD: SC said NOOOO! Mrs. Cerezo’s contention proceeds from the point of
view of criminal law and not of civil law, while the basis of the present action of
Tuazon is quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal
Code. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the present case. It is not even
necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil action because he
opted to file a civil action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and
directly liable for her own civil negligence.
4.Rodriguez v. Informations for violation of BP 22 against Rodriguez were filed and raffled to An offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except:
Ponferrada the MTC of Q.C. On the other hand, the informations for estafa were filed and 1. When from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it,
raffled to the RTC of Q.C. Rodriguez opposed the appearance of Atty. Solomon no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and
as private prosecutor in RTC (estafa case). RTC/Judge Ponferrada allowed the 2. When from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to
appearance of Atty. Solomon. civil indemnity but they
ISSUE: W/N a private prosecutor can be allowed to intervene in the estafa cases a. Waive the right to institute a civil action;
for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from the b. Expressly reserve the right to do so; or
issuance of the checks involved which is also subject matter of the pending B.P. c. The suit has already been instituted
22 cases. à YES The single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct
HELD: An offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except offenses (estafa and violation of BP 22) but the same involves only one civil
in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law liability for the offended party has sustained only a single injury. The possible
defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended single liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the
party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the
entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, BP 22 violation prosecution. As both remedies are simultaneously available
(b) expressly reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit has already been instituted. to a party, there can be no forum shopping. What Rule 111, Sec. 1(b)
None of these exceptions apply to the instant case. The possible SINGLE civil prohibits is the reservation to file the corresponding civil action; but this
liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of cannot deprive a plaintiff to protect his interests in the crim action for estafa.
both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation
prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court expressly allows, even automatically in the present case, the
institution of a civil action without need of election by the offended party. As
both remedies are simultaneously available to this party, there can be no forum
shopping. As a technical rule of procedure, the purpose of the doctrine of
election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent
double redress for a single wrong. However, when a certain state of facts under
the law entitles a party to alternative remedies, both founded upon the identical
state of facts, these remedies are not considered inconsistent remedies.

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5.Hyatt Industrial Hyatt filed a complaint for recovery of SUM OF MONEY against Asia
v. Asia Dynamic Dynamic. [NOTE] Prior to the filing of the civil case, Hyatt had already filed
criminal complaints for violation of B.P. 22 against the officers of the said
company.
Asia moved to dismiss the case due to the fact that Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits the filing of a separate civil
action in B.P. 22 cases. RTC denied, CA reversed RTC decision.
ISSUES:
W/N Hyatt is guilty of forum shopping (there is identity of interests, causes of
action and reliefs in the Civil Case and Criminal complaints for violation of BP
22) à YES
W/N Hyatt violated Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure when it filed the complaint in the civil case à YES
W/N Article 31, as an individual separate action, is applicable à NO
HELD: SC affirmed CA decision and resolution. Upon filing of the criminal
cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of
the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the
criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action.
6.Safeguard Evangeline Tangco is a licensed firearm holder with permit to carry. She went to
Security v. Tangco a bank to renew her time deposits. She took out her gun from her bag to deposit
with the guard (Pajarillo), but he instantly shot and killed her. He was convicted
of HOMICIDE. In the civil case, RTC ruled against Pajarillo and his agency,
Safeguard, adjudging them to be solidarily liable. CA affirmed but modified
liability to a subsidiary one, saying Safeguard’s liability is based on the RPC.
ISSUES:
W/N Pajarillo is negligent and therefore liable for damages? à YES
W/N Safeguard subsidiarily liable under Art. 103 of RPC? à NO, the liability is
solidary.
HELD: SC says CA erred. The liability is solidary. Tangco Heirs reserved the
right to file a civil case (during this time the 1985 Rules required a reservation),
and the allegations in the complaint clearly showed that they were suing for
damages based on negligence, hence based on quasi-delict. It would have been a
different story if they sued based on delict, in which case the liability would
indeed be subsidiary under the RPC.
As to the negligence of the act, the lower courts did not err in their observations.
The claim of self-defense of Pajarillo is not substantiated by evidence, and the
danger that he reacted to was brought about by his imagination. As to Safeguard,
it may have exercised proper diligence in the selection of Pajarillo, but it failed to
exercise the proper diligence in his supervision. Hence, it is liable under Art.
2180.
7.Phil. Rabbit bus Napoleon was a driver of Phil Rabbit bus lines. He figured an accident while
Lines v. People driving the bus of Phil. Rabbit. He was found guilty of reckless imprudence
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The criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. This rule was enacted to help declog court
dockets which are filled with BP 22 cases; creditors actually use the courts as
collectors. The pendency of the civil action before the court trying the
criminal case bars the filing of another civil action in another court on the
ground of litis pendentia.
Elements of litis pendentia:
a. Identity of parties;
b. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for; and
c. Identity is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending
case regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in
the other.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender
1. Civil liability ex delicto under Article 100, RPC
2. Independent civil liabilities
a. Those arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony
i. Culpa contractual under Article 31, CC
ii. Intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, CC
iii. Culpa aquiliana under Article 2176, CC
b. Those where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33, CC
Article 2176, CC covers not only acts committed with negligence but also
acts which are voluntary and intentional • A separate civil action lies against
an offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted provided that the offended party is not allowed, if
he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores and
would be entitled in such eventuality to the bigger award of the two,
assuming they vary. The extinction of civil liability in Rule 111, Section 3(e),
ROC refers exclusively to the civil liability founded on Article 100, RPC,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare
that, strictly speaking, the employers are not parties to the criminal cases
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resulting to homicide, physical injuries and damage to property. He jumped bail instituted against their employees. Employers may assist their employees to
and in effect, waived his right to appeal. The decision thus became final. Phil the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, the former cannot act
Rabbit Bus Lines appealed seeking the acquittal of their employee. They argue independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
that their appeal should be a substitute for the lost appeal of Napoleon. To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would
Ultimately, they want to be free from subsidiary liability. enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the
of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently former’s civil liability but also as to its amount.
of the accused? à NO. Where the civil liability of the accused-employee has become final and
HELD: The decision already became final when Napoleon waived his right to enforceable by reason of his flight, then his employer’s subsidiary civil
appeal by jumping bail. Hence no more appeal is allowed. The employer is not liability has also become immediately enforceable, it ipso facto attaches
even a party to the case. Further, the employer cannot appeal on behalf of the
accused employee without violating his right to double jeopardy. This is because
appeals open the whole case for review. The appellate court can thus impose a
more severe judgment. This cannot be made without the consent of the
accused-employee as he is only the one who can waive his right against double
jeopardy. Consequently, he is the only one who can appeal. Finally, as the
decision has become final, the primary civil liability of Napoleon thus accrues.
Thus, the subsidiary liability imposed upon Phil Rabbit accrues as well.
B. EFFECTS
1. Acquittal/dismissal (Art. 29, CC; Rule 111[2b] & 120[2], Rules of Court)
2. Extinction of civil liability (Rule 111[2b], Rules of Court)
1.Manantan v. CA Fiscal Ambrocio, Ruben Nicolas and George Manantan did several things in one 2 kinds of acquittal:
day. They went to a farm, Ambrocio’s house for dinner, went bowling, went to a Acquittal on the ground that the Acquittal based on reasonable
nightclub etc. While doing these things, they also drank several bottles of beer. accused is not the author of the doubt on the guilt of the
When they decided to go home already, Manantan was the one who drove the act or omission complained of accused
car with passengers Tabangin (a defense witness), Fiscal Ambrocio and Nicolas. Rule 111, RoC Art. 29, CC
He was driving at a speed of about 40 km per hour along the Maharlika Highway Closes the door to civil liability; a Even if the guilt of the accused has
at Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway. However, according to Charles person who has been found to be not been satisfactorily established,
Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 km per hour on the wrong not the perpetrator of any act or he is not exempt from civil liability
lane of the highway because it was overtaking a tricycle when they met a omission cannot and can never be which may be proved by
passenger jeepney with bright lights on. As a result of the collision, Nicolas died. held liable for such act or omission preponderance of evidence only
The TC acquitted Manantanan of the charge of homicide with reckless There being no delict, civil liability Although the two actions have
imprudence without ruling on the civil liability. The Nicolas spouses appealed ex delicto is out of the question, different purposes, the matters
the civil aspect of the TC’s judgment and that Manantanan be ordered to pay and the civil action, if any, which discussed in the civil case are
indemnity and damages. CA ruled in favor of the spouses. Hence, this petition. may be instituted must be based on similar to those discussed in the
grounds other than the delict criminal case.
ISSUES: complained of However, the judgment in the
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of criminal proceeding cannot be read
Appeals as to his negligence or reckless imprudence? à NO in evidence in the civil action to
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner’s acquittal did not extinguish establish any fact there determined,
his civil liability? à NO even though both actions involve
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the the same act or omission because
Manchester doctrine (which held that the Court acquires jurisdiction only upon the parties are not the same and
payment of the filing fees on the amount of claim for damages)? à NO different rules of evidence are
HELD: applicable
1. In the instant case, Manantan had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing

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of the Criminal Case and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The
judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was
elevated to the Court of Appeals by Nicolas was the CIVIL ASPECT OF THE
SAME CRIMINAL CASE. Mantantan was not charged anew in with a second
criminal offense identical to the first offense. There is double jeopardy when a
person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal
or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the
latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.
2 Kinds of Acquittal:
1st Kind: An acquittal on the ground that the accused is NOT the author of the
act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for
a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission.
2nd Kind: An acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In
this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil
action for damages is “for the same act or omission.
2. The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, Mantantan’s civil liability
was not extinguished by his discharge. His acquittal was predicated on the
conclusion that his guilt had not been established with moral certainty. Stated
differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil
liability for the same act or omission lies.
3. At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of
civil actions with criminal actions was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the
1964 Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by Nicolas, under said rule, it was
not required that the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the
complaint or information. Where the civil action is impliedly instituted together
with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as
in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are
to be paid only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or if they are not
so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. The information in the
Criminal Case contained no specific allegations of damages.
2.Sanchez v. CIFL had an account with FEBTC which required CHIN’s signature for Article 100 of the RPC states that every person criminally liable for a felony
FEBTC authority to withdraw from it. There was a finding that there were more than 16 is also civilly liable, except in instances when no actual damage results from
forged checks with CHIN’s forged signatures encashed leading to the CIFL’s an offense (e.g., espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country,
loss of around 3.7M. FEBTC had to reimburse CIFL’s account. FEBTC now and crime against popular representation)
goes after Sanchez (CHIN’s secretary) alleging that she participated in the The extinction of the penal liability does not always carry with it the
fraudulent scheme and tries to collect from her. FEBTC presented evidence extinction of the civil. If the acquittal is made on the ground that the guilt
that she encashed checks and deposited the proceeds in her personal account. has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the accused may be held
Sanchez’s defense: I did everything under CHIN’s instructions. After I encashed civilly liable for damages arising from the same act or omission constituting
the checks, I delivered the money to him anyway RTC acquits Sanchez on the the offense and the liability may be established by a mere preponderance of
ground that she did not commit the fraudulent acts. Did not believe CHIN as a evidence. For this purpose, the offended parties are allowed to intervene in
witness (because he answered candidly etc) and CHIN did not deny the defense the criminal proceedings, but solely to enforce their right to claim
of Sanchez that the money was turned over to him Did not believe PNP Crime indemnification for damages arising from the criminal act
Lab finding that the signatures were forged – based on their procedure (i.e. did

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not even compare it with legitimate contemporaneous samples of CHIN’s
signature). CA reversed RTC and held Sanchez liable to FEBTC for around
1.1M representing the amount of checks encashed and deposited to her personal
account. The basis of the decision was that an acquittal only extinguishes civil
liability delicto and not ex delicto. It appreciated the testimonies of the witnesses
differently from that of RTC and held that Sanchez breached the trust of CHIN
in the performance of her functions because although she was authorized to
encash the checks, she was not authorized to deposit them in her account. This
was based on quasi-delict.
ISSUE: W/N Sanchez is liable to pay FEBTC à NO she is not
HELD: SC ruled that CA was wrong and reinstated RTC decision acquitting
Sanchez. If CA and RTC differs in the appreciation of witnesses’ testimonies
and evidence, the RTC interpretation is favoured as it had the opportunity to
directly hear and observe the witnesses. RTC ruled that acquittal was based on
the fact that Sanchez did not commit the fraud complained of. Hence, it is
settled that this also extinguishes the civil liability arising therefrom.
3.Manliclic v. The vehicles involved: (1) BUS owned by PRBLI and driven by Manliclic (2)
Calaunan owner-type jeep owned by Calaunan and driven by Mendoza. Calaunan and
Mendoza (jeep) were on their way to Manila. Bus was also bound for Manila.
Somewhere in Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Bus
hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the jeep to move to the shoulder on the
right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage.
Calaunan suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. Criminal case: filed
against Manliclic for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries. Subesequently, Civil Case: for damages against Manliclic and
PRBLI. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. The disagreement
arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision? The parties
differed only on the manner the collision took place. Calaunan’s version: the
jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kph on the slow lane of the
expressway when the Bus overtook the jeep. In the process of overtaking the
jeep, the Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Bus hit the
jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Bus was still at the
back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Manliclic’s version: Both Manliclic and
Buan admitted that the Bus bumped the jeep in question. However, they
explained that when the bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep,
the jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it.
PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically
petitioner Manliclic. RTC- in favor of Calaunan. PRBLI and Manliclic are
solidarily liable. CA- Affirmed RTC. In the CRIMINAL CASE, MANLICLIC
was acquitted by CA.
The acquittal of the accused The civil action based on the
does not prevent a judgment delict is extinguished if there is
against him on the civil aspect a finding in the final judgment
of the case where in the criminal action that
a. The acquittal is based on a. The act or omission from which
reasonable doubt as only the civil liability may arise did not
preponderance of evidence is exist or;
required; b. The accused did not commit the
b. The court declared that the acts or omission imputed to him
liability of the accused is only civil;
c. The civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based
upon the crime of which the
accused was acquitted
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders
judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot
appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in
double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the
accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the
case within the period therefor
The extinction of civil liability referred to in Rule 111, Section 2(b), par. (e)
ROC refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100, RPC,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime
Acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict
If an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil
liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence
only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the
author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex
delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of,
civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. Here, a civil action, if
any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, the same
will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility
arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and

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ISSUE: W/N PRBLI and Manliclic should be held solidarily liable à YES distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the
HELD: What is the effect in this civil case of Manliclic’s acquittal in the criminal civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
case? From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was
one arising from, or based on, quasi-delict. Manliclic was sued for his negligence
or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while PRBLI was sued for its
failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision
of its employees, particularly Manliclic. From the declaration of the CA (in Crim
Case), it appears that Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on
the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on
Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads: (b)
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In spite of said ruling,
Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies
only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action
arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The EXTINCTION OF CIVIL
LIABIITY referred to in Section 2 (b) of Rule 111 refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. It is now
settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not
guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on QUASI-
DELICT. As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana,
same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from
fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. Having ruled that it was Manliclic’s negligence
that caused the smash up, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the
employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of
a good father of a family. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is
direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough supervision.
Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have
been shown and established. This, PRBLI failed to do. The lack of supervision
can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing
the rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. How then can all the
drivers of PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations
when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers? For failure to adduce
proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees, PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the
damages caused by Manliclic’s negligence.

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4.Quiambao v. Buensucero, et. al filed a compliant for FORCIBLE ENTRY against Quiambao
Osorio for allegedly entering, placing bamboo posts and constructing a house over a
portion of a subject lot. Quiambao’s defense: Agreement upon which
Buensucero base their prior possession over said lot had already been cancelled
by Land Authority. The pendency of administrative case before the Office of
LA between same parties and same piece of land was determinative of
Buensucero’s right to eject him from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial
question. Buensucero’s defense: Administrative case did not constitute a
prejudicial question as it involved the question of ownership, unlike the
ejectment case that involved merely the question of possession.
ISSUE: W/N the administrative case constitutes a prejudicial question which
would operate as a bar to said ejectment case. à NO prejudicial question but
the court may hold the action in abeyance for the need to save time and effort.
HELD: Strictly speaking, prejudicial questions refer only to civil cases that
suspend criminal ones pending their (civil) resolution. It CANNOT be invoked
when cases involved are merely administrative/civil in character. However,
because of the identity of PARTIES and ISSUES in both cases, the need to save
time and effort for the court, the counsels and parties as well as the need to
resolve the right of possession before the ejectment case is properly determined,
the ejectment case must be held in abeyance pending resolution of the
administrative case. This is in the exercise of a sound discretion of the court, for
there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its
dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.
5.Yap v. Paras Paras sold property to Yap. LATER, Paras sold same property to Saya-ang. YAP
was the sister of PARAS. According to YAP, PARAS sold to her (YAP) his
This is a dispute share in the intestate estate for P300.00. 19 years later, Paras sold the same
between brother and property to SAYA-ANG for P5K. When Yap learned of the second sale, she
sister over a piece of filed on the same day:
property they 1. (CRIMINAL) a complaint for ESTAFA against Paras and Saya-ang
inherited from their with the Provincial Prosecutor; and
parents. The case is 2. (CIVIL) a complaint for the NULLIFICATION OF the said SALE
complicated by the with the RTC-GenSan.
circumstance that the IN CRIMINAL CASE: Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for ESTAFA
Paras’ counsel in this against PARAS in the MCTC-South Cotabato, presided by JUDGE
petition is the son of BARCELONA, Sr. (who is the father of PARAS’ counsel à Atty. Barcelona, Jr.
the judge, the other SC will note later that the Judge was biased). BEFORE arraignment of the
respondent, whose accused, JUDGE BARCELONA motu proprio issued an order DISMISSING the
action is being CRIMINAL case (estafa) on the ground that there is a prejudicial question to a
questioned. civil action (referring to the NULLIFICATION complaint). YAP appeals to SC.
ISSUE: W/N Judge Barcelona is correct for dismissing the case on the ground
that there is a prejudicial question? NO, JUDGE BARCELONA IS WRONG
(and BIASED - reprimanded).
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A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said
case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal
The doctrine comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal
actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so
closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case
before the criminal action can proceed.
The existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal
case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of the
former.
Elements of Prejudicial Question
a. The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
in the criminal action; and
b. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of sound
discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action
in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court,
especially where the parties and the issues are the same. There is power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its dockets
with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.
Where the rights of the parties to the second action cannot be properly
determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled, the
second action should be stayed.
A pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial
question to an administrative case, we see no reason why the reverse may not
be so considered.
Where there is a prejudicial question in a civil case, the criminal action may
not be dismissed but only suspended. This suspension may not be done
motu proprio by the judge trying the criminal case but only upon petition of
the defendant in accordance with the ROC.
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HELD: Section 6, Rule 111 plainly says that the suspension may be made only
upon petition and not at the instance of the judge alone, and it also says
suspension, and not dismissal. A prejudicial question is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The SC criticized the decision
of the JUDGE BARCELONA that relied on Ras v. Rasul. In Ras, there was a
motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground that the defense in the civil
case — forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale — had to be threshed
out first. Resolution of that question would necessarily resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. By contrast, there was no motion
for suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly, JUDGE
BARCELONA had not been informed of the defense Paras was raising in the
civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the issue raised
in the civil action would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. Not every defense raised in the civil action will raise a prejudicial
question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense (a) must
involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the
criminal action and (b) its resolution should determine whether or not the latter
action may proceed.
6.Tamin v. CA Municipality of Dumingag wanted to dispossess and demolish the land and A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case
buildings of Medina pursuant to a Presidential Declaration which reserved the the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said
land for a planned public plaza. Importantly, there was a cadastral proceeding case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
(administrative in nature) that involved such parcel of land. Dumingag filed an The doctrine of prejudicial question comes as in to play generally in a
EJECTION COMPLAINT against Medina – the trial court issued a writ of situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved
possession and demolition which were subsequently enforced. As such, Medina in both cases are similar or so closely-related that an issue must be pre-
was dispossessed and the buildings demolished. Medina appealed to the CA and emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed
lost. Elevated to SC. Medina alleged that the pending cadastral case constituted a The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5,
prejudicial question and therefore the trial judge should not have entertained the Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court are:
ejectment case until a decision was reached in the cadastral proceedings. a) The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue in the criminal action; and
ISSUE: W/N the administrative case between the private parties involving the b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
lot subject matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which action may proceed.
would operate as a bar to said ejectment case. à YES
HELD: Notwithstanding the fact that a prejudicial question requires a criminal
case and a civil case, it applied the doctrine by holding that the situation at hand
(administrative and civil case) was akin to a prejudicial question situation. Based
it largely on economy of time and the interest of justice. However, since the
buildings had already been demolished, the SC instead required the municipality
to issue a bond in the amount of damages that will be due to Medina if it turns
out that the land is adjudged to be his in the Cadastral Proceedings.
SC also discussed eminent domain and propriety of the issuances of writs.
7.Sps. Lee-Yu v. Spouses Yu mortgaged their undivided interests in SEVERAL parcels of land A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil
PCIB located in Dagupan City and Quezon City in favour of PCIB as security for action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former
payment of their loan. They failed to pay. Thus, PCIB filed for extrajudicial an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
foreclosure of the properties in Dagupan City. Public auction was had and PCIB proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
emerged as highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was issued to PCIB. The sale would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City. About two months accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
before the expiration of the redemption period, PCIB filed an ex-parte petition question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. No prejudicial question can

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for writ of possession before Branch 43 of RTC of Dagupan City. Thereafter, arise from the existence of the two actions; they can proceed separately and
Spouses Yu filed a motion to dismiss the petition for writ of possession alleging take their own direction independently of each other
that the certificate of sale was void because of violation of the indivisibility of
mortgage for filing two separate foreclosure proceedings in Dagupan City and
Quezon City. In the meantime, Spouses Yu likewise filed a case for Annulment
of Certificate of Sale before Branch 44 of RTC of Dagupan City. Thereafter,
Branch 43 denied the motion to dismiss filed by Spouses Yu. Yus then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the pendency of the case filed before
Branch 44 for annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the
resolution of the petition before Branch 43 for the issuance of writ of
possession. Branch 43 denied MR holding that principle of prejudicial question
is not applicable in the case at bar because both cases were civil in nature. CA
likewise did not grant the petition on appeal.

ISSUES: 1. W/N a real estate mortgage over several properties located in

different localities can be separately foreclosed in different places? à YES
2. W/N a prejudicial issue exists in the case at bar? à NO
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that there was no prejudicial question
involved since both cases are civil in nature. Both case for annulment of
certificate of sale and petition for writ of possession, can proceed independently.
Further, the issuance of writ of possession is ministerial in nature upon the lapse
of period for redemption.
8.Marbella-Bobis v. October 1985, BOBIS contracted a first marriage with JAVIER. Without A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of
Bobis annulling the first marriage, BOBIS contracted a second marriage with the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the
MARBELLA-BOBIS on January 1996. Allegedly, a third marriage was information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case
contracted with a certain HERNANDEZ. MARBELLA-BOBIS filed a A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically
complaint of BIGAMY against BOBIS on February 1998. BOBIS then filed a admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately
civil action for the JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet
of his first marriage on the ground of the absence of a marriage license. After, he presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case on the ground of case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
a prejudicial question on account of the civil case of nullity. The trial court prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal
GRANTED the motion to suspend. MARBELLA filed an MR, but it was charge through a non-criminal suit.
denied; hence the current case.
ISSUE: W/N the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for
bigamy. à NO, MARBELLA-BOBIS WINS
HELD: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. A prejudicial question
does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply
tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the
further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial
question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements
of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the
prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may
not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on
the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the

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criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. Article 40 of the Family Code,

which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may
remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly
the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or
not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense
because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second
marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully
be prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which are a previous
marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not
been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage. In the case at
bar, Bobis’ clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his
prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
C. SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY (ARTS. 102-103, RPC; ARTS. 106-109 LABOR CODE)
1. Concept and requisites
2. Diligence not a defense
1.Carpio v. Doroja Carpio was bumped by the jitney being driven by RAMIREZ. Carpio filed an Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is
information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries in in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case; the employer’s
the MTC. RAMIREZ pleaded guilty to a lesser of offense and was accordingly subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as
convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries. part of the execution proceedings against the employee. The filing of a
TORIBIO the owner and operator of this Jitney was never impleaded. When separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is
RAMIREZ was adjudged to pay, a writ of execution was issued – unsatisfied due not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision against the accused;
to RAMIREZ’ insolvency. Carpio moved for a subsidiary writ of execution it is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be passed
against the owner-operator TORIBIO. DENIED. MR denied. upon by the appellate court for such subsidiary liability is already implied
from the appellate court’s decision. A judgment of conviction sentencing a
ISSUE: W/N they can enforce the subsidiary liability in the same case? à YES defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion
HELD: This is basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime between the defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the
under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be regarded as a employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter’s subsidiary liability
civil action for the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New not only with regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its amount.
Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-aquiliana. In order that an employer may be held Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability
subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should does not constitute an amendment of the judgment the subsidiary liability
be shown can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does
(1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon
(2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after
(3) that the employee is insolvent the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after
The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises ONLY AFTER execution is returned unsatisfied due to the employee’s insolvency
CONVICTION of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites
present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's
conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. Needless to say, the case at
bar satisfies all these requirements. A separate and independent action is,
therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of
the victim.
2.Bantoto v. Bobis Vallejo was the owner of the Jeepney being driven by Bobis. Bobis, while driving The master’s liability, under the RPC, for the crimes committed by his
the jeepney, hit Damiana Bantoto, who later died from her injuries. Bobis was servants and employees in the discharge of their duties, is not predicated
charged with homicide through reckless imprudence and he pleaded guilty to the upon the insolvency of the latter. The insolvency of the servant or employee
charge. He was sentenced to prison and made to pay P3,000 for the civil is nowhere mentioned in Article 103, RPC as a condition precedent. Such

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indemnity arising from the crime. Bantoto and Lanceta, parents of Damiana,
instituted an action for damages against Vallejo (among others) and to declare
Vallejo solidarily liable for the civil indemnity that Bobis was required to pay.
Vallejo filed a MTD, alleging lack of cause of action since the complaint did not
state that Bobis was insolvent. The CFI overruled him, and after trial, held
Vallejo liable for the P3,000 indemnity. Vallejo appealed to the SC, alleging that
the action should be dismissed for lack of cause of action as it was not alleged
that Bobis was insolvent.
ISSUES :W/N it should be alleged in the complaint that Bobis was insolvent
W/N the award of exemplary damages was proper
HELD: SC found that Vallejo’s contention was without any basis. Art. 103 of
the RPC does not state that the insolvency of the employee is a condition
precedent to make the employer liable. In truth, such insolvency is required
ONLY when the liability of the master is being MADE EFFECTIVE BY
EXECUTION LEVY, but not for the rendition of judgment against the master.
The subsidiary character of the employer’s responsibility merely imports that the
latter’s property is not to be seized without first exhausting that of the servant.
Here, based on the sheriff’s return that Bobis has no property to execute on,
Vallejo is thus liable for the P3,000 civil indemnity.
3.Yonaha v. CA Ouano is the driver of Yonaha. While driving the company car, Ouano hit
Hector Canete. Hector died instantaneously. The heirs of Canete filed a case of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide against Ouano. Court found that
Ouano was guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was required to pay for damages
to the heirs of Canete. A writ of attachment was filed against Ouano. Ouano
manifested his inability to pay the damages. The heirs of Canete filed a motion
for subsidiary execution with neither a notice of hearing nor notice to petitioner
Yonaha. Yonaha filed a motion to stay and recall the motion for subsidiary
execution of the heirs of Canete since she was not given notice of hearing and
the employer-employee relationship was yet to be established. RTC denied the
motion of Yonaha. CA affirmed RTC. CA ruled that the HEARING WAS AN
UNNECESSARY FORMALITY.
ISSUE: W/N Yonaha has the right to a hearing for his subsidiary liability. à
YES, case remanded.
HELD: Execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter of course,
and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to
determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal
applicability and propriety of the employer’s liability. The requirement is
mandatory even when it appears prima facie that execution against the convicted
employee cannot be satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted
employee is in truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in
an industry of some kind; that the employee has committed the crime to which
civil liability attaches while in the performance of his duties as such; and that
execution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency.
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insolvency is only required when the liability of the master is being made
effective by execution of levy, but not for the rendition of judgment against
the master. The subsidiary character of the employer’s responsibility merely
imports that the latter’s property is not to be seized without first exhausting
that of the servant. By analogy to a regular guarantor, the master may not
demand prior exhaustion of the servant’s properties if he cannot point out to
the creditor available property of the debtor within Philippine territory
sufficient to cover the debt. As between the offended party (creditor) and the
culprit’s master or employer, it is the latter who is in a better position to
determine the resources and solvency of the servant or employee
The statutory basis for an employer’s subsidiary liability is found in Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code. This Court has since sanctioned the
enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceedings in
which the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of,
and merely an incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But,
execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter of course, and
it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to
determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal
applicability and propriety of the employer’s liability.
The requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that
execution against the convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The court
must convince itself (1) that the convicted employee is in truth in the employ
of the employer; (2) that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind; (3)
that the employee has committed the crime to which civil liability attaches
while in the performance of his duties as such; and (4) that execution against
the employee is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency. To repeat, the
subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code requires (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b)
that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that the employee
is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the
offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits
“while” in the discharge of such duties); and (d) that said employee is
insolvent. sThe judgment of conviction of the employee, of course,
concludes the employer and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the
same criminal case, but to afford the employer due process, the court should
hear and decide that liability on the basis of the conditions required therefor
by law.

VIII. DAMAGES
A. CONCEPT/KINDS OF DAMAGES (ART. 2197)
CASE TITLE CASE SUMMARY RATIO
1. Sps.Ong v. CA Spouses Ong boarded a bus owned by Inland Trailways. It was bumped in the
rear by another bus, owned by Philtranco. The spouses got injured and were
hospitalized from Feb 9 to 18 1987. Francia's arm was put in a cast for a period
of 8 months. Spouses filed an action for damages against the companies for
damages suffered due to their injuries on December 22, 1988. Spouses allege
that Francia could not operate the sari-sari store due to her injuries, costing
them a daily income of 200php. Also, Renato could not work as an overseas
contract worker as a pipe welder, losing an income of 690USD.
RTC: Found Philtranco solely liable based on culpa aquilana since a Police
Report stated that the accident was due to the driver of Philtranco. It absolved
Inland from liability, Awarded Damages;
CA: Found Inland solely liable due to breach of contract and absolved
Philtranco from liability, since the police report was only attached and not
adopted by the plaintiffs.
CA upheld damages BUT REDUCED THE AMOUNT;
ISSUE: W/N the reduction of damages was proper? à YES
HELD: DAMAGES REQUIRE EVIDENCE. Fundamental in the law on
damages is that one injured by a breach of contract or by a wrongful or
negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just compensation,
commensurate with the loss sustained as a consequence of the defendant's acts.
Thus, actual and moral damages must be proven before any award thereon can
be granted. Actual damages pertains to injuries or losses that are ACTUALLY
SUSTAINED and SUSCEPTIBLE OF MEASUREMENT. It must be
pleaded and proven. SC Took judicial notice of the fact that miscellaneous
expenses are bound to be incurred to cover transportation and food, thus, the
amount of P10,000.00 as actual damages to be reasonable. BUT, Francia's bare
and unsubstantiated assertion of her P200/day earnings is not the best
evidence to prove unrealized income. Also, after her confinement she could
have returned to work since she claimed to have two nieces as helpers. A
person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that
integrity is violated, damages are due and assessable. However, physical injury
is not a pecuniary loss. Moral Damages apply when the loss is not susceptible
of exact monetary estimation. It was proven that Francia's arm did not function
normally, thus, she suffered mental anguish and anxiety. Renato also suffered
mental anxiety and anguish from the accident. Attorney's fees is an indemnity
for damages ordered by a court to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing
party, based on any of the cases authorized by law.
B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RECOVERY
1. Air France v. CA Morales purchased an airline ticket from Air France (AF) through Aspac
Management Corporation (AMC) and [NOTE] the itinerary thereof clearly
included several cities, with certain segments restricted by markings of “non-
endorsable” and “valid on AF only.” While he was in NYC, Morales obtained
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KEY TAKE AWAY
The fundamental principle of the law on damages is that one injured by a
breach of contract or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a
fair and just compensation, commensurate with the loss sustained as a
consequence of the defendant’s acts. Damages are not intended to enrich the
complainant at the expense of the defendant.
Actual damages
Such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the injured party in
the position in which he had been before he was injured. Such injuries or
losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as
provided by law or stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven. To be recoverable, must
be pleaded and proven in court; cannot be presumed. The award must be
based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court
and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and non-substantial proof.
A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that is
violated, damages are due and assessable • However, physical injury is not a
pecuniary loss; it is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation • The usual
practice is to award moral damages for physical injuries • Although actual
damages include indemnification for profits which the injured party failed to
obtain, the rule requires that said person produce the best evidence of which
his case is susceptible.
Attorney’s fees
An indemnity for damages ordered by a court to be paid by the losing party to
the prevailing party based on any of the cases authorized by law. Payable to
the client, unless he agreed with the lawyer that the award shall pertain to the
latter as additional compensation or as part thereof.
Standards in fixing the amount of attorney’s fees
1. Amount and character of services rendered;
2. Labor, time and trouble involved;
3. Nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services
were rendered;
4. Responsibility imposed;
5. Amount of money or value of the property affected by the controversy or
involved in the employment;
6. Skill and experience called for in the performance of services;
7. Professional character and social standing of the lawyer;
8. Results secured; an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it
is contingent than when it is not
The award is subject to judicial discretion and control
It is essential before an award of damages that the claimant must satisfactorily
prove during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its
causal connection to defendant's acts
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medical certificates, attesting to an ear infection that needed immediate

treatment, as he intended to shorten his trip. Morales requested twice from the
AF offices in Copenhagen and Hamburg to shorten his trip, but he was turned
down both times by AF-Manila, whose approval must be secured as a matter of
procedure. Aggrieved, Morales bought a new set of tickets and, upon reaching
Manila, filed a complaint for BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE
and DAMAGES against AF. Both the CFI and the CA ruled in favor of
Morales, finding that the breach was due to AF’s refusal to re-route Morales.
Before the SC, AF assailed the award of damages and maintained that the
original ticket was discounted and specifically non-endorsable in certain
segments.
ISSUE: W/N there a breach of contract of carriage on the part of AF, as to
justify the award to Morales of actual, moral, and exemplary damages? à NO
HELD: The SC held that before damages may be awarded, it is essential that
the claimant satisfactorily prove (a) the existence of the factual basis of the
damages and (b) its causal connection to defendant’s acts. Here, considering
the clear restrictions on the original ticket, it was not unreasonable for AF to
deny the request. Furthermore, there was no bad faith on the part of AF, as it
only followed the advice of AMC, who, if anything, should be blamed for
failing to explain the non-endorsable character of the ticket. Nevertheless,
considering that Morales is a lawyer, he cannot simply plead ignorance of such
restrictions.
2. Dichoso v. CA There was land owned by spouses, 16.9 hectares. Mom died first giving Prila Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly
(Daughter) ½ and Dad ½. Dad died giving (as to the entire 16.9 hectares): 4/6 proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on
of the entire land or 11.2477 hectares was adjudicated to Vivencia Prila, 1/6 or speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages; it
2.8119 hectares to Asuncion Pacamara and 1/6 or 2.8119 hectares to Custodio must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered and on evidence
Parcia. Vivencia Prila sold her 4/6 portion to Dichoso, and Pacamara sold her of the actual amount thereof
1/6 to Ramos. Deed mentions the area of the lot sold as 4.1250 hectares;
obviously in excess of Pacamara's 1/6 share in the property of 2.8119 hectares.
Deed sale in favor of Ramos bound by irrigation ditch and enclosed by a red
line, which is more in line with the 2.8119 hectars. Aforesaid 4.1250 hectares,
which Ramos claims to have possessed, is now the land in question.
ISSUES: W/N CA erred in finding that Ramos is the owner of the 4.1250
hectare land in question.
W/N CA erred in requiring the petitioner to deliver forty (40) cavans annually
to ramos despite its finding that only one-third (1/3) of the produce "went to"
the ramos, two-thirds (2/3) being for his tenant.
HELD: This Court has held that in cases of conflict between areas and
boundaries, it is the latter that should prevail. What really defines a piece of
ground is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty, mentioned in its
description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and
indicating its limits. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but
must be duly proved, and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court
cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount
of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been
suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. The award of actual
damages is hereby REDUCED in proportion to the area that may be awarded
to Ramos and to his one-third (1/3) participation in the harvests, from 1964 up

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to the time the land appurtenant thereto is returned to Ramos. (So…Ramos

wanted the higher award of damages awarded by the TC to be sustained, but
the SC decided against it as the facts were shown to prove that he would have
only received 1/3 of land’s output.)
3.PAL v. Miano Florante Miano took PAL’s flight bound for Frankfurt, Germany. He had an In breach of contract of carriage by air, moral damages are awarded only if the
immediate connecting flight via Lufthansa flight to Vienna, Austria. At NAIA, defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith—a breach of a known duty
he checked-in a brown suitcase containing money, documents, a Nikon camera through some motive of interest or ill will. Bad faith must be substantiated by
with zoom lens, suits, sweaters, shirts, pants, shoes, and other accessories. clear and convincing evidence. In breach of contract cases where the
When he arrived at Vienna, his baggage was missing. He reported the matter to defendant is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for
Lufthansa authorities. After 3 hours of nothing, he went to Piestany, damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of
Czechoslovakia. 11 days after, his suitcase was delivered to him in his hotel. He the obligation which the parties had foreseen or could reasonably have
claimed that because of the delay he was forced to borrow money to buy foreseen. The damages, however, will not include liability for moral damages.
clothes, pay $200 for the transportation of his baggage from Vienna to The prerequisite for the award of exemplary damages in cases of contract or
Piestany, and he lost his Nikon Camera. Florante wrote PAL a letter asking for quasi-contract is that the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
compensation. It was left unheeded so he filed a case in the RTC of Makati for oppressive or malevolent manner. The general rule is that attorney’s fees
damages. PAL said it shouldn’t be held liable because: (1) there was no report cannot be recovered as part of damages because no premium should be
of mishandled baggage on its plane (2) nor was there any tracer telex received placed on the right to litigate. The award of attorney’s fees must be deleted
from its Vienna Station. where the award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.
RTC: PAL’s action was not attended by bad faith but awarded damages and
attorney’s fees to Florante. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees
should be awarded. à NO
HELD: In breach of contract of carriage by air, moral damages can only be
awarded if defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. RTC ruled that there
was no bad faith.
Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or
ill will. Facts show that the late delivery was not motivated by ill will/bad faith.
PAL coordinated with its Central Baggage Services to trace the baggage and
succeeded in finding it. Also, PAL did not receive any tracer telex. Therefore, it
was reasonable to presume that the handling of baggage was normal and
regular. Bad faith must also be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
It cannot be presumed. Exemplary damage cannot be awarded because the
prerequisite for its award in cases of contract/quasi-contract is that the
defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner. The facts do not show such. Attorney’s fees cannot be awarded. The
general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
The award of attorney's fees must be deleted where the award of moral and
exemplary damages are eliminated.
4.DBP v. CA Cuba was a grantee of a Fishpond Lease Agreement (i.e., Leasehold Rights) Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved
from the Government. She obtained loans from DBP and executed PNs using with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations,
as security the Leasehold Rights. She defaulted in her payments. DBP conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must
appropriated the Leasehold Rights over the fishpond without a foreclosure depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by the injured
proceeding. Then, DBP executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of the Leasehold party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof. It
Rights back to Cuba. After the execution of the said Deed, a new Fishpond must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring
Lease Agreement was issued by Ministry of Agriculture and Food in favor of whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.
Cuba. However, again, Cuba failed to pay the amortizations due. DBP
rescinded the agreement, and took possession of the Leasehold Rights.

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Subsequently, DBP disposed the property through a public bidding.

ISSUE: W/N DBP was liable for actual damages? à NO
HELD: With regard to damages, Art. 2199 provides: Except as provided by
law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages. Actual or compensatory
damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with reasonable degree of
certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to
the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that
they have been suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable
evidence of the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts which
could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages
are borne. In the case at bar, plaintiff Cuba claimed aggregate actual damages
of more than 1M based on the following: Equipment, tools, and other articles
= 500k; 230k pieces of bangus = 500k. SC held both losses not proved by clear
evidence
àEquipment etc.: only evidence is testimony of Cuba and her caretaker; no
inventory of alleged lost items presented; no single receipt or record of
acquisition presented.
àBangus: loss not duly proved; claim was also unreasonably delayed; loss
allegedly happened in 1979 when DBP took possession of property, yet from
this time until 1985 complaint, Cuba did not bring the alleged loss to DBP’s
attention.
Thus, the award of actual damages should, therefore, be struck down for lack
of sufficient basis. Nonetheless, an award of MORAL DAMAGES is in order
conformably with Article 2219(10), in relation to Article 21, of the Civil
Code. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES should likewise be awarded by way of
example or correction for the public good. There being an award of exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees are also recoverable because DBP’s act of
appropriating CUBA’s leasehold rights which was contrary to law and public
policy, as well as its false representation to the then Ministry of Agriculture and
Natural Resources that it had foreclosed the mortgage.
C. ACTUAL DAMAGES (ARTS. 2199-2203; 2007, 2209)
1. Damnum emergens/lucrum cessans
2. Disability
3. Indemnity for death
4. Interest
5. Atty’s fees (Art. 2208)
1.PNOC Shipping MV Efigenia collided with Petroparcel. Efigenia sank. After the investigation of Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are
CA the Board of Marine Inquiry, it declared Petroparcel at fault. Efigenia sued those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
Petroparcel for damages. In its complaint, it stated the amount of damages. sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to
Efigenia presented price quotations to support the value of its lost vessel and repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted
the equipment, supplies, and the catch with it. (The quotations are 10 years and not to impose a penalty.
after the incident and they are way more than the amounts in the complaint) In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the
The General Manager of the vessel was the sole witness presented to verify the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.
documents. RTC awarded a bloated amount to Efigenia based on the There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages:
quotations, as well as extra consideration on extraordinary inflation and others. • one is the loss of what a person already possesses (daño emergente); and

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HELD: To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages,
he is required to prove the ACTUAL AMOUNT OF LOSS with reasonable
degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
available. The GM could not testify on the quotations because he was not the
one who issued them. Therefore the quotations are hearsay evidence because
the people who made them were not presented as witnesses. The quotations do
not fall under the exception to the hearsay rule that they are "commercial lists."
Commercial lists imply some level of publication; they are intended for the
general information of the public. However, these quotations are from the
special request of the GM and issued specially for him. No award of damages
can be given based on a hearsay. But NOMINAL DAMAGES may be
awarded (Arts. 2221-2223). The allegations of Efigenia in its complaints may be
made as a basis of the amount of nominal damages.
2.Eastern Shipping 2 fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Japan for delivery vessel SS
v. CA Eastern Comet (owned by Eastern Shipping Lines). The shipment was insured
by Marine Insurance Policy. Upon arrival in Manila, it was discharged to the
custody of Metro Port Service, who excepted to 1 drum said to be in bad
order. Allied Brokerage Corporation then received the shipment and delivered
it to consignee’s warehouse. Due to the damage in one of the drums,
Mercantile Insurance paid the consignee under the marine insurance policy.
Mercantile Insurance wanted to recover the amount paid from Eastern
(carrier), Metroport (arrastre) and Allied Brokerage (broker). They all refused to
pay and Marine Insurance filed a case in court for DAMAGES against shipping
company, the arrastre operator and the broker-forwarder. The court a quo and
CA ruled in favor of Marine Insurance and ordered defendants to
SOLIDARILY pay the amount of P19,032.95 with legal interest of 12% per
annum from date of filing of complaint. The common carrier files a petition
for certiorari under rule 65.
ISSUES: W/N Common Carrier should be jointly and severally liable with
arrastre operator and customs broker
W/N Interest should be computed from Date of decision of trial court at rate
of 6% à YES.
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• the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have
pertained to him (lucro cesante).
To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is
required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of
certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.
The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence
would be presented on either side. He must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole,
adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. In other words, damages
cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific
facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
damages are borne.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay
evidence considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as
witnesses. Accordingly, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay
evidence.
“In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered,
private respondent is entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says,
is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and
not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.”-
Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals
Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in
every case where property right has been invaded. Under Article 2223 of the
Civil Code, “(t)he adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further
contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the
parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.”
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and
the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no
stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon,
and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per
annum.
With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence
of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed
from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to
the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is
breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however,
shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims for damages except when or until the

HELD:
1. Common Carrier – must observe diligence in shipment of goods from time
received to time delivered to person entitled to receive them. If goods lost or
arrives in damaged condition, presumption arise against carrier of it failure to
observe that diligence. The carrier in this case, unable to rebut the presumption
of fault, will be liable regardless of whether there are others solidarily liable
with it.
2.The interest should be 6% computed from date court a quo rendered
decision.
3.Francisco v. Co A complaint for accion publiciana was filed by the COs against heirs of
Baetiong. The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement where the heirs
would lease to COs a portion of the properties for 15 years. The heirs later
contested this but the CA ruled that the judgment by compromise was finally
executed.
Four years later, Francisco (one of the heirs) filed a complaint for forcible entry
against the COs alleging that she is now the owner of the property (which she
inherited from her mom). CA ruled against Francisco because of res judicata. It
also awarded moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to the
COs.
ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly awarded moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees.
HELD: Compromise Agreement had been duly executed BUT the CA erred in
awarding damages. No moral damages should be given because bad faith on
the part of Francisco was not proven. Neither should exemplary damages avail
under the circumstances. No exemplary damages can be awarded unless the
claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages. It is also settled that
the fact that the party was "compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect
and enforce their claim does not justify the award of attorney's fees”. The
general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages
because of the public policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate
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demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the
demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run
from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time
the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages
may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final
and executory, the rate of legal interest, shall be 12% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
NOTE
BSP Circular No. 799 dated July 1, 2013.
Section 1. The Rate of interest for the loan or forebearance of any money, goods or credit and
the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of
interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, but it imports
a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong.
It should be established by clear and convincing evidence since the law always
presumes good faith. In ascertaining the intention of the person accused of
acting in bad faith, the courts must carefully examine the evidence as to the
conduct and outward acts from which the inward motive may be determined.
Certainly, it does not appear that the Court of Appeals has conducted the
mandated careful examination of evidence that would sustain the award of
moral damages.
The plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether exemplary damages should be awarded. If the court has no proof or
evidence upon which the claim for moral damages could be based, such
indemnity could not be outrightly awarded. The same holds true with respect
to the award of exemplary damages where it must be shown that the party
acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. Furthermore, this specie
of damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no
exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his
clear right to moral damages.
What Article 2208 (2) of the Civil Code provides, in order that attorney’s fees
may be awarded, is that "the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest" It is settled that the fact that the party was "compelled to litigate and
incur expenses to protect and enforce their claim does not justify the award of
attorney's fees. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as
part of damages because of the public policy that no premium should be
placed on the right to litigate. The award of attorney's fees must be deleted
where the award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated."

4.Marikina Suelto was driving a MALTC bus along Kamias Road going towards EDSA.
Autoline v. People The bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial
apartment owned by Valdellon. Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against Suelto and a civil
case against Suelto and MALTC for damages. Valdellon adduced a receipt for
P35,000.00 issued by BB Construction. Engr. Regal, Jr. of SSP Construction
estimated the cost of repairs at P171,088.46. Architect Galapate TESTIFIED
that the cost of the repair amounted to P55,000.00. RTC found Suelto guilty. It
ordered MALTC and Suelto, jointly and severally, to pay Valdellon
P150,000.00 as actual damages. CA affirmed RTC but reduced actual damages
to P100,000.00.
ISSUE: W/N Valdellon failed to adduce evidence to prove that she suffered
actual damages in the amount of P100,000.00. – YES
HELD: Valdellon failed to prove that the damages to the terrace caused by the
incident amounted to P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced were the
computation by Engr. Regal, Jr. amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt
issued by the BB Construction for P35,000.00. Valdellon failed to present
Regal to testify on his estimation. RTC awarded P150,000.00 as actual damages
but failed to state the factual basis for such award. The appellate court failed to
explain how it arrived at the amount of P100,000.00. The burden of proof is on
the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either
side. The burden is to establish one’s case by a preponderance of evidence.
Actual damages are not presumed. While claimants’ bare testimonial assertions
in support of their claims for damages should not be discarded altogether,
however, the same should be admitted with extreme caution. An estimate of
the damage cost will not suffice. We note, however, that Valdellon adduced
evidence that the cost of the damage to the terrace would amount to
P55,000.00.
5.Magbanua v. Rosemarie Magbanua used to work as the housemaid of Pilar Junsay. She was
Junsay charged as a co-accused with the crime of Robbery. She allegedly robbed
Junsay of assorted jewelries and cash. However, after trial, Magbanua was
acquitted. She, together with her father, filed a complaint for damages against
Junsay and the police officers. The complaint alleged that by reason of Pilar,
Ibarra and Juanito's false, malicious, and illegal actuations in filing the criminal
case for Robbery against Rosemarie, the latter suffered untold pain, shame,
humiliation, worry, and mental anguish. RTC ruled that Magbanua cannot
recover damages for malicious prosecution, absent malice and probable cause.
CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE: W/N the Magbanuas are entitled to damages for malicious
prosecution. à NO
HELD: SC affirmed RTC and CA decision. The elements of malicious
prosecution are absent. For a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the
plaintiff must prove the following:
(1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or
that he instigated its commencement;
(2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal;
(3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
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The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence
would be presented on either side. The burden is to establish one’s case by a
preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole,
adduced by one side, is superior to that of the other. Actual damages are not
presumed. The claimant must prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the
best evidence obtainable. Specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring
whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne must be pointed out.
Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere surmises, speculations or
conjectures.
While claimants’ bare testimonial assertions in support of their claims for
damages should not be discarded altogether, however, the same should be
admitted with extreme caution. Their testimonies should be viewed in light of
claimants’ self-interest, hence, should not be taken as gospel truth. Such
assertion should be buttressed by independent evidence. An estimate of the
damage cost will not suffice.
"An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution,
civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without
probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other
proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the
putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation
or injury (Cabasaan v. Anota)."
The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are
found in the provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations and on
damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219. To
constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution
was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it
was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false
and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution.
Four elements must be shown to concur to recover damages for malicious
prosecution. For a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must
prove the following:
(1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor
or that he instigated its commencement;
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(4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice -- an improper or a sinister (2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal;
motive. (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice -- an improper or a sinister
on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with motive.
the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.
The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based
on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with
the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.
6.NACAR v. Nacar filed a complaint for constructive dismissal. LA rendered a (1998) A recomputation is a part of the law that is read into the decision. By the
Gallery Frames decision stating that Nacar was illegally dismissed plus backwages to be nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add up until full
computed only up to promulgation of the decision (Original Computation). satisfaction. The recomputation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon
Gallery appealed to the NLRC but the latter affirmed the LA decision. MR execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of
filed but denied. PetRev to CA, denied. MR filed but denied. Petition to SC, the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only
denied through a Resolution. Nacar filed a Motion for Correct Computation the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected, and
praying that the backwages be computed from the date of his dismissal up to this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.
the finality of the (2002) Resolution of the Supreme Court. The motion was
granted and a writ of execution was issued. Gallery filed a Motion to Quash the SC applied the following interest rates:
writ of execution arguing that since the LA awarded separation pay and limited 12% per annum – May 27, 2002 to June 30, 2013
backwages, and that the decision becomes final and executor already, there can 6% per annum – July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction
be no more alteration or amendment. Motion was denied and an alias writ of
execution was issued. Gallery appealed to the NLRC. Appeal granted and
recomputation of the judgment award was ordered. Another pre-execution
conference was set but Gallery failed to appear again. Meanwhile, Nacar moved
that an alias writ of execution be issued to enforce the earlier recomputed
judgment award. Pending the final computation, Nacar moved for a writ of
execution for the payment of the original computation based on the 1998
decision. An alias writ of execution was issued and Nacar received 147,560.19
based on the original computation. Nacar then filed a Manifestation and
Motion praying for the recomputation to include the appropriate interests. LA
granted the motion but only up to the amount of 11.459.73 reasoning that
what it was the original computation that is to be enforced and that the 1998
decision states that separation pay and backwages are to be computed only up
to the promulgation of the 1998 decision. Appeal to NLRC, denied. MR,
denied. Appeal to CA, denied. MR, denied.
ISSUES: W/N a re-computation in the course of the execution of the labor
arbiter’s original computation of the awards made, pegged as of the time the
decision was rendered and confirmed with modification by a SC decision, is
legally proper. (YES)
HELD: Being merely a computation of what the first part of the decision
established and declared, can, by its nature, be recomputed. Consequently,
under the terms of the decision which is sought to be executed by Nacar, no
essential change is made by a recomputation as this step is a necessary
consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared by
the LA in that decision. A recomputation is a part of the law that is read into
the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to
add up until full satisfaction. The recomputation of the consequences of illegal
dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or
amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal

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ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal

is affected, and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final
judgments.
GUIDELINES IN PAYMENT OF LEGAL INTEREST
1. When an obligation, regardless of its source, is breached, the contravenor
can be held liable for damages. Provisions on “Damages” of the civil
code govern in determining the measure of the recoverable damages.
2. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual
and compensatory damages, the rate of interest is as follows:
a. Obligation is breached and it consists in the payment of sum of
money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated
in writing. Further, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from
the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the
rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default.
b. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money,
is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be
imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.
No interest shall be adjudged in unliquidated claims or damages,
except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudically but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made,
the interst shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the
court is made.
The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case,
be on the amount finally adjuged.
c. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes
final and executor, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls
under par. a or b, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
In addition, judgments that have become final and executor prior to Jult 1,
2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the
rate of interest fixed therein.
7.City Trust v. Isagani VILLANUEVA maintained accounts with Citytrust BANK. When his Actual damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved with reasonable
Villanueva checkbook ran out, he requisitioned for more. He went to the bank and filled certainty.
up the necessary slip, but left the space for his account number in blank as he
could not remember it. The Bank representative said that it was okay, the bank Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
could take care of supplying the number. The Bank then supplied the number anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
and delivered the checkbooks to Villanueva. Villanueva then issued a check to humiliation, and similar injury.21 Although incapable of pecuniary
fund his trading account with Kingly Commodities. He also deposited money computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
into his Bank account in order to ensure that it is properly funded. When result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.22 Thus, case law establishes
Kingly placed an order and deposited Villanueva’s check, it turned out to be the requisites for the award of moral damages, viz: (1) there must be an injury,
insufficiently funded. Upon redeposit, it still came back DAIF. Villanueva whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
confronted the Bank, and it was discovered that an incorrect account number (2) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the
was inadvertently placed, there being a person with the same name but wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
different middle initial. Bank apologized and immediately issued a Manager’s sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any

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Check, as Kingly was threatening to close Villanueva’s trading account. He
asked the bank for actual damages in the form of MISSED TRADING
PROFITS. He also asked for moral damages due to his losing of face to his
peers and the officers of Kingly. Bank denied. RTC ruled that Villanueva was
the proximate cause (for leaving acct. no. in blank) and that the actual damages
are unsubstantiated. CA reversed and ruled that Bank was proximate cause (for
processing slip despite it being blank) and awarded moral and attorney’s fees,
but denied actual damages.
ISSUE: Is Villanueva entitled to Actual Damages? Moral Damages? Attorney’s
Fees? NO, NO, NO. Villanueva loses.
HELD: SC established that there was no compensable injury, saying that such
is a factual issue that was not established in the lower courts. Claims for actual
damages were not properly proven. As to Moral damages, it may be true that
Villanueva suffered some, but it could not have been so great, considering that
the Bank immediately rectified the situation and provided satisfactory
explanation.
No attorney’s fees either, considering there was no bad faith in pursuing the
case. If there was any damage at all, it can be considered as damnum absque
injuria.
8.Sps. Ong v. CA Spouses Ong (Francia and Renato) were passengers of Inland Bus. It was
bumped in the rear by Philtranco bus. The spouses were injured. They filed an
action for damages against Inland and Philtranco. RTC held Philtranco liable
under quasi delict. CA reversed. The police report upon which the quasi delict
claim was based was not formally offered as evidence. According to the CA,
Inland is liable for breach of contract.
RTC gave actual damages of 10,000. CA reduced this amount to 3,997 as those
were the amount only shown to have been spent by Spouses Ong. -> Upheld
by SC; RTC granted compensatory damages worth 50,000. CA disallowed this
award. -> Reversed by SC. Granted compensatory damages. (in the form of
moral damages); RTC granted unrealized profit worth 48,000. CA disallowed
this award. -> Upheld by SC; RTC granted moral damages of 50,000. CA
approved. -> SC: 50,000 to Francia, 30,000 to Renato; RTC granted atty. Fees
worth 25%. CA approved. -> Only 10% was allowed by the SC. The task of
counsel was simple and yet he wasn’t able to do it properly, i.e., formal offer of
Police report
ISSUE: W/N the reductions were proper? YES
HELD: 3,997 was the amount only shown to have been spent by the Spouses.
Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that will put
the injured party in the position in which he had been before he was
injured. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and
susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a
party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as he
has duly proven.
To be recoverable, actual damages must be pleaded and proven in Court. In
no instance may the trial judge award more than those so pleaded and
proven. Damages cannot be presumed. The award thereof must be based on
the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and
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of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
The award of attorney’s fees should likewise be deleted. The general rule is
that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the
policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not
to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award
attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and
equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not
be awarded where there is no sufficient showing of bad faith in the parties’
persistence of a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness
of his cause.
The fundamental principle of the law on damages is that one injured by a
breach of contract or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a
fair and just compensation, commensurate with the loss sustained as a
consequence of the defendant’s acts. Damages are not intended to enrich the
complainant at the expense of the defendant.
Actual damages
Such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the injured party in
the position in which he had been before he was injured. Such injuries or
losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as
provided by law or stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven. To be recoverable, must
be pleaded and proven in court; cannot be presumed. The award must be
based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court
and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and non-substantial proof.
A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that is
violated, damages are due and assessable • However, physical injury is not a
pecuniary loss; it is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation • The usual
practice is to award moral damages for physical injuries • Although actual
damages include indemnification for profits which the injured party failed to
obtain, the rule requires that said person produce the best evidence of which
his case is susceptible.
Attorney’s fees
An indemnity for damages ordered by a court to be paid by the losing party to
the prevailing party based on any of the cases authorized by law. Payable to
the client, unless he agreed with the lawyer that the award shall pertain to the
latter as additional compensation or as part thereof.
Standards in fixing the amount of attorney’s fees

certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and non-substantial
proof. Damages, after all, are not intended to enrich the complainant at the
expense of the defendant.
9.Ramos v. CA Erlinda Ramos was advised to undergo an operation for removal of gall
bladder stone, after examinations indicated that she was fit for surgery. She and
her husband Rogelio met Dr. Orlino Hozaka. They agreed that the
"cholecystectomy" operation at the DLSMC would be on June 17, 1985 at 9:00
A.M. Dr. Hosaka assured Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist. At
around 7:30 A.M. of June 17, Erlinda was prepared for the operation. Her
sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, a dean of a college of nursing, was there for
moral support. At the operating room, Herminda saw Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez,
who was to administer anesthesia. At around 10:00 A.M., Rogelio E. Ramos
was "already dying [and] waiting for the arrival of the doctor". At around 12:10
P.M., he came to know that Dr. Hosaka arrived. At about 12:15 P.M.,
Herminda Cruz saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She heard Dr.
Gutierrez say, "ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O
lumalaki ang tiyan". She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds
of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her. She
then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon,
another anesthesiologist. At almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, Herminda
Cruz saw the patient taken to the ICU. About four months thereafter, the
patient was released from the hospital. Since then she has been comatose due
to brain damage. Sps. filed a civil case for damages.
ISSUE: Amount of damages to be awarded.
HELD: At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount established by the trial
court at the time of its decision would be grossly inadequate to cover the actual
costs of home-based care for a comatose individual. The calculated amount
was not even arrived at by looking at the actual cost of proper hospice care for
the patient. What it reflected were the actual expenses incurred and proved by
the Ramos’ after they were forced to bring home the patient to avoid mounting
hospital bills. Ideally, a comatose patient should remain in a hospital or be
transferred to a hospice specializing in the care of the chronically ill for the
purpose of providing a proper milieu adequate to meet minimum standards of
care. Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages recoverable in
suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of
proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to
undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy. Well-settled is the rule that actual
damages which may be claimed by the plaintiff are those suffered by him as he
has duly proved under Article 2199. The rule is that actual or compensatory
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1. Amount and character of services rendered;
2. Labor, time and trouble involved;
3. Nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services
were rendered;
4. Responsibility imposed;
5. Amount of money or value of the property affected by the controversy or
involved in the employment;
6. Skill and experience called for in the performance of services;
7. Professional character and social standing of the lawyer;
8. Results secured; an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it
is contingent than when it is not
The award is subject to judicial discretion and control
Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages recoverable in suits
arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of
proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to
undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy.
Well-settled is the rule that actual damages which may be claimed by the
plaintiff are those suffered by him as he has duly proved. The Civil Code
provides: Art. 2199. - Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the
time of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence
has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these
provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where
the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications
directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict.
In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to
adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which
compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial;
and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which
could not, from the nature of the case, be made with certainty. In other
words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided
for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. As it would
not be equitable - and certainly not in the best interests of the administration
of justice - for the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts
and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages
previously awarded - temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given
as temperate damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into
account the cost of proper care.
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damages generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffered as a
consequence of an act of negligence has been COMPLETED and that the cost
can be LIQUIDATED. But where the resulting injury might be continuing and
possible future complications directly arising from the injury, then the amount
of damages which should be awarded, should be one which compensates for
pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial; and one which
would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the
nature of the case, be made with certainty. Thus, temperate damages can and
should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances
where the injury is chronic and continuing. In the instant case, Ramos’ were
able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has
remained in that condition for over a decade. They should not be compelled by
dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of
professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the
circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would
therefore be reasonable. The husband and the children, all petitioners in this
case, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient’s illness,
knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned their daily
lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term goals to take
into account their life with a comatose patient. For the foregoing reasons, an
award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropriate. Finally, by
way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby
awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the
opinion that attorney’s fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
10.Industrial Driving along SLEX, BUS hit a JEEP (driven by BONDAD) which was Atty’s fees: As a general rule, no person should be penalized for the exercise
Insurance v. parked at the right shoulder of the road while its flat tire was being changed. of the right to litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good faith.
Bondad Due to the impact, BUS ended up swerving and hit also MORALES’ car.
Clearly, the BUS was the proximate cause. The JEEP was correctly parked at As regards moral damages, it is not enough that the claimant alleges mental
the shoulder away from moving cars and was just minding its own business anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like as a
when it got hit. The police records and all evidence clearly show that the BUS result of the acts of the other party. It is necessary that such acts be shown to
was at fault, not BONDAD’s JEEP. INDUSTRIAL Insurance ended up have been tainted with bad faith or ill motive.
paying MORALES for the damage to the insured car. INDUSTRIAL now sues
to recover this amount from BUS, but also impleaded BONDAD. BONDAD
files answer and counterclaim for damages since INDUSTRIAL forced him to
litigate when clearly it had no cause of action against him since it was
established that the BUS was the proximate cause. RTC grants damages to
BONDAD. CA affirms but lessens the damages. Hence, INDUSTRIAL
appeals.
ISSUE: W/N the grant of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees in favour of BONDAD is proper à YES. INDUSTRIAL is
liable to pay.
HELD: As a general rule, no person should be penalized for the exercise of the
right to litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good faith.
Absence of good faith in the present case is shown by the fact that
INDUSTRIAL clearly had no cause of action against BONDAD but it
recklessly filed suit anyway and wantonly pursued pointless appeals, thereby
causing BONDAD to spend valuable time, money and effort in unnecessarily
defending themselves, incurring damages in the process.

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11.Pestano v. Sps.
Sumayang was riding a motorcycle and his passenger was Romagos. As they The Court has consistently computed the loss of earning capacity based on
Sumayang came upon a JUNCTION, where the highway connected with the road leading the life expectancy of the deceased, and not on that of the heir.
to Tabagon, they were hit by a bus driven by Petitioner Pestaño and owned by
Metro Cebu Autobus Corporation (Metro Cebu), which had tried to overtake The award for loss of earning capacity is based on two factors:
them, sending the motorcycle and its passengers hurtling upon the pavement. (1) the number of years on which the computation of damages is based and
Sumayang and Romagos died Respondents filed a criminal case against (2) the rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs is fixed.
Pestano. They also filed a separate civil action for damage against Pestano (as
driver), Metro Cebu (as owner and operator), and Perla Compania de Seguros The first factor refers to the life expectancy, which takes into consideration
(as insurer of Metro Cebu). Pestano asked that both cases be consolidated and the nature of the victim’s work, lifestyle, age and state of health prior to the
RTC allowed. Metro Cebu tried to establish that it exercised the diligence of a accident.
good father of the family by showing that they conducted tests and lectures for The second refers to the victim’s earning capacity minus the necessary living
the drivers and that they posted random inspectors along the route of the expenses.
drivers.
ISSUES: W/N CA properly increased the award for life indemnity à YES Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is that portion of the earnings of the
W/N CA properly based the award of loss of earning capacity on the life deceased which the beneficiary would have received -- the net earnings of the
expectancy of deceased (Sumayang) instead of his heirs (as beneficiary). à deceased.
YES
HELD: The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict has been gradually
increased. At present, prevailing jurisprudence fixes the amount at P50,000.
The Court has consistently computed the loss of earning capacity based on the
life expectancy of the deceased, and not on that of the heir.The award for loss
of earning capacity is based on two factors: (1) the number of years on which
the computation of damages is based and (2) the rate at which the loss
sustained by the heirs is fixed. The first factor refers to the life expectancy,
which takes into consideration the nature of the victim’s work, lifestyle, age and
state of health prior to the accident.
The second refers to the victim’s earning capacity minus the necessary living
expenses. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is that portion of the
earnings of the deceased which the beneficiary would have received -- the net
earnings of the deceased. Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused
by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though
there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: The defendant shall
be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning
capacity at the time of his death;
D. MORAL DAMAGES (ARTS. 2217-2220)
1.Villanueva v. Sps. Salvador secured 2 loans from Ever Pawnshop and pledged jewelry. The Proof of pecuniary loss is unnecessary to justify an award of moral damages,
Salvador 1st loan’s redemption period expired but spouses’ son was able to pay it the amount of indemnity being left to the sound discretion of the court. But
partially after such expiration. In view of this, pawnshop MISTAKENLY the claimant must satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the
renewed the loan and issued a new pawnshop ticket due to oversight. (false hope damages and its causal connection to defendant's wrongful act or omission.
for spouses. they thought jewelry was still with pawnshop). 2nd loan’s redemption period Moral damages are designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
also expired. Pawnshop auctioned jewelry pledged WITHOUT proper notice suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. Proof of moral suffering
(notice on auction day itself, in only one newspaper) Spouses tendered payment of the must precede a moral damage award.
amount due on both loans, with a demand for the return of the jewelry
pledged. Pawnshop refused to accept. Hence, spouses filed a complaint for Requisites for moral damages:

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damages. Upon receiving summons, pawnshop is now willing to accept the 1. Injury (physical, mental or psychological) clearly sustained;
tender of payment but spouses refused the belated offer. (apparently, pawnshop 2. Culpable act or omission factually established;
had found a way to recover jewelry under 1st loan by that time. when spouses offered to pay the 3. Wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
first time around, pawnshop no longer had possession of the jewelry items that’s why they injury; and
refused payment.) TC and CA decided in favor of spouses and awarded moral 4. The award is predicated on any of the cases under Article 2219, CC
damages among others.
ISSUE: W/N the award for MORAL DAMAGES is proper. à NO There must be proof of fraudulent action or bad faith for the claim to
HELD: There must be proof of fraudulent action or bad faith for a claim for succeed. Moral damages cannot arise from simple negligence. To the person
moral damages to succeed. It may be that gross negligence may sometimes claiming moral damages rests the onus of proving by convincing evidence the
amount to bad faith. But what is before us is a matter of simple negligence existence of bad faith, for good faith is presumed. Generally not recoverable
only, the case came about owing to pawnshop’s mistake in renewing the loan in culpa contractual except when bad faith supervenes and is proven
when the sale of the article to secure the loan had already been effected. Under
Art. 2220, before moral damages may be assessed thereunder, the defendant’s
act must be vitiated by bad faith or that there is willful intent to injure. Simply
put, moral damages cannot arise from simple negligence.
In a nutshell: pawnshop is negligent à simple negligence is NOT bad faith à bad faith is
required in claiming moral damages à moral damages is NOT allowed
2.Morris v. CA MORRIS & WHITTIER were American citizens; the VP for technical service Moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of
and the DIRECTOR for quality assurance, respectively, of Sterling Asia, a contract of carriage only where
foreign corporation with regional headquarters at Makati City. Respondent 1. Mishap results in the death of a passenger;
Scandinavian Airline System (SAS ) has been engaged in the commercial air 2. It is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith even if death
transport of passengers globally. MORRIS & WHITTIER had a series of does not result.
business meetings in Japan from Feb 14-22 1978, thus they made travel If the defendant airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith,
arrangements with their agent in Staats Travel Service. They were booked in 1st liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of
class, SAS Flight for Manila-Tokyo on Feb 14, 3:50 pm. On the day of the the breach of obligation which the parties have foreseen or could have
flight, the limo service agency fetched Morris at Urdaneta and Whittier in reasonably foreseen. Not entitled to moral damages? Award for exemplary
Merville. They arrived at MIA at 230pm. They were at the counter around damages likewise baseless. Award for moral and exemplary damages
310pm and gave their travel documents to Erlinda Ponce at the reception desk. eliminated? Award for attorney’s fees must also be deleted.
Later they realized that their travel documents is not being processed. They
called their agent to find out what the problem was. They learned that they
were bumped off the flight. They insisted to get their flight from Ponce and
her supervisor, Mr. Basa. Later, they learned the economy section was
overbooked, and those who came early were given the option to upgrade to 1st
class. Their seats were given away and the flight manifest marked NOSH (no
show) after their name, because the check-in counter closed already 40mins
before departure. Petitioners were advised to be at the airport an hour before
the flight. They came late, and SAS simply followed company policies.
MORRIS & WHITTIER filed a complaint for damages. RTC awarded: Moral
damages: Morris, 1M; Whittier, 750K exemplary: 200K atty’s fees: 300K. MORRIS &
WHITTIER filed an MR with the RTC to increase the award, RTC
grantedàincreased to 1.5M and 1M, respectively. CA reversed à NO
DAMAGES WHATSOEVER. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N SAS is liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage? NO!
HELD: In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the
breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted
fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Where in breaching the contract of
carriage the defendant airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad

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faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences
of the breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen. Moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa
contractual except when bad faith had been proven. However, the same
damages may be recovered when breach of contract of carriage results in the
death of a passenger.
GR: Moral damages are NOT recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a
breach of contract of carriage EXCEPT where
1. the mishap results in the death of a passenger and
2. it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith even if death
does not result.”
The award of exemplary damages has likewise no factual basis. It is a requisite
that the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent
or malevolent manner--circumstances which are absent in this case. In
addition, exemplary damages cannot be awarded as the requisite element of
compensatory damages was not present."
3.Francisco v. Lo’s ordered a wedding cake from Fountainhead Bakeshop that did not show
Ferrer up on time on the wedding day. The Lo’s subsequently refused the cake when
it arrived SUPER late. They bought a cake from Cebu Country Club instead.
Francisco, the owner of the Bakeshop, attempted to apologize and reimburse
the Lo’s by offering a check worth P5000. This was refused by the Lo’s. Lo’s
filed a case for breach of contract and won in the RTC. Got P30,000 in moral
damages. Appealed to the CA and got this figure up to P250,000! Appeal by
Francisco to the SC.
HELD: The SC awarded the Lo’s nominal damages instead (P10,000). The SC
ruled that moral damages in culpa contractual cases may only be awarded when
there is bad faith. It outlined the conditions that must be met in order to claim
moral damages, to wit:
1. first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological,
clearly sustained by the claimant;
2. second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established;
3. third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and
4. fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219 of the CC
4.Filipinas Rima and Alegre were the hosts of the radio documentary entitled “Exposé,”
Broadcasting v. aired every morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting
Ago Medical Network, Inc. ("FBNI"). Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints
from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational
Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine ("AMEC") and its administrators.
Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and its dean filed a
complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre. Lower courts ruled in
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The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by
clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. Mere
allegations of besmirched reputation, embarrassment and sleepless nights are
insufficient. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff
at the expense of the defendant. When awarded, moral damages must not be
palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of
passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the judge
Exemplary damages
To warrant the award of exemplary damages, the wrongful act must be
accompanied by bad faith; the guilty party must have acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner.
Requisites
1. Imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages after the
claimant’s right to them has been established;
2. Cannot be recovered as a matter of right; depends upon the amount of
compensatory damages that may be awarded;
3. Act accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive
or malevolent manner
Nominal damages
Recoverable where 1.) A legal right is technically violated and must be
vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any
kind; or 2.) There has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or
actual damages have been or can be shown
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a
natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as
wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock
EXCEPTION: Article 2219(7), CC expressly authorizes the recovery of
moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation and
does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. A
juridical person can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation
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favour of AMEC and adjudged FBNI, Rima and Alegre solidarily liable to pay and claim for moral damages
moral damages and attorney’s fees. FBNI appealed the decision in the instant Where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages, evidence of
case. an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled
ISSUES: W/N AMEC is entitled to moral damages and attorney’s fees goes only in mitigation of damages. Neither in such a case is the plaintiff
W/N they is solidary liability between Rima and Alegre. required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to
HELD: The SC denied the petition, and affirmed the award of moral damages the recovery of some damages
on the ground that the imputations were libelous per se, and thus implies
damages but lowered amount of moral damages because record shows that
even though the broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC has not suffered any
substantial or material damage to its reputation. Reduced from 300k to 150k.
Attorney’s fees were deleted, failed to justify such an award. AMEC solidary
liable under Art. 2180 in relation to 2176 as joint tortfeasor.
5.Expert Travel & Expertravel (travel agency) issued to RICARDO LO four round-trip plane When moral damages may be recovered:
Tours v. CA tickets for Hongkong, together with hotel accommodations and transfers, for Culpa Contractual Culpa Aquiliana Culpa Criminal
39k php. Expertravel alleged that Lo failed to pay after demands, and thus it 1. Defendant acted in 1. Act or omission When the accused is
filed an action for recovery plus damages. LO answered, that the outstanding bad faith or was guilty causes physical found guilty of
account was remitted to Expertravel through its then Chairperson, Ms. Ma. of gross negligence injuries; 2. Defendant 1. Physical injuries;
Rocio de Vega, who was theretofore authorized to deal with the clients of amounting to bad is guilty of intentional 2. Lascivious acts;
Expertravel. The payment was evidenced by a Monte de Piedad Check No. faith, in wanton tort 3. Adultery/
291559, dated 06 October 1987, for P42,175.20 for which Ms. de Vega, in turn, disregard of his concubinage;
issued City Trust Check No. 417920 in favor of Expertravel for the amount of contractual obligation; 4. Illegal or arbitrary
P50,000.00, with the notation "placement advance for Ricardo Lo, etc." Per its 2. Act of breach itself detention;
own invoice, Expertravel received the sum on 10 October 1987. RTC AND is constitutive of tort 5. Illegal arrest;
CA DECISION – LO already paid the balance due, plus, it awarded moral resulting in physical 6. Illegal search;
damages to LO. Expertravel appeals to the Supreme Court. injuries 7.Defamation;
8.Malicious prosec.
ISSUES: Can moral damages be awarded in a clearly unfounded suit? à NO Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal
Can moral damages be awarded for negligence or quasi-delict that did not justification for the award of attorney’s fees, such is not a ground for an award
result to physical injury to the offended party? à NO of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the
right to litigate. Otherwise, moral damages must every time be awarded in
HELD: SC, it held for Expertravel stating that moral damages cannot be favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff
awarded for unfounded suits.
6.Francisco v. Please see case summary above*
Ferrer
7.Ramos v. CA Please see case summary above*
8.Industrial Driving along SLEX, BUS hit a JEEP (driven by BONDAD) which was As regards moral damages, it is not enough that the claimant alleges mental
Insurance Co v. parked at the right shoulder of the road while its flat tire was being changed. anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like as a
Bondad Due to the impact, BUS ended up swerving and hit also MORALES’ car. result of the acts of the other party. It is necessary that such acts be shown to
Clearly, the BUS was the proximate cause. The JEEP was correctly parked at have been tainted with bad faith or ill motive.
the shoulder away from moving cars and was just minding its own business
when it got hit. The police records and all evidence clearly show that the BUS
was at fault, not BONDAD’s JEEP. INDUSTRIAL Insurance ended up
paying MORALES for the damage to the insured car. INDUSTRIAL now sues
to recover this amount from BUS, but also impleaded BONDAD. BONDAD
files answer and counterclaim for damages since INDUSTRIAL forced him to
litigate when clearly it had no cause of action against him since it was
established that the BUS was the proximate cause. RTC grants damages to

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BONDAD. CA affirms but lessens the damages. Hence, INDUSTRIAL

appeals.
ISSUE: W/N the grant of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees in favour of BONDAD is proper à YES. INDUSTRIAL is
liable to pay.
HELD: As a general rule, no person should be penalized for the exercise of the
right to litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good faith.
Absence of good faith in the present case is shown by the fact that
INDUSTRIAL clearly had no cause of action against BONDAD but it
recklessly filed suit anyway and wantonly pursued pointless appeals, thereby
causing BONDAD to spend valuable time, money and effort in unnecessarily
defending themselves, incurring damages in the process.
9.Calalas v. CA Sunga was a passenger in the jeep of Calalas. While the jeep was full, it As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
nevertheless accommodated Sunga by giving him an extension seat located at predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated
the rear of jeep. During the trip, one of the passengers went down and thus, under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are
Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Unfortunately, an Isuzu truck recoverable:
bumped the jeepney. Sunga obtained injuries because of the incident. Sunga (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as
filed a complaint for damages against Calalas based on culpa contractual provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and
(breach of contract of carriage). (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
ISSUE: W/N Calalas liable for moral damages - NO WAY MANG provided in Art. 2220.
HELD: As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages
are recoverable:
(1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as
provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and
(2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art. 2220.
THERE WAS NO FINDING THAT CALALAS ACTED IN BAD FAITH
IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE. Even if
Calalas admitted in open court that he failed to bring Sunga to the hospital, that
by itself does not mean there was bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of
the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was
utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely
implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.
10.Cocoland Dev’t Cocoland, a corporation that produced coffee, coconut, cacao, and black An award of moral damages cannot be justified solely upon the premise that
v. NLRC pepper, hired Mago as its Field Supervisor. Eventually, Cocoland learned that the employer fired his employee without just cause or due process •
Mago provided technical services and advice to small farmers for Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral
compensation without the permission of management. De la Cruz, Cocoland’s damages under the CC, these being:
VP, wrote Mago, telling him to refrain from engaging in further services, as he 1. The act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive
was disclosing trade secrets in the process. Instead of apologizing, Mago argued to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public
that there is no secret to begin with because practically everyone was aware of policy;
Cocoland’s technology on coffee propagation techniques. De la Cruz 2. Social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom
interpreted Mago’s reply as a blatant refusal to abide by company policy, so the
former asked the latter to show cause why in the hell he shouldn’t be fired.
Dissatisfied with Mago’s explanation, de la Cruz told the former that he will be
let go for loss of trust and confidence. Mago then sued for illegal dismissal with
damages before the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor, awarding

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him separation pay, backwages, and attorney’s fees. Cocoland appealed to the
NLRC, but the latter affirmed the Labor Arbiter and even awarded moral and
exemplary damages in favor of Mago. Cocoland cries GADALEJ before the
SC.

ISSUE: W/N the award of moral and exemplary damages proper?

HELD: The SC held that where an employer terminates the services of his
employee without just cause or due process, the latter would be entitled to
moral damages if he can prove (1) that the dismissal was attended by bad faith
or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy; and (2) that social humiliation, wounded
feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom. Here, Mago failed to adduce
any evidence to show that Cocoland acted in bad faith or in a wanton or
fraudulent manner in dismissing him to justify the award of moral and
exemplary damages and neither did the NLRC have any factual or legal basis to
do so because the Labor Arbiter himself did not provide for such in his
decision. Thus, damages were deleted.

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E. NOMINAL DAMAGES (ARTS. 2221-2223)

CASE TITLE CASE SUMMARY RATIO
1.China Airlines v. Lao had (a cable) business in LA, and had a flight booked with CAL thru
CA Morelia agency. CAL confirmed. Lao then found out that it was cheaper with
Amexco agency, and canceled Morelia’s services. Amexco tried in vain to book
Lao a flight with CAL, but couldn’t. So they used Morelia’s old booking and
used this to issue Lao tickets. CAL confirmed, but at the same time called
Morelia—who in turn cancelled the booking of Lao. So Lao shows up at the
day of the flight, and isn’t let on the plane for he didn’t have a booking! He is
able to go to LA on the next day, with a different airline. He demands damages
from Amexco and CAL.
KEY TAKE AWAY
When plaintiff suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant an award
of actual damages, the court may award nominal damages. The court may
award nominal damages purely to vindicate a right of a plaintiff which the
defendant has violated; not to indemnify any loss the plaintiff has suffered
The court may award nominal damages:
1. In every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, CC;
2. Where there is an invasion of property right

HELD: CAL liable for breach of contract of carriage. But there is no showing
on bad faith. CAL confirmed the reservations of Lao carelessly. Lao relied on
this confirmation. Lao went to the airport and he didn’t have a flight, (fck
hassle). When plaintiff suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant an
award of actual damages, the court may award nominal damages. The court
may award nominal damages purely to vindicate a right of a plaintiff which
defendant has violated and not to indemnify any loss the plaintiff has suffered.
The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any
source enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code, or in any case where there
is an invasion of any property right. We find P5,000 as a reasonable award of
nominal damages to each of the Lao.
2.Mercury Drug v. Mercury hired Mrs. Serrano as a pharmacy assistant. Her duty was to attend to If the dismissal was for cause, the lack of statutory due process should not
Serrano the customers at the counter (take order, receive payment, pull out medicine nullify the dismissal; however, this violation of the right to statutory due
from shelves, compute amount payable, inform customers of price, hand process warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.
amount to cashier who would issue the receipt). Mercury alleged that Serrano The amount is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into
pocketed the P120 payment of one customer. Mateo, the branch general account the relevant circumstances.
manager, asked a mason and 2 students to buy from the store. When the
mason went to buy Squalene, he did not get a receipt. Therefore, Mateo told
Concepcion, the supervisor, to observe Serrano. When the mason returned for
the receipt, Serrano tried to distract Concepcion by asking him to sign the
refund slip. However, Concepcion told her to attend to the customer first.
Concepcion observed that Serrano grew pale. Also, Serrano went behind the
shelves and came back with folded money bills which she inserted into the
sales sheet on the counter. Mercury gave a notice requesting Serrano to appear
before the Investigation Committee. After investigation found her guilty,
Mercury sent her a letter of termination. Labor Arbiter decided for Serrano.
NLRC overturned. CA sided with Labor Arbiter. Hence, this appeal by
Mercury.

ISSUES: W/N there was sufficient cause to terminate. YES.

W/N there was denial of due process. YES. However, SC ordered Mercury to
pay Nominal Damages.
HELD: The ground for termination is loss of trust and confidence due to
dishonesty. Serrano holds a position of trust because her duty was to handle
goods and receive payments. Loss of trust and confidence does not require
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Serrano’s act of pocketing the payment and

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handing it to the cashier only after the customer returned to the branch gave
Mercury reasonable ground to believe, if not entertain the moral conviction,
that Serrano is guilty of dishonesty. This made her unworthy of the trust and
confidence reposed on her by Mercury.
In dismissing an employee, 2 notices must be served. First to inform employee
of particular acts/omissions for which the employer seeks his dismissal. Second
to inform employee of employer’s decision to terminate. Mercury admits it did
not issue the first notice. While Mercury issued a notice requesting Serrano to
appear at the investigation, that notice did not inform Serrano of the specific
offense charged against her and that the penalty for the offense is dismissal.
AS REGARDS NOMINAL DAMAGES: Mercury’s violation of Serrano’s
right to statutory due process warrants the payment of indemnity in the form
of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court, taking into account the relevant circumstances.
Accordingly, the Court deems the amount of P30,000 sufficient as nominal
damages, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.
3.Cojuangco v. CA Cojuangco Jr. owned several racehorses, which he entered in various races The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and
conducted by PCSO. Several of his horses won their races. They landed either exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless
1st, 2nd or 3rd place. Thus, Cojuangco was entitled to the corresponding cash there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney's
prizes. Cojuangco Jr. sent letters of demand to the PCSO and its chairman, fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a
Fernando Carrascoso, Jr. for the collection of the prizes due him. PCSO and clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code.
Carrascoso Jr. consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld The trial court’s award of these kinds of damages must be deleted, as ruled by
on advice of Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of the Presidential Commission on the CA.
Good Government (PCGG). Eventually, this case was filed before the RTC of
Manila. RTC ruled that: PCSO and Carrascoso Jr. had no authority to withhold Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a
the subject racehorse winnings of Cojuangco Jr., since no writ of sequestration plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the
therefor had been issued by the PCGG; it was Carrascoso's unwarranted purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the
personal initiative not to release the prizes; by not paying the winnings, plaintiff for any loss suffered. The court may also award nominal damages in
Carrascoso Jr. had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and every case where a property right has been invaded. The amount of such
harassment of Cojuangco; and that Carrascoso was liable to pay moral and damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. CA: reversed RTC circumstances taken into account.
decision, holding that that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying out
the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of Cojuangco.

ISSUE: W/N Carrascoso can be held liable for nominal damages à YES

HELD: Carrascoso may still be held liable under Art. 32 of the Civil Code
(Civil liberties based on the Bill of Rights) for violating the right against
deprivation of property without due process of law. The withholding of the
prize winnings of Cojuangco without a properly issued sequestration order
clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.
Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a
plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the
purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered. The court may also award nominal damages in
every case where a property right has been invaded. The amount of such
damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant
circumstances taken into account.

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4.Industrial Timber Industrial Plywood owns a plywood plant. It leased the plant to Industrial
v. Ambon Timber. Due to lack of raw materials, it notified DOLE and its worker to
suspend operations until the logs come in. Meanwhile, Industrial Plywood
notified Industrial Timber of the expiration of the lease and its intention not to
renew it. Industrial Timber notified DOLE and workers of closure due to lack
of anti-pollution permit and raw materials. It closed immediately upon
notification. Suspiciously, on the same day as the closure, Industrial Plywood
took over the operations with all the permits, including the anti-pollution
permit. That's why Ababon filed a case of illegal dismissal saying that Industrial
Timber and Industrial Plywood are one and the same company, and the closure
of Industrial Timber was just intended to bust their union.
Where the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 of the
Labor Code but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement,
the sanction should be stiff as the dismissal process was initiated by the
employer’s exercise of his management prerogative, as opposed to a dismissal
based on a just cause under Article 282 with the same procedural infirmity
where the sanction to be imposed upon the employer should be tempered as
the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the
employee.

ISSUE: W/N there was illegal dismissal? None.

HELD: The closure is a management prerogative. To be valid, such closure
must be: 1) accompanied by a notice to DOLE and the employees 1 month
before the actual closure 2) done in good faith 3) accompanied by separation
pay. (Art. 283 Labor code, authorized dismissal) On the second requirement:
Lack of raw materials and absence of permit is a valid cause for closure.
Therefore, it is in good faith. On the first requirement: The notice must be
made 1 month in advance. But such failure of notice does not invalidate the
dismissal, however the employer must still be sanctioned. (Sanctions for non-
compliance with the notification requirement in Art. 283, authorized dismissals,
must be stiffer bec. such dismissals were initiated by the employer, than in Art.
282, just-cause dismissals, since such dismissals were initiated in effect by the
employee) Hence, P50K nominal damages to each emaployee is in order.
F. TEMPERATE DAMAGES (ARTS. 2224-2225)
1.Victory Liner v. Marie Grace Gammad was on board a Victory Liner bus. The bus, while Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206, CC, holds the common carrier in
Gammad running at a high speed, fell on a ravine and this resulted in Marie Grace’s breach of its contract of carriage that results in the death of a passenger liable
death and injuries to other passengers. The heirs of the deceased filed a to pay
complaint for damages arising from culpa contractual against Victory Liner, 1. Indemnity for death (Php50k);
Inc. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the heirs of Gammad and 2. Indemnity for loss of earning capacity and documentary evidence must
ordered Victory Liner to pay the following: actual damages, death indemnity, be presented, except when the deceased is:
exemplary and moral damages, compensatory damages, attorney’s fees and cost i. Self-employed earning less than the minimum wage; or
of the suit. The CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling with modification by ii. Employed as a daily wage worker earning less than minimum wage
lowering the award of actual damages, compensatory damages and attorney’s 3. Moral damages
fees. The CA also awarded the same amount for the moral and exemplary The award of moral damages cannot be lumped with exemplary damages
damages but scrapped the death indemnity. because they are based on different jural foundations.
As for actual damages, only substantiated and proven expenses or those that
ISSUES: appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or
1. W/N Victory Liner should be held liable for breach of contract of carriage - burial of the victim will be recognized
YES A list of expenses and the contract/receipt for the construction of the tomb
2. Whether the award of damages was proper – NO, it should be modified are not competent proof and cannot replace the official receipts necessary to
HELD: In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at justify the award
fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In this case, there is
no evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the proximate cause of
Marie Grace’s death was the negligence of Victory. Thus, Victory Liner was
guilty of breach of contract of carriage. Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206
of the Civil Code, holds the common carrier in breach of its contract of

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carriage that results in the death of a passenger liable to pay the following: a)
indemnity for death, b) indemnity for the loss of earning capacity, and c) moral
damages. In this case, the heirs of Gammad are entitled to indemnity for the
death of Marie Grace which under current jurisprudence is fixed at P50,000.
The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the deceased’s earning
capacity should be deleted for lack of basis. As a rule, documentary evidence
should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity. The exception to this rule are when: 1) the deceased is self-employed
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or 2) the deceased is employed as a daily
wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. In
this case, the trial court and CA computed the award of compensatory damages
for loss of earning capacity only on the basis of the testimony of respondent
Rosalito Gammad as to the age, job or position in the BIR and the salary of the
deceased when she died. No other evidence was presented. The award is
erroneous because the deceased’s earnings does not fall within the exceptions.
However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate damages in the
amount of P500,000 should be awarded to the heirs of Gammad. Under Art.
2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not,
from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. Anent the award of
moral damages, the same cannot be lumped with exemplary damages because
they are based on different jural foundations.
2.Premiere Dev’t Premiere Bank agreed to extend a loan of P4.1 million to Arizona to be used by Temperate damages proper where injury is caused to one’s commercial credit
Bank v. CA its affiliate, Panacor, in its distributorship agreement with Colgate. Eventually, or to a business firm’s goodwill. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary for
Premiere approved in favor of Arizona a loan equivalent to P6.1 million the award of temperate damages; the assessment of such is left to the
(secured by REM), P3.4 million of which was allotted for the payment of discretion of the Court.
Arizona’s existing loan obligations and P2.7 million as credit line of Panacor.
Since this is less than what was agreed upon, Panacor applied for another loan Temperate v. Nominal
from IBA-Finance in the amount of P2.5M. IBA-Finance paid for Arizona’s Temperate Damages Nominal Damages
loan obligations with an understanding that Premiere will deliver the mortgage Indemnifies an injury incapable of Not an indemnity; only a
document. Premiere still refused. Because of this, IBA-Finance couldn’t release pecuniary estimation recognition that the plaintiff’s right
the remaining P2.5 million loan it earlier pledged to Panacor, which finally led has been violated
to the revocation of its distributorship agreement with Colgate.

ISSUE: W/N there is basis to support an award of actual damages in the

amount of Php4.5M

HELD: SC held that acted in bad faith when it deviated from the terms of the
agreement. It unilaterally and arbitrarily downgraded Panacor’s credit line.
However, actual damages must not be awarded. Panacor did not present
receipts to substantiate the claim for actual damages. But the Court granted
temperate damages. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where from
the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced,
although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some
pecuniary loss.

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G. LIQUIDATED DAMGES (ARTS. 2226-2228)
1.Azcuna v. CA Under a 1-year contract, Azcuna as lessee, occupied 3 units of the building
owned by Barcelona's family in Congressional Ave., Q.C. Lease Contract:
P1,000.00 per day as damages in case the LESSEE fails to deliver the unit after
termination of the lease. (3 units x P1,000.00). Upon expiration of the lease without
renewal, Azcuna failed to surrender the units despite Barcelona’s demands.
Barcelona filed before the MTC an ejectment case against Azcuna. MTC,
RTC, & CA ordered Azcuna to vacate the 3 units and to pay the ff.: P25,000.00
monthly rental; P3,000.00 per day, by way of damages
ISSUE: WON the award of P3,000.00 per day as damages in addition to
P25,000.00 monthly rental is improper . à NO
HELD: Azcuna's reliance on "Felesilda," "Shoemart" and "Hualam" is
misplaced inasmuch as such cases dealt with additional damages and charges
other than liquidated damages. Here, the MTC, in making the "P3,000.00 per
day" award, was merely enforcing what was stipulated upon in black and white
by Azcuna and Barcelona appearing in the lease contract. There is nothing
immoral or illegal with the penalty clause of the lease contract which does not
appear to have been forced upon or fraudulently foisted.
2.Radiowealth Spouses Vicente and Maria del Rosario, jointly and severally executed in favor
Finance v. Del of Radiowealth Finance Company a Promissory Note for P138,948. (see
Rosario pertinent provisions and underlined facts on liquidated damages). They
defaulted on monthly payments and despite repeated demands, were unable to
pay. Radiowealth filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before RTC
of Manila. During trial, Radiowealth’s credit and collection officer, Famatico,
presented necessary documents. However, he admitted that he did not have
personal knowledge of the transaction or the execution of any of these pieces
of documentary evidence, which had merely been endorsed to him. Del
Rosario’s filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of cause of action. RTC
dismissed the complaint for failure of Radiowealth to substantiate its claims,
the evidence it had presented being merely hearsay. CA reversed the RTC and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in remanding the case for further proceedings instead
of rendering judgment based on evidence. à YES
HELD: CA should have decided. SC held that Del Rosario’s should pay as
debt became due and demandable. Liquidated damages limited to the 2.5%
penalty charge per month AND NOT the 10% specified as liquidated damages.
Radiowealth’s Complaint, prayed for "14% interest per annum from May 6,
1993 until fully paid." The Court disagrees because the Note already stipulated
a late payment penalty of 2.5 percent monthly to be added to each unpaid
installment until fully paid. Payment of interest was not expressly stipulated in
the Note. It should be deemed included in such penalty. In addition, the Note
also provided that the debtors would be liable for attorney’s fees equivalent to
25 percent of the amount due in case a legal action was instituted and 10
percent of the same amount as liquidated damages. Liquidated damages,
however, should no longer be imposed for being unconscionable. Such
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The lease contract which reads: “That after the termination of the Lease, the
LESSEE shall peaceably deliver to the LESSOR the leased premises vacant and
unencumbered and in good tenantable conditions minus the ordinary wear and tear. In case
the LESSEE's failure or inability to do so, LESSOR has the right to charge the
LESSEE P1,000.00 per day as damages without prejudice to other remedies which
LESSOR is entitled in the premise.” This is clearly an agreement for liquidated
damages — entitling Barcelona to claim a stipulated amount by way of
damages (correctly totalling P3,000.00 per day as there were 3 units) over and
above other damages still legally due him, i.e., the fair rental value for the use
and occupation of the property as provided for in Section 8, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court.
The freedom of the contracting parties to make stipulations in their contract
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy is so settled, and the Court finds nothing immoral or illegal with
the indemnity/penalty clause of the lease contract which does not appear to
have been forced upon or fraudulently foisted on Azcuna. Azcuna cannot
now evade further liability for liquidated damages, for "after entering into
such an agreement, he cannot thereafter turn his back on his word with a plea
that on him was inflicted a penalty shocking to the conscience and impressed
with iniquity as to call for the relief sought on the part of a judicial tribunal."
Radiowealth’s Complaint, prayed for "14% interest per annum from May 6,
1993 until fully paid." The Court disagrees because the Note already stipulated
a late payment penalty of 2.5 percent monthly to be added to each unpaid
installment until fully paid. Payment of interest was not expressly stipulated in
the Note. It should be deemed included in such penalty. In addition, the Note
also provided that the debtors would be liable for attorney’s fees equivalent to
25 percent of the amount due in case a legal action was instituted and 10
percent of the same amount as liquidated damages. Liquidated damages,
however, should no longer be imposed for being unconscionable. Such
damages should also be deemed included in the 2.5 percent monthly penalty.
Further, Radiowealth is entitled to attorney’s fees, but only in a sum equal to
10% of the amount due which we deem reasonable under the proven facts.

damages should also be deemed included in the 2.5 percent monthly penalty.
Further, Radiowealth is entitled to attorney’s fees, but only in a sum equal to
10% of the amount due which we deem reasonable under the proven facts.
H. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES (ARTS 2229-2234)
1.Makabali v. CA Georgina Makabili just graduated from UP Med. As a reward, her parents are
sending her and her sister, Cynthia, to HK for their first trip abroad. They got
in touch with Baron Tours, who supposedly set up everything for them. On
the day of the trip, they could not find anyone from Baron and were forced to
board their flight without instructions. It appears no bookings were made for
hotels and restaurants and because of this, the sisters had to tag along with
another tour group while paying for all meals and accommodations out-of-
pocket. This caused them humiliation. Baron Tours only rectified the situation
on the 4th out of 5-day tour. Sisters sued for 35k in moral and exemplary
damages. RTC awarded P500. CA awarded 5k.
ISSUE: Are damages in order? Yes. SC gave them the full 35k.
HELD: As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that
such damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, 5
they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
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Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good; cannot be recovered as a matter of right, but need not be proved,
although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded.
Moral and exemplary damages are awarded separately; their nature and
purposes are different
Moral Damages Exemplary Damages
Relate to injury personal to the Imposed by way of example or
awardee correction for the public good
In the award of damages, the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during
the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal
connection to the defendant’s acts. Moral damages, though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer, and are allowable only when specifically prayed for in the
complaint. They are awarded only to enable the injured parties to obtain
means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
sufferings the injured parties have undergone by reason of the defendant’s
culpable action. The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration within
the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
The attendance of aggravating circumstances in the perpetration of the crime
serves to increase the penalty (criminal liability aspect) as well as to justify an
award of exemplary or corrective damages (civil liability aspect), moored on
the greater perversity of the offender manifested in the commission of the
felony such as may be shown by
a. Motivating power;
b. Place of commission;
c. Means and ways employed;
d. Time; or
e. Personal circumstances of either or both of the parties
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or corrective
damages are intended to serve as
a. Deterrent to serious wrongdoings;
b. A vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured; or
c. A punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct
Relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230

2.People v. Catubig Danilo Catubig was found guilty of raping her daughter Dannilyn (minor: age
was not specified). The penalty imposed by the trial court was death penalty.
The case was thus elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review. The SC
found that the aggravating circumstance of relationship and minority was
wrongfully appreciated by the trial court. These circumstances were not alleged
in the information. Hence, the crime was reduced from qualified rape to simple
rape. The penalty was also reduced to reclusion perpetua. In the original
decision, exemplary damages were awarded in the amount of 25,000.
ISSUE: W/N exemplary damages should be awarded? YES.
HELD: Art. 2230 of the Civil Code: “In criminal offenses, exemplary damages
as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances.”
The courts before awarded exemplary damages on a case to case basis taking
into circumstance that the crime was attended either by an ordinary or
qualifying aggravating circumstances. They deemed that it is time to abandon
this pro hav vice approach and to have a standard on the matter.
Thus, the DOCTRINE: the award of exemplary damages is proper when the
crime is attended with aggravating circumstance, whether it be ordinary or
qualifying. In the case, the aggravating circumstance of relationship and
minority cannot be appreciated per Criminal Procedure. It follows then that the
exemplary damages could not be awarded as well. However, take note that the
Revised Rules on Crim Pro became effective on Dec. 1, 2000.
Therefore, the award of exemplary damages had already become a vested right
which cannot be defeated by the retroactive application of remedial law. RTC
decision was rendered on Dec. 11, 1998. Hence, the award of exemplary
damages are affirmed.
3.Trans-Asia v. CA Atty. Arroyo bought a ticket from Trans-Asia. He boarded the M/V Asia
Thailand in Cebu heading to Cagayan de Oro City. He noticed that repair
works were still being undertaken on the engine. It departed with only 1 engine
running. After an hour of slow voyage, the vessel stopped near Kawit Island.
Some passengers demanded that they should be returned to Cebu. Thus, the
vessel went back to Cebu and the passengers including Arroyo were allowed to
disembark. The vessel then proceeded to Cagayan. The next day, Arroyo
boarded another vessel (M/V Asia Japan) of Trans-Asia, for its voyage to
Cagayan. Arroyo filed a complaint for damages against Tran-Asia on account
of its failure to transport him when he boarded the M/V Asia Thailand. He
alleged that the engine of said vessel conked out and it was stalled for more
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Also known as “punitive” or “vindictive” damages, exemplary or corrective
damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms
are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is
preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for
injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly
inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt
caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant - associated with
such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or
recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud - that intensifies the
injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to
those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him
for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in
the future.
The term “aggravating circumstances” used by the ART. 2230 of the Civil
Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad
or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect,
one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a
shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award
of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to
the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
In contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be awarded if the
defendant acted in a wanton fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner. It cannot, however, be considered as a matter of right; the court
having to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.
Before the court may consider an award for exemplary damages, the plaintiff
must first show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages; but it is not necessary that he prove the monetary value thereof.
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than an hour causing fear in the passengers. That they were arrogantly told to
disembark without the necessary precautions. He prayed that he be awarded
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages. The TC dismissed the complaint
on the ground that there was no fault, malice or negligence of Trans-Asia’s
employees. CA reversed and awarded moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees ruling that there was bad faith on the part of Trans-Asia.
ISSUE: W/N exemplary damages should be awarded. à YES (only moral and
exemplary damages were awarded, no actual/compensatory damages and
attorney’s fees)
HELD: SC awarded moral and exemplary damages only. No
actual/compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. Actual or compensatory
damages represent the adequate compensation for pecuniary loss suffered and
for profits the obligee failed to obtain. In this case, any further delay then in
the Arroyo’s arrival at the port of destination was caused by his decision to
disembark. Had he remained on the first vessel, he would have reached his
destination at noon of 13 November 1991, thus been able to report to his
office in the afternoon. He, therefore, would have lost only the salary for half
of a day. But actual or compensatory damages must be proved, which Arroyo
failed to do. There is no convincing evidence that he did not receive his salary
for 13 November 1991 nor that his absence was not excused. Moral damages
include moral suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury.
Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. Before the court may consider an award for exemplary damages, the
plaintiff must first show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages; but it is not necessary that he prove the monetary
value thereof. Trans-Asia is liable for moral and exemplary damages. In
allowing its unseaworthy M/V Asia Thailand to leave the port of origin and
undertake the contracted voyage, with full awareness that it was exposed to
perils of the sea, it deliberately disregarded its solemn duty to exercise
extraordinary diligence and obviously acted with bad faith and in a wanton and
reckless manner.
4.QC Govt v. DACARA was driving 1am along a dark road when his car suddenly hit a Article 2231 of the CC mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary
Dacara mound of earth from an excavation site causing his car to turn turtle. damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Consequently, damage to car and physical injuries. (There were no proper
reflectorized signs around the excavation, or any warnings at all) Hence, Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that
DACARA sued QC government and its Engineer for actual, moral, and the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences
exemplary damages, and atty’s fees. QC government claimed it exercised of their carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or
diligence in putting up warning devices – but no proof at all. RTC granted all worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of others; the
types of damages asked for and atty’s fees. CA affirmed the decision. Liability negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or
of QC government was based on Art. 2189 quasi-delict. Hence, appeal to SC property.
under Rule 45.
ISSUES: W/N QC government is guilty and liable à YES for negligence
W/N moral damages was properly granted à NO
W/N exemplary damages was properly granted à YES
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showed self-serving testimonies of Engineer etc. Hence correctly found liable.

Also, SC generally cannot rule on questions of fact.
Moral damages CANNOT be granted since there was no sufficient proof
showing that DACARA suffered physical injuries or mental anguish etc. There
was only his bare assertion that he suffered a big wound on his arm. Also, his
witnesses did not mention at all that he suffered mental anguish.
As a general rule, in moral damages, there must be definite findings as to what
the supposed moral damages suffered consisted of; otherwise, such damages
cannot be granted as it would then become a penalty rather than a
compensation for actual injury suffered. Moral damages are NOT punitive in
nature. Hence, mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by
clear and convincing proof.
As regards exemplary damages, Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in
cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant
acted with gross negligence. Gross negligence means such utter want of care as
to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of
the probable consequences of their carelessness, and that they must have
nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the person
or property of others. Such negligence was evident in this case because there
was absolutely no warning devices. The accident was bound to happen. Also,
the work of LGU is impressed with great public interest.
5.Ramos v. CA Erlinda Ramos was advised to undergo an operation for removal of gall Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
bladder stone, after examinations indicated that she was fit for surgery. She and defendant acted with gross negligence.
her husband Rogelio met Dr. Orlino Hozaka. They agreed that the Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the
"cholecystectomy" operation at the DLSMC would be on June 17, 1985 at 9:00 court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.
A.M. Dr. Hosaka assured Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist. At Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved,
around 7:30 A.M. of June 17, Erlinda was prepared for the operation. Her the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, a dean of a college of nursing, was there for compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
moral support. At the operating room, Herminda saw Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated
who was to administer anesthesia. At around 10:00 A.M., Rogelio E. Ramos damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in
was "already dying [and] waiting for the arrival of the doctor". At around 12:10 order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the
P.M., he came to know that Dr. Hosaka arrived. At about 12:15 P.M., court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the
Herminda Cruz saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She heard Dr. liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to
Gutierrez say, "ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for
lumalaki ang tiyan". She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds liquidated damages
of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her. She
then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon,
another anesthesiologist. At almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, Herminda
Cruz saw the patient taken to the ICU. About four months thereafter, the
patient was released from the hospital. Since then she has been comatose due
to brain damage. Sps. filed a civil case for damages.
ISSUE: W/N the negligence of DSLMC, Dr. Hosaka and Dr. Gutirrez are the
proximate cause of Erlinda’s comatose à YES
HELD: Awarded damages:
Actual damages for the amount Ramos has paid until the beginning of trial.
Temperate damages as an addition to the actual damages, because Ramos
needed to continuously provide for Erlinda home care/medical assistance,
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Moral damages for Ramos (husband and children)’s suffering in not being able
to “enjoy” Erlinda’s presence as a normal human being, she being ill/comatose
since the faulty intubation. Attorney’s fees and cost of suit. EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES also awarded.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence.
Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the
court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved,
the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been
agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such
liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may
consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated
damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate
or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages
I. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES (ARTS. 1192, 2203-2204, 2214-2215)
1.Malaysian Airline Malaysian Air contracted Arellano’s services as pilot. In one of his flights, all The inordinate amount of damages calls for the moderating hand of the court,
System Bernad v. the tires of the plane burst during landing. He was found negligent by the that justice may be tempered with reason instead of being tainted with what
CA investigating board and dismissed by the Malaysian Air. RTC Manila held that appears to be a ruthless vindictiveness. Such improvident generosity is likely
Arellano was not guilty of negligence (accident due to a defect in the rigging of to raise eyebrows, if not outright challenge to the motives of some of our
brake control) and that Malaysian Air acted in bad faith. RTC awarded damages courts, and should therefore be scrupulously avoided at all times, in the
in a staggering amount of P8 million which was affirmed by CA. interest of maintaining popular confidence in the judiciary
ISSUE: W/N the amount of damages awarded is proper à NO
HELD: SC mitigated the damages as follows:
o Actual damages: aggregate amount of P3M+ to P605K+
o Moral and exemplary damages: P3M and P1M respectively to P500K
collectively
o Attorney’s fees: 25% to fixed sum of P25K
The inordinate amount granted to the Arellano calls for the moderating hand
of the Court, that justice may be tempered with reason instead of being tainted
with what appears here to be a ruthless vindictiveness. Baranda v. Baranda:
“Such improvident generosity is likely to raise eyebrows, if not outright
challenge to the motives of some of our courts, and should therefore be
scrupulously avoided at all times, in the interest of maintaining popular
confidence in the judiciary.”
2.Bricktown Dev’t BRICKTOWN executed 2 Contracts to Sell in favor of AMOR TIERRA While we must conclude that BRICKTOWN still acted within its legal right to
Corp v. CA covering a total of 96 residential lots. Out of the total price of P21.6MIO, declare the contracts to sell rescinded or cancelled, nevertheless it would be
AMOR TIERRA was only able to pay BRICKTOWN the sum of P1.3MIO. unconscionable to likewise sanction the forfeiture by BRICKTOWN of
(Hence, leaving a balance of 20.3MIO). In the meanwhile, however, the parties payments made to it by AMOR TIERRA. There is reasonable ground to
continued to negotiate for a possible modification of their agreement, although believe that because of the negotiations between the parties (coupled with the
nothing conclusive would appear to have ultimately been arrived at. fact that the AMOR TIERRA never took actual possession of the properties
BRICKTOWN sent AMOR TIERRA a "Notice of Cancellation of Contract" and BRICKTOWN did not also dispose of the same during the pendency of
on account of the latter's continued failure to pay the installment. Several said negotiations) AMOR TIERRA was led to believe that the parties may
months later, AMOR TIERRA demanded the refund of its various payments ultimately enter into another agreement in place of the "contracts to sell."
to BRICKTOWN. However, BRICKTOWN did not return AMOR There was, evidently, no malice or bad faith on the part of AMOR TIERRA

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TIERRA’s payments. Hence, AMOR TIERRA sued BRICKTOWN. in suspending payments. On the contrary, BRICKTOWN not only
ISSUE: W/N the amounts already remitted by AMOR TIERRA under said contributed, but had consented to the delay or suspension of payments. They
contracts were rightly forfeited by BRICKTOWN. à the cancellation of the did not give the AMOR TIERRA a categorical answer that their counter-
contract by bricktown was valid, but bricktown must return the 1.3mio to proposals will not materialize. We do not find it equitable, however, to
amor tierra. adjudge any interest payment by BRICKTOWN on the amount to be thus
HELD: While we must conclude that BRICKTOWN still acted within its legal refunded, computed from judicial demand, for, indeed, AMOR TIERRA
right to declare the contracts to sell rescinded or cancelled, nevertheless it should not be allowed to totally free itself from its own breach.
would be unconscionable to likewise sanction the forfeiture by BRICKTOWN
of payments made to it by AMOR TIERRA. There is reasonable ground to
believe that because of the negotiations between the parties (coupled with the
fact that the AMOR TIERRA never took actual possession of the properties
and BRICKTOWN did not also dispose of the same during the pendency of
said negotiations) AMOR TIERRA was led to believe that the parties may
ultimately enter into another agreement in place of the "contracts to sell."
There was, evidently, no malice or bad faith on the part of AMOR TIERRA in
suspending payments. On the contrary, BRICKTOWN not only contributed,
but had consented to the delay or suspension of payments. They did not give
the AMOR TIERRA a categorical answer that their counter-proposals will not
materialize. We do not find it equitable, however, to adjudge any interest
payment by BRICKTOWN on the amount to be thus refunded, computed
from judicial demand, for, indeed, AMOR TIERRA should not be allowed to
totally free itself from its own breach.
Comment from a digest: The SC held that forfeiture was unconscionable because
the Bricktown lead Amor Tierra to believe that there will be a new arrangement
as a result of their continued negotiation. On the other hand, since Amor
Tierra even barely covered to pay the complete DP, thus committing a breach
of the Contract to Sell, the interest on the refund was mitigated/reduced by its
imposition ONLY from the finality of the judgment of rescission of K to Sell,
and not from the time of judicial demand of the refund.
3.Lim v. CA Gonzales purchased a jeepney from Vallarta. That jeepney collided with a ten It is the burden of the defendant to show satisfactorily not only that the
wheeler truck and was damaged. The driver of the truck admitted his fault. injured party could have mitigated his damages but also the amount thereof;
Lim, the owner of the truck, offered to reimburse Gonzales – first with failing in this regard, the amount of damages awarded cannot be
P30,000 and second with P40,000. Gonzales rejected both offers twice and proportionately reduced.
asked for P236,000. Notably, Gonzales left the jeepney on the road where it
was damaged and let it deteriorate. The issue went to court where it was
decided that Lim was liable for negligent supervision of his driver. The court
awarded Gonzales P236,000. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N the damages of P236,000 was “inconceivably large” so as to
amount to unjust enrichment à NO
HELD: The SC held that the amount was valid. It reasoned that considering
the amount of profit Gonzales lost due to the accident, the damages were
proper. With respect to mitigation of damages, the SC held that it could reduce
the amount of damages if it is shown that the claimant did not exercise due
care in minimizing damages (Art. 2203 NCC) However, since Lim did not
present any evidence in this regard, the SC did not touch the amounts.
4.Sanitary Laundry A collision occurred between a panel truck owned by Sanitary Steam Laundry, Sanitary failed to prove how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
v. CA Inc. (Sanitary) and a Cimarron. The panel truck and the Cimarron were on contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Thus, the SC affirmed the

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opposite lanes. The panel truck was on its way to Cavite, while the Cimarron award of damages without mitigation, but deleted the attorney’s fees for lack
was heading to Manila. Apparently, the panel truck swerved to its left, of justification for the award.
encroached on a portion of the opposite lane and as a result, the panel truck
collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound lane. The driver and two
passengers of the Cimarron died, while several other passengers were injured.
Thus, the Cimarron passengers filed a civil case for damages against Sanitary.
The lower court rendered judgment in favour of the Cimarron passengers and
awarded damages. The CA affirmed the ruling. Upon appeal to SC, Sanitary
contended that there was contributory negligence on the part of the driver of
the Cimarron, thus its liability should be mitigated, if not totally extinguished. It
claimed that the driver was violating traffic rules during the mishap, and
therefore presumed negligent.
ISSUE: W/N the driver of Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence,
thus mitigating of damages proper? NO
HELD: The SC ruled that Sanitary failed to prove how the alleged negligence
of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Thus,
the SC affirmed the award of damages without mitigation, but deleted the
attorney’s fees for lack of justification for the award. To justify an award of
actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss.
Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.
Here, the actual damages claimed by the victims were duly supported by
receipts and appear to have been really incurred. Moral damages were
reasonable and justified in view of the circumstances of this case. The unearned
income award to one of the victims was increased by the Court on account of
the computation of his earning capacity. The award of attorney's fees should be
disallowed as the trial court did not give any justification for granting it in its
decision. It is now settled that awards of attorney's fees must be based on
findings of fact and law, stated in the decision of the trial court.
IX. PROCEDURAL RULES ON DAMAGES
A. SPECIFICATION OF AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
B. FILING FEES FOR CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES
1.Sun Insurance v. Sun Insurance (SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
Asuncion consignation of fire insurance policy. UY PO TIONG files a complaint for the but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Where the filing of the
civil case against SIOL. UY PO TIONG also claims for damages, attorney’s initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond
damages sought although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Where the trial court
be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, UY PO TIONG originally paid only acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
Php210. in docket fees. The complaint underwent a number of amendments to payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
make way for subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
well as the corresponding docket fees. UY PO TIONG demonstrated his determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the addt’l docket fees as required. lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
ISSUE: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
respondent did not pay the correct or sufficient docket fees? à YES additional fee
HELD: It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the

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action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by

payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party
claims and similar pleadings. In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on
the part of UY PO TIONG to defraud the government of the docket fee due
not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the
second amended complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules
is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the UY PO TIONG
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional
docket fees as required.
2.Iniego v. Pinion hit a jitney being driven by Santos. Santos filed a complaint for quasi- Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively
Guillermo delict against Pinion and his employer, Iniego. Iniego filed a MTD contending actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because
that the Manila RTC does not have jurisdiction. He claims that actions for of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts and are therefore capable of pecuniary
quasi-delict are capable of pecuniary estimation, and that in computing the estimation. Damages claimed represent the monetary equivalent of the injury
jurisdictional amount, the claims for moral and exemplary damages must be which are sought to be recovered by the plaintiff. Fault or negligence is not
excluded as they stem from a different cause of action. The RTC denied the actionable by itself; for the same to be actionable, there must be a resulting
MTD on the ground that actions for quasi-delict are not capable of pecuniary damage to a third person. The remedy of the offended party is for the
estimation, and that the jurisdiction of these cases are properly vested with the reparation, restitution or payment of such damage, without which any alleged
RTC. Iniego appealed to the CA and was denied. Hence this petition. offended party has no cause of action or relief. The fault or negligence of the
defendant is inextricably intertwined with the claim for damages; there can be
ISSUE: W/N actions for quasi-delict are actionable and HOW do you no action based on quasi-delict without a claim for damages. It is the claim for
determine the jurisdiction amount. all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts,
HELD: Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and whether the claims arise from, the same or from different causes of action.
effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages Even assuming that the claims for moral and exemplary damages arose from a
suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts. The damages claimed cause of action other than the quasi-delict, their inclusion in the computation
in such actions represent the monetary equivalent of the injury caused to the of damages for jurisdictional purposes is still proper All claims for damages
plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to be recovered by the should be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless of
plaintiff. As such, they fall within the jurisdiction of either the RTC or the whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action.
municipal courts, depending on the amount of damages claimed. In this case,
the amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is Rule 2, Section 5, ROC allows a party to assert as many causes of action as he
the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the may have against the opposing party; where the claims in all such joined
jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or causes of action are principally for the recovery of money, the aggregate
from different causes of action. amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
3.Intercontinental There was a dispute between Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC- The payment of docket fees, as assessed, negates any imputation of bad faith
Broadcasting v. 13) and Salvador regarding the payment for airtime spot by IBC-13. This led to or an intent to defraud the government by the respondent.
Legasto the filing of a civil case for money claim. Eventually, there was a compromise
agreement entered into between IBC and Salvador which led to the dismissal
of the civil case. Subsequently, IBC-13 refused to comply with what was stated
in the compromise agreement since it alleged that there was no prior proper
approval of PResidentional Commission on Good Governance with respect to
the compromise. More importantly, IBC-13 was contesting that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the proper docket fees were not
paid in full by Salvador. Salvador, on the other hand, filed for specific
performance. RTC and CA ruled in favor of Salvador.
ISSUE: W/N RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case since the full amount of
the docket fees was not paid by SALVADOR. à YES
HELD: As a general rule, it is mandatory that the proper docket fees should be

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paid before the court acquires jurisdiction. However, this case serves as an
exception for the following reasons: 1) Salvador was not trying to defraud the
court; he was actually willing to pay for the proper docket fees. There was no
bad faith 2) At the time of the filing of the complaint, the monetary value of
the airtime was not yet quantified. In other words, the exact amount of the
airtime was not yet clear. 3) In case the monetary claim was not mentioned in
the pleading/ prayer, the addt’l fees shall serve as a lien after the judgment.
4.Ng Soon v. Alday Gan Bun Yaw died and left a passbook worth P900,000. For 3 years, his widow The Manchester case laid down the rule that all complaints should specify the
Ng Soon, and their children had been looking for his passbook but to no avail. amount of damages prayed for not only in the body of the complaint but also
Later on, Ng Soon found out that the account was closed by CBC on in the prayer. Such damages will be considered in the assessment of the filing
December 1988. She discovered that Billie T. Gan, connived with the officers fees. Any pleading that fails to comply with such requirements shall not be
of CBC to withdraw all of the deposit in the account of Gan Bun Yaw by accepted or admitted or shall be expunged from the record.
forging the latter’s signature. Ng Soon filed a complaint for reconstitution of Failure to state the rate of interest demanded is not fatal, the courts will
savings account with a prayer for damages and attorney’s fees. The defendants ultimately fix the same. Rule 141, Section 5(a), ROC, itemizing the filing fees,
filed a Motion to Expunge Complaint for alleged non-payment of the required speaks of the “sum claimed, exclusive of interest.” The specification of
docket fees. This was granted by the trial court. The trial court judge held that interest rate is not indispensable.
the complainant failed to specify the amount of moral and exemplary damages Amounts claimed need not be initially stated with mathematical precision.
prayed for, as well as the amount of attorney’s fees. The judge held that a Rule 141, Section 5(a), par. 3, ROC allows an appraisal “more or less” Final
purported specification which is vague and indefinite obviously serves no other determination is still to be made by the court; the fees ultimately found to be
purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees by misleading the payable will either be additionally paid by the party concerned or refunded to
docket clerk. him. An initial payment of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated
ISSUE: W/N there was failure to pay the correct filing fees as to warrant amount of the claim is allowed, subject to adjustment as to what later may be
expunging of the complaint from the records. proved.
HELD: The case of Manchester Development Corp. v. CA laid down the rule
that all Complaints should specify the amount of damages prayed for not only
in the body of the complaint but also in the prayer; that said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case; and that any
pleading that fails to comply with such requirement shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. Although the body
of the petitioner’s Complaint was silent as to the exact amount of moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees, the prayer did specify the amount of
not less than P50,000 as moral and exemplary damages, and not less than
P50,000 as attorney’s fees. These amounts were definite enough and enabled
the Clerk of Court of the lower court to compute the docket fees payable. The
principal amount sought to be recovered was fixed, and the failure to state the
rate of interest demanded was not fatal not only because it is the courts which
ultimately fix the same, but also because Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court speaks of “the sum claimed, exclusive of interest. Contrary to the
position of the respondent Judge, the amounts claimed need not be initially
stated with mathematical precision because the same Rule 141, Section 5(a)
allows an appraisal “more or less.” A final determination is still to be made by
the Court, and the fees ultimately found to be payable will either be additionally
paid by the party concerned or refunded to him, as the case may be. Clearly, an
initial payment of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated amount of the
claim subject to adjustment is allowed. The pattern in Manchester to defraud
the government is not present in the case. Petitioner demonstrated her
willingness to abide by the Rules by paying the assessed docket fee of P3,600.
She had also asked the lower court to inform her of the deficiency, if any, but

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said court did not heed her plea. In the case of Sun Insurance Office Ltd., et
al., v. Hon. Maximiniano Asuncion et al., the Court already relaxed the
Manchester rule when it held: It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
5.Manantan v. CA Fiscal Ambrocio, Ruben Nicolas and George Manantan did several things in Where the civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, the
one day. They went to a farm, Ambrocio’s house for dinner, went bowling, actual damages claimed by the offended parties are not included in the
went to a nightclub etc. While doing these things, they also drank several computation of filing fees • Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of
bottles of beer. When they decided to go home already, Manantan was the one damages such as moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages are alleged
who drove the car with passengers Tabangin (a defense witness), Fiscal in the complaint or information • The ROC effectively guarantee that the
Ambrocio and Nicolas. He was driving at a speed of about 40 km per hour filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment; the effect
along the Maharlika Highway at Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway. of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal action; the filing
However, according to Charles Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or information
to 90 km per hour on the wrong lane of the highway because it was overtaking
a tricycle when they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights on. As a result
of the collision, Nicolas died. The TC acquitted Manantanan of the charge of
homicide with reckless imprudence without ruling on the civil liability. The
Nicolas spouses appealed the civil aspect of the TC’s judgment and that
Manantanan be ordered to pay indemnity and damages. CA ruled in favor of
the spouses. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of
Appeals as to his negligence or reckless imprudence? à NO
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner’s acquittal did not
extinguish his civil liability? à NO
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the
Manchester doctrine (which held that the Court acquires jurisdiction only upon
payment of the filing fees on the amount of claim for damages)? à NO
HELD: 3. At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied
institution of civil actions with criminal actions was governed by Rule 111,
Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by Nicolas,
under said rule, it was not required that the damages sought by the offended
party be stated in the complaint or information. Where the civil action is
impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages
claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the
computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of
damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages are alleged
in the complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment. The information in the Criminal Case contained no
specific allegations of damages.

AMDG.

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